Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

178 Ind. App. 624

383 N.E.2d 491

Scates v. State

Indiana Court of Appeals

Decided December 27, 1978

Indiana Court of Appeals · decided 1978-12-27

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“For a wrongful act to give rise to a cause of action and thus to commence the running of the statute of limitations, it is not necessary that the extent of the damage be known or ascertainable but only that damage has occurred. ["JExcept in cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides otherwise, the statutory period of limitations begins to run from the time when liability for wrong has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or injury. Consequential damages may flow later from an injury too slight to be noticed at the time it is inflicted. No new cause of action accrues when such consequential damages arise. So far as such consequential damages may be reasonably anticipated, they may be included in a recovery for the original injury, though even at the time of the trial they may not yet exist. When substantial damage may result from any wrong affecting the person or property of another, a cause of action for such wrong immediately acerues.["] ... "Considering the function of a Statute of Limitations as a device for repose, a potential defendant's equities are the same whether the plaintiff knows of his condition or not. Repose is as beneficial to society in the one case as in the other."”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Peake v. International Harvester Co.

“[Thhe statute of limitations will not await the pleasure or convenience of the plaintiff.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Lightle v. Harcourt Management Co., Inc.

Relies on Maloy v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of West Palm Beach · Montgomery v. Crum · 125 Ind. App. 560 - Merritt v. Economy Department Store, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1978-12-27

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently April 2010

15 state decisions

11019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Staton, P.J.

¶1 Oma Scates appeals from the dismissal of her complaint for damages. The trial court found that Scates’ complaint “fails to state a claim against defendants upon which relief can be granted in that the action has not been brought within the appropriate statutory period. . . .” We affirm.

¶2 Scates’ land (53 square feet) was taken 1 by the State for the purpose *625 of highway construction in 1958. Although the State offered Scates $150.00 at that time, Scates refused the offer; the State refused to negotiate. The highway was opened in 1961. Scates filed her complaint for damages on February 24, 1975.

¶3 IC 1971, 34-1-2-1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 2-601 (Burns Code Ed.) provides that a six-year statute of limitations is to be applied “[f]or injuries to property other than personal property, damages for any detention thereof, and for recovering possession of personal property. ...” (Emphasis added.) IC 1971, 34-1-2-3, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 2-603 (Burns Code Ed.) states that “[a]ll actions not limited by any other statute shall be brought within fifteen [15] years.. . .” While we would agree with the State that, on its face, IC 1971, 34-1-2-1, reflects the pertinent time period, the Indiana Supreme Court has specifically held that IC 1971, 34-1-2-3, is applicable to eminent domain proceedings. 2 See Shortle v. Terre Haute & I.R. Co. (1892), 131 Ind. 338, 30 N.E. 1084; Shortle v. Louisville, N.A. & C.R. Co. (1892), 130 Ind. 505, 30 N.E. 639.

¶4 Utilizing the fifteen year limitation, we find that Scates failed to timely file her cause of action. A cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run from the time a suit may be maintained. Raymond and Another, Administrators v. Simonson, Administrator (1835), 4 Blackf. 77. A cause of action accrues at the time injury is produced by wrongful acts for which the law allows damages susceptible of ascertainment. Montgomery v. Crum (1928), 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251. The statute of limitations begins to run at the time when a complete cause of action accrues or arises or when a person becomes liable to an action. Merritt v. Economy Dept. Store, Inc. (1955), 125 Ind.App. 560, 128 N.E.2d 279; Keilman, Tr. v. City of Hammond (1953), 124 Ind.App. 392, 114 N.E.2d 813. A person who has it in *626 his power to make his cause of action complete must do so within a reasonable time, and the statute of limitations will not await the pleasure or convenience of the plaintiff. Hamrick v. Indianapolis Humane Soc., Inc. (D.C. Ind. 1959), 174 F.Supp. 403, aff'd 273 F.2d 7, cert. denied 362 U.S. 919.

¶5 A “taking” in eminent domain includes “substantial interference with private property which destroys or impairs one’s free use and enjoyment of the property.” Schuh v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 403, 407, 241 N.E.2d 362, 364. We cannot countenance Scates’ argument that the statute would only have tolled upon the opening of the highway in 1961. The statute began to run at the time Scates’ free enjoyment of her property was impaired in 1958. Schuh v. State, supra. Scates had damages susceptible of ascertainment at the moment the State wrongfully utilized her land. See Montgomery v. Crum, supra. Therefore, her right of action accrued in 1958, and she had only until 1973 to file suit. She had it within her power to make her cause of action complete within a reasonable time. (Hamrick v. Indianapolis Humane Soc., Inc., supra), yet she waited until 1975 to file her suit. There was no error in the dismissal of Scates’ suit.

¶6 We affirm.

¶7 Buchanan, C.J., (by designation), concurs;

¶8 Garrard, P.J., concurs in result.

¶9 NOTE — Reported at 383 N.E.2d 491.

1

¶10 . We are forced, by the incomplete record, to presume the truth of the factual allegations within the complaint, and to presume the taking of Scates’ property. No formal eminent domain notifications or proceedings are included by Scates in the appellant’s record on appeal. Some of the language of Scates’ complaint supports an inference that the State did not, in fact, take any land at all: “the construction of the highway . . . *625 immediately parallel and adjacent to plaintiff’s property... amounts to a taking of plaintiffs property without compensation----” (Emphasis added.) Because of our determination regarding the statute of limitations issue, we need not address the merits of the complaint or the sufficiency of the record.

2

¶11 . If the State did not formally institute eminent domain proceedings, it would seem that the State’s presence on Scates’ land (if there was a presence) was of the nature of a trespass or inverse condemnation. A six-year statute of limitations would have been applicable if that were the case. See Pickett v. The Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad Company (1892), 131 Ind. 562, 31 N.E. 200.

/178/indapp/624 · .json · Public domain