Volume 18 — Federal Cases

<p>Case No. 10,121.</p> <p>Collision ik East River — Steamer and Schooner —Running out Tack.</p> <p>1. Where a schooner was beating through the East river, and went about without observing the approach of a large propeller, and she might have gone farther on before going about, and, after running about four lengths on such new tack, she struck the side of the propeller, 32 feet from the stern, with her bowstrip, head on, her master having done nothing, after she went about, to avoid the blow, and the propeller, which was going 8 or 9 knots an hour, having neither slowed nor stopped nor sheered: Held, that the schooner was in fault in coming about without heeding the propeller, and when she could have kept on some distance farther.</p> <p>2. She might have slacked up in the wind till the propeller got by, or have fallen off when od her new tack.</p> <p>3. If the propeller had slowed or stopped, she would probably have struck the schooner, and that she had not time to sheer, and was not in fault.</p> <p>[Cited in The Iron Chief, 53 Fed. 511.]</p>

This was a bill in equity, complaining that, about the 15th of February, 1841, Francis A. Calvert had invented a machine for picking and cleaning wool and cotton, and was then contemplating to make improvements thereon, and was preparing to take out letters patent for the machine and improvements.

This was an action of replevin, for a quantity of cotton cloth.

<p>Case Wo. 10,135.</p> <p>Courts — Following State Practice — Construction op Statutes — Constitutionality— Obligation of Prohibited Acts.</p> <p>1. Tlie courts of the United States will follow the established construction of a statute of a state, or the constitution of a state, if it do not impair the obligations of a contract, nor conflict with the constitution or any law of the United States.</p> <p>2. It is important that there should be but one rule of property in a state.</p> <p>3. This rule of construction is followed • without regard to the correctness of the rulings of the state court</p> <p>4. Acts that are prohibited by law can impose no obligation on aiiy one. nor will the law take cognizance of any matters between those who have united to violate the law.</p> <p>[NOTE. This case was taken to the supreme court upon certificate of division of opinion. The case was there dismissed because of want of proper form in the certificate. 6 How. (47 U. S.) 41.1</p>

This was the case of a libel in rem brought by a material man for certain supplies, and especially for a cable furnished to the brig Nestor [Thomas Merrill, claimant].

Tills is an action to quiet title. Tlie complainant [Edward C. Nettleton] purchased a tract of land from Norbert Grignon, and received a conveyance of the same January 27th, 1876, which was properly recorded. The defendant [Dorilus Morrison] claims under a prior deed executed June 8th, 1874, by Peter Zanzius, in the name of Norbert Grignon, by virtue of a power of attorney dated May 30th, 1S74, properly executed to him by the latter.

<p>Case No. 10,130.</p> <p>Off-Shoke Pilotage — Tendee and Refusal — State Limits — Effect of State Statute.</p> <p>1. A British ship, bound to New York, was spoken by a pilot before coming in sight of Sandy Hook light and his services tendered. The master offered to take the pilot on board, but refused to pay off-shore pilotage, and the pilot left. Afterwards the ship took another pilot, and paid in-shore pilotage. The first pilot filed a libel to recover pilotage, as on a refusal of his services: Held, that the first pilot was refused within the meaning of the pilotage act of the state of New York of April 3d, 1857;</p> <p>2. It would defeat the purpose of the statute to make pilotage payable after tender and refusal only where the ship did not accept the service of any pilot The words of the statute do not forbid recovery, in this case;</p> <p>3. The pilot laws of a state have sufficient effect beyond the boundary of the state to fix the compensation of pilots;</p> <p>4. The libellant was entitled to a decree.</p>

' Action on a policy of insurance issued by the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, on the 28th of July, 1866, on the life of Thomas A. Nettleton for the benefit of his wife [Louisa A. Nettleton], the plaintiff. Subsequently the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company was merged into and consolidated with the defendant company, which latter company assumed all the debts and liabilities of the former, and succeeded to all its rights and franchises.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.)</p> <p>This was a libel in rem, in admiralty, filed in the district court. After a decree in favor of the libellants, the claimants appealed to this court. The decision of the district court, (Blatchford, J.,) was as follows:</p> <p>“The libel in this case is filed by Sergeant J. Quick, as master and owner of the canal boat Kate Green, for himself and for F. A. McKnight, against the steamship Nevada. The Kate Green and a cargo of com on board of her were sunk in the slip between piers 46. and 47, North river, in the city of New York, on the 27th of September, 1871, by a collision between her and the Nevada. The cargo was insured by the Western Insurance Company of Buffalo, which paid the loss, and its interest is vested in McKnight. The Nevada, a screw steamer, was moored at the north side of pier 46, lengthwise of the pier, with her bow towards the river, and, about 3 p. m., in full daylight, she steamed from her berth and went out and down the river and out to sea. The Kate Green was in the slip, and was, by the suction caused by the revolution of the screw of the Nevada, drawn into contact with the blades of the screw, as it revolved, so that the bladek made holes in the bottom of the Kate Green and let in water, which caused her to sink, with her cargo, in a very short time. No person on board of the Nevada knew of the occurrence until she reached Liverpool, which was her destination. The libel alleges, that the Kate Green was properly and securely moored and fastened, and that the collision occurred through the negligence of those in charge of the Nevada, and not through any neglect; on the part of the Kate Green, her master and crew. The libel claims for a total loss of the canal boat and her cargo. The answer alleges, that the Kate Green was made fast, by her bow only, to a floating grain elevator which lay alongside and to the south of a steamer which was lying at .the south side of pier 47; that the stem of the Kate Green was not fastened to anything; that between the Kate Green and said steamer there were two canal boats and another elevator; that the Kate Green remained thus made fast until the hour arrived for the Nevada to sail; that her master was notified of the approaching departure of the Nevada, and was warned that the boat was not properly moored, and was exposed to danger from the departure of the Nevada; that, notwithstanding said warning, he neglected to take the steps necessary to secure the boat: that the Nevada, at the hour appointed, left, her berth, and, moving slowly and carefully, proceeded out into the river; that, previous to and while so leaving her berth, the steam whistle was blown, the bells on deck were rung, and all usual and proper precautions were taken to announce said departure and to avoid collision with the several lighters and canal boats lying in the slip; that, as the natural and ordinary result of the movement of the Nevada through the water, and of the action of her screw, the water was sucked or drawn towards the Nevada, and the stern of the canal boat, so allowed to remain unfastened, was thereby drawn over to the side of the Nevada, and struck against the Nevada with a violent blow; also, that the collision was occasioned solely by the negligence of the master and crew of the Kate Green, and- by reason of her said improper and insufficient mooring. The fair reading of the answer is, that the situation and insufficient mooring of the Kate Green were seen and known by those on board of the Nevada, that the Kate Green was warned in respect thereto, that she neglected to moor herself more securely; that, after such warning was given, those on the Nevada saw that the Kate Green did not moor herself more securely, and saw that she continued to be Insufficiently moored; and that, nevertheless, the Nevada, with full knowledge that the natural and ordinary result of the action of her screw, as she would move ahead, would be to suck or draw the water, and with it the unfastened portion of the Kate Green, over to the Nevada, put her screw in motion, and kept it in motion, until the collision occurred, in consequence of such drawing over of the Kate Green until she struck the Nevada. A clearer case of negligence on the part of the Nevada could not well be set forth. Much evidence is given as to the mooring of the Kate Green; as to whether she was fastened at all by lines to anything: and as to how she was fastened, if she was fastened. I deem it unprofitable to discuss or determine those questions, and many other questions as to which evidence was given.</p> <p>“The case is easy of solution on plain propositions. If the Kate Green was loose in the slip, and not fastened at all, her condition ought to have been seen by and known to those on the Nevada, and it was negligence In them to set the screw of the Nevada in motion, under such circumstances that the Kate Green could be drawn over against the Nevada by the suction of the screw of the Nevada. this is true whether the Kate Green waá warned or not, and whether, when warned, she was loose or was only insufficiently fastened. And it is true whether the warning came from the Nevada or from elsewhere. Indeed, an unheeded warning from the Nevada, given before the Nevada set her screw in motion, so far from relieving the Nevada from fault, only serves to make her fault in starting her screw more clear, as showing that she had her attention called to the perilous condition of the Kate Green, and yet set her screw in motion. If the Kate Green was fastened, she was so fastened that 'she was at such a distance from the Nevada, that, after she began to be drawn over by the suction of the moving screw of the Nevada, there was abundant time for the 'Nevada to have stopped her screw and avoided the collision, if there had been a proper lookout kept in the proper place on board of the Nevada. The fact, that no one on .board of the Nevada knew or heard of the accident till she had crossed the ocean, tells the whole story. It is abundantly proved, that, as the Kate Green was being drawn over by the suction of the moving screw of the Nevada, the Nevada was hailed from the Kate Green to stop her screw, but no heed was paid to the hail, by the Nevada, because there was no person in a position .on the Nevada to hear the hail. Whatever observation was made by those on the Nevada, of the position of the vessels in the slip, preparatory to the sailing of the Nevada, and whatever warning she gave by any hails to any boat in the slip, were made and given, on the evidence, at a time before the Kate Green had come into the slip. Indeed, the answer does not aver that any oral notice or hail or warning wap given to the Kate Green by any one on board of the Nevada. As there was fault on the part of the Nevada, causing damage to the cargo of the Kate Green, and as the Nevada alone is sued in this suit for such damage, and as no fault, if any, of the Kate Green, can be imputed to the cargo, there would have to be a decree against the Nevada in respect to the cargo, even if the Kate Green also were found to be in fault for the collision. As to the boat herself, I do not find that she was in fault. If she was loose, not fastened, she was not in fault for remaining so, whether warned or not. because it was the duty of the Nevada to see her condition and not to put her screw in motion. If the Kate Green was fastened, she was fastened at a distance from the Nevada which allowed abundant time, if her fastenings parted, for the Nevada, with a proper lookout, to stop her screw,' after the Kate Green began to be drawn over. In either view, the Kate Green, in fact, hailed the Nevada, after the suction began to take effect, in season for the Nevada to have stopped her screw and saved the collision, if an officer of the Nevada had been stationed in a proper place, to observe the condition of the Kate Green and to hear the hail. There must be a decree for the libellant, as to both boat and cargo, with a reference to ascertain the damages.” [Case unreported.]</p> <p>This court found the following facts: ■“About three o’clock in the afternoon of September 27th, 1871, the steamship Nevada left her'berth in the slip between piers 46 and 47, North river, New York, on a voyage to Liverpool. She was one of a line of ocean steamers plying regularly between New York and Liverpool, owned by an English corporation of which Williams & Guión' were agents in New York, and, previous to her departure, lay on the north side of pier 46, with her bow toward the river, and her stern toward the bulkhead. The slip was two hundred and five feet wide, pier 46 sir hundred and thirty feet long, and pier 47 sir hundred and twenty-four. On the opposite of the slip, and on the south side of pier 47, lay the steamship Queen, also with her bow toward the river, and her stern toward the bulkhead. The bow of the'Nevada was about thirteen feet back from the end of her pier, and that of the Queen fifty-two feet six inches from the end of hers. Two floating grain elevators lay alongside of, and moored to, the Queen; one named the Scotia, at one of the forward hatches, and the other, named the Metropolitan, at one of the after hatches. The canal boat Sarah and Madonna, lay alongside of the Metropolitan, with her stem toward the bulkhead, and was being unloaded into the Queen. At her stern lay the canal boat C. H. Hart, with her bow toward the bulkhead, and extending some distance beyond the Metropolitan. Her stern was made fast by a line to the Metropolitan, and her bow by another leading to the deck of the Queen. She was waiting her turn to be unloaded. One or more boats lay alongside the Scotia, and moored to her, and there were two lighters at the bulkhead, astern of the Nevada. The length of- the Nevada was three hundred and fifty-five feet, and her beam forty-three feet, four inches. The length of the Queen was three hundred and eighty-one feet, and her beam forty-two feet four inches. The Metropolitan was about eighty-seven feet long, and her width twenty-four feet. The C. H. Hart was ninety-six feet long, and her width seventeen feet, four inches. Just as the Nevada was starting, the canal boat Kate Green, owned and commanded by the libellant Quick, came into the slip, in tow, on the port side, of the tug Jacob Sinex, and was placed alongside the C. H. Hart. Her master, Quick, made a line from her bow to the bow of the Hart, and her steersman another from her stern to the stem of the Hart While this was being done, the tug let go and commenced backing out of the slip, but she had only time to get under the stern of the Kate Green, or a little beyond, when the Nevada started. Previous to the time the Kate Green came into the slip, full public notice had been given by those in charge of the Nevada, that she was about to depart, and particular notice was also given to all the boats then alongside the Queen, including the O. H. Hart. When the Hart came in she was sent up the .slip, in order that she might keep out of the way. The Nevada had been advertised to sail at that hour. Her bells had been rung, and her whistles blown, several times. Signals, indicating that she was about to depart, were flying at her mast-head. She took out,, on that voyage, á considerable number óf cabin and steerage passengers, ’ and there was about her decks and on her pier, all the bustle and noise'which usually accompanies the sailing of a large ocean steamer. The Kate Green was not seen from the Nevada when she came in, and no special notice was given to her that the Nevada was about to leave. She had no time, after her arrival, to give particular attention to what was being done on board of the Nevada, or on the pier. All the bells were rung and whistles blown before she arrived, or while the attention of those on board was given to making her fast and getting away from the tug. Neither was there time for her master to examine particularly the fastenings of the Hart The Nevada started almost simultaneously with her getting alongside the Hart, and the first actual notice she had that the Nevada was about to leave was when the propeller commenced moving. If she was, in fact, made fast at the time, it had only just been done. She lay about sixty' feet from the Nevada. The tide was flood, and running up by the ends of the pier, pretty strong.' When the Nevada started, the revolution of her propeller and her own motion caused a displacement of the water in the slip, and a suction, which drew the Hart and the Green away from where they were lying, and broke the bow fastenings of the Hart. As soon as this was done, the Green swung rapidly towards the Nevada. Her master, who was on deck, called loudly to the Nevada to stop the propeller, but he was not heard, or, if heard, not heeded. The Nevada kept on without stopping, and the revolving blades of her screw struck the Green under the water line, an$ a little aft of the port bow, inflicting such an injury ás caused her, the Green, to sink soon after, with her cargo on board, and some articles of furniture, &e., belonging tó her owner. No one on board of the Nevada knew of the parting of the Hart’s lines, or of the swinging of the Green, or of the accident, until after she arrived in Liverpool. If a man had looked from her deck over her side into the slip, he could not have failed to see what was going on all the time from the first movement of the propeller, and before, until she got out. There was an abundance of time, after the breaking of the fastenings of the Hart, and after the Green began to swing, and after the hail of her master, to have stopped the propeller, before the collision. The report of the commissioner as to the damages, is warranted by the evidence, and the libellant, MeICnight, was the owner of the claim for damages when the libel was filed.”</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, against the steamboat Neversink, to recover the value of coal furnished to her at New Brunswick, New Jersey, between the 12th of March, 1866, and the latter part of April, 1866.' She made daily trips between the city of New York and New Brunswick, and was under a charter party to one Thornal and one Hine, who were the owners pro…

This was a bill filed by the complainants [William Neves and James C. Neves] against the defendants [William F. Scott and Richard Rowell], to enforce the articles of agreement entered into by John Neves and Catha-rine Jewell, anterior to their intermarriage, dated February 17, 1810, by which it was agreed “that all the property, both real and personal, which there was or may thereafter become the right of the said John and Catha-rine should remain in common between them, the…

Trover for forty-nine slaves, sold by the defendant to the plaintiff, by the following bill of sale; “Por and in consideration of one dollar to me in hand paid, the receipt of which I hereby acknowledge, and the further sum of eighteen thousand seven hundred and seventy-four dollars to be to me well and truly paid on or before the first day of November next,-1 have bargained, sold, and delivered to John B. Nevett of Mississippi, (planter,) the following negro slaves, to wit,…

The bill in this case was founded upon letters patent [No. 3,917] granted to the plaintiff [William R. Nevins] on the 2d of March, 1S36, for an improvement in a machine for rolling dough and cutting crackers and biscuit. On the 9th of May, 1848, the patent was surrendered, an'd-)a new one was taken out. on an amended specification.

<p>This action, was commenced in personam against the respondents [William Clarke and others], as late owners of the bark Mescino, and seeks the recovery of eight hundred and eighty-five dollars, with interest thereon. Six hundred dollars are claimed as wages due the libellant [John Nevitt] for his services as seaman on board the vessel; the further sum of one hundred and ninety-seven dollars for board in the city of New-York, during the continuance of a sickness contracted on board the vessel on her voyage, and seventy-five dollars for his clothes, &c„ alleged by him to have been kept by the master of the bark on board the vessel, and never restored to the libellant. The facts established on the trial of the cause were, that the libellant shipped in New-York for a voyage in the vessel to various ports in the Pacific, and back to the United States, or for the period of eighteen months, at twelve dollars per month. The vessel left this port in February, 1840, and arrived at Valparaiso in May thereafter. The libellant then left her and was taken to the hospital, and can-tinued there until July following, when he was shipped by the American consul, on board the ship Rachel for the United States, and arrived at this port October 31, 1840. The bark was sold by the captain at Callao, in July, 1840, in pursuance of a previous contract, and duly transferred to the purchasers, but the same master remained in command of her after the sale. On the passage of the vessel out to Valparaiso, some turpentine casks stowed below, as part of her cargo, were burst in heavy weather, and most of the ship’s comfciny were sickened by exhalations from it. The libellant, particularly, was seriously affected in his loins and kidneys, voiding blood with his water, and was greatly debilitated in strength, and unable to perform duty because of such sickness, and for that cause left the vessel at Valparaiso. He never after had an opportunity to rejoin her. On his return home, he continued feeble, but did such duty during the voyage as his strength permitted. Since his return he has made one voyage to the West Indies, but his general health has continued greatly impaired, and he has been most of the time for that cause out of employ, and at board. He has also been attended by a physician at times, since his return from the Pacific.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] Faber & Bierwith filed a libel in rem, in the district court, against the ship Newark, to recover damages for injury caused to tobacco in hogsheads, shipped by them in that vessel from New-Orleans to New-York. The damage was caused by the leakage of grease or lard which ran into the tobacco in the hold of the ship.

<p>Case No. 10,140.</p> <p>Act or Bankruptct— Corporation Dissolved bt State Court — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. A district court has jurisdiction to declare bankrupt a corporation which has been dissolved by a state court, but the proceeding must be commenced within six months after the corporation has been dissolved.</p> <p>2. A corporation was dissolved by a state court and a receiver appointed. More than six months after, the receiver collected a claim of the corporation from a debtor by legal process: Held, that such collection was not a taking of the property of the corporation on legal process, in the sense of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat 517)].</p>

<p>Case No. 10,142.</p> <p>Town Supervisors — Refusal to Place Judgment of Tax List — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>The highest damages which will be' allowed in the United States courts, against, the supervisors of a town for a refusal to put a judgment on the tax list, e.en though a mandamus shall have issued, will not exceed a counsel fee and costs.</p> <p>[Cited in Branch v. Davis, 29 Fed. 891.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,143.</p> <p>Shipping — Sale of Vessel and Appurtenances —What Passes.</p> <p>Where one sells a steamboat with all appurtenances, &c., and prior to the sale, the owner had procured a new ash-pan for the boiler, which had been delivered to the owner, but was not placed on board the boat, held, that the ash-pan passed under the bill of sale as appurtenant to the boat.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,144.</p> <p>Corporations — Name as a Trade-Mark — Right to Such Name — Jurisdiction of Equity to Enjoin its Use.</p> <p>1. The corporate name of a corporation is a trade-mark from the necessity of the thing, and upon every consideration of private justice and public policy deserves the same consideration and protection from a court of equity.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. McGrath (Mo. Sup.) 5 S. W. 30.]</p> <p>2. A corporate name is a necessary element of a corporation’s existence, and any act which produces uncertainty ot confusion concerning such name, is well calculated to injuriously affect the identity and business of the corporation.</p> <p>[Cited in Wells v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 13 Fed. 567.]</p> <p>[Cited in State v. McGrath (Mo. Sup.) 5 S. W. 30.]</p> <p>3. The right to a corporate name does not rest in parol, but is shown by the record and is triable by inspection thereof in any form of proceeding — therefore a court of equity will not refuse to enjoin the use of such name because the right to the same has not been established at law.</p> <p>[Cited in American Order of Scottish Clans v. Merrill. 151 Mass. 562, 24 N. E. 919: Ft. Pitt Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Model Plan Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 159 Pa. St. 311, 28 Atl. 215.]</p> <p>4. The jurisdiction to enjoin the use of a corporate name does not depend upon the insolvency of the defendant.</p> <p>5. The insolvency of a corporation, the legality of the subscription to its capital stock, and the validity of its organization generally, may be judicially investigated, whenever and wherever such investigation becomes material to the determination of the rights of third persons, who are parties to a judicial proceeding before the court.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Oregon Bulletin Printing & Publishing Co., Case No. 10,560.]</p> <p>6. Where a creditor of a corporation, as a bondholder, has a lien upon a grant of land or other property owned or claimed by such corporation, and another corporation is wrongfully using such corporation’s name for the purpose of obtaining such grant of land, such creditor may maintain a suit in equity to enjoin such other corporation from such wrongful use of his corporation’s name.</p> <p>7. An agreement by a corporation to prefer its bondholder in the disposition of 50 per centum of the proceeds of its lands, which may be sold before such bond becomes due, does not give such bondholder a lien upon the corporation lands.</p> <p>8. Quere, can a mere bondholder of a corporation maintain a suit to enjoin another corporation from doing unlawful acts which depreciate the conventional value of such bond in the market.</p> <p>9. In a suit to enjoin the use of a corporate name, the corporation whose name is alleged to ♦e wrongfully used must be a party plaintiff or defendant, but if such corporation refuse to bring such suit upon request its bondholder or creditor may do so, and make such corporation a party defendant.</p> <p>[10. Cited in Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. v. Nine, 2^vNeh. 512, 43 N. W. 349, to the point that a géegraphical name cannot become the subject of property as a trade-name, unless coupled with words which qualify the general geographic term.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Afterwards the plaintiff amended his hill by leave. The defendants both demurred, and pleaded to the amended bill. The case was heard upon demurrer and pleas, and the bill dismissed. Case No. 10,145.]</p>

<p>[This was a hill in equity by James B. New-by against the Oregon Central Railway Company, George L. Woods, E. N. Cooke, J. H. Douthitt, J. R. Moores, Thomas M. P. Patton, John H. Moores, Jacob Courser, A. Laurence Lovejoy, F. A. Chenoweth, Stukeley Ellsworth, Stephen F. Chadwick, John E. Ross, J. H. D. Hendersoift. John F. Miller, Absalom F. Hedges, Samuel B. Parrish, and Green B. Smith.]</p>

<p>This was a libel in rem, by John Hurley and William Murray, owners of the sloop Mary, against the steamboat New Champion, to recover damages for a collision.</p> <p>The facts out of which the action arose were as follows: The steamboat arriving from Hartford in the night time, made her turn on the Brooklyn side of the East river, and was passing across the river to her berth at a wharf in New York. The sloop was at the same time running up with a free wind from the southwest, being close in upon the New York side. Those engaged in navigating her saw the lights of the steamer, and knew that she was on her turn towards the slip, and also what berth she was intending to take. At the time the steamer starboard-ed her helm and had commenced coming around, the river was clear in her proper course and direction to her berth. The sloop ran up across the line of the track she was turning into, unpereeived on board the steamer, until the two vessels were nearly in collision. A quick order to luff was then given to the sloop by the master of the steamer, but it was not complied with in time, and the collision occurred. The pilot and master of the steamer testified upon the hearing, that at the time when the order to luff was given, the sloop could easily have been luffed enough to avoid the steamer; and their testimony was corroborated by proof of declarations subsequently made by the pilot of the sloop, to the effect that he gave the order to his helmsman to luff, but that the order was not obeyed. It was also proved that a good lookout was stationed and kept at the proper post on board the steamer; that her lights were exhibited conspicuously and shining brightly, and that strict precautions were employed on the steamer to avoid collision with other vessels whilst so gaining her berth; that she was coming into her usual and well-known place of landing, and that she pursued the customary method of doing it, as was notorious to vessels navigating the rivers near the docks in this port. It was furthermore proved that the sloop had sufficient timé to have luffed and avoided the steamer, had she adopted that manoeuvre when the necessity of it was discovered by her.</p> <p>(1) The question to be considered is not whether the New Champion has been guilty of extraordinary neglect; but, did she, on the occasion on which this collision occurred, observe due care and exercise the proper precaution?</p> <p>(2) Public safety requires that steamboats, particularly when navigating our crowded waters, should observe extraordinary care and unremitting vigilance. The smaller craft are comparatively helpless, but the steamboat possesses and exercises a power to. which the winds and the tides are obedient. Her own momentum is unresistingly subject to her control; she is independent of external resistance; and in all cases, it may be positively asserted, wherever the smaller vessel is seen, a steamboat, unless her machinery is out of order, can avoid her.</p> <p>(3) The New Champion did not observe ordinary care; no due precaution was taken to avert the collision, although she saw the sloop in ample time to avoid her. Nothing was done on board the New Champion but to hall the people on board the sloop, ordering her to luff. The testimony of the claimants’ own witnesses shows this.</p> <p>(4) The sloop Mary was comparatively helpless; while the New Champion had the full sweep of the river and the entire command of her machinery. The facts, uncon-troverted and uncontradicted, are, that the sloop Mary, a very small vessel, was pursuing her course up the East river, near the New York side, to avoid a strong ebb tide; while the New Champion, a steamboat of a very large class, was crossing over from the Brooklyn side, the sloop and the New Champion came in collision with each other; that the New Champion saw the sloop when she was about one third or one half of a mile from her, and saw her distinctly, although the sloop had no lights.</p> <p>Now, from the mere statement of these facts, the necessary conclusion must be, that the large and strong New Champion, with a propelling power to which the winds and tides are as implicitely obedient as is her own momentum, could, with a suitable effort, which she was bound to make, have avoided a collision with this little vessel, unless by some positive mismanagement the sloop placed herself in the way of the New Champion, so as to baffle any attempts of the latter to avoid her. Then, did the sloop place herself in the way, unnecessarily, of the New Champion? So far from this being the case, she did every thing she could to avoid the steamboat. She was hemmed in while the steamboat had the full sweep of the river. Claimants’ witnesses, indeed, state, that if the helm of the sloop had been put down, she could have avoided the New Champion. This was the very thing that was done; in short, they made every effort on board the sloop, while they on board the New Champion did nothing; whereas, if the sloop had made no effort, no blame could have been attached to her.</p>

This bill in equity by John J. Newcomb, a citizen of Massachusetts, against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, and J. Sanford Roberts and Sarah Thomas Roberts, citizens of Rhode Island, alleged that on March 13, 1866, the defendant company insured the life of the defendant, J. S. Roberts, then residing at New Bedford, in the state of Massachusetts, in the sum of $1,-500, payable to said Roberts or his assigns, March 13, 1879, if he should then be living, or at…

<p>Case No. 10,148.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Provable Debts — Surrendered Preference.</p> <p>The assignee recovered a judgment against a creditor for the value of goods taken by him, prior to the bankruptcy, in payment of his indebtedness. The creditor afterwards paid the amount of such judgment and costs, and proved his debt in the bankruptcy proceedings. On motion to expunge the claim, held, that such payment was a surrender of the preference, and that, in the absence of actual fraud, the creditor had right to prove his claim.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Cadwell. 17 Fed. 694.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,149.</p> <p>Prize — Enemy Property.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,160.</p> <p>Patents — Assignment—Validity—Specific Performance of Agreement to Assign.</p> <p>1. R., the patentee and owner of letters patent, agreed with M., shortly before the patent expired, that he would apply for its extension, and assign the extension, if obtained, to M., and M., in consideration, paid to R. $500, and agreed to pay him $1.500 more on receiving such assignment, and also the expenses paid by R. in procuring the extension. R. died without applying for the extension, and left a will appointing his wife his sole executrix, and making her and his daughter the sole beneficiaries. The will was probated in Massachusetts. After-wards, a corporation, by assignment from M., acquired his rights under said agreement. Thereafter, the widow, as executrix, and acting in the interest of the corporation, applied for and obtained an extension of the patent, the corporation paid her the $1,500. and she executed to it an assignment of the extended term, which assignment was recorded. The assignment was not made under an order of the probate court, and the daughter did not assent to it. In the assignment the widow was described as adminis-tratrix, and conveyed her interest as adminis-tratrix. After the recording of the assignment, she resigned her trust as executrix, and one I. was appointed administrator with the will annexed, and he, as such, conveyed to the plaintiffs the title on which this suit was brought. Held, that the corporation became the equitable owner of the patent, and the plaintiffs had constructive notice of such equity, by the recording of the assignment from the widow, before they procured the assignment from I.. and were not bona fide purchasers; that, as against the plaintiffs, the corporation was entitled to a specific performance of the agreement to assign; and that, therefore, it was not material whether the assignment from the widow was invalid. because made by her as administratrix and not as executrix.</p> <p>[Oited in Prime v. Brandon Manuf’g Co., Case No. 11,421; New York Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co., 32 Fed. 78(5.]</p> <p>2. The assignment from the widow was valid, although made by her as administratrix.</p> <p>3. The sale was not invalid because made without an order of the probate court, although there was a statute of Massachusetts providing that, on application, the probate court might order a sale of personal estate, inasmuch as there was no provision precluding a sale without such order.</p> <p>4. It was not necessary the daughter should have joined in the assignment, or assented to it.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Union Paper Bag Mach. Co. v. Nixon. Cases Nos. 14,386, 14,391, and 105 U. S. 706.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of New Hampshire.] This was a suit in rem for salvage brought [by the Kennebeck & Boston Steam Navigation Company] against the steamboat New England; upon which a decree for salvage was rendered by the district court at the September term, 1838. [Case unreported.] But it was ascertained, after the final adjournment of the court, that by a mistake of the time, nature, and operation of the decree, the…

This action was brought by the plaintiffs in 1841, on a balance of $2,900 for the amount of the proceeds of notes and bills sent to the defendants by the Commonwealth Bank of Boston, Massachusetts, for collection, the plaintiffs claiming the notes and bills as their property and subject to their order and control.

<p>In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction, to restrain the infringement of letters patent [No. 3,633] granted to Charles Goodyear, June 15th, 1844, for what is known as “vulcanized India rubber” [reissued December 25, 1849, No. 156]. The New England Car-Spring Company claimed the exclusive right to make car-springs under the patent, by license from Goodyear, and the bill alleged that the defendants were making car-springs of vulcanized India rubber without right. The defendants claimed a right to make such car-springs by license from Goodyear under the patent. On the 18th of July, 1844; Goodyear entered into an agreement with the Naugatuck India Rubber Company, by which he gave a license to that company, to use, with a few exceptions, the whole right granted by the patent, upon certain terms. By that agreement, Goodyear covenanted not to license any other person, reserving, however, to himself, provided he should deem it for his interest to sell the exclusive right for any particular subject of manufacture under the patent, the right so to do, for a sum in gross, provided, that, before any such sale for a sum in gross, the Naugatuck Company should have the right to become the purchasers, at such stipulated price or sum in gross; and such sale was not to be made to any other person, except on the refusal or neglect of the Naugatuck Company, for sixty days after the offer should have been made to them, to become the purchasers for such sum in gross, nor then, until one-fourth of the stipulated sum in gross should be first paid or secured to the company, to their satisfaction; and, upon such sale, the license to the company, to the extent of the exclusive right sold, was to cease. This agreement was recorded in the patent office. On the 29th day of October, 1847, Goodyear, for the consideration of $5,-000, sold to Charles Ely and Edward Crane the exclusive right to use his patented invention in the making of car-springs. The transfer was in writing, and was recorded in the patent office January 10th, 1848. At the time of such transfer to Ely and Crane, the factory of the Naugatuck Company was at Nauga-tuck, in Connecticut, and all the directors, except Charles J. Gilbert, lived at Hartford, in that state. The company had an office for the transaction of business in the city of New York, where Charles J. Gilbert attended, he being the treasurer of the company. On the 26th of December, 1848, Ely and Crane assigned to the New England Car Company all the right which they acquired by the conveyance from Goodyear to them, of the 29th of October, 1847; and, on the 20th of November, 1851, the last-mentioned company assigned all such right to the plaintiffs, the New England Car-Spring Company. Both of these assignments were duly recorded in the patent office. On the 4th of November, 1848, the Naugatuck Company assigned all the right which they then had, by virtue of their contract with Goodyear, of the 18th of July, 1844, to the defendants, the Union India Rubber Company, they agreeing to perform all the covenants which the Naugatuck Company were bound to perform by virtue of their agreement with Goodyear of that date.</p>

[This was a libel in personam by the New England Insurance Company and others against the Detroit & Cleveland Steam Navigation Company to recover damages occasioned by a collision. Heard upon a plea to the jurisdiction.]

[Appeal from the district court of the Unit■ed States for the district of Massachusetts.] On the 2d of March, 1863, the respondents contracted with the libellant [Thomas Dun-:ham] as the owner of the barque, called the Albina, to insure the barque against the perils of the sea, mentioned in the policy of insurance in the sum of ten thousand dollars for the term of one year, which term was subsequently extended by an indorsement on the policy to the time of the arrival of the…

<p>Case No. 10,156.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — Effect upon Attachment Issued by State Court — Attachment by Original Process — Effect of State Statutes</p> <p>1. To an action brought by A., to recover for goods sold. B. pleaded that, before the bringing of the action, B. had sued A. in a state court of New York, to recover money, and, in that suit, had attached, under the state law, the debt sued for by A.; that A. had removed into this court the suit in the state court; that it was still pending; and that the attachment still held the debt: Held, on demurrer to the plea, that it was bad.</p> <p>2. Where a suit in a state court is removed by a defendant into this court, under the 12th section of the act of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. 79). no attachment of the property of the defendant by the state court can hold that property, after the removal of the suit into this court, unless such attachment was the original process in the suit in the state court.</p> <p>[Cited in Rigg v. Parsons, 29 W. Ya. 526, 2 S. E. 83.]</p> <p>3. Where the suit in the state court is commenced by summons, and the attachment is subsequently issued by it, as a separate process, such attachment is not an attachment by original process, within said 12th section, so as to hold the property attached, after the removal of the suit into this court.</p> <p>[Cited contra in Barney v. Globe Bank, Case No. 1,031.]</p> <p>[See Act March 3,1875 (18 Stat. 471, § 4).]</p> <p>4. State statutes are rules of decision in the courts of the United States, when they proscribe a law governing thei right or title in litigation, but are not allowed to interfere with the processes or modes of procedure of the tribunals of the United States.</p> <p>[NOTE. The defendants subsequently went to trial upon the general issue. There was judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Case No. 10,107. This was affirmed upon appeal to the supreme court. 23 How. (64 U. S.) 433.]</p>

The first of these suits [the New England Screw Company against Charles Bliven and Edward B. Mead] was an action to recover a balance due to the plaintiffs for screws delivered to the defendants. [See Case No. 10,156.] The second [Charles Bliven and Edward B. Mead against the New England Screw Company] was an action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract in not filling orders for screws.

This case came before the district court upon a petition by the assignee of the bankrupt, setting forth, that Brown, the bankrupt, on the 2d February last, filed his petition to be decreed a bankrupt, and on the 3d May thereafter, was duly decreed a bankrupt. On the 20th February, Mary Brown, a widow, the mother of the bankrupt, died intestate, and Charles Brown was duly appointed administrator of her estate.

This was a libel for expenses incurred by the libellant imtowing the schooner, pumping her out and taking care of her, pending proceedings in this court for a resale of the vessel. It appeared that on the 30th day of October, A. D. 1875, a writ of venditioni exponas was issued from this eourt, in the case of Hugh Mallon, an intervening libellant, requiring the marshal to make public sale of the schooner on the 18th day of November.

This was an action brought for the recovery of damages occasioned by a collision.

<p>Case No. 10,188.</p> <p>Collision — Measure or Damages — Impairment op Value op Vessel Injured — Costs.</p> <p>1. In the valuation of damages caused by a collision, the owner of the injured vessel is entitled to be recompensed to the amount of his entire loss.</p> <p>2. When the value of the vessel injured is only impaired, the measure of damages will be the sum required to reinstate her to the condition she was in at the time of collision; if she is a total loss, her market price or value at the time will be the criterion.</p> <p>[Cited in The Baltimore, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 386.]</p> <p>3. The colliding vessel cannot diminish the allowance' of her market value by proving her actual worth to be less, because of her age, imperfect build or the state of her timbers.</p> <p>4. A common carrier by water is not liable for the loss of cargo by collision at sea; but if a commissioner reports damages for that cause, an exception will not lie to the report to try the legality of the decision, it being a question on the merits.</p> <p>5. Relief must be had by motion to vacate the report as not within the scope of the order of reference; or for a rehearing before the court on the merits.</p> <p>6. When seven exceptions are filed to a commissioner's report, and six are sustained by the court, costs will be allowed therefor, to be deducted from the amount decreed to the libellant.</p>

THE -COURT having directed this cause to be docketed at the last term, a motion was now made by the counsel for the plaintiff to remand it to the supreme court of this state, from which it had been removed under the twelfth section of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20.

[This was an action at law by the commonwealth of New Jersey, ex rel. the warden of the Essex county jail, against Noyes.]

<p>Case No. 10,167.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — Citizenship — Repeal of Statutes — Local Prejudice.</p> <p>[1. The second and third subdivisions of Rev. St. § 639, relating to removals by one of several defendants, and to removals on the ground of prejudice and local influence, are not in conflict with the provisions of the act of 1875 [18 Stat. 470] so as to be repealed by the latter act.]</p> <p>[2. Where one defendant is a citizen of a different state from plaintifE, and others are citizens of the same state, and the latter, by answer in the state court, disclaim all interest in the controversy, this does not bring the cause within that clause of the act of 1875 which authorizes removal by a single defendant when the controversy is wholly between citizens of different states, and can be wholly determined as between them; for the matter must be determined-upon the case made in the complaint, and not by the answers.]</p> <p>[3. In such case the causo is not removable on the ground of local prejudice under the third subdivision of Rev. St. § 639; for under this section all' defendants must join in the petition, and they must all be nonresidents of the state.</p> <p>[NOTE. There was also another bill subsequently filed by the New Jersey Zinc & Iron Oo. against Charles W. Trotter, James L. Curtis, and the Franklinite Steel & Zinc Company, to obtain tllS reformation of certain deeds. The cause was heard on n motion to remand to the state court. The motion was granted. 18 Fed. 337.</p> <p>[An action of trespass had been instituted by Trotter to recover damages of the New Jersey Zinc Company for entering on his lands and digging up and carrying away a quantity of ore. Judgment was rendered in favor- of Trotter for $3,320 damages and costs. Case unreported. Defendants then removed the case, by writ of error, to the supreme court. A motion made by Trotter to dismiss, because the value of the matter in dispute did not exceed $5,000, was granted. 108 U. S. 564.]</p>

[This was an action by the New Jersey Steamboat Company against Alfred Pleason-ton, collector of internal revenue, to recover the amount of a tax alleged to hare been unlawfully exacted.]

<p>[In the matter of Frank F. Newland, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,171.</p> <p>Ixsurasce ox Bankrupt’s Life — Right op Creditor who kept Policy Alive — Security for Debt.</p> <p>1. An insurance policy on the life óf a bankrupt was set forth in his list of debts, as security for a debt. The debt was originally $4,000. The policy was for $4,000. Before the bankruptcy, $550 had been paid on .the debt. The debt was proved at $3.450. The surrender value of the policy at the time was credited on the debt by order of the court, at $13.13: and a dividend of $641.64 from the bankrupt’s estate was paid on the debt. The holder of the policy kept it alive by paying the premiums, instead of surrendering it, and, before another dividend was paid by the estate, the bankrupt died, and the insurance policy became due. Seld, that the holder of the policy was not entitled to receive and keep all the insurance money;</p> <p>2. The debt must be charged at its original amount, without deducting the surrender value, with interest, the payments of $550 and $641.64 must be credited on it, with interest, and the amount received on the policy must he applied to extinguish the balance due on the debt, the creditor Having credit for all premiums paid by him after the petition in bankruptcy was filed, and out of the balance, if any, the assignee must be refunded the $550 and the $641.64, with interest.</p> <p>[This decision was affirmed by the circuit court on review. Case unreported.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,173.</p> <p>Patentable Invention — Double Use — Hoop Skirts.</p> <p>[The use of strands of twisted cord to sustain the hoops of hoop skirts held a patentable invention, where the result was a better and cheaper article, although a similar use of such cords for supporting the rounds of rope ladders, the slats of window blinds, etc., was old and well known.]</p>

J. T. Austin, in behalf of Newman, who is an alien enemy, moved the court to permit him to file his declaration preparatory to naturalization, according to the act of 14th of April, 1802, c. 28 [2 Stat.. 153].

<p>Case No. 10,175.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Tradesman—Books op Account.</p> <p>1. The question, what are proper books of account to be kept by a merchant or tradesman, is in' each case a question of evidence.</p> <p>2. Where a bankrupt, for a year before filing his petition, was engaged in the business of buying and selling furniture on his own account, having a shop where his goods were displayed and sold, held, that he was a merchant or tradesman, under the twenty-ninth section of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat 517)].</p> <p>3. Where a bankrupt kept no books but two memorandum books, from which he could not tell the amount of the business he had done, or the particulars and consideration of debts due to and by his principal debtors and creditors, held, that the bankrupt had not kept proper books of account under the twenty-ninth section, and a discharge must be refused.</p>

These were actions brought by tbe surviving trustee of the ground rents, belonging to the Hamilton family, issuing out of lots in the city of Lancaster, to recover the rents of many lots held by each of the defendants respectively. On each of these lots the annual rent was a certain number of shillings, sterling money of Great Britain. These rents were all in arrear for many years.

<p>Case No. 10,179.</p> <p>Collision at Sea — Steamer and Schooner — Lookout — Change in Extremis — Burden of Proof — Presumption of Negligence.</p> <p>1. A steamer and a schooner came in collision on the morning of September 6th, 1874, at sea, off the coast of New Jersey. The schooner was sailing northeast by north, the wind being east-south-east, when the steamer, which was steering about south by west half west, was seen about two or three miles off and about two points and a half on the schooner’s port bow. The schooner kept her course till the steamer was about three lengths, or about 800 feet, distant. The schooner’s second mate then hailed the steamer, and, getting no answer, told the man at the schooner's wheel to let her luff half a point, and the man ported his wheel just before the vessels struck. Both vessels had their lights set and burning, and it was, moreover, so light that the vessels themselves could be seen at an ample distance. The lookout on the steamer had been sent from his post by the second mate, who had charge of the deck, to help wash the decks, the only lookout from that time being the quartermaster at the wheel, in the wheelhouse, with the windows closed. The schooner was not seen till her hail was heard by the second mate, who then saw her over the steamer’s starboard bow, about 850 feet distant. The steamer was running ten miles an hour. The second mate then went to the pilot-house and ordered the steamer’s wheel put hard-a-port, and her engine was stopped by the captain, who had been asleep and was awaked by the second mate’s order to the' quartermaster. The porting of the steamer’s helm changed the steamer’s course but very little. She struck the schooner on her port bow. cutting half-way into her: Bcld, that the fact of a collision under the circumstances of this case was evidence of great negligence somewhere.</p> <p>2. It being the duty of the steamer to avoid the schooner, the presumption of negligence was on the steamer, and it was for her to relieve herself from the burden.</p> <p>3. The steamer was in fault in not having seen the schooner sooner.</p> <p>[Cited in The Ancon, Case No. 348.)</p> <p>4. That the porting of the schooner's helm was a movement in extremis, brought about by the fault of the steamer in approaching so near the schooner, and was not to be attributed as a fault to the schooner.</p> <p>5. That the steamer was liable for the collision.</p> <p>[NOTE. Upon the report of the commissioner, a final decree was entered for the damages found in favor of the libellants. Prom this decree the claimants appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the decree in this court. Case No. 17,353a. Thereafter the libellants moved for summary judgment against the sureties upon the appeal bond, which motion was denied, as having* been made prematurely. Case No. 10.181. From the decree of the circuit court affirming the district court, an appeal was taken to the supreme court. Here, likewise, the decree against the vessel was affirmed. 106 U. S. 13.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,180.</p> <p>Collision- at Sea — Steamer and Pilot-Boat— Lighted Torch.</p> <p>1.A steamer, before colliding with a pilot-boat schooner, stopped and reversed and ported, it being proper for her to stop and reverse, and her officers exercising whar seemed to them to be the best judgment, in porting. The schooner being in fault in not having a proper green light visible at a proper distance, held, that no consequences of such manoeuvres could operate to impute them to the steamer as faults.</p> <p>[Distinguished in The Alaska, 22 Fed. 553.]</p> <p>2. The provision of section 4234 of the Revised Statutes, which requires that “every sail vessel shall, on the approach of any steam vessel during the night time, show a lighted torch upon that point or quarter to which such steam vessel shall be approaching.” is one which the schooner, though a pilot-boat, was bound to observe when off pilot-ground; and there does not seem to be any reason why that section should not appljRto her while on pilot ground.</p> <p>3. As the schooner was carrying colored lights, which rule 11 of section 4233 says a sailing pilot vessel on pilot-ground shall not carry, she must be held to have been regarded by those on board of her as not being at the time a pilot-boat, within the meanings of rule 11. because she was not sailing on pilot-ground. Where she was she was simply- a “sail vessel.” and. therefore, subject to the provisions of section 4234.</p> <p>4. A steamer must exhibit proper lights to a sailing vessel, in order to charge the latter with fault for not having shown a lighted torch.</p> <p>5. Because of the failure of the schooner to show such lighted torch, the Bteamer failed to sooner discover the schooner, and it was held that such fault of the schooner freed the steamer from fault in not sooner discovering the schooner.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 10,181.</p> <p>Appeal in Admiralty — Judgment against Sureties — Ten Days’ Decree.</p> <p>Where, in a suit in rem, in admiralty, in the district court, the claimant, after a decree for the libellant, appeals to this court, and this court decrees for the libellant for a sum sufficient to allow of an appeal by the claimant to the supreme court, which may be a supersedeas, no summary judgment can be rendered by this court against the sureties in the appeal bond executed on the appeal to this court, until after the expiration of ten days after the rendering of the decree by this court.</p> <p>[Cited in The Jesse Williamson, Jr., Case No. 7,297; The Sydney, 47 Fed. 202; Ex parte Warden, 108 U. S. 156, 2 Sup. Ct 384.J</p> <p>[The decree against the vessel in this cause was affirmed by the supreme court. 100 U. S. lo, 1 Sup. Ct. 90.]</p>

In equity. Heard on motion for injunction. The bill was filed to obtain an injunction forbidding the seizure and sale, on execution, of the market bazaar, the property of the city of New Orleans, to satisfy a judgment recovered against the city by [John A. Morris] the defendant to the bill.

<p>Case No. 10,183.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations — Alienation op Public Place — Batture in Front op New Orleans —Lease—Constitutionality op Act Abolishing BhERi Facias against Citt.</p> <p>1. As a general rule a public place is inalienable except by the sovereign.</p> <p>2. But a public place, which is a portion of the batture in front of the city of New Orleans, has a distinctive quality impressed upon it. and may be withdrawn from the use of the public by the city.</p> <p>• 3. The leasing, by the city, of a portion of the batture for a market bazaar, for a term of ten years, for a certain rent reserved, is a withdrawal from public use of so much of the bat-ture as is included in the lease.</p> <p>4. An act of the legislature of Louisiana abolished the writ of fieri facias for the enforcement of judgments against the city of New Orleans, and declared that the effect of the judgment should be limited to fixing the amount of the plaintiffs’ demand, and that said judgment should be registered and paid out of any money in the city treasury designated for its payment, and. if none were designated, that the city council might, if they deemed it proper, make an appropriation for its payment. Belli, that the act was inoperative as to an antecedent debt, because it impaired the obligation of the contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Hart v. City of New Orleans, 12 Fed. 294; Canal & Claiborne Streets It. Co. v. Hart, 114 U. S. 662, 5 Sup. Ct. 1132.]</p> <p>5. Said act is not made obligatory upon the courts of the United States by section 916 of the Revised Statutes.</p>

In equity. Heard on bill, plea, replication and testimony. The bill recited that, on or about February 24th, 1860, the said Bank of New Orleans became the holder and owner of certain promissory notes for the sum of $5,000, made by Robert Tucker and others, payable to the order of Robert Tucker, and by him indorsed; that said notes were secured by mortgage of the same date, which was recorded in the mortgage office of the parish of Lafourche, where the mortgaged property was…

<p>Case No. 10,185.</p> <p>Collision in East River — Steamboat Qvbr-takino Another.</p> <p>1. The tug Q., with a barge in tow alongside, was bound from Jersey City to the Atlantic Basin, in Brooklyn. The steamboat N. came out from a pier in New York City, on a trip through the Sound, and swung her head to port down the North river, during which movement the Q. passed from the starboard to the port side of the N., ahead of her. The N. then swung still further to port to enter the East river, but blew a single whistle to tell the Q., as she alleged, that she intended to go outside of and pass her. The Q. kept on her course, and was «truck by the N. on the starboard side, and sank with the barge. Held, that, as the N. was behind the Q., and to starboard of her, the ■course up the East river which she wished to take must cross that of the Q. either ahead or astern of the Q.</p> <p>[Cited in The St. Paul, Case No. 12,243.]</p> <p>2. In adopting the manoeuvre of crossing ahead of the Q., the N. chose the most hazardous of the two manoeuvres, and that, under these circumstances, the burden was on her to •excuse herself.</p> <p>[Cited in Thompson v. The Great Republic, 23 Wall. (90 U. S.) 34.]</p> <p>3. On the evidence, the excuse which she had set up, that the Q. sheered to starboard, and thus crossed her course, was not made out.</p> <p>4. If the effect of the ebb tide from the East river, striking the port bow of the barge, as the Q. entered such fade, was to deflect the Q. to starboard, this was an effect which the N. could have foreseen, and guarded against by not approaching the Q. so closely.</p> <p>5. If the Q. had slowed and stopped while under the bows of the N., such action, under the circumstances, would not be held to have been a fault.</p> <p>[NOTE. The owners of the barge towed by the Quickstep libeled the latter vessel for the damage suffered by them in the collision. The court held in this case, as in the one above, that the Quickstep was without blame. Libel dismissed. Case No. 8,909.]</p>

This was a bill in equity filed under authority given by the act of congress of March 3, 1871, upon the following case: By joint resolution of congress of March 3, 1869, the consent of congress was given to the erection of a bridge by plaintiffs across the Ohio river, between Newport and Cincinnati, upon condition that its span over the main channel should be not less than four htindred feet long, from pier to pier, and in all other respects according to the conditions and…

<p>Case No. 10,187.</p> <p>Executors and Administrators — Land Subject to Decedent’s Debts — Laws of Ohio.</p> <p>Lands, by the laws of Ohio, are subject to the payment of a deceased person’s debts, and where such sale has been made, under an order from the proper court, by the administration, the court will not disturb the rights of innocent purchasers, after the lapse of thirty years.</p>

[This was an action at law by Hallie Newton against the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company.] 1. On the trial this question of evidence arose: It appeared that Newton, whose life was insured for the benefit of the plaintiff, went to Los Angeles, in California, a stranger, but with letters of introduction to prominent citizens, and registered himself at the hotel. The landlord’s deposition was taken to prove the death of Newton, and the circumstances.

Case for use and occupation of land at Oeeoquan in Virginia. contended that an action for use and occupation did not lie before the statute of 11 Geo. II., c. 19, § 14, and that as that act is not in force In Virginia, no such action could be maintained in Alexandria county, which is governed by the laws of Virginia as they existed in 1801. Esp. 19; Green v. Harrington, Hut. 34; 1 Bac. Abr. (Gwillim’s Ed.) 257; Wilkins v. Wingate, 6 Term R. 62; Brett v. Read, Cro. Car. 343.

This was an action by Lewis Foster, owner of the bark Free Trade,. to recover for injuries sustained by the bark in a collision with the ferry boat New York, on the 28th of October, 1865. The accident happened in the harbor of New York, off the South Ferry slip, on the New York side, on the morning of a cleat-day. The tide was young flood, the wind light, and the vessels in no way embarrassed by other vessels.

<p>Case No. 10,195.</p> <p>Collision ^at Pier — Proper Mooring — Fenders.</p> <p>1. A canal-boat lying at a pier was sunk by injuries received by her during the night, in consequence of her coming in contact with a bark, which was also moored there. A libel was filed to recover damages for the injury, which alleged negligence on the part of those in charge of the bark, in not putting out fenders between the canal-boat and the bark and in not having the bark properly moored. The evidence showed that the wound on the canal-boat which caused her to sink was such a one as would have been caused by a fender, and that there was nothing on the outside of the bark which could cause the injury except a fender. As to whether a fender was put out or not, the evidence was contradictory: Held,, that, on the evidence, the presence of the fender was proved, and the charge of negligence, in not putting out a fender, was not established;</p> <p>2. The bark was properly moored and out of contact with the canal-boat: that the canal-boat drove against the bark, and the bark then did all that could be required of her, by putting out the fender and keeping it there: Held, that the bark was not in fault.</p>

The libel in this case alleged that the libel-lants were owners of pier 46, East river, in the city of New York; that the pier was within navigable waters from the ocean, and within the flow of tide water; and that the respondent [William Hichland] was the owner of the bark Maggie L. Carvill, which, while lying alongside such pier, negligently discharged cargo on the pier and damaged it to the amount of $10,000.

<p>Case No. 10,197.</p> <p>Ferrt — Exclusive Right to Establish — What is Invasion of Such Right — Legislative Interference.</p> <p>1. By the 15th section of the Montgomerie charter, granted to the city of New York in 1730, there was granted to the corporation of that city the sole power of establishing such ferries “around Manhattan’s Island,” “for the carrying and transporting people, horses, cattle, goods and chattels from the said Island of Manhattan to Nassau Island, and from thence back to Manhattan’s, and also from the said island, Manhattan’s, to anv of the opposite shores all around the same island,” in such and so many places as the common council should think fit, and the ferriages from such ferries were also granted to the corporation. The boundaries of the city were made co-extensive with Manhattan Island. In 1874, part of another county was annexed by the legislature of New York to the city of New York, and declared to be a part of the city as if it had always been so, and the like powers were given to the corporation, over the annexed territory, as if it had always been a part of the' city. Afterwards, a ferryboat, fitted up to transport railroad cars only, was run to and fro between a place in such annexed territory and a place in New Jersey opposite the city of New York, connecting with railroads running from the termini of the ferry. The boat was provided with two railroad tracks, which prevented the entrance of ordinary vehi-cíes and of foot passengers, except as transported in the cars: Edd, that such ferry was not such a ferry as the charter contemplated, and did not invade the exclusive franchise of the corporation.</p> <p>2. Whether the legislature can interfere with the ferry franchise granted by said charter, quere.</p> <p>3. Whether the franchise so granted is limited to establishing ferries from the original territory of the city, quere.</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by the New York & Erie Railroad against Shepard & Shepard.]</p>

This y^as a motion for a provisional injunction, to Restrain the defendants from interfering with the running of the plaintiffs’ locomotive engines on their tracks in the Fourth avenue, in the city of New York, south of Forty-Second street.

<p>Case No. 10,200.</p> <p>Admikai/ty — Limitation or Liability — Practice —Stipulation for Value.</p> <p>1. Where the owners of a steamship filed a petition under section 4283, Rev. St., to obtain a limitation of their liability by reason of a certain collision, after their steamer had been proceeded against in an action in rem and released from custody upon their stipulation in her full value given for the benefit of all persons who might have demands arising out of said collision, and after a-final hearing had been had in such action and a decree entered upon such stipulation: Sold, that notwithstanding the vessel had been released upon a stipulation in her full value for the benefit of all who might have demands arising out of the collision, the proceeding for a limitation of liability was not vain or fruitless.</p> <p>2. The right to take proceedings to obtain a limitation of liability was not impaired by giving in an action in rem a stipulation in the full value of the vessel for the benefit of all who might have demands arising out of the same collision.</p> <p>[Cited in Thomassen v. AVhitwell, Case No. 13,930.]</p> <p>3. The right to resort to proceedings by petition to attain a limitation of liability, cannot be exercised after a final hearing has been had and a final decree entered in an. action in rem brought to recover the claims against which relief is sought by the petition.</p> <p>[Cited in Gokey v. Fort, 44 Fed. 365.]</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the circuit court, this decree was affirmed. Case unreported. An appeal was then taken to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was reversed, and the record remanded, with directions to enter a decree reversing the decree of the district court, and giving directions for further proceedings. 103 U. S. 239. The cause was again before the supreme court on motions to modify judgment and mandate. The order of. the court was modified so far as it contained directions to the circuit court to enter a decree reversing the decree of the district court, and giving directions for further proceedings. It was further ordered that each party pay their own costs on these motions. 103 U. S. 247.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,202.</p> <p>Dockage — Contract—Performance.</p> <p>1. A dry-dock company contracted to raise and dock a vessel for $150; but on beginning the work a bulkhead of the dock burst, and the vessel had to wait till the dock was repaired. The vessel was then successfully raised, and her repairs completed. The company asked $250, as on a new contract, and brought suit The owners of the vessel also brought an action, claiming damages of the dock company for delay in performance of the contract to raise the vessel. Held, that the dry-dock company could only recover $150, the amount originally named, as it appeared that no new contract had been made, nor had the old contract been abandoned.</p> <p>[Cited in Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. New York Balance Dock Co., 22 Fed. 674.]</p> <p>2. The owners of the vessel could not recover for delay. The breaking of the dock was a temporary destruction of the thing in reference to whic-h the contract was made, and furnished a legal excuse for the delay, unless it appear that the obstruction was allowed to continue an unreasonable time or that the breaking was caused by negligence.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court the decree of this court was affirmed. Case unreported.l</p>

<p>Case Wo. 10,203.</p> <p>Railroads — Consolidation—Effect upon Remedies for Enforcing Liabilities — Stock Certificates of Old Company — Taxation—Scrip Dividend.</p> <p>1. By the act of the legislature of New York consolidating the New York Central and Hudson River Railroads, the remedies for enforcing liabilities against the property of the former corporation are extended so as to allow enforcement from the property of the new corporation formed by the consolidation, to the same extent as though it were the debtor.</p> <p>2. But the stock certificates issued by the New York Central Railroad, to represent the earnings invested in construction and equipment, are not taxable as “scrip dividends,” within the meaning of the internal revenue law [13 Stat. 223]. A verdict is therefore directed for the plaintiffs for the amount of $594,002.89.</p> <p>[NOTE. Pursuant to this direction a verdict was entered for the full amount claimed. This .iudgment was reversed by the supreme court, where it was carried by writ of error. 22 Wall. (S9 U. S.) 604. A second trial was then had. which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, amounting, with costs, to $5x8,940.99. Case unreported. A writ of error was then sued out to the supreme court, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. 106 U. S. 109, 1 Sup. Ct. 62.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,204.</p> <p>Evidence — Recorder Instruments — Certified Copt — Witnesses to Deed at Common Law-Ejectment — Suit bv Foreign Corporation— Comity — Land Taken for Debt.</p> <p>1. When an instrument is required by law to be recorded, a certified copy, the person being authorised so to certify, is evidence. The keeper of the records is the proper person to certify.</p> <p>2. When a law declares that deeds for the conveyance of lands in the state shall be valid, when executed in any other state, conformably to the laws of such state, when recorded, copies, when duly certified, are evidence,</p> <p>3. A deed at common law did not require witnesses.</p> <p>4. An act required deeds to be recorded by the register of probate, but by law the records were transferred to the register of deeds; he may certify, as the records are legally in his custody.</p> <p>5. In an ejectment the plaintiff has a right to show a legal title, however, acquired fairly.</p> <p>6. A corporation may sue in a state, other than that which granted the charter, by comity.</p> <p>7. And on the same principles lands when taken in security for the payment of a debt, or in payment, may be held. There is nothing in the nature of the association which prohibits this.</p> <p>[Cited in American Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 15 Gray, 494; Mayer v. Mayer, 30 N. J. Eq. 411; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 232.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,205.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Substitution of One Vessel for Another — Libel for Services as for Salvage.</p> <p>A steamboat making regular daily trips on tide waters having become disabled, her owners arranged with the owners of another boat that the latter should make one trip in the place of the former for a certain sum. The trip was made, but was not paid for. A libel in rem filed against the former boat as for services in the nature of salvage was dismissed with costs.</p>

This was an action on a promissory note for $5,000, made by the defendants to the order of Warren Kimball, and endorsed by him to the plaintiffs [H. Cowperthwaite and George W. Lord]. The defence set up was, that the defendants were sureties only, and as such were, under the circumstances of the case, exempt from payment.

<p>Case Wo. 10,808.</p> <p>Involuntary Bankruptcy — Allowance op Counsel Fee to Creditor.</p> <p>Where, as the result of proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy, a large amount of property was in the hands of the assignee subject to distribution to creditors, this court allowed to the petitioning creditor who instituted the proceedings, to be paid out of the fund in the hands of the assignee, a reasonable sum for the expense incurred by him in employing counsel to conduct such proceedings to an adjudication.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Mead, Case No. 9,364; Re Cook, 17 Fed. 330.]</p> <p>[See Cases Nos. 10,209-10,212.]</p>

In bankruptcy. [This case is reported as first heard upon the question of removal of one of the assignees. Case No. 10,209.]

[This case is first reported as heard upon the question of removal of one of the assignees. Case No. 10,209. It was then heard upon the matter of allowance of fees to counsel for assignees. Id. 10,210.] Brown, Hall & Vanderpoel, and Isaiah-T. Williams, of New York City, were attorneys for the New York Mail Steamship Co. prior to its adjudication in bantouptcy. A different attorney was employed by the assignees in bankruptcy.

<p>[In error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.)</p>

<p>Case No. 10,213.</p> <p>Wharfage — Libel in Rem — Local Law.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p> <p>‘[This case is first reported as heard upon the question of removal of one of the assignees. Case No. 10,209. It was then heard upon the matter of allowance of counsel fees. Id. 10,210. Counsel for the bankrupt claimed a lien on papers. Id. 10,211.)</p>

<p>Case No. 10,215.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement—Slight Difference in Results.</p> <p>Where the defendant in an action for infringement uses substantially the same devices as plaintiff, and produces the same result and certain other results differing from those produced by plaintiff, it will still be considered that the patent of plaintiff has been infringed, and that defendant appropriates the invention of complainant.</p>

Assumpsit on a policy of reinsurance by the defendants for the plaintiffs, “lost or not lost, four thousand dollars on the brig Eve-lina, at and from her port or place of loading in Massachusetts, to Amsterdam, and at and from thence to New York.” The parties agreed to the following statement of facts for the opinion of the court: During the voyage insured from Massachusetts to Amsterdam, the vessel sustained damage by perils of the seas, and put into St. Thomas in distress.

<p>Case No. 10,217.</p> <p>Pleading — Amendment of Answek after Trial Ordered — Cumulative Testimont.</p> <p>Leave to file an amended answer will not be granted where trial has been already on an is- ! sue ordered on the bill and answer, and the ! amended answer offers only new and cumula- . five testimony on the issue tried.</p>

In equity. This was a motion for an attachment for contempt, in violating an injunction previously allowed by Mr. Justice Grier, restraining the defendants [Matthew Walker, Daniel S. Walker, and Matthew Walker, Jr.] from the infringement of letters patent for “an improvement in wire fences,” granted to Henry Jenkins, February 13, 1849 [No. 6,106], and assigned to complainants.

This was a libel by the owners of the schooner Margaret Powell to recover damages for her sinking, while in tow of a steam-tug. The tug had taken in tow three schooners. one on her port side and two on her starboard side, to tow them through Hell Gate, the Powell being the outside schooner on the starboard side.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, for collision, filed by John Yan Pelt, in the district court, against the steamboat Niagara, to recover for damage done by that vessel to the steamboat Cleopatra. The district court decreed for the libellant, and the claimants appealed to this court. [Case unreported.]

[Appeal from the district court) of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, in admiralty. That court decreed for the libellant [case unreported], and the claimants appealed to this court.

This suit was brought on May 21, 1878 [by H. B. Nicholas, assignee in bankruptcy, against James W. Murray and others], to have a discharge in bankruptcy heretofore granted to the defendant Murray declared fraudulent and void; and to have certain conveyances of lots T, 2, 7 and 8, in block 65 in Caruthers’s addition to Portland, set aside as being made to defraud the creditors of said bankrupt.

A ship, the property of the Savannah Steamship Company, incorporated under an act of the legislature of Georgia, was attached under the Maryland act of 1795, c. 50, for a debt due to the plaintiffs [F. Nieholl and others], A writ of capias ad responden-dum was issued at the same time, eommand-ing the marshal to take the Savannah Steamship Company.

Assumpsit, against the indorsers of W. Stewart’s note for $101, at sixty days.

objected to the deposition of Thomas White, that the notice given of the time and place of caption was not reasonable. The notice was served between eleven and twelve o’clock a. m. to attend at Gadsby’s tavern betweefi twelve and one o’clock of the same day.

Trespass on the case [by Arthur B. Nichols] to recover damages on account of an injury received as alleged, through a defect in a highway, which the corporation defendants were bound by law to keep in repair. The injury was received on Pearl street, nearly opposite the dwelling-house of one Edward White, who lived on the northerly side of the street. The alleged defect consisted of a cellar nearly opposite White's dwelling-house.

Assumpsit [by W. S. Nicholls] against [Thomas C. Wright] the acceptor of a draft for $200. dated January 11, 1834, payable 45 days after' date, drawn by Richard Wright, payable to his own order, and by him endorsed in blank.

<p>Case No. 10,239.</p> <p>Costs — Tiíavet. and Attendance — Witness Pee or Parti Testifying in His Own Behalf.</p> <p>1. Both before and since the passage of the act of the 20th of February. 1853 [10 Stat. 161], costs have j>een allowed in this court to the prevailing party for travel and attendance.</p> <p>• [Cited in Jerman v. Stewart. 12 Fed. 275; Celluloid Manuf’g Co. v. Chandler, 27 Fed. ¡ 12.] |</p> <p>2. Where a party is called and examined as a • witness in his own behalf he is not entitled to ; travel and attendance as a witness.</p>

Bill in equity brought to enforce a claim to certain interests alleged to have belonged to Amasa M. Eaton, a bankrupt, out of the estate of his mother Sarah B. Eaton, and which complainant [Charles A. Nichols] alleged were vested in him as assignee in bankruptcy.

<p>[This was an action by Thomas Nichols against the Farmers’ Mutual Insurance Company of York, Pa.]</p>

This was an action qui tam. brought in the i name of the informer [James R. Nichols] against the defendants [John Newell and others] to recover the statutory penalty for affixing the word “patent” to unpatented articles. The declaration contained three counts.

In equity. This was a final bearing, on pleadings and proofs, on a bill founded on letters patent [No. 57,232] granted to Sidney S. Wheeler and Daniel B. Hanley, August 14th, 1866, for an “improvement in machines for pouncing hat bodies,” and the title to which had, by sundry mesne assignments, become vested in the plaintiff [Edward A. Nichols], The infringement alleged was the use of infringing machines by the defendants [Hosea O.] Pearce and [Samuel W.] Benedict, and the…

<p>Case No. 10,247.</p> <p>Shipping — Charter-Party— Lay Days — Usage-Delays — Rights op Chabtbber — Deficiency op Coal — Demurrage—Cross Libels.</p> <p>1. By a charter-party, a vessel was to proceed to Pictou, and take a cargo of coal, to be furnished by the hirer. There were to he lay days, as “customary in loading.” and “the cargo was to be received as customary,” and in case the vessel was longer detained, by the fault of the hirer, he was to pay to the carrier demurrage. There being no custom allowing a particular number of lay days, but a peculiar custom as to the mode of loading, receiving, and furnishing the cargo: Held, that each party was bound to conform to such custom.</p> <p>2. There being but few berths at which a ves- j sel could load, and the custom being for vessels there to take their turn, in the order of their arrival at the port, and those which preceded this vessel being delayed by a deficiency of coal, the turn of this vessel was thereby delayed: Held, that the hirer was responsible therefor, such deficiency of coal having arisen from its not being supplied at the customary rate of seven hundred chaldrons per day. ¡</p> <p>3. The vessel being represented in the charter-party, as then lying in the harbor of Boston, it was the right of the hirer to have her proceed directly from that port to Pictou, without any unreasonable and unusual delay.</p> <p>[Cited in Lindsay v. Cusimano, 10 Fed. 303.]</p> <p>4. If the vessel was not at Boston, as stated in the charter-party, but at another port, undergoing repairs, the hirer is entitled to be placed in as good a condition as he would have been, if she had been at Boston, and proceeded directly on her voyage.</p> <p>5. If, by reason of her not having proceeded directly from Boston, she was subjected to greater detention after her arrival, the hirer is liable for no more demurrage than he would have been, if she had proceeded directly.</p> <p>6. But if, from a deficiency of coal, she would have been subjected to delay, if she had performed her duty, the hirer will be liable, to that extent, for the demurrage actually suffered.</p> <p>[Cited in Eleven Hundred Tons of Coal, 12 Fed. 188.]</p> <p>7. Where, in a libel by a ship-owner, for de-murrage under a charter-party, the hirer set up in defence a neglect of duty by the ship-owner, under the same contract, not by way of recoupment, but merely to repel the claim for demur-rage: Held, that the hirer might afterwards maintain a cross libel, for damages sustained by such neglect.</p> <p>[Cited in The Two Brothers, 4 Fed. 159.]</p> <p>8. He might have availed himself of this claim for damages, by way of recoupment in the first suit. But if he had done so, he could not have had a decree for any excess of his damages over the claim of the libellant.</p> <p>[Quoted in Kennedy v. Dodge, Case No. 7,-701.]</p> <p>9. Nor could he have sustained a cross libel for such excess.</p> <p>[Quoted in Kennedy v. Dodge. Case No. 7,-701; The Ciampa Emilia, 39 Fed. 127.]</p> <p>10. He may elect whether to take his remedy wholly in defence, or wholly by suit.</p> <p>11. Where such cross suit was instituted, and the libellant in the first suit was out of the jurisdiction, notice on his counsel and proctor in that suit, is not a sufficient service of the cross libel.</p> <p>[Cited, but not followed, in The Eliza Lines, 61 Fed. 323.]</p> <p>12. But the court may, in its discretion, stay proceedings in the first suit, until an appearance shall be entered, and other steps taken in the second. Under the circumstances, such stay was ordered.</p> <p>[Cited, but not followed, in The Eliza Lines, 61 Fed. 323.]</p>

C. Beckwith, for the city, moved for an order nunc pro tune amending the record to show that an appeal was prayed. Final decree was entered on the 7th of January, 1867. Appeal bond was approved Jan. 16, 1867. Counsel learned that the appeal was not of record, March 26, 1869.

<p>Case No. 10,261.</p> <p>Extent of Nicholson’s Claim in His Patent— The Patent not Infringed bt the Use of These Parts without the Other — A Pavement Similar in External Appearance not Necessarily an Infringement on the Nicholson Patent.</p> <p>1. Nicholson, in his patent, makes no claim to the exclusive use of blocks or of gravel and tar between or over them, or of any of the separate parts which go to make up the structure. What he claims as his invention is the combining of the foundation of the pavement with blocks, or blocks and strips of board, these being so arranged as to form cells or channels, with wooden bottoms, for the reception of broken stone or gravel and tar.</p> <p>2. The patent is not infringed unless the foundation and blocks are used by the defendant in a similar combination. The use of one of them without the other, though all the other necessary elements in the formation of the pavement are employed, violates no right of the patentee.</p> <p>3. A pavement presenting an external appearance similar to that of the patentee, but in which the blocks are placed directly upon the graded earth, no boards or other foundation being interposed, is not an infringement of the Nicholson patent.</p> <p>[NOTE. For other cases involving this patent, see American Nicholson Pavement Co. v. City of Elizabeth, Case No. 311; City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U. S. 120: American Nicholson Pavement Co. v. City of Elizabeth, Cases Nos. 309 and 312; Same v. Jenkins, 14 Wall. (81 U. S.) 452; Jenkins v. Nicolson Pavement Co., Case No. 7,273; Bigelow v. City of Louisville, Id. 1,400.]</p>

[These were libels by Nickerson against the John Perkins, Troy against the Speedwell, and Maher against the Acorn, to recover salvage compensation.]

Bill in equity [by A. J. Nicklin against W. T. Wythe and others] to obtain the conveyance of the legal title to certain lots in Salem, Oregon.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[This was a suit b.v John Nicks and John Rogers against Jeremiah Mathers.]</p> <p>Appeal from the Crawford circuit court.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,255.</p> <p>Phizb — Blockade—Condemnation.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade, the cargo being also mostly contraband of war, and on transportation to a port of the enemy.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Alexis Nicolas.]</p>

This is an action [by Albert H. Nicolay) ■upon eoupóns originally annexed to bonds issued by the county of St. Clair. The coupons are in the usual form. The following is a copy of one of the bonds, dated July 1st, 1870, from which the coupons in suit have been detached: “United States of America. State of Missouri, County of St. Clair. County Bond.

[At law. Action by F. H. Nicoll against the United States for damages for the illegal seizure and detention of certain ships and their cargoes.] The action was an action of trespass, brought by plaintiff to recover damages of defendant for seizing and detaining certain ships, and large quantities of valuable goods, altogether valued between two and three hundred thousand dollars, alleged to be the property of the plaintiff, F. H. Nicoll; the defendant, as marshal of this…

This was assumpsit on a policy of insurance against fire, dated April 15th, 1846, for one year on $5,000 worth of movable machinery in a cotton factory belonging to the plaintiffs. It was situated in the county of Orange, in the state of New York, and was | alleged to have been burned with all its machinery on the 10th of September, 1846, and proper proof and notice of it given to the respondents on the 12th of that month. The premium was 1% per cent.

<p>Case No. 10,260.</p> <p>Contracts — Construction—Lex Loci — Limitations — Lex Fori.</p> <p>1. The nature, validity and construction of' contracts are governed by the lex loci; the form: of action, the course of judicial proceedings, and the time when the action must be commenced by the lex fori.</p> <p>2. The statute of limitations appertains only to the remedy, and is a part of the lex fori; and: the courts of the United States always apply the statute of limitations of the state where the- - court sits, and adopt the same rules in regard to-it as prevail in the courts of the state.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Waterman v. Town of Wa. terloo, 69 Wis. 261, 34 N. W. 138.]</p> <p>3. Held, that an action brought in New York on an attested promissory note made in Massachusetts, was barred by the statute of limitations of the former, although it would not have been by that of the latter state.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] On the 29th of October, 1859, the libellant [Manuel Nieto] shipped as steward on board tile bark Evangeline, of which the respondent [William R. Clark] was master, for a Voyage to Valparaiso and other ports in the Pacific Ocean, and back to Boston. At Valparaiso a lady engaged a passage to the United States.

In this case an application for an adverse decree in bankruptcy against Peter Booth had been made by John Nightingale, and it appeared that on or about the 31st day of May last, Booth, being in insolvent circumstances, had made an assignment of his estate and effects to one Henry I. Ennis and Duncan M’Ewing, and it was alleged that under such assignment certain creditors of said Booth had been preferred, and that such assignment was in other respects fraudulent and void…

This was a motion made by plaintiffs’ counsel, E. D. Shattuck, with whom was W. H. Effinger, on December 13, 1872, to set aside an order theretofore made, continuing this cause until April 25, 1873, upon the ground that the stipulation therefor was signed on behalf of said plaintiffs [John Nightingale and others], without authority.

Ejectment for certain land in Providence, R. I. The cause was submitted to the court upon a statement of facts, agreed by the parties, in substance as follows: Edward Spauld-ing, in July, 1785, made his will, and after providing for the payment of his just debts and funeral expenses, devised as follows: “The residue, &c., the real as well as personal interest, I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Audery Spaulding, for and during her natural life, to be improved for her…

<p>This was an action upon a policy of life insurance [by Alexander Nimick and others against the Mutual Life Insurance Company.]</p> <p>cited Breasted v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 4 Hill, 73, 8 N. Y. 299; Estabrook v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224; St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Graves [6 Bush, 268], Ct. App. Ky.; and 1 Phil. Ins. §§ 896, 1162.</p> <p>cited Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & G. 639; Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; Dean v. American Mut Life Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 96.</p>

This was a suit for mariner’s wages. The respondent, in his answer, relied upon a defensive allegation, asserting that the wages of the libellant were forfeited by misconduct on his part, and also claimed to deduct from his wages certain hospital and prison expenses, incurred during the voyage.

<p>[In the matter of Ozias L. Nims and David Long, bankrupts.)</p>

<p>Case No. 10,269.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Distribution op Assets.</p> <p>N. and L. were copartners under the name of N. & Co. They dissolved, owing debts and having no assets. Subsequently, they formed a new partnership, under the name of N., Agent, and failed, and were adjudged bankrupts, having firm assets. A creditor of N. & Co. claimed to prove against the firm of N., Agent, a debt due by the firm of N. & Co.: Held, that he was not entitled to share in the assets of the firm of N., Agent, being excluded therefrom by the provisions of section 5121 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Vetterlein, 44 Fed. 62.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 10,270.</p> <p>Charter Party — Substituted Freight.</p> <p>1. A vessel was chartered to carry timber and lumber, not less than half of which was to be “resawn.” The cargo fnrnisked was not half “resawn.” but in great part “rough edged.” It was received on board by the master under protest, as not conforming to the charter;. and he inserted in the bill of lading given for the cargo a provision for payment of freight, “as per charter party with additional claim as per protest.” A libel wras filed on behalf of the vessel against the lumber to recover the amount due from the charterer under the'charter, which contained a clause binding the cargo to its performance. Held, that, taking together the charter party, protest and bill of lading, it was clear that the rough-edged lumber was to be transported as freight, and that it was meant that the vessel should realize as much for freight as if the charter had been strictly complied with by furnishing the specified proportion of resawn lumber;</p> <p>2. Whether the action were treated as one to recover freight substituted for that specified in ■the charter, or to recover damages for violation •of the charter, the admiralty would enforce the lien of the vessel upon the cargo.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,271.</p> <p>Bill of Lading and Charter Pautt — Freight —Signature under Protest — Practice —Possession.</p> <p>1. A vessel was chartered to bring a cargo of sugar and molasses, from Havana to New York, at specified rates of freight. No provision for bills of lading specifying a different rate of freight was embodied in it. The cargo was agreed by the charter to be bound for the faithful performance of the agreements contained in it. At Havana a modification, agreed upon between the captain of the ship and the agents of the charterers, was indorsed on the charter, in which a lump sum of §3,828 was specified as freight. Under this agreement, 979 boxes of sugar were shipped. Some days after its shipment the charterers’ agents required the master to sign bills of lading for the sugar, providing for its delivery at New York, to order, on payment of freight at the rate of one dollar a box, and making no reference to the charter party. The. master, insisting that this was not according to agreement, signed the bills of lading, but wrote before his signature, the words “Signed under protest.” The shippers indorsed and delivered these bills of lading to I\ & Co. who indorsed and delivered them to Y. & Co. .at New York, who, on the arrival of the vessel at New York, tendered to the master the $979, and demanded the sugars. The master refused to deliver them, except on payment of the full balance of the charter money. Y. & Co. then filed a libel against the sugar and the master of the vessel, praying that the sugar might be seized under-the process, and by a decree of the court delivered to them. On this libel process was issued as in a cause' of possession, and the property was taken into the custody of the marshal, and thereafter, on consent of the parties, delivered to the libellants on their giving a stipulation in the sum of $4,000, which, it was agreed, was to be considered as in the place' and stead of sugar to that value held in custody by the marshal. No question was raised as to the regularity of the practice, and both parties agreed that the claimants should have a decree that the libel-lants pay the amount of their stipulation, into court, for the benefit of the claimants, in case the court should determine that the ship owner had a lien on the sugar for the amount due under the charter party. Meld, that no opinion would be expressed as to the regularity of the practice, and the question of law would be determined as desired by the parties.</p> <p>2. The ship owner had a lien on the sugar, for the unpaid balance of charter money.</p> <p>3. The libellants were put on inquiry by the words written on the bills of lading by the master, and were not therefore bona fide holders of them without notice..</p> <p>4. A decree would be made, that the stipulat-ors for value pay the amount of their stipulation into court, for the benefit of the claimants, and that the libel be dismissed, and a decree rendered against the libellants for costs.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,272.</p> <p>General Averaob — Ddtt of Carrier as to Vessel.</p> <p>1. A common carrier by water is bound to provide a safe and sea-worthy ship, in all respects fitted to carry her cargo through the ordinary perils of navigation, ánd the failure of so essential a portion of the mechanism as the rudder, in a gale of no extraordinary violence, is sufficient evidence that the vessel was unsea-worthy in this regard.</p> <p>2. The injury to the rudder being fairly chargeable to the common perils of the sea. the carrier is not protected by the exceptions in his bill of lading, and cannot charge the consequences against the cargo.</p> <p>3. Having reached a harbor of safety, and it being practicable for him to gain a neighboring harbor of repair, the expense of towing the ship to her destination, incurred by the master, cannot be charged pro rata against the cargo.</p> <p>4. To compel the cargo to contribute to the towage, it must be shown that this was the only reasonable alternative left to the master, and the soundness of his judgment may be questioned by the owners of the cargo.</p> <p>NOTE. A carrier is bound to provide a vessel tight and stanch and properly furnished for her voyage. Abb. Shipp. (5th Am. Ed.) 417-419; Lyon v. Mells. 5 East, 428; Putnam v. Wood, 3 Mass. 481; Kimball v. Tucker. 10 Mass. 192: Goodridge v. Lord. Id. 483; Bell v. Reed. 4 Bin. 127; Clark v. Richards, 1 Conn. 54. Every freight contract by a carrier by river implies that his boat is river worthy at the time, and it is incumbent on him to show that his boat is capable of performing it. McClin-tock v. Lary, 23 Ark. 215. For a full discussion of the law of general average and contribution. see 1 Pars. Shipp. & Adm. p. 338, and sequitur. In Backhouse v. Sneed. 1 Murphy (N. C.) 173, the rudder was broken by the force of the sea, and the cargo, in consequence, lost. The rudder had the appearance of soundness, but proved to be internally rotten, though its rottenness was unknown to the owner. Held. the carrier liable. Where the master in good faith incurs great expense in securing the safety of both ship and cargo, the cargo is liable to contribution, without reference to the question whether the expense might have been lessened had tlie cargo been separated from the vessel. Goodwillie v. McCarthy. 45 Ill. 187. The master has no power to bind the vessel for a contract to tow a disabled vessel from one port to another. Kimball v. The Dispatch [Case No. 7,773].</p>

<p>Case No. 10,273.</p> <p>Fbeight — Weight bt Invoice — Expense of Weighi ng — Costs.</p> <p>1. The owner of a bark filed a libel against her cargo of hides to recover freight. The hides were shipped in Buenos Ayres, to be delivered at New York on payment of freight at so much per pound. They arrived in good order, and were tendered to the consignee, to be delivered on payment of $1,515 79, freight. This amount was arrived at by taking the weight stated in the invoice and entry presented by the consignee at the custom house on his entry of the goods. The bill of lading did not state any weight. As the consignee refused to pay the amount claimed, the owner of the ship filed a libel against the hides to recover the freight, and the consignee gave a stipulation for value, and took them. On the trial, the consignee proved an actual weighing of the hides after they were delivered, in accordance with which the freight would be $1,417 01: Meld, that, in the absence of a statement of weights in the bill of lading, the ship was entitled to freight only on the weight delivered, and that the weight stated in the invoice and entry was not conclusive on the consignee;</p> <p>2. The ship is bound to weigh the cargo, whenever a weighing is necessary to enable her to compute her freight;</p> <p>[Cited in Henderson v. Three Hundred Tons of Iron Ore, 38 Fed. 39.]</p> <p>3. The ship was entitled to a decree for the amount of freight calculated on the weight proved to have been actually delivered, viz., $1,417 01.</p> <p>4. And it appearing that the answer admitted that freight was due, but that the amount admitted to be due was not tendered or paid into court: Held, that the libellants were entitled to costs.</p>

This was an appeal from a sentence of condemnation In the district court of the Southern district of New-York. The libel stated that ninety-five bales of paper were, on the 28th day of November, 1S17, imported in several ships from France into the United States, and entered at the custom-house in New-York, but were not invoiced according to the actual cost at the place of exportation. Collection Law, § 66.

This was a cause of collision- by the master of the Aurora against the Nineveh for damage received in Massachusetts Bay. The libel was filed March 20. 1868, and a claim was duly filed and the vessel released on bail.

<p>Case No. 10,375.</p> <p>Internal Revenue Seizure — Certificate of Probable Cause — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Property was seized by a collector of internal revenue on SeptemDer 26, 1867, and was next day released to the claimant on a bond given under the 48th section of the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 238). On October 10, 1867, an information was filed against the property. On October 22d, the collector made a new seizure of such of the property first seized as could be found in the possession of the claimant. No information was filed on that seizure.. The circuit court, on a writ of error, decided that the first seizure was abandoned, and the claimant was entitled to judgment. The collector then applied to this court for a certificate of probable cause. Held, that the application must be denied for want of jurisdiction.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This cause comes up by appeal from the decree of the judge of the district court dismissing the libel. The suit was in per-sonam for seamen’s wages against the owners of the ship Niphon. The libelants were mariners of said ship, on a voyage from the Sandwich Islands to Nantucket, on monthly wages.

<p>Case No. 10,278.</p> <p>Master’s Wages — Misconduct.</p> <p>An owner of a vessel, who was sued by her master for a balance of wages, set up as a de-fence misconduct of the master in taking the vessel into the port of San Andros, W. I., without instructions, and neglecting to repair her while there. It appeared .that the owner’s written instructions did not direct the master to go to San Andros, but did direct him to secure all the cargo he could, of a certain debtor of the owner, and that it was representations of such debtor which induced the master to go to that port It also appeared that the owner’s letter to him, written after news of his arrival at San Andros, made no complaint. It appeared, also, that a survey was held at San Andros, which pronounced the vessel unseaworthy, and that the master waited for instructions from his owner before selling her, and that, after his return to New York, the owner gave him a letter of recommendation as an honest and sober man. Meld, that the charge of misconduct was not made out. and that the master was entitled to the balance of his wages.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,279.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Security for Costs — Shipping Commissioner.</p> <p>A libel was filed by a seaman for balance of wages due and clothing destroyed. The claimant moved that he be required to file security for costs, showing by an affidavit of the United States shipping commissioner that a receipt in full for the wages had been given before such commissioner by the seaman. Reid, that the creation of the office of shipping commissioner gives courts of admiralty greater assurance than formerly that the just demands of the seaman have been discharged in any settlement made before the commissioner; and that the rule, allowing a seaman to libel without giving security, must be modified in eases where the seaman has been paid off before the shipping commissioner.</p>

In this case Register Hurley certified that in the due course of such proceedings the following questions, pertinent to the same, arose, and were stated and agreed to by W. P.Maulsby, Esq., attorney for assignees, and A. D. Merrick, Esq., attorney for the bankrupt [Thomas Noakes]: First. “Where the assignees have taken property found in possession of the bankrupt belonging to other parties, how are the real owners to recover it, and before what tribunal?” Second. “Are the…

<p>[This was a motion by Samuel Noblet and others in a suit against the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,282.</p> <p>First Meeting or Creditors — Contested Votes —Power op Register.</p> <p>Where, at the first meeting of the creditors of a bankrupt, one creditor objected to the reception of the votes of other creditors, offering to prove that their votes had been influenced by the bankrupt, and were collusive and fraudulent, held, that the register had no power, without the special order of the court, to inquire into the right of creditors to vote, save for the purpose of postponing the proof of claims until an assignee should be- chosen.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Herrman. Case No. 6.426; Re Bininger, Id. 1,421; Re Hunt, Id. 6,884.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,284.</p> <p>Patents for Inventions — Infringement — Injunction — Abandonment.</p> <p>[1. Letters patent No. 3.188 were issued July 20, 1843, to Charles L. Noe, for an alleged discovery in making hats or caps of horsehair braid, “by sewing the edges of the braid together with horsehair.” The only novelty in the invention was the use of horsehair in sewing, instead of cotton or silk thread, theretofore used. Held that, in a suit for infringing this patent, an injunction would not be granted in the first instance, especially as the patent had been very recently taken out, and never quietly enjoyed by the plaintiff.]</p> <p>[2. 9 Laws Bior. & D. 1019, 1020, § 7 (5 Stat 354), provides that every purchaser of a newly-invented device prior to the application of the inventor for a patent shall have the right to use and vend the specific device without liability to the inventor, “and no patent shall be held to be invalid for reason of such purchase * * * except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public; or that such purchase * * * has been for more than two years prior to such application for a patent.” Mdd, that this act applies to purchases from persons other than the inventor, and does not affect existing decisions as to what acts done by the inventor will bar his right to a patent.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Charles L. Noe against John H. Prentice and Arehibold L. Finn for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a patent. Heard on demurrer.]

<p>Case No. 10,285.</p> <p>Land Grant in California.</p> <p>Entitled to confirmation under the ruling of the supreme court in Fremont’s Case [17 How. (58 U. S.) 542.]</p> <p>[NOTE. There was an application on behalf of the United States for an appeal in this case. The case was subsequently heard upon object tions to' the application, which objections were overruled and the appeal granted. Case No. 10,286. Upon the appeal in the supreme court the decree of the district court was reversed, and order entered that upon the case being remanded the petition of the plaintiff be dismissed. 23 How. (64 U. S.) 312.)</p>

<p>[This was a suit by James Noé, claiming the island of Sacramento, at the first hearing of which the claim was sustained. Case No. 10,285.) Heard on application for an order granting an appeal in behalf of the United States.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,387.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Citizenship.</p> <p>The defendant executed a note to S. Strous or order. Strous indorsed it in blank, and then redelivered it to the defendant, who thereupon delivered it to the plaintiffs. The declaration averred that it was an accommodation note, and that Strous never had any interest in it. Eeld, that, under the 11th section of the judiciary act [1 Stat. 78], the court has no jurisdiction of the case unless it appear by an averment in the declaration that Strous, as well as the plaintiffs, is a citizen of a state other than Indiana. But the rule is otherwise as to foreign bills of exchange, bills and notes payable to-bearer, and suits by indorsees against their immediate indorsers.</p> <p>[Cited in Cooper v. Thompson, Case No. 3,-202.]</p> <p>NOTE. That notes payable to bearer are within the above exception to the 11th section, consult, also, Wood v. Dummer [Case No. 17,-944]; Bonnafee v. Williams, 3 How. [44 U. S.] 574. Nor is a bail-bond, for it is but an incident to the original suit. Bobyshall v. Oppenheimer [Case No. 1,592]. Nor a judgment recovered in a state court, though the original cause of action was a negotiable instrument on which the federal court would not have taken jurisdiction. Dexter v. Smith [Id. 3.866]. The prohibition as to suits to recover the contents of any promissory notes or chose in action does not apply to an action of replevin to recover the instrument itself. Deshler v. Dodge, 16 How. [57 U. S.] 622; Clarke v. City of Janesville [Case No. 2,854], An executor or administrator is not an assignee, within the meaning of the prohibition. Mayer v. Foulkrod [Id. 9,341]. Nor is an indorsee, as against his immediate in-dorser. Evans v. Gee. 11 Pet. [36 U. S.] 80; Keary v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank of Memphis, 16 Pet. [41 U. S.] 89; Campbell v. Jordan [Case No. 2,362). In an action by an as-signee against a remote endorser, he must show that the intermediate endorser could have maintained an action in the circuit court. Fry v. Rousseau [Id. 5.141]; Molían v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. [22 U. S.] 537; Campbell v. Jordan [supra]. In a suit by an assignee, the pleadings must show that his assignor could have maintained an action in the circuit court. Rogers v. Linn [Case No. 12,015]. And in an action by the endorsee against the maker the citizenship of the payee must be set forth, in order to sustain the jurisdiction. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dali. [4 U. S.] 8. And, under the general issue, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that his assignor might have sustained his action in the federal court. Bradley v. Rhines’ Adm’rs, 8 Wall. [75 U. S.] 393.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,288.</p> <p>Bankbüptct — Limitations—Pkovable Debt.</p> <p>In Wisconsin, a demand barred by the statute of limitations is not provable against the estate of a bankrupt.</p> <p>[Cited in Nicholas v. Murray, Case No. 10,-223.]</p> <p>NOTE. The statute of limitation is in Wisconsin a bar to the recovery of any dividend paid more than six years previous to the commencement of the suit: the statute commences to run when the misapplication is made. Main v. Mills [Case No. 8.974],</p> <p>[Contra, BLODGETT, District Judge in Re Reed [Id. 11,635], held that the defense of the statute of limitations should be allowed to the claim of a creditor seeking to prove his debt in bankruptcy, wherever that defense might have been made in a suit in the state where the debt- or resides.]8</p>

This case being set down for trial at- the present term of this court, the counsel of the defendant moved for a continuance, claiming it as a matter of right, and assigning for cause — what was admitted to be the fact— that the defendant is a member of congress, and at this time in attendance upon congress at Washington City. It appeared also that the defendant was sick at Washington, and had been unable to subpoena his witnesses or prepare his cause for trial.

<p>[In the matter of James Nolan, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of Nooman & Connolly, bankrupts.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Wisconsin.) In bankruptcy. Josiah A. Noonan and Peter MeNab were partners prior to June 2d, 1870. On that day proceedings were commenced by MeNab in the state court to put an end to the partnership. and for an account. The state court appointed a receiver, who took charge of the assets of the firm.

This was an application for a separate decree in bankruptcy by Nicholas G. Nor-cross, who had been carrying on business in partnership with one Fisk, under the firm of “Fisk & Norcross.” Objections were filed, and it was insisted that the petitioner was bound to set forth in his schedule an account of the partnership property, and what part or proportion he was entitled to therein, in order that the assignee might take possession thereof; that having failed so to do he had…

• [This was an action by Otis Norcross and others against Philip Greely, Jr., the collector of the port of Boston, to recover a certain amount paid for duties claimed to have been illegally exacted.]

<p>In admiralty. Libel by Jacob Nordlinger and another against the schooner Catherina for damages for injury to cargo.</p> <p>This was a libel filed to recover for damages to cargo. It is alleged that in December, 1S55, thirty-one bales of merchandise were shipped on board the schooner in good order at Rotterdam, for which the master signed a bill of lading, and that only fifteen bales were delivered, and claimed, damages for the loss of the rest. The answer denied all the allegations of the libel, except that certain merchandise was received on board, said to contain seed, which was stowed m the proper and usual manner and delivered in the same order as received, damages for which the respondent is not liable excepted. The testimony showed that the merchandise was hemp seed. The bill of lading admitted its receipt in good order, and contained no exception of the perils of the seas, but it contained the clause, “Weight and contents unknown.” It was proved by the mate of the schooner that the seed was well stowed on the top of 'the cargo below deck. The sixteen bags were rotted by the steam or sweat of the hold, and the seed came out into the hold, was mixed up with the dirt, &c., in the hold, and was gathered up and put into bags on unloading the vessel, but the libelants refused to receive it in that condition. The voyage lasted seventy-two days, and the weather was bad. No other proof was given of the loss of the cargo than the testimony of the mate.</p>

In admiralty, for supplies furnished and for seamen’s wages. James M. Butt files two libels for supplies •furnished on the credit of the boats about to be named. William H. H. Cory, engineer of the same boats, plying across Norfolk harbor, files two libels, one against each of them. The boats are ferry steamers which were used on the Ferry Point or Berkeley Ferry, named the Norfolk and the Union.

<p>These companies [The Insurance Company of North America, the Franklin Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia, and the Aet-na, Phoenix, and Hartford Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn.] in December, A. D. 1872, had insurance on Mr. Chapman’s store at Carbondale, Illinois, in which Norman was a clerk, which was burned. Upon the advice of a detective, Norman was arrested as the incendiary, but the information inculpating him subsequently proved false. Norman, therefore, brought suits against all of the above-named companies for a conspiracy to arrest him and for false imprisonment. The question as to whether the agents of the companies authorized the arrests, or whether the detective acted upon his own responsibility, was a disputed fact; but in reference to the liability of the companies in the case the jury should find the arrest to have been authorized, Judge TREAT charged the jury as follows.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,300.</p> <p>Akkest op Debtok — Time within Which to Chakge Body in Execution — Absconding Debtok, Who Is— Constitutionality of Law to Akkest and Impkison — Action fok False Impkisonment — Probable Cause — Damaqes.</p> <p>1. A creditor who has caused the provisional arrest of an absconding debtor under section 106 of the Code (Code Or. 164) has until the time allowed for a return of an execution against property to charge the body of such debtor in execution.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Griswold, 11 Fed. 80S.]</p> <p>2. An absconding debtor is one who is about to leave the state, either openly or secretly, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors of their just debts.</p> <p>3. A debtor who is about to remove from this state without the consent of his creditors and without a mind to return, is presumed to be acting with such intent, and prima facie he is an absconding debtor.</p> <p>4. The legislature has power to authorize the arrest and imprisonment of such a debtor so ns to enable his creditors to enforce the establishment and collection of their debts by legal proceedings in the tribunals of this state.</p> <p>5. There can be no recovery in an action for false imprisonment when it appears that the affidavit on which the defendant procured the arrest of the plaintiff is sufficient on its face, because then there is no trespass; and if the affidavit be false, the action must be for malicious prosecution, in which both malice and want of probable cause must be alleged and proved.</p> <p>6. In an action for false imprisonment, the question of probable cause is only material in mitigation of damages.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,301.</p> <p>Executors and Administrators — Profitable Investment — Accounting to Legatee —Costs of Suit.</p> <p>1. Where $1,000 was given to a legatee by a will, the money to be raised out of the testator’s estate, and paid over to the legatee; and the executor and; trustee under the will, having raised the money, instead of paying it to the legatee, purchased bank stock with it; and after-wards, when called on by the legatee to account, sold the bank stock, and paid over the proceeds, $1,460.34, to the duly authorized agent of the legatee, which he received as and for the $1,000 legacy, the stock having been sold with his knowledge and assent, held that, as there was no evidence the legatee was advised of the purchase of the bank stock, or ever assented to it, the executor had a right to sell the stock and pay over the proceeds.</p> <p>2. Until the investment was sanctioned by the legatee, he had a right to claim the money; and until then, too, the executor had a right to recall or change the investment, or pay over the legacy, being bound, if any profits were made by the investment, to account for them, and to make up the loss, if any.</p> <p>3. The stock did not belong to the legatee, and the executor was guilty of no conversion or wrong in selling it.</p> <p>4. In a suit in equity against an executor and trustee for an account, where it appears that he acted in good faith in the execution of his trust, but .misapprehended his duty in the particulars in respect to which he is charged in the final decree, he will, where a balance is found by a master’s report to be due from him. be charged with interest only from the date of the report on the sum found due.</p> <p>[Cited in Robinett’s Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 186.]</p> <p>5. But. he will be charged with the costs of the suit, although he succeeded on several points in it, and greatly reduced the amount claimed from him. The balance found was contested by him, and the suit was necessary to recover it.</p>

In bankruptcy. Proof of debt. Appeal by the assignees from the allowance by Mr. Register Fessenden of a proof of debt against firm assets.

In bankruptcy. Proof of debt. Question certified by Mr. Register Fessenden.

Petition in bankruptcy. Philip H. Em-merson, the assignee of James W. Norris, bankrupt, filed his petition in this court, alleging that said James W. Norris, within six months before the petition for adjudication of bankruptcy was filed against him, and in the month of November, 1S69, he being then solvent, and in contemplation of bankruptcy, did sell and cause to be conveyed and delivered to Charlotte M. Rogers, certain real estate in the city of Battle Creek, in this…

This was an action of assumpsit, to recover of the defendants [George L. Cook, and others] the proceeds of the sales of a vessel and part of a cargo of lumber, consigned by the plaintiffs, who were merchants at Bristol, Rhode Island, to the defendants who were merchants at San Francisco, California, and also to recover the amount which ought to have been received from the sale of the residue of the cargo, which was consumed by fire, on shore, at the last mentioned place.

This was a libel [by John Norris and others] claiming salvage compensation for services rendered by the schooner Kensington to the bark Island City, and was like Adams v. The Island City [Case No. 55], certified to this court. The nature of the service is sufficiently set forth in the report of that cause. A few days after the libel was filed, William C. Norton et al., as owners of the schooner, filed their petition to become parties to the libel.

<p>Case No. 10,307.</p> <p>Slavery — Damaoes for Harboring Fugitives— Arrest op Fugitive — Habeas Corpus by State Court — Sufficiency of Affidavits — Held under Authority of toe United States.</p> <p>1. Under the constitution of the United States, the master of fugitives from labor may arrest them wheiever they shall be found, if he can do so without a breach of the peace, and take them back to the state from whence they fled.</p> <p>2. A state judge, on proper affidavit being made, may issue a writ of habeas corpus, and inquire into the cause of detention.</p> <p>[Quoted in Ex parte Robinson. Case No. 11,-934: Ex parte Sifford. Id. 12,848. Cited in Re Reynolds. Id. 11,722; Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 4 Sup. Ct. 546.]</p> <p>[Cited in Re Robb, 64 Cal. 433, 1 Pac. 883.]</p> <p>3. The affidavit of a colored person is sufficient for this purpose.</p> <p>4. Every person within the jurisdiction of a state owes to it an allegiance. He is amenable to the laws of the state, and the state is bound to protect him in the exercise of his legal rights.</p> <p>5.When it appears, by the' return to the ha-beas corpus, that the fugitives are in the legal custody of the master, and the facts of the return are not denied, there is an end to the jurisdiction of the state judge. His jurisdiction is special and limited.</p> <p>[Quoted in Ex parte Robinson, Case No. 11,-934. Cited in Ex parte Sifford, Id. 12,848; Re Farrand, Id. 4,678; Re Reynolds, Id. 11,-</p> <p>6. When it appears the. fugitives are held under the authority of the Union, it is paramount to that of the state</p> <p>[Quoted in Ex parte Robinson, Case No. 11,-934. Cited in Case of Electoral College, Id. 4.336.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa, 93. Cited in Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. St. 303; McConologue’s Case, 107 Mass. 167; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Fitch, 20 Ind. 506.]</p> <p>7. And so when an individual is held under the authority of a state, the federal judiciary have no power to release the person so held. [Cited in Re Reynolds, Case No. 11,722.]</p> <p>8. If the return to the habeas corpus be denied, the master must prove that his custody of the slaves is legal.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Robb, 64 Cal. 433, 1 Pac. 883.]</p> <p>9. If he fail to do this, or make an insufficient return, the state rudge may release the fugitives.</p> <p>10. But the master may subsequently arrest them, and prove them to be his slaves.</p> <p>11. The master, though he may arrest without any exhibition of claim, or judicial sanction, when required, must show a right to the services of the fugitives.</p>

This is a suit instituted against both vessel and captain to recover the amount of sundry necessary articles of skip chandlery, supplied by the actors for the use of this brig, at the request of the captain. It is contended, on the part of the majority of the owners, that the vessel should not be liable, because, at the time they purchased their shares, the captain [Caesar Peronne] engaged to pay all outfits and expenses.

<p>Case No. 10,310.</p> <p>BANKlirPTCV — Assigxmbxt to Ckeditoii within Six Weeks op Filing of Petition.</p> <p>A debtor made an assignment of his stock in trade and notes of hand to one of his creditors within six weeks of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the debtor. Assignment held void under section thirty-five of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)]; and assignee in bankruptcy entitled to recover from the preferred creditor the value of the goods and notes thus transferred to him.</p> <p>[Cited in Mathews v. Riggs, 80 Me. 110, 13 Atl. 49.]</p>

In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction. The bill claimed that the defendants [James Kershaw and others] weie violating two letters patent belonging to the plaintiffs [O. B. North & Co.], for improvements in the manufacture of harness-saddles.

<p>Case No. 10,312.</p> <p>Attachment — Jurisdiction’ —What Constitutes Concealment — No Issuing or Process Necessart.</p> <p>1. Where the defendant is a citizen of Illinois, and the plaintiff a citizen of -another state, and an attachment writ is served upon property, and defendant personally served with process, this court can take cognizance of the case.</p> <p>2. A man who leaves a place to avoid service of process, requesting false information to be given, of his movements “conceals himself so that process cannot be served upon him” within the meaning of the attachment lav,’ of Illinois.</p> <p>3. Circumstances authorizing the issuing of an attachment stated.</p> <p>4. It is not necessary that process should be first issued, or thrt an attempt should be made by an officer to find him. It is sufficient if he so conceal himself that an attempt to serve process would be useless.</p> <p>5. The concealment may be at a distance as truly as _where he resides, and if it turn out that he was in another county, it is no objection that process was not issued to that county.</p>

<p>[Libel in rem by George W. Carey and other's against the cargo and materials of the ship North America, for salvage.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,314.</p> <p>Seaman’s Wages — Fireman—Injury on Board Ship — Medical Treatment on Shore.</p> <p>1. A seaman injured while in the service of the ship, is entitled to medical treatment at the expense of the ship.</p> <p>[Cited in Longstreet v.. The R. R. Springer, 4 Fed. 672.]</p> <p>[Cited in Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N. Y. 216, 13 • N. E. 797.]</p> <p>2. A fireman on board a steamer is a seaman.</p> <p>3. A fireman shipped for a voyage from New York to Rio Janeiro and back. When a few days out from New York, he injured one of his arms, while in the discharge of his duty, so as to be unable to work. When the ship arrived at St. Thomas, he went.to a hospital, and remained there under surgical treatment till the ship returned, when he went on board and came home, doing no work. He. was sent to the -hospital on the judgment of the officers of the ship, as well as his own. The ship paid his expenses at the hospital, without consulting him, and they amounted to more than his wages for the voyage. Meld, that he was entitled to recover wages for the whole voyage.</p> <p>[Cited in Longstreet v. The R. R. Springer, 4 Fed. 672.]</p>

<p>Case Ko. 10,315.</p> <p>Equity — Reformation of Insurance Policy.</p> <p>1. A court of equity has power to reform and cancel an insurance policy issued by mistake for a greater length of time than was intended by the parties.</p> <p>2. Circumstances stated under which a policy will be cancelled even after a loss has occurred.</p> <p>NOTE. If by fraud or mistake the terms of the order for insurance have been departed from in the policy, the court will consider the order as containing the contract between the parties, and variance from the order, unless contradicted by the proof, would be evidence of mistake. But the order can only be resorted to, so far as it varies from the policy, and in all other respects the policy will govern. Delaware Ins. Co. v. Hogan [Case No. 3,765]; Collett v. Morrison. 9 Hare. 162.</p> <p>If from mistake, the policy has been so framed. as not to correspond with the previous agreement of the parties, the error may be corrected, and the policy reformed in a court of equity; but this equitable power of remodeling a written agreement, is wisely exercised with extreme caution, and only upon the clearest evidence. To justify the remedial action of the court, the existence of the mistake, if positively denied by the insurer, must be established by proof morally irresistible. 1 Duer. Ins. p. 71.</p> <p>A court of equity is the proper tribunal to reform a pplicy, but the evidence for this purpose mustkhe very clear. Henkle v. Royal Exeh. Assur. Co., 1 Ves. Sr. 317.</p> <p>If a policy, when drawn and received, does not correctly express a previously concluded agreement for insurance, which it was designed by both parties to execute, equity will reform it. Oliver v. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co. [Case No. 10.498].</p> <p>There cannot be any doubt that a court of equity lias authority to reform a contract, where there has been an omission of a material stipulation by mistake. A policy of insurance is within this principle. But a court ought to be extremely cautious in the exercise of such an authority. It ought to withhold its aid where the mistake is not made out by the clearest evidence. Andrews v. Essex, etc., Ins. Co. [Case No. 374]: Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Gurnee, 1 Paige. 278.</p> <p>In the above cases the loss had occurred before bill filed.</p>

This was a libel by Jacob Johnson and others against the schooner North Cape, George Von Hollen and the city of Chicago, for possession of the schooner North Cape. The admitted facts are that said schooner was on the 1st day of May, 1874, owned by the libel-lants, Jacob Johnson, Spier Amundson, and Neis Peterson — Johnson owning one-half, and the others each a quarter interest — Johnson and Amundson residing in this city, and Peterson at Lake View.

The ship North Carolina was captured, on the 14th of May, 1861, at sea, off Cape Henry, by the United States ship Quaker City, under the command of Acting Master S. W. Mathew, and was libelled by the United States and her captors, as subject to forfeiture, for violation of the blockade of the Virginia ports, and as enemy’s property. On the trial the United States district attorney abandoned all the other charges than that she is the property of enemies.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [The ship North Carolina was captured by the libelants, and was adjudged by the district court to be lawful prize of war, and was ■ordered to be condemned, with costs of the suit. Case No. 10,316a. From that decree the owners of the North Carolina appeal.]

[This was a bill in equity by the state of North Carolina against the trustees of University and C. W. Dewey, assignee, and others.]

This libel in admiralty was brought for the value of a cargo of wheat, shipped in bulk at Hastings, in Minnesota, on the barge Pat Brady, to be towed by the steamboat Keokuk on the Mississippi river, and delivered at La Crosse, in Wisconsin, in good order, the unavoidable dangers of river and fire only excepted.

Various libels in rem were filed in the district court against the steamboat Northern. Indiana, to recover damages for a collision. HALL, District Judge. Considerable time-having elapsed since the argument of these causes, I have examined with great care the very full minutes of testimony taken by meat the hearing, and have endeavored to ascertain, with as much certainty as practicable, the material facts upon which the rights of the parties depend.

<p>Case No. 10,321.</p> <p>Corporations — Where Amenable to Process— Necessary Parties to Action-Local Action.</p> <p>1. A corporation is not amenable to process, ■except in the state where its business is done.</p> <p>2. A corporation in Indiana cannot sue, in that state, a corporation doing business in the state of Michigan.</p> <p>3. Persons or corporations interested, must be made parties, especially where the object of the bill cannot be attained, without seriously affecting the interests of such persons or corporations.</p> <p>4. When a subject is essentially local, as trespass on real estate, &c., the action must be brought in the state where the injury was done.</p> <p>[NOTE. An appeal was taken to the supreme court from a decree of the Michigan circuit court dismissing the bill. Case not reported. This decree was affirmed upon the appeal. 15 How. (56 U. S.) 233.]</p>

The register certified to the district court, that the first meeting of creditors for the choice of an assignee was commenced December 10, 1875, and concluded January 5, 1876; on which last day' there were present twenty-seven creditors, the aggregate of whose claims amounted to sixteen thousand three hundred and seventy-seven dollars and one cent. Five creditors, whose claims amounted to seven hundred and twenty dollars and twenty-six cents, were absent.

<p>Case No. 10,324.</p> <p>Foreign Corporation — Eminent Domain — Negligence — Time of Occupation — Damages for Negligence — Sinking Caused by Weight of Wall.</p> <p>1. A foreign corporation has the right to hold and occupy as lessee or otherwise, such property as is necessary or convenient for the transaction of its business.</p> <p>2. A municipal corporation has a right to enter upon a street, or tunnel under a street, for the purpose of making public improvements; and also has a right for the same purpose to enter upon, occupy and obstruct a portion of the river in front of plaintiff’s lot, and construct a coffer-dam there if it was necessary in order to enable it to construct the tunnel.</p> <p>3. Under such circumstances, however, the city would be liable for damages if it did not use due skill, care and dispatch, so as not to unnecessarily interfere with private property.</p> <p>4. The fact that the street and river were used for a great length of time makes no difference, as the injury, if any. is only greater in degree, provided however, that they were not used longer than was necessary.</p> <p>5. The city would be liable for damages caused by the sinking of a wall by reason of the excavation, if they could be charged with negligence.</p> <p>6. But if such sinking was caused not by the weight of earth but by the superinduced pressure of the weight of the wall, there would be no iiability.</p> <p>[Plaintiff appealed to the supreme court, where the judgment of this court was affirmed. 99 U. S. 035.]'</p>

<p>Case No. 10,323.</p> <p>Collision — Steamehs Approaching Wharf. ‘In admiralty.</p> <p>[For hearing on exceptions to commissioner’s report, see Case No. 10,330.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem by one of the deck hands of the steamer Alliance against the schooner Northern Warrior, for damages to his person received in a collision of the two vessels. The owners of the schooner made claim, and answered that the collision occurred without her fault, .but from the fault of the steamer.

<p>Case No. 10,326.</p> <p>Collision* in New York Harbor — Steamboats Crossing — Wrongful Stopping — Speed.</p> <p>1. The steam-tug H., with a schooner lashed to her port side, was on her way from Hoboken, N. J.. to a place south of Governor’s Island. The steamboat N., a ferry-boat running from New York to Staten Island, left her slip at Whitehall, and su'ung around with the ebb tide, on a port helm, changing her direction from south to south-w'est. until she should be clear of Governor’s Island, when her course would be about south, to Staten Island. The course of the H. was about south. The N. was going from ten to twelve knots an hour and the H. about two. When the vessels were about 300 yards apart, the H.. without giving any signal, stopped and backed. The N. was then on a port helm, intending to pass under the stern of the H. As soon as the stopping of the H. was seen, the N. put her helm hard a-port, and also stopped her engine and attempted to reverse it, but. owing to her speed, it was only on the third attempt that the engineer was able to get the engine to pass the centre. The engine made one or two turns back before the collision. The N. struck the schooner in the side, injuring her so that she sank. The excuse given by the H. for stopping was, that the cleets to which the lines that held the schooner were fastened, were so loose that it was feared that the swell caused by the near passage of the N. ahead of 'her. where it was supposed the N. intended to pass, would have caused the breaking loose of the schooner. A libel was filed on behalf of the schooner against both steamboats. Held, that, as the vessels were crossing, and the N. had the H. on her starboard side, it was the duty of the H." to keep on, and of the N. to keep out of her way.</p> <p>[Cited M.The Britannia. 34 Fed. 553; S. C. 153 U. S. 142, 14 Sup. Ct. 799.]</p> <p>2. The H., therefore, was in fault in stopping and backing.</p> <p>[Cited in The Britannia. 34 Fed. 552; The Fountain City. 10 C. C. A. 278. 62 Fed. 91. Distinguished in dissenting opinion in The Britannia, 153 U. S. 153, 14 Sup. Ct. 803.}</p> <p>3. The excuse set up by her for so doing was itself a fault. She had no business to be navigating with cleets so loose.</p> <p>4. The N. was not in fault in her rate of speed, that being shown to be her usual rate.</p> <p>5. She had the right to assume that the H. would keep on, and to shape her own course so as to pass under the stern of the H., if the latter kept on.</p> <p>[Cited in The Susquehanna, 35 Fed. 323.]</p> <p>6. The stoppage of the H. was the cause of the collision; and the inability on the part of the N. to reverse her engine before she did, was not a fault.</p> <p>[Cited in The St. Johns. 34 Fed. 766; The Britannia, 153 U. S. 142, 14 Sup. Ct. 799.]</p> <p>7. The H. was solely liable for the damage.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this court was affirmed. Case unreported. An appeal was then taken to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was affirmed. 154 U. S. 629, 14 Sup. Ct. 1184.]</p>

Motion to rescind a decree entered by default, and allow respondent to answer. The motion was made upon two grounds: (1) Because of mistake by respondent as to return day of the citation; with general allegations of a meritorious defense. (2) Because Judge WILKINS, who signed the decree as district judge, was not such at the time of entry and signing of the decree, he having ceased to be such by his previous resignation; and the decree is therefore a nullity.

This suit was brought [by Frank Northrup and others against Samuel Adams] for the alleged infringement of a design patent for a provision or cheese-safe. The invention described in the patent was a rectangular base, with a top supported by four corner-posts, with an intermediate stile or support, diving each side into vertical panels, all of which were covered with wire-cloth of fine mesh.

<p>Case No. 10,329.</p> <p>Banks and Banking — Taxation under Internal Revenue Act — License—Definition of “ Broker. ”</p> <p>1. Bankers, confining themselves to the business of banking only, as such business is described in subdivision 1 of section 79 of the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 251), and which is not included in the business of a broker.' described in subdivision 9 of said section 79 (Id. 252), as amended by the act of March 3, 1865 (Id. 472), are only liable to pay the banker’s license fee and percentages mentioned in subdivision 1.</p> <p>2. Such bankers, without any further or additional license or license fee, may transact the business of a broker described in subdivision 9, while the mere broker must pay ?50 for his license. But, if a banker does business as a broker, he subjects his sales to the duties imposed by section 99 of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 273).</p> <p>3. A person who buys stocks in his own name, for his customers, for a commission, and advances the purchase money on the security of a percentage of such price, deemed sufficient, and deposited with him as security against loss, and sells the stocks for another commission, and settles the account according to the resulting balance to the credit of the customer, having no interest except his commissions and interest, or interest and commissions on his advances, the whole being at the risk, and for the account, of the customer, as to profit or loss, does business as a broker, within the meaning of the acts in question, and subjects his sales to the duties imposed by section 99 aforesaid.</p> <p>4. Such duties thereupon become chargeable on all his sales, whether of his own property, or of the property of others coming to his possession. and held, for advances made by him as a banker, or purchased and sold on speculation for the account of others, on commission.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Anthony v. International Bank, 93 Ill. 227.]</p> <p>5. Whether, when a tax is paid to a collector of internal revenue, without objection, or notice, in any form, that the party paying deems is erroneous, and the collector pays over the money to the government, the collector is thereafter liable in an action to recover it back, and whether such an action, if maintainable, can be brought until after such an appeal to the commissioner of internal revenue as is required tiv section 19 of the act of July 13, I860 (14 Stat. 152), quere.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,330.</p> <p>Damaqes roit Collision — Detention for Repairs — Interest—Commissioner’s Report.</p> <p>1. The owner of a vessel damaged by collision may recover for the necessary detention to make repairs when it is made to appear that she could have been profitably chartered or employed during the period of detention. Following Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. [54 U. S.] 101.</p> <p>2. He is also entitled to recover interest on the actual cost of the necessary repairs from the time payment therefor was actually made.</p> <p>3. The report of a commissioner to assess damages in admiralty must be sustained unless it is quite apparent that he has erred.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York,]</p> <p>[These were libels by William H. Reynolds and others, owners of the Ella Warley, against Cornelius Vanderbilt, claimants of the North Star, and Cornelius Vanderbilt against William H. Reynolds and others. Prom a decree of the district court holding the Ella Warley in fault (case unreported), an appeal was taken to this court.]</p>

[These were libels by William H. Reynolds and others, owners of the Ella Warley, against Cornelius Vanderbilt, claimant for the North Star, and Cornelius Vanderbilt against William H. Reynolds and others, in which the district court decreed the Ella Warley to be solely in fault. (Case unreported.) An appeal was taken to the circuit court, where both vessels were held to be in fault, and the loss divided.

[This tvas a libel by Joseph Roberts and others to recover salvage from the cargo and materials saved from the ship Northwester.]

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois.] In admiralty. This was a petition for review, charging actual fraud, and setting up that the libellant was without fault, and would be without remedy unless his petition were allowed.

[This was a bill in equity by the Northwestern Distilling Company against John M. Corse, collector.] This was one of several similar bills, originally filed in the superior court, to restrain the collector from paying over money deposited by distillers for Tice meters, which had not been furnished, and which the parties did not desire to take and had no use for.

This was a bill in equity filed by the Northwestern Fertilizing Company against the town of Hyde Park and its corporate of- ■ fleers and agents, to restrain them from interfering with what were claimed to be its chartered rights, by the passage and enforcement of certain town ordinances then passed or threatened. This company was organized under a special statute of the legislature of the state of Illinois, passed March 8, 18C7 (1 Priv.

<p>Case No. 10,337.</p> <p>Patents — Effect of Error in Name of Patentee — Patent to Administrator of Inventob — Trust fob Heirs — Impeachment of Administrator’s Appointment — What Constitutes Invention — Public Trial — Anticipation — Patentability.</p> <p>1. A patent will not be void, because of an error in the Christian name of one of the pat-entees, provided it contains a description of him, by which he can be identified.</p> <p>[Cited in Bignall v. Harvey, 4 Fed. 337.]</p> <p>2. Where the Christian name of one of the patentees was erroneously stated in the patent, but he was described in it. as a joint inventor with another, and was identified as such, the patent was held to be valid, notwithstanding such error. .</p> <p>3. The decree of a court of probate, appointing ■an administrator, cannot be impeached in a suit upon a patent granted to him as the representa"tive of the inventor; such a decree must be treated as valid, until it is reversed or annulled "by some direct proceeding to that end. It cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding.</p> <p>4. A patent, granted to an administrator of a •deceased inventor, is a grant in trust for the heirs of the inventor, but it is not essential to the validity of the patent, or the efficacy of the trust, that the beneficiaries should be named upon the face of the patent. Citing Stimpson v. Rogers [Case No. 13,457].</p> <p>5. In a suit upon a patent, granted to the ad■ministrator of a deceased inventor, the heir of •the inventor, being the beneficiary of the trust raised by the grant of the patent to the administrator. is a necessary party to the suit, unless the inventor, prior to his death, had parted with :all of his inchoate or equitable title to the invention; in which ease, the administrator would take and hold the patent for the use of those up■on whom the beneficial ownership of it was devolved by the inventor’s own act before it was granted, and the heir, having no beneficial interest, would not be a necessary party to the suit.</p> <p>C. A description of an invention, contained in an application for a patent which was rejected, • cannot be given the effect which the act of congress gives to a publication, because it lacks the essential quality of a publication, in that it was not designed for general circulation, nor made accessible to the public generally.</p> <p>[Cited in Locomotive Engine Safety Truck Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., Case No. 8.453; Lyman Ventilating & Refrigerator Co. v. Lalor. Case No. 8.C32; Westinghouse v. Chartiers Val. Gas Co., 43 Fed. 588.]</p> <p>7. Although a written description of a machine. illustrated by drawings, which has not been given to the public, does not constitute an invention, still, rejected specifications and drawings may be received in evidence, after the invention is perfected, to ascrtainHhe date of the invention, the design of the inventor, and the principle, intended functions, and the mode of •operation of the mechanism.</p> <p>[Cited in Westinghouse v. Chartiers Val. Gas Co.. 43 Fed. 588.]</p> <p>8. A trial of a machine in public, which proves the capacity of the machine to effect what its inventor proposed, entitles him to the merit of having produced a complete invention, and cannot be regarded as a mere experiment, entitling a subsequent inventor to a patent for the same •invention. Gayler v. Wilder. 10 How. [51 TJ. S.] 477. and Parkhurst v. Kinsman [Case No. 10.757], distinguished.</p> <p>[Cited in The Fire-Extinguisher Case, 21 Fed. 41.]</p> <p>9. A patent for an apparatus, in which the alkaline solutions for forming carbonic acid gas were kept separate until required to extinguish .a fire, when they could be readily mingled, held void, on it appearing that similar apparatus had been employed in soda fountains for the supply •of beverages.</p> <p>10. Where an effect or result has been before produced, the mechanical agencies by which it is reproduced, if they are not in themselves new, .are not the subject of a patent.</p> <p>11. The reissued patent, for an improvement in extinguishing fires, granted July 16th, 1872. to 'Dawson Miles, as administrator of P. F. earlier. and to Alphonse A. C. Vignon, adjudged void for want of novelty in all the devices elaim- • ed.</p> <p>[Cited in Platt v. Fire-Extinguisher Manufg Co., 8 C. C. A. 357, 59 Fed. 898.]</p>

Bill to foreclose a mortgage given to plaintiff by defendants, April 14th, 1874. to secure a bond for $2,000, given by one Abraham to plaintiff, payable in five years. Tbe bond lias become due by reason of a default in tbe payment of interest. Other facts are in tbe agreed statement.

The complainant filed its bill in equity against Zebulon H. I’errill and others, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure the payment of the amount stipulated in the fulfillment of the terms and conditions contained in a certain bond; The said bond, among other things, contained the following provisions, viz.: “That if said bounden, Zebulon H. PerriH, his heirs, executors, administrators, or any of them, shall well and triily pay, or cause to be paid, unto the above…

<p>Case No. 10,340.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Reservation of Power to Alter Railroad Charter — Validity.</p> <p>1. The Wisconsin Railroad Law constitutional.</p> <p>2. The clause in the constitution providing that the charters of railroad companies “may be altered or repealed by the legislature at any time after their passage” construed.</p> <p>3. The effect of the law upon inter-state commerce not decided.</p>

This is an appeal by the libellants from the decree of the district court in admiralty, holding that there was mutual fault, and or-deriug an apportionment of the damages. The packet company above named filed a libel in admiralty in the district court, against the respondent. Atlee, to recover damages for injuries to the barge Reaney and cargo, by reason of its running against a pier placed in the Mississippi river by the respondent.

By ns charter the city of Louisiana has power to erect public wharves, and fix' the rates of wharfage thereat. The rates of wharfage for steamboats and boats in tow are fixed by section 3 of an ordinance of said city of Louisiana, in relation to the wharf, etc., entitled, “An ordinance in relation to the wharf; regulating the duties of city marshal, ex-officio wharf master, and prescribing and fixing the rates of wharf-age.” approved February 10, 1S67, as follows: “Section 3.

This action against the city of St. Louis is to recover back wharfage dues, collected by the c-it.v in 1870, 1S71, and up to March, 1872, from the plaintiff's boats. The payments were made under “written protest, without waiving the right of the owners of the boats to recover tiie same from tbe city by an action at law.”

<p>Case No. 10,343.</p> <p>Wharfage Dues.</p> <p>[See Case No. 10,340.]</p>

The plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of Iowa, and was engaged during the years 1870 and 1871 in running its boats and barges on the Mississippi river for the transportation of freight and passengers. This action is brought to recover money illegally demanded and paid under protest, for the privilege of stopping in the port of St. Paul.

<p>Case Ko. 10,347.</p> <p>Land Grants — Patents — Title — Tecsts — Taxation.</p> <p>1. Under a government land grant to a railway company, the patents for the land were to be issued, pro tanto, on the completion of any twenty consecutive miles of road, and it was provided in the grant that the lands thereby granted should, when patented, be subject to the disposal of the company, for the purposes of construction and equipment and no other: Held, that this did not create the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, between the railroad company and the government as to lands so patented, but that the patents when issued vested the complete title in the company.</p> <p>2. Such lands upon the issuing of the patents become subject to taxation.</p> <p>3. It seems that the remedy of the government in case of misapplication of such lands, or their proceeds, would be by proceedings against the company or its officers, and that the titles of purcuasers or mortgagees of the lands could not be affected.</p>

<p>Proceedings in bankruptcy case [In re C. H. Norton] referred to Register Comstock, of Utica. Notice of the first meeting being duly served, on the return day, the register-being absent, the meeting was adjourned. On adjourned day the petitioning creditor appeared by attorney, and a number of other creditors appeared by another attorney. An informal viva voce vote was taken before the register, the attorney for petitioning creditor voting for one assignee, and the other creditors for another; the other creditors expressly opposing the selection of the assignee desired by the petitioning creditor. On application of petitioning creditor the meeting was adjourned by the register. At the adjourned session, by reason of telegrams of the attorney of petitioning creditor, the attorney for other creditors was not present, and they were not represented, when the petitioning creditor, voting viva voce for the assignee which the other creditors had before opposed, the register made a report that at such meeting, there appearing no opposing interest, he had appointed the person so voted for as assignee. Such report being received in the usual manner, was approved by the court. Motion made to set the appointment aside by the opposing creditors. Held:</p>

<p>Case No. 10,350.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Limitations—Failure op Assionee to Discover His Rights for Two Years —Act of 1867.</p> <p>1. The fact that an assignee in bankruptcy did not discover his right to certain property of the bankrupt, until after the expiration of two years from the time an action accrued to him therefor, does not remove the bar prescribed by the second section of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 518)].</p> <p>[Cited in Miltenberger v; Phillips. Case No. 9,621; Walker v. Towner, Id. 17,089; M’Can v. Conery, 12 Fed. 318; Phelan v. O’Brien, 13 Fed. 657.)</p> <p>2. The bar prescribed by that section applies to causes of action which had accrued to the bankrupt before his bankruptcy as well as to those which accrued to the assignee after the bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in Phelan v. O’Brien, 13 Fed. 657.)</p>

<p>This is a suit on the equity side of the court to charge tlie defendants [Moses A. Meader and others] as trustees of certain real property, situated in the county of Santa Cruz, and to compel a transfer of the legal title held by them to the complainant [Charles E. Norton]. It was heard on the pleadings and proofs in September, 1866, but was decided at tlie subsequent October term. As thus presented, tlie case was substantially this:</p> <p>On the thirteenth of February, 1839. three sisters, Maria Candida, Maria Jacinta, and Maria de los Angeles Castro, presented a petition to Alvarado, then governor of the department of California, for a grant of a tract of land known as El Refugio, situated in the present county of Santa Oruz. On the same day the petition was referred to the administrator of the adjoining mission, and upon his favorable report, the governor, on the sixteenth of March, 1839, made “to the parties interested” a provisional concession of the land — a concession subject to his further action in the premises, and also gave them permission to occupy the land pending the proceedings. Under this permission the petitioners entered into the possession of the premises. At the same time the governor, to obtain the proper information to guide his further action, directed the prefect of the district to report upon the subject of the petition. The prefect reported that a grant could be made of the tract solicited, as it was vacant land and not claimed by any one. Accordingly, on the eighth of April, 1839, the governor made a formal concession of the tract to the three sisters by name, referring to their petition and the report of the prefect, and declaring them “owners in fee of the land known by the name of El Refugio,” and directing that the proper grant or title papers (titulo) issue to them, and that the proceedings in the case (the expediente) be retained for the knowledge and approval of the departmental assembly. These proceedings are designated by the number 131. In this concession the name of one of the sisters. Maria de los Angeles, is now erased and over the erasure is written the name of Jose Bol-eoff. On the twenty-second of May, 1840, this concession was approved by the departmental assembly. The approval, as entered on the journals of the assembly, has upon it the number of the expediente, 131, and mentions the date of the concession, and designates the three sisters by name as the parties to whom it was made. On the thirteenth of June following, the governor, referring to the action of the assembly, directed a certificate of the approval to be issued to the three sisters. At the time the concession was made, Jose Castro was prefect of the First district, and as such officer kept a record of the grants of land made in the district. The grants made by himself, as prefect, he entered at length, but of the giants made by the governor he entered only a memorandum, designating their date, the parties to whom issued, and the land granted. A book purporting to be the original registry kept by him is now in the archives in the custody of the sur.veyor-general of the United States. It bears on its face evidence of its genuineness, and is verified in every particular, which is susceptible of verification by documents in the archives. It contains a memorandum of nine grants of the governor; eight of these grants are found in the archives. Each of them has indorsed on it a memorandum directing its entry by the prefect in his registry, and a minute by the secretary of the prefect that it has been so entered with reference to the page of the registry. The minutes on these grants of the entries in the registry correspond. Of the nine grants noted in the registry, the eighth is not found in the archives. This eighth is the one which the complainant contends was issued to the three sisters. The entry in the registry is that on the. eighth day of April, 1S39, the governor granted to them the place called Refugio. This entry was made on the day following. There is also in the archives an index of grants which was prepared between 1838 and 1845, by a clerk in the office of the secretary of state of the department, and under his direction, and is commonly known as Jimeno’s Index. This index gives the number of the expedientes, the names of the grantees, and the designation Of the land granted. Upon the index there is found against No. 131 the entry of a grant of land designated as “El Refugio,” and the name of Jose Boleoff written over an erasure. It is admitted that originally the names of the three sisters were written here. This was the documentary evidence which the complainant produced to show that a grant of the rancho El Refugio was issued to the three sisters, under whom he claimed by sundry mesne conveyances. The parol evidence produced by him related chiefly to the possession of the premises since the concession of the governor, and certain alleged admissions, verbal or by conduct, of the sisters.</p> <p>The defendants claimed title to the premises through Jose Boleoff; and of some portions of the premises they also alleged a conveyance or release from the sisters. As documentary evidence of title they produced: First, a paper purporting to be a grant of El Refugio to Jose Boleoff, by Governor Alvarado, bearing date the seventh of April, 1841; second, a certificate of Governor Alvarado, dated July 28, 1841, stating that the grant made on the eighth of April, 1839, in favor of Jose Boleoff, was approved on the twentj'-second of May, 1841, by the departmental assembly, and purporting to quote the language of the proceedings of that body. The certificate concludes by stating that it was issued to the party interested for his security, in consequence of the decree of the thirteenth of June preceding, existing in the expediente; third, a document purporting to be a record of juridical possession, given to Boleoff, July 26, 1842; fourth, a diseno or sketch of the tract El Refugio; and, fifth, a patent of the United States, bearing date on the fourth of February, I860, issued to Francisco and Juan Boleoff upon the confirmation of the alleged' grant to Jose Boleoff. In 1822, one of the sisters, Maria Candida, intermarried with Jose Boleoff, and in 1S39, Maria de los Angeles intermarried with Joseph L. Majors. The three sisters lived together as members of the family of Boleoff upon the land granted — Eos Angeles until her marriage, and Jacinta until 1850. when she became a member of a religious order in the Catholic Church, and has not since resided upon the premises. Since some time in 1850, Majors and wife had occupied a portion Of the tract, claiming their right to the possession under the grant to the sisters. In 1352, Francisco Bolcoff and Juan Bolcoff, sons of Jose Bolcoff, presented their petition to the board of land commissioners, created under the act of March 3, 1851 [9 Stat. G31], for a confirmation of the claim to El Refugio, asserted by them under the alleged grant to their father. In support of their claim they relied upon the grant of Alvarado, the certificate of approval by the departmental assembly, the record of juridical possession, and the sketch mentioned, with parol evidence of possession and cultivation. No question was raised before the board as to the genuineness of these documents, and in January, 1S55, the claim was confirmed. An appeal from the decision was dismissed, and on the fourth of February, 1S60, as already stated, a patent was issued thereon. In 1852, Majors presented for himself and on behalf of his wife a petition to the board for a confirmation cf her claim to one-third of the tract under the grant to her and her sisters. In support of the claim they produced the petition to the governor, the reports thereon, the provisional grant of March 1C, 1S39. the formal concession of April 8, 1839, and the order of the governor of June 13, 1840, to issue to them a certificate of the approval of the assembly. The board rejected the claim, holding, in substance, that no evidence was offered that any grant was issued to the three sisters; that the decree of concession was of itself insufficient; that until a document as evidence of his rights was issued and delivered to the grantee, a decree of concession and even favorable action of the departmental assembly did not pass any title, legal or equitable, and the property continued part of the public domain, subject to the disposition of the authorities of the government, and observed that this was the view of the governor and departmental assembly, as he had, notwithstanding the concession to the sisters, issued two years subsequently a grant of the same land to Bolcoff, and the assembly had approved it.</p> <p>The whole decision proceeded upon the supposed genuineness of the documents offered as evidence of Bclcoff’s title and the supposed authority of the officers of Mexico to regrant lands once granted, without previous surrender by the first grantee. It is true, the opinion of the board also spoke of a want of proof of compliance with the usual conditions of cultivation and inhabitation, but this view could only have been entertained upon the idea that the residence and cultivation of Bolcoff and his wife, and that of her sisters, were under different grants. The commissioners held, in confirming his claim, that cultivation and residence were sufficiently established. Since the action of the board upon these petitions, the registry of the prefect has been discovered, and the new light it throws upon the question of the issue of a grant to the sisters, and other circumstances, mentioned in the opinion of the court, led to a careful examination of the documents upon which the claim of Bolcoff rested and finally to the institution of the present suit.</p>

Libel for seamen’s wages. The district court on the hearing decreed wages to the libellant; and no appeal being taken in court, tbe court adjourned without day. Three days afterwards, the respondent claimed an appeal in the clerk’s office; but the district judge refused to allow it, upon the ground, that the party was bound to make bis appeal before tbe final adjournment of the court sine die, or within such other period as the court should, upon his application, prescribe.

<p>Case No. .10,353.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,363a.</p> <p>Executors and Admixistkatoks — Preference Given to Judgment Creditors.</p> <p>The act of Maryland of 1798. giving preference to judgment creditors, does not embrace foreign judgments.</p>

This was an action originally brought in a court of the state, and removed by the defendants into this court The case came on for trial before NELSON and SHIPMAN, JJ., and a jury. The facts were as follows: In December, 1859, F. A. Williams, of the city of New York, sent from that city a promissory note, payable three months after date, for $3.000, to the Norwalk Bank, at Norwalk, Connecticut, to be discounted.

[This was a bill in equity by the Norwalk Lock Company against Berger, Matlies, and others, to enjoin the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 3,909, granted to H. H. Elwell April 5, 1870, the original letters patent No. 39,280 having been granted July 21, 1863.]

<p>[This was a libel in rem by John H. Geiger and others against the cargo and materials of the ship Norway for salvage.]</p>

<p>The libel [by Anthony J. Allaire] against the Norway in this ease was filed on the 29th of September, 1S57. and a monition issued, under which the vessel was attached. She was bonded by the claimants, and their answer was put in on the 9th of November. 1S07. The action was noticed for trial, and put on the calendar for the December term, 1S57. The claimants then procured an order for a commission to examine a witness, with a stay of proceedings until the return of the commission. That order and stay had never been vacated. Direct interrogatories to be attached to the commission were served on the proctor for the libellant on the 5th of June, 185S; but no cross interrogatories were served by the libellant, nor had the commission ever been sent. Nothing had been, done in the suit since the service of the interrogatories. The libellant died on the 13th of May, 1S59, leaving a will, which had been duly proved before the surrogate of the city and county of New York, and on which letters testamentary had been issued to two executors named in the will, one of ■whom resided in the city of New York, and the other in the county of Westchester. The executors had duly qualified, and now applied to the court to be substituted as libel-lants in the suit, in place of the original libellant, and for an order vacating .the stay of proceedings.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,358.</p> <p>Practice — Married Woman' as a Commissionei:.</p>

<p>[In admiralty. For the hearing upon order to vacate stay of proceedings, see Case No. 10.357; and for motion to appoint a commissioner to examine a witness residing in the East Indies, see Id. 10.35S.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,360.</p> <p>Limitation op Liabilitt — Value op Vessel— When to be Taken — Stipulation fok Value — Insuiuxce Monets.</p> <p>1. A steamboat, by a collision with a schooner in Long Island Sound, was set on fire and sunk. Her owners filed a petition in limitation of their liability, and a reterence was had to ascertain the value of the steamboat. Exceptions were taken to the report, which fixed such value at $2.500: Sold, that the value to be taken was the value of the boat as she lay sunk; and that that value was correctly arrived at, by taking the vnlue of the vrreck when raised and deducting therefrom the expense of raising.</p> <p>2. Neither the expense of raising her, nor of tlie repairs subsequently put upon her. nor of the insurance moneys received by her owners, under policies of insurance against fire, was to be added to such value so ascertained.</p> <p>[Cited in The Peshtigo, Case No. 11,018.]</p> <p>3. The valuation of the boat, in a stipulation for value, given in the suits brought against her after she had been repaired, was immaterial.</p> <p>|On apppal to the circuit court, the decree rendered in this court was affirmed. Case No. 10,-302.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,361.</p> <p>Limitation of Liahii.itv of Ship Owxers — Injunction — Costs.</p> <p>1. The injunction granted in a proceeding to limit the liability of a ship owner restraining the prosecution of suits pending against the ship owner, should not prohibit the collection of tlie taxable costs in such suits.</p> <p>2. In such a proceeding the costs and expenses of the proceeding are first tp be paid out of the fund.</p> <p>3. The petitioner in such a case is entitled to a docket fee for each creditor who comes in and proves his claim. But he has no preference for his costs over the costs of the creditor.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of New York.] This was a proceeding commenced in the district court, by the Norwich & New York Transportation Company, as petitioners, to obtain the benefit of the provisions of the act of congress, approved March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. 635), providing for the limitation of the liability of ship owners.

This was an action at law, founded upon a policy of insurance against loss of damage by fire. The case was tried before SHIP-MAN, J., and a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs.

In bankruptcy. This was a motion by Joseph R. Payson. assignee of the Republic Fire Insurance Company, to expunge the claim filed by Carlisle Norwood, as receiver of the Lorillard Insurance Company of New York, on certain policies of re-insurance on which there had been a total loss. A corporation has no existence beyond the territory of the power that created it. Day t. Newark India Rubber Co. [Case No. 8,- A dissolved corporation cannot sue, having no existence.

Assumpsit for freight of ■ goods. Plea in abatement, that tbe promise, if any, was made by the defendant jointly with one John Mandeville. moved for a continuance of the cause on affidavit. THE COURT thought the affidavit not sufficient, and refused to receive a supplemental affidavit, on the ground that it is a practice leading to perjury. THE COURT referred to the case of Dawson v. Boyd [Case No. 3,-667], at Washington, on a habeas corpus from Alexandria.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] [This was a libel for salvage by Edgar Nott against the steamboat Sabine and cargo-. Certain exceptions were filed by tbe consignees. which were sustained by the district court, and the libel was dismissed. Case unreported. From that decree, libellants appeal.]

. In equity. [This was a demurrer to a bill of complaint filed [by Joel Nourse aDd others] to restrain the defendant [Richard L. Allen] from infringing four separate patents for “improvements in reaping machines.’!] 2

<p>Case No. 10,368.</p> <p>Cdstody of Vessel — Necessart Kxpekses.</p> <p>The expense of dockage of a vessel, which was seized by the-marshal while she was on a marine railway from which she could not be removed without danger of sinking, is not a disbursement which is limited by the provision of section 829. Rev. St. allowing the marshal $2.50 a day for the necessary expenses of keeping boats or vessels; but a reasonable bill for such dockage may be paid by him and is chargeable upon the property saved thereby.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,369.</p> <p>Collision is New York Bay — Steamer and Schooner — Change of Course in Extremis —Immaterial Allegations.</p> <p>1. A schooner and a steamboat came in collision in New York Bay in the day time. The wind was strong, about W. by S. The schooner was coming up the bay, heading up tor the Narrows, and the steamboat was going down the bay to sea. The libel of the schooner alleged that while she was coming up the bay, heading about N., she discovered the steamboat about a quarter to half a mile off, she having been, till then, hidden from view by other vessels which were also coming up the bay; that the steamer, when seen, was a point or two on the schooner’s starboard bow, heading about W. N. W.. and backing her engines; that soon after the steamboat started ahead with a starboard wheel, on a course attempting to cross the schooner’s bow, but so that a collision was inevitable; and that the schooner luffed to prevent the vessels from coming together head and head and was struck by the steamboat on her starboard side. The steamboat alleged that she. when going down the bay, and heading about S. by E., met several schooners coming up; that she was on the west side of the channel along by the west bank, and that while the schooner was on her port bow, apparently about to pass on the port side of the steamboat as a schooner ahead of her had done, the schooner without cause luffed across her bows and thus caused the collision. Held, that the turning points of the case were whether the schooner, at the time she luffed, had the steamboat on her port bow or on her starboard bow. and whether the luffing of the schooner contributed to produce the collision.</p> <p>2. On the evidence, the schooner had the steamboat on her starboard bow.</p> <p>3. The allegations of the schooner, as to the steamboat’s heading to \Y. N. W. and backing, and going ahead again and coming into the schooner on a starboard wheel, were not proved, but were immaterial allegations inasmuch as it was not claimed that the schooner did anything wrong before she luffed.</p> <p>4. On the evidence, it appeared that the course of the steamboat was on a line eastward of that of the schooner; and that her pilot, in endeavoring to get to the westward of the schooner, crossed her bows and undertook this manoeuvre when there was not time and distance for him to perform it.</p> <p>5. On the evidence, the luffing of the schooner was a movement in extremis not contributing to produce the collision, and the steamboat was solely liable for the collision.</p> <p>[NOTE. The libelants in the case against the Merwin appealed from the clerk’s taxation of ■costs. The court ordered the costs to be re-taxed. •Case No, 4,893.]</p>

A creditor procured an order for the examination of the bankrupt [G. N. Noyes], and .proceeded therewith before the register. In dhe course of his direct examination questions ■were asked about his books, and he testi-■fled that they were kept by his son, who •could explain them. He agreed to produce •certain books in addition to those already before the register, and to procure the attendance of his son.

[In the matter of B. B. Noyes, a bankrupt.] By HO VET K. CLARKE, Register: I, the undersigned register in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that in the course of proceedings in the above bankruptcy, at the fourth general meeting of creditors, the final account of the assignee of said estate was presented, under the provisions of the twenty-eighth section of the bankrupt act, to be audited and passed.

<p>Case No. 10,374.</p> <p>Pleading is Equity— More than Ose Pi.ea bt DEFENDANT — WaST OF JuKISDICTIOS — DEMURRER — Citizessuip of Parties — Fraudulent Judgment.</p> <p>1. Defendant in equity has no right as a matter of course to file more than one plea. But when great inconvenience might otherwise result in a particular case, the court will sometimes in its discretion allow several pleas.</p> <p>2. Where a defendant in equity has filed several pleas without leave of the court, he will be put to his election as to which he will stand upon.</p> <p>3. In general when a defendant insists by plea upon matter which is apparent on the face of the bill and might be taken advantage of by demurrer. the plea will not hold.</p> <p>4. Where want of jurisdiction appears upon the face of the bill, the objection should be taken by demurrer.</p> <p>5. Where an assignee in bankruptcy recovered a fraudulent judgment against an alleged debt- or of the bankrupt, and the judgment debtor filed a bill in the circuit court to enjoin execution upon the judgment, held, that the fact that all parties were citizens of the same state did not oust the court of jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited, but not followed, in Winter v. Swinburne, S Jt? ed. 51.]</p> <p>6. The fact that a state statute has provided a remedy at law aaainst a fraudulent judgment does not preclude the judgment debtor from a resort to the equity courts of the United States for relief against it.</p> <p>[Cited in Benjamin v. Cavaroc, Case No. 1,-300.]</p> <p>7. _A sale of a fraudulent judgment at a public vendue of a bankrupt’s' effects does not confer upon an innocent purchaser the right to enforce payment of the judgment, notwithstanding its fraudulent character.</p>

The petition for the writ of habeas corpus stated that the said John Nugent was held in custody and close confinement by Robert Beale of the city of Washington, without any authority or warrant of law; and that the said Robert Beale has refused to exhibit to the petitioner the authority, if any, under which he pretends to hold him, and to give him a copy thereof, and to discharge him from custody, etc. The writ of habeas corpus was thereupon issued by the court on the 3d of…

This was an action of assumpsit by George Nugent on ninety coupons issued by tbe county of Putnam for the interest on certain bonds issued by… Held: resulting in favor of said subscription; and on the 4th of January, 1870, another election was called by said board, to be held on the Sth of February, 1870, to determine whether said county would subscribe for twenty-five thousand dollars additional stock of said railroad company, payable in the bonds of said county, on the…

<p>Case No. 10,379.</p> <p>Land Claims — Fhemoxt Case.</p> <p>This claim is valid under the ruling of the supreme court in U. S. v. Fremont [18 How. (59 U. S.) 30].</p>

This was an action of assumpsit as for money had and received, brought by Adolphus and Simon Nusbaum, distillers at Peoria, against Enoch Emery, the United States collector for that district, to recover the sum of $1,500 deposited with him to pay. for certain Tice meters to be used in their distillery.

This was a motion by the plaintiff [Adolph Nusbaum] in similar cases, to set aside an order reinstating the cases on the docket, and also a motion by Isaac P. Tice for a rule upon defendant [Enoch Emery] to show cause why he should not pay into court the money in controversy in the several cases.

<p>Case No. 10,383.</p> <p>Equity — Rehearing—When Allowed.</p> <p>[The assignee of a bankrupt, on being notified that a suit was pending for the infringement of a patent owned by a bankrupt and was on the trial list, informed a lawyer that the estate had no money to expend in the preparation of a case, and instructed the lawyer to prepare a prima facie case and make the best defense he could. At the trial the prima facie case was substantially admitted, but the validity of the patent was attacked by an array of witnesses from the West whose testimony was unbroken on cross-examination, and uncontradicted by plaintiff in rebuttal: and the court found the jiatent invalid. Held, that a rehearing would not be granted on the grounds that the lawyer ventured to trial without preparation to defend the validity of the patent and that the assignee deemed an expenditure of money in such a preparation unwise, since the assignee could test the validity of the patent in another circuit, in which a similar suit was pending, without the defendant's being compelled to undergo the expense of a rehearing.]</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Cases Nos. 0,200, 5,201, 5,203, and 1U,3S4.]</p>

Action of contract by the assignee in bankruptcy of A. S. Gear, to recover $G27. alleged to have been received by the defendants [J. g. Wheeler and others] to the use of the plaintiff [Thomas F. Nutter], The case was, by consent, tried by the court without a jury. The facts, as found by the judge, were these: The defendants were manufacturers of machinists’ tools at Worcester, and Gear had a shop in Boston, where he sold such tools, among other things.

[This was an appeal by Mighill Nutting from the refusal of the commissioner of patents to grant him a patent for an alleged invention relating to the indicator pipe connected with steam boilers.] [The apparatus for which the applicant seeks a patent is shown in Pig. 1. His application was rejected by the commissioner upon a reference to patent No. 11.030, granted May 19, 1S54, to Patrick Clark. Clark’s apparatus is shown in Pig. 2.]

fAppeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of Ohio.] The libel was filed in 1854 on a claim for services performed on the above boat.

<p>Case No. 10,387.</p> <p>Prize — Deviation — Contraband op War — Condemnation.</p> <p>The vessel having been captured within five miles of the enemy's const, and about 150 miles off her true course, as designated on her papers, and no excuse being given for (he deviation. and her cargo consisting partly of articles contraband of war, and wholly of supplies of urgent importance to the enemy, and no claim being interposed to the vessel and cargo, although the master was brought in and examined as a witness, the court ordered condemnation of vessel and cargo, unless their owner should, on application, obtain leave, prior to the third regular term after such order, to interpose a claim to the merits of the libel. The libellants were allowed meantime to take an order for the sale of the prize property.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.]</p> <p>This was the case of a libel of seizure against the Nymph, a vessel licensed for the cod fisheries [Bibbord, claimant]. And the charges were: (1st.) That during the continuance of the license the schooner was employed in a trade other than that for which she was licensed, contrary to the 32d section of the coasting act of 1793 [1 Story’s Laws, 285] c. 52 [8]; (2d.) that during the same period she proceeded on a foreign voyage, without first giving up her enrolment and license, contrary to the 8th section of the same act. The district court pro-nouneed a decree of acquittal upon tlie facts [Case No. 10,389], and from that decree the United States appealed to this court.</p>

[This was a libel against the Nymph (Bib-bord and others, claimants).] The libel in this case was founded on the 32d section of the act of February IS, 1793, for enrolling and licensing vessels for the coasting trade and fisheries. The material facts proved were as follows: In May, 1832, a license was taken out by the owners of the Nymph, for the cod-fishery. This was held till July, when it was exchanged for a license for the mackerel fishery.

Affreightment. The libel propounded that [James] Oakes and [Thaddeus] Richardson entered into a charter-party at Boston 19th September, 1S6S, by which the latter, as part owner and agent of the brig Goodwin, then ■on a voyage to Lisbon, chartered her to the libellant for a voyage from Cadiz, in Spain, to Gloucester or Boston, Massachusetts, to carry a full cargo of salt, in bulk, at a freight •of seventeen cents for each bushel, measured •out at the port of delivery; that he…

<p>Case No. 10,392.</p> <p>Practice — Decree of Bankruptcy Vacated.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,393.</p> <p>Vendor and Purchaser — Enforcement of Uncertain Contracts — Rescission.</p> <p>1. A vendee cannot occupy the attitude of an innocent purchaser without notice, where the vendor was not vested with the legal title.</p> <p>2. Courts of chancery will not make contracts for parties, nor enforce contracts when uncertain.</p> <p>3. Where in a contract it was stipulated that a previous agreement relative to the same subject-matter should be rescinded, and this second contract was afterwards rescinded; held, that this •did not revive the first agreement, and that the rescission of one contract cannot revive another without express words, or a necessary implication to that effect.</p> <p>NOTE. At the same term, on the 31st October, 1846. it was proved orally before the court that the lands in controversy exceeded the value of two thousand dollars (Course v. Stead's Ex’rs, 4 Dali. [4 U. S.] 22. 1 Pet. Cond. R. 217; U. S. v. The Union, 4 Cranch [8 U. S.] 216, 2 Pet. Cond. R. 91); and after tendering an appeal bond, with security, to prosecute the appeal according to law, James Oakley, and James W. Finley, as administrator of Allen M. Oakley, deceased, prayed an appeal to the supreme court of the United States from the final decree rendered in the case, which was granted; but the ease was not taken up, and the appeal was abandoned.</p>

The discharge of a bankrupt was opposed on several specifications. Specification 2. Concealing and failing to return five hundred and ninety acres of land in Vernon county, the title to which had been vested in the bankrupt by deed of William Shields, made January 13th, 1866, and falsely swearing that he had no real estate at the date of his petition, and had had none since 1861.

These are petitions for review under section 2 of the bankrupt act. Facts in the case of E. G. Obear; On the 4th day of May. 1874, a creditor’s petition was filed against Obear in the district court for the Eastern district of Missouri, stating that, being a broker and a trader, he did, on the 28th day of May, 1873, suspend, and did not within fourteen days, nor at any time thereafter, resume payment of his commercial paper.

<p>[In the matter of Louis M. Oberhoffer, a bankrupt.)</p>

<p>Case No. 10,397.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Appeal from Adjudication to Circuit Court.</p> <p>1. Where an appeal from an adjudication of bankruptcy was made from the district courts to the circuit court: Held, such appeal would not lie. and should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in Farnsworth v. Boardman, 131 Mass. 118.]</p> <p>[2. Cited in Re Goodman, Case No. 5.540. and in Lnwver v. Gladden, 110 Pa. St. 581, 1 Atl. 660. to the point that, in a state where a feme covert may be sued upon her contracts, she may be declared a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,398.</p> <p>Fokeign Will —Titde to Lands — Aliens and Citizenship — Judgment against Executoks —Sale on Execution.</p> <p>1. Under the statute of Indiana, a will made and recorded in any other state, according to the laws of such state, is valid to pass lands or other property in Indiana; and a copy duly certified from such record is made evidence.</p> <p>2. An alien in the United States before 1802, may be admitted to the rights of citizenship, without proof of having resided, etc., five years.</p> <p>3. A judgment against executors in Indiana, does not authorize an execution against -the lands of the deceased.</p> <p>4. A sále of land on such an execution can confer no title.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,399.</p> <p>Limitation op Action — Fraud—Notice — Jurisdiction— Fraudulent Judgment.</p> <p>1. The circuit court has jurisdiction of a Bill in equity filed by defendant in a judgment rendered therein, against an assignee oí a judgment plaintiff, to set aside the judgment for fraud, though both assignee and plaintiff be citizens of the same state, as such proceeding is merely a continuation of the original suit.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Sabin, Case No. 12,195.]</p> <p>2. Discovery of fraud, in the meaning of the statute of limitations, is not to be imputed to a county simply because it was known to its officer who committed it.</p>

This was a libel in a cause of possession. The libellant [J. N. Harding] was owner of one-half of the schooner Ocean, the other half belonging to one Eaton, of New York, who gave a bill of sale of his half to the claimant, as collateral security for a debt.

<p>Case No. 10,402.</p> <p>Jurisdiction— Rights op Majority and Minority Shipowners — Power to Sell — Bond for Safe Return.</p> <p>1. A court of admiralty has no power to decree a sale of a vessel, at the instance of the owners of a minority interest, except, perhaps, as the result of the failure of the owners of the majority interest to give security for the safe return of the vessel.</p> <p>2. A court of admiralty has power to decree a sale, in case of a dispute between owners of equal moieties, as to the employment of the vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in Coyne v. Capíes. 8 Fed. 640.]</p> <p>[See The Annie H. Smith, Case No. 420.]</p> <p>3. A court of admiralty has no jurisdiction in matters of accounting between part owners of a vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in The John E. Mulford, 18 Fed. 457; The H. E. "Willard. 53 Fed. (501; The Eclipse, 135 U. S. 60S, 10 Sup. Ct. 876.]</p> <p>4. A court of admiralty cannot require the owners of a majority interest in a vessel to give a bond to the minority interest to cover indebtedness of the vessel to the minority owners, or to indemnify them against loss in her future employment.</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem by the United States, claiming a forfeiture of the schooner Ocean Bride for a violation of the revenue laws, by being engaged in a trade other than that for which she was licensed. The owners, ope of whom was the master, made claim and answer, denying all knowledge of the illegal traffic charged.

<p>Case No. 10,403.</p> <p>Prize — Attempt to Violate Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel ostensibly bound to Port Royal, then in the possession of the United States forces, condemned for an attempt to break the blockade of other ports.</p>

<p>[This was a proceeding by the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company against J. Nelson Tappan to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally exacted.)</p>

Bill in equity to set aside a judgment in this court obtained upon a policy of insurance upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence. Held: and the said vessel was condemned and sold for $782.20, which was paid to the said defendant.

<p>Case No. 10,407.</p> <p>Re-Insurance — Insurance on Charter — Parol Evidence to Explain Writing — Information Material to the Risk.</p> <p>1.By an agreement made between the O. Ins. Co., of Portland. Me., and the S. Mut. Ins. Co., of New York, the latter agreed to re-insure such risks, taken by the former, as the latter should endorse on an open policy to be issued by the latter to the former. The open policy was accordingly issued. On the 30th of January, 1804, the ship C. S. P., of which one M. was one-eighth owner, was in New York, and was on that day chartered for a voyage from New York to San Francisco, thence to Callao and the Chin-cha Islands for a cargo of guano, and thence to Hamburg or Rotterdam with such cargo. By this charter the ship was not required to carry cargo from New York to San Francisco. She was at that time under a previous charter, by which she was to carry a cargo of coal from New York to San Francisco. On the 23d of March, 1804, the president of the O. Ins. Co. wrote to the vice president of the S. Mut. Ins. Co., saying: “I enclose returns for registry as follow's: $5.000 on ship C. S. 1’.. to San Francisco and Chin-chas — war; $5.000 on pc. of do — marine”; and in a postscript he added: “I also enclose an additional return for insurance on charter, prim-age 'and property per ship C. S. I’, to San Francisco only.” Tile returns enclosed were all dated that same day and read as follows: (11 “Enter on open policy of this Co., war risk only. $5,-000 on ship C. S. P. at and from New York to, at and from San Francisco and Callao to Chin-chas. rate 3 per cent;" (2) “Enter on open policy of this Co., $5.000 on charter of ship C. S. P. at and from New York to. at and from San Francisco and Callao to Chinchas — rate 3 per centj” (31 “Enter on open policy of this Co.. $0,550 on charter, $2,650 on primage and $1.500 on property, on board ship C. S. P.. at and from New' York to San Francisco, including war risk —rate 6 per cent.” Entries were made on the open policy according to these returns. Separate policies had been issued by the O. Ins. Co. to M. covering these several risks. The ship sailed from New York. and. before reaching San Fiancisco. was lost near Buenos Ayres. The O. Ins. Co. paid to M. and the S. M. Ins. Co. repaid under the re-insurance the $5.000 insurance on the charter of the ship, mentioned in the second of the returns. Such repayment was made before May. 1800. In September. 1866. M. commenced a suit in the supreme court of Maine, on the policy issued to him by the O. Ins. Co., to recover the $6.550 on charter. $2.650 on prim-age and $1.500 on property, which he claimed to have been an insurance on the guano charter. The O. Ins. Co. defended the suit, denying that they had insured the guano charter, and they sent notice of the suit to the S. M. Ins. Co., which co-operated in the defence. On the trial of that suit the plaintiff offered parol evidence to show that the w'ord “charter,” in the application for the policy, and in the policy, was understood. at the time the insurance was effected, to mean the guano charter. When the decision of the court in Maine that such evidence was admissible was communicated by the O. Ins. Co. to the S. M. Ins. Co., the latter refused to cooperate further in the defence of that suit. The parol evidence being admitted in that suit, the plaintiff recovered judgment against the O. Ins. Co., and that company then brought this suit against the S. M. Ins. Co., on the policy of reinsurance: Held, that, as the parol evidence which was admitted in the suit against the libel-lants. to establish that the charter intended to be insured by them wras the guano charter, was not communicated by the libellants to the respondents before the effecting of the re-insur-anc-e. the recovery against the libellants was not binding on the respondents.</p> <p>2. The language of the several returns sent by the libellants to the respondents, did not amount to notice of the existence of the guano charter.</p> <p>3. There being two charters, one of them having the same termini as the voyage described in the policy, and the other of them covering that, route and a farther continuing route, and there being no explanation between the parties as to which charter waá meant to be covered by an insurance on “charter.” the policy must be regarded as saying that the charter intended was the charter covering only the route of the voyage described in the policy.</p> <p>4. The payment by the respondents of the $5,000 on the policy issued under the second of the returns did not constitute a recognition of their having effected insurance on the guano charter.</p> <p>5. The information which it was shown that the libellants had when they applied for the reinsurance, as to the existence of the two charters of the vessel and their terms, was materia) to the risk to be assumed by the respondents and was not communicated to them.</p> <p>6. The re-insurance made by the respondents was not upon the guano charter, and the libel-lants were not entitled to recover.</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the circuit court the decree of this court was reversed, and a decree entered in favor of libelant. Case No. 10,408. Subsequently an appeal was taken to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree dismissing the libel. 107 U. S. 485, 1 Sup. Ct 582.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was an appeal by the libellant, in a suit in personam in admiralty, from a decree of the district court [Case No. 10,407], dismissing the libel. The following facts were found by this court: At the several times hereinafter mentioned, the libellant and the defendant were insurance companies, engaged in the business of insuring against losses by perils of the sea.

[This was a libel in rem by Seth Adams, Jr., against the steamer Ocean Queen, Cornelius Vanderbilt, claimant, for damages suffered by the schooner John L. Darling in a collision.]

<p>Case No. 10,409.</p> <p>Collision — Measure or Damages — Cargo — Value at Ports of Shipmext and Destination.</p> <p>[In case of a collision, the damages should not be computed by valuing the cargo as at the port of destination, but the value at the port of shipment should be taken, with the expense of navigation until the time of the collision and the expense of landing the cargo. On this amount interest should be allowed from the time of the collision. Smith v. Condry, 1 How. (42 U. S.) 28, followed.)</p> <p>[Cited in The Mary J. Vaughan, Case No. 9,-217; The Aleppo, Id. 158.)</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of the district court was affirmed. Case No. 10,410. Subsequently claimant applied in the circuit court for an order that a commission issue to examine certain witnesses, depositions to be used on appeal. The motion was denied. Case No. 10,411.]</p>

[Appeal irom the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New Xork.] This was an application, on the part of the claimant in an admiralty suit, in rem, for an order that a commission issue, pursuant to the practice of the supreme court of the United States, to examine certain witnesses, who were named, so that the depositions of such witnesses might be made available to the claimant on an appeal which he had taken to the supreme court, from the decree…

The libel was filed in this case to recover a salvage compensation for services rendered to the ship Revenue by the steamship Washington, owned by the libelants. The ship Revenue, of 546 tons burden, valued, with her cargo, at $85,000, sailed from Hampton Roads on the 5th of September, 1853, bound to Australia.

<p>Case No. 10,414.</p> <p>Collision off the Battery — Steamboat Fol-lowinr Another — Holdino Course.</p> <p>1. The sioam propeller O. and the steamboat N. came in collision off the Battery, in New York harbor. Each of them belonged to a Une of vessels running from New York through Long Island Sound. The starting point of the N. was the upper side of pier 28, North river, and that of the C. was the lower side of pier 27, North river, and the hour for each to start was 4 p. m. On the afternoon of November 27th. 1867, both vessels started, the N. being the first to leave her pier. The tide was ebb. and the N., in order to avoid vessels at anchor below her pier, went out into the river a considerable distance to the westward of them, before turning down the North river. As she went out, the tide carried her down, and those in her pilot house lost sight of the O., and did not see her again till immediately before the collision. The O. left her pier almost at the same time, and turned down the river east of the vessels at anchor. Off the Battery were vessels lying at anchor, through which both steamers had to make their way, in order to turn into the East river. The N., which was the faster boat of the two, but had the farther distance to go, to get into the East river, turned towards it, so as to cross the bows of the O. The O. kept her course and struck the N. on her port side. The N. did not stop her engine till after the collision. The O. stopped and backed her engine as soon as it was seen that the N. was crowding on. her course: Held, that, although the N. left her pier first, she was not, in view of the fact that the course she took was the longer one to enable her to reach the point where both courses entered the East river, the foremost boat, but the following boat.</p> <p>2. The fact that no one in the pilot house of the N. paid any attention to the O., was negligence on the part of the N., and the cause of the collision.</p> <p>3. The courses of the two vessels were not crossing, within the meaning of the 14th rule for avoiding collisions; and. even if they could be so considered, the N. did not. keep her course, within the meaning of the 13th rule, but crowded on the O., and was solely responsible for the collision.</p> <p>[Cited in The Express, 44 Fed. 397.]</p> <p>TOn appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this court was affirmed. Case No. 10,415.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel by the owners of the Newport to recover damages sustained by reason of a collision with the steam propeller Oceanus. From a decree of the district court dismissing the libel (Case No. 10,414), libellants appeal.]

Libel by the Home Insurance Company of New York and the Merchants’ Insurance Company of Chicago against the steamboat Ocean Wave and the barge Bill Fleming, to recover the amounts paid by them on policies of insurance issued to Beaupre & Kelley on a cargo of bulk wheat shipped by them at St. Paul on the barge Bill Fleming, in tow of the steamboat Ocean Wave, to be transported to Prairie du Chien.

This was a libel by the Home Insurance Company of New York, and the Merchants’ Insurance Company of the city of Chicago, re-insurers, against the steamboat Ocean Wave. The St. Paul Eire and Marine Insurance Company of the state of Minnesota made assurance upon a cargo of wheat shipped by Beaupre & Kelley on said steamboat, to be transported from St Paul to Prairie du Chien. The libellants severally re-insured the St. Paul Company in a portion of the amount of its policy.

[Appeal from the district com-t of the United States for tlie district of Massachusetts.] Appeals in admiralty froln the district court of Massachusetts.

<p>[This was a libel in rem by Morgan O’Con-nell against the brig Tally Ho for breach of a contract of affreightment.]</p> <p>The vessel, laden with a cargo of corn, etc., from the United States to Londonderry, put into the port of Fayal in distress. A part of the cargo was thrown overboard for •safety of vessel, and part was destroyed by perils of the sea, or greatly injured and unfit for further transportation. The vessel and cargo were taken charge of by the American counsel. The said part of cargo, as well as that rotted and perishing, was landed and stored at Fayal. On a survey, it was reported that a sale be made of the deteriorated corn, and the governor of the island advised sale of the said corn because of the scarcity oí’ provisions at Fayal, and distresses of the inhabitants for want of food, and advised the United States consul that an attempt to reload and export the said corn would, no doubt, be resisted by force, and promote a popular rising. The consul ordered a sale of the whole cargo, and paid over part of the proceeds to agents of libelants, and holds balance in his hands. The captain of the vessel protested against the sale of her cargo. The owners of the vessel claim freight in toto, or pro rata itineris. The shipper of the cargo demands the value of the cargo discharged of freight.</p>

In admiralty. This libel of information was brought under the act of congress, approved February 23, 1S71 (1C Stat. 440), entitled “An act to provide for the better security of life on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, and for other purposes,” to recover of this steam-tug a penalty of five hundred dollars for not having been inspected.

The ship Octavia was condemned in the circuit court, as forfeited to the United States [Case No. 10,422], and that decree was affirmed in the supreme court, and a mandate directed to the circuit court to proceed to a due execution of the decree. [1 Wheat. (14 U. S.l 20.] The ship, pending the suit, was delivered to the claimants, upon their giving a joint and several bond with surety for the appraised value with the usual condition.

<p>Case No. 10,426.</p> <p>Prize — Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

<p>[Application for a discharge. The application was opposed on the ground that the bankrupts [Albert S. Odell and Edgar Odell] had mot kept proper books of account.] 2</p>

<p>Case No. 10,427.</p> <p>Composition not a Díscíiakge — Jurisdiction— Expenses.</p> <p>1. The mere fact that a bankrupt has been refused a discharge on a specification of objection, is not an absolute bar to a composition.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Troth. Case No. 14,188; Re Joseph, 24 Fed. 138.]</p> <p>2. A composition is not a discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Clay v. Severance, 55 Vt. 302; First Nat. Bank of St. Albans v. Wood, 53 Vt. 493; Scott v. Olmstead, 52 Vt. 212.]</p> <p>3. The pendency of a petition to review an order refusing a discharge does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for a composition.</p> <p>4. In confirming a composition, the court ordered the bankrupt to pay to a creditor who opposed it his expenses and disbursements, other than counsel fees, in successfully opposing a prior application of the bankrupt for a discharge.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,428.</p> <p>Fraudulent Transfers — Security fob Antecedent Debt.</p> <p>F., being insolvent and within six months previous to his being adjudged a bankrupt, made a conveyance of real estate to his wife through A., the consideration alleged being moneys previously given to F. by his wife, for which no evidence of indebtedness existed, and which had always been treated by him as liis own property, with her consent. The wife had reasonable cause to believe that the conveyance was made by F. in contemplation of insolvency, and knew that the transfer was made to evade the bankruptcy act. After .this conveyance F. took measures to build a house on the premises so conveyed, and for that purpose he bought lumber of J. E. P., holding himself out to J. E. P. as being the owner of the land. J. E. P. afterwards learned of the conveyance by F. to his wife, and, at his solicitation, F. and his wife joined in a mortgage of the premises to him to secure the amount due for the lumber, J. E. P. knowing at the time that F. had deceived him in the matter and that F. was not paying others whom he owed for building the house. An assignee in bankruptcy having been appointed, filed a bill to set aside the conveyances and the mortgage: Held, that the conveyance, must be set aside; that J. E. P., under the circumstances, did not occupy the position of a bona fide purchaser without notice.</p> <p>' 2. Whether J. E. P. could have acquired a mechanic’s lien on the premises for the lumber, or not, he had not done-so, and he had acquired no right as against the other creditors of F.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,439.</p> <p>Equity — Fraudulent Conveyance — Parties to the Fraud.</p> <p>1. Whatever subterfuges may be resorted to to defeat the claims, of creditors, a court of chancery will reach the property conveyed or covered.</p> <p>2. As between the individuals who have concocted the fraud, chancery will not interfere.</p> <p>3. Circumstances, in such matters, are sometimes strong enough to stamp the transaction with fraud, although against the oaths of the parties concerned.</p>

<p>This was an action of trespass on the case brought by the plaintiffs against the defendants for the violation of a patent right [No. 4,714] obtained by one Jesse- Reed, in the year 1807, for a new' and useful improvement in machinery for cutting, griping and heading nails of various sizes at one continued operation, and assigned by said Reedr to the plaintiffs. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and filed the followdng specification of special matter, to be given in evidence. 1st. That the machine, or combination of machinery claimed by the plaintiffs under the patent stated in the declaration in this cause was not originally discovered by the said Jesse Reed, but by a certain Jacob Perkins, and that the said Jesse Reed has surreptitiously obtained the said patent for .the discovery of another person, to wit, of l^e said Jacob Perkins. 2d. That the machine, or combination of machinery claimed by the plaintiffs under the patent stated in the said declaration was not originally discovered by the said Jesse Reed, but was described in a public work anterior to the said supposed discovery, to wit, in a certain patent issued by the secretary of state, to a certain Jesse Reed, dated the 16th day of September, 1810, and also in a certain patent issued to Guppy &Armstróng, assignees of Jacob Perkins, dated 1.4th of February, 1799. 3d. That the discovery or invention contained or described in the patent stated in the said declaration, is contained or described in a certain patent issued to the said Jesse Reed, dated 16th of September, 1810, which is still unrepealed, and that a patent of the date last mentioned was granted to- the said Jesse Reed for the whole or part of the dame invention or discovery patented by the patent stated in the said declaration. 4th. That the patent stated in the said declaration is broader than the discovery or invention of the said Jesse Reed in this, that certain parts of the said alleged discovery or invention were in use prior to the said supposed discovery or invention, and there is nothing in the said patent, by which the said parts can be distinguished from other parts, of which the said Jesse Reed may have been the inventor, and that the parts so in use before the said discovery are the following, to wit, the horns, conductor, clearer and gauge. 5th. That the patent described in the plaintiff's declaration is also broader than the invention or discovery of the said Jesse Reed in this, that a part of the improvement, alleged to have been invented and discovered by the said Jesse, consists in the combination and application of certain parts of the machine described in his said patent, and of certain mechanical powers, which combination and application were in use prior to his alleged discovery. 6th. That the improvements. alleged by the plaintiffs to have been invented by said Reed, contain no new principle or application of principles, or mode of operation, or combination of machinery not before know-n and in use. 7th. That the machine and combination of machinery, described in the plaintiff’s patent and specification recited in the declaration, is the same with the machine and combination of machinery described in a certain patent and specification, issued by the secretary ot state to the said Jesse Reed, dated 22d of February, A. D. 1807, which patent, at the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts at the October term thereof, A. D. 1810, was adjudged to be vacated.</p> <p>Evidence was produced by the defendants, in the opening of the defence, to prove, that the plaintiffs, in the year 1810, had obtained a patent for the same invention and improvements contained in the patent, for a violation of which this action was brought, and this fact was not denied by the plaintiffs. •</p>

<p>Case No. 10,431.</p> <p>Patents — Equivalents—Novelty—Prior Patent.</p> <p>1.Though the defendant’s machine be more simple, cheaper, and possibly better than the complainant’s patented machine, yet if its chief efficiency arises from the use of equivalents to the complainant’s patent, it is infringement</p> <p>2. A prior patent of which no notice has been given will not be considered as bearing on the question of novelty.</p> <p>3. Letters patent No. 149,480, dated April 7th. 1874, granted to John C. Hurcombe, for an improvement in machines for fixing metallic rings to umbrella-cases, held to be valid.</p>

Case for infringement of a patent right [No. 4,714] of one Jesse Reed for cutting and heading nails at one operation. The plaintiff claimed as assignee of said Reed. At the trial, the plaintiff produced and proved the patent of said Reed, dated the 22d of February, 1807, and an assignment to himself of the whole of Reed’s patent right.

The following case was agreed by the parties, to be considered as a special verdict. The plaintiff caused insurance to he made at the office of the defendants, by a policy dated the 21st of December, 1807, upon the schooner Hazard, valued at 3,500 dollars, for a premium of five per cent, at and from Philadelphia to Havana, prout policies and warranties. The policy was duly sealed by the defendants, the premium paid by the plaintiff, and the vessel was American property.

At Bangor, March 4th, 1809, before Charles Hamlin, Esq., register in bankruptcy. Edmund W. Flagg, of said Bangor, being first duly sworn, and examined at the time and place above mentioned, upon his oath, says, in answer to the questions proposed by H. M. Plaisted, Esq., assignee: Q. 1. Did you have charge or direction of the sale, at auction, of the John O’Donohoe stock of goods, in No. 2 Harlow’s Block, Dec. 7th and 9th, 1S6S?

This was an application [by James M. O’Donnell] for search-warrant made under section 7 of the penal act of August 14,1876, in relation to trade-marks, üpon affidavit of the alleged agent of the owners of the registered mark. The single affidavit specified several distinct parties, having different places of business, against whom process was desired.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by the Odorless Excavating Apparatus Company against Reuben A. McCauley and others.]</p>

[Bill of complaint and for injunction to restrain the alleged infringement, by William K. Clements, of the first and third claims of patent No. 6,9ü2, reissued February 29, ISTfi, to Lewis R. Keizer, assignee of Henry C. Bull, for apparatus for cleaning privies. The original letters patent, No. 113.500. were granted to Henry C. Bull June 0, 1S71.] 3

[This was an action at law by the Odorless Rubber Company against the North Bennington Boot & Shoe Company on account, and for failure to insure goods lost by fire.]

[In the matter of Michael O’Dowd, a bankrupt.] By ALBERT G. FOSTER, Register: Upon the appointment of the assignee, the entire property of the bankrupt and all interest held by him in property, under the provisions of the fourteenth section of the bankrupt act, are vested in said assignee in the same manner and to the same extent as the same'was held by the bankrupt at the time of the filing of the petition against him.

[This was an action by Oelrich and others composing the firm of Oelrich & Co., against the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of Pittsburgh. to recover upon coupons of certain municipal bonds.]

This was a hearing on a petition for adjudication in bankruptcy.

At a recent session of the United States court, this suit, brought against the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of Pittsburgh, was for the interest on city bonds. The plaintiff obtained judgment in the suit for two thousand dollars, and an execution was issued to the marshal. [Case No. 10,442.] The marshal seized upon city gas stock, and threatened to sell it to satisfy the claim. An application was made to Judge M’Candless, to set the levy aside as alleged.

<p>Case Wo. 10,445.</p> <p>Sale of Property by Assignee in Bankruptcy —Approval by Court.</p>

[This was an action at law by Offut's executor against Hall’s administrator.] At May term, 1S21. the jury in this cause not being able to agree, a juror was withdrawn; after which, upon the defendant's motion, the court permitted him to plead the statute of limitations.

In this case, after the first meeting of creditors, one of the bankrupts, Matthew O'Farrell, died. In the course of the subsequent proceedings, a witness was called on behalf of the dead bankrupt, to give certain evidence with a view that a discharge of such bankrupt might be issued.

Assumpsit on a note for $020.05, drawn by Henderson & Company, payable to the plaintiff or order, and the name of the defendant written on tlie back of it. The plaintiff’s 'attorney had filled up the blank in-dorsement, in this manner, viz: “In case the within Alexander Henderson & Company, should fail to pay the within-mentioned sum when it becomes due, and should then be insolvent, I then promise to pay the same to the within-mentioned liezin Offutt.

Assumpsit. Verdict for the plaintiff, at November term. 1808. on tlie three first counts, and for tlie defendant on the last count. [Case unreported. See Case No. 10,-449. j Motion in arrest of judgment. 1. Because the undertaking, set forth in the counts upon which the verdict is taken, is void in law. 2. Because the declaration does not aver tintó payment of the note was ever demanded of Henderson & Co. 3.

Assumpsit Gabriel Greenfield had given a promissory note to Offutt in these words: “Georgetown, June 4. 1793. Sixty days after date, I promise to pay Thomas B. Offutt. or order, four hundred and six dollars, for value received. Gab’l Greenfield’ — which note- was indorsed by Parrott, in blank, by writing his name upon the back of it.

This was an action [by David Ogden] against [Hiram Barney] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back the sum of 810, paid under protest as half storage on imported goods.

This action is brought to recover the sum ■of 2.509 dollars 72 cents, the amount of a bill ■drawn by Thomas Newbold & Co., of New York, on the defendants [Gillingham, Mitchell & Co.] in favour of the plaintiffs [Ogden, Ferguson & Co.] and duly accepted by the defendants. The pleas of non assumpsit and payment, with leave to give the special matter in evidence, especially certain writs of foreign attachment.

<p>Case No. 10,457.</p> <p>Sale of Land fok'Taxes — Purchaser’s Title— Payment to County instead of State.</p> <p>1. In a sale of land for taxes, any material act which the law requires, or which may prejudice the rights of the owner, will be fatal to the title of the purchaser.</p> <p>[Cited in Cahoon v. Coe, 57 N. H. 59G.]</p> <p>. 2. But mere technicalities which do not come within this rule, and cannot prejudice the interest of the land holder, do not vitiate the sale.</p> <p>8. A payment of the money received on the sale into the county treasury, instead of the state, or the treasury of the county, instead of the treasury of the township, cannot affect the title.</p> <p>4. The officer who pays or receives the money wrongfully, is liable to pay it over to the proper treasury.</p>

This was an action against the defendant [Hugh Maxwell], as collector of the port of New York, to recover back money paid under the following circumstances: The plaintiffs [David Ogden and others] were owners of the ship Hacer. She arrived at New York from Liverpool, in November, 1851, with 769 steerage passengers, and their wearing apparel and other personal baggage and tools of trade.

<p>Case No. 10,459.</p>

The complainant [Ogden] filed his bill against the defendant [Strong, administrator of B. W. Hopkins, deceased] to recover mon-oys paid by him as surety for B. W. Hopkins, upon custom-house bonds, judgments having been obtained against him by the United States on such bonds.

The plaintiffs [Ogle and Witliero] filed their bill on the equity side of the court, setting forth that the plaintiff Ogle is the original inventor of a new and useful improvement in the plough, for which he obtained a patent in the year 1818.

[Appeal by John O’Hara from the decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant him a patent for his improvement in hats.]

In bankruptcy. Counsel for the petitioning creditors presented to the register a claim of $1,500 for compensation for their services as counsel, which they asked to have taxed in their favor as costs in the proceedings, to be paid out of the funds in tiie hands of the assignees. At the time of presenting said claim, they also made proof that notice of their intention to do so had been served upon the bankrupt and the assignees.

[Appeal by James O’Hara from the decision of the commissioner of patents in the matter of interference declared between the application of said John L. Hawes and the said James O’Hara for an improvement in retort for distilling coal oil.]

<p>Case No. 10,467.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Amount Involved— Changing Security.</p> <p>Of three several sums advanced for repairs and outfit of this vessel, one only could attach as a sufficient lien to give jurisdiction to the-admiralty; and that security having been changed, the libel was dismissed in toto.</p> <p>[Cited in Putnam v. The Polly, Case No. 11.-482.)</p>

[These were actions at law by Oh Chow and Gin Lee against J. L. Hallett, and She At and Wing Lock against same defendant, to recover balance of wages, and damages for breach of contract.]

<p>Case No. 10,470.</p>

Assumpsit on a policy of insurance of 2500 dollars on the schooner Warren, at and from Philadelphia to Alvarado, valued at 2500 dollars. Loss averred to be total by perils of the seas. (2) Count, on a policy of 1200 dollars on the freight on board of the same vessel, valued at 1200 dollars. Loss averred to be total in like manner. (3) Count, money had and. received. Plea, the general issue.

This cause was tried at the last term, and the facts, as they appeared at the trial, are reported in the former report [Case No. 10,-472], A motion was afterwards made [by John F. Ohl] for a new trial, and was argued at the present term.

<p>[In the matter of William O’Kell, a bankrupt See Case No. 10,474.]</p>

This was a libel to recover the sum of $489; as the value of the wine contained in a cask, shipped on the bark Olbers, at Rotterdam, on the 3d of November, 1865, by C. Hemmann & Co., consigned to the libellants, Jacob Wolf and Alexander Wolf, at New York. The shipment was made under a bill of lading signed by the master of the vessel. The bill of lading covered twenty-six casks in all.

[This was a suit by Horatio J. Oleott against the county board of supervisors of Fond du Lao county.] The legislature of Wisconsin in 1807 authorized the imposition of a tax upon the property of the county of Fond du Lac, for the purpose of enabling a railroad company to prosecute the construction of a railroad, the money raised by taxation being intended as a donation for that purpose.

In this case the petition of the bankrupt [Cornelius Oleott] was filed in July, 1867, and on an affidavit of the bankrupt, an order was made, enjoining the Ocean Bank from proceeding under an execution issued upon a judgment against the bankrupt, under which execution a levy had been made upon certain personal property as being the property of the bankrupt. The assignee in bankruptcy was appointed in August, 1867.

<p>Case Tío. 10,480.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement—Perpetual Injunction.</p> <p>Perpetual injunction in favor of Woodworth’s patent for planing, tODguing, and grooving boards, &c.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see cases Nos. 17.214. 1S.013, 18,014, 18,016, 18,018, 18,019, and 18,021.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,481.</p> <p>Partnership — 1Trading in Land — Apportionment op Loss.</p> <p>1. A partnership in purchasing and selling lands, is governed by the same principles as ordinary partnerships.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 7; Rovelsky v. Brown, 92 Ala. 522, 9 South. 184.]</p> <p>2. The complainant and defendant entered into a partnership to buy and sell lands, the complainant to furnish the capital, the defendant to buy; and after the close of the business, the money paid by complainant, and the interest thereon, to be first paid out of the proceeds, and the residue to be divided as profits. If a loss should be incurred, they were to bear it equally. Under this contract a large tract of land was purchased. The land deteriorated in value; it was conveyed to the complainant but on a bill, the court ordered the land to bo sold, the loss to be borne equally by the parties.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Ellsworth v. Pomeroy, 26 Ind. 164. Cited in Young v. Thrasher, 115 Mo. 231, 21 S. W. 1104.]</p>

Motion to vacate order remanding vessel to the custody of the marshal. In this case the propeller was arrested November 10, 1808, and bonded on the same day by John Hutchings, claimant, with two sureties. December 18, 1868, Hutchings mortgaged the propeller to Eber B. Ward, who intervened pendente lite, setting up his mortgage as the basis of his right to intervene.

On the evening of the 11th of November, 1874, the schooner Louise Crockett, which had put to sea from Hampton Roads, meeting threatening weather, put back to Hampton Roads, and when within a mile or two of the Thimble light was sunk by a collision with the steamship Old Dominion, which was bound out from Norfolk to New York. The owners of the schooner and of the cargo on board her filed separate libels to recover their damages.

This is an appeal into this court from a decree of the district court, rendered on the 21st November, 1873. [Case unreported.] The leading facts are as follows: On the 21st November, 1872, the schooner Annie Cole, John Q. Hozier (the libellant), master, being in North river, North Carolina, near the mouth, laden with fresh fish for Norfolk, fell in with the steamer W. G. Oler, John E. Wyatt, master, also bound for Norfolk, and signalled the steamer for a tow.

<p>Case No. 10,486.</p> <p>Patents — Falsely Stamping an Article “Patented” — Penalty—Patentability of the Article-Parties to Action for the Penalty.</p> <p>1. The question, whether it is a violation of the statute, to mark with the word “patent” articles which are not patentable, discussed.</p> <p>2. The action was brought to recover a penalty under section 4.901 of the Revised Statutes, for marking certain sacks of unpatented flour with the word “patent.” The defendants demurred to the complaint, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action: Meld, that the allegation in the complaint “that all of said flour and sacks were the property of the defendant and .patentable under the laws of the United States,” was a sufficient allegation that the flour marked was patentable, and that it was not a sham allegation, as flour may he a patentable article.</p> <p>[3. Cited in Winne v. Snow, 19 Fed. 508, to the point that in an action brought by an informer for his own benefit and that of the United States under section 4901, Rev. St., for falsely stamping the word “Patented” on an unpat-ented article, the plaintiff may properly describe himself as bringing the action for the benefit of himself and of the United States; that in such cases the United States is not regarded as a party to the action; and that a demurrer for misjoinder will not he sustained.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 10,487.</p> <p>Prize — Enemy Property.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,489.</p> <p>Collision in New York Harbor — Tug and Tow —Inevitable Accident.</p> <p>1. A barge, while under tow, lashed to the side of a tug, was injured by a collision with a vessel lying at a dock. On the part of the tug, it was claimed, that the collision was caused by the slackening of the bow line between the barge and the tug, by some one in charge of the barge, against the will of the master of the tug, whereby the tug had not full control of the barge: that another tug, passing close by the tow, raised a swell, which, with the tide, gave the barge a sheer towards the dock, which the tug was not able to check, owing to the slackening of the bow line: and that the collision was caused by inevitable accident: Meld, that, as the tug had acquiesced in the slackening of the bow line, she became responsible for whatever consequences resulted from that arrangement.</p> <p>[Cited in The Sweepstakes, Case No. 13,687.]</p> <p>2. That the tide was known and ought to have been calculated for, and the effect of the passing óf the other tug ought to have been guarded against.</p> <p>[Cited in The Merrimac, Case No. 9,478.]</p> <p>3. That the circumstances, therefore, did not make out a case of inevitable accident.</p>

Five seamen of this schooner proceeded for their wages and for salvage. Their contract was to carry on the bank and other cod fishery from Plymouth during the season, and to make two trips, if the owners should wish to make so many, for round sums of money for the season. The schooner was a large one, and her first trip lasted until the early part of September.

<p>Case No. 10,491.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Forfeiture for Violence upon Master — Condonation—Imprisonment.</p> <p>1. Forfeiture of wages by the first' mate for personal violence upon the master.</p> <p>[See The Almatia, Case No. 254.]</p> <p>2. His being permitted to continue in his office for a few days, until the master can reach a place more convenient for the exercise of his authority, is not a condonation, especially if the mate continue to be contumacious.</p> <p>3. The owners having suffered no damage, tlie forfeiture is decreed only as a penalty tor the offence.</p> <p>4. If the mate has been sufficiently punished by imprisonment, he ought not to be subjected to a further infliction.</p>

On the petition of Isaac Young that the assignee be required to pay over to him the proceeds of certain mortgaged property. The petition alleged that petitioner held a mortgage of personal property, executed by the bankrupts to him August 12, 1877, but not recorded until November 29th of the same year. The mortgage covered certain goods, from the sale of which the assignee received the money now in his hands. Bankruptcy proceedings were instituted December 12th.

This was an action on the case by Cecilia Oliver and others, by their next friend. Eli Stake, against Daniel Kauffman, Stephen Weakley, and Philip Breekbill, for damages caused by their illegal harboring and secreting of plaintiffs’ fugitive slaves.

This bill was filed by Edward Oliver, an alien, against the Commercial Mutual Marine Insurance Company, a corporation created by a law of the state of Massachusetts, and established and doing business in that state, to have an alleged mistake corrected in a policy of insurance. The case being somewhat complicated in point of fact, the opinion of the court will be better understood by giving the substance of the bill and of the answer.

This was an action brought [by George T. Oliver] to restrain the collection of taxes by the city of Omaha on the plaintiff’s lands lying within the corporate boundaries of said city, but used exclusively for agricultural purposes. No suit for the taxes had been commenced in the state court when this suit was brought. Submitted upon the pleadings and agreed state of facts.

Bill in equity [by Ebenezer Oliver and others against William Vernon, executor]. The bill states, that in the year 1796, the New England Mississippi Land Company purchased a tract of land in the Mississippi territory, containing eleven millions three hundred and eighty thousand acres.

Rule to show cause of action, and why the defendant should not be discharged on common bail. The plaintiff produced a positive affidavit of the debt, made by Sarmiento, the real plaintiff.

This was a suit brought under the act of congress of February 12. 1793 [1 Stat. 302). Oliver, of Maryland, was the owner of certain slaves, who ran away from him, and came like the others into Pennsylvania. He traced his negroes to the defendant’s barn, and endeavoured by particular and general evidence to show that this person had harboured and concealed them.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] This was an appeal from a decree of the district court sitting in admiralty. The appellants were the sheriff of the county of Cumberland, in the state of Maine, and the plaintiff in an action at law commenced in the supreme court of that state.

[This was a libel by Gideon Olmstead and others against the executors of David Ititten-house, to enforce a decree rendered December 15, 1778, of the court of appeals in prize cases of the United States, reversing a decree of the court of admiralty of Pennsylvania in relation to the disposition of the proceeds of the sloop Active, which had been condemned as a prize in the latter court.) Gideon Olmstead, Artimus White, Aquilla Rumsdale, and David Clark, citizens and…

<p>Case No. 10,504.</p> <p>Collision — Vessel at Axchok without Lookout.</p> <p>[A schooner lying at anchor in the North river at night, about 100 yards from the dock at Thirteenth street, New York, was injured by the tow of a steamboat which was endeavoring to land one of her tows at the dock. There was no lookout on the schooner, and the man who took the helm on a hail- from the steamboat forced the vessels in collision by sheering the schooner in the wrong direction. Held, that the schooner was alone in fault in anchoring in such place without keeping a lookout, but that no costs should be allowed claimants, as the maneuver of the steamboat was slightly hazardous.]</p>

On the 2d of December, 1869, Fordyce, a creditor of Olmsted, filed a petition in bankruptcy against him. The usual order to show cause was granted, returnable December 10th. On the return day the debtor did not appear, and on the motion of the petitioning creditor the case was adjourned, and on subsequent days it was further adjourned till May 3, 1870, and no one appearing on that day the proceedings were dropped.

<p>Case No. 10,506.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction op District Court— Suit by or against Assignee — Proceedings ' in State Court — Receiver.</p> <p>1. District courts have jurisdiction, under section 4979, of a suit by or against an assignee whenever he is a necessary and proper party, although other persons may be joined.</p> <p>2. About sis months prior to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, the bankrupt made a voluntary assignment. Plaintiff was afterwards, and before the filing of the petition, appointed receiver of the bankrupt in certain proceedings supplementary to execution in the state court. In a suit brought against the bankrupt, the voluntary assignee and the assignee in bankruptcy to set aside the voluntary assignment, as void under the state law for noncompliance with the statutory requirements, and as void as to creditors on the ground that it was void in fact, held, that the district court had jurisdiction; that the receiver was a person claiming an adverse interest within the meaning of the statute; that the assignment, being one void in fact or by force of express statute, was not within the limitation of three months, and the property covered thereby and in which such interest was claimed was “property transferable to or vested in the assignee”; and that all persons having an interest therein to be affected by the decree were properly joined as defendants.</p> <p>[NOTE. The case was subsequently heard upon bill, answer, and proofs, and the bill was dismissed. 10 Fed. 101. An appeal was then taken to the circuit, court, where the decree of the district court dismissing the bill was affirmed. 18 Fed. 636.]</p>

The instrument upon which the action was brought was as follows: “St. Louis, Mo., May 10, 1801.

<p>[In the matter of William O’Malley and others, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>Case. No. 10,508.</p> <p>Foreclosure of Mortgage —Proceedings for Deficiency.</p> <p>After a foreclosure by a mortgagee he is still ' entitled to recover the balance of the debt due ! him beyond the value of the mortgaged premises at the time of the foreclosure.</p> <p>(Cited in brief in Bliss v. Weil. 14 Wis. 39. Cited in Hunt v. Stiles, 10 N. H. 469; Porter v. Fillsbury, 36 Me. 284.]</p>

In bankruptcy. Motion to discharge the bankrupt [Michael O’Mara] from arrest on ca. sa. issued from the circuit court of Cook county.

In admiralty. The vessel is libelled by-Staples. Peed & Co., of Norfolk, for supplies, etc., disbursed to her to the amount of $4.-012.80, to enable her to complete her voyage from Baltimore to Demerara, after putting in at Norfolk. The house of Loud, Claridge & Co., of Baltimore, come in by petition, claiming to be paid $1,128.09; the balance of an account due them for disbursements in Baltimore, in part for fitting her out for said voyage.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Robert On-derdonk against John Fanning and others for damages for violation of rights under patent No. 217,519, for lemon squeezers. The patent in this case was originally issued to the defendant John Fanning, and by him assigned to his wife, Josephine Fanning, and to one Isaac Williams, a one-half interest to each. These assignees assigned the whole patent to the plaintiff. In a former action between the same parties as in this suit, a preliminary injunction was granted to the plaintiff. 4 Fed. 148. Subsequently he moved for an attachment to punish an alleged contempt of this injunction. This motion was denied, on the ground that the machine then manufactured by the defendant was not the same which had been adjudged an infringement of the plaintiff’s patent, and was not clearly an infringement, so as to make the defendant liable for a contempt 2 Fed. 568. In the meanwhile the defendant had procured a patent on his new manufacture. This suit is now brought by the plaintiff to restrain the manufacture of this last machine by the defendant. It is heard upon motion for a preliminary injunction for this purpose.]</p>

Ejectment for lot No. 10, in the square No. 78, in the city of Washington. The plaintiff [O’Neal’s lessee] proved that in the year 1784, and from that time to the 20th of June, 1791, Benjamin Stoddert and James M. Lingan were and continued in peaceable and undisturbed possession of the land comprehended in the square No. 78, in their own right and claiming to be proprietors thereof in fee-simple.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

Assault and battery, by beating the plaintiff's slave. A free colored man was offered by the plaintiff as a witness. THE COURT was divided as to his admission.

<p>Case No. 10,617.</p> <p>Salvage.</p> <p>A steamship lost her anchor, at night, in a roadstead within the limits of the harbor of Boston, and a wrecker, knowing the ownership of the vessel, and that the owners were ready to contract for the recovery of the anchor, went in search of it, and succeeded in finding but was unable to raise it, when another wrecker, employed by the owners, came to the spot, and offered him twenty-five dollars for what he had done: and, when that offer was rejected, offered the use of a steam winch for raising the anchor. The first, wrecker expended money and time in recovering the anchor, and refused a tender of fifty dollars. Held, that he should have twenty-five dollars, without costs.</p>

A cargo of lumber and timber was brought from Port Royal, S. C., to New York, under a charter party, and a bill of lading which specified 118 sticks of timber, amounting to 171,206 feet, besides plank and resawed lumber, at $7.50 per M. freight for the timber and $7.00 per M. freight for the plank and lumber. On arrival the master informed the consignee that there was a claim of $150 for demurrage at Port Royal, and requested an advance on the freight.

<p>Case No. 10.620.</p> <p>Carriers — Lien for Freight — Demvert— Effect.</p> <p>1. The mere manual delivery of an article by a carrier to the consignee, does not, of itself, operate necessarily to discharge the carrier’s lien for the freight; but the delivery must be made with the intent of parting with the lien.</p> <p>[Cited in The Santee, Case No. 12,328; Six Hundred Tons of Iron Ore, 9 Fed. 597. Distinguished in Costello v. 734,700 Laths, 44 Fed. 108.]</p> <p>2. A delivery made under the expectation that the freight will be paid at the time, is not such a delivery as parts with the lien, and the carrier may afterwards libel the article in rem, in admiralty, for the freight.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Egan v. A Cargo of Spruce Lath.]</p> <p>[3. Cited in The Mary K. Campbell, 40 Fed. 907, to the point that the application by the court of payments to items not liens is unobjectionable, if there has been no special application by the parties.]</p>

This was a libel in rem, filed by Thomas Crowell and others, the owner, master, and crew of the bark Reliance, against one hundred and ninety-four shawls, and certain other articles salved by the libellants from the wreck of the Lady Kenneway, to recover salvage compensation. The Reliance was a British vessel, owned in Liverpool.

<p>Case No. 10,522.</p> <p>Bill of Lading — Freight— Delivert — Damages fob Delay.</p> <p>1. Under a bill of lading given by a canal-boat for 250 tons of coal, deliverable to M. or his assigns, “he or they paying freight for the same at” so much per ton. no freight is flue until all of the coal is delivered, unless the delivery is pievented by the act or fault of the shipper or the consignee.</p> <p>[Cited in Clark v. Five Hundred and Five Thousand Feet of Lumber, 12 C. C. A. 628, 65 Fed. 239.]</p> <p>2. Under a bill of lading containing no clause as to rate of discharging, the only obligation resting on the consignee is to take the cargo in the customary way, with reasonable diligence; and a delay of the boat in waiting for her regular turn at the wharf for unloading was held, in this case, not to make the owner of the cargo liable in damages for the detention of the boat.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.] This was a libel of information, filed in the district court, by the United States, against a quantity of pine lumber, brought in a vessel from Canada into the United States, to condemn it as forfeited, for a violation of the 1st section of the act of congress, of March 2, 1821 (3 Stat. CIO).

<p>Case Ho. 10,524.</p> <p>Demurrage — Charter Party and Bill oe Lading — Lien—Costs.</p> <p>1. A schooner was chartered to bring a cargo of timber and lumber from Savannah to New York, at specified rates of freight. The charter contained no clause specially binding the cargo for its performance. In loading the cargo the vessel was detained six days by default of the charterer. The master signed bills of lading for the lumber and others for the timber, which provided for the delivery of the cargo at New York to order, on payment of freight as per charter: which bills came into the hands of third parties, who made advances on them without notice of any claim for demurrage. On the arrival of the vessel in New York, the master offered to deliver the cargo on payment of the freight, and demurrage for the six days. The consignees were willing and offered to pay the freight, but refused to pay the demurrage; whereupon the master filed a libel against the cargo to recover the freight and demurrage. The consignees of the lumber and of the timber intervened and defended separately. After the suit was brought, the freight on the lumber was paid. Hdd, that the bills of lading, when in the hands of innocent third parties, released the cargo from all lien except for the freight. and that the master should hare delivered the cargo on being paid his freight.</p> <p>[Cited in The Querini Stamphalia, 19 Fed. 125: Gronn v. Woodruff. Id. 144. Distinguished in The Peer of the Realm. Id. 217. Cited in The Pietro G., 39 Fed. 368.]</p> <p>2. That the libel, as against the lumber, must be dismissed, with costs, and that, as against the timber, the libellant might have a decree for the freight due thereon, less the claimant’s costs.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Lindsay v. Cusimano. 12 Fed. 505. Cited in Addicks v. Three Hundred and Fifty-Four Tons Crude Kainit, 23 Fed. 729; The Mary Riley v. Three Thousand Railroad Ties, 38 Fed. 255.]</p>

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States fór the Southerp district of New York.]</p> <p>[In admiralty. This was an information under section 4 of the act of congress of Slay 28, 1830, claiming forfeiture of 123 packages of glass. Barclay & Livingston interposed a claim to the goods. The district court rendered a decree for the government. Claimant brings error. Reversed.]</p>

This was a libel of information, filed November 26th, 1866, on behalf of the United States, against “100 barrels of whiskey, and all the tools, implements, instruments and personal property whatever, found in the distillery, 48 Broadway.” It averred, that the property proceeded against had been seized on the 23d of November. 1866, as forfeited.

[In the matter of James L. Fowler, a bankrupt. An adjudication of bankruptcy was made in Case No. 4,99S.] The register took evidence touching the right of O’Neil to prove the amount of a judgment which he had obtained against Fowler before'his bankruptcy, and ruled pro forma that the question whether all just credits had been given by the creditor before obtaining his judgment could not be inquired into.

In bankruptcy. The bankrupt offered fifteen per cent, to his creditors, excepting those having priority; and it appeared in evidence that a large number of the creditors who voted upon the question were privileged to the extent of fifty dollars for their wages as workmen of the bankrupt, and that the assets were ample to pay them in any event.

<p>Case No. 10,630.</p> <p>Collision — Vessel at Anchor-Lookout— Mutual Fault.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel anchored in Boston Harbor. without an anchor-watch, was run into by another vessel while getting under way, and the collision could have been avoided if there had been an anchor-watch, both vessels were held in fault, — the one at anchor for not having a watch, and the other for not notifying the one at anchor of the intention to get under way,— it appearing that there was danger of a collision, and that it was known to the vessel getting under way that the other had no watch.</p> <p>[Cited in The Lady Franklin, Case No. 7,984; The James M. Thompson, 12 Fed. 189; The Delaware, Id. 574.]</p> <p>2. Where both vessels are in fault, the damages and costs are divided.</p> <p>[Cited in The Clover, Case No. 2.908; The Mary Patten, Id. 9,223: Vanderbilt v. Reynolds, Id. 16,839; Wells v. Armstrong, 29 Fed. 220.]</p>

Action of ejectment [by Thomas H. O’Neil against the Wabash Avenue Baptist Church Society,] for the recovery of a lot in Chicago, a part of the southwest quarter of section 22. township 39 north, of range 14 east of the 3d P. M.. commencing at a point 350 feet south of the southeast corner of lot 6, of block 4, of Clarke’s addition to Chicago, thence south 65 feet to 18th street, west 191 feet, and thence north 65 feet, the property being the lot on the northwest corner of…

<p>Case No. 10,532.</p> <p>Informer's Share — Costs—Value Less than $350.</p> <p>1. The proviso in the 91st section of the act of congress of March 2d, 1799 (1 Stat. 697). that where the value of the property forfeited is less than $250, the share of the United States is to be applied towards the costs of the prosecution, is general in its application, and is applicable to forfeitures under the internal revenue laws.</p> <p>2. Treasury regulations on that subject, issued under the authority of the 9th section of the act of July 13th. 1860 (14 Stat. 145). are not binding in cases which come within that proviso.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,534.</p> <p>Informer’s Share — Percentage on Grose Amount.</p> <p>Under section 179 of the internal revenue act of June-SOth, 1804 [13 Stat. 305]. as amended by the act of July 13th, 1866 [14 Stat. 145], aiid the regulations of the secretary of the treasury of August 4th, 1866. the amount of an informer’s percentage is to be calculated upon the gross proceeds of the forfeiture, without deducting the costs.</p> <p>[At a subsequent reargument of this case, Judge Blatchford confirmed the conclusion at which he had arrived in the first hearing of the case. Case No. 15,935.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,535.</p> <p>Prize — What is — Who Authorized to Make Prizes — Enemy Property — Seizure on Land near Water.</p> <p>1. Property seized by an armed vessel of the "United States empowered to make prizes while •afloat in an enemy port, on board of an enemy vessel, is lawful prize under the law of nations.</p> <p>2. ‘Enemy property captured by a public vessel in an enemy port, although, when seized, stored in a warehouse on land, near the water, hold, under the facts in this case, to be lawful prize.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel for nonpayment of freight by Mary Dunham, executrix, and others, against one thousand two hundred and sixty-five vitrified pipes (William Nelson, Jr., claimant). From a decree of the district court for libellants (Case No. 14,280), claimant appeals.j

This was a proceeding in rem, on behalf of the United States, to enforce the forfeiture of certain property, which was, at the time of its seizure, being used by the claimant in the manufacture of vinegar.

On the 14th of December, 1865. Eberhard Faber chartered the schooner Onrust in New York to bring a load of cedar timber from Bayport, Florida, or some ■ one of several other specified ports adjacent… Held: that assuming the Necessity of taking the property for the object in view, viz., “the enterprise undertaken against >the enemy,” that was not such a necessity as would protect the officer.

<p>Case No. 10,538.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Cooperage.</p> <p>The admiralty has jurisdiction of a contract made between the master of a ship and a cooper, to put the cargo of the ship in landing order, the services being rendered partly on the ship and partly on the wharf, but before the delivery of the cargo.</p> <p>[Cited in Roberts v. The Windermere, 2 Fed. 728. Followed in Constantine v. The River Queen, Id. 732. Cited in Endner v. Greco. 3 Fed. 413; The Erinagh. 7 Fed. 235; The Egypt. 25 Fed. 330; The Crystal Stream, Id. 576; Florez v. The Scotia, 35 Fed. 917; The Gilbert Knapp. 37 Fed. 214: The Main, 2 C. C. A. 569. 51 Fed. 957: Norwegian S. S. Co. v. Washington, 6 C. C. A. 313, 57 Fed. 225; The Seguranca, 58 Fed. 909.)</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, in the district court, against the schooner Onrust, to recover damages on a charter-party, by which the owner of the schooner chartered his vessel for a voyage from a place, or places, designated. in the state of Florida, to the port of New York, with a cargo of cedar.

Cross-libels for damage by collision between the whale-ships Ontario and Helen Mar, in the Arctic ocean, Sept. 26, 1866, at ten o’clock at night. A gale was blowing from the north-west, and both vessels were lying-to under storm-sails.

This was a petition by T. & J. Coggeshall, of Newport, against the proceeds of the sale of the brig, on account of general average expenses.

On demurrer to the answer. The plaintiff [George Opdyke] brings this action at law to recover of the Pacific Railroad Company of Missouri the amount of seventy-three coupons for interest due Nov. 1st, 1873, upon that number of bonds, of the St. Louis, Lawrence & Denver Railroad Company.

These two cases, arising out of the same facts, and involving the same principles of law, were considered and argued together as one case.

At law. (We have waited some time to ascertain the result of an endeavor to obtain a more detailed and authentic report of the opinion of Judge DURELL in this ease. We understand that it was, like most of the opinions delivered by that learned judge, an oral one, and has not been written out.' The points given below are believed to be substantially correct, and are laid before our readers with these remarks. — Ed.) .

This is the case of an open boat and lading, seized by the collector of Passamaquoddy, on her passage from Eastport to St. Andrews, in the province of New Brunswick. The boat was owned by persons who are natural born subjects of Great Britain, but who for several' years had resided and had their domicil .at Eastport, though they have never been naturalized in the United States.

<p>Case No. 10,550.</p> <p>Admitting False or Fictitious Debt — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. If a bankrupt put into his schedule, as due, a debt which is false or fictitious, it will, under the 29th section of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 : (14 Stat. 531)], prevent his obtaining a discharge, ■ even though the debt be not proved.</p> <p>2. The burden of proof is on the objecting creditor, to prove that the debt was false and fictitious.</p>

[This was a libel by Clement A. Auffln Ordt and others against the Ocean Steam Navigation Company for failure to deliver goods under the terlns and conditions of a bill of lading.] On the 23d of May, 1853, the duly-authorized agent of the Ocean Steam Navigation Company at Havre signed a bill of lading for 10 cases of ribbons, which the respondents had received from Messrs. Dose & Ko-petadt.

<p>Case No. 10,553.</p> <p>Carriers — Delivery to Intermediate Transport Vessel — Delivery to Vessel on Wharf.</p> <p>1. Where an ocean steamer is making regular voyages to a port, and for any reason she is' unable to reach such port, and the agent of her 'owner charters a steamboat to take the passengers and -freight down a river to such steamer and bring back her cargo, a delivery of goods under such circumstances to the steamboat for the purpose of being conveyed by such steamer, is a delivery to the latter, and she is thenceforth bound for their safe carriage and timely delivery.</p> <p>2. Where a vessel is discharging and taking on cargo at a wharf, a delivery of goods thereon by the direction of the master, for the purpose of carriage upon the same, is a delivery to such vessel, and her responsibility for the carriage and delivery thereof commences from that time.</p> <p>[Cited in Pearce v. The Thomas Newton, 41 Fed. 108.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of Ordway Bros., bankrupts.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,554.</p> <p>Suit in Equity to Foreclose a Mortgage— Contracts — Lex Loci.</p> <p>1. Where a foreign corporation loans money to an inhabitant of Oregon through the intervention of an agent resident in Oregon, subject to the approval of the corporation at its home office, the contract of loan is made in Oregon; and unless such corporation had complied at the time with the laws of Oregon concerning foreign corporations doing business therein, it is void.</p> <p>2. Where the notes given for such loan are made payable to such corporation at its office in Scotland, so far as the performance of the contract is concerned, including the rate and payment of interest, its validity is to be tested by the law of the place of performance, as if made there; and this rule is not afEected by the fact, that a mortgage was given on real property in Oregon to secure the payment of said notes.</p> <p>[NOTE. On motion of the complainant, a rehearing was allowed by the district judge, and it was held that the mortgage was invalid if made contrary to the laws of Oregon. It was then suggested by counsel for complainant that sections 8 and 9 of the act of Oregon of October 21, 1864, did not apply to complainant or any foreign corporation, except those mentioned in the title of the act, and it was therefore ordered that the cause be reargued before the district judge upon that question. Case No. 10,555.]</p>

Suit to enforce the lien of a mortgage. This cause was first heard on bill and answer before the district judge who then stated the case as follows: “Giving full effect to the denials and statements of the answer, it appears that the complainant is a foreign corporation, having its principal place of business in Dundee, Scotland, and had not at the date of the transactions involved in this suit, complied with the laws of Oregon, requiring a foreign corporation before doing…

This suit is brought to enforce the lien of a mortgage executed to the complainant by C. W. Shaw and wife upon the south half of the donation of John tV. Chambers and wife, situate in Polk county, Oregon, and being parts of sections 31, 32 and 33, in township 0, south range 3 west of the Wallamet meridian.

<p>Case No. 10,558.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Petition against Corporation— Repeat, of Act of 1867.</p> <p>1. A petition to have a corporation adjudged a bankrupt may be maintained under section 0122 of the Revised Statutes by nny creditor of such corporation, and the provision of section 12 of the act of June 22, 1874 I IS Stat. 180], in relation to the number and amount of the creditors required to join in such petition against a natural person does not apply.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Re Leavenworth Sav. Bank, Case No. 8.166.]</p> <p>2. The original bankrupt act of 1867 [14 Stat. 517], and all the acts amendatory thereof, except the act of 1874 aforesaid, were superseded by the title “Bankruptcy” of the Revised Statures, and repealed by section 5596 of said statutes.</p> <p>3. Quaere, whether such appeal took effect from the enactment of the Revised Statutes; on June 22, 1874, or from December 1. 1S73. the date on which said statutes took effect, as declared in section 5595 thereof.</p> <p>[NOTE. An adjudication in bankruptcy was had, founded on a verdict of the jury. Case No. 10,559. Subsequently a motion to stay proceedings pending a petition for review in the circuit court was overruled. Id. 10.560. The case was heard by the circuit court on review in Id. 10,561.]</p>

1 [This was a bill in equity by the Oregon & Washington Trust Investment Company against C. W. Shaw and wife and Charles Swegle to enforce the lien of a mortgage. A decree was entered directing a sale of the mortgaged premises and a distribution of the proceeds among the different parties, according to the priority of their respective liens. Case No. 10,556. It is now before the court on rehearing.]

[In bankruptcy. The case was formerly heard upon motion to strike out certain denials in defendant’s answer as irrelevant. Case No. 10,558.]

<p>[This case was first heard upon motion to strike out certain denials in the defendant’s answer as irrelevant. Case No. 10;55S. After this an adjudication in bankruptcy founded on verdict of a jury was had. Id. 10,559. It is now heard upon] rule to show cause why the proceedings in the district court should not be stayed pending a petition for review in the circuit court. • ’ „</p>

[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Oregon.] In September, 1S75, certain creditors filed a petition in bankruptcy in the district court against the Oregon Bulletin Printing and Publishing Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Oregon, in which they alleged that they constituted one-fourth in number of the creditors, and held one-third in amount of the aggregate provable debts of the corporation, the amount due them exceeding…

<p>Petition by the assignee for a writ of injunction.</p>

[This was a hill in equity hy H. E. O’Reilly against John S. Holt and C. S. Jeffards.] The bill was filed by the complainant as as-signee in bankruptcy of one Edington, to carry into effect certain decrees rendered by the chancery court of Adams county in favor of Edington for the enforcement of certain liens on lands situate in Issaquena county.

On the 12th of July, 1869, John M. Orem, Son & Co., creditors, filed their petition, praying that the defendant, George W. T. Harley, might be declared bankrupt. The petition proceeded upon two alleged acts of bankruptcy. It embraced the usual formal allegations, and set forth in full the character of the petitioners’ claim, which consisted of two promissory notes, one of which matured on the 13th of April, and •the other on the 6th of June.

<p>">$p&se No. 10,568.</p> <p>Towage — Duty op Tug in Making Up Tow — Collision between Tows.</p> <p>• [In making up a tow it is the duty of a tug to consider the character of the vessels, the channels through which they are to pass, and all other matters bearing on their safe transportation; and if the voyage involves the passage through narrow and shallow channels, and the tug, after taking one tow. afterwards attaches to it by a hawser, another which she knows to be a very bad steerer, she is responsible for a collision resulting therefrom by which the first tow is injured.]</p> <p>I [NOTE. A reference was made to a commis-I sioner, to whose report exceptions were filed, i This court confirmed the commissioner's report, ! and entered a decree for libelant in accordance ¡ therewith. Case No. 11.619a. An appeal was then taken to the circuit court, where the decree of the district court was affirmed. 4 Fed. 337.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,539.</p> <p>Priorities — Seamen’s Wages — Collision —Foreign Vessel.</p> <p>1. The wages of seamen have a priority over a claim for collision against the proceeds of their vessel, whether such wages were earned prior or subsequent to the collision.</p> <p>See The Pride of the Ocean, 7 Fed. 247.</p> <p>[Cited in The Adolph, 7 Fed. 505. Approved in The Samuel J. Christian, 16 Fed. 797. Cited in The Young America, 30 Fed. 795; The Amos D. Carver, 35 Fed. 067. 669; The Daisy Day, 40 Fed. 539. Cited contra in The F. H. Stanwood, 49 Fed. 581.]</p> <p>2. Whether the same rule would be applied in the case of a foreign vessel, quaere.</p> <p>3. But, if it would, a vessel owned in New Jersey is not such a foreign vessel as to call for the application of any different rule.</p>

[This was a libel in admiralty by Charles N. Russell and others against the schooner Oriental. A decree was entered in favor of the libellants, and the cause is now heard on a motion to have that decree set aside on the ground of surprise.]

[In admiralty. In this ease a decree was entered in favor of the libellants, Charles N. Russell and others, in the district court. At a subsequent term of the court the claimants moved to set aside the decree on the ground of surprise. This motion was overruled. Case No. 10,569a. The case is now heard on appeal.]

<p>Case No. 10,571.</p> <p>Carrier may Show that Package was Secretly Defective — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. Although the hill of lading states that a package was received in good order, the carrier may. nevertheless, show’ that it was secretly defective or insufficient.</p> <p>2. The burden of proof is upon the carrier to show that a package receipted for in good order, was in fact secretly defective or insufficient: and unless he does so he is liable for the contents in case-of loss.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this court was affirmed. Case uureported.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,572.</p> <p>Cakkiehs of Passengers — Passenger Entitled to Berth — Steerage Passenger — Freight in Steerage —' Disfigurement of Person — Damages for. v</p> <p>1. Common carriers of passengers are bound to use extraordinary care and diligence, and are excused only by reason of force or pure accident.</p> <p>2. An undertaking to carry a passenger in the steerage of a steamship from San Francisco to Portland includes the furnishing of such passenger with a berth, unless there is a fair understanding to the contrary.</p> <p>3. A steerage passenger is entitled to the use of the steerage room to walk about or sit down in during the voyage, without the risk er inconvenience of freight therein: but if,freight is stowed therein it is at the risk of the carrier, and it is his duty so to stow and secure it that no harm will be caused to the passengers by it: nor can the carrier impose any arbitrary regulation upon the passengers with a view of diminishing such risk — such as to remain in their berths during the whole voyage, or any unusual portion of it.</p> <p>4. Where a number of boxes of tin were stowed in the after part of the steerage, so as to makea pile six feet in length, three feet in width, and from five to eight feet in height, without nny means.of preventing the top tiers from sliding off on the floor in case of rough weather; and a steerage passenger sat down by the side of said pile, and was injured by the rolling of the ship causing some of the boxes to fall upon her: held, that the stowing of the tin in the manner in which it was done was gross negligence, anil the carrier was liable to the passenger in damages for the injury.</p> <p>5. Disfigurement of the person caused by such an injury is a proper subject of damages, but in estimating them it is proper to consider the condition and circumstances of the party disfigured.</p> <p>[Cited in Heddles v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 77 Wis. 231. 46 X. W. 115.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,573.</p> <p>Admiralty — Libellant’s Right to Discontinue Proceedings — Costs—Inquiry into Damages at Instance of Claimant.</p> <p>1. A libellant has the right, at any stage of the cause, voluntarily to discontinue the same; and the only penalty to which he can legally be subjected is, the payment of the costs of the proceedings.</p> <p>[Cited in The Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. (74 ü. S.) 458.]</p> <p>2. The court will not, upon a summary application of a claimant, inguire into damages caused him by an unfounded arrest of his ship.</p> <p>3. Nor will it assume power to coerce parties into issues not raised in the pleadings filed in the cause.</p>

<p>[This was a libel of information filed against the bark Orion charged with being engaged in the slave trade.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,574.</p> <p>Conditional Sale or Vessel — Possession— Failure of Condition.</p> <p>1. Where there is a contract for the sale of the vessel and the purchaser is to have a title upon the performance of a condition at a future day, and in the meantime to have possession, if the condition be not performed, the original owner is entitled to the possession.</p> <p>2. In a suit for such possession it is not necessary to go into all the equities, but only to ascertain the legal title.</p>

The complainant is the owner of a lot in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, and conveyed in trust the said lot to Edward Ingle and Seth I. Todd to secure the payment of a sum of money. The debt was paid, and he prays that a trustee be appointed to release the trust. He states that Edward Ingle, one of the trustees, died and left Seth I. Todd, the survivor, who also died, leaving infant heirs.

<p>Case No. 10,579.</p> <p>Patents — Construction op Claim — Infringement.</p> <p>The invention described in the letters patent granted to Albert S. Southworth, April 10, 1855, reissued September 25, 1860, consists in bringing successively into the field of the lens of a camera, the different portions of a single plate, or several smaller plates.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Wing v. Schoonmaker, Case No. 17,870: Wing v. Richardson, Id. 17.869; Wing v. Anthony, 106 U. S. 142, 1 Sup. Ct. 93; Wing v. Warren, Case No. 17,871.]</p>

In this case, at an adjourned meeting of tlie creditors of the bankrupt [Freeman Orne], held August 27th, 1867, for the proof of debts and the choice of an assignee, objections were raised by the bankrupt to a proof of debt by Benjamin Pope & Co. The proof was filed with the register, August 7th, 1867, the amount of the claim being 811.512.34, and the consideration an account current for goods, a check, and a draft, and interest on the three items.

[In the matter of Freeman Orne, a bankrupt. This case was first beard upon proof of debt of Pope & Co., and as to certain offsets to the same claimed by the bankrupt. See Case No. 10.581.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was an appeal from the sentence of the district court, in a case for mariner’s wages. • The suit was brought by a libel in personam against the appellant [Joshua Orne], who was master of the ship.

On motion to remand cause to the state court. The plaintiff was the collector of internal revenue for one of the districts of Missouri, and appointed the defendant his deputy. The defendant gave the bond which the plaintiff by the act of congress was authorized to require and accept. This action, brought in May, 1875, is upon this official bond, and alleges various breaches of the same.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

This was a bill in equity, brought to restrain the defendant, a stove-maker in Boston, from making air-tight stoves, for which a patent had been granted to the late Isaac Orr. The suit was brought before Dr. Orr’s death, and an injunction was granted at the commencement of the suit, after the usual notice to the defendant, he making no opposition.

<p>Case No. 10,589.</p> <p>Bills and Notes Sent for Collection — Blank Indorsement — Protest of Foreign Bill — Surplusage — Notary’s Seal — Law Merchant and Civil Law — Purchase of Bill at Discount-Usury.</p> <p>1. Words of surplusage, not descriptive of the bill, but of the place where it is payable, is no variance.</p> <p>2. When notes or bills are sent for collection, they are, generally, indorsed in blank, so as to enable the holder to fill up an assignment to himself. Under this, he may bring a suit in his own name.</p> <p>[Cited in Bank of America v. Senior, 11 R. I. 377.]</p> <p>3. A foreign bill of exchange must be regularly protested, after a demand and refusal of payment.</p> <p>4. A seal of a notary may be an impression made by the seal on paper, without wax or any other tenaceous substance.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Phillips, Case No. 11,098; The Gallego, 30 Fed. 274.]</p> <p>5. The seal of the notary is recognized in all countries where the law merchant prevails.</p> <p>6. A seal is not required by the civil law.</p> <p>7. Where evidence has been given, as to notice. the court will refer the matter to the jury, stating, as matter of law, what is a sufficient notice.</p> <p>8. There is no usury in charging exchange on a bill drawn in Indiana, payable in New York.</p> <p>9. A purchase of a bill at any discount or premium, not done to cover usury, is not usurious.</p> <p>10. The notes of a Western specie paying bank are' less valuable, generally, than the notes of Eastern banks, and this may be covered by a contract, without usury.</p> <p>[Cited in Town of Danville v. Sutherlin, 20 Grat. (Ya.) 567.]</p> <p>11. The notes, it is alleged, were signed and indorsed in Michigan, but as they were negotiated at the bank in Indiana, the court held that, that was the place of contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Buchanan v. Drovers’ Nat. Bank, 5 ■ C. C. A. 83, 55 Fed. 227.]</p>

This was a bill in equity. It alleged, that before the 20th of January, 1836, Isaac Orr, whom the complainant [Matilda K. Orr] represented, was the inventor of a new improvement in stoves, called the air-tight stove, and on that day obtained a patent therefor. But the specification being made out inaccurately, he caused the patent, on the 12th of November, 1842, to be cancelled, and a new one to be issued [No. 48].

This was a bill in chancery, filed the 9th of September, 1845, charging the defendant [William Merrill] with selling Orr’s patent air-tight stoves, without a license from the complainant [Matilda K. Orr, administratrix of Isaac Orr]. She was averred to be the owner of said patent procured by her husband, and to have supported her right to it and the validity thereof in several former trials, and to have been for some years in the possession and sale of it.

The facts of the case and the nature of the pleadings on which the opinion was pronounced are sufficiently stated therein. (1) In suits and proceeding instituted in, or transferred to, the federal courts, the same defenses, set-offs and counter claims may be interposed as could be if they were brought and tried in the state tribunals.

<p>Case Wo. 10,593.</p> <p>Firm Property Solo ox Judgments and Executions AGAINST THE PARTNERS SEPARATELY.</p> <p>Where judgments had been obtained before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy against ench of two partners in trade by a separate creditor of each, and the firm property had been sold under executions issued on the separate judgments, and purchased by an agent of the plaintiff in the separate suits: Reid,that neither he nor his assignee was' entitled to hold the property as against the assignee in bankruptcy of the firm.</p> <p>[Cited in Crane v. Morrison, Case No. 3,355; Re Sauthoff, Id. 12,380.]</p>

LThis was a bill in equity by Rufus Osborn against the Michigan Air Line Railroad Company and others to set aside a decree alleged to have been secured by fraud in a suit brought to foreclose a mortgage against the railroad. Heard on demurrer.]

On the 28th of March, 1861, the defendant [Young A. G. Nicholson] executed to the plaintiff [Henry T. Osborn] his promissory note for $1,300, and at the samé time the plaintiff executed to the defendant a bill of sale in these words: “For the consideration of thirteen hundred dollars, I hereby transfer all the right, title and interest I have to a negro boy named Albert, aged about twenty-three years. I warrant said negro to be sound in body and mind, and a slave for life.

Writ of entry sur intrusion brought by the demandant [Daniel Osborne], as administrator of David Osborne, deceased, upon a mortgage, and counting on the seizin of the •intestate, David Osborne, in fee and in mortgage, and an intrusion by the tenants [Joshua Benson and Eliza Benson, his wife] after his death. Plea, the general issue.

In equity. This was a motion to dissolve a provisional injunction.

Ejectment. The case came on upon a statement of facts agreed by the parties as follows; It is agreed that the plaintiffs [Willard Osborne and others] are the heirs at law of Weaver Osborne, the grandson of the testator William Shrieve;. and to whom the testator devised the premises demanded in manner as set forth in said testator's will; that the defendants [Nancy Shrieve and others] are in possession of the premises demanded, devised as aforesaid, and claimed by the…

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania. [This was an action by Ann Osborne, ad-ministratrix of Joseph Osborne, upon a distiller’s bond.]

<p>Case No. 10,600.</p> <p>Contracts —Void as against Pdblic Policy— Plea of the General Issue.</p> <p>1. R., an agent of the Turkish government, came to the United States to buy fire-arms for that government. O., the consul-general for that government, in New York, procured from R. orders for W. to make such fire-arms, and W. agreed to pay O. a commission on the amount of such orders. W. furnished the fire-arms. O. then sued W. to recovei the amount of the commission: Scld, that the agreement was void, because against public policy, and that no action upon it would lie.</p> <p>2. The agreement was a purchase and sale of the official influence of O. ,</p> <p>3. Such a defence can be set up under a plea of the general issue.</p> <p>[This cause was carried by writ of error to the supreme court, where the judgment of this court was affirmed. 103 U. S. 261.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,601.</p> <p>Pkize — Vessel Taken bs United States at Appealed Value.</p> <p>Vessel condemned as enemy property, having been appraised by a naval survey, and appropriated, at that valuation, to the use of the United States at the place of capture. Appraised value ordered to be distributed.</p>

On the 19th of March, 1840, William Frances, a colored seaman, filed a libel against the brig, in which he charges, that in the month of December, 1843, he shipped on board her at Boston, for a voyage thence to New-Orleans, thence to Bordeaux in France, and tlienq» back to the United States, Morgan being her master. That he shipped as cook and steward, at $16 per month.

Bill in equity [by James R. Osgood and others against Edward C. Allen] for an injunction to restrain the defendant from the use of the words “Our Young Folks,” as the title of a publication.

[This was a bill in equity by Stephen Osgood against the Chicago, Danville & Vin-cennes Railroad Company and others.] On the 22d of February, 1875, the plaintiff, a citizen of Massachusetts, as a bondholder of the railroad company, filed a bill in the Will county circuit court, to foreclose a mortgage, making as defendants, the company, its president, treasurer, and .directors, and also the trustees of mortgages amounting to several millions of dollars, given by the railroad…

[This was a bill in equity by James R. Osgood and others against George G. Rockwood .for the alleged unlawful use of a trade-mark. Heard on motion for a provisional injunction.]

This was a suit in rem, promoted by Kenneth Urquhart and others, owners of the British brig Fanny, against the steamer Osprey, for a collision. At the same time, a cross-libel was promoted by John Linton & Co., of Philadelphia, owners of the Osprey, against the brig Fanny. The two suits were tried together, upon the same evidence and arguments.

<p>Case No. 10,607.</p> <p>Collision in Long Island Sound — Schooners Crossing — Burden op Proof — Lookout.</p> <p>1. Two schooners, the O. and the S. H., came in collision in Long Island Sound at night. The O. alleged that the wind was south and she was heading south-west by west, close hauled, and made no change of course; and that the S. H. was seen, showing no light, about two points on the starboard bow of the O., sailing free, and would have passed the O. on the starboard bow of the O. but sheported her helm and ran into the O. The S. H. alleged that the wind was east of south and she was heading east by north-half-north: that the red light of the O. was seen off the lee bow of the S. H.; and that the O. put down her helm and ran into the S. H.: Meld, that the courses of the two vessels were crossing, so as to involve risk of collision.</p> <p>2. Therefore, it was the duty of the O. to keep her course and of the S. H. to keep out of the way.</p> <p>[Cited in The Maria & Elizabeth, 7 Fed. 254.]</p> <p>3. The burden of proof was on the S. H. to establish that the O. did not keep her course,. and she had not established it</p> <p>4. No question of the lookout on the O. arose, it not being shown that she changed her course.</p> <p>5. The S. H. was liable for the damages sustained by the O.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, both vessels were found to be in fault and the costs in both courts were equally divided. Case No. 10,608.]</p>

These were cross libels filed in the district court, in rem, in admiralty. The district court decreed against the Sandy Hook, and dismissed the libel against the Osseo [Case No. 10,607]. The Sandy Hook appealed to this court, in both suits.

[This was a libel for salvage by Oliver Nelson and others, master, etc., of the mail steamer Matagorda, against the hull, materials, and cargo of the ship Osteonthe.]

Osterhaus was- convicted of the crime of passing counterfeit money in the district court of the Third judicial district of Wyoming territory, and by that court sentenced to imprisonment in the Detroit house of correction in this state and district for the period of ten years. He was so sentenced to that particular prison by virtue of a designation by the secretary of the interior made in pursuance of section one of the act of congress of May 12, 1SG4 (13 Stat. 74).

<p>Case No. 10,610.</p> <p>Tow-Boat and Tow — Negligence—Pleading.</p> <p>1. A canal boat was taken in tow by the steamboat O.. at New York, to be towed to Hudson. She was in the head tier of the boats towed astern of the O.. and next to the outside boat on the starboard hand. When the steamboat and her tow were off Haverstraw, the canal boat sank. Her owners filed a libel against the O.. to recover their damages. They alleged that, a storm arising on the passage, they hailed the steamboat to give notice that the canal boat was leaking and in danger, which hail was heard, but the steamboat kept on, no attention being paid to the hail, till the canal boat sank. They alleged negligence, in that the boat was improperly placed in the tow, because her stem projected beyond the stems of the other boats in the tier; that the tow should have been landed at Piermont, or at some pier above Piermont, or anchored; and that the steamboat should have gone to the east side of the river, as the wind blew from the north-east. On behalf of the O., all negligence was denied, and it was alleged that the canal boat was old and rotten and easily water-logged, and sank by reason of her being overladen and rotten, and that, as soon as any notice was given of the canal boat's being in danger, every effort was made to save her. It appeared in evidence that the steamboat stopped at Piermont for some time, and took another boat in tow, but no notice was there given from the canal boat that she was in danger. It also appeared that the hatches of the canal boat were not properly covered, and that her sinking was due to the water’s finding its way into the hold through such open hatches: .Held, that there was no peril to the boat before she reached Pier-mont or at Piermont; and that if there had been, it would have been gross negligence, directly causing the subsequent disaster, that those in charge of the canal boat did not make known the peril at Piermont, to those in charge of the steamboat, for which they had ample opportunity.</p> <p>2. The sinking of the boat was caused by the hatches of the boat not being kept properly covered: and. although this was not set up as a de-fence in the answer, yet, as the evidence was not objected to when offered, it must be hrld to establish fault on the part of the canal boat, contributing to the disaster.</p> <p>[Cited in Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. New England Transp. Co., 24 Fed. 500.]</p> <p>3. There was no negligence on the part of the steamboat in placing the boat where she was placed, although the master of the steamboat, according to his own testimony, thought the boat was old and weak, and was. therefore, bound to use great precaution in towing her.</p> <p>4. There was no negligence on the part of the steamboat in not going up on the east side of the river, or in not leaving the canal boat at Piermont.</p> <p>5. On the facts, although those on the canal boat signalled the steamboat as soon as the peril commenced, such signals were not seen or heard from the steamboat until a late period.</p> <p>6. As the disaster was due to the uncovered condition of the hatches, and those on the steamboat were not informed of such dangerous condition. and did not hear the signals, because the boat was so far astern, in a place in which she was put without the expression of any desire on the part of her captain to be placed alongside of the steamboat, where he coujd communicate with her more easily, the court must, though with some hesitation, acquit the steamboat of any negligence contributing to the disaster, and the libel must be dismissed.</p>

<p>Motion for new trial.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, by David G. Cartwright and Frederick H. Harrison, against the schooner Othello and her cargo, on a bottomry bond executed by her master on vessel and cargo, at St. Thomas, where she had put in, in distress, on a voyage from Wilmington, N. C., to New York, with a cargo of property that had been captured by the army of the United…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] [This was a libel in admiralty by William Otis and others against the steamer Rio Grande.] The suit is founded upon a record of the United States circuit court for the Southern district of Alabama. [See Case No. 10,614 and note.]

This cause came on for hearing on the motion of libellant [William Otis] for an order to place the cause upon the docket of this court, the same having been duly appealed from the district court, and bond given as required by law.

This was a libel in rem, by ffm. P. Stafford and Clark Haywood, lessees of a wood dock or wharf, extending from the shore some distance over the water, at Port Hope, on Lake Huron, for a collision with, and damage to, their wharf by the propeller Ottawa, on the 6th dáy of November, 1869. The propeller stopped at libellants’ wharf for a supply of wood.

The brig Ottawa with a valuable cargo was anchored in a dangerous position, in Vineyard Sound, near the breakers at the Island of Cuttyhunk, on the night of 7-8 April, 1868, and in a very severe gale was partly dis-masted, and was abandoned by her crew.

<p>Case No. 10,620.</p> <p>¡ Prize — False Destination on tiie Papers of the Vessel — Spoliation op Papers.</p> <p>1. The entire cargo of the vessel was contraband of war, and was thrown overboard while she was being chased, before her capture; anil her claimant was part owner of another vessel recently condemned in this court for a violation of the same line of blockade.</p> <p>2. If the vessel arrested as prize was acting in violation of public law, she is amenable to trial and condemnation therefor in behalf of the United States, whether the persons or means employed in making the seizure had authority to make it or not. It is enough that the gov-eminent conies into the national court demanding the condemnation of an offender; and the court never inquires whether the party or tiling proceeded against has been regularly or irregularly brought under attachment or complaint.</p> <p>3. Vessel condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade and to introduce into the enemy's country a cargo of articles contraband of war.</p> <p>4. A motion to redeliver to the master his nautical instruments denied, he having been actively engaged in acts of hostility against the rights of the United States and the public law.</p> <p>NOTE. My impression is that the question raised between the parties about the surrender to the master of this vessel of the nautical instruments, as being nis personal property, was deferred for further hearing. If a delay is not asked for by either party, the court is prepared to dispose of the point.</p> <p>January 2, 1863, ordered, that the motion for the redelivery of nautical instruments to the master be denied, he having, as appears in proof, been actively engaged, on board of his vessel, in acts of hostility against the rights of the United States and the public law.</p> <p>This decree was affirmed, on appeal, by the circuit court July 17, 1863. [Case No. 10,621.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

Petition to confirm tax sale, determined in the circuit court, before Hon. Daniel Ringo, district judge, holding said court; absent, the-Hon. Peter V. Daniel, associate justice of the supreme court.

<p>[This was an action by David Overman, assignee, against John H. Quick.]</p>

[This was a proceeding by Overton and King against Gorham and Durley.] A judgment havihgr. been obtained in this case, at a previous term, an execution was issued and levied by the late marshal on real estate, which was sold by him after giving due notice. After the levy and before the sale, the late marshal was removed from office and a successor appointed; but before the sale he was not notified of his removal,' nor of the appointment of his successor.

<p>Case No. 10,625.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Appointment op Additional As-signee — Application to Contest a Claim.</p> <p>1. An additional assignee may be appointed to act in conjunction with the one previously appointed, upon a petition to the court showing sufficient reasons for so doing.</p> <p>2. An application to contest a' claim against bankrupt’s estate will he allowed upon a petition and affidavits stating fully and in detail the grounds upon which such application is based.</p>

In 1859, the New York Life Insurance Company executed a policy of insurance upon the life of Iskam H. Owen, of Danville, Virginia, for the benefit of Mary A. Owen, his wife, in the sum of $5,000, for a premium of $105.50 per annum, payable on that day, and annually on each succeeding 23d day of April in each year until the death of the husband.

Motion to set aside the exemptions allowed by the assignee. Jesse A. Mitchell and Alexander Eeid brought an action of replevin in the Lawrence circuit-court against John Owens, to recover the possession of certain personal property.

(The record in this ease having been lost or mislaid, the reporter is precluded from furnishing a statement of the facts elicited in the cause. As the following opinion, however, discusses a very important question of evidence, he has thought it advisable to insert it, especially as the question is purely a legal one.)

This action was brought [by James A. Owens, assignee of Murphy & Rowe, bankrupts, against Conrad Gotzian and Ckanning Sea-bury] to recover damages for the conversion by the defendants to their own use of certain personal property alleged to belong to the bankrupts’ estate.

Complaint, filed 30th day of March, 1876, sets out that plaintiffs [Owsley & Co.], citizens of Kentucky, sent to defendants [Henry Cobin & Co.], citizens of South Carolina, on 1st February, 1876, certain goods for sale on commission. That defendants sold the same, and rendered an account of sales, showing net sales due plaintiffs one thousand two hundred and forty-seven dollars and thirty-four cents, which they had failed to pay. Answer filed 22d July, 1S76, admits the sales.

<p>[This was an action by the Oxford Iron Company against Edwin P. Slafter, assignee in bankruptcy of Foot, Doud & Co.)</p>

Assumpsit by the assignee of Thomas Moore, a bankrupt [against John and James Tucker]. The defendants offered to set off a debt due to them by Henry and Thomas Moore. cited the 42d section of the bankrupt law (2 Stat. 19); 1 Esp. 117; 1 Atk. 133. Partners are jointly and severally .bound. A separate commission may issue against one partner, upon & partnership debt; consequently a joint debt may be proved under a separate commission.

Claim for eleven leagues of land in Mari-posa county, rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimant [Juan Perez Pacheco].

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] Charles D. Cleaveland filed a libel in rem, in the district court, against the ship Pacific [her tackle, etc.]2 then lying in the port of New-York [and against the owners and master],2 for a breach of a passenger contract.

This was a libel in rem for seaman’s wages. The answer alleged that the master was bound to return the libellant to St Domingo, and that the wages were not due until his arrival there; and it was so stipulated in the shipping articles. The libellant was a native and subject of Hayti, and shipped there, con-formably to the laws of that country, for the present voyage.

<p>Case No. 10,645.</p> <p>District Attohnet — Compensation — Per Cent-um on Sums “Collected” and “Realized.”</p> <p>1. The act of March 3, 1863, § 11 (12 Stat. 741), does not give district attorneys a per cent-um on the amount of a judgment or decree obtained by them in favor of the United States, but only upon the sum actually collected or realized thereon.</p> <p>2. The words “collected” and “realized,” as used in said section, are substantially synonymous; and money is not “realized” by the United States within the meaning of the same, until it has received the same or the benefit of it.</p> <p>3.Amount allowed district attorney for attending an examination to procure remission of a forfeiture under section 50 of the collection act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 665).</p> <p>[Followed in The Orizaba, Case No. 10,576.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,646.</p> <p>Salvage — Compensation.</p> <p>[A steamer hound to San Francisco, having become disabled near the mouth of the harbor by striking upon rocks, came to anchor, and sent the mate with three seamen to San Francisco for a tug. The next morning a steamer passing up the coast was discovered, which, upon request, took the vessel in tow. On reaching the mouth of the harbor, a tug, which had been engaged, was met, and the vessel was taken in tow by her, the steamer turning back upon her course. The time of service by the steamer was two hours, and the total time lost from her voyage was three and one-half to four hours. The weather was fair, the injured vessel was in no danger, and there was no hazard connected with the service. The tug had agreed to bring the vessel in for $125; the value of the tow was about $60,000, and that of the towing steamer about $20,000. It appearing that $2,000 had been offered and refused, and $7,500 demanded, held, that the offer was fair and liberal, and a decree for that amount should be entered.]</p>

This and several other actions of trespass against the same defendant were tried at this term, the facts of which were the same. A number OT) questions of law were raised in the argument; but as they had been decided in former cases it is not deemed necessary to make a detailed statement of the case, or to notice the arguments of counsel. Vide [Co-nard v. Atlantife Ins. Co.] 1 Pet [26 U. S.] 386; [Conard v. Nicoll] 4 Pet. [29 II. S.] 291; Atlantic Ins.

<p>Libel for salvage.</p>

On motion for an injunction. The complainant, the Pacific Railroad Company (of Missouri) is a corporation chartered by the state of Missouri, and It built and is operating a road from St. Louis to… Held: prevents the complainant from operating said road through the city, and no trains have run through the city, or to Atchison since that time. The bill sets forth the above facts, and that the damage therebjK&aused is irreparable, stating the facts showing it to be so.

[This was a petition by .DeW. C. Packard for the payment to him of the purchase money of goods mortgaged by the bankrupt B. Butler.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was an appeal from a decree of the district court, dismissing the following libel. It was filed by the'libellant [John S. Packard] in November, 1845, against the sloop Louisa, of forty tons burthen, for wages due to him for services on board of her, commencing in March, 1842, and ending in November after.

<p>[This was an action by Austin Packard and others against L. Gilbert and I. Wilson.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,653.</p> <p>Descent — Heir at Law — Statutes op Pennsylvania.</p> <p>These extracts are inserted as showing the views of the court of the effect of the domicile of Matthias Aspden, the testator, in the construction of his will. See [Harrison v. Nixon] 9 Pet [34 U. S.] 494.</p> <p>[NOTE. A bill of review in this case was filed, but dismissed upon hearing. Case No. 11,-270. Subsequently, on appeal, the decree above was reversed by the supreme court. 9 Pet. (34 U. S.) 483. The case was again before the supreme court upon a certificate of division of opinion among the judges of the circuit court upon a matter of practice. The supreme court decided the matter not properly the subject of such certificate. 10 Pet. (35 U. S.) 408. The whole subject of Matthias Aspden’s estate was again before the court upon the question of the interest of the devisees under the will. Case .No. 589.]</p>

Libel on a bottomry bond, pledging the ship, freight, and cargo. The ship Packet with a valuable cargo on board, belonging principally to various shippers, was, on a voyage from' St. Petersburg (in Russia) to Boston (in America), run down by another vessel at sea, and was so much injured, that she was compelled to put into Christiansand (in Norway) for repairs.

<p>Case No. 10,655.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Factor—Advances—Proceeds —Costs.</p> <p>1. A factor, to whom a general shipment has been entrusted as security for advances, commissions, and expenses, has a special property only in the shipment, and subject to his lien for those charges, the owner may dispose of them as he pleases, and the conveyance will carry the right.</p> <p>[Cited in Boston & M. R. Co. v. Warrior Mower Co., 76 Me. 261.]</p> <p>2. In the admiralty, where the factor, and the persons claiming a derivative title under the owner, contest the right to the proceeds, the court will decide upon the equities of all concerned, and decree the amount of the lien to the factors, and the residue of the proceeds to the other claimants.</p> <p>[Cited in Leland v. The Medora, Case No. 8,-237; The Lady Franklin, Id. 7,983.]</p> <p>3. If, in such a case, a factor sets up a title as general owner, and not merely for a lien, he will not be entitled to costs.</p> <p>[Cited in Hunter v. Marlboro, Case No. 6,908.]</p>

This action was brought [by William H. Paekwood against George H. Clark and others] to recover the sum of $3500 due upon a promissory note, with interest thereon from May 23. 1S73.

[This case was formerly heard upon the question of payment to certain creditors of witness fees.

[In the matter of S. Paddock, a bankrupt.] By HOVEY K. CLARKE, Register: I do hereby certify that on the twelfth day of September last, the deposition of Horace G. Miller, taken before Cephas R. Dresser, one of the commissioners of the United States circuit court for this district, was filed in my office, to prove the claim of said Miller against the estate of said bankrupt; and on the twentieth day of September last the deposition of John G. Gistivit, taken before the same…

The bill states that Johnson & Smith carried on business as partners, under the firm of Johnson, Smith & Co., the former living in London, and the latter in New York.

<p>Case No. 10,660.</p> <p>Seamen — Fishing Voyage — Improper Equipment —Negligence op Master — Pat for Catch.</p> <p>Where the master of a vessel engaged in a fishing adventure negligently omitted to procure salt, in consequence of which the voyage was terminated twenty-five days before the close of the season, held, that the men were entitled to compensation, and for this purpose were to be credited for the twenty-five days lost, with the same number of fish as they had caught for the twenty days preceding the breaking up of the voyage.</p>

This was an action on the case [by George Tage against William M. Ferry, Jr.], tried by WILKINS, District Judge, and a jury, brought for the alleged infringement of letters patent [No. 2,174] for an “improvement in circular saw mills,” granted to the plaintiff July 10, 1841, and extended for seven years from July 16,1855. The invention consisted of combination of the free end play of the saw mandril with guide rollers at the periphery.

Certain questions in this case were, by agreement of parties, and the sanction of the court of insolvency, submitted to the arbitration of Judge Sprague, of the United States district court.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the-United States for the district of Massachusetts.]</p> <p>[This was a libel by G. C. Munro and others against Chauncey Page and others.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel for wages by Henry L. Sheffield against Kilby Page, part owner of the .ship Uriel. From a decree of the district court in favor of libellant (Case No. 12.-743), respondent appealed.]

<p>[This was an action of debt by W. W. Page against Joseph W. Trutch, to recover a fixed sum for professional services.]</p>

This was an ejectment for a tract of land lying in the state of New Jersey, which was argued at last term by Bichard Stockton for ■the plaintiff [lessee of James Page], and by Ewing and Wood for the defendant; and was held under advisement until the present term. The parties agreed on a ease, which presented the single question whether, under the will of James Page, Mary his widow took an estate for life or in fee, in the real estate devised to her.

Paget having filed his petition in ordinary form, to be decreed a bankrupt, &c. the application was resisted on the grounds, that he had fraudulently concealed1 his property, made preferences in contemplation of bankruptcy, confessed fraudulent and fictitious judgments, and done omer acts which would prevent his having the benefit of the law.

In equity. This was a final bearing, on pleadings and proofs, of a bill in equity brought [by Edward W. Paige and Samuel W. Jackson, executors, etc., of Alonzo C. Paige, against David Banks. Jr., and others] for the alleged infringement of copyrights. Although the scope of the bill was wider, the case at the hearing was limited to the question of infringement by the sale of what is known as the first volume of Paige’s Chancery Reports.

<p>Case No. 10,672.</p> <p>Bankruptcy— Fraudulent Payments — Recovert by Assignee — Trial—Interest Remitted.</p> <p>1. Under the thirty-fifth section of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat 534)], an assignee in bankruptcy may recover money paid to a creditor by the bankrupt, as a fraudulent preference, within four months before the petition in bankruptcy, if at the time of the payment the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that it was made in contemplation of insolvency, and to give him a preference over other creditors; although he had no reasonable cause to believe the debtor then to be insolvent in fact.</p> <p>[See Alderdice v. State Bank of Virginia, Case No. 154.]</p> <p>2. Evidence of a statement made by the defendant to a witness, of the contents of a letter of the defendant not called for, is competent.</p> <p>3. It is not error to allow the plaintiff to remit an excess of interest found in the verdict, and then affirm the verdict, so amended.</p>

<p>[In the matter of John B. Paine, bankrupt.]</p>

Bill by the assignee of a bankrupt, to recover from‘'fifIenry L. Caldwell] a citizen of Massachusetts the amount of a judgment recovered by him in the courts of Maine against his debtor, the bankrupt, and collected in fraud of the bankrupt act through an attorney resident in Maine, upon whom process was served.

<p>Case No. 10,676.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Citizenship — Relief against Illegal Taxation — Following State Decisions — Tax on Railroad Profits.</p> <p>1. Where a portion of the stockholders are citizens of other states, they may seek relief in the circuit court against an illegal taxation of their property by a state, although there be no allegation that the tax is in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States. And in such case, the corporation doing its business in the state, in order to obtain relief, may be made defendants.</p> <p>2. The circuit court will give relief under the laws of tbe state, the same as the state court. And if the construction of the tax law has been fixed by the supreme court of the state, such decision will constitute a rule of decision for the circuit court.</p> <p>[Cited in Stansell v. Levee Board of Miss. Dist. No. 1. IS Fed. 851.]</p> <p>3. A tax can be just and equal on railroad corporations only by taxing the profits.</p> <p>4. The investments in such an enterprise are materially different from investments in real estate.</p>

<p>Case Ho. 10,677.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages — Disobedience — Means Used by Master to Overcome Same.</p> <p>1. The disobedience of a seaman is a very serious fault, and if persevered in is a forfeiture of all claims for wages.</p> <p>2. If the master attempts to overcome the refusal of duty, he must be careful what means he employs. But the general conduct and behavior of the seamen may be fully inquired into.</p> <p>[Cited in Thompson v. Herman, 47 Wis. 607, 3 N. W. 581.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Virginia.] E. V. Palmer filed his petition in bankruptcy on June 30th, 1874, in the United States district court for the Eastern district of Virginia, at Richmond. His application for discharge was opposed by one of his creditors, Rogers & Co., they alleging that his assets were not equal to thirty per centum of the debts proved against him, upon which he is bound as principal debtor.

This was a petition by the British consul at Philadelphia for the extradition of Benjamin Palmer, upon the charge of murder. By the depositions taken in the cause it appeared that Benjamin Palmer shipped on the bark ,T. B. Duffus on April 13, 1S73, as boatswain or second mate. That on June S, 1873, while the bark was at sea, the morning being squally, and the ship not steering well, the master ordered Palmer to lower the spanker.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

The bankrupt, Charles N. Palmer, having filed his petition for discharge, of which due notice was -given to all creditors who had proved their debts, Sawyer & Herman, attorneys, entered their appearance as attorneys for Weaver, Richardson & Co., and, in due time, filed specifications in opposition to the discharge, signed Sawyer & Herman, and Brown & Case, attorneys for opposing creditors.

This action was brought on a promissory note; the statute of limitations was pleaded, and to this a part payment before the maturity of the note, was replied. Held, that the replication was good. Held: that the replication was good. A jury was waived in this case and the cause submitted on the pleadings to the court.

This was an issue, sent from the commissioners of bankrupts, to try whether any thing, and how much, is due from the bankrupt to the plaintiff. A great part of the plaintiff’s demand arose upon bills of exchange, drawn by bankrupt in favour of plaintiff, and remitted to him in Jamaica, to sell, and to remit the proceeds to bankrupt.

<p>At chambers. In equity. This cause was heard upon the motion of complainant for a preliminary injunction.</p>

On motion by plaintiff [Henry L. Palmer] to remand cause to the state court. This is a bill to foreclose a mortgage.

<p>Case Mo. 10,688.</p> <p>Rivers — Obstruction to Navigation — Constitutional Law — Right of Congress to Regulate Commerce between States.</p> <p>1.The provision in the ordinance of 1787, that certain navigable waters “shall be common highways and forever free,” &c., does not prevent the improvement of the navigation of said waters by a state. The ordinance referred to these waters in their natural state.</p> <p>[Cited in Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw-Bridge Co., Case No. 7.441; Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U. S. 690, 2 Sup. Ct. 195; Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 19 Fed. 354; Holyoke WaterPower Co. v. Connecticut River Co.. 20 Fed. 79; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 547, 7 Sup. Ct. 315; Rhea v. Newport N. & M. V. R. Co., 50 Fed. 20.]</p> <p>[Cited in City of Chicago v. McGinn. 51 Ill. 273. ''Spited in brief in People v. U. S.. 93 , Ill. 32.' Cited in Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Parker. 29 La. Ann. 430; Attorney General v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 42 Mich. 634, 4 N. W. 486. Cited in brief in Dugan v. Bridge Co., 27 Pa. St. 308. Cited in Wisconsin River Imp. Co. v. Manson, 43 Wis. 264.]</p> <p>2. If they shall be improved by slackwater navigation or otherwise, a reasonable toll for the increased facility, would not violate the ordinance.</p> <p>3. No state can obstruct a navigable stream which extends to other states, or is connected with a river or lake which falls into the sea.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Bain, Case No. 14,496; Holyoke Water-Power Co. v. Connecticut River Co., 20 Fed. 79.]</p> <p>[Cited in Holyoke Water-Power Co. v. Connecticut River Co., 52 Conn. 575.]</p> <p>4. The power to regulate commerce among the several states is paramount, in the federal government, and cannot be restricted by a state.</p> <p>[Cited in Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw-Bridge Co., Case No. 7,441.]</p> <p>5. It might be difficult to state, in this respect, the difference between the general power of a state not subject to the ordinance, and one that is subject to it.</p> <p>[Cited in McLean v. Hamilton County, Case No. 8,881.] •</p> <p>[Cited in People v. U. S„ 93 Ill. 32.]</p> <p>6. The Connecticut Reserve, ceded to the United States after the adoption of the ordinance, is subject to that instrument equally, ns other parts of the territory northwest of the Ohio.</p>

[Appeal from the district court ,of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] In admiralty. The complainants filed a libel in the district court on the 17th of June, 1841, claiming the sum of $284.90 with interest, being the amount paid by them for repairing damages to their brig, occasioned by collision with the Orion, at the Chester piers, in January, 1840.

This was an action of assumpsit [by Julius A. Palmer and others against William H. Elliot and Stanford Hovey] and was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts. With the exception V>f one or two particulars the material circumstances were the same as in the case of Bigelow v. Elliot [Case No. 1,390].

<p>[Action of trespass on the case by Court-land Palmer against John Fiske and others.]</p>

This was an action of indebitatus assump-sit. to recover back 810,000 paid by the plaintiffs’ agents to the defendants, as freight, upon certain goods brought in the ship America. from Calcutta to Philadelphia, which the plaintiffs insist were not liable to pay freight.

<p>Case No. 10,693.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant — Limitation — Adverse Possession — California Statute — Defense.</p> <p>1. A grant made by an alcalde of San Francisco, after the transfer of California to the United States, is a Mexican title within the meaning of (he proviso to the sixth section of the statute of limitations of the state of California, as amended in 1855.</p> <p>2. The claim of the city of San Francisco to the pueblo lands, not having been finally confirmed on the eighteenth of April, 1863, the statute of limitations had not commenced to run at that date against a party claiming title under an alcalde grant, to a lot within the limits of the pueblo.</p> <p>3. Where the plaintiff, in an action to recover land, relies upon title acquired by virtue of an adverse possession for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations, but alleges his seizin generally in his complaint, without setting out the statute, or the nature of his title, the defendant need not plead an exception to the statute upon which he relies, but may upon the trial, show by evidence that he is within the exception without pleading it.</p> <p>4.The word “defense,” in section 6 of the statute of limitations of California of 1863. refers to the same cases as the word “defense” in the proviso to section 7 of the statute of limitations of 1855.</p> <p>[This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court, where it was carried on writ of error. 98 U. S. 1.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,694.</p> <p>Payment — Receipt op Note.</p> <p>Where a material man who had trusted two owners of a vessel, afterwards received the negotiable note of one of them, and subscribed at the foot of the account the words “Rec’d payment,” held, that this was, prima facie, payment of the account.</p>

[This was a motion by claimants [Joseph C. Palmer and others, claiming the rancho Punta De Lobos] that the case be set for hearing at an early day.

<p>This was a motion by claimants [Joseph C. Palmer and others, claiming the rancho Punta De Lobos] to set the cause for hearing.</p>

Claim for two leagues of land in San Francisco county, rejected by the board, and appealed by claimants. [The case was previously twice heard upon motion by [Joseph C. Palmer and others, claiming the rancho Punta de Lobos] to set the case for hearing. Cases Nos. 10,695 and 10,696.]

Assumpsit on a policy of' insurance. The case came before the court upon an agreed statement of facts to the following effect: The plaintiff, on the 1st day of May, 1839, procured a policy of insurance to be underwritten by the defendants, viz.: “Twothou-sand dollars, on one half of the brig Spy, for the term of one year from this 1st day of May, 1839, at noon, excluding during the term all ports and places in Mexico and Texas, also the West Indies from July 15th to October…

On the 12th of July, 1854, the schooner Palmetto was lying at the claimant’s dock, on the west side of the south branch of the Chicago river, with her head up stream. An anchor was suspended from her larboard bow, with its flukes some distance below the surface of the water. It was about six o’clock in the morning; the wind was blowing pretty fresh from the south-east.

The manner in which this case came before the court will appear by a recapitulation of the antecedent facts.

The controversy in this action is upon a bottomry bond, and came before the court in two aspects. The owner of the ship and a mortgagee intervened, and filed answers to the libel, and each claimed, as against the other, a right to the remnants and surplus remaining in the registry after satisfaction of the bottomry bond in suit. Separate petitions were also filed by them for such remnants. The owner also contested the validity of the bottomry.

[Claim by Clement Panaud and others to the garden of San Cayetano, a part of the mission lands of San Jose. The grant, it was claimed, was for 100 raras, and was made to Juan B. Alvarado and Andres Pico.]

Three libels were filed against this vessel; •one by Charles Moody, founded on a bill of lading of merchandise, shipped to his order at Boston for this port, and consigned to him, and which was not delivered; another by Mifchell & Cobb, for goods shipped for them by their order, by a parol agreement without a bill of lading; and a third by Tarr, one of the crew, for wages.

A capias had issued in this suit, returnable to the present term; but previously to the return of the writ, there had been a hearing before Judge Peters, at his chambers, upon a citation to shew cause, why the defendant should not be discharged on common bail; the judge had ordered bail to be given; and the defendant had appealed from this order to the court.

<p>Case Wo. 10,710.</p> <p>Partnership — Release op One Partner prom a Firm Debt — Construction.</p> <p>1. Although by the common law the release of one partner, or of one of two or more joint or joint and several debtors, operates as a release to all of them, yet this rule does not apply where the release extends to the individual liability only of the party released to the creditors, and does not affect his liability to his co-partners for contribution or otherwise.</p> <p>2. The court cannot construe such an instrument with reference to a foreign statute, unless the intention of the parties tb be governed by such statute is evident from the instrument itself, without the aid of extrinsic evidence.</p>

The case was as follows; Action on notes. Defendants [Myron Ticknor and others] pleaded in bar that they had effected a composition in bankruptcy, in manner provided by act of congress; that plaintiff [John Paret] was duly notified of the various meetings and attended the same; that in the statement of liabilities, plaintiff’s claim was represented, as plaintiff knew, as fully secured by deed of trust on real estate worth more than the amount of debt; that plaintiff did not…

This was a bill in equity, filed [by Charles Parham] to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent for an “improvement in sewing machines,” granted to complainant November 21, 1854 [No. 11,971], reissued November 3, 1863 [No. 1,562], and extended for seven years from November 21, 1868.

<p>Case No. 10,714.</p> <p>Marshal — Fees—-For Service — Aids—Doties Covered bt Per Diem Allowance.</p> <p>1. A fee is allowable to a marshal as for “a service,” when a writ or warrant is executed by him; but not otherwise. Charges for “aid” or assistance are allowed where the nature of the case renders it proper, and the amount claimed is shownbe reasonable.</p> <p>[Cited in vTerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. 274.)</p> <p>2. A fee is allowed for a commitment, when made under an order of the court, or in execution of a mittimus, but not in other cases.</p> <p>3. A fee is proper for a discharge when a prisoner is released entirely from custody; but not when brought into court for trial or testifying.</p> <p>4. A charge for keeping prisoners, at seventy-five cents a day, when their board is paid for by the government, and they are in prison, and the court net in session, is inadmissible, either as reasonable or under any statute of the state of Maine.</p> <p>5. An order to commit a- witness for mot recognizing in a criminal case to appear and testify, or for a contempt of court, need not be in writing and sealed; but it is best to enter it on the records, and a copy be taken by the marshal to file with the jailor.</p> <p>6. Many of the duties performed by marshals during the sittings of courts, are considered as covered and paid for by the per diem allowance' for attendance on courts, and must not be charged as independent services.</p>

Action for the violation of the plaintiff’s patent-right to alarm-bells for fire engines. The' specification states the bell to be attached to a horizontal piece of iron, fixed into an upright elastic piece, the vibrations of which are regulated by a ball of four or five pounds on the top — the Whole frame being fastened on the engine, and the bell made to ring by the motion of the wheels on which the engine is fixed.

Special action on -the case [by Park’s administrator against Willis] — plea, not guilty. On' the trial, the defendant objected to the reading of a deposition, because it did not appear that the witness might not attend personally. The residence of the witness was agreed to be at Fredericksburg, fifty miles only from Alexandria. No subpoena had been issued for him.

This was an action on the case founded upon the Virginia laws of December 17, 1792, p. 192, § 50, and January 25, 1798, p. 374, §§ 6, 7; by the first of which it is enacted that no master of a vessel shall transport out of the commonwealth any servant or slave without the consent or permission of the person to whom such servant or slave doth of right belong, upon penalty of $150 for a servant, and $300 for a slave; one moiety to the commonwealth and the other to the owner;…

In bankruptcy. Application for discharge. Attorneys for creditors objected that the bankrupt [Renslow S. Parker] had not scheduled certain interests in personal property belonging to his wife before marriage, but which they claimed vested by marriage in the husband. The marriage was in 1859, at which time the wife had about $1,500 in cash in her own right, and which came into his hands soon afterward, and before the passage of the act of 1861.

The applicants in this case returned, in the schedule of debts they owed, one to Von Werke, which they described as due “on notes and money left with us, till convenient, through the rates of exchange, to draw upon for sums or amounts to suit our mutual ability or convenience.” H. D. Gilpin stated to the court that, if the circumstances of this case could be developed, it would appear that the debt thus returned had been contracted by malversation in a fiduciary capacity, —…

The first section of the bankrupt law enacts, “that all persons whatsoever, &e., owing debts which shall not have been' created in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer, or as executor, &c., &c., or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity,” shall be entitled, &c. The applicants in this case owed some debts which it was admitted were of an ordinary character, but among their debts was likewise one which had been created while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

<p>Case Wo. 10,735.</p> <p>Patents — Pleading—Failure to Answer — Damages — Profits.</p> <p>1. When no answer is made to an alleged infringement of a patent, the charge is admitted.</p> <p>2. One-fourth of the proceeds being estimated as the profits of the mill, the damages were estimated at that amount.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent see note to Parker v. Hatfield, Case No. 10,736.]</p>

This was a motion [by Zebulon Parker] to retax a bill of costs, upon exceptions filed by the defendants [William Bigler, William Powell, and John F. Weaver).

[These were bills in equity by Oliver H. P. Parker against Joseph Bryant and others.] These were suits in equity, for the infringement of the patent of Zebulon and Austin Parker, [granted Oct. 19, 1829,] more particularly described in the ease of Parker v. Hulme [Case No. 10,740]. Upon a motion for provisional injunction against the defendants, objection was made that the bills contained no averment of prior adjudication, to support the application.

Bill in equity by [J. G. Parker] the as-signee of Edward Oakes, to ascertain the title to certain parcels of salt in bond. Oakes had been a well known salt merchant in Boston for a great many years, and had dealt largely with the defendant [W. B.] Byrnes. In December, 1869, the defendant sold Oakes three several lots of salt on a credit of four months, and took his notes for the price.

The respondent [Plorimond J. Dusar], the owner [of the ship Calliope], allowed the claim of wages, but made a charge against the libellant for the amount of a quantity of ship’s slush, valued at seventy-eight dollars and upwards, which he alleged the cook had embezzled, sold and converted the proceeds to his own use.

<p>Case No. 10,730.</p> <p>Witness Pees — Summoned in Several Causes.</p> <p>A motion was made by Mr. Mason, to re-tax the costs of a witness summoned in eleven cases, and charged for an attendance in each. Cited 1 Stat. 73 (Act 1789); 3 Stat. 21 (Act 1813).</p> <p>This motion was opposed by Mr. Noble, who cited 5 Mass. 313; 10 Mass. 174; Crosby v. Folger [Case No. 3,421]; 1-Pick. 452; 1 Wend. 68.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,731.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement—Ignorance of Plaintiff’s Rights — Compensatory and Vindictive Damages.</p> <p>1. Where a patent right has been infringed, the defendant not knowing of the plaintiff’s right at the time, no more than compensatory damages will be given.</p> <p>• 2. But where the infringement is characterized by a disposition to affect the interest of the patentee, counsel fees, and what may be termed vindictive damages, may be assessed by the jury.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent see note to Parker v. Hatfield, Case No. 10,736.]</p>

On tie 25th of May, 1839, Chambers executed to Parker his bond and mortgage for $10,000, payable one year after date; and as a collateral security, assigned to him a bond and mortgage of one Wharton, dated the 30th March, 1839, “to secure the payment of $6,000 on the 30th March, 1841.” On the 20th March, 1840, more than a year before this last bond became payable, Chambers applied to Parker to receive Wharton’s bond and mortgage of $6,000 as an absolute payment, pro tanto,…

This was an action [by Zebulon Parker against Jonathan Ferguson] for the infringement of letters patent granted to Zebulon Parker and Austin Parker, October 19th, 1829, for “an improvement in the application of hydraulic power,” and extended by the patent office for seven years from October 19th, 1843.

2 [This was a suit in equity [by Zebulon Parker] to restrain the defendant [William Hatfield] from infringement of letters patent for “a new and useful improvement in the application of hydraulic power,” viz. a percussion and reaction water wheel, granted to said Zebulon Parker and Austin Parker October 19,1829. Austin Parker having deceased, the entire interest in the patent became, by assignment from Austin’s administrators, vested in Zebulon Parker, the complainant.

<p>Case No. 10,736.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement—Limitations.</p> <p>[Cited in Rich v. Ricketts, Case No. 11,762.]</p>

This was a demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations. A patent for a new and useful “improvement in hydraulic power,” was granted to Zebulon and Austin Parker October 19, 1829, and, having been extended for seven years from the expiration of the first term, expired October 29, 1850. An action on the case, to recover damages for the infringement of this patent, during its lifetime, was brought in 1857.

<p>Case No. 10,738.</p> <p>Patents — Assignment — Averments to Support Action for Infringement — Similarity in Principle — Combination.</p> <p>1. A patent may be assigned in part, or the whole of it.</p> <p>2. An averment in the declaration that the defendant has made the thing “in imitation of the patent” is sufficient to sustain the action.</p> <p>3. The machinery complained bf¡ if the same in principle as the plaintiff’s, is an infringement</p> <p>[Cited in Sewall v. Jo.nes, 91 U. S. 184.]</p> <p>4. Parker’s patent is for improvements on known machinery and a combination of' mechanical powers. There can be no infringement of the combination, which does not embrace all the parts.</p> <p>5. But it is an infringement to adopt any improvement of the plaintiff's of any of the parts of the combination.</p> <p>[Cited in Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. (56 U. S.) 342; Buchanan v. Goodwin, 57 Fed. 1040.]</p> <p>6. An inventor, under his patent, claims no monopoly.</p> <p>[7. Cited in Goodyear v. Blake, Case No. 5,-560; National Folding Box & Paper Co. v. American Paper Pail & Box Co., 55 Fed. 490; Paine v. Trask, 5 C. C. A. 497, 56 Fed. 233. Criticised in New York v. American Cable Ry. Co., 60 Fed.' 1017, on the point that copies of assignments of a patent, duly certified^ are pri-ma facie evidence of the genuineness of the originals on file.]</p> <p>[This was an action by Zebulon Parker against James F. Haworth for the violation of letters patent granted to plaintiff October 19,1829.]</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see note to Parker v. Hatfield, Case No. 10,736.]</p>

Hotchkiss, the defendant, who resided without this circuit, had been admitted by the court to make defence in a suit between Parker, the present plaintiff, and one Perkins; and he was attending in this city for the purpose of being present at the trial of that case. It was tried at this term, and Parker, having been nonsuited, issued summons on the same day, and served it on Hotchkiss at his lodgings.

This was an action on the case [by Oliver H. P. Parker against James S. Hulme], tried before KANE, District Judge, and a jury, for the infringement of letters patent, granted to Zebulon and Austin Parker, October 19, 1829, for “a new and useful improvement in hydraulic power,” and assigned to plaintiff.

<p>Case No. 10,741.</p> <p>Jurous’ Fees.</p> <p>Jurors living at a distance, and not receiving mileage at adjournment, are entitled to a per diem for those days during which the jury stands adjourned, as well as for those to which it stands adjourned, and on which the jurors appear and answer to their names.</p> <p>[Cited in Edwards v. Bond, Case No. 4,294.]</p>

<p>[This was an action of trespass by Peter C. Parker against Eli J. Lewis and Peter Edwards.]</p>

The following bill in equity, or summary proceeding, was filed in the district court of New Hampshire by the plaintiffs. “To the Honorable Judge of the District Court of the United States for the District of New Hampshire: “Humbly complaining, show unto your hon- or, Isaac Parker and Abraham W. Blanchard, both of Boston, in the county of Suffolk, and state of Massachusetts, merchants, late partners in trade, under the firm of Parker and Blanchard, that on and prior to the…

<p>Case No. 10,744.</p> <p>Commission to Take Evidence — Names op Witnesses.</p> <p>A party taking out a commission to take evidence in relation to pedigree, is not bound to name the witnesses he intends to examine.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,745.</p> <p>Patents — Infkingement—Damages.</p>

Bill in equity. The case set out in the bill was in substance as follows: Edward Sea-grave, of Providence, was the owner of large real… Held: but the real interest in them was averred to be íd other parties, the complainants receiving the paper solely for the purpose of commencing suit in the circuit court; it was denied that any combination was made to defraud the complainants; that any understanding was had with Edward Seagrave for them to make a purchase of the paper,…

[This was an action by Charles Parker against Charles Remhoff.] The patent upon which this suit was brought was granted to George N. Cummings, January 24th, 1860, and numbered 26,S91, for an “improved catch for spectacle eases,” the same being extended for seven years on January 20th, 1874.

[This was a bill in equity by Oliver H. P. Parker against John Sears and others.] These were applications for provisional injunctions to restrain the infringement of the letters patent granted to Zebulon and Austin Parker, October 19, 1829, for what is known as the “Parker water-wheel,” which patent is more particularly referred to in the case of Parker v. Hulme [Case No. 10,740].

This is an action on the case-[by Zebulon Parker against John Stiles) for an alleged infringement of a patent for an improvement in the application of hydraulic power, granted to Zebulon and Austin Parker, dated 19th of October, 1829, and renewed for an additional seven years from the expiration of the term of the original patent, thereby extending its duration till October 19th, 1850. 2 [The specification of this patent was as follows: [“To all to whom these presents shall…

[In error to the district-court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.] This was a writ of error from the district court of Pennsylvania. In the first case, the declaration filed in the-district court was for money had and received, by Parker, to the use of the United States. The facts of Parker’s case, as provided on the trial in the district court, and which are equally applicable to both cases, were as follows.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.] This was an information, filed in the district court against the brig Agnes, alias the Gustaf Ekerman [Parker, owner], for a breach of the first embargo law, and the supplement thereto. The claim of the captain, on behalf of the owner, Hr.

This was a bill in equity praying for an injunction to restrain the corporation defendants [the Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Manufacturing Company] from raising the surface of Lake Winnipiseogee, in the state of New Hampshire, or from retarding, obstructing, or holding back the natural flow of the water out of the lake and along the channel of the river constituting its outlet, to the premises of the complainant [John A. Parker].

On the petition of Moore, Foote & Co., creditors, for leave to amend their proof of debt, the answer of Edward E. Kane, as-signee, and proofs.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.) This was a libel in rem, filed in the district ■court, by the owner of the schooner J. R. Price, against the steamer Parkersburgh, to recover damages for a collision which occurred between the two vessels, on the morning of the 10th of April, 1859, before day light, some eight miles below Barnegat, on the coast of New Jersey, and three or four miles from shore.

<p>Case No. 10,766.</p> <p>Jukisdictiox — Alien—Will—Injunction.</p> <p>1. The United States court has jurisdiction as a court of equity, concurrent with the orphans’ court, to compel an executor to settle his accounts and give security, but it cannot interfere with a suit already begun in the orphans’ court for the same purpose.</p> <p>2. An alien is entitled to come into this court for the construction of a will, and, as incidental to this, may compel the settlement and distribution of the estate according to the views expressed by the court. In a suit brought by aliens in this court for the construction of a wili, an injunction was issued to restrain the executor from distributing the estate, the injunction not to interfere with proceedings already taken in the orphans’ court to remove the executor for neglecting to give security according to the order of that court.</p> <p>[For a hearing on bill for account and other relief, see 8 Fed. 220.]</p>

[This case is first reported as beard upon the application of the defendant to reduce the amount of bail for which he was held under arrest. Case No. 10,761.] The bill in this case was filed on the 9th of February, 1847. and set forth, that the plaintiff [Stephen It.

[This case is first reported as heard upon the application of the defendant to reduce the amount of hail for which he was held under arrest.

[This was a bill in equity by Stephen R. Parkhurst against Israel Kinsman and James W. Hale, and is reported as first heard upon the application of the defendant Kinsman to have reduced the- amount of the bail for which he was held under arrest Case No. 10,761.] An injunction having been granted against tbe defendant Kinsman, on the filing of the bill, restraining the sale by him of certain machines constructed according to a certain patent issued to the plaintiff (see…

[This case is first reported as heard upon the application of the defendant to have reduced the amount of the bail for which he was held under arrest.

This was an application to reduce the amount of bail which had been taken in an action by the above plaintiff [Stephen R. Parkhurst] against the defendant [Francis Kinsman], The suit had been instituted on the 20th of August, 1847, returnable to the next October term. Tbe defendant was arrested tbe day after, and a bail-bond demanded and taken, for $20,000, with sureties.

<p>Bill in equity [by T. D. Parkinson against E. B. Laselle] to restrain the infringement of a copyright to a map of the Comstock lode. The defendant demurred specially on the ground that the bill does not allege the delivery at the office of the librarian of congress, or a deposit in the mail addressed to said librarian, of a copy of the title of the map before its publication, or a delivery to said librarian, or a deposit in the mail, addressed to him, of two copies of said map within ten days from its publication. The copyright is claimed to have been obtained on October 2, 1874. Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes, then in force, provides, that “any citizen of the United States * * * who shall be the author * * * of any * * * map * * * shall, upon complying with the provisions of this chapter, have the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing and .vending the same.” Section 4930 provides that “no person shall be entitled to a copyright unless he shall, before publication, deliver at the office of the librarian of congress or deposit in the mail addressed to the librarian of congress, at Washington, District of Columbia, a printed copy of the title of the book or other article * * * for which he desires a copyright, nor unless he shall also, within ten days from the publication thereof, deliver at the office of the librarian of congress or deposit in the mail addressed to the librarian of congress, at Washington, District of Columbia, two copies of such copyright book or other article.” * * * Section 4959 provides that “the proprietors of every copyright book or other article, shall deliver at the office of the librarian of congress, or deposit in the mail, addressed to the librarian of congress, at Washington, District of Columbia, within ten days after its publication, two complete copies thereof, of the best edition issued.” * * * Section 4960, that “for every failure on the part of the proprietor of any copyright to deliver or deposit in the mail either of the published copies, or description or photograph, required by sections 4956 and 4959, the proprietor of the copyright shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five dollars, to be recovered by the librarian of congress in the name of the United States, in an action in the nature of an action of debt, in any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which the delinquent may reside or be found.” And section 4962, that “no person shall maintain an action for the infringement of his copyright unless he shall give notice thereof by inserting in the several copies of every edition published, on the title page or the page immediately following it, if it be a book, * * * or if a map * * * by inscribing upon some portion of the face or front thereof, or on the face of the substance on which the same shall be mounted, the following words: ‘Entered according to act of congress in the year-by A. B. in the office of the librarian of congress at Washington.’ ”</p>

[This was an action at law by George Parkman against James Bowdoin and another.] Covenant, for a breach of the covenants of * deed, dated the first day of March, 1S33, conveying certain real estate in Boston.

<p>Case No. 10,764.</p> <p>Criminal Jurisdiction — Review upon Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>Where the indictment by its averments gave the United States district court jurisdiction of the offence, and that court took jurisdiction, and the jury found the facts charged in the indictment, and the accused was sentenced by the district court, and imprisoned, error in the proceedings cannot be reviewed by the United States circuit court upon habeas corpus, and the accused will be remanded to the custody of the marshal.</p>

This case comes up on the petition of John F. Parks, one of the bankrupts, to have a certain lot or part of lot in the city of Detroit, and the dwelling-house thereon, occupied by him with his family, claimed by the assignee as a part of the assets for the benefit of the creditors of the partnership of which the bankrupts [John F. & C. R. Parks] were the members, set-off to him as exempt under the bankrupt act and the constitution and laws of Michigan.

In admiralty. In December, 1855, Charles Hears & Co., of Chicago, Illinois, agreed with Luther Moses, of Cleveland, Ohio, to build the hull of and complete, with the exception of the engine, boiler, &e., a new propeller. At the same time, they agreed with libel-ants [Luman Parmlee and Joseph R. McGin-nis] to build and furnish for said propeller, a new engine, boiler, &c., all to be completed and set up in the propeller ready for use. The agreement was in writing.

<p>[Those were bills in equity by Duncan S. Parmley against St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad Company, Amos Paul against Pacific Railroad Company, Ozias Bailey against Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, Frederick St John against Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company, and Milton Courtright against Clark, state auditor, and others.] These are separate suits by non-resident stockholders in the several railroad companies above mentioned, brought against the directors of those companies and against the state auditor and the officers of the several counties and municipalities through which the respective roads run, to restrain the collection of taxes levied under the legislation of the state, for the year 1873. The bills, in their frame and theoiy, are like that which was considered and supported by the supreme court of the United States in .Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. [59 U. S.] 351. Special grounds of relief, total or partial, in addition to the general one noticed in the following opinion, are set forth in the bills. The cases came before the circuit judge, at his chambers, August 5, 1874, upon motions by the respective plaintiffs for the allowance of temporary injunctions. No answers were filed, and the question argued was whether the bills, upon their face, and supposing their allegations to be true, made out a prima facie case, for a preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>[These were bills in equity by Duncan S. Parmley against the St. Louis, Iron Mouu-tain & Southern Railroad Company; Amos Paul against Pacific Railroad Company; Ozias Bailey against Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company; Frederick St. John against Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company, and Milton Courtright against Clark, state auditor, and others.]</p> <p>These are the cases above reported, and at the September term, 1S74, they came before the court (Miller and Dillon, JJ., and by their request Treat, J., sat at the argument).</p> <p>The bills, as amended, in the several cases, in substance, set forth and allege that an illegal and excessive assessment of state, county, and municipal taxes has been made for the year 1873, in consequence of an excessive and exorbitant valuation of the property of all the railroad companies, alleged to have been illegally and improperly made by the state board of equalization, without jurisdiction.</p> <p>The bills specifically charge that the members of the board were actuated by passion and prejudice, and that “in violation of the constitutional provisions requiring equal taxation in proportion to value, and intend' ing to discriminate against railroad property,” “knowingly and intentionally required such property to pay one-third more taxes in proportion to its value than other property of equal value." In the assessment of the St. Louis, Iron Mountain, and Southern Railroad, it is charged that, without evidence, the board fixed the value of the road at $6,-208,334, and this sum it is alleged, is more than three times the actual cost value of the road. That in 1872 the board fixed the value of the property at .$2,111,435.</p> <p>It is also alleged that the state board of equalization referred to a committee of five members the taking of all evidence, as to the value of the property of the road, and that the attorneys and representatives of the road were only permitted to appear and be heard before this committee, and not before the whole board, and that the evidence, when so taken by the committee, was ordered by the board to be reduced to writing and reported to the board. Yet in many instances the evidence was not taken down, and it is alleged “that not a single statement which was reduced to writing was reported to the board, nor was there ever any report to the board of any evidence before the committee, or even of the facts which the committee believed to have been established by the evidence.”</p> <p>Similar allegations as to excessive valuation and alleged irregularities are made in each of the bills, as also the allegation that two of the members of the board were not sworn; that the lieutenant governor, although by law a member of the board, was not permitted to vote. And, in addition to these common grounds of complaint as to the action of the state board of equalization in fixing the value of the railroad property, there are special grounds of relief set forth in several of the bills not common to alL These special grounds are:</p> <p>1. In the case of the Atlantic and Pacifie Railroad Company, a total exemption is claimed from all state, county, and municipal taxes for the year 1873, under the provisions of the 12th section of the act of December 25, 1852, which provides that “the said Southwest Branch Railroad shall be exempt from taxation until the same shall be completed and in operation and shall declare" a dividend. * * * Provided, that if said company shall fail for a period of two years after said road shall be completed and put in operation to declare a dividend, then said company shall be no longer exempt from the payment of said tax.” It is alleged that the company did not complete its road until May, 1871, and that no dividend has been declared.</p> <p>2. In the case of the Missouri Pacific, a perpetual exemption is claimed from all county, municipal and other local taxation under the provisions of the 12th section of the act of December 25,1852.</p> <p>3. In the cases of the Missouri Pacific Railroad and the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railway Company, it is alleged that the Pullman palaee cars, used on their respective roads, have been erroneously assessed as property of the railway company; and in the case of the Chicago and Southwestern Railroad Company it is claimed that rolling stock of several hundred thousand dollars in value, belonging to the Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, has been erroneously assessed as the property of the Southwestern Railway Company.</p> <p>4. There is also contained in each of the several bills an allegation that the several officers of the state, counties and municipalities are about to proceed to enforce, by commencement of suits and seizure of property, the payment of the taxes assessed, and that ■ unless restrained irreparable injury will result. It is further alleged “that after the said illegal and unauthorized assessment was made, your orators, applied to and demanded of said railroad company, its board of directors and the defendants composing said board, that they should at once institute proceedings in the proper courts to prevent the collection of said taxes and the waste of said property, and to have said assessment and levy of said taxes set aside and annulled; but said company, its directors, officers, and managers have, and do refuse so to do, or to take any action whatever in the premises, and have declared their intention not to resist the collection of said taxes, although they well know that said taxes are unjust, illegal, and unauthorized by law.”</p> <p>The answers filed in the several cases, verified by affidavits, deny that any illegal or excessive assessment has been made against the railroad property of the several companies for state, county, or municipal purposes, for the year 1873, in consequence of any excessive valuation, and deny that the state board of equalization inad,e an illegal or improper assessment and aver that the assessment, as made by the board, was a just and equitable assessment, and properly made.</p> <p>The several answers deny that the members of the board of equalization were actuated by passion, prejudice, or by any improper motives, or that they intended to discriminate, or did discriminate, as against railroad property, or that they disregarded the provisions of the constitution' in this regal’d, or that either knowingly or intentionally, or otherwise, they required such property “to pay one-tliird more taxes, in proportion to its value, than other property of equal value," as alleged. And it is denied that the •board fixed the value of the St. Louis, Iron •Mountain, and Southern Railway property without evidence, and allege the fact to be that the valuation was made upon a careful examination and full information as to all the facts, as well as the sworn testimony of witnesses produced, sworn and examined, and whose testimony was reduced to writing for the use and information of the board; and it is denied that the valuation, as fixed, of $6,268,334, is three times the value of the road. On the contrary, it is averred that the actual value of the road is largely in excess of this sum.</p> <p>1.As to the special exemption from taxation claimed by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, it is in the answer denied that the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad is exempted from taxation under the provisions of the 12th section of the act of December 25, 1852, and it is alleged that in I860 all the rights, property, and franchises of the Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad became and.were forfeited to the state of Missouri, and the property and franchises granted by the act of December 25, 1852, and other acts amendatory thereof, which took possession of and run the same for some time, when the state, as sole owner, sold the same to one John C. Fremont, on certain terms and conditions, which said Fremont on his part failed to keep and perform, and the said road, its property and franchises, again reverted to and vested in •the state of Missouri, and that all the title that was ever vested in the South Pacific Railroad Company (from whom the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad claim title) in and to said property, was by virtue of an act of the legislature, approved March 17th, 1868. It is further shown that on the 8th of April, 1865, a new constitution of the state of Missouri was adopted, and the exemption of property from taxation by the legislature prohibited. It is therefore averred that the legislature, at the time of passing the act under the provisions of which the road claims title, had no power to exempt the property from further taxation, neither by the terms of that act- did they assume or attempt so to do; and by the provisions of the act of March 15th, 1S71, entitled “An act to autliorize the South Pacific Railroad Company to merge in and consolidate with the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company,” it was provided that such consolidated company should “be subject to all the duties, liabilities, obligations and provisions of the general laws of the state governing railroad companies.”</p> <p>2. The special claim of exemption made by the Missouri Pacific Railroad from county, municipal and other local taxation, under the provisions of the 12th section of the act of December's, 1852, is denied. And it is claimed that the construction now contended for on behalf of the road, of the section referred to, is erroneous.</p> <p>3. The errors of assessment of the Pullman palace cam is denied, and the liability of the railroad compa.ny for the taxes thereof is claimed to be perfect, and that the company is bound to pay taxes thereon.</p> <p>4. And as to the pretended demand of the stockholders, and refusal of the companies to institute proceedings in the proper courts to prevent the collection of said taxes, “respondents deny that the complainants, or any one for them, demanded of said railroad company, its board of directors and the defendants composing said board, or any of them, that they should institute proceedings in the courts to prevent the collection of said taxes, and to have the assessment of levy and said taxes set aside and annulled, and respondents allege that any such pretended demand and refusal, If made, was not in good faith, but was a mere subterfuge for the purpose of giving to the United States courts jurisdiction in the premises.”</p> <p>Motions were made in behalf of the state and the various counties and cities to dissolve the temporary injunctions which had been allowed by the circuit judge, as appears in the report of the preceding eases [Oases Nos. 10,767 and 732].</p>

[In the matter of M. A. Parrish, a bankrupt.) By JOHN RITHUR. Register: A., on the first of January, 1868, becomes B.’s security on a note. On the 15th of April, 1870, judgment is rendered against B. as principal, and A. as surety. A.’s land is levied upon and sold in satisfaction of the judgment. B. is declared a bankrupt on the 1st of January, 1874. A. proves his debt against the estate of B. in bankrupty. Under this state of facts.

<p>[This was an action by Isaac Parrish against Samuel Danford and others.]</p>

This cause is now before the court on the motion of the defendants to dissolve the temporary injunction which was granted at chambers without resistance, restraining the defendants, the Messrs. Wilson, from operating the ferry hereinafter described.

<p>Case No. 10,773.</p> <p>Tenants’ Liabilitt for Waste — -Public Polict —Covenant, Waiver, Etc. — Waste in Apartments — Accidents — Damages to Adjoining Premises — Carrier not Entitled to Know Contents of Packages — Performance of Legal Duty mat be Assumed.</p> <p>1. In the absence of some agreement to the contrary, the tenant is responsible for all waste, however, or by whomsoever committed, except it be occasioned by act of God, the public enemy, or the act of the reversioner himself.</p> <p>[Cited in Powell v. Dayton, S. & G. R. Co., 16 Or. 33, 16 Pac. 868.]</p> <p>2. The liability of tenants for waste does not depend on negligence, but is imposed on grounds of public policy.</p> <p>3. A covenant in a lease to surrender the premises at the expiration of the term in as good condition as the reasonable wear thereof will permit, damages by the elements excepted, does not protect the Tenant from liability for waste, resulting from accidents occurring without his fault</p> <p>4. A covenant in a lease requiring the tenant to occupy the premises for a specific purpose, as an express office, does not impose on the landlord, and exempt the tenant from, all the risks incident to such business, not resulting from the wrongful acts or negligence of the tenant.</p> <p>5. Waste may be committed by a tenant of a portion of a building.</p> <p>6. Defendants are expressmen carrying packages between New York and California. A wooden case containing nitro-glyeerine was delivered to defendants at New York, to be carried to Los Angeles, California, in the ordinary mode, and in the ordinary course of business. No questions were asked, and no information given, as to its contents. On arriving at San Francisco, a liquid resembling oil appeared to be leaking from the ease, and it was taken to the office of defendants, the premises leased from plaintiff, for examination. While under examination it exploded, injuring the premises occupied by defendants, and other premises of the plaintiff leased to. and occupied by, other parties. Defendants had no knowledge of. and no reason to suspect, the dangerous character of the .contents, and there was. under the circumstances, no negligence on their part. Meld, rhat defendants were not liable for the damage resulting from the accident to plaintiff’s premises, occupied by other parties adjoining the premises held and occupied by defendants, but were liable for waste resulting to the premises occupied by themselves.</p> <p>7. A common carrier is not, under all circumstances. entitled to know the contents of packages tendered for carriage, and a mere failure to ascertain whether the package contains anything dangerous, there being no reasonable ground for suspicion, does not, of itself, constitute negligence.</p> <p>[Cited in Hale v. Milwaukee Dock Co., 29 Wis. 489.]</p> <p>8. In the exercise of his lawful rights, every man has a right to act upon the hypothesis that every other person will perform his duty, and obey the law; and in the absence of any reasonable ground to think otherwise, it is not negligence, to assume that he is not exposed to a danger, which can only come to him from a violation of law on the part of some other person.</p> <p>[The case was taken upon writ of error sued out by the plaintiff to the supreme court, where the judgment of this court was affirmed. 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 524.]</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by John Par-rott against D. N. Barney and others.]</p>

<p>[This was an application by Charles Parsons, Jr., for a writ of mandamus.]</p>

<p>In equity. Heard upon exceptions to answer.</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by Charles Parsons, Jr., against the Greenville & Columbia Railroad Company.]</p>

In equity. The bill in this case stated in substance that the complainants together with some of the defendants and certain other persons whose names appeared in the bill, and who were citizens of the same state (New York) with the complainants, were associated together in the lottery business, being proprietors of several lottery grants from various states; and that to facilitate the business and avoid conflict of interest, they had put the entire business into the hands of…

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of New Hampshire.] Information for the penalty of $500 for not depositing the ship’s register, &c. with the consul of the United States, on arrival in a foreign port, contrary to Consular Act Feb. 28, 1803, c. 62, § 2 [2 Story’s Laws, 884; 2 Stat 203, c. 9].

This was a bill in equity for the construction of the will of the late Samuel Parsons, of Durham, Connecticut, and for an account. The defendants [David Lyman and others] were trustees and executors under the will, Lyman being the active trustee. The trustees had discretionary powers as to the amounts to be paid, under certain limitations, to the legatees.

This was a motion, founded on bill and answer, in a suit in equity [by Joseph H. Parsons and others against David Lyman and others), to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction in the court to entertain the suit. [Prior to this a motion' had been made to have the names of certain infants interested in the suit, and who had not been made parties to it, inserted in the bill. The motion was denied. Case No. 10,779.]

<p>[Appeal from tbe district court of tbe United States for tbe Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>Tbis was a libel in personam, filed in the district court, by the owners of the ship Hemisphere, to recover the freight money on a charter-party. The whole of the vessel, except deck, room for crew, &c., was chartered to the respondent, for a voyage from Liverpool to New York. He was to supply her with a full cargo of general merchandise, and not exceeding five hundred and thirteen jjassengers, second cabin and steerage, and the ship was not to take exceeding her registered tonnage of iron. This was one thousand and twenty tons. The charterer was to pay, for the hire of the vessel, the round sum of £1,500 sterling. A dispute arose between the captain and the consignee at Liverpool, in respect to the stowing of the goods, "The former refused to stow the iron in the hold, to the extent of the quantity mentioned in the charter-party, but stowed part of it between decks; and, in consequence, the vessel was unable to carry the number of passengers mentioned. She was laden with only some 923 tons of dead freight, and 374 tons admeas-urement, together with 303 passengers. She had, on a previous voyage from Liverpool to New York, carried a larger freight of the same description, and her full 'complement of passengers. The district court decreed for the libellants [Case No. 11,160], and the respondent appealed to this court</p>

Libel in personam by [William C. Parsons] the late master, who was also a part-owner of the whaling ship William & Henry, of Fairhaven, against [Isaiah F. Terry and others) his co-owners.

<p>Case No. 10,783.</p> <p>Salvage — Compensation—Salvors as Joint Owners.</p> <p>[The ship Friendship, laden with a cargo of nenner. was seized off the coast of Sumatra, by the native Malays, and upon an appeal for aid by the master, the libelants succeeded in rescuing the ship and cargo from the pirates. Eeld, that the libelants are entitled to two-fifths of the net proceeds of the sale of the ship and cargo, and that the expenses of the homeward voyage, including the wages of the crew, are to be borne by them as joint owners, and to be deducted, together with all the expenses of the suit, from the gross amount in determining the net proceeds.]</p> <p>[Cited in The Henry Ewbank, Case No. 6,376.]</p> <p>NOTE. For a concise, practical view of the subject of salvage in general, see Law Summary, 339. As a general rule, a party not actually occupied in effecting a salvage service, is not entitled to salvage. The principal exception is in favor of owners of vessels, which, in rendering assistance have been diverted from their proper employment, or have experienced a special mischief. The Vine, 2 Hagg. Adm. 2; The Baltimore, 2 Dod. 132. A passenger on board the vessel saved, who assists in saving the vessel, has no claim for salvage. The Branston [2 Hagg. Adm. 3], cited in the case preceding. But where a vessel has been wrecked, and part of the crew were taken on board of a vessel, which afterwards was thrown into a very dangerous situation, from which she was rescued, and the crew so taken on board contributed to that object, by working day and night, it was thought they might be entitled to some remuneration. The Salacia, 2 Hagg. Adm. 269. The part of a ship’s company that go on board a distressed vessel, are no more entitled to claim salvage, than those who remain behind, provided they are equally ready to go. The Baltimore, 2 Dod. 132. Where two vessels sail together under a special agreement to give mutual assistance, there can be no claim for salvage between them on account of services rendered. The Zephyr, 2 Hagg. Adm. 43. Where a vessel in distress agrees with the master of another vessel for assistance for a sum certain, the court cannot entertain a claim from the owner for salvage. The Mulgrave, 2 Hagg. 77.</p> <p>As to what constitute salvage services, it was held, in the^ case of The Emulous, that whenever the service has been rendered in saving property on the sea, or wrecked on the coast of the sea, the service is a salvage service. Whether the services have been rendered for an agreed compensation, or upon the ordinary terms of a quanthm meruerunt, the services are still salvage services, and if the compensation is stipulated, it merely fixes the rule, by which the court will be governed in awarding salvage. See [Case No. 4,480]. In that case, the circuit judge, Story, observes: “Contracts made for salvage services are not ordinarily held obligatory by the court of admiralty, upon the persons whose property is saved, unless the court can clearly see that no advantage is taken of the parties’ situation, and that, the rate of compensation is just and reasonable.. The doctrine is founded upon principles of sound public policy, as well as upon just views of moral obligation. No system of jurisprudence, purporting to be founded upon moral, or religious, or even rational principles, could tolerate for a moment the doctrine, that a salvor might avail himself of the calamities of others, to force upon them a contract, unjust, oppressive, and exorbitant.” In the case of Schütz v. The Nancy [Case No. 12,493], Judge Bee held all such agreements void, as made under a species of duress.</p> <p>Salvage is forfeited in cases of embezzlement, or concealment of the property saved. See the case of the ship Blaireau, 2 Crhnch [6 U. S.] 240. So even by .gross neglect. The Bello Cor-runes, 6 Wheat. [19 TJ. S.] 152. In that case, Hr. Justice Johnson observes, in delivering the opinion of the court: “As to the claims of the salvors, it may be remarked, that maritime courts always approach them with favor. Yet, in proportion to the inclination to favor where there is merit, is the indignation with which they view every indication of a disposition to take advantage of the unfortunate. Spoliation, and even gross neglect, may forfeit all the pretensions of salvors to compensation.” See, also, the remarks of Story. J., in the case of The Boston [Case No. 1,673]. To entitle a person to salvage, the danger must be real and imminent, and not merely speculative. But it is not necessary that it should be such, that escape from it by other means is impossible. See Talbot v. Seemen, 1 Cranch [5 Ü. S.] 1. The sal-vors have a lien on property saved, so long as it remains in their possession. If they deliver it to the owner, though the lien is gone, the right to salvage remains. If the owner refuses to receive the property, he is not answerable for salvage, the property alone being then answerable. See Brevoor v. The Fair American [Case No. 1,847].</p> <p>The salvors are admitted as witnesses from the necessity of the case, notwithstanding their interest. But their competency is limited by that necessity; since they are not competent witnesses as to facts occurring after the properly has been brought into port The Boston [supra].</p>

This was a bill in equity to restrain the respondent from publishing and selling chromo lithographic copies of a painting, representing a view on Claverack creek, Columbia county, in the state of New York, executed by the complainant and praying' for an account [Arthur] Parton alleged that he was an artist earning his living by designing, composing, and painting landscapes and other pictures, and selling the same; that he designed from nature and executed the picture of…

Bill in equity by [H. Partridge] the as-signee of Isaac Seabury against three judgment creditors [J. B. Dearborn and two others] who levied their several executions on the goods of Seabury a few days before be filed his petition in bankruptcy, and caused them to be sold soon afterwards. The proceeds of sale were in the hands of the officer, who was made a party defendant. The bill charged that the judgments were obtained and realized by way of fraudulent preference.

[This was an action by B. Frank Partridge against the, Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company to recover for services rendered defendant as agent in its business of life insurance.]

On the 9th day of October, 1867, in the city of New York, Alice B. Smith executed to the complainants a mortgage on an eighty-acre tract of land in McHenry county, Illinois, which was described as follows: “The south half of the south-east quarter of section 15, in township No. 8 north, of range ■No. 43 east of the 4th principal meridian, being in the county of McHenry and state of Illinois.” This mortgage was given as security for an indebtedness already over due.

<p>Case No. 10,789.</p> <p>Patents — Novelty. ■</p> <p>Where the process described and claimed is Droved to have been practiced by others some time before the date of the patent, and before the period anterior to that when the patentee claims to have discovered it, the bill in equity will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,791.</p> <p>Cabriebs of Passengers — Vessels—Limitations as to Number and Space Allowed.</p>

The cause was heard for final decree upon the pleadings and evidence. The facts were as follows: In the year 1843, the defendants Gideon A. Dowse and Sarah A. Dowse, then Sarah A. Morrison, being about to marry, entered into an ante nuptial contract with George Harris, since deceased, and the defendant Robert J. Morrison as trustees.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel for personal damages by James Marshall against Edward Patch, master of the brig Hope. From a decree of the district court in favor of libellant (ease unreported), respondent appealed.]

<p>Case No. 10,794.</p> <p>Seamen — Assignment op Wages — Right op As-signee.</p> <p>An assignment by a mariner of his wages confers upon his assignee no right to maintain a suit in rem against the vessel for the recovery of the wages assigned.</p> <p>[Quoted in Sturtevant v. The George Nich-olaus. Case No. 13,578. Cited in The Champion, Id. 2,583; The Napoleon, Id. 10,011; M’Carty v. The City of New Bedford, 4 Fed. 827; Ross v. Bourne, 14 Fed. 862.]</p>

<p>[Error to the circuit court of Hempstead county.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,796.</p> <p>Collision — At Pier between Steamboats— ■ Lookout — Costs.</p> <p>1. A steamboat, whose berth was on the north side of a pier, was unable to get into it, and came to the end of the pier, and, for the purpose of making a landing, was backed down across a ferry slip on the south side of the pier, without any one on her stern to look out, and was run into by a ferryboat, which was coming into the ferry slip: Seld, that the steamboat was in fault, in thus backing without keeping at her stern a proper lookout, and without paying attention to the approach of the ferryboat.</p> <p>2. The ferryboat was also in fault, in not stopping sooner, and in not approaching with greater caution, especially as her pilot saw that there was no one on the steamboat’s deck noticing the ferryboat’s approach.</p> <p>3. The damages must be divided, and the libel-lant should have his costs.</p> <p>[Cited in The Mary Patten, Case No. 9,223; Vanderbilt v. Reynolds, Id. 16,839; The Hercules, 20 Fed. 205.]</p>

This was a motion to set aside a judgment by default in ejectment; the ease being thus: By a statute of 1800, the legislature of Pennsylvania abolished the common law mode of instituting actions in ejectment, and substituted a writ of summons in a certain form; ordering, also, a declaration to be filed. This act requires the plaintiff to file on or before the first term, a description of the land, and number of acres claimed.

On September 3d, 1877, Casselberry filed a libel for supplies against the schooner. The court thereupon issued a writ of attachment, which was duly returned “Attached,” etc. Pending the writ another libel was filed for supplies, and two for wages. These were libels of intervention. None of the claims were contested.

The libel in this case was filed by [George W. Patlenj the owner of the canal boat John W. Williams, to recover damages occasioned to her by a collision, which occurred while she was being towed from Albany to New-York, by the steamboat. The court below held that the steamboat had been guilty of no ■negligence, and dismissed the libel [case unreported], from which decree the libelant appealed.

<p>Case No. 10,801.</p> <p>Prize — Attempt to Violate Blockade— Carrying Contraband Articles.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.)</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

This is a bill by the assignee in bankruptcy of Mackoy & Co. to have declared fraud-' ulent a certain conveyance of real estate made to, or for the benefit of, the defendant, by J. C. Mackoy (one of the firm) and his wife.

This was an action of ejectment [by Matthew Patrick and wife against Elijah W. Sherwood]. The case was tried before the court, without a jury, under a stipulation that the finding of the court ón the evidence should be put into the form of a special verdict. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>This was a suit brought by Reuben Ross, Jr., against the ship Patrick Henry, in rem, to recover damages for the breach of the following bill of lading: “Shipped, in good order and well conditioned, by James Patrick, in and upon the good ship or vessel called the Patrick Henry, whereof is master for the present voyage Wm. Page, and now riding at anchor in Hudson Bay, and bound for New York, one bag containing ninety sovereigns British sterling, being marked and numbered as in the margin, and are to be delivered in the like good order and condition at the aforesaid port of New York (the act of God, the queen’s enemies, fire, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation, of whatever nature or kind soever, excepted), unto ordeR or its assigns, he or they paying freight for the said goods, £2 sterling in full, with primage and average accustomed. In witness whereof, the master or purser of said ship or vessel hath affirmed to four bills of ladings all of this tenor and date, the one of which bills being accomplished, the others to stand void. (Signed) Wm. C. Pagei Dated in Melbourne, Sept. 19th, 1865.”. The ship upon which this coin had been placed on freight proceeded to New York, and arrived there from Australia in December, 1865. The libellant was the in-dorsee of the bill of lading, and as the ship failed to deliver the coin according to the terms of the contract, he brought this suit to recover damages for the breach. The only question was as to the true rule of damages, the breach being admitted.</p>

Assumpsit, for overdraft by defendants, $150. The plaintiffs having released Mr. Coote, one of the defendants, from all actions and demands, except jointly with the other defendant, Mr. Jones offered him as a witness. cited Consequa v. Willing, 1 Pet. [26 U. S.) 305; Wise v. Bowen [Case No. 17,905], in replevin in this court, in 1821, where Bowen, the defendant, was examined as a witness; Gaither v. Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Bank of Georgetown, in this court, in December, 1S24…

This was a bill in equity brought by the complainants [George F. Patten and others], owners of the ship Delaware, wherein they claimed from the owners of the cargo a contribution by way of general… Held: if a ship is voluntarily stranded for the common benefit, and is thereby wrecked, the cargo is to contribute to indemnify the owners. Columbian Ins. Co. v. Ashby, 13 Pet. [38 U. S.] 331; Barnard v. Adams, 10 How. [51 U. S.] 270; Sturgess v. Cary [Case No.' 13,572].

<p>Case No. 10,811a.</p> <p>Limitation or Actions — Defendant beyond Seas — Font Days within Jurisdiction.</p> <p>In a suit against the endorsers on a promissory note, the defendant, answering, interposed the plea of the statute of limitations, to which the plaintiff replied that the defendant was beyond seas during the time covered by the defendant’s plea, and the defendant rejoined, that he was within the jurisdiction of the court for four days during the time, to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s rejoinder was held bad.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,813.</p> <p>Justice or Peace — Authority to Take Boxtj for Good Behavior — Com mox Prostitute.</p> <p>A justice of the peace in the city of Washington has authority, under the charter of May 4, 1812, and the by-law of the 16th of December, 1812, section 7, to require a common prostitute to give security for her good behavior; and has jurisdiction of a suit upon the bond given therefor; the penalty not exceeding $20.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,814.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Issue op Law — Waiveb — Filing Proof op Debt before First Meeting— Examination of Bankrupt.</p> <p>1. Where creditors, before the first meeting of creditors, filed proof of their debt, and applied for an order for the examination of the bankrupt, and the bankrupt objected to the granting of the order, on the ground that it could not be made before the first meeting, and, after argument. the register granted the motion, whereupon the bankrupt moved that the question be adjourned into court for the decision of the judge, under section 4 of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat 519)], and the register declined to adjourn the question, but, on the bankrupt’s request certified the matter to the court; held, that the objection of the bankrupt to the granting of the- order for the examination, raised an issue of law which it was the duty of the register to adjourn into court</p> <p>[Cited in Re Blaisdell, Case No. 1,488; Re Heller, Id. 6,339; Re Pease, 29 Fed. 595.]</p> <p>. 2. As the bankrupt argued the question before the register, he waived his right to have the question adjourned into court, and, after the decision of the question by the register, there was no issue of law to be adjourned, and the register was right in not adjourning the question under section four.</p> <p>3. Creditors may prove their claims before the first meeting of creditors.</p> <p>4. A creditor who has proved his claim, may apply for an examination of the bankrupt before the first meeting of Creditors.</p> <p>5. It is not the duty of the register to notify the bankrupt, or his attorney, of the filing of proof of any claim before the first meeting of creditors.</p> <p>[NOTE. The bankruptcy of Charles G. Patterson was again before the court upon certificate from the register in several cases. Upon the question of the power of the register to decide upon validity of objections to questions put to the bankrupt on examination (Case No. 10,-818); upon the ruling of the register in declining to adjourn certain questions into court, and as to the admissibility of the questions, also upon the right of bankrupt during his examination to consult counsel (Id. 10,815); as to the right of the bankrupt to refuse to answer certain questions the answer to which might subject him to criminal prosecution (Id. 10.816); as to his right to refuse to answer the same questions put in a changed form (Id. 10,820). The case is last reported as heard upon the right of the bankrupt to claim exemption from arrest by state authorities upon an execution issued upon a judgment obtained by default upon a complaint charging fraud in the contracting of the debt on account of which suit was brought. Id. 10,817.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of Charles G. Patterson, a •bankrupt.]</p>

[In this case the register certifies the following question: Under an order of examination had In .the case, the bankrupt [Charles G. Patterson] was present before the register on the 30th day of October, and was being examined by Mr. Robert D. Benedict, attorney for Tupper & Beattie, creditors. The following questions were asked and answered as follows by the bankrupt: “Question 126. How much property had you a year ago? Answer.

<p>,^Case Mo. 10,817.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Debt — Judgment-Arrest.</p> <p>1. Where a judgment by default was rendered against a bankrupt in a state court, on a com-Dlaint which showed that the debt, which the suit was brought to recover, was contracted by fraud, held, that the question, whether the debt represented by the judgment was created by the fraud of the bankrupt, was concluded by the judgment.</p> <p>[Cited in Hazleton v. Valentine, Case No. 6,-287; Re Sidle, Id. 12,844; Re Wright, Id. 18,065.]</p> <p>2. Under the thirty-third section of-.the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 533)]. the judgment would not be affected by the discharge, any more than the debt which it represented.</p> <p>[Cited in Warner v. Cronkhite, Case No. 17,-180.]</p> <p>[Cited in Donald v. Kell, 111 Ind. 3, 11 N. E. 783; Oarit v. Williams, 74 Cal. 186. 15 Pac. 752; Wade v. Clark, 52 Iowa, 159, 2 N. W. 1040.]</p> <p>3. The bankrupt, therefore, was not exempt from arrest on an- execution issued on the judgment in question.</p> <p>[For collateral proceedings in this litigation, see note to Case No. 10,814.]</p>

By JAMES F. DWIGHT, Register: Facts: An order had been made for the examination of the bankrupt under oath, and he had attended before Mr. Register Ketch-um, acting in the absence of, and at the request of Mr. Register Dwight, on the 15th, 16th, and 19th of October, and had been examined under oath.

By JAMES F. DWIGHT, Register: Facts: The bankrupt [Charles G. Patterson] being duly under examination, was asked this question by Mr. Benedict, counsel for the creditors, Tupper & Beattie: “Q. 128. Have you since that time, a year ago, and before the commencement of these proceedings in bankruptcy, lost any part of your property in gaming? Answer.

<p>Case No. 10,822.</p> <p>Notes — Assignment — Plea or Patmext to Assignor-Pleading at Law.</p> <p>1. A plea that the defendant paid the note to the assignor, before he had notice of the assignment, cannot be sustained against the assignee.</p> <p>2. The plea should aver that the payment was made before the note was assigned, or before it was due. And so where the defendant alleges he paid ?500 to the assignor, before he had notice of the assignment. And the averment, that the balance was paid to the plaintiff is defective, as it does not appear that the plaintiff received it as such, in discharge of the note.</p>

Attachment in chancery. The defendants had by answer denied that the plaintiffs were executors in the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs thereupon dismissed their bill. [See Case No. 10825.]

Motion to discharge a ne exeat issued against Bowie, as garnishee of Ball. Bowie, contended that the act of Virginia of 26th of December, 1792, p.115, provides for the case of restraining the garnishee from paying away the money, &c., by authorizing the court to require security, or by ordering the property to be given up to the plaintiff. A ne exeat does not lie against any but the principal debtor himself. 2 Har. Ch. Prac. 202-210.

This case came before the court on a motion for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection by the court, and the admission of improper evidence. The action was in the nature of an action of waste, brought by [Henry C. Patterson] the owner of a mortgage on certain premises in Brooklyn, to recover the damages by him sustained by reason of the removal from the mortgaged premises of á certain building which had been erected thereon.

In chancery. .This was a motion [by Benjamin Patterson] to discharge the ne exeat and certain chancery attachments, and for restoration of certain goods delivered by Holliday & Allen, to the marshal, under the condition of the order for a ne exeat. The bill states that Charles McLaughlin, late of Georgetown, deceased, was indebted to the plaintiff in nine hundred and ninety-two dollars and upwards, which sum yet remains due and unpaid.

[This was an action by William C. Patterson against the Mississippi & Rum River Boom Company.] A statute of the state of Minnesota incorporated a boom company and authorized it to exercise the right of eminent domain for the appropriation of land necessary for its business. Sp. Laws 1867, p. 355, § 13.

<p>Case No. 10,829a.</p> <p>Executors and Administrators — Duty to Board and Clothe Infant Heirs — Allowance—Limitations — Judgment against Estate — Writ of Error by Heir.</p> <p>1. An heir is entitled to prosecute a writ of error to reverse a judgment rendered by the circuit court against an estate, in favor of the executor.</p> <p>2. It is no part of the duty of an executor or administrator to board and clothe infant heirs, and he can have no allowance for it in his administration accounts.</p> <p>3. Notice must be given to heirs where their interests are to be affected by a proceeding.</p> <p>4. Where the statute of limitations does not apply, lapse of time affords a presumption against the justice of a claim, entitled to weight by a court or jury.</p>

This was an action [by John D. Patterson against Thomas J. Tatum] to recover the possession of a parcel of land situated in the county of Stanislaus, and was tried by the court, before Mr. Justice FIELD, without the intervention of a jury, by stipulation of the parties. The court found for the defendant

<p>[This was a libel by William Patton and Samuel D. Dickson against the schooner Randolph, to enforce a bottomry bond.</p>

The plaintiffs, in support of their title,, produced in evidence a grant from the state of North Carolina to John G. Blount and Thomas Blount, for five thousand acres of land, as mentioned in the declaration; and they offered in evidence a deed from the-grantees to David Allison, under whom they claim.

The declaration was upon a promissory note, made by Brooke, payable to Violett or order, and by him assigned, by indorsement, to the plaintiff; and averred demand of payment from Brooke, his refusal and insolvency at the time of demand, and notice thereof to Violett.

offered a demurrer to the evidence, stating the testimony only as delivered by the witnesses for the plaintiff. objected to join in demurrer, because it did not state thert'acts which might be inferred from the testimony. Cocksedge v. Panshaw, 1 Doug. 131; Hoyle-v. Young, 1 Wash. [Va.] 131; Bull. N. P. 313; Thweat v. Finch, 1 Wash. [Va.] 220.

On May 9, 1876, the defendants [Lester F. Hulbert and Charles C. Paige] mitered into a contract to build and erect for the plaintiff [Benjamin F. Paul] a flouring mill, and furnish and provide materials and machinery complete for the same. This suit was commenced September 27, 1877, to recover damages for breach of warranty under the contract.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] [This was a libel by James Paul against the bark Ilex to enforce a maritime lien for services as a stevedore. The libel was dismissed in the court below.] Case unreported.

Assumpsit for money had and received by the defendant [Elias Kane] for the use of the plaintiff [Gabriel Paul], as executor of Edward Coursault, to recover from the defendant the sum of $7,864.32 principal, and $304.72 interest, received by the defendant from the treasury of the United States, for indemnity for French spoliation of the testator’s brig Good Friends and cargo, confiscated by the French government in 1810.

[Bills by Amos Paul against Pacific Railroad Company, Dunc-an S. Parnyely against St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad Company, and Ozias Bailey against Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company.] These bills In equity were filed for an injunction and relief against taxes assessed for the year 1873, upon the property of the Pacific and certain other railroads in the state of Missouri...

This was a libel in rem, promoted by James W. Elwell et als., ship-brokers, in New York, to recover money paid for supplies furnished by them in 1855, to the bark Paul Boggs [J. H. Rivers and others claimants], belonging to Maine. At the time of the commencement of the suit, which was on the 13th of July, 1857, the original owner of the bark was dead, and the present claimants came in as purchasers, by a bill of sale, made in June, 1857, from the admin-istratrix.