Volume 182 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Marc Gouin, was indicted by a Providence County grand jury on four counts of child molestation. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress statements he made to a Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF) investigator on grounds that he had rendered the statements involuntarily. The hearing justice granted his motion, and the state appealed. The defendant argued that he made the statements involuntarily in that the DCF investigator did not inform him that she was a mandatory reporter or that DCF policy permitted him to have an attorney present. The Supreme Court held that the DCF worker was acting as a state actor at the time of the interview. The Court determined that the defendant's interview with the DCF investigator did not have any indicia of coercion. It further held that the defendant's statements were made voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court hearing justice's decision.

After a jury trial in Kent County Superior Court, the defendant, Eugene Danis, was convicted of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and the sale or distribution of photographs of a minor suggesting that the minor engaged in, or is about to engage in, a sexual act. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice deprived him of his Sixth Amendment constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine the complaining witness regarding prior sexual-abuse allegations against her biological father. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in precluding the line of questioning regarding whether the complaining witness had a motive to lie about the allegations made against the defendant, based upon the lack of reliable testimony during a voir dire hearing. Further, the Court determined that the issue was waived because defense counsel failed to attempt this line of questioning before the jury after the trial justice's ruling on the motion in limine. As such, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

David Paolo appeals from a grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, West Davisville Realty Co., LLC, holding Paolo liable on a personal guaranty of a termination of lease agreement between the plaintiff and Alpha Nutrition, Inc. On appeal, Paolo argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff fraudulently induced him to personally guarantee the agreement. Paolo also averred that there was an issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff provided consideration to Paolo to effectuate a valid contract. The Supreme Court held that Paolo's failure to plead fraud in the inducement against the plaintiff in his answer amounted to a waiver of the affirmative defense, and, therefore, his allegations against the plaintiff raised for the first time in opposition to summary judgment were inadequate to oppose summary judgment. Additionally, the Court concluded that there was sufficient consideration for the underlying contract with the corporation such that the personal guaranty was valid. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

In these cases, the Supreme Court addressed two issues: (1) whether the duration of Frederick Gibson's duty to register as a sex offender under G.L. 1956 § 11-37.1-18 was a lifetime or ten years and (2) whether Gibson's convictions for failing to comply with the notification provision of the registration statute in 2007, 2009, and 2010 violated the ex post facto clause by virtue of two amendments to § 11-37.1-4(a) extending the duration of his duty to register and increasing the punishment for the failure to notify. Those issues were addressed in the context of two cases: Gibson's petition for certiorari seeking review of a Superior Court magistrate's decision denying Gibson's motion to dismiss a 2012 charge for failing to notify under §§ 11-37.1-9 and 11-37.1-10 and Gibson's appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court denying his application for postconviction relief from his three previous failure-to-notify convictions. With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court held that Gibson's duty to register was limited to ten years, pursuant to the plain language of §§ 11-37.1-18 and 11-37.1-4(a). With respect to whether Gibson's 2007, 2009, and 2010 failure-to-notify convictions violated the ex post facto clause, the Supreme Court first concluded that the ex post facto clause was not implicated by the General Assembly's extension of Gibson's duty to register by the two amendments to § 11-37.1-4(a) because they were in furtherance of a civil, nonpunitive regulatory regime and not an example of retroactive punishment. Moreover, the Supreme Court also held that the increases in the punishment for failing to register or notify—from a misdemeanor in 1992, to a felony punishable by up to two years imprisonment in 1996, and to a felony punishable by up to ten years imprisonment in 2003—did not run afoul of the ex post facto clause because Gibson's 2007, 2009, and 2010 failure-to-notify convictions were all well after the 2003 increase in punishment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and quashed in part the decision of the magistrate denying Gibson's motion to dismiss. The Court affirmed that part of the decision denying the motion to dismiss, but reversed the magistrate's ruling that Gibson had a lifetime duty to register. With respect to Gibson's application for postconviction relief, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment denying relief, but reversed the hearing justice's ruling that the duration of Gibson's duty to register was a lifetime.

The defendant, Jesse Perry, appealed a judgment of conviction on two counts of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation following a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court. On appeal, he challenged the trial justice's decision that allowed the state to introduce testimony about the defendant's prior sexual misconduct. He maintained that the evidence did not satisfy the requirements of nonremoteness and similarity pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The defendant further asserted that the evidence should not have been admitted under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because its probative value was outweighed by its risk of prejudice. The defendant also argued that the trial justice's decision on his motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 29(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure amounted to a mid-trial conclusive determination. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting the testimony about the defendant's prior sexual misconduct because the evidence satisfied the requirements of Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. It further concluded that, in rendering her decision on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive relevant and material evidence or was not otherwise clearly wrong. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, who is the tax assessor for the Town of Portsmouth, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the plaintiffs, a group of Portsmouth taxpayers who had challenged the defendant's tax assessments on their properties for tax years 2009 and 2010. The question on appeal was whether certain sections of G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 44 required the plaintiffs to base their tax appeals on the fair market value of their properties "as of December 31 in the year of the last update or revaluation ." According to the defendant, when the plaintiffs appealed their assessments for tax years 2009 and 2010, they were locked in to the values of their properties as of December 31, 2007, the year of Portsmouth's last revaluation at issue. The plaintiffs, whose properties experienced a substantial decline in value after December 31, 2007, disagreed. After analyzing the pertinent provisions of chapter 5 of title 44, the Supreme Court concluded that it was confronted with conflicting statutory language, resulting in significant ambiguity as to whether the plaintiffs were required to base their tax appeals on the December 31, 2007 revaluation. In the face of such ambiguity, the Supreme Court applied the maxim that "taxing statutes are to be strictly construed with doubts resolved in favor of the taxpayer" and held that the plaintiffs had the right to appeal the yearly tax assessments for tax years 2009 and 2010 based on the fair market valuations of their properties as of December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2009. In other words, the plaintiffs were not, as the defendant had argued, locked in to the valuations as of December 31, 2007. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

The plaintiff, Ian DeLong, a former college hockey player, alleged that he inhaled noxious fumes while playing in a game at an arena owned by the defendant DRF Arena, LLC, and operated by the defendant Rhode Island Sports Center, Inc. He claimed that he, along with several other teammates, became ill upon returning to school after a hockey game against Johnson & Wales University at the defendants' ice rink facility. He brought a negligence suit against the defendants, who filed and prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted. The Court determined that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether: (1) a dangerous or defective condition existed on defendants' premises (2) defendants had prior notice of that condition and (3) there was a causal link between that condition and any injury that may have been sustained by plaintiff. As such, the Court concluded that defendants' alleged negligence was a question that should have been left for a factfinder.

The plaintiff, Dana Gallop, is before the Supreme Court on appeal from an order entered in the Superior Court granting the State defendants' motion to dismiss based on G.L. 1956 § 13-6-1, Rhode Island's civil death statute. While being held as a pretrial detainee at the Adult Correctional Institutions, plaintiff was attacked by Ian Rosado, another inmate, and suffered lacerations and permanent scarring on his face. The plaintiff alleged that Matthew Galligan, a correctional officer, knew about Rosado's planned attack and provided Rosado with an opportunity to assault the plaintiff by leaving his post. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants alleging negligence. On the day before trial was set to commence, the trial justice raised the issue of the civil death statute sua sponte, and the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that plaintiff was civilly dead under the law. The Supreme Court addressed the arguments of both parties and concluded that the trial justice was correct in dismissing the case because, although the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, it did not have the authority to proceed in light of § 13-6-1. The Supreme Court also held that it was error for the trial justice not to address the plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint before deciding to dismiss the case. The Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case with directions to hear and decide the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.