Volume 179 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Ropolo Family, LLC, appealed from an order of the Superior Court that confirmed an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff, ABC Building Corp., and from a corresponding judgment of the Superior Court in favor of ABC and against Ropolo in the amount of $72,415, plus statutory interest in the amount of $7,086.24 through the date of the arbitration award, and post-award interest thereafter. Ropolo contended on appeal that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by (1) manifestly disregarding clear and unambiguous contractual language that should have precluded any award in favor of ABC, and (2) manifestly disregarding well-settled law by awarding ABC recovery in quasi-contract when a valid and enforceable contract was in existence. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator neither manifestly disregarded a contractual provision nor manifestly disregarded the law. Indeed, the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' agreement and was sufficiently grounded in the contract to be within the scope of his authority. In light of the standard of review governing the Court's review of arbitration awards, the Supreme Court affirmed the order and the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Thomas Carter, appealed from a Family Court decision pending entry of final judgment following a divorce proceeding. The trial justice found the marital estate to be virtually nonexistent, with most of the disputed assets belonging solely to the plaintiff, Simeng Wu-Carter. Thomas disagreed with that finding he argued that the trial justice erred in not identifying certain assets as marital property, which would have been subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision pending entry of final judgment of the Family Court. Deferring to the trial justice's findings of fact, the Court held that Simeng's car was properly excluded from the marital estate because it was premarital property. The Court also held that, based on the trial justice's findings, certain funds in Simeng's individual bank accounts were correctly identified as nonmarital property because they were a gift or loan to Simeng alone during the marriage for the purpose of satisfying immigration requirements. However, the Court held that the rest of the money in Simeng's individual bank accounts was marital property because it was derived from income she earned during the marriage her intent to keep her finances separate from Thomas's was not determinative of its classification as marital or nonmarital. Those funds were property acquired during the marriage, and, as such, they were subject to equitable distribution upon the parties' divorce. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Family Court to distribute that money pursuant to the parties' stipulation.

The defendant, Leron Porter, appeals his conviction of: (1) second degree murder (count one) (2) discharging a weapon while committing a crime of violence (count two) and (3) possession of a firearm, having been previously convicted of a felony (count four). The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with twenty-five years to serve on count one, a consecutive term of life imprisonment on count two, and a consecutive term of ten years to serve on count four. The trial justice also declared the defendant to be a habitual offender and imposed an additional consecutive term of twenty-five years to serve. On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction based on two alleged Batson violations relative to the decision by the first justice that allowed the state to exercise two preemptory challenges during the jury selection. The defendant further contends that the trial justice improperly restricted the cross-examination of a witness about a gun the witness saw at some point before the murder. Next, defendant argues that the trial justice abused her discretion by denying defendant's motion to pass the case after an emotional outburst during the defense's opening statement. Finally, the defendant asserts that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial. The Court held that the trial justice did not err when she concluded that the state's explanation for each Batson challenge could qualify as a race-neutral reason for excusing a juror. The Court also affirmed the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion to cross-examine a witness based on the lack of evidence connecting the weapon to the murder. The Court further held that the trial justice did not err by refusing to pass the case based on an emotional outburst made on the first day of a seventeen-day trial. Lastly, the Court affirmed the trial justice's decision to deny defendant's motion for a new trial.