Volume 19 — Federal Cases

In admiralty. Libel by Daniel Newhall for breach of verbal charter. The facts appear in the opinion. The cause of action is of admiralty jurisdiction, in personam and in rem. (1) In Personam. The jurisdiction of the admiralty in personam in a case of contract depends solely on the question whether the contract be maritime or not, and is entirely independent of the existence or non-existence -of a maritime privilege or lien.

Libel in rem, by Charles Finch, late master of the British bark Pawasliiek, of Summer-side, Prince Edward’s Island, for wages. The libellant and the claimant both lived at- Sum-merside. The contract between the parties was as follows: “Captain Charles Finch agrees to take charge of bark Pawasbick, for the sum of nine pounds sterling per month, from this date, and Robert T. Holman, the owner, agrees to pay that sum.

This was a libel by the Newark Lime and Cement Manufacturing Co., owners of the sloop Arsenal, to recover for the loss of the sloop, which was sunk in consequence of a collision with the ferry-boat Pavonia, which was on a trip from New York to Hoboken, on the night of December 2d, 1869.

This was a bill inequity to foreclose a mortgage. The complainant had obtained a decree against the mortgagors and sold the mortgaged property under its decree. The master had reported the sale, and reported that there was a balance remaining unpaid; and the complainant then asked a judgment or a decree in the nature of a judgment at law, for the balance unpaid.

<p>Seamen — Receipt in Fell of All Claims — Construction — Ambiguitt—Flogging— Incompetence</p> <p>1. Where a seaman, in a whaling voyage, upon his discharge in a foreign port, signed a writing, acknowledging that he had received a certain sum, in full- of his share of the proceeds of the voyage, and relinquishing all claims against the owners, master and officers, held, that the relinquishment was only of the claim for which he had received compensation, and not of claims for personal violence committed by the master.</p> <p>[Cited in Gnbrielson v. Waydell, 135 N. T. 9, 31 X. E. 972.]</p> <p>2. If such receipt be ambiguous, the ambiguity is not to prejudice the seaman.</p> <p>3. Since the proviso in St. 1850. c. 80, § 1 (9 Stat. 515]. punishment by flogging on board of a whale ship is illegal.</p> <p>4. Incompetency to perform the duties of the station for which an officer or seaman has shipped, is no justification for the infliction of punishment.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,853.</p> <p>Plea of Misnomer — Amendment of Record.</p> <p>After a plea of misnomer in abatement, the court will not suffer the record to be amended, but upon payment of costs, and a discharge of the bail.</p>

Petition for an adjudication of bankruptcy •■against Solomon. Two acts of bankruptcy were alleged, viz., that on May 29th, 1875, [Samuel L.] Solomon, being insolvent, paid to the Continental Bank, as a creditor, thirty thousand dollars, with intent to prefer, and that on June 1st, 1875, he paid the same bank, as a debt to creditor, fifteen thousand dollars, with intent to prefer.

Action in assumpsit to recover from defendants an assessment of CO per cent, on ten shares of stock of the bankrupt corporation held by them. The declaration averred that defendants had paid 20 per cent, on subscribing. and were liable for remaining 80 per cent, in event of the 20 per cent cash fund becoming impaired by losses.

Assumpsit on a bill of exchange drawn at Baltimore on the 7th of March. 1S14, by Messrs. Cornthwait & Carey, for 2,000 dollars, upon the defendants at Boston, payable at sight, to the order of John Bandall, and by him endorsed to the plaintiffs. The declaration alleged the bill to be duly accepted by the defendants.

The question to be decided is whether the action is barred by the section of the bankrupt act (Rev. St § 5057) which provides that no suit at law or in equity shall, in any case, be maintainable by or against the assignee, etc., unless the same shall be brought within two years from the time the cause of action accrued for or against such assignee.

In equity. The defendant moves to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. The petition alleges that the plaintiff, “Joseph R. Payson, assignee in bankruptcy of the Republic Insurance Company of Chicago.

[This was a bill in equity by Joseph R. Payson, assignee of the Republic Insurance Company, against Benjamin F. Hadduck, Jr., and others, to enforce the payment of certain assessments levied by the court in Case No. 11,704. Heard upon demurrer.]

This action is brought by the plaintiff [Joseph R. Payson], the assignee in bankruptcy of the Republic Insurance Company of the state of Illinois, against J. C. Stoever, to enforce the collection of an assessment of sixty per centum upon the par value of ten shares of stock in said company, of which he is alleged to be the holder and owner.

This was an action by Joseph K. Payson, assignee of the Itepublic Fire Insurance Company of Chicago, Illinois, against Warren H. Withers, to recover an assessment of $00 made on each of the ten shares of capital stock of the said insurance company held by him.

<p>Case No. 10,865.</p> <p>Tug and Tow — Contract—Safe Place — Negligence of Master — Del at — Costs.</p> <p>1. Where a tug going up the Hudson river with several boats in tow, could not land one of the boats at the dock where it was destined in the then state of the tide, and left it at another safe place, to await the return of the tug on the next tide, and the boat having to be moved out of the way of other boats, was put by her master in a place where she took bottom before the next tide, and suffered damage for which action was brought, held, that it was not negligent in the tug to leave the boat in a safe place, where she did, to await the next tide.</p> <p>2. It was negligent in the master of the tow to move his boat to an unsafe place, when there were other places open to him and known to be safe; and the libel must be dismissed.</p> <p>3. The failure of the tug to return at the next tide showed a willingness to disregard the welfare of her tow, for which she should be refused COStS.</p> <p>4. A boat left by her tug to wait for her, in order to complete the • towing contract, at a place which though safe cannot be retained and from which the boat must move to an unsafe placo, is not left in a safe place.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,866.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Authority op Register to Set Opp Exempt Property — Regularity- op Order — Application by Assignee por Discharge — Misconduct — Cost op Keeping and Disposing of Propertt Charged with Lien.</p> <p>1. A register has no authority to set off exempt property to the bankrupt, nor to direct the assignee in the matter.</p> <p>2. An ex parte order approving the schedule of property set aside to the bankrupt, or confirming a report of sale of assets, made on the day such schedule or report is filed, is irregular and therefore not binding upon the creditors.</p> <p>3. The bankrupt court has power to set aside such orders at any time during the pendency of the proceedings, where an aggrieved party moves therefor within a reasonable time after notice.</p> <p>4. Creditors are not bound to except to the schedule of exempt property within twenty days after it is filed, where the assignee has failed to file it within twenty days after the assignment.</p> <p>5. Under the statute of Colorado a merchant is not entitled to an exemption of two hundred dollars worth of goods as “stock in trade;” he is entitled to a horse, as a “working animal,” but not to a buggy.</p> <p>6. On an application by the assignee for his discharge, any misconduct on his part in respect to the estate is a proper subject for examination.</p> <p>7. Every fact which is relied on to establish fraud should be distinctly Stated and verified; and the creditor raising the issue should give security for costs.</p> <p>8. Where property taken by the assignee is •charged with a lien, the reasonable cost of keeping and disposing of it, including the assignee s fees, should be charged upon it. No charge can be allowed for the services of an auctioneer unless it be shown that such services were necessary; nor can such fund be charged with attorney’s fees for services rendered to the assignee in his contest with the lienor respecting such property.</p>

Assumpsit on a promissory note made by the defendants and two others, at Aux Cayes, in the year 1797, signed “Denton & Co.” and “Nathan Brothers & Co.” and endorsed by the. payee, Endicott, to the plaintiff.

Samuel Peabody and others, libellants of the proceeds of twenty-eight bags of cotton. This libel was filed by Samuel Peabody, one of the surviving owners of the schooner Equality, in behalf of himself and another owner, and the representatives of a third owner, who had also been master of the vessel.

<p>Case No. 10,868.</p> <p>Definition of “Broker” — Broker’s Tax.</p>

[This was a libel in rem by Benjamin Peacon and others against the cargo and materials of the Norwegian bark Amazon for salvage.]

[This was a libel against the steamer Pearl and her cargo to procure their condemnation as prize for attempting to violate the blockade.]

[This was a bill in equity by Oliver Pearl and others against the Ocean Mills and others, for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 6,036, granted to complainants Sept 1, 1S74.)

<p>Case No. 10,877.</p> <p>Assignment fob Benefit of Creditors — Br Partner — Fraudulent Assignment — Schedule of Property — Preferences—Release.</p> <p>1. How far one partner may dispose of or assign away th'e partnership property and effects? Quaere, if he can assign away the whole without the assent of his partner, and what is evidence of such assent.</p> <p>[Cited in Bowen v. Clark, Case No. 1,721.]</p> <p>[Cited in Dana v. Lull, 17 Vt. 394; Deckard v. Case, 5 Watts. 24; Egberts v. Wood, 3 Paige. 524; Hannaman v. Karriek (Utah) 33 Pac. 1042; Howell v. Harvey, 5 Ark. 270; Kirby v. Ingersoll, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 485; Steinhart v. Fyhrie (Mont.) 6 Pac. 372.]</p> <p>2. An assignment by a debtor of all his effects, for the benefit of such of his creditors as should release their debts in sixty days from the date of the assignment. In what case it would be, and in what cases it would not be fraudulent.</p> <p>[Cited in Halsey v. Fairbanks, Case No. 5,-964; The Watchman, Id. 17,251; Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 615.]</p> <p>[Cited in Atkinson v. Jordan, 5 Ohio. 297; Grover v. Wakeman, 11 Wend. 200, 209.)</p> <p>3. Such an assignment would not be fraudulent merely for want of a schedule of the property assigned.</p> <p>4. A debtor who is insolvent, may prefer one creditor to another.</p> <p>[Cited in Ashby v. Steere, Case No. 676; Marsh v. Bennett, Id. 9,110.]</p> <p>[Cited in Gordon v. Cannon, 18 Grat. (Va.) 404; Howell v. Edgar, 3 Scam. 421. Cited in brief in Skipwith v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh, 278.]</p> <p>5. The offer to release, made by a creditor to the trustee, under an assignment for the benefit of such creditors who should release within a particular tíme, the trustee having undertaken to prepare and have ready a release, and who failed so to do. is not sufficient to entitle the creditor who did not execute the release, to come in under the trust</p> <p>[Cited in Collier v. Davis. 47 Ark. 344, 1 S. W. 686; Armstrong v. Hurst (S. C.) 18 S. E. 153. Cited in brief in Grant v. Levan, 4 Pa. St 426.]</p> <p>6. Acceptance of the trust by the trustee, who was also a creditor, will not entitle him to the benefit of the trust, if he has failed to execute the release in time.</p> <p>[Cited in National Union Bank v. Copeland, 141 Mass. 266, 4 N. E. 795.]</p> <p>7. The day on- which the assignment was made, is to be excluded. The general rule as to “from the date,” and “from the day of the date,” stated.</p> <p>[Cited in Barber v. Chandler, 17 Pa. St. 50. Cited in brief in Kimm v. Osgood’s Adm’r, 19 Mo. 60; Lebus v. Wayne Ratterman Co. (Ky.) 21 S. W. 652. Cited in State v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 190, 14 S. E. 410. Cited in brief in Taylor v. Jacoby, 2 Pa. St. 496. Disapproved in Warren v. Slade. 23 Mich. 5. Cited in Weeks v. Hull, 19 Conn. 379. 382; Knowlton v. Culver, 2 Pin. 246, 1 Chand. 214.]</p> <p>8. If any of the creditors release on the sixty-first day, the preceding day falling on Sunday, he is too late. He should have released on the sixtieth, or on some prior day.</p> <p>[Cited in Shefer v. Magone, 47 Fed. 873.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Page v. Weymouth, 47 Me. 241.]</p> <p>9. Preparing a deed of release before the expiration of the sixty days, is not sufficient; if it was not executed within the limited time.</p>

At the first meeting of creditors in this case, fifty of the creditors, representing about one thousand dollars of claims, voted for John. G. Crocker for assignee; while some' twenty creditors, representing some ten thousand dollars of claims, voted for M. C. Comstock for assignee.

<p>Case No. 10,879.</p> <p>Executors — Delegation of Power to Sell— Sale bt Heir at Law.</p> <p>1. Where an executor, by the will, is empowered to sell real estate in the best mode in his judgment, for the interest of the estate, he cannot delegate the power to another.</p> <p>[Cited in Clinefelter v. Ayres, 16 Ill. 333. Cited in brief in Tatum v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 423. Distinguished in Whittier v. Wink-ley, 62 N. H. 338.]</p> <p>2. It is a case of special trust and confidence, and is personal to the executor.</p> <p>3. Where a sale was made under such circumstances and the consideration paid, the heir at law may sell the same estate; the first sale being void.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,882.</p> <p>Bills and Notes —Innocent Holder — Failure of Consideration — Note Given for Horse in Unsound Condition.</p> <p>1. Where a negotiable note is transferred by indorsement to a third person who is ignorant of any infirmity affecting its validity, and the indorsement is before the maturity of the' note, the indorsee is an innocent holder, and may recover against the maker, although as to him there has been a failure of consideration.</p> <p>2. An indorsee of a note given in payment for a horse, in the sale of which there was a fraudulent concealment of the animal’s unsound condition, is not an innocent holder of the note, if the proof shows that he and the seller were the owners of the horse, and that in the sale the seller acted as his agent.</p> <p>3. If. at the time of the sale of a horse, the animal is subject to a disease known to the seller, which he conceals, and which was not discoverable by The buyer with ordinary vigilance, the sale is fraudulent.</p> <p>[Cited in Wafer v. Harvey Co. Bank, 46 Kan. 610, 26 Pae. 1036.)</p>

A stipulation containing a statement of facts has been filed, from which it appears, that “three parties named Pease, Sherman, and Hall were partners in Minneapolis under that firm name, carrying on the business of dealing in paints, oils, and glass. As such co-partners they contracted a debt to D. F. Freeman & Co., and gave a firm note for the amount, signed Pease, Sherman & Hall. Aft-erwards the partnership was dissolved, B. S. Pease retiring.

The propeller Napoleon had been libeled in admiralty, and a decree made in favor of the libelant [George B. Pease], and for a sale of the vessel. A writ of venditioni ex-ponas had been issued, and the vessel duly advertised and sold, the proceeds paid into court, and an order of distribution made. Subsequently, L. M. Dickens, claiming an interest in the vessel as mortgagee, appears in court, and moves that the sale of the said propeller be set aside.

<p>[This was an action at law by Charles A. Peaslee against Joseph L. Haberstro. Heard on motion to set aside the summons.]</p>

This was a motion for an attachment against Elisha Peck, for an alleged contempt in refusing to answer questions put to him on his examination de bene esse, before a United States commissioner in New York, on a sub-pcena duces tecum, as a witness in a suit pending in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Connecticut.

<p>By JOHN L. EDWARDS, Register:</p> <p>2 [To the Honorable District Court within .and for the District of Vermont: The undersigned register begs leave to report that on the Sth day of October, A. D. 1873, Horatio S. Loomis of Montpelier, in the county of Washington, administrator of Roswell R. Keith, late of said Montpelier, deceased, took •out his writ of attachment in due form of law against the said J. Q. A. Peck as principal debtor, and therein summoning Alonzo T. Keith of said Montpelier, as trustee of the said J. Q. A. Peck, and said writ was dated on said 8th day of October, and made return-Able to the county court then next to be hold-■en at Montpelier, in the county of Washington on the second Tuesday of March, A. D. 1876, and in said writ the plaintiff declared specially upon three promissory notes — one for six hundred and sixty-one dollars and •fifty-four cents, dated March 8, 1864, on demand and interest annually; one for one thousand four hundred and thirty-four dollars and forty-two cents, dated May 31, 1873, •on demand and interest annually; and one for four thousand three hundred and thirty-, five dollars, dated March 17, 1864, on demand and interest annually. On which first-named note was indorsed March 14, 1870, twenty-five fiollars, and said last described note was indorsed May 15,1866, seventy-nine dollars and ninety-seven cents, also September 1, 1874, the sum of three thousand one hundred and fifty dollars and five cents. The plaintiff also •declared in a count in general assumpsit, and demanding in damages nine thousand dollars. Said writ was duly signed by Luther New-comb, clerk of said county court, and directed to any sheriff or constable in the state. And Afterwards on said Sth day of October, the said plaintiff delivered said writ to D. W. Dudley, deputy sheriff within and for the county of Washington, to serve and return as the law requires. And said Dudley, as such ■deputy sheriff, on the 9th day of October, 1875, served the same writ on the said A. T. Keith, trustee, by delivering to him a true •and attested copy of said writ with his, the said Dudley’s return thereon, and on the second day of March, 1876. the said Dudley, as •such deputy sheriff, made further service of ■said writ on the said J. Q. A. Peck, by attaching as his property one chip, and on the ■same day delivered to him. the said J. Q. A. Peck, a true and attested copy of the original writ with his, the said Dudley’s return indorsed thereon. And for greater particularity a copy of said writ and officer’s return thereon is hereto attached and made a part of this report and marked “A.” Said writ was duly returned to the term of court when and where it was made returnable, and said cause was duly entered upon the. docket of said court and continued from term to term of said court, and is now pending in said court. The trustee appeared in said court and filed his disclosure, a copy of which is hereto attached and marked “B.” On the 29th day of June, A. D. 1876, the said J. Q. A. Peck filed his petition in bankruptcy, in the district court of the United States, and was thereaft-erwards on the same day duly adjudged a bankrupt, and said petition having been duly referred to a register, a first meeting of creditors was held on the 28th day of July, 1876, at which Joel Poster, Jr., was duly elected assignee of said bankrupt’s estate, and said election was thereupon confirmed by the district court On the 28th of July, 1876, the said Horatio S. Loomis, as administrator as aforesaid, proved said three promissory notes in said bankruptcy at the sum of eight thousand and fifty-nine dollars and fifty-three cents, and claiming in said proof that said three notes were secured by said trustee process, so served upon said trustee as aforesaid. The assignee claiming that said proof should be modified so as to stand as a proof without security, and having made application to the undersigned register to hear and determine that matter, due notice was given said assignee and the said H. S. Loomis that said register would hear such matter at the office of Fifleld, Pilkin & Porter in Montpelier, in the county of Washington, on the 8th day of March, 1877, at 10 o’clock a. m. At which time and place the said EL S. Loo-mis, as administrator as aforesaid, appeared before me with his counsel, Charles H. Heath and Homer W. Heaton, and the said Joel Poster, Jr., also appeared by himself and his counsel, C. W. Porter, when a full hearing was had touching the modification of said proof.</p> <p>[Prom the evidence submitted to him the. register finds the foregoing facts and that there is a large sum due from the said Alonzo T. Keith to the said J. Q. A. Peck, which said Keith holds as trustee of said Peck, precisely how much did not appear from the evidence. The said H. S. Loomis, as administrator as aforesaid, claimed that said proof should stand as made, and that he hold a lien upon the funds in the hands of the said Alonzo T. Keith by virtue of the service of said trustee process upon him more than four months before the filing of said petition in bankruptcy. It was claimed on the part of the assignee that no lien attached to said funds in the said Alonzo T. Keith’s hands for the reason that said trustee’s writ was not served upon the said J. Q. A. Peck till within four months next before the filing of said petition in bankruptcy. I find that the said J. Q. A. Peck had no knowledge of said trustee process whatever, till said writ was served upon him as above stated on the second day of March, A. D. 1876, and for this reason it was also claimed that no lien was created. From the foregoing facts the register decides that said proof ought not to be modified and that it stand as a secured claim as proved.</p> <p>[The register would recommend, if the court sustain the ruling of the register, that the parties be ordered to proceed in the county court, where said cause is pending, and ascertain by the judgment of that court the amount due from the said A. T. Keith to the said J. Q. A. Feck, embraced in said suit, provided this can be done so as not to cause an unreasonable delay in settling the estate of the bankrupt in the district court. So that if there is more due from the said A. T. Keith than sufficient to liquidate the plaintiff’s claim in that suit, the balance may be available to the assignee in the bankrupt’s estate.</p> <p>[All which is respectfully submitted.] 2</p> <p>[By JOHN L. EDWARDS, Register:</p> <p>[Since said report was recommitted to me, such proceedings have been had in the county court in Washington county, where said cause is pending, that the amount in the hands of the trustee has been fixed upon, and that amount it is agreed by counsel is four thousand three hundred and sixteen dollars and three cents, less trustee’s costs, taxed and allowed at nine dollars and five cents, leaving in the hands of said trustee on which said lien is claimed four thousand three hundred and six dollars and ninety-eight cents. All which is respectfully submitted.]</p>

By ISAAC DAYTON, Register: I, Isaac Dayton, one of the registers of said court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that in the course of the proceedings in said cause before me, the following- questions arose pertinent to said proceedings, and were, by Charles N. Judson, Esq., attorney and counsel for John J. Cisco, one of the creditors of said bankrupt, stated for the opinion of the court thereon.

[This was a libel by William M. Peck and others against John Bums and others to recover damages for the loss of libellants’ vessel, caused by a collision with respondents’ steamship.]

Libel, upon a charter party, by Peck and others against Laughlln, the master of the schooner Clytie. Upon September 8, 1877, the schooner was discharging cargo at Marseilles, France. Fitz Bros., of Boston, ship brokers, being desirous of effecting a charter for a cargo of salt, but not being the agents of the vessel, telegraphed the master as follows: “Can charter Hyers Boston eight. Fitz.” To this telegram the master telegraphed answer as follows: “Fix Boston Hyers eight.

[This was a bill in equity by Clarence I. Peck, against the board of county commissioners of Miami county, Charles Giller, clerk of said board, and others.] On demurrer to the bill of complaint. The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the collection of certain taxes and for relief against tax sales already made.

<p>Case No. 10,892.</p> <p>Carriers op Passengers — Stage Proprietors— Skill and Prudence op Drivers — Character of Equipment — Collision with Another Stage —Exemplart Damages.</p> <p>1. A stage proprietor is responsible for the skill and prudence of his drivers.</p> <p>[Cited in Farisb v. Reigle, 11 Grat. 705.]</p> <p>2. He is also bound to procure good stages, harness, and well broke horses. If. for want of such preparation, an injury is done to a passenger in the stage, the proprietor is responsible. Or if the drivers do not act with skill and prudence in driving the stage.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Andrews v. Capitol N. O. & S. W. R. Co., 29 D. C. 139.]</p> <p>3. Although the accident may have occurred through the recklessness of the driver of another stage, who may be liable, and also his employers — yet if the driver of the stage to which the accident occurred be in any respect wanting, in the exercise of skill and prudence, his principals are liable.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Lake v. Milliken, 62 Me. 241. Cited in Ricker v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 433: Sanderson v. Frazier, 8 Colo. 79, 5 Pac. 033; Board of Com’rs of Sullivan Co. v. Sisson, 2 Ind. App. 319, 28 N. E. 374.]</p> <p>4. Damages will be assessed for the injury received.</p> <p>5. Where there has been great recklessness bv the driver, exemplary damages should be given.</p> <p>[Cited in Brown v. Evans, 17 Fed. 914.]</p> <p>[For an action brought by William L. Peek to recover damages for injury personally sustained in the same accident see Case No. 10,-893.)</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by John Peck, survivor, etc., against William C. Pease.]</p>

Bill in equity by [Albert M. Peck and another], two jiartners, to compel the return of certain liquors, alleged to be the property of the partnership, attached and seized by [Emil Schultze] the marshal, one of the defendants, in an action at law brought by the other defendants against one of the partners to recover the amount of a claim against him; and to enjoin the marshal from further interference with the property.

Debt on a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendants [R. and T. Williamson] in the supreme court of Massachusetts. Among other points involved in the case was the much agitated question as to the effect which a judgment obtained in one state should have when suit is instituted upon it in another state.

Bill in equity. The bill in substance set forth, that on the 20th day of September, A. D. 1842, a petition was filed in the district court within and for the • district of Rhode-Island sitting in bankruptcy, by the Franklin Foundry and Machine Company of Providence, creditors of said John F. Phillips & Son. against said John F. Phillips & Son, in which it was alleged that said John F. Phillips & Son had become bankrupts under tlie act aforesaid, by committing the acts…

<p>Case No. 10,899.</p> <p>Power op Attornet — Departure prom Terms op the Power — Intention—Witness—Interest in Controversy — Release.</p> <p>1. A letter of attorney which authorizes an agent to purchase a certain steamboat from A. B. and to draw bills on the principal for such amounts, and payable at such times as should be agreed upon between them, does not authorize the agent to purchase the boat from other persons.</p> <p>2. The principal appears to have placed a special trust and confidence in A. B., as to the amount to be paid and the times of payment; and this can not be dispensed with by the agent.</p> <p>S. The intention of the parties can not be shown different from the written power.</p> <p>4. The agem who, contrary to the power, associates himself as one of the purchasers of the boat, is interested in the purchase, and can not be used as a witness.</p> <p>5. A release of all claims on him, by the plaintiffs, under the special counts, does not restore his competency. As a joint purchaser he is liable for the boat, and may be made liable, if the defendant shall not be bound.</p>

<p>A habeas corpus and certiorari were issued to bring the body of Lars Pederson before the court, and also for a return of the proceedings before Commissioner Nelson in his case. It appeared from the papers that Pederson was one of the crew of the Swedish brig Lina, and shipped on board her in Norway on a voyage to the United States and back. In November, 1849, it is alleged, he deserted the vessel in New Orleans; and being now found in this city, the vessel being in this port,' he was arrested at the instance of the Swedish consul under the provisions of the treaty between the United States and Sweden and Norway, and of the act of congress passed to carry into execution the treaty stipulations. It was proved before the court that in 1850 Pederson had returned to Norway, and the port from which he shipped, and where the owners of the Lina reside, and in June of that year, with the knowledge of the said owners, obtained a passport from the local authorities of that place to leave Norway for the United States, and that he embarked at the same port for New York in a Swedish vessel with his family, and removed to New York for his permanent residence, where he now lives, and had resided eight months or more, when arrested for such desertion.</p>

In this case, the respondents, owners of the ship Troubadour, appointed Pedrick the master, and in their letter of appointment and instructions, they say that “the ship and freight are insured by the year, — ship valued at $70,-000, and freight valued at $25,000, on board or not;” and also, “for your services you are to have $25 a month, and five per cent pri-mage on the freight as collected.” The vessel sailed from Newburyport, on March 12th, 1854, with no cargo on board,…

<p>Case No. 10,901.</p> <p>Seamen — Discharge—Lay—Deductions — Costs.</p> <p>1. A mate was shipped for a whaling voyage of three years at a certain lay and a “bonus” of two hundred dollars, paid him at the time of shipment, and receipted for as a bonus “to perform the voyage.” He served faithfully for fourteen months, and was then discharged with the master’s consent upon terms satisfactory to both, one of which was that he should have his lay up to the time of his discharge. Sdd, the owners could not deduct from the mate’s lay a proportionate part of the bonus as a set-off or recoupment, on the ground that he had not performed the voyage.</p> <p>2. Costs given the libellant because the owner had refused to pay until the expiration of a credit which he had given for the oil.</p>

In bankruptcy. On the 3d day of November, 1S74, Lemuel Peebles, the bankrupt, made his negotiable note to the Petersburg Savings and Insurance Company for eighteen hundred dollars, expressing in the body of the note that he deposited 168 shares of the capital stock in the said company, twenty shares of the Atlantic, Mississippi and Ohio Company, and a bond to him of J. W. Pool for $916.52, as collateral security, “with authority to sell the same at public or private sale, or…

[Motion for increase of damages in an action at law. [Suit brought upon letters patent .for an “improved machine for sawing thin boards,” etc., granted to John Myers and Robert G. Eunson, May 23, 1854 [No. 10,905] and extended for seven years from May 23, 1868. The plaintiffs [Eben Peek and -Gilbert J. Bogert] were the owners of the patent for that part of the city of New York lying west of Broadway and Eighth avenue.

<p>[This was an action by Bben Peek and others against John Frame and others.]</p> <p>Motion for the allowance of costs in an action at law referred to in the report of the case of Peek v. Frame [Case No. 10,903]. It appeared that after the verdict was rendered, the plaintiff had filed a disclaimer to some of the claims of the patent in suit, and it was insisted that this was equivalent to a verdict against .those claims upon the trial, which would have deprived the plaintiff of the right to recover costs.</p>

This was a suit by libel [by Willard Peele .and others against the Merchants’ Insurance Company] on the admiralty side of the court, founded on a policy of insurance.

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Virginia.)</p> <p>At law.</p>

<p>[In the matter of P. A. Pegues, a bankrupt.]</p>

The cause was set down for hearing on bill and answer, and at a former court an account was directed. When the case came on-before the auditor, the defendants [West’s executors] insisted that the answer was to be taken as true, and that no evidence could be given by the plaintiff to disprove it.

Assumpsit to recover of the defendant, a merchant of Gottenburgh in Sweden, a balance alleged to be due on sundry consignments made to him by the plaintiff. The defendant claimed to be allowed in account the difference, (being 6180 rix dollars,) between a sum advanced by him to the plaintiff’s supercargo, upon certain goods shipped by the Dolphin, and the net proceeds of those goods.

Upon a rule obtained by' the defendants [West’s executors] to show cause why the amended bill, filed in this case, should not be referred to the master for impertinence; it appeared, that after all the original defendants, except two, had answered the bill, the plaintiffs [Peirce & McDonald] obtained leave to amend, by making new parties. [Case No. 10,909.] The new bill contains all the matter of the original bill, together with that applicable to the new parties, and calls…

<p>Appeal from Pope circuit court. [This was a suit by William Pelham against Alfred E. Pace.]</p>

<p>The bankrupts were wholesale millinery merchants in St Louis. The assignee filed a petition in the district court, representing that the bankrupts had fraudulently withheld from him goods and property to the amount of $48,000, and asking an order on the bankrupts to show cause why they should not turn over that amount of prop-' erty to him. The order issued, and the bankrupts appeared and filed a sworn answer denying the charge, and stating that they had delivered to the assignee-all their property and effects. The matter was heard by the district court upon the examination of the bankrupts before the register (admitted in evidence without objection, as far as the record discloses), and upon the testimony of various witnesses produced by the assignee and by the bankrupts.- The testimony, including the examination of the bankrupts, covers about six hundred written pages. The bankrupts, or their wives, or the persons to whom they alleged that money had been paid just preceding their failure, were not examined as witnesses, or their depositions taken. After a hearing, which occupied several days, the district court found as a fact that the said bankrupts “have secreted, concealed, and prevented from coming to their assignee herein, property to the value of $7,762.22, belonging to the said estate, and thereupon ordered the bankrupts to pay said sum to the assignee on or before the 8th day of September, 1875.” The bankrupts, on the 8th day of December. A. D. 1875, filed their petition in this court for a review of the said order. An answer to this petition was filed by the assignee, and the matter, by stipulation and agreement, was to be heard in the circuit court upon the same proofs upon which it was determined by the district court</p> <p>By consent, the case was, at the March term, 1876, of this court, referred.to S. D. Thompson, Esq., one of the masters in chancery in this court, to report upon the law and the facts. The master has filed an elaborate report, in which he states that he has given to the case a thorough examination, and seems to be of opinion that the finding of the district court against the bankrupts was for a sum too small instead of too large, but as the assignee had prosecuted no proceedings for review, he recommends an affirmance of the order below, with costs, against the bankrupts. Exceptions were taken by the bankrupts to the master’s report, on the single ground that it is not sustained by the proofs, and on these exceptions the cause was submitted to the court</p>

Gardner Waters filed an application for letters patent for an “improvement in lubricators,” March 31, ISOS. On the 21st of April. 1S68, Hiram Taylor made an application for a patent, for substantially the same improvement. Both applications were rejected by the examiner.

<p>Case No. 10,916.</p> <p>Master—Cook—Disrating.</p> <p>Held, that although the cook had been guilty of some misconduct, the master had no right, under the circumstances, to offer him the alternative either to be discharged in a foreign port, on payment of a little more than half his wages earned during a service of seven and a half months, or else to go into the forecastle with the men, “where he would have a chance to earn a portion of his wages, or at least ins grub, and if he refused to work, to be charged for board."</p>

This was an action [by Robert W. Flour-noy] founded upon an open account, in the following words: “K. W. Flournoy, to Joseph Antonio Penaro, Dr. For my services on his plantation, from the 15th April, 1834, to 15th February, 1S44; 9 years and 10 months, at $150 per annum, $1470.’’ The defendant, among other pleas, relied upon the statute of limitations.

[This was an action at law by J. Morrison Pendall, who sues for himself and for the use of Alliance Mutual Insurance Company, against John Bench and others, who constituted a transportation company, to recover damages for loss of and damage to certain goods delivered to defendants as common carriers.]

<p>Case No. 10,918.</p> <p>Transfer or Stock Limited by By-Laws.</p> <p>A corporation, organized under a statute which authorizes it to make by-laws for “the management of its property, the regulation of its affairs.” and “the transfer of its stock.” and, further provides, that the stock of the company “shall be transferable in such manner as shall be prescribed by the by-laws of the company,” has power to make a by-law, providing that no transfer of stock shall be made upon the books of the corporation, until after the payment of all indebtedness to the corporation due from the person in whose name the stock stands on its books. .</p>

[This was a libel by John Pendergrast against Henry Lampman to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been inflicted by the defendant.]

<p>Equity — Practice—Ruling Defendant to Answer.</p> <p>To entitle the plaintiff to take the bill pro confesso on account of an answer not being filed within three months after the day of appearance and bill filed, the defendant should have been ruled to answer, and the cause should be set down. The decree in this case is merely nisi, to be made absolute at the term succeeding that to which service of a copy of the decree shall be returned executed, unless cause is shown to the contrary.</p> <p>[Cited in Stockton v. Throgmorton, Case No. 13.463. Quoted in Halderman v. Halder-man. Id. 5,908; O’Haro v. MacCornell. 93 U. S. 152. Cited in Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 120, 5 Sup. Ct. 796; Schofield v. Horse Springs Cattle Co., 05 Fed. 430.]</p>

The plaintiff, having complied with what was required by the court upon the former motion [Case No. 10,920], now renewed his motion to take the bill for confessed, and presented the form of a decree, that the defendants [Oliver Evans’ executors] should pay to the plaintiff the sums stated in the account annexed to the bill, ás well as other sums advanced by the plaintiff on account of the estate of the said Oliver Evans, since his death.

<p>Case against the defendant [Bufus B. Kins-ley) to recover damages for injuries resulting to the plaintiff [Dewit C. Pendleton] from an assault and battery alleged to have been inflicted upon him by one Charles L. Stan-hope. Personal injuries were inflicted on the plaintiff by Charles L. Stanhope, clerk of the steamboat Perry, employed at the time and for many years before in carrying passengers and freight between Newport and Providence, in this district, and he brought action against the defendant, as the owner of the steamer, to recover compensation for the injuries so inflicted while he was a passenger on board the steamer. Service having been made upon the defendant, he appeared and pleaded the general issue, and upon that issue the parties went to trial, and the jury, under the instructions of the court, returned a verdict for the defendant, subject to the opinion of the court upon questions of law reserved by the court for further consideration. Evidence was introduced by the plaintiff sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant was owner of the steamer for the voyage, as it appeared that the record title of the steamer was in his name, that the clerk was in the employment of the defendant, and that the steamer was not under charter to any other person.</p> <p>Business made it necessary for the plaintiff to go to Providence on the 29th of August, 1862, and, being at Newport at the time, he went on board of the steamer for that purpose before she started from Newport on her morning trip to the former place. He had often passed over that route in that steamer before, and, having been accustomed to purchase tickets for the trip, of the clerk of the steamer, he applied to him for one on this occasion, within a short time after he went on board, and offered him a one-dollar bill on one of the national banks of the state to pay for the ticket The price of tickets was fifty cents, and the witness states that he had frequently offered bills for tickets before that time, and seen others do the same thing, and that the clerk always received the bills and made change without any objections. On this occasion, however, he refused to take the bill, or give him a ticket, saying that he had no change, to which the plaintiff replied, “If you have no change, give me postage-stamps,” but the clerk replied to that suggestion that he had no postage-stamps, and suggested that the plaintiff would have to take two tickets, to which the plaintiff replied that he did not want two tickets, adding that he was not accustomed to purchase tickets in advance. Whereupon the plaintiff left the main deck, where the office of the clerk was, and went to the saloon deck above, where there were many gentlemen and ladies and children sitting on the settees facing the stem of the steamer. Nothing further of importance occurred till after the steamer passed Portsmouth Grove, when the express-agent came around to collect the tickets from the passengers, as'he sometimes did, in the place of the clerk who had charge of that business. He went to the plaintiff and asked for his ticket, but the plaintiff told him that he had none; that he offered to pay for one when he first, came on board, and that the offer which he made was refused, to which the express-agent replied, “You will have it to pay,” and passed along. In a few minutes the clerk and the express-agent came up together, and the clerk demanded pay for his fare of the plaintiff, but the plaintiff replied substantially as before, that he had once offered to pay for a ticket, and that he, the clerk, had refused to accept the pay for the same. Here the conversation ended, but the clerk seized the plaintiff by the collar, and pulled him violently from the settee where he was sitting, pushed him from there to the companion-way, and shoved him down those steps to the main deck, near where he was when he offered to.purchase and pay for a ticket, and from there he pushed him to the companion-way leading to the lower deck, and shoved him down that passageway also to the lower cabin, and set him down violently on the seat near the berths, and left him without any explanation. Left alone he remained there for a short time, and then went to the saloon deck, where he was when he was assaulted, and on the arrival of the steamer at Providence he left unmolested. and on the following day returned to his own residence.</p> <p>Evidence was introduced by the plaintiff tending to show that he was seriously injured in his back and other parts of his body, and that the injuries were of a permanent character. Much testimony was introduced as to the extent of his injuries, but it is unnecessary to refer to it in this report, as the defendant at the close of the plaintiff’s case moved the court to instruct the jury that in view of the whole evidence the plaintiff could not recover, and that their verdict should be for the defendant; and the court gave that instruction as requested. After the verdict a motion for new trial was duly filed by the plaintiff, and the parties were heard upon the question whether the defendant in any view of the evidence was liable for the assault committed on the plaintiff by the clerk of the steamer.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,924.</p> <p>Evidence — Letter from War Department not Authenticated as Prescribed bt Congress— Error — Fact not Stated in Bile of Exceptions.</p> <p>1. In a suit brought by the United States against the representative of a surety of M. and H.. contractors to furnish rations to the troops of Virginia and Maryland, for the year 1802, a letter from the department of wgf, not authenticated in the form prescribed by the act of congress, claiming advances made to the principals, up to the 6th of January, 1803, is inadmissible in evidence, and no admission of its correctness. express or implied, by the principals, can bind the surety.</p> <p>2. Where a cause is removed from an inferior to a superior tribunal, by writ of error, no fact, not stated in the bill of exceptions, will be noticed.</p> <p>iOited in U. S. v. Jarvis, Case No. 15,469.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of John R. Penn, Charles V. Culver, and Lucien H. Culver, bankrupts. The proceedings in this case are first reported as heard upon motion of certain creditors to set aside the adjudication of bankruptcy theretofore rendered. Case No. 10,926.]</p>

[In the matter of John R. Penn, Charles V. Culver, and Lucien H. Culver, bankrupts. The proceedings in this case are first reported as heard upon motion of certain creditors to set aside the adjudication of bankruptcy theretofore rendered. Case No. 10,926.]

These-were bills in equity, involving a great variety of facts, respecting the disposition of the estates of the late proprietary family: but the principal object of all of them, was submitted for the opinion of the court, on the following agreement: “It is agreed, that these suits be submitted for the opinion of the court, upon the following statement of facts, admitted by all the parties, except the fact, that Anthony Butler, for his own accommodation, and without the…

On chancery side. Exceptions had been taken to the defendant’s answer.. But now stated, that for certain reasons it would be satisfactory to both parties, to go to a hearing upon the bill and original answer, and moved for leave to withdraw his exceptions; which being allowed, he filed a replication instanter.

This case [by the lessee of John Penn and Richard Penn against Groff] was, in every respect, like that of Penn v. Kline [Case No. 10,935], and the argument at the bar, was nearly the same; except that this point was started .by the counsel for the defendant (Mr. James Ross of Pittsburgh, and Mr. Hopkins, who were employed by the state of Pennsylvania), and very much pressed; that is, that after settlements were made on the western side of the Susquehánnah, on the common…

The plaintiff [Penn’s lessee] proved an order of the proprietors to the surveyor, to lay off 10,000 acres for the proprietors, on both sides of Wyaloosing creek, and east of the Susquehanna, dated August, 1773; for which, a warrant to the surveyor general issued, in September, 1773; and a survey was made, on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of October, 1773, and returned into the land office, on the 31st of October, 1774.

This was an ejectment brought by the former proprietaries of Pennsylvania, to recover the tract of land in question, being part of the manor of Springettsbury. Springettsbury Manor was surveyed in the year 1722, under a warrant from the governor of Pennsylvania, for the use of the proprietary. The survey, however, was not returned into the land office, but into that of the council.

This was a scire facias to revive a judgment in ejectment for the term, and for damages, after the expiration of twelve months.

[This was a suit by G. W. Pennington, as-signee in bankruptcy of C. D. Bryan, against J. H. Lowenstein and others. The case is now before the court on the defendants’ demurrer.]

<p>Case No. 10,939.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Sheriff's Levy after Filing of Petition.</p> <p>A levy was made by the sheriff on certain goods of bankrupt after the date of filing his petition in bankruptcy: B.dd, that the title being vested in him, the assignee must make sale and deposit proceeds of such goods subject to whatever claims may be determined by the court to be upon them.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Dey, Case No. 3,870; Re Carow, Id. 2,426; Re Mallory, Id. 8,991; Re Brink-man, Id. 1.884; Re Hufnagel, Id. 6,837; Thames v. Miller, Id. 13,860.)</p> <p>[Cited in Stuart v. Hines, 33 Iowa, 60.]</p>

Scire facias. The bail offered to surrender the principal. Thornton and Stickney jointly and severally recognized as bail for Blodget The writ against Thornton was returned “scire feci.” That against Stickney, “nihil.”

, [This was a bill in equity by Joseph L. Pennock against Horace A. Beale, for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a patent, and for an account.]

<p>This was an action on the case for the infringement of a patent right. The declaration states that the plaintiffs [Abraham L. Pennock and James Sellers] were the true and original inventors and discoverers of a certain new and useful improvement, in the art of making leather tubes or hose for conveying air, water, and other fluids; which improvement had not been known or used before the said invention by the plaintiffs. It then proceeds to state the steps taken to obtain a patent, as prescribed in the first section of the patent law [1 Stat. 318], and the granting of the patent on the 6th of July, 1818. Upon the plea of not guilty, the defendant [Adam Dialogue] gave a written notice to the plaintiffs, that he .should, at the trial, offer evidence tending to prove that the plaintiffs were not the original inventors of the thing patented, but that the same was known and in use before the supposed discovery of the plaintiffs.</p> <p>The specification sets forth that “the ordinary method of constructing leather tubes or hose, is by securing the two edges together by sewing or stitching. The improvement consists in lapping the edges of the leather so as to form a double thickness in that part, and then connecting them with metallic rivets and burs. The leather near both edges being perforated, rivets, having heads on one end, are inserted in the holes so formed along one edge first; the other edge of the leather is then lapped over and driven on the projected rivets. The rivets then being made through both edges, or thicknesses of the leather, burs of metal about the size and shape of the heads of the rivets, are then forcibly driven on their projecting ends, and secured there by hammering or compressing the ends so as to form heads. The rivets are inserted near each other in one or more rows as occasion may require, and the burs are so forcibly driven, as to bring the parts of the leather into complete and close contact, forming a durable, flexible, and water tight seam; the pressure of the fluid upon the inner lap or edge of the leather, increasing the tightness of the seam. In order to connect several pieces of leather, so as to form a tube or hose of any extent, the ends are cut in an oblique form, and are secured together by rivets and burs in the manner above described.’’</p> <p>The defendant’s counsel admitted that the defendant had made and used the rivet hose, as described in the specification, since the date of the plaintiffs’ patent, and that the invention was useful. They then gave evidence, tending to prove that the first specimen of hose was procured by the zeal and public spirit, and at the expense of the Philadelphia Hose Company in the year 1811; and that the plaintiffs were not only members of that company, but were on the experimental committees who were charged with the duty of inquiring into and procuring some improved mode of mailing them. That in that year, a certain quantity of hose was made by order of the committee for that company, by a certain Samuel Jenkins; who stated upon his examination, that he was taught by the plaintiffs in 1811, to make hose, and that by their permission, he made about thirteen thousand feet of hose for different hose companies, from the year 1811 to the time when the patent was granted. They also gave evidence that more than thirty years ago, one Andrews used harness, the parts of which were fastened by metallic rivets and burs. That in the year 1811, an Indian scabbard, used for containing a large knife, was brought to Philadelphia, and was shown to the president of the Philadelphia Hose Company. It was made of sole leather. the edges of which were united and fastened by lead rivets. That before the year 1S11, Mr. Bedford made a specimen of hose, in all respects resembling that claimed by the plaintiffs, except that the edges, which were lapped, were fastened by nails with the heads on the inner side, and clinched on the other. This specimen was placed in a domestic warehouse for public examination. Evidence was also given, by John Anderson, that in the year 1799, he, being one of the ship’s company of the ship Samuel Smith, made six or seven pieces of hose with scupper leather, and fastened with rivets and burs, which he applied to the scuppers of that ship to convey off the water from the deck; and that in the year 1802, he made another piece of hose in like manner, which he applied to a small fire engine for washing windows, as a substitute for a goose neck, and which was used frequently for the purpose for which it was designed, by the person for whom it was made, and by others.</p> <p>Upon this evidence the defendant’s counsel contended: (1) That the plaintiffs were not the true and original inventors of the improvement in question, but that the same was known and in use before their alleged discovery in 1811; the harness, the scabbard, and the hose constructed by Bedford, and by Anderson, being in principle the same as the patented improvement. That independent of this evidence, the specimen made by one of the plaintiffs was not the effect of the suggestions of either of the plaintiffs, but was brought into existence by the exertions, and at the expense, of the Philadelphia Hose Company; nor was the merit of the invention at any time asserted by the plaintiffs, or either of them. (2) That the patent cov-era two rows of rivets, whereas it is proved that another person suggested to the plaintiffs the two rows. (3) That the use of the improvement by the plaintiffs and others, prior to the application for the patent, avoids it under the first section of the patent law; which authorizes the granting of a patent to the true and original inventor of a machine, manufacture, &e. not known or used prior to his application; and that these expressions are not controlled by those to be found in the sixth section. 3 Inst. 183; 5 Bac. Abr. 591, 592; Gods. Pat. 60, 61, 64; Wood v. Zimmer, 1 Holt, N. P. 58. Thomas v. Knight [unreported], decided by Judge Van Nesse, Law Journal, published in Connecticut. (4) That the use by the public of this invention, from 1811 to the time when this patent was applied for, without opposition by the plaintiffs, amounted to an abandonment of their right, and a gift of their discovery to the public. Whittemore v. Cutter [Case No. 17,601]; Evans v. Eaton, 1 Pet. [26 U. S.] 348. Also, Pettibone v. Derringer [Case No. 11,043], in this court These points were all controverted with great ability by the plaintiffs’ counsel; who, upon the last point insisted, that an abandonment was not to be presumed in this case, inasmuch as it appeared that every foot of hose which had been made prior to-the date of the patent, was made by Jenkins, under the permission of the plaintiffs, who thereby retained their control over their discovery.</p>

<p>The bill in this case was filed [by William H. Pennoyer and Cornelia Pennoyer, his wife] to recover from the defendant [Henry] Shelden one-half of the rents and profits of the real estate of the late Abraham G. Thompson, from the time of his decease until the sale of the estate under certain trusts in his will. The plaintiff Cornelia, and the defendant [Edward G.] Thompson, were his sole heirs at law, and the defendant Shelden was the executor of the will. After devising certain legacies, and, among others, one of $100 to the plaintiff Cornelia, his granddaughter, the testator disposed of the rest of his estate, as follows: “All the rest and residue and remainder of my estate, real and personal, I give, devise and bequeath to my executors and trustees hereafter named, and to such of them as shall take upon themselves the execution of the trusts of this my will, and the survivors and survivor of them, in trust, to sell and convey my real estate, and to sell and dispose of my personal estate,” (with a special exception as to the time of disposing of certain of the real estate,) “and, having converted said real and personal estate into money, then to distribute and divide such residue and remainder of my estate as follows.” The testator then directs the proceeds to be divided into thirty-two equal parts, and gives them to certain benevolent institutions enumerated. The bill prayed for an account by Shelden of such rents and profits, and a decree in favor of the plaintiffs for the one-half of them. The defendant Shelden demurred to the bill.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,945.</p> <p>Salvage — Service by Passenger.</p> <p>1. The rule of maritime law that a passenger that has no opportunity to leave a vessel in distress cannot render a salvage service may admit of a qualified exception where he'has promoted her safety by an extraordinary and peculiar service which he was not compellable to render. But, in admitting such an exception in favor of a passenger, the greatest caution is necessary, and especially so where he is of the nautical pro-, fession.</p> <p>[Approving Towle v. The Great Eastern, Case No. 14,110.]</p> <p>2. Where a passenger of the nautical profession who has rendered such service afterwards assumed and exercised illegitimate authority over the vessel, though the circumstances were not such that he incurred an absolute forfeiture of the salvage compensation, its amount was nevertheless materially reduced by reason of such usurpation of authority.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,946.</p> <p>Collision in New Yoke Harbor — Vessel in Tow and Steamship — Failure to Keep Course.</p> <p>1. Boats in tow, and exclusively under the control of a steam-tug, are, as respects other vessels, to he considered vessels under steam.</p> <p>2. "Where a steamboat, having fourteen boats in tow, was coming up the Hudson river on a flood tide, and saw a steamship ahead, and about 2,000 feet off, coming down the river, presenting the bluff of her starboard bow, and blew two whistles as a signal to her to pass to her own left, and received no answer, and soon, seeing that the steamship had ported her helm, the steamboat, without altering her own helm, stopped, and reversed her engine, the effect of which, in the flood tide, was to cause the rear boats to spread out. so that they were thrown across the course of the steamship, which would otherwise have cleared them, but which struck the rear boat on the port side of the tow: Mdd, that if the steamship was seen directly ahead of the steamboat, and presenting the bluff of her starboard bow, as claimed by the steamboat, the vessels would have passed clear, if both had kept on. and that article 14 of the rules for avoiding collisions was, therefore, on that theory, not applicable to the case.</p> <p>3. If it were, it was also the duty of the steamboat, under article 18, to keep her course, and, having allowed her tow to spread out across the track of the steamship, she did not, in the sense of the statute, keep her course, and was negligent in so doing.</p> <p>4. The spreading out of the tow by the tide, was a necessary effect of her stopping, and was a special circumstance requiring a departure from article 16. if that article would otherwise have been applicable.</p> <p>5. Under article 20, the steamboat was liable for neglecting the precaution of keeping on without stopping.</p> <p>6. The steamship, having made the tow a little on her port bow. and having ported her helm, and having slackened her speed, and stopped and backed as soon as she saw, by the stopping of the steamboat, and the spreading out of her tow, that there was risk of collision, was not in fault.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,947.</p> <p>Collision at Sea — Steamer and Sailing Vessel-Speed in a Pog — Vessel Lying to.</p> <p>1. A bark was lying to near the George’s Banks under shortened sail, with her helm lashed three quarters to port, drifting about a mile an hour. It was very foggy, and a bell on board her was being struck, but no fog horn was blown. A steamer was approaching her nearly at right angles, running at a speed of seven knots an hour. As soon as the bell of the bark was heard, the helm of the steamer was put to port, then changed to starboard, and then again put to port, her engine having been stopped and reversed. She struck the bark amidships and sunk her: Bdd, that the bark was under way, and was bound to have been using a fog horn, instead of a bell.</p> <p>2. The use of the bell could not have misled or embarrassed the steamer, for the bell was the proper signal to announce the presence of a vessel. not in motion and incapable of getting out of the way, which was, substantially, the condition of the bark.</p> <p>8. On the evidence, the bell could be heard further than the fog horn.</p> <p>4. On the evidence, the bark had a proper lookout, and was not guilty of any fault which contributed to the collision.</p> <p>[Cited in The Atlas, Case No. 634.]</p> <p>5. It was the duty of the steamer to have reduced her speed to the lowest point, consistent with steerage way.</p> <p>6. On the evidence, it was not necessary for the steamer to have been running at the rate of seven knots an hour.</p> <p>[Cited in The City of Panama, Case No. 2,-764.]</p> <p>7. Her helm was negligently managed.</p> <p>8. She was liable for all the damages.</p> <p>[NOTE. Pursuant to the order of the court, a reference was had to a master to ascertain the value of the vessel at the time of her loss. The exceptions to the master’s report filed by claimant were overruled, and the report confirmed. Case No. 10,948. Subsequently an appeal was taken to the circuit court, where the decree of the district court rendered in this case was affirmed. Id. 10,950. On appeal to the supreme court, the decree of the circuit court was reversed, it being held that both vessels were in fault. 19 Wall. (80 U. S.) 125. Thereupon the claimants, not having alleged that they had sustained any damages by reason of the collision, moved in the circuit court for leave to amend their answer in that respect. The motion was granted. Case No. 10,951.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,949.</p> <p>Collision in North River — Tug and Tow-Lookout.</p> <p>Where a propeller came up the North river having in tow alongside a large float, extending some forty feet in front of the pilot-house of the propeller, on which were railroad cars thirteen feet high, whereby those on the propeller were prevented from seeing anything to starboard, unless at a considerable distance, and had no lookout on the front part of the float, and a collision occurred with a vessel in tow of a tug coming out from the piers: Mdd, that the propeller had no proper lookout; such a float alongside must be deemed part of the propeller, and it was the duty of the propeller to have a lookout upon it</p>

<p>[This was a libel by the owners of the bark Mary A. Troop against the Pennsylvania, to recover the value of the bark, which was sunk in a collision between the two vessels. A decree was rendered condemning the Pennsylvania, with a reference to a master to ascertain the value of the bark. Case No. 10,-947. The cause is now heard on exceptions to the master’s report.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,950.</p> <p>Collision — Rate op Speed in Fog — Steamer and Sailing Vessel — Fog Horn — Jurisdiction op Eastern District op New York — Value op Vessel.</p> <p>1. A steamship and a barque collided, in the Atlantic Ocean, within a day’s sail of New York, in the track of her inward and outward commerce, where the presence of other vessels was to be expected, in a fog so dense that a vessel could not be seen at a distance greater than the length of the barque. The steamer was going, at the time, at a speed of not less than seven miles an hour: Meld, that the steamer was in fault in going at such a rate of speed, and that such fault was a cause of the collision.</p> <p>[Cited in The Atlas, Case No. 634; Ellis v. The Katy Wise, Id. 4,404.]</p> <p>2. Her navigators were in fault, in giving conflicting and vacillating orders, after discovering the barque.</p> <p>3. The barque, although under way, was ringing a bell, and was not blowing a fog horn. That was a fault on her part, but, on the evidence, it was not a fault which contributed to the collision.</p> <p>4. The jurisdiction of the district court for the Eastern district of New York, in this case, sustained, although the vessel proceeded against was found and attached in the w’aters of the county of New York.</p> <p>5. The report of the commissioner as to the value of the libellant’s vessel, founded on conflicting or varying estimates, sustained.</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the supreme court the decree of this court was reversed, it being held that both vessels were in fault. 19 Wall. (86 ÍJ. S.) 125. Thereupon the claimants, not having alleged that they had suffered any damages by reason of the collision, moved in the circuit court for leave to amend their answer in that respect The motion was granted. Case No. 10,951.]</p>

In this case, this court, affirming the decision of the district court [Case No. 10,0-17], decreed in favor of the libellants [Id. 10,950]. The supreme court, on appeal (19 Wall. [86 U. S.] 125), held that both vessels were guilty of fault which contributed to the collision in question.

This was a criminal prosecution in the court of quarter sessions of Bucks county, against [Enos Artman and Henry W. Bach] officers of the United States appointed under the “Conscription Act,” for an alleged assault and battery. The case was certified by the state court, under the act of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. 756], to the circuit court of the United States, before indictment found.

<p>Case No. 10,952a.</p> <p>Collision — Vessels Meeting in East Riveb — Rule fob Passing.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,953.</p> <p>Constitutional Laiv— Buidges — Navigable Stkeam within a State.</p> <p>[1. The act of a state legislature providing for the bridging of a navigable stream within the state is not in conflict with the constitutional power of congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, unless in a case where congress has exercised that power by special enactment, and the state act is in conflict therewith.]</p> <p>[2. The state of New Jersey by its contract with the Delaware & Raritan Canal Company did not thereby disable itself from afterwards passing an act providing for the bridging of the Raritan river.]</p> <p>[See Easton v. New York & L. B. R. Co., Case No. 4,259.]</p>

This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain the defendants [Gugenheim, Dreifuss & Co.] from infringing letters patent granted for an “improvement in devices for putting up caustic alkalies,” granted to George Thompson, October 21, 1856, reissued to him April 16, 1867, in three divisions, Nos. 2569, 2570, and 2571, of which Nos. 2569 and 2571 were for “improvements in the manufacture of caustic alkalies,” and 2570 was for an “improved process of putting up caustic alkali.”…

This was a motion for preliminary injunction upon bill filed by complainants, praying an injunction and account for infringement of their letters patent Nos. 2,570 and 2,571 ■(reissue), alleged to have been committed in the Eastern district of Wisconsin. The defendant pleaded the pendency of a similar •suit in said district of Wisconsin, commenced August IS, 1S74, between the same parties, for the same infringement, and yet undetermined.

Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [by Pennsylvania Salt Manuf’g Co. against E. A. Thomas] upon letters patent for “improvement in devices for putting up caustic alkalies,” granted to George Thompson, October 21, 1856, and reissued to him in three divisions, Nos. 256U, 2570, and 2571, of which Nos. 2509 and 2571 were for “improvements in the manufacture of caustic alkali,” and No. 2570 was for an “improved process of putting up caustic alkali.” The nature of…

<p>Case No. 10,957.</p> <p>Bankruptct — Power op Court to Enjoin — Homestead Exemption — Joint Judgment— Termination of Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. The bankrupt court has jurisdiction to enjoin parties from proceeding to judgment and execution in a state court during the pendency of proceedings in bankruptcy.</p> <p>2. Where the declaration of bankruptcy has been suggested and not denied, the plaintiff is estopped from further proceeding with his suit in the absence of an order authorizing it.</p> <p>3. Although a conveyance by a father to his son may be void as to creditors on account of fraud, the father is not thus deprived of his right to an exemption out of the property for a homestead.</p> <p>4. A joint judgment against the bankrupt and a third party does not in any way affect the right of the plaintiff to proceed against the third party, even though enjoined from enforcing execution against the bankrupt.</p> <p>5. The jurisdiction of the bankrupt court ceases with the granting of a discharge, and the plaintiff may then apply direct to the state court for relief. Bill dismissed, each party to pay his own costs.</p> <p>[Cited in Adams v. Crittenden, 17 Fed. 45.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,959.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Setting Aside Adjudication — Dissolution of Corporation — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. On the 6th of February, 1875, a petition of the trustees of a corporation, praying for the dissolution of the corporation, with affidavits accompanying, was presented to the supreme court of the state of New York, and thereupon an order was made “that the said corporation be and the same is hereby dissolved and shall from henceforth cease and determine, except only that power is hereby reserved to the officers of said company to convey its property to the said receiver, as hereby directed.” No other order was made by the state court in that proceeding. On the 27th of February a voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed by the corporation, in the view that the proceeding in the state court had been without jurisdiction and was void. An as-signee in bankruptcy was appointed, and the proper steps were taken to vest him with the title to the property of the corporation. Creditors of the corporation, who claimed to have obtained liens by attachment of the property of the corporation, on the 15th of February) applied to have the adjudication in bankruptcy vacated, on the ground that the corporation had been dissolved before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy: Meld, that, in proceedings in regard to the voluntary dissolution of corporations, under the Revised Statutes of the State of New York (2 Rev. St. 466), no presumption of jurisdiction attends the judgment of the court, but the facts essential to the exercise of jurisdiction must appear upon the record of the court.</p> <p>2. The order of the state court dissolving the corporation, without a previous order to show cause, its publication, and the report of a master, as required by sections 61, 63, and 65 of the Revised Statutes, was without jurisdiction and was void.</p> <p>3. The application to vacate the adjudication must be denied.</p> <p>[NOTE. Subsequently a bill for an injunction was instituted by the Freeman's National Bank against O. Edgar Smith, assignee, in bankruptcy of the Pensacola Dumber Company. The injunction asked for was denied. Case No. 5,089.]</p>

<p>[This was a proceeding by Edward Pen-rose against Thomas B. Penrose. Heard on motion for an injunction.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,960.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Exclusive Privilege to Build Telegraph Lines — Conflict of Laws.</p> <p>1. The section of an act of a state legislature which purported to ¡five the exclusive right to a telegraph company, incorporated by it, to erect and use lines of telegraph within certain counties of the state, is in conflict with the act of congress approved July 24; 1866 [14 Stat. 221], entitled “An act to aid in the construction of telegraph lines, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military and other purposes;” and the section conferring such exclusive right is therefore null and void.</p> <p>[Cited in Com. v. Louisville Bridge Co., 42 Fed. 245; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 63 Fed. 519.]</p> <p>2. Congress has the constitutional power to pass an act giving to telegraph companies, organized under state laws, the right to construct and use lines of telegraph along any of the military or post roads of the United States.</p> <p>[NOTE. The decree in this case was affirmed upon appeal to the supreme court, Hr. Chief Justice Waite delivering the opinion; Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Hunt dissenting. 9G U. S. 1.1</p>

¡This was a libel by James Pent and others against the ship the Ocean Belle and cargo to recover salvage for services rendered.]

<p>Case No. 10:,96la.</p> <p>Salvage—Contracts or Consortship—Licensed Wreckers—Distribution of Salvage Money.</p> <p>[1. Contracts of consortship, if within reason, will be sustained when fully proven, hut the burden of proof is upon him who sets up an agreement materially changing the rights of sal-vors, and excluding, without just cause, any one who took partin rendering the service from sharing in the salvage award. Held, therefore, that where an alleged contract was set up, which was contrary to all principles of dividing salvage, but tiie evidence was insufficient to show a common understanding at the time it was entered into as to the terms thereof, the same would lie disregarded. and the salvage money divided according to the established rules.]</p> <p>[2. The law requiring vessels engaged in wrecking on the coast of Florida to have a wrecking license justifies the exclusion of unlicensed vessels from participating in a salvage service, and sharing in the award therefor, only when licensed vessels are present which are capable of rendering the required services, and i£ the services of unlicensed vessels are accepted, they are entitled to share in the compensation.]</p> <p>l'3; Where salvage services were rendered wholly by the crews of the vessels present, the vessels themselves being unable, from the peculiar circumstances, to participate therein, and being also in the aggregate of only 10 tons of measured tonnage, held, that the usual rule, giving one-half to the vessels and one-hall' to the men. should be varied, and that only two-fifths should be given to the vessels, and the other three-fifths divided among the crews.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of the petition of Frederick Pent-large and “William Beeston.]</p>

<p>[This was a hill in equity by Rafael Pent-large against William R. Beeston and Frederick Pentlarge for infringement of certain letters patent.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Rafael Pent-large against William It. Beeston and Frederick Pentlarge for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 5,937, granted plaintiff June 30, 1S74, the original letters patent, No. 14S.747, having been granted March 17, 1S74.]

<p>Case No. 10,965a.</p> <p>Patents — Preliminary Injunction — Threats.</p> <p>In a suit for the infringement of a patent the court will not grant a motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendant from threatening to bring suits upon his patent before it is adjudged invalid, and the injunction will not he granted where the court has held the defendant’s patent invalid, but the adjudication has been set aside upon an agreement of compromise between the parties.</p> <p>[See note to Case No. 10,963.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,964a.</p> <p>Patent — Preliminary Injunction — Improvement in Bungs.</p> <p>[NOTE. In this case a decree was subsequently entered dismissing the bill. 20 Fed. 314. For other cases involving this same nat-ent, see Cases Nos. 10,903, 10,904, and 10,902; 1 Fed. 802; 19 Fed. 817.]</p>

Debt by the plaintiff as assignee of a promissory note made by the defendant. Mr. Youngs, for defendant, offered to read a deposition which had been taken under the act of congress, without notice, before Judge Darker, in Virginia, who certified that it was written by himself, and subscribed and sworn to by the deponent, and that the deponent resided more than one hundred miles from the county of Alexandria, and District of Columbia.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 10,971.</p> <p>BiMKiirpTO' — Fokmer Slut — Estoppel.</p> <p>B. proved a claim against a bankrupt. Before the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced, the bankrupt had sued B. for a debt, and B. had set up said claim in defence, as a distinct cause of action against the bankrupt. Tbe suit was tried after the adjudication of bankruptcy, and, on the trial, B. offered no evidence in support of such defence, and the bankrupt had judgment against B. The. assignee in bankruptcy was not a party to the suit. He set up the judgment as an estoppel against the proving of the claim by B.: Held, that it was not an estoppel.</p>

At the April term, 1879, the question of the validity of the bonds of the defendant county arose on a demurrer to the answer in the case of Pepper v. Saline Co.

[This was a bill in equity by Gregory A. Perdiearies against the Charleston Gaslight Company.) On the 30th August, 1801, the Confederate states passed an act in retaliation for the act of the 6th August of the United States, sequestrating, with few exceptions, the property of loyal citizens found within their territory.

Perdicaris, a citizen of a state adhering to the United States in the Civil War, was a stockholder in the Charleston Gaslight Company. During the war his stock was seized as that of an alien enemy, by virtue of an act of- the Confederate congress for the sequestration of the property of such persons, and was duly sold tinder a decree of the district court of the Confederate states for the district of South Carolina, by the receiver, as required by law.

In this case on the 24th of April, 1860, the vendor, Wm. L. Mitchell, now deceased, sold to the vendee, Lindsey Perdue, six hundred and forty acres of land, in Meriwether county, Georgia, for eight thousand eight hundred dollars, receiving in exchange, by way of payment therefor, another tract of land in said county, at the value and price of five thousand one hundred dollars, and taking notes for the balance of the purchase money, to wit: three thousand seven hundred…

<p>[This was a bill in equity by John W. Derogo and others against John N. Bone-steel. Henry E. Bonesteel, and Joseph Cary, charging a fraudulent assignment.]</p>

<p>Case No. 10,977.</p> <p>Garnishment — Assignee under Fraudulent Assignment — Property Turned over to Receiver.</p> <p>1. In Wisconsin an assignee under a fraudulent assignment may be made a garnishee in attachment proceedings, and it is immaterial how the property came into his hands, so it be property liable to seizure by attachment.</p> <p>2. If the garnishee afterwards turns over property to a receiver appointed under a creditors’ bill filed by another creditor, the court will protect him by ordering the proceeds of such property paid to the creditors to whom he was first liable as garnishee.</p>

A French manufacturing corporation shipped plate glass by steamer from Havre to tlieir agents in New York, tinder a bill of lading, which, by its terms, exempted the ship from liability for breakage. There were fifty cases of different sizes, some very large.

This was an action brought [by B. F. Pere-les] upon certain bonds of the city of Water-town bearing date on the 1st day of August, 1853, and due and payable on the 1st day of August, 1803, bearing interest at the rate of 8 per cent., payable semi-annually according to interest warrants or coupons attached. 1.

<p>[This was an action in bankruptcy by the Perm & Gaff Manufacturing Company and others against John A. Peale.]</p>

This was a petition by John A. King and Newton S. Taylor, creditors of the State Insurance Company, bankrupt, filed under the second section of the bankrupt act, to review an order of the district court refusing to remove Norman C. Perkins, assignee of the State Insurance Company of Chicago, bankrupt.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[These were bills in equity by Angier M. Perkins and Jacob Perkins against Solomon H. Currier and Nathaniel Perkins, executors of Abraham Perkins, and the same plaintiffs against Hazen Morse, Isaac Cary, and Vistus Balch, in addition to the same- defendants.] They related .to the same transaction, but the latter part of it, after 1833, included additional respondents. These last were proceeded against in a second bill.

This was a libel in personam, promoted by George Perkins, Jr., claiming freight for certain merchandize belonging to the respondent f.l ohn S. Hill], on a voyage from Boston to Havana, on board the schooner Austin, of which the libellant was master and part owner.

This was an appeal from the decree of the district court, dismissing the following libel. [Case No. 10,980.] It was one purporting to claim compensation for the freight of certain merchandise belonging to the respondent [John S. Hill] on board the schooner Austin, from Boston to Havana, commanded and partly owned by the libellant [George Perkins, Jr.].

<p>Case No. 10,988.</p> <p>PARTIES — PLEADING—CODE CONSTRUED.</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] This was an action like the one reported and described in the preceding case [of McGlinehy v. United States, Case No. 8,803). The case was removed to this court by the same processes, and the same reasons assigned for setting aside the verdict in the district court. [Case unreported.]

[Action by Henry Perkins against the city of Watertown.] This was a motion on behalf of the city to dismiss five suits pending, brought on bonds of the city, on the ground of insufficiency of service.

[In the matter of Daniel J. Perley, a bankrupt.] This was a case of voluntary bankruptcy. Bankrupt resides at Oldtown; a physician. His petition was filed March 3, 1S43, the day •of the repeal of the bankrupt act [5 Stat. ■614]. Objections were filed by certain of his creditors, alleging: (1) Fraud, and willful concealment'of property. (2) Preference of certain creditors.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.] This was an action [against Perots and Chamberlain] brought by the United States, in the district court, to recover the additional duties on a cargo, imported into the United States, from the British East Indies, in the year 1812. Upon a special verdict [case unreported], the district court gave judgment against the defendants, who removed the cause, by writ of error, into this court.

[This was a motion for an injunction against the defendant on a bill in equity under letters patent granted to one Birdsall. to enjoin the use of an infringing machine. Prior to this the patentee Birdsall had sued the makers and vendors of the defendant's machine and recovered from them their gains and profits for all machines made and sold by them, among which was the defendant's machine.

<p>Case No. 10,995.</p> <p>Mortgage. — Void in* Part — Payment of Consideration — Recording—Bankruptcy.</p> <p>1. A mortgage covering “a stock of lumber and moldings, and all renewals thereof from time to time,” and other property, although void as to the lumber and moldings, may still be valid as to the other property.</p> <p>2. Although the mortgage was recorded only the day before the petition in bankruptcy was filed, the evidence showed that the consideration did not pass until the mortgage was recorded. Meld, that the transaction was an inchoate one. not consummated until the mortgage was recorded, hut still, in point of time, a unit; being marked by good faith, the consideration ought to be regarded as passing when the mortgage was recorded. The court further held that the proceeds of the sale of the property, other than moldings and lumber, must he applied on the amount due on the mortgage.</p> <p>[Cited in Sparhawk v. Richards, Case No. 13,-205; Clark v. Hezekiah, 24 Fed. 667.]</p> <p>[Cited in Cook v. Whipple, 55 N. Y. 156.]</p>

<p>[This was an action by Orlando Perrine against the town of Thompson.]</p>

The plaintiff in this cause had a mortgage on a building in Beresford street, and instituted proper proceedings to foreclose the same, in the course of which, after the decree of foreclosure, the house was taken possession of by the defendant, as marshal of this court, in order to hold it until the day of sale.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Perry & Allen, bankrupts.]</p>

Indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received by defendant [James Barry] to the use of the bankrupt [Nantes, surviving partner of R. Muilman & Co.], and of the plaintiffs as his assignees. Hadfield. of London, held a protested bill for 819,000, drawn by Browne, of Richmond, Virginia, and assigned it to Muilman & Co., of London, for collection, who employed Barry (the defendant) as their agent to collect it. Muilman & Co. became bankrupt.

[This was an appeal by Alonzo D. Perry from a decision of the commissioner of patents, in interference, awarding priority to Samuel G. Cornell in respect to an invention of an improvement in machines for making lead pipe.]

The bill in this case alleged the infringement, by the manufacture and sale of stoves, of letters patent granted by the United States, and owned by the plaintiff [John S. Perry, trustee and executor].

This was a demurrer to a bill in equity. The bill alleged, that one Dennis G. Little-field was the inventor of an improvement in stoves and received letters patent [No. 8,047] therefor, dated April 15th, 1851; that he made a further improvement, called a “supplying cylinder,” for. which he received letters patent December 30th, 1852; that, on the 5th of April, 1853, he entered into a contract with the firm of Treadwell & Perry, whereby he “did assign and transfer to the said…

This suit was brought by the assignees of Nantes, surviving partner of Muilman & Company [against Crammond and others, executors of Cay, surviving partner of Clow & Cay], to recover £18,000 sterling, the amount .of forty-seven bills of exchange, with damages at the rate of twenty per cent.

This was a petition in bankruptcy, under the act of 1S67, praying that Wm. H. Langley be declared a bankrupt. The only distinct act of bankruptcy alleged in the petition is that Langley, then being largely insolvent, on the 25th day of May, 1867, executed an assignment of all his property to two assignees, jnuned in trust for the benefit of all his creditors.

<p>Case No. 11,008.</p> <p>Patents — Assignment—Equity—Demurrer— Decree or Transfer.</p> <p>1. The decision of the supreme court in Lit-tlefield t. Perry, 21 Wall. L8S U. S.] 205, construed.</p> <p>2. The invention covered by the claim of the letters patent [No. 4,000] re-issued to Dennis G. Littlefield, May 31st, 1S70, for an “improvement in the mode of hinging covers to stoves, tea-kettles and other open-topped vessels,” on the surrender of the original letters patent [No. 53.251] granted to said Littlefield, March 13th,' 1866, namely, “a detachable cover and its seat, respectively provided with a pin and an opening, so constructed as to engage or lock with •each other, tor the purpose of hinging and securing a cover upon an open-topped vessel, .substantially as described,” is an invention the exclusive right to which for the states of New York and Connecticut, as applicable to stoves covered by the patents embraced in the assignment of April 5th. 1853. and in the supplemental agreement of the same date, referred to in Littlefield v. Perry [supra], belongs to the plaintiff, as against Littlefield and all persons claiming under him. .</p> <p>3. A bill in equity being maintainable in some respects, a demurrer to the whole bill was overruled.</p> <p>4. The parties to the suit being all of them citizens of New York, this court has no power to decree that the defendant execute to the plaintiff a transfer of letters patent.</p>

This was a motion by [P. W. Perry] the supervisor for a rule against the defendant [Daniel R. Newsome], who is clerk of the North Carolina Railroad, having custody of the books of said company, for failing and refusing; to produce certain books and papers belonging; to the company for examination by the supervisors, as provided in section 49, of the act of July 20, 1SG8.

This was a bill in equity [by William Perry and others, against Betsy Parker and others] praying an injunction against the respondents not to cut down the dam and gates of the complainants, on Johnson’s brook, in Bradford, in this state.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by John S. Perry and others against George Starrett]</p>

<p>[This was a libel by Theodore Perry & Co. against Elkanah Bangs for the nondelivery of certain goods.]</p>

[This was an action by the Perry Manufacturing Company against Brown, Harris, and others.) In each of these cases, Francis Skinner and. four others were summoned as trustees, described as “partners in trade, under the firm of Francis Skinner & Co.,” and notified in the writ that they were “summoned as such partnership, and not as individuals.” At the return day, their counsel entered five separate appearances, and filed five separate general answers, by attorney, in each…

This was assumpsit on a promissory note made by the principals to the plaintiff, and payable in New York, for $1,481.07. The plaintiffs were incorporated by the laws of ltliode Island, and were doing business at Newport, in that state. The defendants [Brown and others and the Western Kail-road trustees] who were principals, resided in Massachusetts, and were defaulted; and the railroad, which was sued as trustee, was incorporated and doing business in the same state.

This was a libel in rem, against the brig Pereeverance. The libel set forth that the libellant advanced $4,500 to one Thompson, at his request, to enable him to purchase the brig, and, on the purchase, took from him, as security, the bill of sale executed by the former owners to Thompson, and also a power of attorney constituting the libellant the irrevocable attorney of Thompson, to transfer tlie vessel by a bill of sale; that an indenture was at the same time entered into…

<p>Case No. 11,016.</p> <p>Bottomry Bond — Lien, when Lost.</p>

[This was a libel for breach of charter party by tbe government of Peru against the ship North America (Cornell and others, claimants). Heard on claimants' motion for a discharge upon giving bail for $40,000.]

Libel in personam, by McMorraw and Fitzgerald, owners of the schooner St. Andrew, against one Dunham, owner of the schooner Peshtigo. to recover damages brought about by a collision of those vessels.

<p>Case No, 11,022.</p> <p>Admiralty — Re-examination of Master on Standing Interrogatories — Right of Witness to Modify or Enlarge Testimony.</p> <p>1. Under the special circumstances of this case the master of the vessel, who had been examined as a witness in preparatorio; was allowed, on the application of the claimants, to be reexamined on one of the standing interrogatories, on condition that he should at the same time be examined, on certain special interrogatories framed by the court.</p> <p>2. By the regular course of procedure in a prize suit, a witness cannot claim a right to modify or enlarge his testimony after it has been formally completed and submitted to the court.</p> <p>[NOTE. Subsequently the vessel and cargo were condemned. Case No. 11,023. A final decree of forfeiture was entered against the vessel and cargo. Id. 11.024. Appeal was then taken to the supreme court where this decree was reversed, except as to a portion of the cargo. 5 Wall. (72 U. S.l 28. Pending the appeal in the supreme court, the district court refused to order the costs of the prize commissioner to be paid out of the funds of this case, holding that the appeal removed the cause from that court, and placed the prize property exclusively under the control of the appellate court. Id. 11,025.)</p>

[In admiralty. A motion to have the master of the vessel re-examined was allowed on condition that he should be examined at the same time on certain special interrogatories.. Case No. 11,022. It is now heard on pleadings and proofs.)

<p>Case No. 11,024.</p> <p>Prize — Examination op Witnesses and Cargo— Evidence — Neutral Vessel and Neutral Port — Contraband op War — Resistance to Visitation and Search — Spoliation or Papers.</p> <p>1. On motion of the district attorney, acting under instructions from the government, a mail bag, under the official seal of the general post-office of Great Britain, found on board of the prize vessel, was ordered by the court to be delivered to the district attorney, to be by him disposed of conformably to the instructions of the government.</p> <p>2. The attorney for the United States is, by law, official master of suits prosecuted by the United States in the prize court, and has authority, at his discretion, to offer to or withhold from the consideration of the court any particular of testimony relative to a prize suit in prosecution in court, under his discretion.</p> <p>[Cited in Confiscation Cases. 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 457.]</p> <p>3. In this case the court made an order for the unlading, opening, and examination of the cargo, to ascertain its nature and quality.</p> <p>4. The court refused to allow a witness, who was a passenger on the prize vessel, and who had been examined in preparatorio, to be reexamined for the purpose of showing his personal loyalty, on the ground that the question of his individual loyalty or disloyalty was of no importance, and that his political status was shown to be that of an enemy.</p> <p>5. Under the special circumstances of this case the court permitted the master of the prize vessel to be re-examined on the standing interrogatory as to the destruction of papers, and ordered him to be at the same time examined on three special interrogatories framed by the court, although the testimony of all the witnesses had been filed in court and an order made that the proofs be opened. [Case No. 11,022.]</p> <p>6. The court struck out from the testimony of the master, as irrelevant, a statement made by him as to another witness, which was not responsive to any part of the standing interrogatories.</p> <p>7. A prize commissioner has no right to put to a witness any interrogatories except the standing ones, or those specially framed by the court for the particular case.</p> <p>S. The court rejected, as evidence, a statement made on the record by the prize commissioner in regard to the reluctance of a witness to answ'er.</p> <p>9. A document produced for the first time at the hearing, and forming no part of the depositions in the case, is not admissible in evidence.</p> <p>10. Although'such document, if properly put in evidence, would be regarded by the court fs a very material piece of evidence against the vessel and her cargo, yet the court did not, upon the proofs in the case, entertain any such doubt upon the question of condemning the vessel and cargo, as to make it proper to direct an order for further proof in order to permit the introduction in evidence of the document.</p> <p>11. In prize oases, the court of that district into which the property is carried and proceeded against, has jurisdiction.</p> <p>12. The mere carrying of a vessel, or of her cargo, seized on the high seas as prize of war, into any particular district, without the institution there of any proceedings in prize, caunoi affect or take away the jurisdiction over the property of the district court of another district, in which the proceedings against the property may be instituted after the property has been carried into such other district.</p> <p>13. A neutral vessel, laden with a neutral cargo. may lawfully trade between neutral ports, in time of war, in all descriptions of "merchandize, contraband or otherwise, without being liable to seizure by a belligerent.</p> <p>14. But a seizure is justifiable if a vessel be engaged in carrying contraband of war Tor or to the enemy, or to the port of the enemy; and all contraband goods, even though belonging to neutrals and found in neutral bottoms, are liable to capture and condemnation, if seized by a belligerent while on a destination for the uses of the enemy of such belligerent.</p> <p>15. The principles announced by this court in the cases of the Stephen Hart [Case No. 13,-364] and The Springbok [Id. 18.2G4J. affirmed.</p> <p>16. A prize court will not shut its eyes to a well known and obvious system of conducting trade with the enemy in contraband articles.</p> <p>17. Effect of a claim put into prize property by underwriters who had insured it against capture.</p> <p>18. A person who was a citizen of the United States, residing in Texas at the time of the breaking out of the war. and has never owed any allegiance to any foreign country, is to be regarded as a citizen of the enemy’s country, in prize proceedings, and cannot appear as a claimant in them, because he has no persona standi in court.</p> <p>19. Implements and munitions of war which, in their actual condition, are of immediate use for warlike purposes, are to be deemed contraband whenever they are destined to the enemy’s country or to the enemy’s use.</p> <p>20. All military equipments and military clothing are regarded as contraband articles. In England all manufactured articles which, in their natural state, are fitted for military use, or for building and equipping ships-of-war. among which' articles cordage is included, are contraband in their own nature.</p> <p>21. The probable use of articles is inferred from their destination; and if articles capable of military use are going to a place where any need of their employment in military use exists, it will be presumed that they are going for military use, although it is possible that they might have been applied to civil consumption.</p> <p>22. In this case the vessel, although ostensibly on a voyage from London to neutral waters at the mouth of the Rio Grande, was laden with a cargo composed largely of articles contraband of war, which were not designed, on their departure from England, to be sold or disposed of in the neutral market of Matamoras, but were designed to be delivered, either directly, or indirectly by trans-shipment, in the Country of the enemy and for the use of the enemy.</p> <p>23. The refusal of the master of a neutral merchant vessel to permit the papers of his vessel to be taken on board of a belligerent cruiser when demanded, to be there examined by the commander of the cruiser, especially after those papers have been already so far examined on board of the merchant vessel, by a_ subordinate officer from the cruiser, as to excite suspicion concerning their regularity, is, on the part of the neutral master, a resistance to the right of visitation and search, even though he offers his papers for examination on board of his own vessel, and his vessel for search.</p> <p>24. Papers on board of the vessel were destroyed at the time of her capture, some by being burned and some by being thrown overboard by order of the master.</p> <p>25. False evidence .by the master as to the destruction of the papers.</p> <p>26. The spoliation of papers on board of a neutral vessel, when overhauled by a belligerent cruiser, is of itself a strong circumstance of suspicion.</p> <p>27. In England and in- the United States spoliation of papers is not held to furnish of itself sufficient ground for a condemnation, but to be a circumstance open to explanation; yet, if the explanation be not prompt or frank, or be weak and futile, if the case labors under heavy suspicions, cr if there be a vehement presumption of bad faith or gross prevarication, it is ground for the denial of further proof, and condemnation ensues from defects in the. evidence, which the party is not permitted to supply.</p> <p>28. Deficiencies in the manifest in respect to the contraband articles on board.</p> <p>29. The absence of invoices as to some of the contraband articles.</p> <p>30. Defects in the bills of lading.</p> <p>31. Character and quantity of the contraband portion of the cargo.</p> <p>32. Character and status of some of the passengers on the vessel.</p> <p>33. Notwithstanding the ostensible destination of the vessel to neutral waters at the mouth of the Rio Grande, the evidence establishes the actual hostile destination of the cargo.</p> <p>34. All the claimants of the vessel and cargo had on board contraband articles, which were destined to be delivered directly, or indirectly by trans-shipment, into the enemy’s country, and for the use of the enemy.</p> <p>35. When contraband articles, destined for the use of the enemy, are found on board of a vessel, all other goods on board of that vessel belonging to the owner of the contraband articles, even those goods which are innocent, must share the fate of the contraband goods.</p> <p>36. Whether the English doctrine is sound that contraband goods are liable to capture, even though destined to a neutral port, if found entering waters common to both the neutral port and a hostile port. Quere.</p> <p>37. Where the vessel belongs to the owner of the contraband articles, or where there are circumstances of fraud as to the papers, or the destination of the papers or the cargo, and thus an attempt, under colorable appearances to defeat the rights of a belligerent, the vessel which carries the contraband articles will be condemned, and the penalty on the vessel will not be limited merely to a loss of freight and expenses.</p> <p>38. So, too, the vessel will be condemned not only where her owner is privy to the carriage of contraband, but where the master of the vessel. as the agent of such owner, interposes so actively in the fraud as to consent to give additional color to it by sailing with false papers,</p> <p>39. So, also, if the owner of a vessel places it under the control of a master who permits it to carry, under false papers, contraband goods ostensibly destined to a neutral port, but in reality going to the country of the enemy, he must sustain the consequence of such misconduct on the part of his agent.</p> <p>40. A neutral owner of a vessel is, as a general rule, held responsible for all the acts -of the master of his vessel committed in violation of the rights of a belligerent.</p> <p>41. A master is, in time of war, bound to know the contents of his cargo, and cannot be permitted to aver his ignorance of the contents of contraband packages on board of his vessel.</p> <p>42. From the moment a vessel, having on board contraband articles, which have a destination to the enemy’s country, leaves her port of departure, she may be legally captured, and it is not necessary to wait until the goods are actually endeavoring to enter the enemy’s country, the penalty attaching the moment the illegal transportation commences.</p> <p>[43. Cited in Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 687, to the point that the court will take judicial notice of. the situation of a town in a foreign country, and that a bar exists at the month of the river at which it lies, which vessels of the draught of the vessel libeled cannot cross.]</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the supreme court the decree of this court was reversed, except as to a part of the cargo, and as to that affirmed. 5 Wall. (72 U. S.) 28. Pending the appeal in the supreme court, the district court refused to order the costs of the prize commissioner to be paid out of the funds of this case, holding that the appeal removed the cause from that court, and placed the prize property exclusively under the control of the appellate court. Case No. 11,025.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,025.</p> <p>Appeal in Pkize Cases — Effect upon the Property — Cases Pending Appeal — Capture on Land — Title.</p> <p>1. An appeal to the supreme court from the decree of this court in a prize cause removes the cause from this court, and places the prize property exclusively under the control of the appellate tribunal.</p> <p>2. Tending such an appeal, this court refuses-to order the costs of the prize commissioner to-be paid out of the funds in this case.</p> <p>3. The distinction stated between the effects of a capture of property on land by a belligerent and of a capture of prize property at sea.</p> <p>4. In the former case the title passes as soon, as the capture is complete. In the latter the right of property remains unchanged until a final decree of condemnation by the courts of the-country of the captors. ■</p>

Heard on motion to dissolve attachment. The plaintiff [W. S. Peterkin] being the holder of certain bonds issued by the city of New Orleans in aid of the Opelousas Railroad and of the Jackson Railroad, and the bonds having become due and remaining unpaid, had reduced the same to judgment in this court.

This is a petition by F. W. Peters for a writ of habeas corpus. The indictment on which petitioner was convicted in the district court of the United States, contains four counts. The first count charges that Peters, on the 2Sth day of October, 1874, did forcibly break into the post-office at Bucklin, Linn county, Missouri, with the intent to commit larceny therein.

[This was a bill in equity by W. Y. Elliott*, administrator with the will annexed of Jonathan Bostick, and D. W. Bowman, against J. R. Chalmers and wife, George B. Peters and others, to enforce a vendor’s lien upon real estate. The defendants Chalmers and wife and Peters filed a cross. bill, praying rescission of contract of sale, and for the ■declaration of a lien in their favor on account of certain money paid by them, and for improvements made by them.

[This was a bill in equity by W. Y. Elliott, administrator with the will annexed of Jonathan Bostick, and D. W. Bowman, against J. R. Chalmers and wife, George B. Peters, and others, to enforce a vendor’s lien upon real estate. A cross-bill was filed by some of the defendants, and a demurrer thereto was sustained at the June term, 1864. See Case No. 11.02S. The cause is now submitted for final hearing upon the bill, amended bill, answers, exhibits, and proofs.]

This was a bill filed to obtain an injunction against proceeding in certain actions of ejectment commenced in this court. The bill stated that the defendants had commenced ninety-two suits in ejectment against the complainants, and that the plaintiff, the lessors of the plaintiff, the defendants, and the declarations filed, were the same in each cause. That the title of the plaintiffs and of tlie defendants in each cause was the same.

This was the complaint of Captain Henry Peters, of the ship Limerick Lass, an American vessel, against J. G. Martens, steward of said vessel, setting forth charges of insubordination against the latter. The defendant was brought to this port in irons, from Bremerhaven, under consular orders. The testimony on the part of the captain •showed that the steward was drunk several times, had used offensive language, and had struck the captain.

[This was an action of indebitatus assump-sit by John Peters and others against Zebe-diah Rogers and trustee.] The only question was, whether the trustee was, upon his disclosure, answerable. Held: that they were not inclined to give a larger operation to the statute than its words clearly import.

This cause was formerly before this court, and the report thereof will be found in Peters v. Warren Ins. Co. [Case No. 11,035]. It now came again before the court at this term, upon exceptions filed to the report of the auditor, to whom it had been referred to ascertain and adjust the loss, which the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.

[3 Sumn. 389; 1 1 Law Rep. 281; 1 Hunt, Mer. Mag. 67.] This was a case on a policy of insurance, dated the first day of April, 1836, whereby the defendants insured the plaintiffs, for whom it may concern, payable to them, eight thousand dollars'on the ship Paragon, for the term of one year, commencing the risk on the 15th day of March, 1836, at noon, at a premium of five per cent.

This was an information in the district court, for a violation of the fourth section of the act for registering and recording ships or vessels, &c., passed in 1792, in which the oath stated in the section is set forth; and it is asserted that an alien, viz. Don Bass. Rod-erigues, a subject of Spain, was, at the time the vessel was registered, interested in her. The jury found a verdict .to the following effect: That Bass.

This was an action in personam, by [John Peterson,] a seaman against [George Watson,] the master of a vessel, for an assault and battery at sea. The respondent appeared, and, by his answer, denied the allegations of the libel imputing to him tortious conduct, and justified his acts as a legal exercise of authority. Proofs were taken on both sides.

<p>Case No. 11,038.</p> <p>Patents — Claim Exceeding the Invention— Failure to Set Forth Improvement in Declaration — Demurrer.</p> <p>1. If the patentee claims more than he has invented, his patent is not void.- as under the former law; but, so far as his invention goes, he is protected.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Rheem v. Holliday, 16 Pa. St. 350.]</p> <p>2. But where the claim is for an improvement of a machine, the patentee must show in what the improvement consists.</p> <p>3. In a declaration, the improvement must be stated as an essential part of the plaintiff’s right; and if this he not done the declaration is demurrable.</p>

On petition to remove cause from New Jersey supreme court. Before August 6,1879, plaintiff had filed three replications to three pleas. August 6, before issue, plaintiff gave notice of trial at September term in Hudson county. August 29 the supreme court judge ordered that plaintiff make election as to issues. The ease was noticed for December term. December 2, a petition for removal was presented by defendant; the judge declined to make the order and tried the cause.

<p>Case No. 11,041.</p> <p>JumsnicTiox — Suits eetween Aliens — Citizenship op Coupon AT JONS.</p> <p>1. The act of congress of 1798 [1 Stat. 5701, read, as it must be, in connection with section 2. art. 3, of the constitution, does not confer jurisdiction to the United States circuit court over controversies between aliens, but between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. Montalet v. Murray, 4 Cranch [8 U. S.j 46. recognized.</p> <p>2. As respects rights of action and liability to suit, a corporation will be regarded as a citizen of the state by which it was created. That the defendant corporation has an office and is transacting business here is unimportant. A corporation cannot migrate.</p> <p>3. The defendants’ offices in Philadelphia render them liable to suit here ii any court having jurisdiction of the parties and the controversy; but, as this court has not, the writs must be quashed.</p>

[These were actions at law by Peter G. Petterson against William P. Chapman, Henry P. Chapman, and Alfred Woodbridge, and by Morton Brownson and Charles Ennis, executors, etc., against the same defendants, for the conversion of certain securities belonging to the plaintiffs. Heard on motion to remand the causes to the state court.]

This was an action on the case for an infringement of the plaintiff’s patent for “a new and useful improvement in boring muskets, pistols and rifles, by an auger called the ‘spiral groove’ or ‘twisted screw’ auger.” The specification states that this auger consists in the manner of making it, or the particular form or construction of the same, as also the mode of application.

[This was a bill in equity by William Pet-tilon and others against William T. Noble and others, to restrain the negotiation of certain notes Heard on motion to remand the cause to the state court,]

This was a libel in personam for an assault and battery on the high seas. The libel-lant shipped as steward, in October, 1841, on board the barque Massasoit, of Bath, for a whaling voyage. He was, in the language of seamen, a green hand; that is, it was his first voyage as a seaman. For the first two weeks he was so much affected by sea-sickness as to be unable to perform his duty.

In admiralty. The libellant [Charles W. Pettit] and John H. Wemple were owners of the steamer Chas. Hemje, Wemple being managing owner. Wemple becoming embarrassed, gave a mortgage to the Home Savings Bank upon various interests that he owned in different vessels, his interest in the Chas. Hemje among the number, to secure it for large advances made by it to him to enable him to carry on the many different branches of business in -which he was engaged.

In this case the bankrupt applied for an order staying the execution of an issue against his body, upon a judgment obtained against him by Richard J. Connor and Charles .T. Richardson, of the city of New York. This motion was opposed on the ground that the judgment was obtained for a debt created by the fraud of the bankrupt. The application was denied.

<p>Case No. 11,047.</p>

Heard upon motion to dismiss the suit, on the ground that it had been improperly removed from the state court.

This was an appeal by the respondents [Henry B. Merrill and others] from a decree of the district court, in a case of collision. in which the libellants’ vessel, the schooner Mary Eveline [John W. Petty and others, owners], was damaged.

<p>Case No. 11,051.</p> <p>Admiralty — Uhiiearikg.</p> <p>A collision occurred between two vessels, the M. and the E. The libellants, as owners oí the M., brought this suit, in personam, in the district court i'or this district, against the owners of the E.. to recover for damages caused by such collision, claiming $2,100. The owners of the E. sued the M.. in reni, in the district court for the Southern district of New York, claiming to recover $3,480.37, as damages caused by the collision. Both suits were tried together, on the same proofs, before the same judge, in the district court. In this suit, the libellants had a decree for $1,695.92. The libel in the other suit was dismissed. The owners of the E. appealed to circuit court, in each suit The decree in the suit in the Southern district was directed to be affirmed in November, 3870, and the formal decree of affirmance was entered in February, 1871. In the latter month the owners of the E. appealed from that decree to the supreme court, In November, 1871, the appeal in this suit was heard by the circuit court, and, on the 8th of March, 1872, the libellants had a decree therein, in this court, for $1,292.81. In the latter month, the owners of the E. appealed from that decree to the supreme court. That court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Afterwards, that court, on the merits, reversed the decree of the circuit court for the Southern district dismissing the libel in the suit in that district. The respondents in this suit, in .rune. 1873. moved this court for a rehearing of this suit: Eclil, that the motion must be denied.</p>

The question certified to the court is whether the claimant is entitled to priority in the distribution of the assets as for wages due to him as an operative. He was employed for a year at a salary of nine hundred dollars, but, owing to the insolvency and suspension of his employers, the bankrupts [Warren E. Pevear and William La Croix] was discharged at the expiration of six months.

<p>Case No. 11,052.</p> <p>Collision' — Vessels at Anchor.</p> <p>1. The brig O. and the hark P. were lying at anchor in a harbor at a safe distance apart. The anchor of the P„ which was the windward vessel, dragged till she was near the O., when a second anchor was dropped, which held her so that the vessels were still at a safe distance apart. But afterwards, when the P. undertook to remove from that place, she was brought in contact with the O., doing her some damage. The P. claimed that her anchor was fouled, which caused her dragging, and that the coming in contact, when the P. attempted to remove, was inevitable, under the circumstances then existing. Held, that the P. was in fault for dragging, and that her watch was in fault, in not sooner discovering that she was dragging, and dropping the second anchor.</p> <p>2. The P. took the risk of attempting to remove when she did from the place where she was held by the second anchor; and she was liable for the damages.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,054.</p> <p>Prize — Condemnation.</p> <p>The vessel having been chased at sea while attempting to break the blockade and driven on shore in the enemy’s territory and captured, with her cargo, and wrecked after capture, a part of her cargo having been brought into this district, was condemned as prize of war.</p>

At a prior term of the court, the defendant presented his petition for the removal of a suit then pending against him in the state court, alleging that it involved the question of the validity of a title to lands, to recover which it was brought, which title he derived from a sale of the lands for taxes, made by tax-commissioners under the acts of 1861 and 1862; and he prayed a certiorari to the state court, directing the return of the record under section 3 of the act of…

<p>Case No. 11,054a.</p> <p>Pleading — What tiie Plea must Contain — Plea in Bar — Insolvent Estate.</p> <p>1. Every plea must contain an answer to the whole cause of action or some certain part of it.</p> <p>2. A plea that an estate is insolvent, is not a flood plea in bar.</p> <p>3. If the administrator of an insolvent estate pursues the course pointed out by law, he cannot be held personally liable.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit brought by Thomas W. Peyton, against Richard Veitch and Anthony Crease, joint merchants, trading under the firm of Richard Veitch & Co., Jonah Thompson and Craven P. Thompson, joint merchants, trading under the firm of Jonah Thompson & Son, and Jacob Hoffman, to recover the sum of $4,000 paid by the plaintiff to redeem the schooner Alert and cargo, which had been seized as forfeited, in Curacoa, for violation of the laws of that place, by…

<p>Case No. 11,058.</p> <p>SnippiNG — Carriage of Goods ox Deck — Dei.iv-F.UT OX WnATiF — NOTICE TO CONSIGNEE — EXCUSES fok Failure to Give Such Notice.</p> <p>1.The burden is on the ship-owner to prove that the shipper agreed that his property might lie carried on deck.</p> <p>[Cited in Chubb v. Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Bushels of Oats. Case No. 2.709. Cited in brief in The Delaware, 14 Wall. (81 U. S.) 594.]</p> <p>2. In a suit in rem against the vessel, to recover the value of the goods lost or damaged, the master is an interested witness; but a release from some of the part owners renders him competent.</p> <p>3. Though delivery may be made by landing property on a wharf and giving notice to the consignee, where such is the custom of the port, yet such notice, or a valid excuse for not giving it, is indispensable.</p> <p>4. If the master has wrongfully omitted to sign bills of lading, and sailed without learning the names of the consignees, he cannot avail himself of this ignorance as an excuse for not giving notice of the landing of the goods.</p> <p>[Cited in The Thames, 14 Wall. (81 U. S.> 107.]</p> <p>[Cited in Robinson v. Chittenden, 69 N. Y. 535.]</p> <p>5. Though, ordinarily, the master is not bound to seek out the consignor for the purpose of signing bills of lading, yet if, when they are presented to him by an agent of the consignor, he objects to one of their stipulations, and says he will call on the consignor, and sails without doing so, he is in fault, and cannot have any advantage from the non-existence of bilis of lading.</p> <p>[Cited in Fox v. Holt, Case No. 5,012.]</p> <p>[Cited in Hatch v. Tucker, 12 R. I. 505.]</p>

This is a libel in reni against the schooner Peytona, on a contract for the transportation of 472 hides from Boston to Belfast, consigned to Messrs. Lewis <fc Miller. The hides were stowed on deck, and on the voyage 184 were either washed overboard, or thrown over by the crew on account of stress of weather, and for the safety of the ship.

[In the matter of John and Martin Pfromm, ¡ bankrupts.] ' : This matter came up on a certific-dte of the ' register. Hovey K. Clarke.

This was a suit founded on a bill of lading. The libel alleged that on the 24th of August, 1S32, G. AY.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of New York.] [This was a libel in admiralty by Joseph ~W. Pharo and others against Geo. Smith and others to recover damages for collision. The The decree of the district court was in favor of the libelants. Case unreported. The district court overruled a motion of libelants to require the defendants to file a stipulation for costs on appeal. Case No. 11,002.]

At a former term of tlie court, a decree was obtained by McLellan against the Phe-be, for the non-performance of a contract of the master by a bill of lading, for the transportation of certain merchandise described in the libel from Eastport to Boston. [Case No. 11,064.] A venditioni exponas was issued, on which the vessel was sold, and the return of the marshal states that the brig was sold to “Robert Perkins, of Castine. he being the highest bidder therefor, for §370, upon…

L'Xhis was an action for the nonperformance of a contract of the master upon a bill of lading. There was a decree in favor of the libelant and a sale of the vessel thereunder.

<p>Case No. 11,067.</p> <p>Common* Cabbiebs by Watek — D.uty of Shif-OWNEBS</p>

<p>Case No 11,068.</p> <p>Liability op Shareholders in Cokpouations— Payment in Property.</p> <p>1. Unless prohibited by statute, an agreement between the incorporators of a company and the directors, by which the former convey to the company property needed for the purpose of its operations, and receive payment therefor in full-paid shares of the stock of the company, is, in the absence of fraud, binding upon-the parties, and such stock is full-paid stock.</p> <p>[Cited in Steacy v. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co., Case No. lo,329.]</p> <p>[Cited in Clayton v. Ore Knob Copper Co., 109 N. C. 385, 14 S. E. 39; Coffin v. Rans-dell, 110 Ind. 422, ,11 N. E. 23; Eylton Land Co. v. Birmingham Warehouse & Elevator Co., 92 Ala. 407. 9 South. 132; Jackson v. Traer. 04 Iowa, 409, 20 N. W. 704; Young v. Erie Iron Co., 05 Mich. 120, 31 N. W. 814.]</p> <p>2. Whether subsequent creditors of the company can impeach such transaction as respects shares of stock which purport to be full-paid shares, when they are in the hands of a subsequent registered transferee for value, and who purchased the same as full-paid shares, relying upon the certificates and the records of the corporation that full payment therefor had been received by the company, quaere?</p> <p>[Cited in Steacy v. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co., Case No. 13.329.]</p> <p>[Cited in First Nat. Bank of Deadwood v. Gustin Minerva Con. Min. Co., 42 Minn. 327, 44 N. W. 200.]</p> <p>3. The petition of a creditor of the company which had become insolvent and dissolved was held not suiiieient to ojien an inquiry into the transaction between the corporators and the company as to the value of the property conveyed to the eomjiany in payment of shares, with a view to hold a shareowner for the difference between the agreed valne and the actual value of the property convoyed.</p> <p>NOTE. There are later decisions than those cited in the principal case, to the effect that the bona fide purchaser for value of shares issued by a corporation which falsely purport to be full-paid shares cannot be held liable to pay the same where it is not shown that he purchased with notice of the facts. Foreman v. Bigelow, [Case No. 4,934], Dist. of Mass. Oct. 1878, before Clifford and Lowell, JJ., and where the later cases are referred to. including Nieholls’ Case, 26 Wkly. Rep. 334; Burkmshaw v. Nich-olls, Id. 819; Steacey v. Little Rock & Ft, S. R. Co. [Case No. 13,329].</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] This was an action by Phelan, assignee in bankruptcy of the Central Savings Bank, against the Iron Mountain Bank, to recover the amount of an alleged illegal preference. The cause was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, and judgment was rendered by the district court for the plaintiff. • The defendant sued out a writ of error.

<p>Case No. 11,070.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proof of Debt — Liability to Former Partner.</p> <p>P. and E. being copartners, P. sold out to E. his interest in the firm, P. agreeing to pay all the firm debts, and to save E. harmless thereon. Afterwards, P. being adjudged a bankrupt, and firm debts remaining unpaid, E., without having paid anything on such debts, claimed the right, under section 5068 of the Revised Statutes, to prove against the estate of P. for the differences between the amounts of such debts and the dividend which the estate would pay thereon, and to have the present value of P.’s liability to him ascertained: Meld, that he was not entitled to make any such proof and that there was no present value of such liability which could be ascertained.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,071.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Choice op Assignee — Firm and Individual Creditors — Joint Power of At-tornet — Meeting for Choice of Assignee.</p> <p>1. Creditors who have proved a debt against a partner of a firm in bankruptcy, have no right to participate in the election of the assignee for the company, who must be chosen by the creditors of the company only.</p> <p>2. The powers given by a letter of attorney to several persons jointly, cannot be exercised by one of the attorneys alone.</p> <p>3. A meeting to prove debts and choose an as-signee. should be organized at the hour designated in the official notice, and should be kept open until an assignee is chosen, or it is ascertained that no choice can be made.</p>

2[This was a motion for a new trial. The plaintiffs [Anson G. Phelps and others] had brought suit against the defendants [James Brown and others], a corporation under the laws of Connecticut, to recover damages for the alleged infringement of letters patent [No. 12,227] for an “improvement in machines for manufacturing brass kettles,” granted to plaintiffs as assignees of Lyman C. Camp, January 12, 1855.

[Appeal from the district court of the United Stares for the district of Maryland.] The libel in this case was filed in the district court on the 21st of April, 1S37, by the members of the firm of Phelps, Dodge & Oo., of New York, against the brig Camilla, of Boston, then lying at the port of Baltimore, and against E. G. Wiswell, and all others who might intervene in the cause. [Case unreported.] The claim was for materials furnished by the libellants to said vessel, at New…

This was a writ of error to the district court. Phelps filed his petition in involuntary bankruptcy against Charles L. Ciasen and A. B. Ciasen, merchants, doing business under the firm name of A. B. & C. L. Ciasen, for reasons not necessary to be here stated.

<p>Case Wo. 11,075.</p> <p>Patents — Assignee’s Right to Renewal.</p> <p>1. A mere assignment of a part of a patent gives the assignee no interest in the renewal of the patent</p> <p>[Cited in Jenkins v. Nicolson Pavement Co., Case No. 7,273.]</p> <p>2. But, when the assignment is special, conveying clearly the intention to give an interest in the renewal of the patent, the assignee will take an interest in the renewal.</p> <p>[Cited in Hodge v. Hudson River R. Co., Case No. 6.559; Jenkins v. Nicolson Pavement Co., Id. 7,273.]</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Case v. Redfiold. Case No. 2.494. and note to Parker v. I-Iatfieid, Case No. 10.73G.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,076.</p> <p>Misichfal Coefobations — Validity ok Bonds— Bona Fide Purchaser: — Affidavit of Assessors as to Consent or Taxpayer — “Last Assessment Roll” — “Situate alono the Route” —Demand—Interest.</p> <p>1. Bonds issued by the town of Lewiston, in the county of Niagara, in aid of the constructiou of the Lake Ontario Shore Railroad, under the' acts of the legislature of New York, passed May 11th, 18G8, and April 19th, 1809 (Laws 1808. c. 811. and Laws 1809. c. 241), held valid in the hands of a liona fide purchaser for value, without notice, before maturity.</p> <p>2. The plaintiff bought the bonds in September, 1874. Certiorari proceedings in the supreme court of New York, respecting the bonds, which took place in 1872 and 1873, held not to affect the rights of the.plaintiff, for the reasons set fortli in the decision of the court of appeals of New York, in People v. Walter, 68 N. Y. 403, resi>ecting such proceedings.</p> <p>3. Various offers of proof held to be irrelevant. when made by the defendant, on the trial of a suit by such plaintiff against said town, to recover the amounts of coupons on said bonds, on the ground that the plaintiff was a bona fide holder of the bonds.</p> <p>4. Under the 2d section of said act of 186S, as amended by the 2d section of said act of 1809. the affidavit of the assessors in this ease was held to lie conclusive proof that the required consent of tax payers had been obtained before the bonds were issued, as respected the plaintiff, as a bona fide holder of the bonds, for a valuable consideration, without notice.</p> <p>[Followed in Irwin v. Town of Ontario, 3 Fed. 49, 57.]</p> <p>5. Such affidavit having been attached to the consent papers when the two were filed together in the office of the county clerk, it was held, in view of that fact, and of the contents of the affidavit and of the consents, that the afiidnyit was sufficient, although it did not state on ils face what the consent was to. or for. or about.</p> <p>[Cited in Smith v. Ontario. Case No. 13.0SO. Followed in Irwin v. Town of Ontario, 3 Fed. 49, 57.]</p> <p><1. “Tlie last assessment roll,” referred to in the statute, is the last assessment roll next preceding the making of such affidavit, and not the last assessment roll next preceding the issuing of the bonds.</p> <p>7. The town of Lewiston was a town “situate along the route” of said railroad, within the statute.</p> <p>8. The pendency of writs of certiorari brought to have the determination of the assessors, and the action of the commissioners in pursuance thereof, declared void, is not such notice of the invalidity of the bonds, as to defeat the title of a purchaser of the bonds for value, before maturity, who has no actual notice of the pen-dency of the writs or of the objection to the bonds.</p> <p>9. There being no evidence on which the jury Could properly proceed 10 find a verdict for the defendant on the issue as to whether the plaintiff was a bona fide holder of the bonds for value, it was proper not to allow the defendant to go to tlie jury on that question.</p> <p>10. The commissioners having power to issue coupons with the bonds, a statement in the bonds that they have caused one of their number to sign the coupons is equivalent to a signing -of the coupons by all of them.</p> <p>11. Payment of coupons on the bonds having been demanded, it is proper to allow interest on them.</p> <p>12. The statutes under' which the bonds were issued are not invalid.</p> <p>13. Where legislative authority has been given to a municipality or to its officers, to sule scrilx; for the stock of a railroad company, and to issue municipal bonds in payment, but only ■bn some condition precedent, and where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment, that the officers of the municipality were invested with power to decide whether the ■condition precedent had been complied with, their recital that it has been, made in the bonds issued by them and held by a bona fide purchaser, is conclusive of the fact and binding upon the municipality, for, the recital is itself a decision of the fact by the appointed tribunal.</p> <p>[Cited in Currie-v. Town of Lewiston, 15 Fed. 379.]</p>

These two suits are by the same plaintiff to foreclose two mortgages respectively executed by the defendants at the dates stated in the opinion of the court The question in each ease was, whether the decree of foreclosure should order a general execution for any balance which might remain after the sale of the mortgaged estate.

Action [brought by Thomas Phelps] on a judgment rendered August 5th, 1S73, in favor of the plaintiff's assignor, a citizen of Wisconsin, against the county of O’Brien, by the district court of the state of Iowa, for the county of Dickinson, and ’ assigned to the plaintiff, a citizen of Illinois.

On demurrer to the bill of complaint. The bill is filet! for the purpose of setting aside a foreclosure of a mortgage and sale of certain lands belonging to the bankrupt’s estate, by advertisement, under the statute of Michigan, for the reasons: First, that the notice of sale was not sufficient under the said statutes; and, second, that the advertisement, foreclosure and sale, were had pending the bankruptcy, and without proof of the mortgage debt in the bankruptcy court,…

<p>Case No. 11,080.</p> <p>Baskkoptct — Phook or Debts — Secukjty.</p> <p>Where a creditor petitions that debts proved by respondents, who are also creditors, be disallowed, on the ground of having taken a mortgage to secure their debts within four months of adjudication, held, debts of respondents disallowed.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,082.</p> <p>Municipal Bonds — Right op Municipality to Show that Bonds were Delivered without Seal — Numbers and Dates.</p> <p>By the acts of the legislature of New Tork, of Hay 11. 1868, and April 19. 1869 (Laws N. T. 1868, p. 1823. c. 811, and 1869, p. 447, e. 241), commissioners appointed for a town were authorized to borrow money on the faith and credit of the town, “and to execute bonds therefor, under their hands and seals,” in aid of a railroad. The commissioners executed bonds and delivered them to the officers of the railroad company. The bonds, when so delivered, contained a recital, over the signatures of the commissioners. that they were issued under the hands and seals of the commissioners. In a suit against the town, on coupons belonging to the bonds, by a person who purchased such coup'ons for value and bona fide: held, that the town could nof be allowed to show that the bonds were so delivered before any seals were affixed, and with the dates and numbers of the bonds in blank, upon the understanding that the bonds were not to be negotiated until certain conditions on the part of the company were fulfilled, but that, before such conditions were fulfilled, the officers of the company affixed seals to. and inserted the dates and numbers in, the bonds and negotiated them.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,083.</p> <p>Insolvency — What Amounts to Representation as to Property — Fkaudulent Conveyance-Release — Re-examination of Witness after Close of Deposition.</p> <p>1. If a release he given by a creditor to a debt- or, where he has been misled by a fraudulent misrepresentation, or other artifice of his debtor, the release may be sot aside in equity. But the mere fact that thedebtorhad madea previous assignment of property, which would be fraudulent as to creditors, if known to the creditor, or if not intended to mislead him, will not alone work such an effect.</p> <p>[Cited in Renter v. Patch, 18 D. C. 592; Richards v. Hunt, 6 Yt. 235; Reynolds v. French, 8 Yt. 8S.]</p> <p>2. What circumstances amount to a misrepresentation.</p> <p>3. Where a party applies for. and attains the benefit of an act of insolvency upon his petition and representation of such insolvency, and a statement of what his property is; such statement is a representation to all his creditors, that it contains all his property, and is made in good faith.</p> <p>4. What circumstances are presumptive of a conveyance ’ being fraudulent as to creditors; want of possession of real estate is not, as it is of personal estate, a presumption of fraud.</p> <p>[Cited in Almy v. Wilbur. Case No. 256; Re Hussman, Id. 6.951: Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585, 12 Sup. Ct. 763.]</p> <p>[Cited in Hempstead v. Johnston, 18 Ark. 123; Quill v. Wolfe, 4 D. C. 190; Sliaw v. Thompson, 43 N. H. 132.]</p> <p>5. In chancery, where the deposition of a witness has been once taken and closed, it is not the practice to allow him to be re-examined without an order of court, and then only upon good cause shown.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,084.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Leaving Vessel at Foreign Port — Consent of Master — Reinstatement of Contract — Working Passage.</p> <p>1. A seaman leaving a ship at a foreign port during her voyage, with or without leave, and not returning within a reasonable time before another man is hired in his place, forfeits the wages then due him.</p> <p>[Cited in The John Martin, Case No. 7,357.]</p> <p>2. If he abandons the ship by consent of the master, such mutual agreement annuls the shipping contract between thorn, and the seaman cannot afterwards reclaim his place on board the ship. The master may be subject to penalties or the ship to a chanre of extra wages, by positive law, for abandoning or leaving a seaman in a foreign port, but this does not reinstate the shipping contract.</p> <p>3. After a mariner has voluntarily left his vessel in a foreign port without leave of the officer in command, and his place has been supplied by another, he cannot acquire a right to be reinstated and to wages, by coming clandestinely on board, and remaining concealed from her officers until she is out at sea.</p> <p>[Cited in Allen v. Hallet, Case No. 223.]</p> <p>4. The master, under such circumstances, is authorized to compel him to work his passage whilst he continues with the ship, and no engagement to pay him wages can be implied therefrom.</p> <p>5.When a seaman receives payment for wages during an outward voyage apparently equal to, and rather exceeding the amount due, and afterwards, without demanding further payment, voluntarily leaves the vessel, and on her return to her home port brings suit against her for wages for the full voyage, the court will not order a reference to compute the exact state of his claim when he abandoned the vessel, but will dismiss the libel, with costs, against him.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,085.</p> <p>II.wu.nk Tout. — Admikaltx Jokisdiction--Oot.-I.ISION WITH PrEK — NeRI.IGF.N'CE OF CONTRACTOR.</p> <p>1. The admiralty has jurisdiction over marine torts, which may he defined to be unlawful acts, injurious to others, independent of contract, happening or being committed upon the sea or tide-water.</p> <p>2. A steam-tug, regularly licensed under the acts of congress, plying between ports in different states, is within the provision of the constitution as to the regulation of commerce, and the observance of the special state laws regulating Sunday labor, is not compulsory upon such steam-tug; but it would have been otherwise had the tug been engaged in towing vessels between ports of the same state.</p> <p>3.Where the respondents had contracted with certain parties for the building of a bridge across the Susquehanna river, and the bridge contractors. at the request and for the convenience of the respondents' engineers, had driven in the bed of the river a “sight-pile,” upon which a steam tug-boat run. without fault on her part, and was thereby much damaged, Arid, that the negligence of the contractors and engineers, in not removing the “sight-pile," was the negligence of the respondents, the relation of each master and servant being established by the facts.</p> <p>[This was a libel by the Philadelphia & Havre de Grace Steam Tow-boat Company against the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company, to recover damages for an injury alleged to have been sustained by a towboat belonging to the libel-ants in running against a pile in the Susque-lianna. river, left in said river by the agenta of the respondents.]</p> <p>[An appeal was taken to the circuit court, wnere the decree of this court was affirmed. Case unreported. An appeal was then taken to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was affirmed, with costs. 23 How. (64 U. S.) 209.]</p>

A petition was presented by the receivers of the railroad asking to be allowed to create a car trust loan of a million of dollars, to provide for the rolling stock and equipment of the road.

<p>This was ail action brought, [by the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company' against John T. Barnard and Sons] to recover $287.92 freight on a portion of a cargo of coal transported and delivered by the libel-lants under the following circumstances: L. T. Conner & Co., at Philadelphia, shipped 214 tons of coal on board the boat of the libel-lants, for which the ordinary bill of lading was issued, according to which the coal was to be transported to New York, and there delivered to the shippers or their assigns, he or they paying freight for the same at the rate mentioned therein. The margin of the bill of lading contained a memorandum that the freight was to be paid to D. E. Moore, the agent of the libellants, at Trinity Buildings, New York. Under this contract, the coal was safely transported to New York, and delivered as follows: Twenty-one tons to one Bass, who paid to the libellants freight on what lie received, but declined to receive any more on account of an objection to the quality, whereupon the balance, 179 tons, was delivered from the vessel’s side to the defendants in this action, who thereupon gave a receipt upon the back of the captain’s copy of the bill of lading, acknowledging the receipt from the libellants of the 1S9 tons. It appeared that the coal, before delivery, had been sold by the shippers to one Merritt, by him sold to one C. A. L. Blanchard, by him sold to Bass; and when Bass threw up the purchase after receiving the twenty-one tons, Blanchard sold the rest to the defendants. The defendants objected at first to buying the coal, because coal was dull of sale, and they would be obliged to pay. the freight at once; whereupon Blanchard agreed to see that the freight was paid, if the defendants would give him their note for the amount of it This was done, and the defendants, after the receipt of the coal from the vessel, gave Blanchard their two notes, one for the price of the coal, the other for the amount of the freight, with the interest added, both of which notes were duly paid. No copy of the bill of lading was indorsed or delivered to the defendants, nor any other evidence of the purchase made.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,087.</p> <p>Income Tax — Percentage of Corporation Dividends.</p> <p>1. The tax of five per cent, out of dividends payable by a bank, railroad company, &c., is a tax on the income of the holder of the stock, and only differs in the mode of collection from his other income tax. The corporation is made the agent of the government for its collection.</p> <p>2. A dividend declared payable after December 31st, 1809, although for earnings of the year 1869, is not liable to the income tax.</p> <p>3. The collector cannot justify in an action of trespass for levying on the property of a company for such tax.</p> <p>[The judgment of this court was reversed by the supreme court, where it was carried on writ of error. 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 294.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,088.</p> <p>Income Tax — Ookpokation Dividends.</p> <p>■ Dividends declared and payable by railroad companies during the last five months of 1870, are not liable to .taxation by the United States. A seizure by collector of United States revenue is illegal.</p> <p>[Cited in Metropolitan R. Co. v. Slack, Case No. 9,500.]</p> <p>[The judgment of this court was reversed by the supreme court, where it was carried on writ of error. 154 U. S. 616,14 Sup. Ot 1196.]</p>

This was a bill to compel the defendants [Charles Morrison and others] to extinguish ground rents on receipt of the principal monies in United States notes. The constitutionality of the law, and its application to this case were the points raised. The first was not decided.

This was a libel [by the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company against William L. Northam] to recover freight and demurrage on two cargoes of coal, shipped from Philadelphia to New York, on board of canal boats belonging to the libellants, one by boat No. 58, and the other by boat No. 75, under bills of lading signed therefor by the masters of the boats.

<p>Case No. 11,091.</p> <p>Amended Bankrupt act — How Proportion in Number and Value op Petitioning Creditors Computed.</p> <p>A petition in bankruptcy having been filed against the above corporation, an answer was filed by them denying that the requisite proportion in number and value of their creditors had joined in said petition. Whereupon the court referred the question to the register (Davis) to ascertain and report summarily whether the requisite proportion in number and amount of said creditors had joined in the petition. The register reported that the requisite proportion in number and amount had so joined.</p> <p>Exceptions were filed to said report: 1. Because the register had computed in said proportion Gordon, Monges & Co., who had first signed the petition, but subsequently filed a petition praying that they might be allowed to withdraw. 2. Because certain creditors who had joined in the petition had not filed proofs of debt. 3. Because the register had excluded from the computation, as to both number and amount, all creditors whose debts did not exceed $250.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,091a.</p> <p>Salvage — Compensation—Saving both Vessel and Cargo — Value op Property Saved.</p> <p>Tl. Greater compensation should be awarded for saving vessel and cargo from imminent peril of total loss than for saving the cargo alone.]</p> <p>[2. Other things being equal, the ratio of the salvage award to the value of the property saved should be less when such value is large than when it is small.]</p>

[This was a proceeding by Thomas Philips & Co. against William Crammond, Willing, and others, creditors of Crammond and Samuel Mifflin.] This ease was argued in April or May, 1809, when the commissioner of the court was directed to state the accounts between the plaintiffs and Crammond, at certain periods, and also the manner in which the entries, respecting the estate called Sedgeley, the estate on Spruce street, and the vessels, were made on the books of Philips,…

The defendant relied principally upon the statute of limitations, and produced a grant which had not been countersigned by the secretary. It was objected that this was no grant, as it wanted one of the essential requisites of a grant, the countersignature of the secretary of state. Nov. 1777, c. 1, § 15; 1783, c. 2, § 15.

<p>The questions in the case arise on a demurrer to the answer. The plaintiff, in his petition alleges, that at the time of bringing his action, and at the time when the contract in 'Suit was entered into, he was a citizen of the state of Texas, and that the defendant was, at said times, a citizen of the state of Iowa. The contract declared on is a promissory note made by the defendant to the plaintiff, and purports on its face to have been made in the “state of Texas,” in the “county of Montgomery,” therein, on the first day of January, 1866. The note contains a recital that it is secured by a deed of trust; and the petition contains an averment that the deed of trust has been executed and the property sold, and the proceeds of the sale (which was made out of court under a power contained in the instrument) credited on the note. To recover the balance, after allowing the credit, this action is brought. Among other defences, not necessary to be specially mentioned, the defendant pleads, in substance, the following: That at the time of the making of the note sued on, the plaintiff was a citizen and inhabitant of the state of Texas, and the defendant was a citizen and resident of the state of Iowa. The answer refers to the act of congress, of July 13, 1861 [12 Stat. 255], and the proclamations of the president hereafter mentioned, and alleges that the president did declare the state of Texas and the inhabitants thereof to be in actual rebellion against the United States, and that such rebellion continued to exist until the 20th day of August, 1866, when, by proclamation of the president, the state of rebellion theretofore existing in the state of Texas was declared to be suppressed. The answer also alleges that the plaintiff was a rebel, and gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States in armed rebellion during the time aforesaid; that he never took the oath of allegiance; and never received any permit to carry on trade or commercial intercourse from the proper or constituted authorities of the United States; wherefore, the defendant says the contract in suit is null and void, and he prays judgment accordingly. The plaintiff demurs, assigning as a ground therefor, that the facts pleaded do not, in law, make the note void.</p> <p>2 [Certain acts of congress and proclamations of the president of the United States, bearing upon the controversy may be here conveniently referred to. On the 19th day of April, 1861, the president issued his proclamation declaring that he had set on foot a blockade of the ports of certain states, including the state of Texas, because of the existence therein of an insurrection against the government of the United States. 12 Stat. 125S. On the 13th day of July, 1861 (12 Stat. 255, 257, § 5), the congress of the United States passed an important act, by which it was provided that the president, in certain cases, may declare the inhabitants of a state, or any section or portion thereof, to be in a state of insurrection “and thereupon,” it is enacted, “all commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens thereof, and the citizens of the rest of the United States shall cease and be unlawful, so long as such condition of hostility shall continue; and all goods, etc., coming from such state or section into the other parts of the United States, and all proceeding to such state or section, by land or water, shall * * * be forfeited to the United States.” Then follows a proviso that the president may, in his discretion, license and permit intercourse “to be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the secretary of the treasury.” Pursuant to this act of congress, the president by his proclamation of the 16th day of August, 1861 (12 Stat. 1262), declared the state of Texas, with others, to be in a state of insurrection, and also proclaimed all unlicensed commercial intercourse to be unlawful. The power given to the president by the 5th section of the act of July 13, 1861, above cited, to license trade, was subsequently repealed except in certain cases. 13 Stat. 377, § 9. And see proclamation of April 2, 18(13, repealing exceptions in the proclamation of August 1G, 1801 (13 Stat. 730). By the act of July 17, 1SG2 (12 Stat. 5S9), it is provided that any person, in the states named, engaged in the rebellion, or aiding it, who fails, for GO days after public warning or proclamation by the president, to cease to aid the rebellion and return to his allegiance, shall forfeit his property to the United States, the same being considered and “condemned as enemies’ property” (sections 6 and 7). On the 2d of April, 1866, the president issued his proclamation, “declaring that the insurrection which heretofore existed in the states of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida is at an end, and is henceforth to be so regarded.” 14 Stat. 811. It will be noticed that the state of Texas was not included in this proclamation, but it was included in the like proclamation of August 20, 1S6G. 14 Stat. 814. This last proclamation recites in terms that the insurrection in Texas was not suppressed at the date of the former proclamation (April 2, 1866), and it is then (August 20, 1866), declared “to be at an end, and to be henceforth so regarded,” in the said state of Texas, as in the other states named in the proclamation of April 2, 1S6G. On the 13th of June, 1805 (13 Stat. 763), the president issued his proclamation declaring that restrictions on trade east of the Mississippi river, with certain exceptions, be removed. On the 17th of June, 1865 (13 Stat. 7G5), the president issued his proclamation appointing a provisional governor for Texas, but containing no declaration of removal of restrictions on trade and intercourse therein, which had before been declared.] 2</p>

This was indebitatus assumpsit, for work and labour done and performed by plaintiff, as ship carpenter, on the sloop industry, the property of the defendant.

<p>Case No. 11,097.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Summons of Assessor — When Objections to should be Taken — Refusal of Witness to Answer — When Improper.</p> <p>J. Witness was summoned and appeared for' examination before an assessor under section 14 of the act of 1864, as amended, and refused to answer questions propounded touching the falsity or verity of-certain tax returns of tobacco manufacturers. He was thereupon attached as for contempt, upon application of the assessor, and on a motion for his discharge, held, the power conferred upon the assessor and exercised by him in the premises is constitutional. The questions were pertinent and proper, and the witness must answer.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Platt, Case No. 11,212.]</p> <p>2. It is no defence that the answers would' tend to criminate witness, inasmuch as no disclosures or admissions so made can be used against him in criminal or quasi criminal prosecutions, under the act of February 25, 1868.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. McCarthy, 18 Fed. 89.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of the bankruptcy of William W. Phillips.] In the matter of the proof of debt of Chase, Isherwood & Co.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,099.</p> <p>Pleading — Time fob Filing Special Plea — Continuance— General Issue.</p> <p>1. A special plea or notice must be filed thirty days before the term, in a patent case, or the plaintiff will be entitled to a continuance.</p> <p>2. The option to file the general issue and give notice, does not take away the right to set up the special matter in a plea.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Robert CL Phillips, Eugene Robinson, and Jesse H. Farwell against the city of Detroit, to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 121,544, granted to Phillips December 5,1871, for improvement in wooden pavements. In a suit for the violation of a preliminary injunction the members of the board of public works of the city of Detroit were fined for the willful violation of the injunction. Case No. 11,101. It is now heard for final decree.]

[This was a bill in equity by Robert C. Phillips, Eugene Robinson, and Jesse H. Farwell against the city of Detroit to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 121,544, granted to Phillips December 5, 1871, for improvement in wooden pavements. Heard on a charge of violation of a preliminary injunction.]

Construction of the act of congress, 2d March. 1790, iu relation to foreign coins. Usage of merchants. This was an action of covenant on an open policy of insurance for twenty-one thousand dollars on goods on board the ship Nancy from Calcutta to New York. There was no dispute as to the ownership or loss. The only question was as to the amount of the plaintiff’s interest on board.

<p>Case No. 11,103.</p> <p>EXECUTION— COUNTERMANDED AT REQUEST OF DEFENDANT — New Execution.</p> <p>When an execution is countermanded at the request of the defendant and for his accommodation, the plaintiff may have a new execution, after the year and day, without scire facias.</p>

This is an appeal from a pro forma decree of the district court, which dismissed the libel of the appellant, surgeon on board the Mercury, for salvage. The libel sets forth, that the ship sailed from Philadelphia to Calcutta in the year 1809, where she took in a valuable cargo, and on her return voyage, was, on the 8th of May, 1810, when near the island of Madagascar, captured as prize by a Erench national frigate.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Benjamin F. Phillips and others against Samuel S. Mariner. Heard on demurrer.J</p>

On the 13th May. 1S2S, suit was brought by tire United States of America against Henry Toland and John C. Smith, on a custom house bond for the payment of duties. On the 19th May, judgment was rendered for the United States, and on the 30th May, a •writ of fieri facias issued.

<p>Case No. 11,106a.</p> <p>PRACTICE AT Law — EllllOIt CORAM NOBIS — PoH What Lies.</p> <p>1. A writ of error coram nobis may be brought in the same court where the judgment was given, when tlie error assigned is not for any fault in the court, but for some defect in the execution of the process, or for some default of the ministerial officers.</p> <p>2. It lies to set aside an erroneous execution.</p>

This libel is filed [by Isaac C. rhillips and others] to recover a salvage compensation for services rendered to the ship United States, by the steam tugs Hercules and Underwriter. The ship, worth from $10,000 to $15,000, and having on board a cargo of about a thousand tons of railroad iron, worth about $45,000, while bound into the port of New York, about 2 or 3 o’clock p. m. on the 11th of March, 1853, ran on the outer middle shoal, about three miles from Sandy Hook.

This ejectment is to recover 400 acres of land, lying north and west of the Ohio, Allegheny and Conewaugo. The plaintiff's title was founded on an application for this land, on the 25th of April, 1793, by one Me-gee (in the name of R. Thompson), who sold to Wells and Morris; a warrant in the name of Richard Wells, for 400 acres, lying between Big and Little Beaver creeks, to include his improvement; and a survey dated in March, 1795.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.] This was an appeal from a sentence of the district court, decreeing to the appellee his wages as a seaman on board said schooner, on a voyage from Philadelphia to Jamaica, and back.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in ran, filed in the1 district court by Joseph W. Hancox, master of the steamboat Hero, against the ship Phoenix, to recover damages for an injury that occurred to the former in a slip on the North liver, in ilie city of New York.

This was a libel to recover for the loss of certain shipments of grain delivered on hoard the propeller Merchant July 24, 1874, at Chicago, to be transported, so far as it was to be carried on the Lakes, to Erie, Pennsylvania. At the time stated, libellant was a corporation of the state of New York, authorized to transact a general lake and inland insurance business.

<p>Case No. 11,113.</p> <p>Attorney and Client — Presumption op Authority — Executor—Sale op Land — Defective Title — Wills—Execution—Powers.</p> <p>1. An application may he made by an executor or administrator to the court of common pleas, by attorney, for a sale of real estate.</p> <p>2. A schedule of the debts must be exhibited. &c. but the application for the sale may be by motion or in writing.</p> <p>3. Where these proceedings have been carried on by an attorney, the court will presume the sanction of the executor or administrator, unless the contrary appear.</p> <p>[Cited in Wall v. Bissell. 125 U. S. 390. S Sup. Ct 9S3.J</p> <p>4. The court have no power to order a sale except on the application of the executor or administrator.</p> <p>5. Unless a will is required to be sealed, it is good without seal.</p> <p>6. Cannot require an instrument to contain any requisites, to its validity, which the statute does not require.</p> <p>7. A power of attorney not under seal, will not authorize the attorney to execute a deed.</p> <p>S. A court of chancery will never aid a defective power; but it will relieve from a defective execution of a power.</p> <p>[Cited in Snow v. Perkins. 2 Mich. 238. Cited in brief in Ferre v. Board of Foreign Missions, 53 Vt. 166.]</p> <p>9. A bona fide purchaser at an executor's sale of land, where the consideration has been paid, may apply to chancery for a title.</p> <p>10. The payment of the consideration, the possession and improvement of the property, in such a case, will rebut any presumption, from lapse of time, that there has been an abandonment of the contract</p>

<p>Case No. 11,114.</p> <p>Contracts — Against Public Policy — Fraud— Pleading in Equity — Pleas in Bar — Form.</p> <p>1. A contract made in fraud of the law, or against public policy, is void.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Breslin v. Brown. 21 Ohio St. 5(iS. Cited in Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 601, 43 X. V'. 1102.]</p> <p>2. An agreement between two or more persons not to bid at a sheriff's sale, against each other, and that one shall purchase for the benefit of all, held to be void.</p> <p>LCited in Hill v. Smith, Case No. 6.499.]</p> <p>¡.Cited in Loyd v. Malone. 23 Ill. 48; Phippen v. Stiekney, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 387.]</p> <p>3. But sales on execution may well be distinguished from voluntary sales; and especially sales of public lands, made at public auction by the United States. That an association of individuals cannot purchase at such sales, is a novel doctrine.</p> <p>[Cited in James v. Pulcrod, 5 Tex. 512.]</p> <p>4. A plea in bar to a hill, must be full and complete, to every part of the bill, and the fraud charged must be denied by an answer filed in support of the plea. And if the plea does not set up a bar to every equitable allegation in the bill, it will be set aside. In this respect the rule is the same in chancery as at law.</p> <p>5. The defendants in their answers may insist on the same matters, as might be, or have been, pleaded in bar.</p> <p>C. Pleas in bar, which seek to avoid the equity of the case, are not to be favored. Great strictness in their form and substance is required.</p> <p>NOTE. Judge Burnet’s name is used in the proceedings of this case; but it is understood that he has no interest in the controversy, and has taken no agency in the management of the suit</p> <p>[Subsequently, the defendants having answered, the cause came on for final hearing. An opinion was rendered in favor of complainants, but the case was referred to the master for an account of sales, money received, etc., in order to enable the court to enter final decree. Case No. 11.115. Upon reargument of the case this opinion was confirmed. Id. 11,116. After the case had been recommitted several times to the master, and reports filed by him, a final decree in conformity with the opinions above m Cases Nos. 11,115 and 11,116 was entered. From this decree the respondents appealed to the supreme court. Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the decree. 3 How. (44 U. S.) 333.]</p>

<p>Pübuc Lands — Association to Purchase at Sale — Execution Sale — Equity op Redemption-Pleading in Equity — Parties—Trusts.</p> <p>1. Where a. complainant files a bill, claiming for himself and others certain tracts of land purchased in partnership, to sustain the suit it is enough to show that the land was purchased by the partnership funds, without specifying the amount contributed by each partner.</p> <p>2. A contract made in fraud of the law, which grows out of. or is connected with, an immoral act. will not be enforced.</p> <p>[Cited in Tufts v. Tufts. Case No. 14.233.]</p> <p>[Cited in Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 6G1, 43 N. W. 1111; Daniels v. Stevens, 19 Ohio. 244.]</p> <p>3. An agreement not to hid against each other at a sale on execution is against public policy, and consequently invalid.</p> <p>4. But on a sale of public lands, it is not unlawful for individuals to associate together to purchase for their joint interest.</p> <p>I Cited in M’Elroy v. Swope. 47 Fed. 380.]</p> <p>5. Such an association is unobjectionable, where there was no fraud, and especially where a high price was given for the land purchased.</p> <p>0. A doubt may well be entertained whether a rule which, in this respect, applies to sales of . chattels on execution, can apply to a public sale I of lands by the United States. Great numbers I attend these sales, general notice of them being ¡ required. And such restrictions are imposed as , are deemed necessary to protect the public in- ! terest. They are made, too, on a national scale. ¡</p> <p>7. The reason of the rule, which forbids associations for the purpose of purchasing, &c., ; does not apply.</p> <p>8. In this case there was no agreement not to ¡ bid against each other, but that certain tracts ■ should be bought at the sale by the joint company. |</p> <p>0. That one of the parties, who had acted a* i agent, should shelter himself from responsibility i under such circumstances, instead of promoting, ! would defeat the great ends of justice. !</p> <p>10. The transaction was sanctioned by the government in issuing certificates of purchase, and afterwards by the relief given under a special law.</p> <p>11. No judgment of a state or territory can affect lands beyond the jurisdiction of such state or territory.</p> <p>12. The jurisdiction of the territory of Michigan extended south to the northern boundary of Ohio as first run, and until such boundary was altered with the assent of congress.</p> <p>13. This alteration of the line with the assent of congress, which extended the jurisdiction of Ohio north, cannot affect titles to real estate acquired by judicial proceedings in Michigan, within the territory over which the jurisdiction was thus changed.</p> <p>14. An agency, as against the individual, may be proved by his acts and declarations. The intent with which certain acts are done may be inferred from the facts connected with the circumstances.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Bradstreet v. Everson, 72 Fa. St. 124.)</p> <p>15. When a judgment is used as evidence, its regularity cannot be inquired into.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Walsh. 22 Fed. 048.]</p> <p>[Cited in Holland v. Jones, 9 Ind. 49G.]</p> <p>16. .At common law an equity of redemption is not liable to be sold on execution, nor by attachment.</p> <p>[Cited in Hill v. Smith, Case No. 6.499.]</p> <p>17. It is made liable in some states by statute. In the territory pf Michigan, an equity, vested in an agent for certain purposes by the cestui que trusts, the fee being in the government, cannot be levied on and sold by an attachment against the agent.</p> <p>18. A purchaser at the sale on the attachment, under such circumstances, can acquire no right. And an assignment by the trustee to the purchaser, being for no other consideration than the sale by attachment, can convey no interest. The proceedings on the attachment being invalid, the assignment, as a consequence of those proceedings, must be equally invalid.</p> <p>19. This matter is properly examinable íd equity. And although on the assignment of the certificate of purchase, patents may have been obtained by the assignee, his right may still be inquired into.</p> <p>20. The assignee of an equity takes it generally subject to all equities. This is especially the case, where the assignee had a full knowledge of the interest assigned.</p> <p>21. All persons materially interested in the subject matter of the suit must, if within the jurisdiction of the court, be made parties.</p> <p>22. There are some cases where a trustee may sue. without naming the cestui que trusts, but the cestui que trusts must be named, where the object is to divest them of title.</p> <p>23. In general, the cestui que trnsts must be made parties.</p> <p>24. If the demand existed on the trust fund before the trust was created, a suit may be sustained against the trustee only.</p> <p>25. Where the parties are so numerous as not to be inserted conveniently in the record, suit may be maintained in the names of a part for the whole.</p> <p>26. In a proceeding in equity, to foreclose a mortgage given by the trustee, the cestui que trusts are necessary parties. And a sale of the premises, where the cestui quo trusts are not made parties, does not bind their interests.</p> <p>27. The assignment of the certificates of purchase for the land sold under the mortgage by the trustee, by which the purchaser, as assignee, obtained patents, being made under the mortgage sale, cannot bind those who were not parties to the suit.</p> <p>[Cited in Sheldon v. Sheldon, 3 Wis. 70S.]</p> <p>28. After the execution of the mortgage, the trustee had no power to sell.</p> <p>29. It is a well established principle in equity, that the act of a trustee shall not prejudice his cestui que trust. If a trustee purchase the estate of his principal, the sale, as a matter of course, is set aside unless ratified.</p> <p>30. If a trustee purchase land with the trust fund, and take the conveyance in his own name, in equity the land is held as a resulting trust.</p> <p>31. Whatever acts are done by the trustee, are presumed to be done for the benefit of the ces-tui que trusts, and not for the benefit of the trustee.</p> <p>32. Wherever the trust fund is converted into another species of property, if its identity can be traced, it is liable in its new form to the ces-tui que trust. In such a case the cestui que trust may exercise his option either to take the property or pursue some other remedy. This doctrine applies to all persons who act in a fiduciary character.</p> <p>33. An individual who has an interest in certain real estate, for the management and sale of which a trustee is appointed, must be presumed to know the nature of his title and the acts of the trustee. He cannot, having purchased the estate from the trustee, set himself up as an innocent purchaser without notice.</p> <p>34. The statute of limitations does not run against an established trust.</p> <p>[See Miles v. Thorne, 38 Cal. 335.)</p> <p>35. Nor will lapse of time, except under extraordinary circumstances, operate, in a case of trust</p> <p>[NOTE. Upon reargument this opinion was confirmed. Case No. 11,116. Exceptions were filed to the master’s report These were heard, and the case recommitted. The case was again several times recommitted because of death of parties or other causes, and a final decree was not entered until July 30, 1S42. The decree was in conformity with the opinion above. From this decree the respondents took an appeal to the supreme court. The decree wan affirmed, 3 How. (44 U. S.) 333.]</p>

[This was a suit by Robert Piatt against William Oliver, Mic-ajah Williams, and others. It was first heard upon pleas to bill. Case No. 11,114.]

<p>Case Ho. 11,117.</p> <p>Limitation of Actions — Non-Residents—Fraud —Notice.</p> <p>1. The statute of limitations of 1804 was repealed by the act of 1810. This act was repealed by the act of 1824 — no provision in this act where the former statutes had begun to run — this was remedied by the act of 1826.</p> <p>2. A statute of limitations cannot bar for lapse of time before its passage; but if a reasonable part of the time fixed for the limitation has to run, at the time the statute is enacted, it will operate.</p> <p>[Cited in Johnson v. Bond, Case No. 7,374; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 632, 6 Sup. Ct 215.]</p> <p>[Cited in Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 325, 328; Pritchard v. Spencer, 2 Ind. 486.]</p> <p>3. The statute of Ohio does not operate against non-residents of the state.</p> <p>[Cited in Bowman v. Wathen, Case No. 1,-740.]</p> <p>4. Lapse of time may be applied, under proper circumstances, to bar an equity, where the statute would not bar.</p> <p>[See Reed v. Dingess, 56 Fed. 175.]</p> <p>5. This rule is applied by a court of chancery, on its own principles, which do not depend upon the statute of limitations.</p> <p>[See Reed v. Dingess, 56 Fed. 175.]</p> <p>6. The statute will operate even where there has been fraud, from the time the fraud is discovered.</p> <p>[Cited in Parks v. Satterthwaite, 132 Ind. 413, 32 N. E. 82.]</p> <p>7. Mere rumor is not sufficient notice.</p> <p>8. Where notice is denied in the answer, it must be proved by more than one witness.</p> <p>9. Notice to a purchaser, who purchased from a bona fide purchaser, without notice, cannot affect the title.</p> <p>[This was a bill in equity by Robert Piatt against Charles Vattier and others and the Bank of the United States to secure title to a certain lot.]</p> <p>Mr. Scott, for complainant</p> <p>Mr. Starr, for defendants.</p> <p>This case was taken by appeal to the supreme court, where this decree was affirmed. 9 • Pet [34 U. S.] 405.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the distfict of Maryland.] [This was a libel in rem by John Pickell against the steamboat Loper to recover the value of certain supplies furnished the vessel. Prom a decree of the district court dismissing the libel for want of jurisdiction (case unreported), libellant appeals.]

<p>Case No. 11,120.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Effect upon Adjudication op Passage op Amendatory Act.</p> <p>1. A was adjudged a bankrupt on a creditor’s petition, filed March 30, 1870, before the passage of the amendments approved June 22, 1874 [18 Stat. 178]. On an application for an order permitting one-fourth in number and one-third in value of the creditors to join in the petition, in compliance with section 39 of the bankrupt act [of 1¿67 (14 Stat. 536)], held, that the decree of adjudication having been rendered prior to the approval of the amendatory act, it stands as the decree of the court</p> <p>[Cited in Re Comstock, Case No. 3,077; Re Leland, Id. 8,231.]</p> <p>2. It is not in the power of the legislative department of the government to so far interfere with the judicial department as to vacate the judgments and decrees of the latter.</p>

The agreement made at the termination of a prior suit referred to in the answer quoted below, was as follows: “Charles R. Atwood and Others, in Equity, v. Taunton Crucible Co. Stipulation. In this cape the parties having agreed: 1. That the defendants, by the use of the Bramer machine, have infringed upon one of the patents mentioned in the bill, and fully satisfied the plaintiffs therefor. 2.

[This was a bill in equity by Arthur Pickering and others against Michael McCullough, Jr., and others, for the infringement of letters patent No. 49,140, granted to G. Nimmo August 1, 1865, reissued October 24, 1871, No. 4,60S.] [The plaintiffs were the owners of a patent issued to one Nimmo for a machine for the manufacture of plumbago crucibles, and they alleged that the defendants were infringing their patent.

[This was a suit by William C. Piekersgill ■and others against John G. Williams for the amount of certain supplies and repairs furnished the ship Selma on the faith of letters of credit given the master by libelants at respondent’s special request, who agreed to honor drafts for the amount.] In the month of March, 1850, the respond■ent- was the owner of the brig Selma, then lying in this port, and bound for San Francisco.

<p>Case No. 11,124.</p> <p>Mortgage—Porcuase with Notice—State Law.</p> <p>1. Under the act of the legislature of New York passed April 28. 1864 (Laws N. Y. 1864, p. 993), in regard to filing in the office of the auditor of the canal department a mortgage on a canal-boat and refiling a copy, no filing is necessary, after the original filing of the mortgage and the first filing of the copy, with the proper statement, in order to make the mortgage a continuing security, and there need not be a subsequent refiling.</p> <p>2. The act of 1864 has never been amended so as to require a copy of the mortgage, with a statement of interest, to be again filed within thirty days next preceding the expiration of each and every term of one year after the filing of the mortgage. ’</p> <p>3. The provisions of the act of the legislature of New York passed April 29, 1833 (Laws N. Y. 1833, p. 402), so far as they apply to canal-boats, are superseded and replaced by those of the act of 1864; and the filing of mortgages on canal-boats depends wholly on the act of 1864, and not at all on the act of 1833.</p> <p>4. A person is not a purchaser of a canal-boat in good faith, within the meaning of the act of 1864, when he purchases with notice of a prior mortgage on the boat.</p> <p>5. A person who has notice enough to put him on inquiry is bound to make inquiry, and will be held to have had notice of everything to which such inquiry would have reasonably led.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,125.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,126.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Suit to Set Aside Discharge-Limitation's.</p> <p>A suit to set aside a discharge of a bankrupt must be brought within two years from the date of the same.</p> <p>[NOTE. The following is the opinion of Judge Taft in the case of Perkins v. Gay, in the superior court at Cincinnati, referred to in the above opinion. It was filed in 1870, and is reprinted from 3 N. B. R. (Quarto) 189:</p> <p>[“Taft, J. The suit is founded on a judgment rendered against the defendant some twelve years ago in Erie county, Ohio, for $1,266 damages and $43.95 costs. The answer sets up a decree in bankruptcy rendered October 15th, 1867, discharging defendant, Gay, from all his debts. The plaintiff replies that the defendant concealed valuable property when he made his application in bankruptcy, and describes several parcels of real estate situated in Indiana, not included in his schedule, but which the defendant owned at the time of making his application. To this the defendant demurs.</p> <p>[“The defendant, to sustain his demurrer to the plaintiff’s reply, relies on the 34th section of the bankrupt act of 1867 (14 Stat. 533), which provides that ‘a discharge duly granted under this act shall, with the exceptions aforesaid, release the bankrupt from all debts,’ and that the decree shall be a complete bar to all suits therein, and that ‘the certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the fact and regularity of the discharge.’ The plaintiff, however, claims that there is still another ordeal to which the bankrupt is liable to be subjected under the 29th section of the act. This section provides that ‘no discharge shall be granted, or, if granted, be valid, if the bankrupt has concealed any part of his estate,’ or ‘has been guilty of fraud’ in any of the sundry particulars in that section specified. It is provided in the 34th section that in making an application to set aside the discharge the creditors shall specify some one of the acts of fraud mentioned in section 29, and the defendant claims that this indicates that the question of the validity of the discharge raised under the 29th section is to be determined according to the provision of the 34th section, and not otherwise; and such is the construction adopted by Avery & Hobbs in their recent and valuable work on Bankruptcy. In their comments on section 34 of the bankrupt act, they remark (pages 245, 246, note b): ‘It will be observed that there is no appeal given upon the allowance of a discharge; but, in case any creditor desires to contest its validity, this clause of the act points out the way. It was evidently intended by the framers of the law to limit all contestants to the period of two years after granting the discharge, and to the forum that granted it. In all suits founded upon any claim provable in bankruptcy, the discharge is by express terms made “a full and complete bar,” and there is no such reservation as that in the law of 1841 (5 Stat 440), “unless impeached for fraud,” etc. It would seem to follow, from the language of this section, that the discharge cannot be impeached in any suit at law, founded upon any claim provable in bankruptcy, nor can the regularity of the discharge in any suit be inquired into. There is but one way of contesting its validity, and that is expressly indicated in this section.’ Mr. James, on the contrary, in his work on the Bankrupt Law (page 136), afte.r discussing the provisions for contesting tbe validity of the discharge under the 34th section, says: ‘The bankrupt has still another ordeal to pass through. If sued by a creditor for a debt due before the adjudication of bankruptcy, such creditor proceeds with his action, and does not prove under the bankrupt’s estate, and the bankrupt, having obtained his order of discharge, pleads it in bar to such action, the creditor may, by way of replication to such plea, im-peaeh such discharge upon any or all of the grounds in respect of which this act invalidates it; and the question thus raised upon the pleadings is that which is to be tried by the jury.’</p> <p>[“The question of construction thus presented by these two learned commentators is not without difficulty, — a difficulty not at all aided by their disagreement. Under former bankrupt acts, the certificate of the bankrupt has been impeachable for fraud in obtaining it, in whatever court it was pleaded. The present act provides in the 34th section for a proceeding to set aside the certificate of discharge, to be commenced in the court which granted it, within two years. This, however, does not, in our opinion, take away the right to impeach the certificate under the 29th section, which says expressly that ‘no discharge shall be granted, or if granted be valid, if the bankrupt has wilfully sworn falsely in liis' affidavit annexed to his petition,’ ‘or if he has concealed any part of his estate or effects,’ —with several other similar exceptions.</p> <p>[“The 34th section provides ‘that a discharge duly granted under this act with the exceptions aforesaid, release the bankrupt from all debts, claims, liabilities, and demands which were or might have been proved against his estate in bankruptcy, and may be pleaded by a simple averment that on the day of its date such discharge was granted to him, and the certificate shall be conclusive evidence in favor of such bankrupt of the fact and regularity of such discharge. Always provided that any creditor of said bankrupt, whose debt was proved or provable against the estate in bankruptcy, who shall see fit to contest the validity of such discharge on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained, may, at any time within two years after the date thereof, apply to the court which granted it to set aside and annul the same. Said application shall be in writing, shall specify which, in particular, of the several acts mentioned in section twenty-nine it is intended to give evidence of against the bankrupt,’ etc.; providing also for notice to the bankrupt and for a hearing, ‘and that if the court shall find the fraudulent acts proved, and that the creditor had no ■knowledge of the same till after the granting of said discharge, .-judgment shall be given in favor of such creditor, and the discharge of said bankrupt shall be set aside and annulled.’ -It is to be observed that this section, in making the certificate conclusive, expressly says ‘with the exceptions aforesaid.’ For the defendant it is claimed that the ‘exceptions aforesaid’ must be taken to refer to those only which are contained in section 33. immediately preceding. But we think that they may be taken to refer to all the exceptions to the validity of the discharge which are mentioned in the preceding sections, including section 29.</p> <p>[“The result of the constniction claimed for this defendant would be to enable a bankrupt to secure the benefit of a premature discharge from his creditors, though he may have defrauded them by concealing his property. It may be that the legislature intended to leave tbe creditors no longer time than two years to inquire into the fraud. But it seems to offer a permission to fraud and concealment, which is not to •be looked for in a bankrupt act that professes to discharge a man from his honest debts on the surrender of his property. It has been argued that the bankrupt would not secure the right to keep his property from his creditors if he should succeed in concealing it for two years. This may be true. The assignee would probably be •entitled to recover the concealed property if he could find it. Nevertheless, such a construction of the act as is claimed for the defendant, we think, would encourage fraud. The discharge from personal liability for his debts is the grand object of the bankrupt, and this he is entitled to if he gives up his property. A dishonest bankrupt may hope successfully to conceal his property for two years. If he can secure an effectual discharge, he can afford to run the risk of losing his concealed property after the two years have passed. The creditor would have less motive to detect the fraud upon the law, as he could not thereby deprive the bankrupt of his ill-gotten certificate, or hold him liable personally. We are unwilling to adopt a construction which will so obviously tend to encourage deception and fraud, unless the language of the act clearly requires it.</p> <p>[“It has been the uniform policy of all former bankrupt acts, both in this country and in England, to guard against concealment of property by the bankrupt. The temptation is so strong to hide from his creditors, and his facilities are so great for hiding assets, the existence of which he alone may know, that the severest enactments have not always prevented it. It is not to be presumed that the legislators of the present day would intend to remove any of the guards against temptation and fraud on this critical point. Nor is it to be regarded as a hardship that the bankrupt shall be required to be ready to meet any charge of this kind. The burden of proof is on the creditor who asserts such a concealment; and, if the bankrupt is innocent, he need not be very much embarrassed in his defense.</p> <p>[“We think, therefor, that the provision in the •34th section making the certificate conclusive, and allowing an application within two years in the U. S. district court to annul it, did not intend to cut off a creditor from setting up a fraudulent concealment by the bankrupt of his property, against his certificate, in whatever court he may plead it. Demurrer overruled.”]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,127.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Fremont’s Case.</p> <p>This claim must be confirmed under tbe ruling of the supreme court in Fremont’s Case [17 How. (58 U. S.) 542],</p>

Claim for eight leagues of land in San Joaquin county, rejected by the board, and appealed by claimants [Antonio Maria Pico and others, claiming the Rancho El Pesca-dero].

<p>Claim for eleven leagues of land in Cala-veras county, rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimant [Andres Pico].</p>

Claim for eleven leagues of land in Tuo-lumne counts, rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimants [Francisco Pico and others, claiming the Rancho Las Calave-ras].

Assumpsit on a large number of bills of exchange, drawn on the 4th of July, 1811, by one Pretag in Paris, payable to his own •order, on James Swan, (the deceased,) and accepted by him in Paris, payable in Boston, Massachusetts, at different and distant dates. All of them were indorsed to the plaintiff’s intestate by Pretag, and fell due between February, 1813, and February, 1822; and all of them were dishonored. The whole amount of the bills was about 897,759.

Assumpsit on several bills of exchange, drawn by the defendant [James Swan] in Paris, payable in Boston.

This was a foreign attachment, commonly •called a trustee process [brought by Cyrus B. Piequet]. The principal debtor [James Swan] did'not appear, or make any defence in the cause; and it came on to be heard upon the answers made by the trustees, who denied that they had any property pf the debt- or in their hands liable to attachment; and having made a special disclosure of all' the facts, moved the court for their discharge.

[This was a proceeding by Antonio F. Pic-quet, administrator, against James Swan and trustees.] The trustees were discharged at the last term [Case No. 11,133], and at this term, being the third term since the commencement of the suit, a motion was made, that the defendant be defaulted for his non-appearance, and judgment be given against him for such default according to the usual practice of the state courts of Massachusetts.

[Por former actions at law to obtain judgment on this claim, see Case No. 11,132 and note.] This was the case of a bill in equity, brought by the plaintiff, an alien, and a subject of the Ling of Prance, as administrator ■of Jean Claude .Piequet, late of Paris, in the kingdom aforesaid, deceased, intestate, an ■alien, and also a subject of Prance, against James Swan, who was described in the bill as “a citizen of the United States, who now is, and for the last twenty years…

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] This is a petition, under the second section of the bankrupt act, to review and reverse an order of the district court adjudging the petitioner a bankrupt The petitioning creditors, Sterling Price & Co. charge as an act of bankruptcy that the present petitioner purchased of them three hundred and four bales of cotton at the price of $22.000; that it was expressly agreed…

<p>■ The libel in this case was filed for the recovery of wages, including compensation for short allowance of provisions and water. The libel-lant [William Pielil] alleges that he shipped as an ordinary seaman, in New-York, on board the bark Caroline, of which the respondent [George Balchen] was master, in the month oí October, 1S39. and signed articles for a voyage from New-York to Pernambuco, and thence to a port or ports in Europe and back to New-York, at the rate of ten dollars per month. He further alleges, that he performed the voyage to Pernambuco, and from thence to Ham-burgh, between which two places he was put on short allowance of bread, water and salted provisions for forty-eight days, cáused by the master’s having sold the ship’s provisions at Pernambuco. That the vessel then proceeded from Hamburgh to the Cape de Verd Islands, from thence with a cargo to Rio Janeiro, which was delivered there; thence with another cargo to Monte Video, which was there delivered; thence to Buenos Ayres with a cargo, which was delivered at the latter place. That he was sent ashore several miles from the ship by the master in a small boat, and was, by the violence of the seas, thrown out of it, and greatly injured, by being washed upon the rocks, and, as he imputes, was intentionally abandoned there by the master, where he was impressed into the. naval service of the country; and .he further alleges in detail, great bodily sufferings .and detentions, which prevented his return to New-York until the 25th of July last. The respondents say, in their answer, that “it is true,” as is alleged in the libel, “that in the month of October, 1S39, the barque, then in the port of New-York, and bound on a voyage thence to Pernambuco, and thence to one or more ports in Brazils, thence to Europe, Havana or the United States,” shipped the libellant to serve as an ordinary seaman, for said voyage, at the rate of seven dollars per month wages, and admits that the voyage stated in the libel was performed by the libellant But the answer denies all the allegations of short allowance, cruel treatment, &e., and alleges, in defence of the demand of wages by libellant, that he deserted from the vessel at Buenos Ayres, and thereby forfeited all wages earned previous to such desertion and after the vessel left Hamburgh; and that for the wages earned before the arrival at Hamburgh, he had paid him in full, for which he produced a receipt, dated at Hamburgn, June 29,1840, for nine dollars, in full of all demands against the ship, and proved the handwriting of the subscribing witness to the receipt, who is now dead. Upon these issues the parties went to trial, September term, 1843, and on the oth of October the court rendered a decision in favor of the libellant for wages, at the rate of $10 per month to the termination of the voyage at Hamburgh, and at the rate of $7 per month for the voyage from Ham-burgh to Buenos Ayres, up to the time the li-bellant left the vessel at that port, and denied any compensation for short allowance. The parties moved for a rehearing of the cause. The motion was granted, and the cause was again argued in February term, 1844.</p>

This was a bill in equity by William Frederick Piek, of the kingdom of Holland, and an alien, Henry E. Pierson and Moses Taylor, citizens of the state of New York, holders .of certain bonds issued or guarantied by the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, filed on behalf of themselves and others similarily situated, and also by the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., and the Union Trust Co., corporations organized under the laws of New York, and citizens of that state, being…

[The bankrupt and his wife were examined, and their testimony fully taken touching this property. The assignee claimed it as the property of the bankrupts, or of one of them.] 2 This was a petition by the assignee of the district court for the possession of personal property which it was alleged was in the hands of the bankrupts [Charles L. Pierce and James M. Whaling]. The petition remained unanswered except by the affidavit referred to in the opinion.

The bankrupt firm carried on business in Boston under the style of the Boston Drug Mills, as the successors of an earlier firm, consisting of the two bankrupts and one Lincoln.

The petition in this case was filed on December 31, 1869. The bankrupts [Pierce &. Holbrook] having applied for their discharge, on the day appointed to show cause, October 8, 1869-

<p>[This was a libel by Nelson Pierce and others against the bark Alberto for materials and supplies.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,143.</p> <p>Power op Attorney to Compromise — Satisfaction of Judgment — When Set Aside.</p> <p>An attorney was employed to bring suit and collect the amount due. After obtaining judgment against the defendant, the attorney compromised with the defendant and accepted less than the_ full amount — and entered the judgment full}' satisfied. The attorney failed to turn over the amount received: Held, that plaintiffs were entitled to have the satisfaction set aside, on condition that they would indorse on the judgment the amount received by the attorney.</p>

Libel by [J. G. Pierce and others] the owners of the brig Transit against [J. H. B. Lang and others], the owners of the steamer Oriental, for damage. The brig was lying at the head of the dock at Bartlett’s wharf, in Boston, and the steamer in the corresponding position on the opposite side of the dock.

This was a claim by ['William Pierce] the libellant for wages, amounting to seventy-nine dollars and seventy-eight cents, earned, as he alleged, during a voyage in the brig Enterprise [James Patton, owner], from Philadelphia to St. Jago and back. It appeared that on the outward voyage the vessel touched at Wilmington, in North Carolina, where the libellant was detained a few days in gaol, under the provisions of the act of 20th July, 1790.

[This was an action by George M. Pierce-against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for damages for being ejected from defendant’s train. Heard on demurrer to answer.].

Case by the plaintiffs [Peter H. Pierce and others] against the defendant [Hastings Strickland], a deputy sheriff of the county of… Held: on scire facias, against him, that he was liable for the amount returned. Mild-may v. Smith, 2 Saund. 343; Clerk v. Withers, 2 Ld. Iiaym. 1072, 1 Salk. 322; 6 Mod. 290; Holt, 303, 646. See, also, as to the eon--clusiveness of the return, Drown v. Smith, 3 N. H. 299; Bridge v. Wyman, 14 Mass. 195; Wakefield v. Stedman, 12 Pick. 562.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was an admiralty appeal. The respondents [Nathaniel Winsor and others] chartered of the libellant [Henry A. Pierce] the ship Golden City, for a voyage to San Francisco, and then put her up as a general ship. A quantity of mastic was shipped as freight by the United States government from their works in New York to the fort at Fort Point, San Francisco.

<p>[This was a libel for seamen’s wages by Charles Pierce against the steamboat Victory.]</p>

This was a bill in equity [by John Pier-pont against William B. Fowle], asking for certain disclosures to interrogatories concerning the title, and printing, and sale of the American First Class Book, and the National Reader. It averred, that the copyright in both belonged to the complainant, of the first one for fourteen years from the-22d of June, A. D. 1S37; and of the last one, for fourteen years from the 11th of June, 1841.

The defendants [Nathaniel Winsor and others] chartered of the libellant [Henry A. Pierce] the ship Golden City for a voyage to San Francisco, and then put her up as a general ship. A quantity of mastic was shipped on freight by the United States government from their works at New York to the fort at Fort Point, San Francisco. The mastic was in cakes, and was stowed in bulk in the run.

Opinion and decision upon the hearing of the specifications filed by John A. Harris and Isaac L. Devou, certain creditors of the bankrupt [William H. Pierson] against his discharge.

[In the matter of William H. Pierson, a bankrupt. Por the hearing of the specifications of certain creditors of the bankrupt against his discharge, see Case No. 11,153.]

This was an action of the case brought by the plaintiff [Jeremiah H. Pierson], as as-signee of a patent “for an improvement in the machine for cutting the threads of wood and other screws,” for an infringement of the patent. The patent under which the plaintiff claimed was taken out by one Henry Crum, as the inventor, and bore date November 14th, 1836 [No. 79].

This was an action [by Henry L. Pierson and Samuel Hopkins] to recover back an alleged excess of duties paid to the defendant [Cornelius W. Lawrence], as collector of the port of New York, on certain importations of iron. A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court.

[This was an action by Henry L. Pierson and Samuel Hopkins against Hugh Maxwell, collector of the port of New York, to recover an alleged excess of duties.] This was an action substantially like the case of Pierson v. Lawrence [Case No. 11,-158].

<p>[This was a libel by Jonathan Pierson and others against David Ogden for breach of charter party.)</p>

The plaintiff proved his account, by evidence of the defendant’s acknowledgment of all the items; but, two of them were for the plaintiff’s guarantees for the defendant’s engagements in England, in which the plaintiff, as his surety, had become liable to pay before the bringing of this action: but, no proof of payment was offered, and the plaintiff’s counsel insisted, that the jury ought to presume it.

This was a trial before Judge Pitman and a jury, of issues of fact, arising in a suit in equity brought to restrain the defendant [Asa K. Potter] from infringing upon letters patent [No. 12,030], for an “improvement in processes for curing meats, granted to John C. Sehooley, March 13, 1835, and assigned to complainant [Charles F. Pike].

[This was a bill in equity by Charles F. Pike against the Providence & Worcester Railroad Company and others, to enjoin the infringement of letters patent No. 120.G38, granted to G. H. Griggs, November 7, 1871, reissued September 10, 1872, Nos. 5,050 and 5,051.]

The plaintiffs [Luther H. Pike and others] describe themselves in the bill of complaint as the children and heirs-at-law of Albert Pike, who was formerly a citizen of the state of Arkansas, but is now a'citizen of the state of Tennessee, residing in the city of Washington,” jn the District of Columbia.

Trespass for beating a mare, and breaking her leg with an axe, so that she died. The defendants, Plum and Swann, had been taken different times, and had pleaded severally. offered to examine the defendant Swann as a witness for Plum, the other defendant. objected; and contended that there could be but one judgment, although the verdicts might be several.

<p>Case No. 11,168.</p> <p>Rules op Navigation — Exceptions — Steam ek Meeting Sail Vessel — Answer — When Sufficient — When Sailing Vessel Should Change Her Course.</p> <p>1. There are exceptions to the general rules of navigation, for which no regulations can be provided. Under such circumstances each vessel should be managed with care and skill, to avoid a collision, and if there be a failure to do this, though a vessel be within the rule, she ■ can claim no damages for injuries received. A .strict adherence to the rule, which necessarily leads to a collision, affords no excuse to a vessel.</p> <p>2. A steamer is .equired to give way to a sail vessel; yet, if she cannot do so without peril, the sail vessel must avoid her. It is no objection to the jurisdiction, that the sail vessel was less than twenty tons burden, nor that the collision was near the Canada shore.</p> <p>S. An answer which sets up facts constituting negligence is sufficient, though no fault be formally charged. The rules of pleading in admiralty are less technical than at law.</p> <p>4. The master of a steamer has a right to expect that an approaching sail vessel will change her course if she can do so without risk, and any other course will involve danger of collision.</p> <p>5. No sail vessel which recklessly attempts to cross the line of a steamer when there is no necessity for doing so, and when the steamer could not give way without encountering peril, can be entitled to recover for an injury received.</p> <p>NOTE. See The Delaware [Case No. 3.760]; The Empire State [Id. 4,474]. If the collision is occasioned by an alteration of the course of the sailing vessel, it devolves upon her to prove the necessity or propriety of such movement. If by changing her course without necessity to cross the bow of a steamer, so near to the latter, that stopoing and backing the engine did not avoid a collision, she cannot support an action for the damages thereby occasioned. The William Young [Id. 17,760].</p> <p>Where a vessel is tacking in a river or narrow channel, a vessel approaching her under the pressure of an obligation to avoid her, has, in general, the right to assume that she will beat out her tack; but this presumption must yield to peculiar exigencies. The Vicksburg [Case No. 16.932.] A vessel has a right to assume that other vessels will act in obedience to statute regulations (The Ariadne rid. 525J), and will beat out their tack (The Vicksburg [supra]). As to duty of sailing vessel to beat out her tack, see Whitney v. The Empire State [Case No. 17,586]. As to right so to do, The Argus [Id. 521].</p> <p>Where a steamer and sailing vessel are approaching each other on courses that may lead to a collision, the steamer cannot be excused for holding her way upon the hypothesis and belief, that the sailing vessel cannot with safety to herself keep her tack, but must go about or come into the wind before they meet. The Washington Irving [Case No. 17,243]. A sailing vessel has, however, no right to persist in her course in such a manner as to make a collision probable. or to drive the steamboat into danger or exposure in order to avoid her. The Cornelius C. Vanderbilt [Id. 3,235]. Nor is she entitled to impose upon the steamer the duty to guarantee her against a collision. The New Champion [Id. 10,146].</p>

<p>Case No. 11,169.</p> <p>Bills and Notes — Agreement to Pat — Consideration.</p> <p>Two notes having been given, signed by Ely and Hawes, payable to Walden, Thomas & Co., the notes were indorsed by them, and also by David J. Ely, in blank. Afterward, David J. Ely agreed with Walden, Thomas & Co. on the delivery of the above notes, to pay the amount, as if he had indorsed the notes. Held, that he was liable, the surrender of the notes to him being a valuable consideration.</p>

Bill in equity determined in the circuit court. flie case, as made out in the bill, is mostly admitted in the answer of [Archibald W.j Goodloe, and such allegations as he has denied hare been proved, — -fully and conclusively proved.

<p>Case No. 11,170.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proceedings to Discover Assets —Commenced after Fifty Years.</p> <p>[The lapse of fifty years after an assignment in bankruptcy should bar proceedings to discover assets not disposed of by the assignee.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 11,171a.</p> <p>Prize — Enbmt Property — Coxdemnatiox.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property because belonging to resident citizens of the enemy's country.</p> <p>[Cited in The Amy Warwick, Case No. 341.]</p> <p>NOTE. The decree in this case was affirmed by the circuit court, on appeal, July 17, 1SG3. [Case No. 11,174.] Afterwards, further proofs were, on leave, put in by the claimants, in the circuit court, and on a further hearing the decree of the district court was again affirmed by the circuit court, November 25, 1803. [Id. 11,-jli5.]</p> <p>[Pending the appeal, the district court, on the consent of all parties, directed the prize commissioners to sell the cargo and vessel, and to bring the proceeds of sale into court. Case No. 11,172.]</p>

It appearing to the court that the cargo of the prize vessel herein is of a perishable character, and that both vessel and cargo are .suffering, and will be subject to much deterioration in their condition and value, pending the appeal of the claimants from the decree of condemnation [see Case No. 11,171a] thereof, it is ordered that the prize commissioners of this court do forthwith take into their possession the said bark Pioneer, and her cargo laden on board, and procure…

<p>Case No. 11,173.</p> <p>Prize — -Enemy Propertt.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] The vessel and cargo in this case were condemned by the district court Case No. 11,-171a. Pending this appeal, the district court, by cohsent of all parties, ordered the prize commissioners to sell the vessel and cargo, and to bring the proceeds into court. Case No. 11,172.

<p>Case No. 11,176.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages— Misconduct as Cause.of For-fettuke — Inpertinent Allegations —Exceptions.</p> <p>1. Exception for impertinence to an allegation in an answer which serves no legal purpose, and is a mere slur upon the libellant, allowed.</p> <p>2. An allegation of misconduct on the part of an engineer as a cause of forfeiture of wages must state the particular acts of misconduct relied on, with the circumstances of time and place.</p> <p>[Cited in The Maria, Case No. 9,075.]</p> <p>[See The Almatia, Case No. 254.]</p> <p>3. C. brought suit against the steamboat P. for wages as engineer; the claimant in its answer set up that prior to the commencement of such suit, it had commenced an action against C. in the territory of Washington, to recover damages for injuries to the steamboat P., caused by the misconduct of the latter as engineer thereon, and caused a garnishee process to be served upon IC, the master, and sometime owner of the steamboat P. during the period that C. was employed upon her as engineer: .Held, on exception that the allegation was impertinent.</p> <p>[Cited in The Tom Lysle, 48 Fed. 692.]</p> <p>[There was a decree in favor of the libellant for $583.33%. Case No. 11,177.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 11,177.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Inland Waters — Doubtful Contract —Wage Rate — Misconduct—Puiob Voyage — Contract Prohibited by Statute.</p> <p>1. Rule of ascertaining rate of wages of seaman, where the contract is doubtful, in case of an engineer on inland waters, commented on and applied.</p> <p>2. Misconduct by seaman upon one voyage does not enure to die benefit of the owner so as to forfeit wages earned upon another; in this respect the case of monthly hirings, although continuous, upon river boats, likened to separate voyages at sea.</p> <p>3. A party cannot recover upon a contract prohibited by statute, although the statute contain no express declaration that such contract shall be void; therefore when libellant served as an engineer upon a steamboat from November 8, 1862, to July 13, 1863, without being licensed therefor by the United States inspectors, he could not recover wages for such service, because it was within the prohibition of section 9. subsec. 10, of die act of August 30, 1852 (1Ó Stat. 67).</p> <p>[Cited in Harding v. Hagar, 63 Mé. 517.]</p> <p>4.Appropriation of payments — the rule stated and applied.</p> <p>PIONEER, The See Case No. 6.451.</p>

[This was a bill by Edwin L. Piper, as-signee of Levi Berger, a bankrupt, against E. H. Baldy, to set aside certain judgments obtained by the said Baldy against the bankrupt.]

3 [This was a bill in equity filed to restrain the defendants from infringing two letters-patent. one for an “improvement in the method of preserving fish, and other articles.” granted to complainant [Enoch Piper] March 19, 1801 [No. 31,730], and the other for an “improvement in apparatus for preserving animal and vegetable substances,” granted to him August 5, 1802 [No. 30,107].

[This was a bill in equity by James Brown and others against Enoch Piper. The court held complainant entitled to an injunction and account.

<p>3 [Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs.</p> <p>[Suit brought [by Enoch Piper against George T. Moon and others] on letters patent [No. 31,730] for “improvement in the method of preserving fish,” granted to complainant March 19, 1861.</p> <p>[A suit upon the same letters patent will be found reported in the ease of Piper v. Brown [Case No. 11,180].</p> <p> </p> <p>[The above engraving shows the apparatus used by complainant, and described, by words and drawing, in his letters patent. A is a box of wood, or other suitable material, in which the fish are laid, in small quantities, on a rack, R. This box is surrounded by a packing of charcoal or other suitable nonconducting material. 1, 2, 3, 4 are metallic pans, which, being filled with a freezing mixture, such as salt and ice, are then set over the fish, and the cover A is shut upon them. C is the large preserving-box in which the fish are afterward packed, and B the larger box in which C is inclosed. The space between these boxes is designed to be filled with charcoal or other non-conducting material. D, D, D are metallic tubes, opening at the upper ends, for the introduction of the freezing mixture; a, a are slats, which may be removed at pleasure, for the purpose of putting in or taking out the fish. B' is the cover of the outer box, and is provided with holes, D', through which the tubes may project, so as to be charged with the freezing mixture when the box is closed. The mode of using this apparatus is more fully described in the opinion of the court below.] 3</p>

Burrington Anthony, lately marshal of the United States for the district of Rhode Island, filed liis jietition, stating that, as marshal, he received from the treasuiy of the United States, and jiaid to [John T. Pitman] the clerk of this court large sums of money, from time to time claimed by him for feus due to him from the Uuited States; that subsequently. on a settlement of his accounts witli tlie treasury, various items of the clerk’s accounts, which had been thus jiaid,…

<p>Case No. 11,184a.</p> <p>Forcible Entry — Possession—Trespass by Landlord for Injury to Tenant.</p> <p>1. The landlord cannot maintain trespass for an injury to his tenant, and on the same principle the tenant only can have a writ of forcible entry and detainer against one who expels him from the tenement.</p> <p>2. Actual possession is absolutely necessary to enable a plaintiff to maintain an action for forcible entry and detainer, and constructive possession is not sufficient.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Libel for mariner’s wages.

The parties in this case diff not agree, as to the extent of the decree pronounced at a former term. See [Case No. 11,185]. The libellant [John Pitman] understood it to have been the intention of the court, to decree payment of the whole amount of wages from half the time the vessel remained in Russia, to the time of the arrival of the seamen in the United States.

<p>Case No. 11,187.</p> <p>Mauitime Liens — Undek State Laws — Cabin Furniture.</p> <p>[Labor and supplies to burnish a passenger steamer’s cabin give rise to a lien under the New York statute.]</p>

L. C. Potter made proof of a debt of $387.25 against the bankrupt’s estate, to which the assignee objected on the ground that the claim was usurious and illegal. On April 10, 1873, the bankrupt and creditor were examined before the register in relation to the matter, from which it appeared that: “On October 13, 1872, Potter came into Robert Pittock’s store on Front street, and asked Pittock if he wanted some money.

<p>Case No. 11,188.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Amendment op Petition.</p> <p>A petition in bankruptcy against a firm, naming only two partners of the firm and omitting the third member, cannot be amended so as to make the third member a party, after all the testimony has been taken and the cause is before the court upon hearing; and upon a petition so defective, the firm cannot be adjudicated '.bankrupts.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,190.</p> <p>Bankruptcy— Effect of Discharge upon Debt Fraudulently Contracted — Execution—Stay.</p> <p>A. creditor of the bankrupt, prior to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, recovered judgment in an action for goods sold and delivered. An order of arrest was granted in such action on affidavits showing that the credit given was induced by false representations made by the bankrupt as to his credit and means. An appeal from this order was not finally determined until after the proceedings in bankruptcy had been commenced, when it was .affirmed. Held, that such a debt, even after judgment, is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, and that, as there %vas a final judgment before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, a stay of proceedings which would prevent the issue of an execution against the person of the bankrupt was not authorized by sec-section 510U.</p> <p>[For demurrer to specifications in opposition to bankrupt’s discharge, see 8 Fed. 263.]</p>

This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain the infringement of letters patent granted to William Woodworth, December 27, 1828, for improvements in planing and tonguing and grooving machines, more particularly referred to in the case of Foss v. Herbert [Case No. 4,957]. The complainant shows a prima facie case of exclusive right, exemplification of the letters patent, and the defendant’s stipulation as to title. Act 1836, § 4 (5 Stat 117); Curt.

This was an action on the case [by John A. Pitts against Joseph Hall], tried before Mr. Justice NELSON and Judge CONK-LING, for the infringement of letters patent [No. 4,505] granted to Daniel Carey, of Clark-son, N. Y., June 27th, 1846, for an “improvement in the horse-power.” The plaintiff was assignee of the patent, for the state of New-York. The infringement alleged was the making and selling horse-powers containing the patented improvement.

This was an action on the case for the infringement of letters patent [No. 542] granted to the plaintiffs [John A. and Hiram A. Pitts] in the year 1837, and extended for seven years, in 1851, under the 18th section of the act of July 4,1836 (0 Stat 124).

This was an action on the case tried by Judge DIIUMMOND and a jury, for the infringement of a patent issued to Hiram A. and John A. Pitts, December 29, 1837 [No. 542], and assigned to plaintiff for “a new and useful improvement in machines for threshing and cleaning grain.” The specification of Pitts set forth that the inventors “had invented a new and improved combination of maehinei'y for separating grain from the straw and chaff as it proceeds from the threshing machine.”…

[This was an action on the case by Pitts & Pitts against Wemple and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 542, granted to H. & J. Pitts, December 29, 1837.]

This was a case for the infringement of a patent granted to Hiram A. Pitts and John A. Pitts, as inventors of “a new and useful improvement in the machine for threshing and cleaning grain.” The… Held: and is well settled law, that notice or even possession is equivalent to registry. Priest v. Rice, 1 Pick. 165; and see Brooks v. Byam [Case No. 1,947].

<p>Case No. 11,197.</p> <p>Power op Railroad Corporations in Indiana to Execute Leases — Place op Execution — Power to Lease Railroads in Ohio — Eviction— Mortgage — Decree op Sale —Stipulation in Lease — Classipication op Railroad Indebtedness — Time op Performance — Rescission op-Conthact — Construction of Contracts.</p> <p>1. There being no statute in Indiana which in terms forbids or prohibits railroad corporations of that state from executing leases of their property, a lease made by such a corporation, and which is neither in violation of any statute, nor against the public policy of the state, is valid.</p> <p>2. The laws of Indiana, and the decisions in that state bearing upon this point, considered.</p> <p>3. One of the defendant corporations — a corporation of the state of Indiana — leased its lines to the plaintiff — a corporation of the state of Ohio. The lease was made for the purpose of forming a connecting lino of travel and traffic: Meld, that such lease was not in contravention of the statutes or public policy of Indiana, and that the lessor corporation had power to execute it.</p> <p>4. It is not essential to the validity of such a lease, (in the absence of express statutory provision,) that its original execution or subsequent purification should have been evidenced by corporate action taken by the lessor within the limits of the state by which it is created.</p> <p>5. The lessee corporation was not forbidden by the laws of Ohio to take the lease in question, of tlie road in Indiana.</p> <p>6. An unexecuted decree, for the sale of a portion of the demised railroad, for the purpose of satisfying a mortgage made prior to the lease, is not such an eviction of the lessee, by paramount title, as to termínale the lease.</p> <p>[Cited in Moran v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 32 Fed, 888.]</p> <p>7. So, also, the appointment of receivers for the lessor corporation, but with instructions not to disturb the possession of the lessee, is not an eviction.</p> <p>8. A stipulation by the lessor corporation to arrange, provide for. adjust and classify its indebtedness, was held to be one of substance which it must perform.</p> <p>0. And the lessee is not bound to wait for an indefinite or an unreasonable time for such arrangement, adjustment and classification of the lessor’s indebtedness, to be effected. *</p> <p>10. But in such ease, where the lessee has acted under the lease before such arrangement and classification has been made, the court will not decree a rescission of the contract upon the application of such lessee, until the lessor is given a reasonable time within which to comply with the stipulation; especially, where by the frame of its hill of complaint, the lessee has prayed for a rescission, unless the lessor shall specifically perform within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court.</p> <p>11. In thiB case the court considered that eight months from the date of the order would be a reasonable time within which the lessor should carry out the agreement.</p> <p>12. Contracts, when their meaning is not clear, are to be construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties when they were made, and the practical interpretation i which they by their conduct have given to the j provisions in controversy. ¡</p>

<p>Case No. 11,198.</p> <p>Conditional Sale — Pledge—Poweb or National Banks to Take Pledges of Chattels.</p> <p>1. A locomotive was leased by the manufacturers to a railroad .corporation in Iowa, by an instrument in writing not recorded, for a sum equal to its value, to be paid in nine months; otherwise the manufacturers were to have the right to re-possess the same. The lessee pledged the locomotive to a bank to secure a loan of money. Held, under section 1922 of the Iowa Code (1873), which requires contracts for the conditional sale of chattels to be recorded in order to be valid against creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice, that the pledgee’s right was superior to that of the manufacturers.</p> <p>2. A national bank may take a pledge of chattels as security for money lent.</p> <p>NOTE. In Shoemaker v. Mechanics’ Nat. Bank [Case No. 12,801], decided in the Maryland circuit, it was held by Mr. District Judge Giles that a national bank has power to lend money on a note or other personal obligation secured by a pledge of stock of a corporation as collateral security.</p> <p>[This cause was carried by writ of error, to the supreme court, where it was heard on a motion to dismiss the case. The motion was granted. 154 U. S. 026. 14 Sup. CL 1180.]</p>

The libel in this case was filed July 21,1S51, against the steamer Pizarro, for damages occasioned by a collision with the schooner Thomas Conner.

<p>Case Wo. 11,200.</p> <p>Appeal in Bankruptcy — Failure to Comply with Requirements of Act — Review— Act March 2. 1867.</p> <p>1. The claim of a creditor of a bankrupt was rejected by the district court. Within ten days after the decree to that effect, the creditor claimed an appeal from such decision, and gave notice thereof, as required by section 8 of the bankruptcy act of March 2d, 1807 (14 Stat. 520), but he did not file in this court the statement required by section 24 of the act and rule 20 of the general orders in bankruptcy, nor enter the appeal in this court during the ten days limited by said rule 2G. Meld, that the appeal must be dismissed.</p> <p>[Cited in Re McEwen, 4 Fed. 16.]</p> <p>2. After the expiration of ten days from the time of giving notice of the appeal, the creditor filed, in this court, a petition for the review of such decision of the district court: Held, that such decision could be reviewed only by an appeal taken in the manner prescribed by sections 8 and 24 of the act and said rule 26, whereon a trial by jury could be had in this court.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Joseph. Case No. 7,532; Thistle v. Hamilton, Id. 13.884.]</p> <p>3. Such petition for a review could not be treated as the statement so required, even assuming that it was filed within the time prescribed.</p> <p>[This cause was again heard on appeal, when the apnea l was dismissed, without costs. Case No 11,201.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of James K. Place and James D. Sparkman, bankrupts.]</p>

The steamboat City of Norwich, while on a voyage from New London to New York, on the 18th day of April, I860, collided with a schoon•er Gen. Van Vliet — was seriously injured and set on fire thereby, and finally sank. She was afterwards raised and repaired, • and was then seized in this action, which was brought by [George Place,] a freighter to recover of the vessel the sum of 8S.000 as damages, occasioned by loss of cargo in the collision and fire •above mentioned.

Libel for collision. The facts conceded and the facts proved to the satisfaction of the court were substantially these: The schooner Stella, of 176 tons burden, was pursuing her voyage from Buffalo to Milwaukee, when, for want of wind, she came to anchor at midday, in the St. Clair river, above Port Huron, about 400 feet from the American' shore, the river being at that point about 1,500 feet wide, and the current nearly five miles an hour.

The libellant, a boy of about nineteen years of age, shipped at St. John, N. B., his native place, for a voyage described in the articles as being from St John to the West Indies, thence to Sydney, and thence to St. John. Instead of returning to St John, however, the vessel came to Boston. On arriving here the boy demanded his discharge and wages; both which were refused him. The master also refused to give up his clothes.

<p>In equity. Submitted for final decree upon pleadings and evidence.</p>

A libel was filed on the 10th of December, 1830, by William L. Howard and Francois Va-rion, shipwrights, residing in New Orleans, against the steamboat Planter (Sylvan Pey-roux, claimant), claiming the sum of two thousand one hundred and ninety-three dollars and thirty-five cents, being the balance asserted to be due to them for the price of work, labor, materials furnished, and repairs made on the said boat, under contracts of 13th September and 19th October, 1830, and…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of Alabama.] On November 7, 1871, the libellant, the West India and Pacific Steamship Transportation Company, Limited, had possession of and a special ownership in 889 bales of cotton in the city of New Orleans, which it desired to have transported and delivered to the steamship Australian, lying in Mobile Bay.

The facts, as disclosed by the evidence, were substantially as follows: Before the late war of Rebellion the plaintiff was an incorporated bank, domiciled at Nashville, Tennessee, and St. John, Powers & Co., was-a firm of private bankers doing business in Mobile, Alabama. The firm consisted of Newton St. John, Benj. Whitaker and Wm. G. Chandler, all of whom were resident citizens of Mobile. On the 29th of May, 1861, on account of the war which had then recently broken out.

<p>Case No. 11,209.</p> <p>Patents — Validity op Reissue — Anticipation— Improved Roofing Composition.</p> <p>1. The reissued patent granted to William L. Totter. July 16, 1867, for an “improved composition for roofing and other purposes,” as limited by disclaimer of May 10, 1871, held valid for the use for roofing purposes of pulverized argillaceous rock mixed with coal-tar to the consistency of plasterer’s mortar.</p> <p>2. An invention consisting in the use for a roofing, of a mixture of pulverized argillaceous rock and coal-tar, of the consistency of plasterer’s mortar, hardening on exposure into a solid slate roof, is not anticipated by prior use of thin mixtures of pulverized slaty material and oil or coal-tar, as paints for the sides and roofs of buildings.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,310.</p> <p>Admiraltt— State Claim — Pleading and Proof -Set-Off in Cause of Damage — Abduction of Minor — Advances for Clothing.</p> <p>1. In the admiralty, when the respondent intends to rely on the objection of the staleness of the claim, or any other defence that does not go to the merits, it should be propounded by formal plea, or by a distinct allegation in the answer. Otherwise, evidence will not ordinarily be received to support it.</p> <p>[Cited in The G. H. Starbuck. Case No. 5.S78. Southard v. Brady, 36 Bed. 561; The Queen of the Pacific, 61 Fed. 215.]</p> <p>2. A set-off, or compensation founded on contract, express or implied, is no defence to a libel in a cause of damage. But in a suit by a parent for the wrongful abduction of his minor son, where the damage, substantially, is loss of service, the court is not absolutely precluded from taking into consideration, in determining the amount of damage, the advances of clothing and other necessaries for the minor during the time.</p> <p>[3. Cited in Cutting v. Seabury, Case No. 3,-521, to the point that knowledge of the minority by the respondent is essential to the maintenance of an action by a father for the loss of his minor son.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of the petition of John E. Platt and Edward A. Boyd.]</p>

[This was an action by John H. Platt, as-signee in bankruptcy of the Stuyvesant Bank, against Oliver H. P. Archer.] [Points for Plaintiff. 2 [First. — The appointment of Mr. Archer as receiver of the property of the bankrupt was. equivalent to .an assignment, transfer and conveyance by the bankrupt to him, because [1.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by John H. Platt, as assignee in bankruptcy of the Stuyvesant Bank, against Oliver H. P. Archer. See Cases Nos. 13.5S1 and 11,213.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,315.</p> <p>Banking Act — Receiver— United States Officer—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. A. receiver of a national bank, appointed under the thirty-first section of the national banking act (13 Stat. 99), is an officer of the United States.</p> <p>(Cited in Stanton v. Wilkeson, Case No. 13,-299; Frelinghuysen v. Baldwin, 12 Fed. 397.]</p> <p>(Cited in McCormick v. Thatcher, 8 Utah, 291, 30 Pac. 1093.]</p> <p>2. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction of an action at common law. brought bv such receiver (Act March 3, 1815, § 4 [3 Stat 245]), to collect a claim which was due to the bank at the time of his appointment.</p> <p>[Cited in Frelinghuysen v. Baldwin. 12 Fed. 397; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. 508; Stephens v. Berna vs. 41 Fed. 402; Fisher v. Yoder, 53 Fed. 5G5.J</p>

This action is brought by the receiver of the Farmers’ and Citizens’ National Bank, to recover the amount of a promissory note, made and indorsed by the defendants. It now comes before the court upon a motion for judgment upon a verdict for the plaintiff, which was taken by direction of the court subject to the opinion of the court.

[This was a suit by John H. Platt, assignee in bankruptcy of John Dickenson, against Thomas Dickenson and others to set aside a conveyance and to enjoin an execution sale, etc.]

This was an action by [Obadiah H. Platt] endorsee against acceptor, on the following draft: “ipl.CIS 73. Poughkeepsie, N. Y., March 1st, 1844. Five months after date, pay to my order, at the Union Bank in the city of Xew York, sixteen hundred and seventy-eight 73-100 dollars, for value received, and place to the account of your obed’t servant, Franklin Merrill. “Mr. Chauncey Jerome, New Haven. Ct.” (Endorsed^: “Franklin Merrill. Pay N. G. Ogden, Esq., Cashier.

This was a bill filed May 22, 1847, praying, for an injunction against the respondent. But a discontinuance has been since entered as to Amory S. Houghton. The injunction desired was against the sale of a certain tract of land situated in Cambridge, in this state, which had been advertised by David McClure, under a power to sell inserted in a mortgage of the premises. The bill averred, that one Dallinger was the owner of these premises and conveyed the same to Adam Hoit.

Plaintiff filed in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York a lis pen-dens upon certain property held by defendant. Defendant moved for an order that the plaintiff release the property to the extent of enabling the defendant to make a mortgage upon it.

<p>Case No. 11,219.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Assignment without Prefehences —Preference—Mortgage—Injunction—Receiver— Mcltifariousness of Bill.</p> <p>1. A general assignment for the benefit of creditors without preferences is necessarily a fraud under the bankrupt law [of 1807 (14 Stat. 517)].</p> <p>[Cited in Welil v. Wald, 3 Fed. 93.]</p> <p>2. The bankrupt, who was a brewer, in March, 1878, gave to one P. a chattel mortgage for thirty thousand dollars on his machinery and other personal property, to secure payment of _ an amount then due, and also for future consignments of malt. This mortgage was not filed, and on the 14th of August was assigned by P. to one W., who gave therefor his promissory notes for thirty thousand dollars. W. had not sufficient means to pay said notes, unless the mortgaged property proved to be nearly worth the amount he gave for it. At the time of this assignment the bankrupt was insolvent. W. filed the mortgage on the 15th of August, foreclosed it, and, at the sale on the 20th, purchased the property for thirteen thousand dollars. On the same day the bankrupt leased the brewery for an alleged adequate rent to W., who took possession, and carried on the business in the name of the bankrupt’s son. On the same day also the bankrupt made a general assignment to one D., his bookkeeper, and a person of no pecuniary means, who never gave the bond required by law. On the 31st of August a petition was filed by creditors, on which the bankrupt was adjudicated. On a motion for an injunction and a receiver, made in a suit brought by the assignee to recover the property, held, that the motion should be granted; that the bill was not multifarious, the acts of all the defendants being charged to have been done with a common purpose, and the object of the bill being single, viz. to recover the estate and clear it of the apparent encumbrances created by the several instruments sought to be set aside.</p> <p>[Cited in Van Kleeck v. Miller, Case No. 16,-860.]</p> <p>3. The assignment and lease were clearly indicative of actual fraud on the creditors.</p> <p>4. While the mortgage was not a fraudulent preference under the bankrupt law, by reason of its subsequent filing, or of its being kept secret to induce credit, yet, under the laws of New York, it was void as to creditors, and their rights as to the property covered by it passed to the as-signee, and can be enforced by him.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Oliver, Case No. 10,492; Wait v. Bull’s Head Bank, Id. 17,043; Wehl v. Wald, 3 Fed. 93; Re Kraft; 4 Fed. 524.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Diekelman subsequently died and the cause was revived against his administrator. Upon the final hearing the bill was dismissed as to I'reston and Weinfeld. The charge of fraud was not proved as against them. As to Diekelman's administrator.no order was entered, the case not being ready for hearing. 3 Fed. 394. From this decree the plaintiff took an appeal to the circuit court. It was there heard upon motion to dismiss. 8 Fed. 182.)</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by John H. Platt, assignee in bankruptcy of Simeon Leland & Co., against Alexander T. Stewart and others. For a hearing on the subject of compensation of sheriff, see Case No. 11,221.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,321.</p> <p>Bankkcptct — Sheriff’s Fees — Friok Executions.</p> <p>1. The sheriff is entitled to compensation for services rendered by him under executions issued against the bankrupt before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, out of the proceeds of the personal estate: such compensation not to exceed the fees legally taxable under the laws of the state of New York.</p> <p>2. No compensation can be allowed in respect to executions issued subsequent to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.</p> <p>[See Case No. 8,228.]</p>

[In equity. Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 56.261] for an “improvement in buttons, granted to complainant [Clark M. Platt], July 10, 1866. [a, plate; 2, 2, folded edge; 3, central hole. [The nature of the invention is illustrated by the accompanying engraving, and an abstract of the specification, together with the claim -of the patent, will be found in the opinion of the court.] 2

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.) The plaintiff [Preston Player] is the as-signee in bankruptcy of Benjamin R. Lippin-cott, and brought this suit to set aside a chattel mortgage, dated November 15th. 1870, recorded November 18th of the same year, executed by the bankrupt to the defendants. On final hearing the bill was dismissed by the district court, and the assignee appeals.

This was a bill in equity [by Preston Player against Lippincott & Co. and others] to set aside a chattel mortgage.

<p>Case Wo. 11,286.</p> <p>Collision is Hunsox River — Tug and Tow — Lights — Steam Vessels Crossing.</p> <p>1. The tug S. R., a small tug about sixty feet long, was coming down the Hudson river, towing two canal-boats, one on each side of her, their bows projecting beyond her bow. Her pilot saw a steamboat, the P. V., coming up the river on his port hand, and, when about half a mile off, heading across the river towards him. He kept on his course till the P. V. was but a short distance from him, when she headed more across his bows. He then blew a whistle and rang the bells to stop and back his boat, but, before it could be done, the P. V. ran into the tow, striking the canal-boat which was on the port side of the tug, on her port side, and sinking her almost instantly, and also striking the other canal-boat so violent a blow that she also sank soon after. The owner of the two canal-boats filed a libel against the tug and the steamboat, charging that both vessels were in fault, the P. V. in that she had no proper lookout, and did not see the tug and tow as soon as she should, and improperly changed her course, and did not stop and back in time; and the S. R. in that she did not stop and back in time, and did not give any signal to the P. Y. till the vessels were close together. The answer of the tug alleged no fault in the canal-boats, but- claimed that the P. V. alone was in fault, alleging against her the faults charged in the libel, and also that her pilot was incompetent. The answer of the steamboat alleged that the collision was due to fault in the tug and tow, in that they had no lights set, although it was then very dark, so dark that the pilot of the P. V. was unable to see the tow till it was near, and then, from seeing no lights, supposed it was a tow going from him, and could not discover that the tow was coming towards him. till the collision was inevitable, when he rang his bells to stop and back, which was all, he could do. Neither steamboat, nor tug, nor canal-boats had any lights set, and as to the time of the collision and the darkness of the hour, which was not, however, far from sunset, there was a great conflict of evidence. Held, that, on the evidence, the pilot of the P. V. was not incompetent or inattentive.</p> <p>2. On the evidence, when the collision took place, it was already so dark that the pilot of the P. V., looking down upon the water, was unable to see the tug and tow sooner than he did, and was misled, by the absence of the lights on the tug, into the supposition that they were going away from him instead of coming towards him.</p> <p>3. The tug was in fault in not having lights set, as required by law, either on herself, or on either of the canal-boats.</p> <p>4. The P. V. could take advantage of the fact of negligence on the part of the tug in not showing lights, as a defence on her own part, although such negligence was not set np in the libeL</p> <p>5. The pilot of the tug was in fault in not sooner signalling the P. V., to give her notice of the presence of the tow by his whistle, in the absence of lights.</p> <p>6. The change of course of the P. V. by star-hoarding, if made before her pilot was aware of the presence of the tow, was not such a change of course as is forbidden by the rules for avoiding collisions; and, if made after such discovery, was made in extremis, under the apprehension caused by the sudden near approach of the tug, for which the latter was liable, by reason of her having no lights and giving no signal.</p> <p>7. The absence of a lookout on the P. Y. outside of her pilot-house, was not a fault contributing to the collision.</p> <p>8. Neither the thirteenth nor the fourteenth rules for avoiding collisions were applicable to the course of the P. V.</p> <p>9. The tug was in fault in not having lights, in not sooner signalling the P. V., and in not sooner stopping and backing.</p> <p>10. The libellants were entitled to a decree against the tug alone, and the libel against the P. Y. must be dismissed.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,227.</p> <p>Baxkuuptcy — Informalities in the Petition.</p>

Two cases in previous parts of these Reports (White v. Brown [Case No. 17,538], and Aspden’s Estate [Id. 5S9]) give an account of Mathias Aspden and his estate.

Information under section 2S of the act of 1799, for receiving a quantity of Canadian liquors from the bark Fame, while lying moored at Port Huron, without a permit from an officer of the customs. [There was a decree of condemnation, under section 1, Act March, 1S21. Case No. 4,633.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] The brigantine Ploughboy was seized and libelled, for proceeding to a foreign port, to wit, the Havanna, contrary to the third section of the act of 9th January,' 1808 [2 Stat. 453] c. 8.

<p>Case No. 11,231.</p> <p>Partnership Adjudication — Discharge op Individuals.</p> <p>1. Where an individual member of a copart-nership is adjudged a bankrupt, without any adjudication against the copartnership, or against the other partners in the copartnership, inasmuch as the assignee of the individual cannot administer the estate of the copartnership, or call third persons to an account for partnership property, the estate of the firm is not in the bankruptcy court in any such wise as to rantv a discharge of the individual operative in respect to the debts of the firm, provided there me assets of the firm when the bankruptcy proceedings are instituted.</p> <p>2. Adjudication of the members of a firm, by adjudication of one member of it in one proceeding, and of the remaining members of it in a separate proceeding, with such effect as to bring the firm into bankruptcy, is a thing not contemplated by the statute (section 36 of the act of March 2d, 1867. now section 5121 of the Revised Statutes), nor by general orders Nos. 36 and 18. The adjudication must be made in one proceeding and on one petition, and the two petitions cannot be consolidated. Therefore, the individual member cannot, in his proceeding, be discharged from the debts he owes as a member of the copartnership, and he must, in a given proceeding, be discharged from all his debts or from none.</p> <p>[Cited in Re White, Case No. 17,533; Re Henry, Id. 6,370.]</p>

Bill in equity [by Patience C. B. Plummer against the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company] to obtain a settlement of accounts, and for an injunction to restrain the prosecution of certain actions at law by the defendant corporation. The defendant demurred to the bill, upon the ground that the complainant had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. [For an action at law between the same parties, see Case No. 3,-106.]

Libel in the admiralty in personam. The allegations in the libel stated, that the infant son of the plaintiff [Moses Plummer] was shipped, with the consent of the plaintiff, on board of a vessel of which the defendant [Michael Webb] was master, on a certain voyage described in the libel, and proceeded to give an historical detail of certain gross misconduct, ill usage, and cruel treatment, on the part of the master, towards the son of the plaintiff; that his health was…

This was a libel filed by Moses Plummer against the respondents, the master and first aiid second mates of the brig Romulus, for various assaults and batteries alleged to have been made on John S. Plummer, the minor son of tlie libellant.

<p>Case No. 11,236.</p> <p>Supplies — N ecessaries — Lien.</p> <p>1. A steamboat, which made several trips a day from New York City to Sandy Hook, a voyage of about an hour and a quarter, kept a restaurant on board, at which food was supplied to such passengers as wished. The money received at the restaurant was received by the purser as part of the daily earnings of the boat. The crew of the boat were fed at the restaurant. Supplies for this restaurant were furnished to the boat at the city of New York, the boat being there a foreign vessel. The person who furnished the supplies filed a libel against the boat to recover their value. Eeld, that the supplies were necessary to the boat, and that the libel-lant had a lien upon her therefor.</p> <p>[Cited in Harney v. The Sydney L. "Wright, Case No. 6,082a; The New Champion, 17 Fed. 816.]</p> <p>2. Articles, which form part of the natural and reasonable outfit of a ,vessel, for the business in which she is engaged, áre necessaries.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this court was affirmed. Case No. 11,237.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,236.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — Presumption op Credit.</p> <p>When the master of a foreign vessel has authority to contract upon the credit of his vessel for necessary repairs, the credit of the vessel is presumed to be an element in any contract he may make for such repairs. An apparent necessity for the credit of the vessel is presumed from the necessity for the repairs and the general authority of the master. This presumption is not repelled hy proof that the owner of the vessel was in good credit at the time the repairs were ordered.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,237.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Supplies—Effect of Owner’s Besidence upon Character of Vessel — Enrollment — Necessity for the Supplies.</p> <p>1. A new Jersey corporation owned a steamboat which was enrolled in the port of New York. She ran as a passenger boat between the city of New York and Long Branch, in New Jersey, making several trips a day each way. Supplies of food were furnished to her in New York, on her credit, such supplies not being absolutely necessary for the passengers or crew, but being useful and convenient. Some of the food was consumed by the employés of the vessel, but the larger part was dispensed at a restaurant on board, to passengers, who paid for what they ordered. Held, the enrollment of the vessel at New York did not make her a domestic vessel there, but she was a vessel in a foreign port, while in New York, because her owner did not reside at New York.</p> <p>[Cited in The Bapid Transit, 11 Fed. 330; Chisholm v. The J. L. Pendergast, 32 Fed. 416; The Havana, 54 Fed. 202, 64 Fed. 496.]</p> <p>2. There waa sufficient necessity ’for the supplies to furnish a basis for a Hen on the vessel, and the fact that they were dispensed to passengers from a restaurant furnishes no ground for alleging that such necessity did not exist.</p> <p>[Cited in Harney v. The Sydney L. Wright, Case No. 6,082a; Bovard v. The Mayflower, 89 Fed. 42.]</p> <p>S. A lien on the vessel for such supplies was created.</p> <p>[Followed in The Metropolis, Case No. 9,503; The Long Branch, Id. 8,484.]</p>

<p>[These were libels by John Poag and ■ethers, and by Newell Chamberlain, owner of the canal boat S. K. Williams, against the -steamboat General McDonald, for negligence in towing. Heard on objection to the jurisdiction.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>[This was a libel by John Poag and others against the General McDonald for negligence in towing. From a decree of the district court dismissing the libel (Case No. 11,238), libelants appeal.]</p>

Motion to amerce the marshal, the baiR named in the recognizance taken before justices of the peace, being alleged to be insufficient.

This was an action at law [by Peter roillon against Joseph Schmidt] for the infringement of letters patent [No. 17,855] granted to the plaintiff on the 21st of July, 1857, for a new and useful “means for rendering joints steam-tight.” The invention was made by William S. Gale, and assigned to the plaintiff.

On petition of libelants to permit themselves to be sworn as witnesses in their own behalf. This was a libel for services rendered in towing the barge Poland from Port Huron to East Saginaw. Held: that the case fell within the proviso of section 858 of the Revised Statutes, and that they could not testify as to any transactions with or statements by the deceased claimant. The trial was then stopped, and the case ordered reheard at the next term of court.

<p>[This was a libel by Nathan W. Poland against the Maryland Coal Company for freight.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,245.</p> <p>Charter Party — Construction — Duty to Furnish Cargo — Lay Days.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel was chartered for “a series of voyages” from G. to W., from May 2d to November 1st, with coal as a cargo, each trip, for a compensation per ton of coal, the charterer was not bound to furnish a cargo, at G., on October 19th, unless there was reasonable cause to believe that the voyage could he completed, in the usual way, by November 1st.</p> <p>2. As the charter specified what lay days should be allowed for loading, the charterer was not required to furnish a cargo, except at his own convenience, during such lay days.</p>

[This was a libel by James Poland and others, against the freight and cargo of The Spartan (Jacob Quincy, Charles Pox, Joseph E. Poxcraft, and Robert H. Thayer, claimants).] The facts upon which this ease turns, lie in a narrow compass, and are not controverted. William J. and Charles E. Quincy chartered the brig Spartan of Zadock Prince and others, owners, for a voyage from Portland to the Western Islands, and back to Portland.

In bankruptcy. This was an exception by William C. Poleman to the decision of the register sustaining the objections to the setting aside by the assignee of the bankrupt’s homestead.

Ejectment for the one-third interest in the S. E. % and N. W. JA, section 12, township 39 N., range 13 E., in Cook county, Illinois. It was stipulated that Joseph M. Faulkner had title on the 20th of June, 1836, and the plaintiff [Edward L. Polk] claimed under a deed in attachment proceedings instituted by James Marsh against Faulkner, February 15, 1838. Judgment recovered May 23, and deed in due form by the sheriff to Marsh November 1, 1840.

This was an action of ejectment, to which the defendants pleaded not guilty, and issue joined. The plaintiff produced in evidence a grant from the state of North Carolina, to William Polk, for five thousand acres, dated April 17, 1800. This grant was founded on a removed warrant from John Armstrong’s office, or the office opened pursuant to the act of 1783 (chapter 2).2 The plaintiff proved, his boundaries, and that the defendants were settled within them.

Ejectment; plea not guilty, and issue. The plaintiff produced the oldest grant for five thousand acres of land, dated about the year 1786, lying on the head waters of Rich-land creek, beginning at John Nelson’s southeast corner (of grant No. 1,120). thence north one thousand two hundred and fifty poles, east six hundred and forty poles, south and west to the beginning, in an oblong.

On the trial of this cause the plaintiff's counsel offered in evidence forty copies of warrants having the same numbers with those referred to in the grant to Sevier for twenty-five thousand acres, certified by the secretarj* of North Carolina to be the same warrants on which Sevier’s grant issued.

The manufacturing corporation now bankrupt, made, through its treasurer, a written ■contraer, July 1, 1873, with the petitioner, by which he was to serve them as superintendent for ten years, and to transfer to them, and to another corporation having the same treasurer, all inventions which should be made by him during that time and the patents granted therefor, the corporations paying all expenses connected with the inventions and the patents; and the felting mills were to…

Action on certain coupons originally attached to the negotiable bonds issued by the defendant city, under legislatr-- authority. The bonds were of two classes. One issued in payment of stock in a railway company: the other, as recited on their face, under the funding act of the state authorizing municipalities to fund their indebtedness and issue bonds therefor. The nature of the defenses set up in the answer appears in the opinion of the court.

<p>Case No. 11,255.</p> <p>Municipal Cokpoiutions —What is an Apfro-piiiATioN — Excess op Expenses — Vigilant Creditors — Execution—Adoption of Process of State Court — Attachment—Requisites of Answer.</p> <p>1. An answer should be a counter statement of facts, a confutation of what is alleged by the other party, and should be neither evasive nor argumentative.</p> <p>2. The annual estimate of the probable expenses of the county for the ensuing year, required by law to be made by the commissioners, is not an appropriation.</p> <p>3. An appropriation is to set apart or vote a sum of money for a particular object</p> <p>4. There is no appropriation of any part of the common fund, until the commissioners, by their warrant on the treasurer, indicate the specific object to which it is to be applied or set apart. It is then severed from the mass and “appropriated,” and not before.</p> <p>5. When unfortunately the current expenses exceed the current income, and all cannot be promptly paid, to the vigilant must be given the first products of the treasury.</p> <p>C. No capricious application of the public funds by the commissioners, in the face of a debt solemnly adjudieatéd, and after notice of an execution commanding its payment, will be permitted.</p> <p>7. The execution provided by the act of 1834, relative to counties, operates as an injunction upon the commissioners, restraining them from drawing any warrant, or making any payment for any purpose whatever, until the judgment is satisfied.</p> <p>8. The jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted, by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until the judgment shall be satisfied.</p> <p>9. The writ authorized by the act of 1S34 is not the prerogative writ of mandamus, for that can issue without a judgment, but this cannot.</p> <p>10. Neither is it an original proceeding against the commissioners, but an execution and final process to enforce the payment of a judgment.</p> <p>11. There can be no just ground of complaint, when the courts of the United States adopt the process of the courts of the state.</p> <p>12. A refusal to obey the command of the execution. will be followed by an attachment against the commissioners.</p>

This was an action [by Pollock against Pratt and Harvey, assignees of Baker] to recover the balance of a large sum of money, paid by the plaintiff to the United States, as surety for Mr. Swanwick, in a custom-house bond; Swanwick having become insolvent, and having assigned all his estate to Baker & Shoemaker, in trust, first to discharge his custom-bonds, to indemnify his sureties, and then in trust for his other creditors.

This was a libel for an assault and. battery committed by the master on a passenger, on a voyage from Guadaloupe to Portland. It appeared from the evidence that the libellant was a slave in Guadaloupe, that he was put on board the vessel by his master, Mons. Bercier, in company with his son, Eugene, a youth of about seventeen years of age, whom he was to attend during his residence in this country, as his sen-ant.

It appeared, in the evidence, that the wife of the bankrupt had received from her grandmother some advances and a legacy, which the bankrupt testified he had never reduced to his possession, but had always treated the same as the separate property of his wife.

[This was a bill in equity by Benjamin Pomeroy, administrator of Charles E. Phelps, against D. l'\ Manin, B. F. Phelps, & Foote, to set aside and declare null and void a certain instrument executed by Charles E. Phelps in his lifetime to the defendant D. F. Manin.]

This was an action at law [by Alexander H. Pomeroy] against a corporation created by the laws of the state of Connecticut. The suit was commenced by the service of process upon an officer of the company within the Southern district of New York. The case came up on a demurrer to a replication to the plea of the defendants.

Debt against the indorser of a bill of exchange drawn by Cadogan, at Barbadoes, in favor of the defendant, on merchants in England, indorsed by the defendant to the plaintiff in Alexandria, but not accepted nor paid. contended that the defendant is not liable to the fifteen per cent, damages under the act of assembly of the 12th November, 1792, p. 113. The act means bills drawn in Virginia. The defendant is not liable for more than he can recover frcm Cadogan.

<p>[These were bills by Pomroy, Wilson & Butler against Harter & Camden, and Baldwin & Lee against the same defendants.]</p>

[These were bills in equity by George B. Chase and others against the Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1S71 to establish a lease; and by Charles M. Pond, survivor, and others, against the Vermont Valley Railroad Company of 1S71, the Rutland Railroad Company, the Central Vermont Railroad Company, and others, for the cancellation of said lease, and other auxiliary relief. The jurisdiction of the court was heretofore sustained. Case No. 11.2G5.

<p>Case No. 11,265.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Citizenship of Parties— Equity— Jurisdiction to Restrain Misuse of Corporate Powers or Property — Directors as Wrono-Doers — Bill bt Stockholders.</p> <p>1. Citizens of Connecticut, as stockholders in a Vermont railroad corporation, brought this suit to restrain the execution of a lease of the railroad of the corporation to another Vermont railroad corporation, alleging that the execution of such lease was contrary to the expressed will of a majority of the stockholders, and in disregard of the rights and interests of all who were stockholders, and a fraud upon such rights; that the persons threatening to make such lease were a former board of directors, holding over after their term of office had expired, and being in the actual possession of the seal, books, papers, and money of the corporation, and in the apparent control and management of its affairs, but who were, in fact, largely interested in such other railroad company, and were thereby induced to sacrifice the interests of the plaintiffs’ corporation, and were, to that end, conspiring with such other company, in fraud of the stockholders in the plaintiffs’ corporation, and in breach of trust; that, to perpetuate such apparent control, and effect the fraudulent purpose aforesaid, such former board of directors refused to call a meeting of stockholders for the annual election of directors, thereby exposing the company to a forfeiture of its charter; that, notwithstanding such refusal, the president did call a meeting, at which a new board of directors was chosen, but such former directors denied the validity of such election, retained the possession and management of the affairs of the corporation, and persisted in their determination to execute such lease; that the plaintiffs had called upon such new board of directors, and required them, by suit or otherwise, to prevent the execution of such lease, and prevent the transfer or wrongful disposition of the property threatened by such holding over board, and to themselves obtain possession: but that, although such new board concurred with the plaintiffs, and admitted that such lease would be a violation of the rights of the stockholders, they refused to take any such measures, by suit or otherwise, alleging that they so refused in consideration of the many obstacles in the way of obtaining such relief in the state courts. The defendants were the said former board of directors, (citizens of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York.) the new board of diiectors, (citizens, also, of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York,) and the corporation itself, with the other corporations embraced in the alleged conspiracy. The bill prayed for an injunction, and that such holding oyer directors be decreed to surrender the road and property to the corporation, or to a receiver, and give up the seal, books, papers, and money to the new board, or to a receiver, that a receiver be appointed, and for such other and further relief as to equity might appertain. To this hill one of the defendants pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court, that certain of the defendants were citizens of Vermont, and that their rights and interests were identical with those of the plaintiffs, and that they were made defendants for the purpose of giving this court a colorable and false jurisdiction, when, in truth, they were plaintiffs, aiding in the prosecution of the suit. Another defendant, after having answered the bill, made a motion, founded on affidavits. to dismiss the bill on the same grounds stated in the plea, and alleging that some of the defendants had conspired with the plaintiffs, for the fraudulent purpose of giving the court jurisdiction, and that the refusal of such new board of directors to bring suit was for the purpose of giving this court jurisdiction, and was a fraud upon the court. The court overruled the plea, and denied the motion.</p> <p>2. A court of equity has jurisdiction, at the instance of stockholders in a corporation, to restrain the corporation and those who have the control and management thereof, from acts tending to the destruction of its franchises, from violations -of the charter, from misuse or misappropriation of the corporate powers or property, and from other acts prejudicial to the stockholders, amounting to a breach of trust.</p> <p>[Cited in Hardon v. Newton, Case No. 6,054.]</p> <p>[Cited in Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co. (Mich.) 53 N. W. 223.]</p> <p>• 3.-Such jurisdiction will be entertained notwithstanding the case may involve, ns an incidental question, the inquiry which of two is the legal board of directors.</p> <p>■ 4. Where the board of directors are themselves the wrong-doers, or they refuse to prosecute, to restrain or redress the wrong, stockholders may file the bill.</p> <p>K'ited in Hardon v. Newton, Case No. 6,054.]</p> <p>[Cited in Davis v. Gemmell (Md.) 17 Atl. 265; Slattery v. St. Louis & X. U. Transp. Co., 91 Mo. 225, 4 S. W. 81.]</p> <p>5. So, where one board, claiming to be directors. are the wrong-doers and the other board, claiming and alleged to be the legal directors, refuse to prosecute, stockholders may file the bill.</p> <p>6. The plaintiffs cannot be defeated of their right to sue in the federal court by the fact that the members of such legal board of directors have, as stockholders, the same interest as the plaintiffs, or that they desire the success of the plaintiffs, nor by the fact that the refusal of the said legal board of directors was in order to drive the plaintiffs to bring the suit themselves, or even to enable the plaintiffs to bring their suit in the federal court.</p> <p>7. The provisions of the judiciary act of 1789 [1 Stat. 73], giving the circuit courts jurisdiction where a suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state, and declaring that no civil suit shall be brought therein against any inhabitant of the United States in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found, do not. forbid the. exercise of jurisdiction where some of the defendants reside in the state in which the suit is brought, and other defendants, who appear and submit to the jurisdiction, reside in other states. In such case, any supposed defect of jurisdiction relates not to jurisdiction of the action, but to jurisdiction of the person, and is waived by appearance.</p> <p>[Cited in Kemna v. Brockhaus, 5 Fed. 764.]</p> <p>8. Under the act of February 28. 1839 (5 Stat. 321. § 1), the jurisdiction of the circuit court in such case is clear.</p> <p>9. Hence, it is not a good plea, by a defendant residing in Vermont, the state wherein the suit, is brought by plaintiffs residing in Connecticut, that some of the defendants are citizens of New. York and some of Massachusetts.</p> <p>10. Where the bill of complaint, on its face,' shows want of jurisdiction, the appropriate mode of raising the objection is by demurrer, though there are precedents for a summary motion to dismiss the bill on that ground.</p> <p>[Cited in Romaine v. Union Ins. Co., 28 Fed. 637.]</p> <p>11. But, where the bill shows apparent jurisdiction. and a defendant desires to contest its-allegations, or show new matter in avoidance of that jurisdiction, he must do so by plea, and not by motion founded on affidavits; and, when such defendant has appeared and answered to' the merits, such a motion will not be entertained.</p> <p>• 12. On final hearing, the court will see to it that it does not exceed its jurisdiction, where want of jurisdiction of the action appears, but parties must conform to the ordinary modes of' placing on the record the defences on which they rely, so that thé court may pass upon the issues made by the record, and so that they may be the subject of review, should the record be sent to an appellate tribunal.</p> <p>[NOTE. On final hearing, the bill of Chase was dismissed, and a decree entered for Pond. Case No. 11,264.]</p>

In equity. The plaintiff in this case [Amanda L. Ponsford] a citizen of New Jersey, filed her hill against William Johnson and others, citizens of New York. She claimed to he the widow of James Ponsford, deceased, the defendant Johnson was his administrator, and the other defendants were his next of kin.

<p>This was an action [by George Ponsot]'. against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the-port of New York, to recover back an alleged excess of duties on sundry importations. At the trial, a verdict was rendered for the-plaintiff, for $1,500, subject to the opinion of the court as to the sufficiency of the protests. There were six entries. The first entry was; made April 19th, 1851, and embraced “rosewood and mahogany furniture,” “common, wood furniture,” “rosewood furniture,” and “silk and worsted goods.” The protest, (annexed to the entry,) was “against paying 40 per cent, duty on rosewood furniture, as specified in this entry, believing it should pay 30-per cent, as cabinet furniture.” The second entry was made the same day, and embraced articles of “rosewood furniture,” of “rosewood and mahogany furniture,” and of “oak furniture.” The protest was “against paying 40 per' centón the article of rosewood furniture, spec-' ified in the entry attached, believing it should pay 30 per cent., as cabinet furniture.” The third entry was made May 2d, 1851, and was of “rosewood furniture,” of “common wood furniture” and of “rosewood and common wood furniture.” The protest was the same as in the last case. The fourth and fifth entries, made the same day, were of the same general character, and the protests were substantially like the others. The last entry was made May 3d, 1851, of “rosewood and common wood furniture,” of “rosewood furniture,” of “rosewood,” and of “varnish.” The protest was in substance like the others.</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Ohio.] This cause came on to be heard upon the exceptions of Hiram Pool, a creditor of McDonald & Co., and J. A. Saxton, to the ruling and judgment of the district court, in its affirmance of the proposition of composition made by J. A. SaSton and accepted by the requisite number and amount in value of the creditors of said bankrupt.

On the 18th June, 1829, the libellant [Joseph Pool] shipped at Philadelphia as a seaman on board the brig Juniata, bound to Antwerp and thence to Cadiz, his wages being fourteen dollars a month. On the 4th August, the vessel, having left Antwerp, encountered a gale by which she was driven ashore, near Flushing. While lying there, the mainmast was cut away, and the vessel continued for some days embedded in the sand.

<p>Case No. 11,270.</p> <p>Equitt Practice — Bilí, op Review — When Allowed — Affidavits—Newi.t Discoveked Evidence — New Matteh — In Whose Favok — Re-HEAKIXO — PENDINO APPEAL — ReVEIÍSING DECREE of Supreme Court.</p> <p>[1. Bills of review are an anomaly in the system of jurisprudence prevailing in England and the United States. Cognizance of them rests-entirely on Lord Bacon’s order by which they were first allowed, and the practice founded thereon. They are not favored, and the party applying for leave to file such a bill must not only perform, or give security for the performance of, the decree sought to Vie enjoined, but must support his application with a strong affidavit, showing that the new matter upon which the review is sought was not known to the party or his solicitor, and could not have been ascertained, at the time of the original decree.)</p> <p>[2. The common affidavit to original bills cannot be received in such a case, but the affidavits must contain the averment, not only of the party, but of all other persons whose negligence may be imputable to him. that they could not possibly have secured the evidence claimed to be-now at the hearing or before the decree.)</p> <p>[3. One J. petitioned for leave to file a bill of review, claiming to have new evidence upon a question of pedigree, which was the decisive question in the original suit, which evidence would suffice to alter such decree. It appeared that the facts upon such question which the new evidence tended to prove were all within the knowledge of the petitioner long before the rendition of the decree; that the most trustworthy evidence of such facts was accessible to the petitioner in the parish registers in England, where it should and could have been found, and that the new evidence consisted of memoranda and family records of a deceased person, confirmatory of the evidence of such registers, which memoranda and records were also insufficient, of themselves, to prove all the facts necessary to establish the petitioner’s claim. Meld, that no case was made out for a bill of review.]</p> <p>[4. An entirely new title, in a new party, claiming adversely to all the original parties to a suit in which a title was established, cannot be considered newly-discovered matter, for the purpose of opening the decree in such suit by a bill of review.]</p> <p>[5. A bill of review lies only in favor of a party or privy to the original suit, or of one who is aggrieved by the decree. Accordingly, where a decree had been lendered in favor of one W., as devisee of M., upon a finding that he was the heir of M„ hold that one J., not a party to the original suit, who claimed to be the true heir of M., and so entitled to the devise, was not entitled to file a bill of review.]</p> <p>[6. A court of equity has no power to order a rehearing of a cause after the close of the term at which a final decree therein is rendered, but thereafter new parties and new matter can be introduced, as a ground for a prayer for revision and reversal of the decree, only by a bill of review.]</p> <p>[7. A circuit court of the United States has cognizance of a bill of review, after an appeal to the supreme court from the decree sought to be reviewed, if it is brought on newly-discovered evidence of facts, though not if it is for error apparent in the body of the decree, and may permit such a bill to be filed as an amendment by adding new matter and parties to the original record.]</p> <p>[8. Whether, on such a bill filed, the circuit court can reverse, for error in fact, a decree affirmed by the supreme court, quaere.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 10.(553 for opinion of circuit court in the ease of Packer v. Nixon.]</p>

[These were cross libels by William S. Poole and others against the schooner Washington, and Lothrop L. Sturges and others against the bark Mazeppa, to recover damages sustained by a collision.]

Bill in equity. This was brought by David Poor, against Richard Carleton and others.

Assumpsit. The first count was for $7,000,. money had and received of the plaintiffs [Henry Pope and others].

Assumpsit. The parties agreed upon the following statement of facts: “This is an action of assumpsit on four bills of lading, signed by the master of the schooner Annawan, belonging to the defendants [Thomas Nickerson and others] for a cargo of fruit and wine, shipped on board of her at Malaga, and consigned to the plaintiffs [Daniel Pope and others] at Philadelphia.

■ Appeal from the district court in a cause •of collision. The libel was entered at a special district court held on the 21st of October, 1856, and thence continued to the 25th of the same month, when, after a full hearing, a preliminary decree was pronounced in favor of libellants and an assessor appointed, whose report was made and filed March 27, 1S57, and on the same day a final ■decree was entered against the steamboat for the sum so reported, and costs. [Case No.…

<p>Case No. 11,276.</p> <p>Salvage — Contract foe Payment at all Events —Amount of Award — Vessels in Contact— Liability of One at Fault for Salvage.</p> <p>[1. A statement, by the master of a vessel to the commander of a tug asked to tow her out of danger, “that the ship would pay,” is not sufficient evidence of a contract for payment at all events to bar a libel for salvage.]</p> <p>[2. A contract for payment of salvors at all events, wheie the danger is not great and sue-, cess is reasonably certain, should have little influence on the amount of the award.]</p> <p>[3. Where twe vessels are in contact, causing mutual damage, salvors who separate them should receive from the one at fault salvage upon the total value of the two.]</p> <p>[4. When the value of the property saved is such as to justify a liberal reward to the salvor, as compared with his ordinary profits, the maximum award has been reached. It should not increase with the value of the property beyond that point.]</p> <p>[For appeals in the case of The Euryale v.The Sapphire, see 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 104, and 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 51.]</p>

Rule to show cause, why the judgment by default, rendered in this case at the October session of 1822, should not be set aside.

In equity. This was a motion [by Conrad Poppenhusen] for a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent granted to Otto P. Meyer December 20, 1853 [No. 10,339], and April 4. 1854 [No. 10,741], for improved modes of treating caoutchouc, and other vulcauizable gums.

Actions, on two policies, .on vessel and cargo. The defence was — 1. That the vessel was built in New-England, and thirteen years of age, which circumstances were not communicated to the underwriters; and 2. That the plaintiff had not shown that the vessel was sufficiently found and manned, although the jury should be satisfied that the body of the vessel was seaworthy for the voyage.

[This was a bill in equity filed [by Conrad Poppenhusen] to restrain the defendants [Oscar Palke and others] from infringing the patents granted to L. Otto P. Meyer which are more particularly referred to in .the reports of the eases of Poppenhusen v. New. York Gutta-Percha Comb Co. [Cases Nos. 11,2S3, 11,281, and 11.2S2], and of Pop-penhusen v. Palke [Case No. 11,279].

In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction, to restrain the infringement of two letters patent, granted to L. Otto P. Meyer, one dated December 20th, 1833, [No. 330,] for an “improvement in processes for vulcanizing caoutcko-uc compounds,” and the other dated April 4th, 1854, [No. 10,741,] for an “improvement in treating caoutchouc and other vuleanizahle gums.” The bill averred, that the patents had been assigned to the plaintiff [Conrad Poppen-husen] by…

[This was a motion for an attachment against the defendants, for contempt, in violating the injunction granted in the case of Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co. [Case No. 11.281). The defendants had substituted thin sheets of brass for the sheets of tin-foil previously used, and it was insisted by the complainant [Conrad Poppenhusen) that this was but an equivalent for the latter substance.) 2

This was an action on the case tried by Judge Ingersoll and a jury, for the alleged infringement of two letters patent granted to L. Otto P. Meyer, one dated December 20, 1S53 [No. 10,339], for “an improvement in processes of vulcanizing caoutchouc compounds,” and the other dated April 4, 1854 [No. 10.741], for “an improvement in treating caoutchouc, and other vulcanizable gums,” both of which had been assigned to plaintiff, [Conrad Poppenhusen.] The invention described in…

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,285.</p> <p>Ad.mikai.tv — Collision—Fog Signals.</p> <p>1. A boat moored in the channel of the river near a large city, and at a place where vessels in making a landing would naturally come, was hela to be in fault, because, during a heavy fog and snow storm, in which it was impossible to. see but a short distance, it failed to give the usual fog signals.</p> <p>2. The duty of vessels navigating the river during a heavy fog and snow storm, as respects speed, signals, &c. considered.</p> <p>NOTE. Bearing upon and supporting the decision in this case, see Strout v. Poster (The Louisville) 1 How. [42 U. S.] 89: The New York v. Rea. 18 How. [59 TJ. S.] 223; Culbertson v. Shaw (The Southern Belle) Id. 584; The Indiana [Case No. 7,020]; The Northern Indiana [Id. 10.320]; The Bay State [Id. 1,148], on appeal, 18 How. [59 U. S.] 89; The Scioto [Case No. 12.508]: Bazin v. Steamship Co. [Id. 1,152]; The Rocket [Id. 11,975].</p>

Insurance was effected in July, September and October, 1874, on the Vaughn bouse at Bast Rapids, Michigan. The policy was taken in the name of Benjamin Porter, the property being described as “his three-story brick hotel,” etc. This hotel was built by an incorporated company, Morgan Vaughn being president thereof. In Slay, 1874, the hotel was, under mechanic’s lien proceedings, sold. Vaughn bought this title and placed it in Porter’s name.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] The Sea Witch was a foreign vessel which sailed from Belize, Honduras, on a coasting voyage, about September 10, 1870. She left Ituatau on Nov. 1, 1S70, and reached the port of Now Orleans, where she was seized and sold under process in this case. The claim of the libelant J. II. Porter was for a sail furnished the Sea Witch at Pensacola, Florida, on June 24, 1870.

<p>Treasury Warrant or Distress — Relief—Act op Mat 15,1820 — Power op Court — Injunction' — Pinal Decree — Appeal.</p> <p>1. The 4th section of the act of congress of May 15. 1820 |3 Stat. 595], prescribing the mode of relief against a treasury warrant of distress, confers a power upon the court, and not upon the judge as an individual.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Bolton, Case No. 14,623.]</p> <p>2. The provisions in the act authorizing the person aggrieved, by the refusing or dissolving of an injunction to appeal, were designed to vary the rule of chancery practice in this respect, so as to place the party in the same situation as if a final judgment had been rendered against him.</p> <p>3. The decision of the district judge, awarding a perpetual injunction against a treasury warrant of distress,' is a final decree within the act of congress of March 3, 1803 [2 Stat. 244], which allows an appeal from all final judgments or decrees, of a district court to the circuit court.</p> <p>4. The act of congress of April 9.1814 [3 Stat. 120], dividing the state of New York into two districts, intended ¡.bat the two courts should stand in relation to the circuit court precisely as the single one had previously stood. Consequently, the district court of the Northern district is placed in the same relation to the circuit court as that of the Southern district, and an appeal lies from it to this court to the same extent.</p>

On the third of April, 1857, the defendant, Yiets, entered into a contract in writing with the plaintiffs, by which he sold them fifteen thousand bushels of corn at forty-eight cents a bushel, deliverable free* on board, during the last half of June. The plaintiffs were to pay for the corn on delivery. Both parties executed the contract. The corn not being delivered, suit was brought on the contract.

[These were libels by William .T. Portevant, owner of the steamboat Ruby, and by the owners of the schooner Louisa against the steamboat Bella Donna, for damages sustained by collision.]

The questions arise upon the offer of a deposition of John E. Miller, cashier of the First National Bank of Port Huron, to prove a debt claimed by said bank to be due from the Port Huron Dry Dock Company. The deposition not being satisfactory to the register, he declined to file it, and the attorney for the creditor insisting upon its sufficiency, it was certified into court lor determination by the district judge.

Libel by tbe Salt Company of Onondaga for a quantity of salt jettisoned while the propeller was aground at tbe harbor of Wau-kegan.

The register certified to the court, that, in this case, which was one of voluntary bankruptcy, a surrender of property was made to him by the bankrupts [Robert O. Porting-ton and Francis Portington], which property remained in bis custody until a composition was made by the bankrupts with their creditors, whereupon, by order of court, the property -was surrendered again to the bankrupts; that the amount to be paid to the register for his fees in the matter had been…

Assumpsit on thirty-six coupons issued by the town of I!ellow Head, Kankakee county, Illinois, to aid in the construction of the ■Chicago, Danville and Vincennes Railroad, a corporation organized under’ a special charter granted by the legislature of Illinois. 2 Priv. Laws 1803, p. 140.

This cause was argued at length by Gayle and Holladay against the confirmation of the election of the Bains as assignees, and by W. H. C. Ellis for the election. J. G. Bain had been appointed attorney in fact by a majority in number, representing a majority in amount of the creditors.

<p>Case No. 11,399.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Conveyance within Pour Months —Consideration—Personal Property— Remedy at Law — Accounting.</p> <p>1. Where a bill was filed to recover certain real estate and personal property alleged to have been conveyed and transferred by the bankrupt within four months next before the filing of the petition against him for adjudication of bankruptcy in fraud of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)], and the bill is based od two alternative theories. — 1st That the transfers were without consideration and made to hinder, delay and defraud the bankrupt’s creditors, or 2d. If there was a consideration it was a previous indebtedness and the transfers were made with a view to give the defendant a preference, he having reasonable cause to believe the bankrupt insolvent, — held, actual possession under the agreement and performance of it clearly takes the case out of the statute requiring the agreement to be in writing. And as to its vagueness, and uncertainty in the particulars specified, the agreement having been executed by the actual making of the conveyance, the court will now look into the agreement only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the consideration for the conveyance was such as a court of equity will sustain as against the creditors of the grantor. Looking into the agreement for that purpose I find that full and adequate compensation had been made by defendant unde’- an agreement between him and the bankrupt, made while the latter was amply solvent, and when he had a perfect right as against all the world to make the same, and hence the conveyance of the one hundred and seven acre tract ought to be sustained.</p> <p>[Cited in Napier v. Server, Case No. 10,010.] ,</p> <p>2. As to the personal property it was objected at the hearing that the assignee has a complete remedy at law, and therefore cannot recover for the same by bill in equity. This objection comes too late. It was not taken by demurrer nor by way of answer, but was first made at the hearing. A court of equity will not refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause merely on the ground that complainant has a complete remedy at law where, as in this case, the parties have submitted their rights to the jurisdiction of the court without objection, especially where proofs have been taken and a hearing upon the merits has been entered upon.</p> <p>3. Decreed that defendant account to complainant for all personal property received by him from the bankrupt at any time within four months immediately preceding commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. Decree for plaintiffs for land not included in agreement, for payment for the personal property, and for costs, and dismissal of bill as to the Butterfield farm of one hundred and seven acres.</p>

Rule upon the plaintiff to show his cause of action. The plaintiff produced a positive affidavit of debt, due for goods taken and sold by the defendant.

<p>Case No. 11,302.</p> <p>Bonds Issued by Countv in Aid of a Railroad — Jurisdiction — Privity — Collection of Taxes — The Court will Make All Such Orders as viay he Necessary to Attain This End —Practice—Other Property Holders — How Made Parties — Ancillary Petition — Judgment and Other Process.</p> <p>1.Bonds issued in aid of a railroad by a county court, authorized so to do by law, are binding obligations, and while there is no such privity between the purenasers of said bonds and the tax debtors as would authorize a suit at law, such a case comes within well-established equity jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. If no one can be found able and willing to collect the taxes, when loaned by the county court to pay creditors who have obtained a decree on interest coupons, on bill filed this court will entertain jurisdiction.</p> <p>3. In such case the court will direct the payment of taxes so assessed into the registry, to be applied in satisfaction of complainants' decree; and against each defendant debtor, who shall not so pay within the time specified in the order, an execution will issue.</p> <p>4. Should the property of parties, made defendants, be not sufficient to pay the amount due complainants, on application therefor, a receiver will be appointed, authorized to collect taxes assessed for the purpose against other property holders, not parties to this cause. And should they not pay within a reasonable time, the receiver will be instructed to bring them before the court by ancillary petition.</p> <p>5. In such case a decree will be entered against them for the amount so owing and for costs, and payment will he coerced by such other further appropriate decrees and process as may seem proper and necessary. *</p>

<p>Case No. 11,303.</p> <p>Collision — Steam and Sail — Chande of Coukse —Proof at Variance win Libel.</p> <p>1. Where a steamboat with a vessel in tow and a vessel under sail, with the wind free, were approaching from opposite directions, and each on a course which, if pursued, would carry them clear of each other, the steamboat was not liable for damages to the latter by a collision caused by an improper change in her course across the bow of the steamboat.</p> <p>2. The steamboat exonerated herself from blame by using the means within her power to avoid a collision, when ascertaining that the sailing-vessel was crossing her course.</p> <p>8. Proofs on the part of the libellant will not he allowed to contradict tlio allegation of the libel.</p> <p>4. Facts tending to fix the relative position of vessels by those on hoard allowed more weight than the opinion of lookers-on, although the latter outnumbered the former.</p> <p>NOTE. The above case haying been appealed to the circuit court of the United States, the decree of the district • court was affirmed, with costs, by the Hon. Samuel Nelson, Circuit Judge, at the October term, 1851. [Case unreported.]</p>

<p>[This was a proceeding by Postley & Post-ley against Ebenezer Higgens.]</p>

This was a writ of error from the district court, in an action of debt by the plaintiff in error, against the defendants [Cross and Wonder], as sureties of-, a deputy postmaster, on his official bond, for $1000, penalty. Plea, non est factum and payment.

[This was a writ of error from the district court, in an action of debt by the plaintiff against Nimrod F. Fennell and others, as sureties for Richard J. Jackson.]

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Alaine.] These were actions of debt, brought officially by the postmaster general upon bonds given for the faithful performance of his duties, by one Benjamin Whittier, late postmaster at Belfast, Maine, who is since deceased.

<p>Case No. 11,309.</p> <p>Postmaster's Bond — Second Bond with New Sureties — Joint Liability of Sureties — Effect of Act Increasing Rates of Postage.</p> <p>1. The defendant gave a bond as surety for a postmaster, conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties, and that he should pay over all moneys which should come to his hands for postages to the postmaster general. Afterwards, the postmaster continuing in office, another bond, with different sureties, was taken with the same condition. At the time of the taking of the second bond, a balance was due from the postmaster for postages; but payments were subsequently made by him, and credited in his general account, sufficient to extinguish it In an action against the sureties on the first bond for postages not paid over, it was held that their liability did not cease upon the giving of the second bond for defaults thereafter incurred. That the second bond was not a substitute for or extinguishment of the first, but additional security; and that equity would consider the two sets of sureties as jointly responsible for defaults occurring after the giving of the second bond.</p> <p>2. Acts of congress had been passed subsequently to the giving of the bond increasing the rates of ]>ostage. and, consequently, the responsibility of the sureties. But it was held, that ns the undertaking of the sureties was general that all postages should be paid over, and referred to no particular act explaining or limiting the rate of postage, and was not taken under any law defining its extent and operation, the sureties were not discharged. It would have been otherwise had the acts of congress enlarged the powers of the postmaster, or supero dded any new duties whereby he was made the receiver of other moneys than for postages.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Gaussen. Case No. 15.192: U. S. v. M’Cartney. 1 Fed. 107; Chadwick v. U. S. 3 Fed. 756.]</p>

On the 7tli June, 1825, the postmaster general addressed a letter to Richard Bache, then postmaster at Philadelphia, in which he stated, as follows; “Some weeks since I directed a bond to be sent to you as postmaster, that you might have it executed under the post office laws, passed at the last session of •congress.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of New Jersey.] This cause was argued at the last session of the court, and was taken under advisement.

On the 26th February, 1816, .Tohn Apple-back was appointed a deputy postmaster at Cherryville, in the state of Pennsylvania. At the time of his appointment, he gave bond to the postmaster general, together with Owen Rice and Sebastian Gundt, the defendants, in the penal sum of six hundred dollars, conditioned for the faithful execution of the duties of his office, and the punctual payment to the postmaster general of all moneys coming to his hands for postages.

On the 8th September, 1804, Matthew Ridg-way and Hugh Ross executed a joint bond, in the penal sum of five hundred dollars, to the postmaster general, conditioned for the faithful execution by Matthew Ridgway of the duties of the office of postmaster, at Milford, in Pennsylvania, aud for the regular payment by him of all moneys coming to his hands for postages.

At a former term of this court the plaintiff recovered judgment against Waterman Many, a deputy postmaster, on his official bond, for a balance due on his account with the general post-office, of moneys received for postage; and this is a scire facias to revive the judgment and obtain execution against his administrator. The defendant [Willard Robbins, administrator] has filed several pleas in answer, but the third embraces the matter which is relied upon in the defence.

This was an action of debt brought in the district court, in the name of the postmaster general of the United States, upon a bond given to the postmaster general by the defendants [Ustick.

[This was an action by Janies Potts and others against Chester A. Arthur, collector of the port of New York, to recover back duties paid on certain books.]

[This ivas a bill in equity by Orlando B. Potter and others against Julius E. Brauns-dorf and Henry Weil.] This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs, of a suit in equity for a perpetual injunction and an account of profits, founded on the alleged infringement of letters patent reissued to John Bachelder December 12th, 1S05 [No. 2,135], for an “improvement in sewing machines.” The original letters patent were granted to Bachelder. as inventor.

[Appeal from the district co-urt of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] Potteiger was adjudged a bankrupt on creditors’ petition, and in default of appearance, February 17, 1868. No assets came to the hands of the assignee, and he so returned after the filing of the present petition.

[This was a petition by Potter, Denison & Co. against James H. Coggeshall. assignee in bankruptcy of Joseph Dow, for the purpose of establishing the validity of a certain chattel mortgage executed by the bankrupt to the plaintiffs.]

<p>Case No. 11,823.</p> <p>Infringement of Patent — Preliminary Injunction.</p> <p>Upon a bill to restrain an infringement of a patent, if it is shown that defendants have formerly been engaged in infringing, the mere fact that since the commencement of the suit they have ceased to do so, and do not threaten to renew their sales, is not an answer to an application for a preliminary injunction to restrain the continuance or renewal of such infringement.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see note to Potter v. Whitney, Case No. 11,341.]</p>

This was a motion [by Orlando B. Potter, Nathaniel Wheeler, and others] for a provisional injunction to restrain the defendants [Davis Sewing-Machine Company] from infringing letters patent for an “improvement in sewing machines,” granted to Allen B. Wilson, November 12. 1SD0 [No. 7,776], reissued January 22, 1856 [No. 346], and extended for seven years from November 12, 1864.

[This was a bill in equity by Orlando B. Potter, Nathaniel Wheeler, and others against Courtlandt P. Dixon and Edward Learned.] 2 [The bill in this ease was filed to set aside letters patent (or so much thereof as conflicted with letters patent owned by the plaintiffs) issued by the commissioner of patents to James G. Wilson, in pursuance of an order by Judge Dunlop, chief justice of the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia, made on appeal,…

<p>Case No. 11,336.</p> <p>Patents — Extension—Effect upon Prior Keissue.</p> <p>Where a patent has been extended to a pat-entee under section IS of the act of 1836 [5 Stat. 124], it is immaterial whether or not he was vested with the entire interest in the patent at the time of a surrender and reissue made prior to the extension. The extension vested an absolute and complete title in1 him.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see note to Potter v. Whitney, Case No. 11,341.]</p>

In equity. This was a motion [by Orlando B. Potter, Nathaniel Wheeler, and others] for a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendant [Abraham Fuller] from infringing reissued letters patent, Nos. 340 and 414, for improvements in sewing machines, granted to Allen B. Wilson, and more particularly referred to in the report of the case of Potter v. Wilson [Case No. 11,342], The defendant was selling what was known as the “Williams & Orvis” machine, in the Southern district…

In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction.

2 [In equity. This was a motion [by Orlando B. Potter and Nathaniel Wheeler) for a provisional injunction to restrain the alleged infringement [by Goodrich Holland] of letters patent [No. 7,776], for an “improvement in sewing machines,” granted to Allen B. Wilson, November 12, 1850. The original patent was surrendered and reissued January 22, 1856, in two divisions or patents, designated as reissue Nos. 345 and 346.

In equity. This was a motion [by Orlando B. Potter, Nathaniel Wheeler, and others] to suspend an injunction and permit the defendant [William A. Mack] to give bond to keep an account until the coming in of the master’s report.

This was an action on a policy of insurance. At the trial the principal question was, whether the plaintiff [Robinson Potter] had an insurable interest beyond what was covered by prior policies; in which ease, by the usual memorandum in American policies, the defendants would be exonerated from any liability. It was referred to an auditor to ascertain the facts of interest, and his report was made in favour of the plaintiff, for an uninsured interest of about $1200.

This was a motion [by Orlando B. Potter and others], for an attachment. The defendant [Anton Muller] had been enjoined, Potter v. Muller [Case Xo. 11.334]. from infringing the patents of Allen B. Wilson for improvements in sewing machines; the machine in question having a wheel feed, in imitation of the Singer machine.

In equity. This was a motion [by Orlando B. Potter, Nathaniel Wheeler, and others] to dissolve a provisional' injunction, granted to restrain the defendant [Anton Muller] from infringing reissued letters patent Nos. 340 and 414, for “improvements in sewing machines,” issued to Allen B. Wilson, and more particularly set forth in the report of Potter v. Wilson [Case No. 11,342].

Action on a policy of insurance,' dated the 4th of March, 1836, whereby the Ocean Insurance Company insured the plaintiff [Robinson Totter], “fourteen thousand dollars on the bark Hannah, at sea and in port, for and during the term of one year, commencing the risk on the 3d of March, lS3(i, at noon.

Assumpsit on a policy of insurance, dated 10 Sept., 1825, as follows, “85,000 on ship Jefferson and appurtenances for and during the term of twelve months in port and at sea, and at all times and plaees during that period, beginning the adventure on the 1st •of September at 12 o’clock at noon.” Premium, 8 per cent. The loss was averred in the declaration to be by penis of the seas. Plea, the general issue. At the trial, the facts were not disputed.

In equity. This was a motion for a provisional injunction to restrain defendants from infringing letters patent for “improvement in sewing machines,” granted to Allen B. Wilson, November 12, 1850 [No. 7,776], reissued January 22, 1856 [No. 346], and extended for seven years, November 12, 1864.

In equity. This was a motion [by Orlando B. Potter and Nathaniel Wheeler] for an injunction to restrain the defendants [Henry L. Stevens and James II. Stevens] from infringing letters patent for “an improvement in sewing machines,” granted to Allen B. Wilson, November 12, 1S50 [No. 7,77(5], and more particularly referred to in the case of Potter v. Wilson [Case No. 11,3-12]. So much of the opinion of the court is given, as follows a statement of the substance of the bill.

This was the case of a policy of insurance ■dated on 80th of March, 1S30, “for $9000 on the brig Benjamin Ruggles, at and from New York, commencing the risk at noon on the 27th of March, 1S30, to, at and from, all ports and places to which she may proceed, for and during the term of one year from that time,” with a provision for a continuation of the risk if she should be then at sea, Ac. at a premium of 7 per cent. Vessel valued at 815,000.

[Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [by Charles L. Potter against Oscar S. Thayer and others] upon letters patent for “improvement in devices for attaching the shanks to mineral and composition buttons,” granted Charles L. Potter, December 13, 1870 [No. 110,070].

This was a motion [by Orlando B. Potter and others] for a provisional injunction, to restrain defendant [Washington Whitney] from infringing letters-patent for “improvement in sewing-machines” granted to Allen B. Wilson, November 12, 1850 [No. 7,776], reissued January 22, 1856 [No. 346], and extended for seven years from November 12, 1S04. See Potter v. HoL.md [Case No. 11,-330].

This -was a hill in equity, filed [by Orlando B. Potter and Nathaniel Wheeler] to restrain the defendants [James G. Wilson and Alexander C. Stockmar] from infringing letters patent, granted to Allen B. Wilson, November 12, 1S50' [No. 7,7761, for an “improvement in sewing machines.” The original patent was surrendered and reissued January 22, 1856, in two divisions, designated as “Reissue Nos. 345 and 346.” Reissue 345 was surrendered and reissued, December 7, 1856, and…

This was a bill in equity against Samuel Wright by Stéphen A. Potter and William Wright, trustees in bankruptcy of Bancroft and Grambo. The bill alleged that Bancroft and Grambo had severally been adjudged bankrupts in 1873, and that Samuel Wright had been chosen assignee of both, bankrupts.

This was a petition by certain creditors of Potts and Garwood to have that firm declared bankrupt. It appeared that Potts and Gar-wood were shipping merchants in Philadelphia.

This was an ejectment to recover 300 acres of land. The plaintiff produced a regular title from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, commencing with a warrant in 1784; payment of the purchase money in the same year; return of survey in the year 1788; and a patent in 1800.

, editor of the American Daily Advertiser, to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him for a contempt of court in publishing the following article in his paper of the 12th nit.: “Drew, the Counterfeiter. — This notorious fellow, who was arrested some time since at Philadelphia, and lightened of about six thousand dollars of good money, has recently had the effrontery to bring a suit against the mayor of that city to recover this amount of property.

[This was a libel for collision by Frederick A. Potts against the steamboat William A. Burden. Heard on exceptions to the libel. This case came up on exceptions to the libel. The case was brought for damages caused by a collision.

[This was an action at law by George Pou-sot against Cornelius W. Lawrence to recover back duties illegally exacted by defendant as collector. Verdict was given for plaintiff, sub-jeet to the opinion of the court.]

<p>The complainant’s bill was filed by a receiver of an insolvent national bank to hold the defendant, Johnson, personally liable as a stockholder. It alleged that the defendant, Johnson, in January 10th, 1S70, became the owner of 130 shares of the capital of the First National Bank of Norfolk, Va.; that the bank failed to honor its notes May 20th, 1S71, and that the complainant was appointed receiver June 3d, 1874; that the defendant, Johnson, visited Norfolk in January, 1S74, for the purpose of examining into the affairs of the bank, and becoming satisfied that it was in a critical condition, and that a suspension was inevitable, he returned to New Jersey, and immediately thereafter, to wit. on the 15th of January, 1874, in order to exonerate himself from liability to the creditors of the association, transferred or caused to be transferred his 130 shares of stock to the defendant Valentine, and that the pretended transfer was made without legal consideration, and with a view of releasing himself from his liability, and to one who was known to be insolvent. The bill prays that the transfer may be set aside. A joint and several answer was filed by the defendants, in which they deny all the material allegations of the bill, and assert that the transfer was made by said Johnson to said Valentine (who was his mother-in-law) in good faith and for a valuable consideration, without knowledge of the failing condition of the association. Testimony was taken on the part of the complainant.</p>

“To the Honorable Richard Peters, Judge of the District Court of the United Slates in and for the Pennsylvania District. “The libel of William Potvell, Charles Floxon, John Harris, and George Middleton, late seamen of the ship Betsey, of Philadelphia (Uuier & Diehl and others, owners, •and John Risbrough, master), respectfully sets forth: That your libellants shipped at the port of Philadelphia on the twenty-ninth ■day of August, one thousand eight hundred and ten, on board…

<p>[In the matter of Allen F. Powell, a bankrupt.]</p>

This .was a hill in equity, brought by the plaintiffs, Ellick Powell and Elizabeth, his wife, praying for an assignment of her dower, in certain lauds, now owned by the defendants, and which formerly belonged to one Boswell Merrick, the former husband of the said Elizabeth.

[This was a bill in equity by Ellick Powell and Elizabeth, his W'ife, against the Monson & Brirufield Manufacturing Company.] The commissioners appointed to assign dower according to the interlocutory decree of the court [Case No. 11,350], having made a report of their doings, the cause came on again for argument upon the question of confirming that report.

This was a bill in equity, to compel the defendants, [Hernán J. Redfield and John McI-Ceon,] the one as collector of the port of New York, and the other as district-attorney of the United States for the Southern district of New York, being the district in which that port is situated, to elect which one of two actions, now depending in the district court for that district, they would prosecute, and to abandon the prosecution of the other.

A summons for witnesses in Virginia, on the part of the plaintiff, was issued and directed to the marshal of Virginia. It was served by a private person who made affidavit that he read it to the witnesses and required their attendance, and that he believed they attended in consequence of such summons.

[This was a proceeding by Charles Powers, guardian of the children of James Brown, Jr., deceased, against Anna Olivia Mortee and Thomas J. Mortee, her husband, to set aside proceedings of the Eighth district court of Louisiana appointing defendants tutrix and ■co-tutor of the minors, as illegal, and therefore null and void, and seeking to recover as much of the property of James Brown, Jr., as belongs to the children.]

This was an action [by Thomas H. Powers and others] against [Hiram Barney] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an alleged excess of duties paid, under protest, on an article invoiced as “Bark, Peruvian,” imported from Southampton into the port of New York. The duties were paid on the 31st of July, 1861.

The plaintiffs offered in evidence a statute of the state of Maryland, incorporating them in the name of the Powhattan Steamboat Company, and further introduced evidence tending to prove that for many years prior to the 2Gth day of June, 1853, they had run a weekly line of steamboats, for the transportation of goods and merchandise between the city of Baltimore and the city of Richmond, in the state of Virginia, which boats were accustomed on each trip to stop at City Point,…

Indebitatus assumpsit, for work and labor done and materials furnished for the defendant’s intestate by the plaintiff, who was a painter and glazier.

By ISAAC DAYTON, Register: I, Isaac Dayton, one of the registers of said' court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that, in the course of the proceedings in said cause-before me, the following question arose pertinent to said proceedings.

On the 31st day of December, 1875, the Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Company of Detroit issued a policy insuring the life of Mary Prather, of Jackson Co., Ind., in the sum of 33,000, payable to her husband, Jno. C. Prather, in case of death. On the 25th day of October, 1S7C, the insured was taken suddenly sick, and died in about six hours, and was buried the next day.

<p>Case Wo. 11,369.</p> <p>Non-Payment op Commercial Paper — Injunction.</p> <p>A petition in involuntary bankruptcy having been filed against 1\, an injunction was issued, which was served on him on December Gth or 7th. 1871, restraining him from making any disposition or transfer of his property. A subsequent petition was filed against him, the only act of bankruptcy alleged being the non-payment. for fourteen days, of a promissory note, which matured November 29th, 1871: Bdil, that, as the injunction on the first petition was in force when the second was filed, the debtor could not be said to have stopped or suspended, and not resumed payment, for fourteen days, of the note in question.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Charles C. Pratt, a bankrupt]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Samuel F. Pratt and others against John C. Burr, Morgan Craig, William D. Mead, and others. Heard on application for a writ of assistance.]</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Samuel F. Pratt and others against John C. Burr, Morgan Craig, AA'illiam D. Mead, and others. It was formerly heard upon the question of homestead exemption. Case No. 11,372.)

Two bills in equity by [Isaac Pratt, Jr.] the assignee of the firm of [Francis] Curtis & Col-lamore, asking that certain conveyances made by Mr. Curtis about fifteen months before his bankruptcy should be set aside, and for other relief.

Bill in equity. The facts of the case were as follows: Adam Ferguson of Newport, Rhode Island, made his will, bearing date April 12, 1797, giving all his property, real and personal, to his only child, Isabella Am-brose, and appointing her executrix to his will. Some time in July, 1800, said A. Ferguson died, (his daughter Isabella having died before him,) leaving his will unrevoked.

This was a libel for subtraction of wages, and in a cause of damage for alleged person-til wrongs and injuries.

<p>Case No. 11,379.</p> <p>Prize — Vessel in Sion-r — Claim op Share— Commission.</p> <p>1. The right, under which a vessel in sight may claim a share of the prize taken by another vessel, is founded in a presumption of law, which supposes a vessel so in sight, and armed, and prepared for battle, to have induced a surrender.</p> <p>2. A vessel not commissioned, must be considered as a mere merchantman.</p>

[There were actions by John Q. Preble against the board of supervisors of Portage ■county upon certain coupons cut from bonds issued by the county in aid of railroad construction. There were verdicts and judgments in favor of plaintiff. Heard on motion to set the same aside.]

Bill in equity seeking a reconveyance of certain lands. Held: to see if a compromise could be effected. Among the assets exhibited to tlie creditors at one of the meetings, ¿t which Theodore was present, was a statement from the books of George, showing Theodore to be very largely indebted to him. No compromise with the creditors was made, and George Prentice filed a petition in bankruptcy.

This was an action of debt brought on' a promissory note, made by the defendant, payable to the order of James H. Johnson, in the following words: “$5437.90. Philadelphia, Nov. 28, 1S36. Five years after date I promise to pay to the order of James H. Johnson, five thousand four hundred and thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents, without defalcation, for value received.

The original bill in this case was filed by the plaintiff, Christopher Prentiss, trustee of William Prentiss, alleging himself to be a citizen of Maryland, in November, 1806, and the answer of the defendant, a citizen of Virginia, in June, ISOS. In the progress of the suit, Seth Barton, the defendant, died, and the suit was revived against his executors. In December, 1816, the executors filed an amended answer, in which the question of jurisdiction is raised.

In equity. The plaintiff [Douglass Fren-tiss] filed his bill in this case against the defendant [Charles W. Brennan] for the settlement of a partnership account, claiming a large balance due to him from the firm, charging that the defendant had wrongfully taken possession of the partnership books, papers and effects, and had absconded with them from Kingston’, in the province of Canada, where the partnership business had been carried on, into the state of New-York, and…

[This was a bill in equity by Elijah Prentiss against Henry L. Elsworth, as commissioner of patents, to procure a decree ordering that letters patent be issued to him for an alleged invention.) The complainant filed his bill complaining that the defendant, as commissioner of patents, had refused to grant him a patent for certain improvements made by him in the art of weaving goods of various hinds, and prayed the court should by decree order the letters patent prayed to be…

At this term a petition was filed by G. W. Prescott, Esq., the clerk of the district court of the district of New Hampshire, in behalf of himself and of the late clerk of said court, praying that a monition might issue to Messrs.

In bankruptcy. This was an exception by the assignee in bankruptcy of Martin Prescott to the decision of the register allowing the claim of J. W. Lawrence for $3,300. This claim was made up of two items. 1. A note for $300, which Lawrence had signed as surety with the bankrupt, and afterwards paid. 2. A claim of $3,000 for money loaned by Lawrence to the bankrupt at different times, on which he had received interest at the rate of two per cent, per month.

Trespass for cutting down 4000 timber trees on lot No. 1, in the fifth division of lands drawn to the right of David Chandler, in the township formerly called New Sun-cook, now composing the towns of Lovell and Sweden, whereof the plaintiffs [James Prescott and another] and defendants are tenants in common, against the statute of the 15th of March, 1821 (chapter 35). Plea, the general issue of not guilty.

<p>No. 11,391.</p> <p>NOX-IXTEKCOUKSE — PROCLAMATION BY PRESIDENT.</p>

“On this twentieth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, before AY. AY.

In the matter of the petition of Geo. N. MeConaha, assignee of the estate of C. H. Preston, bankrupt, praying that a sale made by Stretch, sheriff of Snohomish county, be set aside. On a hearing before his honor, Judge Green, it was agreed by counsel that a statement of facts be prepared and submitted for his honor’s decision, as a special case under the statute.

<p>Case No. 11,395.</p> <p>Malicious Prosecution’ — Action for Damages— Evidence — Piioof.</p> <p>1.Where a writ of attachment is sued out maliciously and without probable cause, and damage ensues, the defendant has a remedy on common-law principles, aside from the remedy on the attachment bond.</p> <p>■2. To sustain an action at common law for maliciously suing out an attachment, it is not enough to show merely that the writ was wrongfully sued out because there was no debt due. The plaintiff must show malice, want of probable cause, and damage.</p> <p>[Cited in Thompson v. Gatlin, 7 C. C. A. 351, 58 Fed. 535. 536.]</p> <p>[Cited in Burton v. St. Paul. M. & M. Ry. Co., 22 X. W. 300, 33 Minn. 193.]</p>

Quantum meruit for work and labor done, (and materials furnished,) as a carpenter. The defendant proved a special agreement-under hand and seal. The plaintiff offered evidence that he was interrupted by the yellow fever from proceeding with the work, and that before the fever subsided, the defendant employed another person to complete the work. The agreement was as follows: “Alexandria, July 29th, 1803.

On the seventh of July, 1877, a verdict was obtained by the plaintiff in the circuit court of the United States for the Western, district of Pennsylvania, and judgment, nisi, was entered thereon the same day.

<p>Case No. 11,402.</p> <p>Phacticb — Execution—Rev. St. U. S. § 9S5.</p> <p>[See note to Case No. 11,404.]</p>

Petition by defendant to remove cause from Pittsburgh, in the Western district of Pennsylvania, to Williamsport, in the same district. The petition set forth that the suit was case for damages done to the plaintiff’s colliery in Columbia county; that this suit was brought for the same cause of action as in the case of Prevost v. Gorrell, originally brought in common pleas No. 2 of Philadelphia county (reported in 2 Wkly.

Bill in equity in aid of execution at law, filed by Prevost, setting forth the following facts: The complainant had obtained a large judgment against Gorrell [See Case No. 11,404], and had then issued execution against all of his discoverable property, real and personal, within the state of Pennsylvania, the sale of which left a large part of the judgment unsatisfied.

This was a proceeding in equity in which the matter had been referred by the court to the official stenographer of the Schuylkill county court, as examiner to take testimony. The examiner and two of the complainant’s counsel lived in Schuylkill county; the other counsel of the complainant resided in Philadelphia.

This case was argued at the last term, and was taken under advisement until the present. It was a bill filed on the equity side of the court, by [George W. Prevost,] the administrator (de bonis non) with the will annexed of George Croghaoi, deceased, against the administrators of M. Gratz. deceased, wlio was one of the executors of G. Croghan. The hill charges II.

[This was a bill in equity by George W. Prevost against Simon Gratz, Joseph Gratz, and Jacob Gratz, for a discovery and account of all the estate of G. Croghan.]

Bill in equity, filed by Prevost v. Daniel, Healy, averring that complainant had purchased at marshal’s sale, on December 21, 1877, under a judgment obtained by him on July 7, 1877, against one Gorrell, certain real «state in Clarion county, therein described.

<p>Case No. 11,408a.</p> <p>Bankrupt Act — Number and Amount of Creditors Required to Join — Individuad and Partnership Creditors.</p> <p>[Partnership debts are also individual debts of each member of the firm. In estimating the number of creditors and the amount of indebtedness represented in the creditors’ petition against a bankrupt member of a firm, it is necessary to take into account the partnership creditors and the amounts due them.]</p> <p>[In 3 Dill. 514, this case is published as a note to In re Israel, Case No. 7,111.]</p>

I, the undersigned register, in charge of the above bankruptcy, do hereby bring to the notice of this court the failure by Stewart Young, the assignee in said bankruptcy, to comply with the provisions of the rule of this court, adopted November IS, 1869 (3 N. B. R. 304, see rule), although the said as-signee has, from time to time, had his attention called to said rule by the undersigned, and said assignee absolutely refuses to make and file any account whatever in the above…

On the petition [of Price & Miller] for adjudication of bankruptcy and denial. No demands for trial by jury. The ease coming on for hearing the debtor's counsel contended that the petitioner must first make out his case by proofs, the same as in any other issue.

[In the matter of Price, Bond & Co., bankrupts.] This is an application to expunge a proof of claim with security filed by Silas Merchant, a judgment creditor, against the bankrupt’s estate, on the ground that the judgment was a fraudulent preference and void as to the other creditors, under provisions of section 3128 of the bankrupt act [of 1867 .(14 Stat. 584, 530)].

<p>Case No. 11,413.</p> <p>Patents — Portable Cibcus Seats — Infringement.</p> <p>1. The complainant filed his bill upon three ■patents for improvements in show and portable seats and in circus seats: Held, that as the defendant constructed and used the ordinary circus seats, which were old and common, and upon every alternate board of which, when elevated, he put chair-seats, he did not infringe upon any claim of cither of the patents.</p> <p>2. Where no infringement is shown, it is unnecessary for the court to examine the other issues raised by the pleadings in the case.</p> <p>[On appeal to the supreme court, the decree of this court was affirmed. 154 T). S. 069, 14 Sup. Ct. 1208 ]</p>

<p>[This was an action by J. P. Price and others against Isaiah Morris and others, to recover certain laud.]</p>

[This was a bill by Price and others, owning certain lands by purchase and conveyance from one Absalom Michael, to set aside the following lease, made by his grantor before complainant purchased the lands: “For value received, I hereby assign all my right, title, and interest for the term of 99 years, also with the privilege of renewal for a like period of time, to all the minerals of whatsoever description that may be found on my land in the county of Augusta, state of…

<p>Case No. 11,416.</p> <p>Salvaos cr Seaman.</p> <p>A seaman cannot have salvage for the boat which has brought him to land after the loss of his ship.</p> <p>[Cited in Peaslee v. Peaslee, 147 Mass. 1S3, 17 N. E. 510.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,417.</p> <p>Bills and Notes — Rate op Exchange at Maturity.</p> <p>Where a note is given in Indiana payable in New York, with interest and the rate of exchange. the rate of exchange will be, the time the note becomes due.</p>

<p>Action by the receiver of a national bank against a shareholder to enforce his liability.'</p> <p>Two questions were reserved at the trial of the case, and a verdict was taken for the plaintiff subject to the opinion of the court upon these questions:</p> <p>• The first question involves the effect of an. order of the court of common pleas of Ve-nango county, Pennsylvania, for the composition of the claim now in suit. The second relates to the statute of limitations. In I867 suit was brought in that court by the receiver of the Venango National Bank against the present defendant to enforce his personal liability as a stockholder in that bank, which is also the subject of the present suit. [On the 23d of March, 1869, with the assent and concurrence of Judge Derrickson, then acting as the representative of the comptroller of the currency, and as the counsel of the receiver, the receiver made a written application to the court for an order to adjust and settle the suit by the payment of twenty-five dollars by the defendant, whereupon an order was made by the court that “the receiver may settle and compound the said suit and the claim involved therein on the terms prayed for in the proposition.”] 2 The sum offered was afterward paid to the receiver. It also appears that the alleged indebtedness existed in May, 1866, when the receiver was appointed, but that this action was not commenced until June, 1876. No explanation of the delay was offered.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,419.</p> <p>Collision at Sea — Crossing Courses — Practice —Suppressing Depositions.</p> <p>1. Where a collision occurred about 65 miles from Sandy Hook, on a clear moonlight night, between a ship loaded with petroleum and sailing S. E. % S. within 2 points of close-hauled, on the starboard tack and going 6 or 7 knots, and a schooner loaded with coal and sailing N. E. nearly before the wind with booms all off to starboard and going 4 or 4% knots, each vessel seeing the other at- a distance of two-miles and each at the time of collision endeavoring to avoid the other, the schooner by going to westward under a starboard helm and the ship by going westward under a port helm: Held, that the change of course of the ship was made deliberately, not to avoid a collision but to go- astern of the schooner, and that she was in fault for the collision-, not having held her course as she was bound to do.</p> <p>2. On a motion to suppress depositions of witnesses for claimant because taken before answer: Held, that no rule of practice requires answer to be filed before taking depositions; and no prejudice to the libellant in this case appearing, the motion must be denied.</p> <p>3. Semble, that where answer is delayed for a purpose, and prejudice to the libellant’s case appears, such a motion might prevail, in the absence of any rule.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,421.</p> <p>Patents — Assignment—Notice op Optstanoino Rights — Effect of Failure to Record —Extension—Costs.</p> <p>1. Where an assignment of a right under a patent refers to the patented improvement as being in use by a certain party, such reference is express information to the assignee of the fact of such use; and, the party referred to being in possession to the extent of such use, such possession is constructive notice of the claim of right under which the possession and use are had.</p> <p>[Cited in Dueber Watch-Case Manuf’g Co. v. Dalzell, 38 Fed. COO.]</p> <p>2. An assignment of a patent by a bankruptcy court to the assignee in bankruptcy of the bankrupt owner of the patent need not be recorded in the patent office, in order to prevail over a recorded assignment of the patent from the administrator of the bankrupt, made after the bankruptcy, as. by section 5046 of the Revised Statutes of the United States [14 Stat. 522], all patent rights of the bankrupt vest at once, by operation of law, in the assignee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>3. A patentee, during the original term of his patent, parted with his right to an extension, and agreed to sign all necessary papers to secure the extension for the benefit of his grantee. Afterwards, for the purpose of showing to the patent office that he would own the extension, if granted, the full title to the extended term was conveyed to him. before the extension was granted. The extension would not otherwise have been granted. The grantee paid all the expenses of obtaining the extension, and all parties understood that he really was to own tlie extended term: Held, that the original instrument was binding, in equity, on the pat-entee; that the equitable right to the extended term was in the grantee; that, as the conveyance back to the patentee was made to deceive the patent office, it was inoperative; but that, as the original grantee of the right to the extension could not claim the extension except by availing himself of such inoperative instrument, the court would leave the parties where it found them.</p> <p>4. The special act of congress of July 15th, 1870 (16 Stat 657). authorizing an application for an extension to be made to the commissioner of patents, did not vary the positions or rights of the parties.</p> <p>5. No costs allowed, on dismissing a bill and a cross-bill.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,432.</p> <p>Decedents’ Estates — Liability por Debts in Virginia.</p> <p>One half of the real estate of a testator in Virginia is liable for his debts, although not charged by the will. Quaere.</p>

[In error to the 'district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was a writ of error to the district court of Massachusetts, in an action of debt brought by the United States against the ' plaintiff in error, on a revenue bond for the duties payable on a certain prize cargo imported into the United States.

<p>Case No. 11,426.</p> <p>REi.ivnut of Caugo — Notice to Consignee.</p> <p>1. A ship arrived at New York, having on board eleven cases of iron goods consigned to B., who, seeing in a newspaper that she had arrived, and knowing that she was to bring the goods, went to the office of the agents of the ship, and paid the freight on the goods. Two days afterwards he paid the duties on them, and a permit for their landing was obtained, and was received by the custom-house officers on board of the vessel. The eleven cases were discharged from the ship on the wharf. One of them went to the public store, and was ultimately received by B. The other ten remained on the wharf till the vessel left, and what became of them afterwards did not appear. B. filed a libel against the ship, to recover their value. The owner of the ship set up that the goods were duly delivered, and also set up that, when this suit was commenced, another action was pending in the supreme court of New York, between B. and the owner of the ship, for the same cause of action. Edd, that whether the pendency of the suit in the state court would be a good plea in abatement or not, the objection should have been taken, if good, by a dilatory or declinatory exception, under rule 7G of this court; and that, moreover, that suit was not of the same nature as this, being a suit in personam, while this is in rem.</p> <p>[Cited in Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alexandre, 16 Fed. 281.]</p> <p>2. The burden of proof was on the ship, to show that notice was given to B. of the place where the ship was to discharge, and, as she had failed to prove the giving of such notice, B. was entitled to recover.</p> <p>■ [Cited in Unnevehr v. The Hindoo, 1 Fed. 629.J</p>

Vessel and cargo condemned, as enemy property. The captors allowed to produce further proof on the question of breach of blockade.

<p>Case No. 11,427.</p> <p>Collision — Steam and Sail — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>On a clear moonlight night, a steamer and sailing vessel, running in opposite directions on a .river between half a mile and a mile wide, collided with each other; the two boats having been in plain sight of each other immediately before the collision, while running a distance of about four miles. Held, that these facts put the burden of proof on the steamer to show that she was not in fault.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,429.</p> <p>Pjuze — Enemy Profekty.</p> <p>Decree of the district court, condemning vessel and cargo as enemy property, and acquitting them on the charge of violating fie blockade, affirmed.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,430.</p> <p>Pilotage — Constkuction of State Law.</p> <p>The construction put by the highest court of a state upon a law of the state becomes a part of the law of the state, and is binding upon the courts of the United States in actions depending on that law. notwithstanding a different construction had been previously put on the state law by the supreme court of the United States.</p> <p>[C'ted in Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Deuel County, 3 Dak. 1, 12 N. W. 569.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,431.</p> <p>Remission of Forfeiture — Ilt.egal Importation —Power of Collector — Goods Stolen from Friendly Sovereign.</p> <p>[1. Although a collector of customs has no control of a prosecution for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported, yet when the United States takes steps to remit the forfeiture he may, under Act March 3. .1797 (1 Stat. 506), show cause against the remission.]</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. One Case of Silk, Case No. 15,925.]</p> <p>[2. In a proceeding for the remission of a forfeiture under Act March 3, 1797, the judge has jurisdiction to determine whether the case presented to him falls within the statute.]</p> <p>[3. A United States district attorney may, upon the authorization of the government, appear in behalf of a person seeking the remission of a forfeiture under Act March 3, 1797 (1 Stat. 50G).]</p> <p>[4. A proceeding under Act March 3, 1797. for the remission of a forfeiture, cannot be maintained until the forfeiture suit has proceeded to judgment.]</p> <p>[5. Property stolen from a friendly foreign sovereign, and smuggled into the United States, is not subject to forfeiture for illegal importation.]</p>

In bankruptcy. This was a motion on behalf of the general creditors of Thomas Princeton, the bankrupt, to expunge the proofs filed by certain mortgagees, on the ground that the giving and receiving of their mortgages was a preference, and a fraud on the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)].

[These were libels by the Schuylkill Navigation Company and by Alfred Lawton against the steamboat Princeton, the first being filed to recover the value of a scow lost while in tow of the steamer, and the second to recover the value of a cargo of coal, which was on board the scow, and was lost with her.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court against the steam-tug Princeton, to recover the value of a cargo of coal which was lost by the sinking of a canal-boat on which it was laden. The canal-boat was towed by the tug from the Raritan river, in New Jersey, to the port of New York, under the following order, signed by the agent of the claimants: “December 10th, 1S47.

Motion of libellants to strike the claim and answer of Andrew B. Crawford and Jacob Crawford from the files, and the counter motion of the respondents to amend their claim. The tug was libelled and arrested at the suit of Mary Jane Peach, for repairs, in the sum of $1,275 35, and thereupon was bonded by and delivered to one George E. Brockway, as claimant.

<p>Ill bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,438.</p> <p>Admjrartt Jurisdiction — -Repaiks Ordered by Agent of Owner.</p> <p>The contract for repairs being made on land, and the owners being represented on the spot by a consignee who has funds, a plea to the jurisdiction of the court of admiralty must avail.</p> <p>[Cited in The Jerusalem, Case No. 7,294; Phillips v. The Thomas Scattergood, Id. 11,106; Leland v. The Medora,. Id. 8,237; Packard v. The Louisa, Id. 10,652; Cox v. Murray, Id. 3,304; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank. C How. (47 U. S.) 391; Cunningham v. Hall, Case No. 3.481: Dief-enthal v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet-fahrt Actien-Gesellschaft, 46 Fed. 397.]</p>