Volume 189 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Willie Washington, was found guilty by a jury of four offenses in connection with a shooting that occurred in Providence on November 15, 2014, and he appealed his conviction. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admissibility at trial of two separate show-up identification procedures that resulted in witnesses identifying him as the shooter. In addition, he challenged the admission of an anonymous 911 call as evidence at trial. While this appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, counsel for the defendant learned that the state had a pretrial phone call with the 911 caller. Based on this information, the defendant filed a motion before the Supreme Court to remand the matter to the Superior Court seeking a new trial based on allegations that the state withheld information gleaned from that pretrial phone call, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court remanded the portion of the record necessary for the Superior Court to hear the Brady-related motion for a new trial. On remand, the trial justice held a hearing on the defendant's Brady allegations. Prior to the issuance of the trial justice's decision, the defendant filed a motion to recuse the justice based on the defendant's contention that there was an appearance of impropriety. The trial justice ultimately denied the defendant's Brady-related motion for a new trial and his recusal motion. The defendant returned to the Supreme Court and contended that the trial justice, in addition to committing errors in admitting the show-up identifications and the 911 call into evidence at trial, erred by denying the defendant's Brady-related motion for a new trial and recusal motion. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice was not clearly erroneous in finding that the show-up procedures were marred by some suggestiveness but were nonetheless were reliable and admissible based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the procedures. In regard to the 911 call, at the time of the pretrial hearing, the trial justice admitted the then-anonymous 911 call under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule after he listened to the recording itself and determined that the 911 caller saw the license plate. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion based on the information before him at that time. After trial, it came to light that the no-longer-anonymous 911 caller did not personally observe the shooter's license plate, rendering the 911 caller's statement regarding the license plate number inadmissible hearsay because the caller was not a percipient witness, as the excited-utterance exception requires. However, the Supreme Court held that, because the defendant's guilt was sufficiently established by proper evidence, the admission of the 911 call amounted to harmless error. The Supreme Court next considered the defendant's Brady-related motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not commit clear error in finding that the state did not deliberately withhold any information obtained from the pretrial phone call that was of high value to the defendant and that the state did not fail to disclose information favorable to the defendant that was material to his guilt or punishment. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not commit clear error in denying the defendant's motion to recuse because the defendant failed to put forth any facts establishing a personal bias, prejudice due to a preconceived opinion, or any reason for a member of the public to question the trial justice's impartiality. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Restivo Monacelli LLP (Restivo), appealed from a February 1, 2016 judgment in Providence County Superior Court in favor of the plaintiff, Rhode Island Resource Recovery Corporation (Resource Recovery), in the amount of $5,733,648.18, inclusive of interest. That judgment was entered following a jury trial and a verdict in Resource Recovery's favor. On appeal, Restivo contended that the trial justice erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law for the following reasons: (1) Resource Recovery was required to present, but did not present, expert testimony with respect to proximate cause and (2) Resource Recovery did not have standing to assert a claim for "investment losses." Restivo further claimed that the "trial justice committed prejudicial error in his instructions to the jury." Restivo posited, additionally, that the trial justice erred as a matter of law by holding that Resource Recovery was "'immune' from the in pari delicto defense and that the 'adverse interest' exception to the defense applied to [Resource Recovery]." Lastly, Restivo contended on appeal that the trial justice erred in denying Restivo's motion to "set off settlement amounts that [Resource Recovery] received from other parties from the jury's awarded damages." The Supreme Court held that Resource Recovery was required to present expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause with respect to both its professional malpractice and breach of contract claims, but it did not do so. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.