Volume 20 — Federal Cases

<p>Case No. 11,439.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Power of Register in Composition Proceedings — Examination of Debtor.</p> <p>1. In composition proceedings the register has power, subject to the reviewing power of the court, to conduct the inquiries to be made of the debtor, and to take down the substance of his answers, and to adjourn the meeting with, and in some eases without the consent of the parties, but not to conduct a written examination upon things in general, like one in bankruptcy, n-or to permit all the inquiries and investigations which would be proper in bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Cheney, Case No. 2,637.]</p> <p>2. In most cases, the register is justified in refusing to permit the inquiries to extend beyond the day of the meeting.</p>

This was a libel in rem, filed by the commandant of the U. S. brig of war Vesuvius, against the proceeds of certain Mexican vessels captured by the libellant’s vessel during the late war with Mexico, to obtain distribution of the same.

<p>Case No. 11,441.</p> <p>IXFHINGEMENT OP TuADE-MiKK.</p> <p>[A trade-mark for soap, consisting of the words. “Mottled German Soap,” with a circle having a moon and several stars in- the middle, held infringed by the use of the words “S. W. McBride’s German Mottled Soap” (McBride being the maker), in connection with a crescent having a single star within it. notwithstanding that “Mottled German Soap” or “Mottled Soap” had been in common use for many years.]</p> <p>[Cited in Roberts v. Shelton, Case No. 11,-916.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,442.</p> <p>Charter Partt — Breach — Forfeiture — Charterer’s Refusal to Claim When Libeled for Wages.</p> <p>1. A court of admiralty has no authority to decree the possession of a ship to her general owners on their libel, alleging that the charterers have failed to fulfill the contract on their part, the charter being one which gave possession and control of the ship to the charterers for a time certain, with no condition of forfeiture on a breach.</p> <p>2. A court of admiralty may order a ship li-belled for wages to be delivered to the general owners, if the charterers who are entitled to possession refuse to claim her.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court against the bark Prospect, a foreign vessel, for supplies furnished to her in June and July, 1851, amounting to $435.27. After a decree by the district court in favor of the libellants [case unreported], the claimants appealed to this court

<p>Case No. 11,444.</p> <p>Insurance Policy — Contributory Plan — Construction — Assessment upon Policy Holders —Monthly Assessments — Failure to Make— Power op Court to Make Assessments — Assets.</p> <p>1. If a policy of insurance is sui generis and not provided for either in the general laws of the state regulating insurance, or in the special charter of the company, the obligations of the company and the policy holders to each other, must be found wholly in the terms of the contract.</p> <p>2. The policies of a life insurance company provided that the means for paying the death losses were to come from assessments upon the other policy holders, who were such at the time of the assessment, but the policy holders when assessed were at liberty to pay or not as they elected: Held, that an assessment under these policies would not authorize the company to bring suit in case of failure to pay and that the court cannot confer such a right on the assignee of the company by an assessment on the policy holders.</p> <p>-3. And where the policies provided that the assessments were to be made monthly on all policy holders who had made timely payment of the last assessment: Seld, that the failure of the company to make the assessments regularly from month to month as provided could not be retrieved by an assessment by the court</p> <p>4. The fact that death losses had accrued against the company for which assessments should have been made, but which the company neglected to make, prior to the institution of proceeding, by the auditor of the state, to .wind up the company, does not £ thorize the court to exercise the functions of the company by making these assessments.</p> <p>5. Under these policies the amount to be assessed is not an asset of the company and its general creditors have no right to it.</p>

Motion by F. S. Key, for defendant [Gibson, administrator of Abraham. Young], to dissolve an injunction which had been obtained to stay two judgments at law, for £1,000 each, to be released on payment of £500 with interest at 3 per cent, from January 1,1792, and costs, and it was agreed that all payments made to appear to James D. Barry, within two months, should be allowed.

This was an action on the case for the infringement, by the defendants [Draper, Rug-gles & Co.], of a patent of the plaintiffs [David Prouty & Co.], for “a new and useful improvement in the construction of the plough.” The defendants pleaded the general issue; and also filed a specification of special matters of defence under the patent act of July 4th, 1S36, c. 357 [5 Stat. 117].

Case for infringement of a patent for an improvement in the manufacture of ploughs.

<p>Case No. 11,449.</p> <p>Collision in Hell Gate — Following Vessel.</p> <p>A steamboat, the P., following another steamboat on a flood tide, overtook her near the upper end of Blackwell’s Island. Several tows were met, the P. crossed to the south channel as the other steamboat was passing down the channel towards the end of the island, and in crossing-her bows came in collision: Held that the P. was in fault being the following vessel, for not stopping when she could easily do so, to allow the other vessel to get ahead enough-for the P. to pass under her stern in safety.</p>

This was a bill in equity against the defendant [Mary Manchester), for an injunction to a suit brought in this court to recover certain land belonging to her, of which a deed had been executed by herself and her husband in his lifetime, on a sale thereof to the plaintiffs. The acknowledgment had not been taken in the form prescribed by the act of Rhode Island (Dig. 1798, p. 267, § 7), so that it was incompetent to bind her. There was also a prayer for general relief.

<p>Case No. 11,451.</p> <p>Limiting Liability op Ship Owners — Act op 1851 — Loss by Pire — Injunction.</p> <p>1. A steam propeller, running between Providence and New York, was burned at her dock in New York, on May 24, 1868, with a valuable cargo on board. Portions of the cargo were saved, but not in a condition to be delivered. The wreck of the vessel was sold for $5,000. Various shippers of cargo on board the vessel commenced suits against the corporation which owned her, to recover for the loss of their goods. These suit were pending in the courts of the states of New York, Rhode Island lind Massachusetts. In 1872, the owners of the steam propeller filed a libel and petition in this court, under the 55th, 56th, 57th, and 58th admiralty rules of the supreme court, for the purpose of obtaining the benefit of the limitation of liability given by the act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat 635). On the filing of the petition, the court made an order directing that an appraisement of the value of the interest of the petitioners in the vessel and her freight be made by the clerk, on proofs to be presented to him, and on hearing the petitioners and such of the parties as had begun suit in this district, and that notice of the hearing be given to the attorneys of such parties, and that, in the mean time, the said parties and their attorneys be enjoined from the further prosecution of those suits. One of those parties moved to set aside that order: Edd, that the proceeding; thus instituted is a matter of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. It is substantially a suit in rem against the vessel and its pending freight.</p> <p>[Cited in The John- Bramall, Case No. 7,334; Re Long Island, etc., Transp. Co., 5 Fed. 625, 627; The Tolchester, 42 Fed. 185.]</p> <p>2. The supreme court had power to make the 55th admiralty rule, notwithstanding the provision in the act of March 2, 1793, § 5 (1 Stat. 335), that an injunction shall not “be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state.”</p> <p>[Cited in Re Long Island, etc., Transp. Co., 5 Fed. 625, 627.]</p> <p>[See Hill Manuf’g Co. v. Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co., 113 Mass. 501.)</p> <p>3. The rules, above named, do not transcend the act of 1851, or the power of the supreme court to make rules, under the 6th section of the act of August 23, 1842 (5 Stat 518).</p> <p>4. The 3d section of the act of 1851 was applicable to the case presented on the petition, although the loss was a loss by fire.</p> <p>[NOTE. A motion was subsequently made to strike out a paper filed in this case, called “Exceptions and Answer.” The court held that the paper should be allowed to stand, so far as it amounted to an exception to the jurisdiction of the district court to enjoin further actions. Case No. 11,452.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,453.</p> <p>Discount of Notes — Rhode Island Transaction —Usury—Costs.</p> <p>1. In March, 1873, an application for a discount was made to a bank in Rhode Island, by A., who was its treasurer and one of its trustees, on behalf of H., who resided in New York, and was not then in Rhode Island. Thereupon H. made three notes, two for $12,-500 each, and one for $3,000, which were dated in New York, payable in New York one year after date, endorsed in Rhode Island by A. and also by L., another trustee of the bank, and delivered to the bank, which thereupon gave, at its place of business in Rhode Island, $25,000; the note for $3,000 representing the interest on the $25,000 for one year. He also at the same time made two other notes for $1,500 each, one to the order of A. and the other to the order of L. which he gave them, as compensation for endorsing the notes which were delivered to the bank. To secure the payment of the five notes, H., on the same day, executed and delivered to A. a chattel mortgage on property in New York. A. and L. were duly charged as endorsers on all the notes. H. was adjudicated a bankrupt and F. was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and the property covered by the chattel mortgage, was sold by the bankruptcy court and the proceeds deposited in a trust company. The bank, with A. and L.. then filed a bill in equity to compel the application of the proceeds to the satisfaction of their claim. The trustee insisted that the transaction was a New York transaction and was void for usury. The plaintiffs claimed that it was a Rhode Island transaction and valid. A. and L. had agreed, at the time of the transaction, that they would be holden to each other equally on the five notes, and that the mortgage should be held for the benefit of both, equally: Bold, that the transaction was one made in Rhode Island, and was valid.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Dodge, Case No. 3,948.]</p> <p>[Cited in Dickinson v. Edwards, 77 N. Y. 585.]</p> <p>2. The bank was entitled to have the fund applied first towards the payment of the notes for $28,000, with interest at 6 per cent.</p> <p>3. A. and D. were entitled to have the residue applied towards the payment of the two notes held by them, with like interest, share and share alike, and were entitled to be admitted as general creditors for the amount still remaining unpaid, if any.</p> <p>4. The costs of the plaintiffs and of the depository of the fund must be paid out of the general funds of the estate.</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the circuit court the decree of this court was affirmed. Case No. 11.454. Two of the three obligees in the bond brought a suit on it in this court against the principal and the sureties to recover on it. It was held that this court had jurisdiction of the suit, and that the plaintiffs could sue jointly on the bond, and that, where the terms of a | bond on appeal comply with the provisions of section 1000, Rev. St., in regard to superse-deas and stay of execution, the bond operates as a supersedeas and stay of execution without any order to that effect. Case No. 558.)</p>

The facts in this matter will be found by reference to [Case No. 11,451]. It now came up on a motion to strike out a paper filed in the case, called “Exceptions and Answer.”

<p>Case No. 11,454.</p> <p>Bills and Notes — Lex Loci Conteactps — Place op Discount.</p> <p>1. A promissory note was signed by its maker in New York and transmitted by him to Rhode Island, to be discounted in that state. It was there discounted, and it had no inception as an obligation to pay until it was so discounted: Mdd, that the contract of the maker was made in Rhode Island, and that its legality or illegality, on the question of usury, was to be determined by the law of Rhode Island, and not by that of New York.</p> <p>■ 2.- The decision in Providence Co. Sav. Bank v. Frost [Case No. 11,453] affirmed.</p> <p>[NOTE. Two of the three obligees in the • bond brought a suit on it in this , court, against the principal and the sureties, to recover on it. It was held that his court had jurisdiction of the suit, and that the plaintiffs could sue jointly on the bond, and that, where the terms of a bond on appeal comply with the provisions of section 1000, Rev. St., in regard to super-sedeas and stay of execution, the bond operates as a supersedeas and stay of execution, without any order to that effect. Case No. 558.]</p>

[This was a libel by Samuel A. Provost against the schooner Selkirk.] This case came on to be heard on the report of Earl Bill, the commissioner, to whom it was referred, to report a table of distribution.

<p>Case Wo. 11,460.</p> <p>Limitations — Exceptions—“Persons beyond the Seas” — Effect of Repeal — Perfected Rights —Land Titles in Ohio — Adverse Possession.</p> <p>1. The exemption in the act of limitations of the legislature of Ohio, passed the 25th of February, 1824 [Chase’s St. 1402], of persons being within the age of twenty-one years, insane, feme covert, imprisoned, or without the United States or the territories thereof, at the time of the accruing of the right of action, and giving them, in an action to recover lands the 21 years allowed by that act, after the disability removed, was continued by the acts of 22nd February. 1830 [Id. 1654], and 18th February, 1831 [Id. 1768], up to the act of 28th February, 1846 [44 Laws Ohio, p. 78].</p> <p>2. The act of 28th February, 1846, repeals so much of the laws then in force as saves the rights of persons being non-residents of this state, or “beyond seas,” but defers the operation of the repeal, as to rights of action then already accrued, to the 4th of July, 1847. And the phrase, “persons beyond seas,’* is construed to mean persons who are not residents of the state of Ohio; and this limits the operation of the exception in favor of such parties to the date last mentioned.</p> <p>3. A repealing act totally abrogates the law repealed, except ás to such rights as became perfect under it.</p> <p>4. An objection to the running of the statute of limitations, in an action for the recovery of land, founded upon the allegation that the possession of the defendant was obtained by fraud, can be made only by the party injured by the fraud.</p> <p>5. The second section of the act of Ohio of the •22nd March, 1849 [47 St. 53], “to give additional security to land titles in this state,” and abridging the statute of limitations to seven years after open and notorious possession, in actions brought for the recovery of lands against any person claiming under or by virtue of a judicial or tax sale, saving for five years thereafter the rights of persons then having such rights of action, is repealed by the seventh section of title 2 of the Code. And the repeal applies as well to rights of action existing under the act of 1849 at the time the Code took effect, as to those to accrue after the Code went into operation, provided a right of action had "accrued before the passage of the act of 1849, under the statute at that time in force, and was not barred by the statute under which the right first accrued.</p> <p>6. The words, “statutes now in force,” contained in the sixth section of the Code, as applied to a case where the cause of action had accrued prior to the passage of the act of 1849, ■and which also falls within the terms of the second section of the act last mentioned, are construed to apply only to the statute under which the right of action originally accrued.</p> <p>This was an action at law by Felix P. Pruseux and others, against Simeon W. Welch, Henry Phillips, and Benjamin F. Doler. There was a yerdict for defendants in ejectment, and motion was now made for a new trial.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,457.</p> <p>Bankrupt Must not Sell Property — Exemption.</p> <p>1. Under no circumstances can the bankrupt, after he has filed his petition and schedule, be justified in selling any of his property without leave of the court.</p> <p>2. If the bankrupt is dissatisfied with the exemption of property allowed him by the assignee, his only mode of redress is to except to the ruling of the assignee, and have him certify the question to the district court</p> <p>NOTE. The transfer of promissory notes by the payee, during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings against him. upon which he was afterwards adjudged a bankrupt, vests no title in the purchaser, even though he had no actual notice of the bankruptcy proceedings. The as-signee can recover such notes, even from a bona fide purchaser. In re Lake [Case No. 7.992].</p> <p>As to the mode of proceeding, upon the as-signee’s exemption certificate, see In re Thiell [Case No. 13,882].</p>

Case stated for the opinion of the court, to be considered as a special verdict.

This case came before the court upon the certificate of the register. It seemed that at the first meeting of creditors, a creditor appeared and filed objections to the discharge of the alleged bankrupt, alleging that the petitioner had wilfully sworn false in his affidavit annexed to the petition and schedules; that he was not insolvent, and had given preference to certain creditors, and had lost part of his property in gaming.

<p>Case No. 11,461.</p> <p>Corporate Powers — Power to Mortgage Fran chises — Rolling Stock — When Included in Mortgage — Particular Description Controls General Terms — Specification—When Exclusive — Parties'— Injunction — When Granted — Appointment of Receiver.</p> <p>1. A corporation has only such powers as its charter gives, either expressly, or as incident to its existence.</p> <p>2. No corporation can mortgage its franchises without clear legislative authority to do so. And authority to a railroad company to mortgage its “road, income, and other property,” does not authorize a mortgage of its franchises.</p> <p>3. Legislative authority to mortgage, includes the power to make a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage.</p> <p>4. A trust deed may be void in part, and valid in part.</p> <p>5. A mortgage by a railroad company of “all the present and future-to-be-acquired property of the company, including the right of way and land occupied, and all rails, and other materials used therein or procured therefor,” includes the rolling stock of the road.</p> <p>6. Where a mortgage, in describing property, employs at first general terms, and afterwards proceeds to describe particularly each thing mortgaged, the latter will control the former, if there be a repugnancy.</p> <p>[Cited in Calhoun v. Memphis & P. R. Co-Case No. 2,309.]</p> <p>7. .In a deed, specification generally excludes things not specified. But the omission to specify a thing, without which the things specified would be of no value, does not exclude it.</p> <p>8. A railroad company having a general power to mortgage its road, may mortgage any part of it.</p> <p>9. Purchasers pendente lite are not necessary parties to a bill in chancery. The judgment binds them, though they are not brought before the court.</p> <p>10. A temporary injunction will be decreed, where without it great injury may happen to the complainant, and no injury can result from it to the defendant.</p> <p>11. The appointment of a receiver is generally within the sound discretion of the court. But it is a power only to be exercised in strong cases. In no case of a mortgage ought a receiver to be appointed if it is clear that on a foreclosure the mortgaged property will bring enough money to pay the debt, interest, and cost.</p> <p>[Cited in Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Union Mills Plaster Co., 37 Fed. 291; Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Kansas City, W. & N. W. R. Co., 53 Fed. 19(5; Pennsylvania Co., etc., v. Jacksonville. T. & K. W. Ry. Co., 5 C. C. A. 53. 55 Fed. 136.]</p> <p>' NOTE. For opinions in this case, consult Bill v. New Albany, etc., R. Co. [Case No. 1,407], and Pullan v. Cincinnati & C. Air-Line R. Co. [Id. 11,462], See further, that a corporation can only exercise such powers as are conferred or such as are necessary to carry into effect • those expressly delegated. City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90. A railroad’s deed of trust operates as a mortgage. Coe v. Johnson, 18 Ind. 218. That a corporation has no power to mortgage its franchise, without express legislative authority, see Coe v. Columbus. P. & I. R. Co., 10 Ohio St 372; Com. v. Smith, 10 Allen, 448. Generally, assignees or purchasers pen-dente lite need not be made parties, and are ..bound by the proceedings. 1 Daniell, Ch. Pl. & Prac. 280, and note 7, where there is a large collection of authorities. Por a collection of authorities on the proposition that the appointment of a receiver is discretionary with the court, see 2 Daniell, Ch. Pl. & Prac. 1715, and notes et seq.</p>

Assumpsit by [Lot Pugh and others] the payees against [Philo Durfee and Calvin Bishop] the acceptors on the following draft: “Dolls. 1500. March 4, 1846. At one day’s sight pay to the order of Lot Pugh & Co. fifteen hundred dollars, value received, and charge the same to account of your obt: servt: J. B. Hart. To Philo Durfee & Co: Buffalo, New-York.” (Written across the face): “Accepted at ninety days from date.

In equity. This was a bill of foreclosure filed by James Pulían, successor in trust to George Carlisle and JosephB. Varnum, against the Cincinnati & Chicago Air-Line Railroad Company and numerous other parties in interest to foreclose a mortgage given February 25, 1852, in the form of a deed of trust, by the Newcastle & Richmond Railroad Company, to secure its bonds to the amount of ?300,000. The present questions came up on exceptions to master’s report.

<p>Case No. 11,463.</p> <p>Com.bction op Taxes — Injunction".</p> <p>1. Section 19 of the internal revenue ael of July 13, 1800 (14 Stat. 152), as amended March 2. 1807 (14 Stat. 475). — which provides that no suit to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax authorized, shall be maintained in any court, — applies to all cases where the officer has power to inquire and determine whether the thing assessed by him is liable to taxation, however erroneous his decision of that question may be.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Brice v. Elliott, Case No. 1,-854. Cited in Delaware R. Co. v. Pretty-man, Id. 3,707: Kissinger v. Bean, Id. 7.-853; Kensett v. Stivers, 10 Fed. 523: Snyder v. Marks, 109 Ú. S. 193, 3 Sup. Ct 160.]</p> <p>2. The statute is not unconstitutional; either as depriving the party of his property without due process of law, or as refusing trial by jury.</p> <p>Bill in equity for an injunction. This action was commenced by Richard B. Pulían and others against Christian Kinsinger and others, to obtain an injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with the collection of a tax, which, as internal revenue officers of the United States, they claimed to collect from the defendants, as distillers. The tax in question was claimed under section 20 of the act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 133). The action was commenced in the superior court of Cincinnati, by which a restraining order was granted. The defendants then procured the removal of the cause to this court, and now demurred to the bill.</p>

[This was a hill in equity by Joseph H. Pulte, M. D., against Henry W. Derby and •others. Heard on an application for an injunction on bill and cross bill.]

<p>Case No. 11,466.</p> <p>•Baxkhcftct Pkaotice — Duty of Registf.ks — Statement of Residence of Ckeditoks —Notice—Marshal’s Return.</p> <p>1. Where the petition .in -bankruptcy stated the present residences of certain creditors to be unknown, but gave their former residences: Held, that the statement as to the present residence was sufficient; that the statement ot the previous residence was surplusage; and that the bankrupt should show, either in the schedules attached to his petition or in a separate affidavit, what efforts he had made to find the present residence.</p> <p>2. The marshal’s return to the warrant, though not conclusive, is sufficient to authorize the register to proceed, if it shows due service and iJub-lication.</p> <p>S. The marshal should copy into the notices the exact language used in the warrant, but immaterial variances are to be disregarded by the register.</p> <p>4. Registers in bankruptcy should certify to the court only questions which actually arise.</p>

In this case the register certified to the court, that, on the return before him of the order to show cause why a discharge should not be granted to the bankrupt [Eugene Pul-ver] creditors, who had proved their debts, appeared and claimed ten days to file specifications of objection; that the bankrupt asked that the final oath be administered to him, and the register give a certmcate of regularity and conformity; but that the creditors objected that that could not be done…

[In the matter of Patrick Purcell and Henry M. Robinson, bankrupts.] In this case the register certified to the court that a certain portion of the bankrupt’s property delivered to the assignee was personal property, which was covered by a chattel mortgage; that the assignee had sold all the property; that the mortgaged property did not at such sale realize the amount of the mortgage; that the holder of the mortgage claimed that the assignee should pay the amount of the…

<p>[In the matter of G. & H. Pupke, -bankrupts.] This was a case of involuntary bankruptcy. On the return day, Mr. A. F. Smith, who-appeared in behalf of the debtors, stated to the court that arrangements were being made for a compromise of the matter, to carry out which it had been agreed that the proceeding should be adjourned, but, if the compromise should fall through, he should want a jury; and he inquired of the court whether he would, under the act [of 1807 (14 Stat. 517)], have the same right to demand a jury on the adjourned day, as on this the return day.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,470.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition — Set-Off — Accommodation Paper — Creditors Entitled to Vote.</p> <p>1. The statute allows any composition which is satisfactory to the requisite majority of the creditors, and which is for the best interests of all concerned.</p> <p>2. Nothing can be set off, under section 5073, against the principal of a debt due a creditor, except a debt due from the creditor to the bankrupt.</p> <p>3. Where the bankrupt had given a creditor his accommodation notes to an amount larger than the claim of such creditor, which were discounted and afterwards proved against the estate by the holders, held, that an assignee would have the right to set off the dividend paid upon the notes against the dividend due such creditor, and recover from him the balance of the amount so paid, and the same equitable right obtains in die case of a composition.</p> <p>4. At a first meeting in composition fifteen creditors were assembled, representing seventy thousand and eighty-three dollars and ninety-six cents. A composition of one per cent, was accented by a vote of eight creditors, representing fifty-six thousand two hundred and seventeen dollars and fifty-two cents. One of those voting in the affirmative was the assignee of an insolvent firm, and voted upon a claim of four thousand one hundred and twenty-seven dollars and fifty-eight cents. The bankrupt bad lent his accommodation notes, to the amount of ten thousand dollars, to the firm, who discounted them for their own use, and the notes were proved against the estate by the holders and constituted part of the debts represented at the meeting. Bchl. that the assignee had no interest in the composition and should not be regarded as a creditor who had any voice in its acceptance; that the composition was not approved by the requisite majority, within the true meaning of the statute.</p>

<p>Case Ho. 11,471.</p> <p>AnMiiiAr.Tr — Settlement after Seuvicb or Pkocess — Costs.</p> <p>After service of process, in a suit by a seaman against an officer for a tort, a settlement was made, without the knowledge of the libellant’s proctor, but in good faith, and when the situation of the respondent was such, that there was more danger of undue influence upon him, than unon the libellant: .Held, that the proctor could not recover his costs.</p>

[Appeal from fhe district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] This was an appeal from a decree of the district court, in a suit by the appellee to enforce a lien for his wages as a joiner, for work done on the vessel proceeded against. It appeared that the claimants, being engaged in building this ship, contracted with one Chapman to do the joiner work at a fixed rate per ton.

The material facts in this case are, that the claimant, in November, 1854, being engaged in building a vessel at W’iscasset, of about 500 tons burden, contracted wiui John L. Chapman, to do the joiner work at the rate of 82.25 per ton. Chapman, in the progress of the work, engaged Purinton, the libel-lant, to do a portion of it, for which he was to be paid the sum of $175.

<p>Case No. 11,474.</p> <p>S.V1.VAOK J! V STBAMTUGS NI3A It A PoitT — DEUELICT — Al'I'OKTIONMENT.</p> <p>1.The ship P., in endeavoring to enter the harbor of New York, struck on the False Hook, a bar running parallel to Sandy Hook. The channel to the west, between it and Sandy Hook, is about 300 yards wide, and to the east of it is the open sea. The wind was blowing a gale directly on shore, and the ship pounded so hard on the shoal that in fifteen minutes she had eight feet of water in her, and soon after portions of her keel came up alongside. A powerful tug, the C., came near her, and the captain and crew of the ship, thinking that, the ship would not come off from the shoal, left her and went up to New York in the C. Another tug, the W., had also in the mean time approached', but her captain, seeing the condition of the ship, also thought she would never come off, and she went away looking for .other business. About an hour afterwards, two other tugs, the J. G. N. and the J. M., seeing the flag of distress which had been left flying, went to the ship and found her abandoned. They layby her, and after a while found that she >vas moving, and was about to come off the shoal on the inshore side. Having agreed to share in the salvage, they ran in close to her, and put on board four men, and got a hawser to her, when she came off the shoal, and they succeeded in towing her round the point of Sandy Hook into the bay, where they put her on the mud. pumped her all night, and the next day at noon brought her to a dock in safety. When the captain of . the Wi saw the ship moving, he came up also and offered his assistance to the two tugs, which then were towing the ship, but it was refused. The captain of the ship on the tug C., on his way up to New York, left word with a wrecking company to be ready to go to the ship. He left his crew in New York, and the next morning early he went himself on board the C., and went' to look for the ship, and found her on the mud in charge of the salvors. The owners of the two tugs filed a libel for salvage. The owners of the C. also filed a petition claiming salvage. The' ship and her cargo and freight were worth from ■ $225,000 to $237,000. The tugs were worth one • of them $9,000. and the other $17,000. Each of them had a crew of six all told, and on one of them was a boy who had gone with the tug • for a pleasure trip: Bdd, that in view of the . peril to the property, the value of the property saved, the risk of loss of the tugs, and the danger to the lives of their crews — such danger and risk was not excessive, and the services lasted about twenty hours — the sum of $30,000 was a proper amount of salvage to be paid to the two tugs.</p> <p>2. The C. was not entitled to recover salvage.</p> <p>3. The amount of salvage should be divided equally between the two tugs. The masters of them should receive $3,000 each; the men who went on board the ship, and especially one who took charge on board of her, should receive a higher rate than their fellows; and the rate of wages afforded a proper criterion by which to fix the shares of the men.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,475.</p> <p>Bankkdptot — Eights op Assignee — Fkadd op Bankkupt.</p> <p>A made a loan to B and delivered to B’s agent ■a package of bank notes containing the amount •of the loan. At the time the agent of B was instructed to negotiate the loan B was insolvent, and the contract made by his agent was after his failure, but before the news had reached A. It also appeared that B had then resolved not to pay the bill or note which was given as evidence •of the loan: that as soon as A was informed of the failure he endeavored to reclaim the package •of notes still in the hands of B’s agent; that it was placed in a bank with the seal unbroken, for the benefit of A. and the next day B, in the presence of the president of the bank, expressly •disclaimed ownership of the said package and •declared that it justly belonged to A. Held, that the assignee in bankruptcy of A had no title to the package of notes for the reason that fraud is ineffective to change the ownership of property obtained by means of it; that the assignee is invested with the rights of the bankrupt only, subject, of course, to all the equities which would have affected him if he had not been adjudged •a bankrupt.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,476.</p> <p>BAxkuurTOT — Who mat Vote foe Assignee.</p> <p>1. An, agent of a -creditor proved the claim of his principal in bankruptcy, and sought to vote for assignee. Meld, that he could not do so without a power of attorney.</p> <p>2. An attorney at law cannot vote for his client without being duly constituted his attorney in fact.</p> <p>8, -A joint creditor who had proved the joint claim in bankruptcy sought to vote for assignee. Meld', that if- the joint creditors were partners^ he could vote the full amount of the debt, but if be was joint trustee or joint creditor and no partner, neither could act or vote without consent and authority of the other.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Barrett, Case No. . 1,043.]</p> <p>4. A firm creditor of the bankrupt can be counted only as one creditor in the vote for as-signee.</p> <p>5. Where creditors of a firm proved claims in bankruptcy against a member who had petitioned individually, held, the private creditors only could vote for assignee.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Webb. Case No. 17,317.]</p> <p>6. A person to be elected assignee must receive a majority of all tvho have proved claims, and not simply a majority of votes cast.</p>

On the petition of Morris N. Rowley for an order requiring the assignee to deliver to him, the said Rowley, as his property, three certain scales, of which the assignee has taken possession as assets of the bankrupt [A. Pusey]. An answer was put in by the assignee denying Rowley’s right to the scales, and proofs have been taken.

On petition of Henry Dean for the delivery to him of certain paper and stationery goods, in possession of the assignees, claimed by Dean to belong to him, and the answer of the assignee, claiming that the goods in question were transferred to Dean by the bankrupt [A. Pusey] without adequate consideration, and for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the bankrupt, and in violation of the bankrupt act [of 1SG7 (14 Stat. 517)].

<p>In equity. Final hearing on pleadings and1 proofs. Suit brought [by H. W. Putnam against Sephreness Hickey and others] on letters patent [No. 23,203] for an “improved bottle-stopper fastener,” granted to complainant, March 15, 1859, and reissued January 24, 1864 [No. 1,600J. The invention is fully described, in the opinion, and is illustrated by the accompanying engraving, which also shows one of the forms of the stopper-fasteners described in the Chalus patent, and by which it was insisted by the defendants the invention, of Putnam was anticipated.</p> <p> </p> <p> </p>

<p>Case No. 11,481.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — When Exclusive — Judgment op State Court — Code — Cumulative Remedies— Stale Demands — Exhibits—Cross-Bill—Ratification op Subscription bv Citt — Practice —Subscription —When cannot be Rescinded — When mat be Modified — Estoppel — Parol Evidence — Volunteer.</p> <p>1. It is a general rule that when different courts have concurrent jurisdiction of a matter, the first that takes the jurisdiction excludes the others. But to this rule there are exceptions.</p> <p>2. When a party has obtained a judgment in a state conrt*against a corporation, on account of whose insolvency he is unable to - collect the same, he may file his bill in equity in a national court to oblige the debtors of the corporation to pay the judgment if the citizenship of the parties to the bill will confer the jurisdiction according to the provisions of the judiciary act [1 Stat. 73].</p> <p>TCited in Gorrell v. Dickson, 26 Fed. 455.]</p> <p>. 3. The Indiana Code of Procedure, which rives certain equitable remedies in courts of law, is, as to these, cumulative only; and it does not take from courts of equity those remedies which existed before the Code was adopted.</p> <p>4. Courts of equity are reluctant to sustain a demurrer to a bill on the ground of staleness alone, unless it is such that the delay would bat-an action at law on the same claim, or unless there is a strong analogy between the case in equity, and a case at law on which a statute of limitation would operate.</p> <p>[Cited in Lemoine v. Dunklin Co., 38 Fed. 570.]</p> <p>5. There is no rule in equity pleading requiring that either writings mentioned in a bill, or copies of them, shall be filed, as exhibits, with the bill.</p> <p>6. In a suit in equity in this court, in which all the defendants are citizens of Indiana, one defendant cannot file a cross-bill against his co-defendants proposing to litigate subjects foreign to the matters set up in the original bill, and in which the original complainants have no interest.</p> <p>7. An illegal subscription of railroad stock by a city may be ratified under a subsequent act of the legislature authorizing its ratification. A bill alleging such subscription ought to aver the ratification. But the answer, by putting in issue the question of such ratification, may supply the ■want of such averment in the bill.</p> <p>• 8. The Indiana Code authorizes a plaintiff, in a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage, to take a personal judgment for the debt secured by it, if such debt be evidenced by a note or other writing than the mortgage.</p> <p>9. A subscription of capital stock in a corporation cannot be rescinded so as to affect the rights of its creditors while the corporation is insolvent.</p> <p>10. But when the subscription is conditional, and while the corporation is solvent, it may be reduced and modified according to the terms of the condition; and such modification, acquiesced in at the time by all parties, will not, after the lapse of fifteen years, be set aside.</p> <p>11. To render a former adjudication an estop-pel. the point adjudicated must have been admitted, or distinctly put in issue in the course of the former adjudication.</p> <p>12. Parol evidence, in aid of the record to establish an estoppel, cannot be tolerated.</p> <p>13. An answer and cross-bill filed by a person not named in the bill, nor admitted as a defendant, will be stricken from the files.</p> <p>NOTE. The above statement by Judge McDonald that, as to the individual subscribers, the bill would be dismissed, must refer to those subscribers who had duly prosecuted their defense, for two of the defendants, Ezekiel It. and Silas C. Day, were defaulted, and on the enrollment of the decree herein, judgment was entered against E. B. Day for $6,230, and against S. C. Day for $3,026, with a provision that any money collected from the Days should be applied in reduction of the decree against the city, and upon full payment by the city no execution should issue against the Days.</p> <p>To set aside this finding against them, E. R. and S. C. Day filed a bill of review in this court, on the hearing of which before Judge Drummond, November term, 1872, the prayer was granted, and these findings set aside. lUn-reported.]</p> <p>In the appeal by the city of New Albany the supreme court held that the laches of the complainants was sufficient to bar the relief asked in their bill, and reversed the decree so far as the city was concerned, and ordered the bill dismissed as to it. New Albany v. Burke, 11 Wall. [78 U. S.J 96.</p> <p>In the appeal by the complainants as against the individual defendants, the supreme court affirmed the decree below. Burke v. Smith, 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 390.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,482.</p> <p>Bottomht — Necessity.</p> <p>The lender of money on bottomry must inform himself whether the alleged necessity exists. If not, he loses his specific lien on the vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in Greely v. Smith. Case No. 5,750.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Henry W. Tutnam, praying for an injunction against defendants, G. Sudhoff and others, and an .assessment of damages for using bottle-stopper fasteners made in imitation of the Putnam patent fastener. Letters patent No. 28,-.203 were granted to H. W. Putnam March 15, 1859, and reissued January 24, 1864 (No. 1,60G). Defendants are soda manufacturers :in St. Louis.

[This was a. suit in equity, brought against Ephraim D. Weatherbee and ' others for an alleged infringement of reissued letters patent No. 23,263, granted to- Hen it W. Putnam, January 19, 1864, for an “improvement in bottle-stopper fastenings.” The invention will be found illustrated in the reported case of Putnam v. Hickey [Case No. 11,480]. The present suit came up on a motion for a preliminary injunction.

Petition [by A. Waldo Putnam and others] for the confirmation and division of a Spanish claim, under the act of 26th May, 1824 (4 Stat. 52), in the district court of Arkansas.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Henry W. Putnam against Henry W. Yerrington, for the alleged infringement of reissued letters patent.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,488.</p> <p>L.vucmxv — Tuktimoxv to Scstaix Ixdictmext.</p> <p>An indictment for larceny cannot he sustained on the testimony of the prosecuting witness that he loaned the confederate of the prisoner money with which to gamble, and on the prisoner winning the money, went off with it notwithstanding the objection of the witness, who stated, “I hope you d:d not bring me around here to rob me instead of soiling me a coat.”</p>

<p>Case No. 11,489.</p> <p>Voluntary Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Preferences — Act of 1841.</p> <p>By the 2d section of the bankrupt act [of 1841 (5 Stat. 440)], it is declared, “that in case it shall be made to appear to the court in the proceedings in bankruptcy, that the bankrupt, his application being voluntary, has subsequent to the first day of January last, or at any other time, in contemplation of the passage of a bankrupt-law, by assignment or otherwise, given or secured any preference to one creditor over another, he shall not receive a discharge, unless” &c. The meaning and intention of the legislature is, that in ease the bankrupt (his application being voluntary) gives or secures a preference to one creditor over another, at any time subsequent to the first of January, 1841, he is debarred of a discharge; or if he makes such preference at any other time in contemplation of the passage of a bankrupt law, he incurs the same disability. Where, therefore, it appeared that a bankrupt had in December, 1840, declared that the house of which he was a partner would proceed to arrange their affairs, sell their .stock of goods at auction to protect some confidential debts, and then make an assignment and await the passage of the bankrupt law, and that prior to 1st of January, 1841, certain pref-erenees had been given to creditors, held, that such preferences were made with a knowledge that a bankrupt law was in progress through congress, and the' probability of its becoming a law, and were therefore made and given in contemplation of bankruptcy,' and that the bankrupt was therefore pot entitled to a discharge and certificate.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this court was affirmed. Case No. 11,490.]</p>

' [Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [In the matter of John Quackenboss, a bankrupt, of the firm of Griggs, Quacken-boss & Day, the bankrupt’s application for i a discharge was denied. Case No. 11,489. Applicant appeals.] In this case the petitioner had been opposed by Wm.

<p>Case No. 11,493.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Bonding Distillery Property-Fraud.</p> <p>1. Where distillery property is libelled for alleged violation of the internal revenue laws, the rule of the court is not to allow it to be bonded where there is reasonable ground, on the evidence, to believe that the law has been violated.</p> <p>2. Where it appeared, plainly, that a rectifying establishment and a distillery were situated close together, and that appliances existed by means of which spirits could easily be run into the rectifying establishment from the distillery in fraud of the law, and there was some evidence that that had been done, the motion to bond was denied, notwithstanding the positive affidavits of the claimant and his foreman and his workmen, that it had not been done.</p> <p>3. On such an application, the government is not bound to furnish the details of its evidence, any further than is necessary to show reasonable anil probable ground to sustain the prosecution.</p>

Suit to foreclose a mortgage containing the usual interest clause, that, if any installment ■of interest or principal shall come due and remain unpaid for thirty days, the whole ■sum secured shall be due and payable at the •expiration of said thirty days, at the option of the mortgagee.

<p>Case No. 11,494.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Aot Juxe 80, 1864, § 48 — Act July 13, 1S6B, § 26 — Presumption—Evidence—Regulations—Branding Spirits.</p> <p>1. Under the 26th section of the internal revenue act of July 13th. 1866 [14 Stat. 154], rectifiers were bound to keep the book prescribed by that section and make the proper entries in it, whether the commissioner of internal revenue had prescribed any rules and regulations on the subject or not.</p> <p>2. Where a rectifier had kept a book as so prescribed and had himself made an entry in it of a certain purchase, which entry did not comply with the requirements of the act, but he gave no evidence to explain the discrepancy. held, that file jury must take anything doubtful about the entry most strongly against him.</p> <p>3. Where a party to a suit has in his possession evidence which he can give to clear up any doubt, and he does not give it, there is a presumption that the evidence, if given, would corroborate that which has been given against him.</p> <p>4. The fact that spirits are purchased for less than the amount of the tax upon them is sufficient evidence, in the absence of any explanatory circumstances, to show that the purchaser could not have believed that the tax was paid.</p> <p>5. Where spirits were proved to have been found upon a rectifier’s premises and no proof was given that the tax had been paid, held, that the jury were to assume, as matter of law and as matter of fact, that the tax had not been paid.</p> <p>6. The 48th section of the act of June 30th, 1864 [13 Stat. 240], is not ambiguous, nor is the statute a penal one.</p> <p>7. The fact that spirits were properly branded by United States inspectors is not evidence that the taxes on them had been paid.</p> <p>The jury rendered a verdict for the government on the 20th section of the act of 1860, and the 48th section of the act of 1S64.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,495.</p> <p>Internal Revenue Act op July 20, 18US — Can-celling Stamps — Rectifier’s Books— Knowing and Wilful Neglect.</p> <p>1. Empty barrels were found on the premises of a rectifier, on which were stamps which had not been cancelled as required by the 43d section of the internal revenue act of July 20. 1808 (15 Stat. 125). Held, that if the rectifier knew that the stamps were not cancelled, and it was his will, freely exercised, that they should not be cancelled, when the barrels were emptied, then he had “knowingly and wilfully” neglected to comply with the 43d section, and, under the 96th section of the same act, all distilled spirits or liquors owned by him were forfeited.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Learned, Case No. 15,580. Criticised in U. S. v. Ninety-Five Barrels of Distilled Spirits, Id. 15.889. Cited in U. S. v. One Thousand Four Hundred and Twelve Gallons of Distilled Spirits, Id. 15,960; U. S. v. Pour Thousand Eight Hundred Gallons of Snirits, Id. 15,153; U. S. v. Bayaud. 16 Fed. 384.]</p> <p>2. A rectifier must himself make the entries in the book required by the 45th section of the same act. and his failure to do so subjects him to a similar penalty.</p> <p>The jury found a verdict for the United States as to the empty barrels and the distilled spirits and liquors, and for the claimant as to the rest of the property seized.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,499.</p> <p>.Proceedings Supplementary to Execution — “Common Law Cause” — Suit in Rem for Forfeiture.</p> <p>1. A suit in rem for forfeiture of property by Teason of violation of the internal revenue iaws is a “common law cause,” within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 910 (re-enacting the statute of 1872, c. 255, § 6; 17 Stat. 197), which provides that “the party recovering a judgment in any ‘common laiv cause’ in any circuit or district court shall be entitled to similar remedies upon the same by execution or otherwise to reach the property of the judgment debtor as are now’ provided in the like causes by the laws of the state in which such court is held, or by any such law's hereafter enacted, which may be .adopted by general rules of such circuit or district court.”</p> <p>2. In such a case, after return of execution •against the stipulators unsatisfied, proceedings supplementary to execution in accordance with the laws of New York are properly taken.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,500.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Canceling Tobacco Stamps —Intent to Sell ok Remove in Fkaud op the Law.</p> <p>1. Two unstamped packages of tobacco, and some unstamped packages of cigarettes, were found in a tobacco store. It was a question, on the evidence, wkc-.ther these packages belonged to tho establishment. Other packages, properly stamped, were also found there. There was evidence tending to show that the person in charge of the store had been in the habit of not destroying the stamps on packages which were emptied, but of keeping them: Held, that the unstamped packages must be forfeited, under the 70th section of the act of July 20, 1808 (15 Stat. 156).</p> <p>2. The expression, “in fraud of the internal revenue laws,” in the 48th section of the act of June 30th, 18G4, as amended by the 9th section of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. Ill), means “in violation of the internal revenue law's.”</p> <p>3. Although there might have been no intent to sell or remove the stamped packages without their paying the taxes which the stamps indicated, there might have been a design to remove and sell them in fraud of the law.</p> <p>4. If there was an intention on the part of those in charge of the establishment, to violate the law' in relation to the goods that were taxable, by not canceling the stamps on packages that were sold, as required by the 72d section of the act of July 20th, 1868, then the whole establishment was forfeited.</p> <p>5. If the unstamped packages belonged to the establishment, and were there for the purpose of being sold without the payment of tax upon them, it would be good ground for forfeiting the entire establishment.</p> <p>6. The government must make out its case to the satisfaction of the jury, by a preponderance of testimony.</p> <p>The jury found a verdict for the United States, condemning the two packages of tobacco and the cigarettes, and for the claimant as to the rest of the property seized.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,501.</p> <p>Collision ix New Yore Harbor — Steamer axd Schooner — Porting Helm — Lights.</p> <p>1. Where a collision occurred after sunset between a steamer and a schooner, and the schooner. though having no lights, was seen from the steamer at a distance variously estimated by her witnesses as from three-quarters of a mile to two miles, and the steamer alleged as a de-fence that the schooner changed her course, and it appeared that on seeing the alleged change of the schooner’s course, the steamer’s helm, which was then amidships, was ported and kept hard a-port till the collision, although the schooner was then in such a position and so far off that there was time for the steamer, by a slight change of her helm to starboard, to have avoided the collision: HáA. that although the schooner should have had her lights set, the absence of them did not contribute to the collision.</p> <p>2. Tiie schooner’s course being seen and known by the steamer, the burden of proof .was on the latter to show that the schooner changed her course at such a time that the steamer coitld not keep out of her way.</p> <p>3. She had failed to furnish such proof.</p> <p>4. The porting of the steamer’s helm under the circumstances was the cause of the collision, and was a fault</p> <p>5. There is no obligation on a steamer, when there is danger of a collision with a sailing vessel, to port rather than to starboard her helm.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court the decree of this court was- reversed, it being held that the collision was the fault of the schooner, and the libel of her owners was therefore dismissed. Case No. 11,502.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel for collision. From a decree of the district court, in favor of libel-ants (Case No. 11,501), claimants appeal.]

<p>Case No. 11,506.</p> <p>Marine Insurance — Abandonment — Recapture — Salvase—Temporaut Interruption op Voyage.</p> <p>1. Insurance was effected on the ship Experiment, at and from New-York to any ports on the north side of Jamaica, and at and from the same, to New-York, with the usual warranties. The vessel was captured by a Spanish privateer, while proceeding from Falmouth, in Jamaica, to Monlego Bay; recaptured by the British, carried back to Falmouth, and afterwards to Montego Bay, where the vessel and cargo were subjected to a salvage of one-eighth; sold, for the payment thereof; purchased by the captain, for the benefit of those whom it might concern; and the vessel, having completed her lading, returned to New-York, subject to a bottomry bond for advances made by the consignee; her outward freight having exceeded the salvage and expenses resulting from the recapture. The insured abandoned, on being informed of the recapture. The court held, that there was no ground for an abandonment.</p> <p>2. A capture as prize, will authorize an abandonment. as soon as notice is received, provided the loss continue to the time when the abandonment is made.</p> <p>3. If a recapture is made with a view to salvage, and this does not exceed, with the expenses, one-half of the value of the property, and the recapture produces only a temporary interruption of the voyage, the insured cannot abandon.</p> <p>4. If the recapture be as prize; or the voyage be lost, or not worth pursuing; if the salvage be very high; or if further expenses be necessary, and the underwriters will not agree to pay them, the assured may abandon.</p> <p>[Cited in Dickey v. American Ins. Co., 3 Wend. 662.]</p>

These were cross libels, filed by the respective owners of the brig and ship above named, to recover the damages occasioned by the vessels’ coming in collision in the harbor of New York, in the night of January 2d, 1S7Ü.

This was a libel, filed by the owners of the steamboat Sylvan Glen, to recover for the damages received by her in a collision with the Queens County, which happened about daybreak on the morning of December 30th, 180Í). The Sylvan Glen was on a trip from Harlem to New York. She came down the east channel, between Blackwell’s Island and Long Island.

<p>This was an action for the possession of a parcel of land situated in Santa Clara county, and was tried at the July term, 1868, by the court without the intervention of a jury, upon stipulation of the parties.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Indiana.] This was a libel filed by the owners of the steamer Ollie Sullivan against the steamer Quickstep, for a collision by which, it is alleged, the Ollie Sullivan was sunk in the Ohio river, in consequence of the negligence of those on board the Quickstep in the management of their steamer.

<p>[This was an action at law by James F.. Quigley against the Central Pacific Railroad. Company.] Motion for a new trial.</p>

The case of Tho-mas Quigley, of Toledo, Ohio, administrator of Bernard Quigley, deceased, against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, also tried in the same court at this term, was particular in its facts, although not complicated in its law. Bernard Quigley, the decedent, had a policy of $1,000 on his life in the defendant company. On the 5th day of May, 1873, he was adjudged insane and a guardian was appointed by the probate court.

Emil Quinike filed his petition in bankruptcy in this court in March, 1868. Warrants were issued and the proceedings were all regular up to July, 1868, when he died. An assignee was afterwards appointed and made disposition of the assets. This was a motion for a discharge under the act.

This was a suit [by Thomas Quimby and others against the brig Euphemia] for the recovery of seamen’s wages. The libel in this case alleged a hiring of the libellants at the rate of £2.10 sterling for each per month, except. Quimby. whose wages are alleged to have been £2 per month.

<p>Case No. 11,516.</p> <p>Collision — Exceptions to Lihel —Pleaiung in Behalf of Vessels Injured while in Tow —Pull Statement of Facts.</p> <p>1. A canal-boat in tow of a steamboat was injured in a collision with another steamboat. The owner of her filed a libel against both vessels. in which he did not set out the facts of the collision, though the movements of the vessels were seen by á person on board the canal-boat. The claimants excepted to the libel. Sdtl, that exceptions to a pleading in admiralty have the effect of a demurrer, and also that of a motion to make the pleading more definite and certain.</p> <p>[Cited in The M. M. Hamilton, Case No. 9,-680.]</p> <p>2. To make cases of collisions like this exceptions to the general rule, which requires a full statement of the facts of the collision, would be to permit the parties to come to trial without any preliminary statement from either party, which would be of any assistance to the court, or would apprise the parties most in interest, of the facts which they are calk'd on to meet.</p> <p>[Cited in The M. M. Hamilton, Case No. 9.-68u.]</p> <p>3. Whether such exceptional pleading might be allowed where the libellant was unable to give any statement of the facts of the collision— qnere.</p> <p>4. The present is not such a case, and the libel , must be reformed by setting forth as far as , practicable, the material circumstances attend- , ing the collision in question.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,517.</p> <p>Seamen — Articles—Pahoi. Evidence— Clauses not Explained — Forfeiture—Wages— In what Monet Reckoned.</p> <p>1. Where seamen shipped at Valparaiso on hoard a Chilian vessel and signed articles for a voyage to Boston and back to Valparaiso, they cannot by parol evidence vary the voyage shown in the articles, if the contract in this respect was fully explained to them before they signed it.</p> <p>2. But they can avoid a clause in the articles which was not clearly explained to them, and which undertakes to forfeit all their wages and property if they should be absent from the ship for forty-eight hours without the express permission of the master.</p> <p>ICited in The Samuel Ober, 15 Fed. 622.]</p> <p>3. Where, in such a case, the seamen left the vessel on her arrival in Boston, under a claim of right, and in ignorance of the penal clause of the articles; and upon learning that the master-insisted on their return, offered to come on board and serve again, but were refused permission, and their absence had worked no injury to the owners, held, they might recover their full wages to Boston.</p> <p>4. The wages should be reckoned in the money of the United States, the contract being for so-many dollars payable here.</p>

This action was brought [by William Quirk against Peter Clinton] to recover damages for non-performance of an agreement of af-freightment.

<p>This was an action of assumpsit oil a promise of the defendant to ship to the plaintiffs, at Marseilles, a quantity of sugar. The declaration contained several special counts, in which the contract was variously stated; but those relied on at the trial stated it as follows: That David J. Rabaud, Andrew E. Belknap, and others, the plaintiffs, were merchants at Marseilles, in partnership, under the firm of Rabaud, Brothers, & Co.; and that George D’Wolf, of Bristol, Rhode Island, wishing to draw on them for 100,000 francs, James D’Wolf, jun., on the 15th of November, 1S25, at the city of New7 York, in consideration that the plaintiffs would authorize such drawing, promised to ship, for the account of said George D’Wolf, on board such vessel as he should direct, 500 boxes white Havana sugar, consigned to the plaintiffs at Marseilles. That in consequence the plaintiffs gave the authority to draw bills to the amount of 100.000 francs, which were accordingly drawn and duly paid. That George D'Wolf afterwards named a vessel lying at New-York and ready to receive the sugar, on board of which the defendant ought to have shipped it, according to his promise, but which he refused to do.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded the general issue.</p> <p>On the trial the plaintiffs read the deposition of George D’Wolf, taken under a commission, proving the following facts: The plaintiffs were partners as stated in the declaration, and the plaintiff, Belknap, was also agent for the house in the United States. On the 15th of November, 1825, George D’Wolf and Belknap being then in the city of New-York, the former having between 300 and 400 boxes of Havana sugar in the hands of the defendant, proposed to the latter to increase the quantity to 500 boxes, and ship them to the plaintiff's house at Marseilles, on receiving an authority to draw on account of the same to the extent of 100,000 francs. At this interview7, which wras in the street, the defendant was present. Another interview, an hour afterwards, at the defendant’s counting-room, was proposed by Belknap, who was then engaged. At this interview, Belknap observing that the advance requested was heavy, a calculation was made by the defendant and one Bull of the value of the 500 boxes of sugar, compared w7ith the amount to be advanced, the conclusion of which was an agreement, that the sugars should be shipped, and the authority given to draw7, upon the defendant's engaging by letter to ship the sugars in behalf and on account of George D’Wolf, which form of a letter the said George D’Wolf submitted to Belknap, who assented to it, and the defendant having signed it, the authority to draw the bills was accordingly given. The letter referred to by the witness was as follow’s: “New-York, 15th Nov. 1825. Mr. James D’Wolf, jun. — Dear Sir: You will please ship for my account, on board of such vessel as I shall direct, five hundred boxes white Havana sugar, consigned to Messrs. Rabaud, Brothers. & Go. Marseilles, and oblige your friend and obedient servant, George D'Wolf.” “Agreed to. James D'Wolf, jun.” Tlie authority to draw was as follows: “New-York, 15th Nov. 1825. Messrs. Rabaud. Brothers, & Co. Marseilles: I have this day authorized George D’Wolf, Esq. to draw on you for - thousand francs, and I request you to honour his bills for that amount. Your obedient servant, A. E. Belknap."</p> <p>At the time of this transaction, George D’Wolf was indebted to the-plaintiffs in the sum of 80.000 francs. It did not, however, appear that the defendant knew of this cii-cumslance. The sugars were to be shipped for the purpose of obtaining the 100,000 francs, George D’Wolf preferring the market of Marseilles to that of New-York; the proceeds to be placed in the defendant’s hands on the bills being negotiated, in order to further the shipment, and not with reference to the accounts existing between George D’Wolf and the defendant. The plaintiffs were to have the usual commissions for accepting and paying the bills, and for the sale of the produce. The bills were drawn and accepted by the plaintiffs, and, as witness presumed, paid. The sugars which George D’Wolf had in the hands of the defendant, at the commencement of the transaction, amounting to from 300 to 400 boxes, were, 07 of them, remitted from Rhode Island by him to the defendant, on account of which he drew on the defendant for 4,000 dollars, and the remainder were purchased for him by the defendant, for which he gave in payment his own notes of hand. He was at the same time indebted to the defendant to a considerable amount. Belknap, however, was ignorant of every thing in relation to the purchase of the sugars. It was agreed between George D'Wolf and the defendant, that the former should remit the latter the proceeds of the bills when negotiated, upon which verbal promise the defendant granted his signature to the said letter. The defendant, when the letter was presented him, declined signing it until next morning, when he should see the said Bull. The next morning it was signed, and the defendant then pressed George D'Wolf for payment of what was due him. The defendant afterwards wrote George D'Wolf that he should not make the shipment until the remittances were made. It did not appear that Belknap knew of any understanding between George D’Wolf and the defendant. The bills were negotiated in Boston, from which place George D’Wolf was to remit the proceeds to the defendant. He actually remitted only 7,000 dollars. It was the intention of George D’Wolf to have shipped tlie sugars in a vessel of his own; but haying become embarrassed, he wrote Belknap on the 27th of December, 1825, informing him, that owing to this circumstance the vessel which was to have come to New-York to take them, would fail to do so, and that he was at liberty to make any arrangements with the defendant which he might think proper for the interest of all concerned. The defendant objected to the admission of this letter, and excepted to the decision of the judge allowing it to be read, for the purpose of showing an authority from George D’Wolf to Belknap to appoint a vessel. On the 3d of January, 182G, Belknap communicated this letter to the defendant, and gave him notice of his intention to provide a vessel, and the next day notified him that he had provided a good vessel for the purpose, and required him to ship the sugars in such vessel, or, if he preferred it, to procure another vessel and ship the sugars without delay. All the plaintiffs were proved to be aliens, except Belknap. Several witnesses, whose testimony is stated in the charge of the court, were called to prove that Belknap was a citizen of Massachusetts.</p> <p>The defendant having moved for a non-suit, and excepted to the decision of the court disallowing it, called the said Bull as a witness, who testified, that he had been for nine years a confidential clerk of the defendant; that he was present at the interview at the defendant’s store on the 15th of November, which lasted 10 or 15 minutes; that the defendant appeared, so far as the witness observed, to take very little interest in the conversation that was going on between George D’Wolf and Belknap, and no conversation of any importance passed between the latter and the defendant; that he, the witness, was wi-iting at the desk, and occupied in his own affairs of business, and did not pay particular attention to the conversation of the parties: That defendant and Belknap might have conversed about the sugar’s without his knowing it, &e. The defendant offered to prove by said Bull, that there was an express agreement between George D’Wolf and the defendant, at the time the latter signed the letter of the 15th of November, that the former should furnish the latter with funds to purchase the sugar’s before he should be under any obligation to ship the same. This evidence was not admitted.</p> <p>insisted and desired the court to charge the jury:</p> <p>That, as it appeared by the deposition of George D’AVolf, that the whole contract, agreement, or undertaking of the defendant relative to the shipment of said 500 boxes of sugar, was in writing, no parol evidence could be admitted on the part of the plaintiffs, to prove their declaration, or to alter, enlarge, or in any way vary the written agreement of the defendant. That the letter from George D’AVolf to James D’AVolf, jun.. dated November the 15th, 1825, did not prove, nor conduce to prove, the declaration of the plaintiffs, and was not evidence of any contra ct or agreement between the plaintiffs and tlie defendant, or of a promise from the defendant to the plaintiffs. That the letter, if it were any evidence of a contract or agreement between the plaintiffs and defendant, only conduced to prove a collateral undertaking on the part of the defendant, to ship 000 boxes of sugar in behalf of George D’Wolf, and consigned to the plaintiffs, and that the same was void by the statute of frauds. That the whole of the contracts or agreements offered in evidence on the part of the plaintiffs, were nuda pacta and void, both for want of mutuality and want of consideration. That no vessel had ever been designated by George D’Wolf, on board of which the defendant was directed by George D’Wolf to ship said 500 boxes of sugar, in pursuance of the stipulation contained in said letter of the 15th of November, 1825; and, that until such designation, no right of action accrued to the plaintiffs. That the plaintiffs had not offered any sufficient evidence to prove, and had not proved, any authority on the part of Belknap to appoint such a vessel. That there was a material variance between the declaration of the plaintiffs and the proof offered to support it. in this: that the plaintiffs, in their declaration, have set forth as the consideration of the undertaking on the part of the defendant, an authorization on the part of the plaintiff's to George D’Wolf, to draw bills of exchange upon the plaintiffs for 100,000 francs. Whereas it appears, by the deposition of George D’Wolf, that the said authorization on the part of the plaintiffs was in writing, and was for a blank number of francs, no sum being therein speciffed. That Belknap was not proved to be a citizen of the state of Massachusetts, nor of any state other than New-York; and that, therefore, the plaintiffs had failed to show any right to sustain their action in the courts of the United States, and that this court had no jurisdiction of this cause.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,521.</p> <p>Collision — Sailing Vessels — Right of Wav.</p> <p>1. When two vessels are approaching each other in opposite directions, one of which is free ;and the other close-hauled to the wind, the one free must take the responsibility of avoiding a collision, and the one close-hauled must keep her way.</p> <p>2. But if the wind is equally free to both, or if both have it on their beam, each must turn to her own right.</p> <p>NOTE. The amount for which the decree was entered for libellant in this case, was nine hundred and eighty-seven dollars. On appeal by respondent, the decree of the district court was affirmed with costs by the circuit court, at April term, 1866. [Case No. 3,442.]</p>

This was a petition in involuntary bankruptcy, which set forth a debt due to the petitioners, for tobacco sold and delivered by them to the bankrupt [Peter Rado], to the amount of $2,027.16. and alleged that on account of that he had returned to them tobacco worth $1,140.10, at such a time as to make such return an unlawful preference of their debt to such amount.

In bankruptcy. On the 16th day of May, 1877, C. L. Radway, being a resident of Richmond, engaged in business, a householder, and the head of a family, was sued by one James Mitchell for the seduction of his daughter Laura, and on May 18th' he was sued by said Mitchell for an insult to his daughter Lucy.

In bankruptcy. The bankrupt [Jacob Raf-fauf] filed an affidavit showing that the requisite number of his creditors did not petition for his adjudication according to the 12th section of the act of June 22, 1874, amendatory of the bankrupt law, and moved that the proceedings be dismissed unless a sufficient number join in the petition within the time prescribed in said act.

<p>Case No. 11,524.</p> <p>Collision — Light—Tow-Boat.</p>

In equity. This was an action by Harriet M. Rafferty and others, heirs at law of wil-liam R. Oliver, to recover lands bid in, In satisfaction of a mortgage due the intestate. by a foreign administrator, and sold by him to Isaac M. Mallory, the defendant, without any order or authority of the probate court. The general rule is that an administrator is not' suable and cannot sue outside the jurisdiction appointing him. Story, Confl. Law, § 513.

Libel claimed for services as seamen and mariners employed in navigating a raft of cypress logs from New Madrid, Mo., to Memphis, Tenn., on the Mississippi river, and contained the usual averments as to length of service, good conduct and amount due. Claimants excepted upon the ground that the services were not maritime and that this court had no jurisdiction.

This was a libel in rem, filed by John S. Keteltas, against a certain raft of spars, to recover compensation for salvage services. The facts out of which the action arose were, in brief, as follows: On April 8, 1848, the libellant observed the raft in question, which consisted of sixteen spars, to be adrift below the Narrows and floating out to sea.

This was a libel in rem, filed by John S. Keteltas, with whom other libellants were afterwards joined on petition, against a certain raft of spars, to recover compensation for salvage service.

In bankruptcy. Henry C. Duncan et al., who are creditors of the bankrupt [William Ragsdale!, filed st>ecifications of the grounds of their objection to his discharge, alleging C1.) failure and refusal of bankrupt to surrender all his property; (2) failure to keep proper books of account: (3) fraudulently procuring assent of creditor to discharge.

<p>[This was an action by Patrick H. Rahilly against Wilford L. Wilson, assignee of Atkinson & Kellogg.]</p>

This is an appeal in bankruptcy from the ■decree of the district court, granting the relief prayed in the original bill of Patrick Rahilly, filed for himself and the other warehouse grain receipt holders, and dismissing the cross bill of the First National Bank of St. Paul. The suit was brought in the district court to settle the title to twenty-one thousand five hundred bushels of wheat, or its representative in money, now lying in the registry of that court.

<p>Case No. 11,534.</p> <p>Equity — Relief against. Judgment — When Granted.</p> <p>1. Courts of equity will not grant relief against a judgment at law except when the injured party has had a verdict or judgment rendered against him in consequence of accident or mistake or fraud of the other party without any fault of his own, and has no remedy, or has without fault lost his remedy at law.</p> <p>[Cited in Crim v. Handley, 94 U. S. 658.]</p> <p>2. Where a motion had been made on the law side of the court to set aside a verdict and judgment and grant a new trial, and had been overruled; upon a bill in equity filed for relief against the judgment, on the ground that it was unjust, and there was a good defense, that the defendant in the case at law had been surprised on the trial, and that he did not have a full and fair hearing on the motion for a new trial in consequence of the indisposition of his counsel, this court sitting in equity refused the relief and dismissed the bill.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Throckmorton. 98 U. S. 68; Brooks v. O’-Hara, 8 Fed. 034.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,535.</p> <p>Patents — Combination—Conpuctok’s Registeu.</p> <p>1. Letters patent No. 76.646, granted to W7m. C. McGill. April 14th, 1868, for a conduct- or’s register, construed, and upon the construction given, and in view of the state of the art, the defendants held not to have infringed the same,</p> <p>2. A claim for “the combination of the ratchet wheel, pawl and lever, with or without the bell •attachment, arranged and operating substantially as and for the purposes described,” held, in view of the state of the art, not to cover the ratchet wheel, pawl and lever, used by the defendants. the arrangement of which was different, especially in the mode in which the lever was operated.</p> <p>3. The fourth and seventh claims of the reissued patent of Blackbttrn and Woodside, No. 7,120, May 16th, 1S76, for an improved fare register construed, and the defendants held- i not to have infringed. ¡</p> <p>4. The tenth and eleventh claims of the reissued patent of Joseph Corbett, No. 6,929, granted February 15th, 1876, held, valid, and that the defendants infringed the same.</p>

Depositions taken on behalf of the defendant [John D. Haynes], under the 30th section of the judiciary act of 17S9, were objected to by the plaintiff [Thomas G. Rainer, use of Joseph H. Boyle], on the following grounds: (1) That the magistrate certified that the witnesses were by him first “carefully examined and cautioned and duly sworn to testify the truth in regard to the matters in controversy,” whereas by the act of congress the oath or affirmation should have been to…

<p>Case No. 11,537.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge—Action to Set Aside: —Concealment—False Swearing.</p> <p>A debtor sold his farm for much less than it was actually worth to his father-in-law', who, in turn, deeded it back to the wife for a mere nominal consideration. At the time of the transfer debtor was largely indebted, but believed himself to be solvent. The wife repeatedly told her husband these deeds were burned. He so informed his creditors and procured credit of some of those whom he still owed to a considerable amount on the faith of his actual ownership of the farm and his record title. After his insolvency, these deeds were produced and placed on record, thus giving apparent title to the wife. Debtor was adjudged a bankrupt, filed his schedules without including the farm, and in due time received his discharge. In an action brought to set it aside, the referee held that the bankrupt had been guilty of concealment and false swearing, within the meaning of section twenty-nine of the present United States bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 531)], and that the discharge should be set aside and annulled.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,538.</p> <p>Seamen —Wages — Receipts — How Treated in Admiralty.</p> <p>1. Courts of admiralty deal with claims by seamen for compensation of marine services, in the nature of wages, in a manner different from that in which courts of common law treat ordinary transactions.</p> <p>[Cited in McCarty v. The City of New Bed-ford, 4 Fed. 828.]</p> <p>2. Receipts or releases given by seamen, even with all the solemnity of sealed instruments, will have no effeei, beyond the actual consideration fairly paid.</p> <p>[Cited in Broux v. The Ivy, 62 Fed. 604.]</p>

In admiralty. Libels against the company’s steamers, Raleigh, L. G. Cannon, and Astoria. The Pioneer Transportation Company was duly incorporated on the 2d day of September, 1872, with its principal office at Portsmouth, Virginia. It became owner of several vessels, of which the steamers Raleigh. L. G. Cannon, and Astoria, which were ■severally libelled in these proceedings, were part.

This was a libel for damages. It appeared that the Linnaeus [Mathew C. Ralston, Charles A. Davis, and Sidney Brooks, owners] and the State Rights [Joseph H. Allen, master] were running, in opposition, between Philadelphia, Burlington, Bristol, and Bor-■dentown, on the river Delaware; that on the 0th and 30th of May, and on the 13th of June, 1830, the two boats came into collision; that the State Rights was much the stronger and more powerful boat; that the Linnaeus was…

<p>Case No. 11,541.</p> <p>Prize — Violation or Block ape.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for a violation of the blockade.</p>

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court, upon the following case: On the 4th of December, 1811, Thomas Bedwell & Co. at Rio de Janeiro, drew a bill of exchange on William Nunn & Co. of London, payable to the order of the defendant at three months sight, for £253. 6s. 6d. sterling, which lie by the bill desired to be placed to the account of John Dayton, and in case of need, to apply to Messrs.

Suit by a seaman for wages against the captain of the ship Governor Strong. offered to read the answer of the captain to the libel of the sail- j ors in the court of admiralty, the present ! plaintiff being one of the libellants. ¡ Admitted by the court (KILTY, Chief Judge, ; •doubting). i It appeared by the proceedings in the ad- , miralty, that shipping articles had been exe- i cuted, and the declaration being indebitatus assumpsit for work and labor, and quantum meruit,…

<p>Case No. 11,546.</p> <p>Judgment — Res Judicata — Trial on Merits.</p> <p>1.Where a verdict has been rendered against the plaintiff, and a judgment thereon has been entered, it is a bar to a suit for the same cause of action.</p> <p>[Cited in Gray v. Giliilan, 15 Ill. 456, 458; Greenup v. Crooks, 50 Ind. 420. Cited in brief in Stevens v. Hughes, 31 Pa. St. 382.]</p> <p>2. And a replication that the evidence was wholly insufficient to establish the claim, or that no evidence was offered or received by the court, will not avoid the bar.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Ford v. Hennessy, 70 Mo. 582; Spradling v. Conway, 51 Mo. 52. Cited in Vaulandingham v. Ryan, 17 Ill. 28.]</p> <p>3. The plaintiff should have suffered a non suit., or moved for a new trial.</p>

The prisoner [F. 51. Bamsey], while in discharge of his duty as deputy United States marshal, killed one Joseph Lightfoot, a citizen of Kentucky. For that he was arrested and held by the state officers. The other facts appear in the statements of counsel and in the opinion of the court. moved that the prisoner, before the court on a writ of habeas corpus, be discharged from the custody of the jailer of Warren county.

<p>Case No. 11,648.</p> <p>Seamen’s Waoes — Confiscation of Cargo — Freight the Mother op Wages.</p> <p>[1. .The fact that the shipowner also owns the cargo, so that there is no contract for freight, does not destroy the connection between freight and wages; and the court may properly' contemplate the subject as if cargo belonging to other persons had been actually received on board, to be transported- for' freight.]</p> <p>[2. Where an American ship, with cargo belonging to the shipowner, .discharged part of her cargo at Naples without interference, after which the ship and cargo were sequestrated by the Neapolitan government, held that, in re-soect to the rights of the seamen to wages, it should be considered that freight had been earned on the part of the cargo thus landed, and the subsequent confiscation thereof did not affect the right to wages.]</p> <p>[8. Where a ship bound from an American port to ports of the Mediterranean and return was confiscated at Naples, and was after-wards restored to the master on condition of his making a special voyage, held, that the original voyage was broken up, and the seamen. having entered into a new contract for wages after the confiscation, were bound thereby on the return of the ship to the United States.]</p> <p>NOTE. Mr. Story, for respondent, prayed an appeal, which was allowed. Afterwards in the circuit court. Judge Story, having been of counsel for the respondent, gave no opinion, but affirmed the decree pro forma. And an appeal was claimed to the supreme court of the U. S. and allowed; but it was not prosecuted.</p>

This was a petition in bankruptcy, by Benjamin Bandall and Timothy Beed, of Boston, traders and copartners. The petition stated in substance, that on the second day of March, 1842, one of the petitioners.

<p>Case No. 11,651.</p> <p>Bankruptcy—Petition— Details — Allbqations —Insolvency—Acts op Bankruptcy —Assignment.</p> <p>1.The facts concerning an alleged act of bankruptcy should be stated in the petition with such certainty and detail, as to inform the debtor of what he is required to make proof or explanation, as provided in section 41 of the act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 537)].</p> <p>TCited in Re Price, Case No. 11,411; Re Had-ley. Id. 5,894.]</p> <p>2. An allegation in a petition that the debtor being a trader, stopped payment of his commercial paper within a period of fourteen days, is too indefinite to put the burden of proof upon the debtor concerning such alleged stoppage, and may be disregarded as immaterial.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Ryan, Case No. 12,183.]</p> <p>3. An insolvent is one who is unable to pay his debts in full at once, or as they become due.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Walton, Case No. 17,130; Re Oregon Bulletin Printing & Publishing Co., Id. 10,559.]</p> <p>4. An assignment of his property by an insolvent person for the’ purpose of having the same distributed among his creditors, is presumed to have been done with intent to defraud the operation of the bankrupt act, by preventing such property from coming to the assignee in bankruptcy, and being distributed under the act, and is therefore an act of bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Ryan, Case No. 12,183; Catlin v. Hoffman, Id. 2,521; Martin v. Toof, Id. 9,167; Re Marter, Id. 9,143; Re Seeley, Id. 12,628.]</p> <p>5. An assignment by a solvent person of ail his property to a crustee for the equal benefit of the creditors, is an act of bankruptcy, because it hinders and delays creditors in the collection of their debts, and for the same reason it is void under the statute of frauds.</p> <p>[Cited in Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co., Case No. 6,480.]</p>

On January 9, 1860, [E. G.] Randall and [John] Sunderland being insolvent assigned all their property to Foster with intent to evade the bankrupt act.

<p>Case No. 11,553.</p> <p>Equity — Deed—Trust—Alien—Escheat.</p> <p>1. A private act of assembly construed: It did not confer a mere power, which dies with the person, beyond remedy even in a court of equity, but clothed with a trust, the execution of which, on the death or default of the trustee, a court of equity is competent to enforce by the substitution of another.</p> <p>2. In a suit brought for that purpose in the proper court in the county where the trust land lay, the court having entertained jurisdiction, its decree, though all the parties in interest may not have been duly convened, is so far conclusive that its validity cannot be collaterally questioned in another tribunal.</p> <p>3. A deed executed by an attorney in fact, although he be duly authorized, and although also it be manifest on the face of the deed, that it was the intention -of the grantor to execute the power, by conveying the title of the principal, yet will not be the deed of the principal, unless the attorney shall either sign the name of the principal, with a seal annexed, stating it to be done as attorney for the principal, or sign his own name with a seal annexed, stating it to be for the principal.</p> <p>4. The title to land having under a special act of assembly been held in trust by an un-naturalized alien, upon his death in 1842, his next of kin being also all unnaturalized aliens, it was subject to escheat; but the commonwealth not consummating her title by inquest and office found, and a decree of a competent court of equity in a suit brought for the purpose by the next kin of the deceased trustee, though it directed a conveyance by a commissioner only of the title of such next of kin, yet having- appointed a new trustee and in terms vested in him the title of which the former trustee died seized, is valid for the latter purpose, and vested said title by its direct operation.</p> <p>5. A deed, ’ though void as an executed contract at law, yet held to be valid as an executory contract in equity; and being otherwise a sufficient foundation for a bill for specific performance. held further, that equity will allow a bill for foreclosure, brought on said deed on the hypothesis that it was valid as a mortgage, and to which a demurrer must otherwise be sustained. to be converted, by amendment, into a bill for specific performance.</p> <p>6. Vendor of land retaining title as security, liis action, or that of tbe assignee, to subject the land in equity to the satisfaction of the purchase money, can not be defeated by the operation of the statute of limitations, whether the objection arises on demurrer or by plea.</p> <p>7. Upon a contract to pay a sum certain in an indefinite quantity of cattle and horses, after the day of payment, an action of'debt lies, and not merely an action sounding in damages.</p>

This is a bill in equity for dower. The complainant [Sarah Ann Randall] is the-widow of John Randall, of New 'fork, who died in 1869. She and her husband were married in 1848, and never resided in Minnesota. The husband became seized of the-land in which dower is claimed in 1849; and the same was conveyed by deed dated January 16, 1855, which deed, by virtue of a letter of attorney, was made to the grantor of the defendant [Louis Kreiger].

Bill in equity. The bill stated that one Wil-liam WTest, on the 19th June, 1792, being possessed of certain real estate set forth in the bill, for the consideration of £2150, conveyed the sanie to Jeremiah Phillips, Job Randall (the father of the plaintiff), Gideon Smith, and Joseph Battey, and their heirs and assigns.

- This was an action of assumpsit, founded on a warranty that a vessel, called the Baltic, was built mostly of white oak timber. It appeared that, in July, 1851, negotiations for a sale of the vessel were had between the parties, through the agency of W. W. Brown, a ship-broker, who was originally employed by the plaintiffs, but was subsequently authorized by the defendants to make a sale, at a price fixed by them.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel for collision by J. Orlando Randall, owner of the Planet, against the sloop Zebra. The libel was dismissed (unreported). Libelant appeals.]

The petitioner, Robert B. Randolph, was brought into court by virtue of a writ of ha-beas corpus, directed to the marshal of the Eastern district of Virginia, requiring him to have the body of the petitioner, late acting purser of the United States frigate Constitution, and who was detained under the custody of the marshal, together with the cause of his being taken and detained, before the judges of this court.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,560.</p> <p>Conflict of La ws — Limitation of Actions — Judgment — Pleas—Constitutional Law.</p> <p>1. In an action in the circuit court of the United States, on the record of a judgment in another state, in a plea that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, the statute of Ohio, as the lex fori, controls the question.</p> <p>[Cited in Marx v. Kilpatrick, 25 Neb. 114, 41 N. W. 114.]</p> <p>2. Tlie supreme court of Ohio having decided that the record of a judgment of another state is a specialty, and that the limitation of the right to sue on such record is fifteen years, under the statute of Ohio of February IS, 1831 [29 Laws Ohio 1831, p. 214], this court will follow that decision.</p> <p>3. The provision of the constitution of the United States, “that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public records and judicial proceedings of every other state,” can not be construed as prohibiting a state from passing a law barring a right of action from lapse ol' time, on the record of a judgment of another state.</p> <p>4. The judgment of a court of record can not be collaterally impeached, and the plea that the judgment set forth in the record on which this suit is brought was obtained “by fraud, duress.” etc., is bad, and a demurrer to it will be sustained.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Reúne R. Rau-dolpli against Mary A. Robinson and others.) A cross bill was dismissed because; 1st. It was filed before the answer to the original bill; 2d, it brought in new parties; 3d, it introduced new and distinct matters; 4th, its purpose was different from that of the orig-innl bill.

[This was a libel by William Randolph, owner of the Belleville, against the steamship United States, for damages resulting from a collision.)

This was a bill in equity, filed by Edmund D. Randolph, a citizen of New York, for himself and any of his fellow bondholders, under a mortgage given by the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company, dated March 3, 1808, against that company, the trustees named in that mortgage, the Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York Railroad Co., and aft-erwards, upon their respective petitions, by order of court, Paxson Kitchen, a bondholder under a junior mortgage of the Wilmington and…

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Morris Ranger against the city of New Orleans.] Submitted on motion for injunction pendente lite.</p>

On May 2, 3868, the United States commenced suit against the steamboat Iianier, for sixteen penalties, amounting in the aggregate to $S,UOO, for violations of section 2 of the act of July 7, 1S3S (5 Stat. 304), and section 1 of the act of August 30, 1S52 (10 Stat. Gl), commonly called the “Steamboat Acts.” The boat was taken into custody by the marshal, under process issued in the suit.

This was a petition by David Rank for a prohibition (injunction), or such other action as to this court might seem fit, to stay proceedings in certain suits in the courts of common pleas of Lebanon and Dauphin counties, in Pennsylvania, under which the petitioner had been arrested, and released on giving bonds to apply for the benefit of the insolvent laws of that state, as provided thereby.

The petition in this case.sets forth: First. The amount and nature of the debt due the petitioners [Rankin & Pulían and others], and that said debts are provable in bankruptcy. Second.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] Bill in equity by [Thomas Rankin] the as-signee in bankruptcy of Robert Rankin, filed in the district court in November, 1874, against the Third National Bank and others, to set aside an alleged fraudulent preference made by the bankrupt to the bank, within four months of the bankruptcy proceedings.

<p>[This was an action in ejectment by the lessee of Ransdale against Jacob Grove.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,571a.</p> <p>Admiralty—Maritime Contracts—Suit for Negligence.</p> <p>[A contract made on land by a ship wright to-repair a vessel in his ship yard is not maritime, and admiralty has no jurisdiction of a suit for negligence or delay in performing the same.]</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this court was affirmed. Case No. 11,571.]</p>

This was an action for the infringement of letters patent [No. 1.980, granted to plaintiffs February 13, 1841], At the trial, before HALL. District Judge, December 24th, 1850, the plaintiffs [Franklin Ransom and TJzziah Wenman] obtained a verdict for $20,000 damages. [Case No. 11,573.] In the course of the trial, various exceptions were taken by the defendants to rulings of the court, and exceptions were also taken to the charge of the court to the jury.

This was an action on the case [by Franklin Ransom and Uzziah Wenman against the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York], tried by Judge Hall and a jury, for the Infringement of letters patent granted to. plaintiffs February 13, 1841 [No. 1,980], for an “improvement in fire engines.” The defense embraced a variety of issues, which are fully referred to in the charge of the court.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>At law.</p>

This was a prize allegation against the schooner Rapid and cargo. The facts of the case, as they appeared in the papers and preparatory examinations, were as follows:— That the schooner was enrolled and licensed for the cod-fishery, at Boston, on the 23d June, 1812, by Ebenezer Perry, as owner and master. That the schooner sailed from Boston for Eastport on the third day of July, 1812, having Mr. Jabez Harrison, the claimant, as a passenger, on board.

This was a bill in equity [by Adam William Rapp against Edmund H. Bard and Henry H. Wilson], filed to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent granted to complainant January 6, 1852 [No. 8,641], for “improvement in gold pens,” the claim of which was as follows: “What I claim as my invention and improvement in the gold pen, and desire to secure by letters patent, is reducing or thinning the sides of the pen at a. between the shoulder, A, and split, c; whereby…

<p>[In the matter of Robert Rateliffe, a bankrupt.)</p>

In equity. The bill in this case set forth, that the plaintiff [Jean C. O. Rateau] and the defendant Pierre L. Bernard were French subjects, and that the defendant Eugene Ter-ray was a citizen of New York.

<p>Case No. 11,580.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Specifications of Opposition to Discharge — Fraudulently Contracted Debt — False Swearing.</p> <p>1. Specifications of opposition to a discharge, under section thirty-one of the bankruptcy act [of 18G7 (14 Stat. 532)], and general order No. 24, must be as specific as the grounds for avoiding a discharge after it is granted, required by section thirty-four of the act. The allegations must be allegations of fact, and must be distinct, precise, and specific, so as to advise the bankrupt what facts he must be prepared to meet and resist.</p> <p>[Quoted in Ee Burk. Case No. 2,156. Cited in Ee Jacobs. Id. 7.160: Ee Graves, 24 Fed. 552; Ee Carrier. 47 Fed. 439.]</p> <p>2. It is no ground of objection to a discharge That a debt vi-as created through the false and fraudulent representations of the bankrupt.</p> <p>3. An allegation that a statement in one of the bankrupt's schedules was false is insufficient. Such a statement must be willfully false to afford ground of objection.</p> <p>4. An allegation that the bankrupt falsely testified as to a certain matter on his examination is insufficient, if it does not aver that the false swearing was willful, and that the fact was a material one.</p> <p>5. An' allegation that the bankrupt “is entitled” to certain real estate is a sufficient specification to show that the bankrupt has been guilty, under section twenty-nine, of negligence in delivering to the assignee property belonging to him.</p> <p>6. Certain specifications in this case were held too vague and general.</p> <p>[NOTE. Subsequently this cause came up for trial on the fifth, seventh, and eighth specifications. The court held that the eighth specification brought the case within grounds for withholding a discharge. A discharge was consequently refused. Case No. 11,583. The case was afterwards referred back to the register for further testimony, and the case was then heard on the whole testimony. The discharge was refused. Id. 11,581.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of Robert C. Rathbone, a bankrupt] In this case several specifications of opposition to the bankrupt’s discharge had been filed. [Case No. 11,580.] On the hearing, the court held that the eighth specification was made out, but after-wards referred the case back to the register for further testimony Tl'd. 11.583], and the case now came again before the court on the whole testimony.</p>

[In the matter of Robert C. Rathbone, a bankrupt. The cause was first heard on specifications filed by a creditor of the bankrupt in opposition to his discharge. Case No. 11,580.]

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by [William Rathbone and others] the owners of the ship Oneiza, to recover from the defendants [Frederick R. Fowler and others] as consignees and owners of cargo transported on board of that vessel, on a voyage made by her from Calcutta to New York, a sum alleged to be due to the plaintiffs, by way of .a general average contribution, for losses and expenses suffered and incurred in consequence of. an alleged voluntary stranding of the…

Action on the case [by John W. Katlibone and Ellis Baker against John Orr, John Niles, and Edwin Hollister]. Demurrer to the declaration. Suit brought on letters patent for •‘design for stoves,” Addison Low, inventor, who assigned same, October 7, 1845, to Rath-bone & Co., under which name the plaintiffs did business. The facts of the case and the points raised on demurrer are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court

<p>Case No. 11,586.</p> <p>Deeds — Wipe's Acknowledgment — P,elinquisument op Dower — Formal Defects.</p> <p>1. All the substantial requisites of the statute must be complied with, in taking a relinquishment of dower.</p> <p>2. The legislature may remedy a mere formal defect of deeds previously executed.</p> <p>[Cited in Chesnut v. Slianc. 3 6 Ohio, 609; De Moss v. Newton. 31 Ind. 221.]</p> <p>3. Dower is often claimed under circumstances of great injustice.</p> <p>[See Case No. 11,587.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,587.</p> <p>Deeds — Wipe’s Acknowledgment — Separate Examination — Statutory Requirements.</p> <p>1. The separate examination of a feme covert, as required by the statute, is indispensable; but the very words of the statute need not be used by the certifying officer.</p> <p>rCitod in Rogers v. Woody, 23 Mo. 550.]</p> <p>2. If, in this respect, the requisites of the statute are substantially complied with, it is sufficient.</p> <p>[Cited in Ivnrnnnugh v. Day, 10 R. I. 395.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,588.</p> <p>Removal or Causes — Citizenship— Change op Residence Pendente Lite.</p> <p>A cause cannot be removed to the federal court under the act of 1875 [18 Stat. 470], unless the citizenship, required by the act, existed at the time of the commencement of the suit in the state court.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Curtin v. Decker, 5 Fed. 3S5J</p> <p>NOTE. In the circuit court of the United States at Memphis. Aug. 22, 1881, Hammond. J., decided an important question on motion to remand. The case was that of Woolridgo v. McKenna [8 Fed. 050], Woolridge, as assignee of McKenna, a bankrupt, brought suit in the state court to set aside certain conveyances of real estate, on the ground that they were fraudulent. To that bill he made McKenna, and his daughter, Maud B. McKenna (citizens of Shelby county, as he alleged) parties. Whereupon, McKenna, the father, as next friend of the daughter. Maud B., petitioned for removal of said cause into the federal court in the name of said Maud B. McKenna, by himself as next friend, etc., alleging that said Maud B. was a citizen of Kentucky, etc. Judge Hammond rules that a father cannot by merely depositing his child in this or that state continue to change its domicile for any purpose without changing his own. He must relinquish and abandon his rights in that behalf to the child itself or another. or by operation of law the child’s domicile will shift only with his own. As the affidavit in this particular case showed only that the father, a citizen of Tennessee, had placed his child to reside with friends in Kentucky, (permanently ns he supposed) it does not follow that he may not change that intention and resume parental control, or that these friends may not compel him so to do by sending back the child to him. * * * As long as he exercises his legal control qua father, or has the right to do so. his child’s domicile must be his own. The order declares that as Maud B. McKenna (the daughter) is a citizen of Tennessee, for that as well as other reasons of record, the cause must be remanded.</p>

In this case, upon the day appointed by the register, on the application of Wheeler, Madden & Clemson. creditors, for the examination of the bankrupt [James D. Ray] and his wife and other witnesses, under section. 26 of the bankruptcy act, the bankrupt objected to the examination, on the ground that the claim of those creditors was barred by the statute of limitations of the state of New York, and, in support of such objection, the bankrupt put in before the register an…

<p>Case No. 11,590.</p> <p>Slavekt — Action fok Hakboking Fugitive Suaves — Knowledge — Hem oval or Slaves — E vi dence— W itxess.</p> <p>1. An action against one or more persons, fox-harboring or secreting fugitives from labesv whether brought for the penalty or the value-of the slaves, is founded on the constitution off the United States and act of congress [of 179ES (1 Stat. 302)].</p> <p>2. In such an action, the plaintiff must prove* the ownership of the slaves, and that they escaped from his service.</p> <p>3. A removal of the slaves from the place where they had been secreted with the view of returning them to their master, so that they were enabled to escape from the pursuit of the master, is a harboring and secreting of them within the act of congress.</p> <p>4. The circumstances under which they were removed, may be sufficient to show that the person removing them, had knowledge that they were fugitives from labor.</p> <p>5. The evidence must preponderate in favor of the plaintiff, to authorize a verdict for him.</p> <p>6. Whether a verdict for the plaintiff extinguishes his x-ight to the fugitives, is not. a question for the jury. They are to give damages for the injury done to the plaintiff by the acts of the defendants. And if by such acts, the services of the fugitives have become lost to the plaintiff, the value of these services will be the damages sustained.</p> <p>7. Where the credibility of a witness is so impeached as to create strong doubts as to the truth of his testimony, the jury may decide the controversy on the other evidence in the case.</p> <p>8. Where the general character of a witness has not been impeached, though he may have been contradicted by other witnesses, his general good character can not be pi-oved.</p> <p>The jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at fifteen hundred dollars.</p>

This was an action [by James Ray against Thomas Law] for a malicious prosecution.

<p>Case No. 11,593.</p> <p>Juut — Assessing Damages — Phactice at Law.</p> <p>1. In an action of tort, in a court of the United States, where the defendant suffers a default, the plaintiff has no constitutional right to have the damages assessed by a jury.</p> <p>2. Such assessment is a matter of practice, and may be made according to the practice of tlie courts of the state in which the federal Court is held. In Connecticut, such assessment may he made by the court.</p>

[In the matter of the appeal of Lewis Raymond from the decision of the commissioner of patents rejecting his application for a patent for an improvement in boat frames.]

<p>Case No. 11,594.</p> <p>Mamtime Lies- — Giving Note — Statutori- Lien —Domestic Vessels — Navigable Wateks.</p> <p>1.The giving of a note to a material man does not extinguish the general maritime lien, for materials furnished in building a vessel, or in repairing it.</p> <p>[Cited in McAllister v. The Sam Kirkman, Case No. 8.658: The Napoleon. Id. 10,011; The Richard Busteed, Id. 11,764; Harris v. The Kensington, Id. 6,122.]</p> <p>[Cited in Sinton v. The R. R. Roberts, 46 Ind. 486.]</p> <p>2. The rule holds where the lien is given by statute.</p> <p>3. The general maritime lien does not apply on domestic vessels.</p> <p>4. It is important that the note given' should be delivered up at the trial. This is essential to the maintenance of the action.</p> <p>5. The rule as to the maritime jurisdiction over our navigable waters is the reasonable-rule. It is within the reason of the principle of jurisdiction at first adopted.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 11,595.</p> <p>Taxation—Sale fob Taxes—Description—Signing List — Evidence — Copy of Official Letter.</p> <p>1. A copy of an official letter of instruction from the auditor of state to the county auditor of Hamilton county, certified by the latter to be a true copy, is admissible as evidence.</p> <p>2. If the list of lands forfeited for the nonpayment of taxes, required by law to be forwarded by the auditor of state to the proper county auditor, is not made out and authenticated according to law, the subsequent proceedings are void. Such list must be authenticated by the seal of the office of the auditor of state.</p> <p>3. The signing of such list as follows: “J. B., Auditor of State, by J. B. T.,” without any designation of the latter as chief clerk of the auditor’s office—is not a signing within the requirement of the statute.</p> <p>4. The tract in question was entered on the tax list, and so described in all the subsequent proceedings as “five acres in sec. 24, T. 4, R. 1.” Held, that the tax sale is void for the vagueness and uncertainty of the description.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.</p> <p>[The judgment of this court was affirmed by the supreme court, where it was carried on writ of error. 14 How. (55 U. S.) 76.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,596.</p> <p>Officer — Patmastek in Navt — Action on Bond —Laches—Revocation—Penal Action —Limitations.</p> <p>1. To an action of debt, brought by the United States, on the bond of a surety for a paymaster in the navy, the defendant pleaded matters which amounted to allegations of laches on the part of the United States in their dealings with the paymaster, and also that the defendant had revoked his bond: Meld, that the pleas were bad.</p> <p>2. The provision in section 1047 of the Revised Statutes (formerly section 4 of the act of Eebruary 28, 1839 ; 5 Stat. 322) that “no suit or prosecution for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the laws of the United States,” shall be maintained, unless commenced within five years from the time when the penalty or forfeiture accrued, relates to penalties and forfeitures incurred by infractions of the law, and does not relate to the penal sum named in a bond.</p>

<p>Case 3Yo. 11,597.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Non-Payment op Commercial, Paper — Continuous Act — Petition —Signep by Attorney.</p> <p>1. Under section 39 of the bankruptcy act of March 2. 1807 (14 Stat. 530), the non-payment of commercial paper at maturity, and the continued neglect to pay it, are a continuous act of bankruptcy, so that the non-payment of it for more than fourteen days, may be alleged as an act of bankruptcy, committed within six months before the filing of the petition, although the first fourteen days after maturity expired more than six months before the filing of the petition.</p> <p>[Cited, contra, in Re Brewer & Bemis Brewing Co., Case No. 1,850.]</p> <p>2. It is sufficient if a petition in involuntary bankruptcy be signed and sworn to by an attorney of the petitioning creditor, duly authorized thereto, and it is not necessary that it should be signed or sworn to by the petitioning creditor in person.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Simmons, Case No. 12.804; Re Donnelly, 5 Fed. 7S7; Wald v. Wehl, 6 Fed. 167.]</p>

[This was a libel by William Pope and others against the steamboat R. B. Forbes. Charles Pearson, treasurer, claimant, for damages resulting from a collision.]

This was a libel, brought in behalf of the owner of the bark Zamora, against the consignee of a part of her cargo, to recover a general average contribution, for the alleged voluntary sacrifice of the vessel.

<p>Case No. 11,601.</p> <p>Assumpsit — Counts Thereunder — Federal Jurisdiction — Citizenship.</p> <p>1. Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, money had and received, and insimul compu-tassent. Plaintiff employed defendant as his agent to sell a parcel of goods, for a certain commission. He sold a part of them, and received part of the purchase money, which, with the residue of the goods, he confided to a person whom he appointed as his clerk, and who ran off with the money and goods. The plaintiff cannot recover on the first and third counts, as no sale was made of these goods to the defendant, nor was any account settled and a balance struck between the parties. But the plaintiff is entitled to recover, under the second count, the amount of money received by defendant and lost by the perfidy of his own agent.</p> <p>2. What constitutes judicial citizenship, in reference to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.</p> <p>[Explained in Toland v. Sprague, Case No. 14,076.]</p> <p>The jury could not agree, and after being out a day and night, the counsel consented to their discharge.</p> <p>lOn the retrial the plaintiff recovered. Case No. 11,602.]</p>

This was an action for account render. The pleas were (1) never bailiff or receiver; and (2) plene eomputavit.

<p>Case No. 11,603.</p> <p>.Deposition — Taken under Rude — Inability op "Witness to Attend.</p> <p>A deposition taken under a rule of court to be read in case of the inability of the witness to •attend, cannot be read, unless such inability be shown, or that the witness lives beyond the reach of a subpoena.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,605.</p> <p>Bail — Civid Case — Discharge under State Insolvent Laws.</p> <p>1. The defendant having been discharged by the insolvent laws of the state of Pennsylvania, from a debt contracted in the state, the court discharged him on common bail.</p> <p>[Cited in Campbell v. Claudius, Case No. 2,-356. Followed in Richardson v. McIntyre, Id. 11.789.J</p> <p>2. The court refused to quash a writ of capias issued against the defendant, for a debt contracted in this state, he having been discharged by the insolvent laws.</p>

<p>This ease came before the court upon a motion to dissolve the injunction granted on the 24th day of April, 1821, and a rule obtained by the plaintiff to show cause why the bill should not be taken pro confesso. The bill was filed with an affidavit and prayer for an injunction in November, 1S1G,. soon after the action at law, sought to be enjoined, was brought. It states, in substance, that after the plaintiff had given to the defendant, a Hong merchant at Canton, the notes on which the suit was brought, he placed in the hands of Mr. Benjamin C. Wilcocks, the agent and attorney in fact of the defendant, various funds to a considerable amount, with directions to apply the same towards the discharge of the said notes, and which the plaintiff charges were sufficient for that purpose. Amongst other matters charged in the bill, it is stated that the plaintiff, Benjamin C. Wilcocks, J.. S. Wilcocks, and Richard H. Wilcocks, having purchased the ship Sally, which they held in certain proportions, it was agreed between them and the defendant to put a cargo on board of her, to the value of about 840,000, one fourth of which belonged to the plaintiff, one fourth to the defendants, and the other half to the three Wileocks’s, and that the plaintiff, for the purchase of the cargo, was in advance for the other owners more than $3,000. The cargo wTas consigned to the plaintiff, as super cai-go, and he proceeded with the ship and cargo to Batavia,-where he sold part of the latter for about $27,000, which he remitted to Benjamin Wilcocks in Philadelphia. Other parts were sold, and the proceeds invested by him in other articles, which he brought in the Sally to Philadelphia, where he settled wdth Benjamin O. Wilcocks as part owner, and as agent of the defendant, all his accoufits in his character of supercargo. Part of the cargo brought to Philadelphia was sold there; and except another part, which wras divided amongst the owners, the residue was shipped to Madeira and to Canton, for account of the owners. The proceeds of the latter shipment were received by the defendant. The bill further states that the plaintiff afterwards assigned his interest in the .Sally and cargo, then on a voyage to St. Petersburg and to Canton, to the defendant, by an arrangement made with the said Benjamin C. Wilcocks in Philadelphia, to secure any balance which might be due from the plaintiff to the defendant; but the defendant was to be at liberty to take the same, upon the arrival of the ship at Canton, at cost, or to reject it; that the ship, with a cargo on board, instead of proceeding from St. Petersburg to Canton, returned to Philadelphia, and the whole of the plaintiff’s interest in the said cargo remains unaccounted for. The bill charges that the said B. C. Wilcocks was the attorney in fact or agent of the defendant, and that as such, he had received from the plaintiff’s funds, and paid over to the defendant, large sums of money; and the charging, as well as the interrogating parts of the bill, are principally directed to those points with a view to a discovery. On the 19th of May last, the court gave leave to the plaintiff to file an amended bill, without prejudice to the injunction, the principal object of which seems to be to discover whether Benjamin C. Wilcocks, although he might not have been regularly constituted the defendant’s attorney, was not in some way or other authorized by the defendant to collect his debts, and as his agent, to bind him by his acts in relation thereto. It does not vary, in any material degree, the case as stated in the original bill. During the last session of this court, a commission to Canton, which had issued on the part of the plaintiff, was returned, containing the deposition of Benjamin C. Wilcocks, taken upon interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff. The witness denies that he ever was the attorney in fact of the defendant, or that he acted as such, and the deposition throughout was relied upon by the defendant’s counsel as disproving the equity of the bill. The affidavit of John Gibson was filed in the cause, stating that in September, 1S20, he, as the agent of the plaintiff, took with him to Canton a copy of this bill, which, in that or the succeeding month, he delivered to the defendant, but that no answer was sent by him upon his return; and he adds, that there were then many American vessels at Canton, which have since arrived at different ports in the United-States. The answer of the attorney at law and in fact of the defendant was read, and an offer made to swear to it, but no answer of the defendant, or affidavit of any kind, was filed.</p> <p>insisted upon the following points:</p> <p>(1) That the plaintiff having confessed judgment to the amount of the defendant’s claim, the court ought not to continue the injunction, except upon the terms of his paying into court the sum so acknowledged to be due. Sherwood v. "White, 1 Brown, Ch. 452; Cully v. Hickling, cited in 2 Brown, Ch. 14;' Weshet v. Carnevalli, cited in 1 Cox, Ch. 330; Cotes v. Lindsay, 1 Dickens, 352; Potts v. Buer, 1 Cox, Ch. 330; Whitmore v. Thornton, 3 Price, 2-11; Eden, Inj. 112, 113, 115, 110. (2) The injunction was dissolved of course -by the amended bill; and the reservation that it should be without prejudice to the injunction, ought not to keep it alive, as leave to amend was given without due notice. 3 Anstr. 651; Wattleworth v. Pitcher, 2 Price, 189; Bliss v. Boscawen, 2 Yes. & B. 102; Eden, Inj. 121; 2 Dickens, 536. (3) The plaintiff not having taken the proper steps to have the bill answered is always a good cause for dissolving the injunction. 2 Johns. Ch. 148. (4) There is no ground of equitable jurisdiction stated in the bill, and upon this ground the court will dissolve at any time without answer. 4 Johns. Ch. 28, 30, 173 ; 2 Hen. & M. 8. The matter of the bill is not account, but set off. Dinwiddie v. Bailey, 6 Ves. 136. (5) The court will dissolve on the answer of the agent of the defendant. Bayley v. De Walkiers, 10 Ves. 441; Harding v. Harding, 12 Ves. 159. (6) The court will dissolve upon an affidavit denying the merits of the bill; and in this case the deposition of Benjamin C. Wilcocks, the plaintiff’s witness, disproves every material charge.</p> <p>stated that the defendant’s solicitor was informed verbally of the motion to file the amended bill, and was besides in court when it was made. They contended that the equity of the bill was not fully denied by the deposition, and if it were, still the answer was important. That the court will never dissolve, without answer or affidavit; and that the cases cited as to bringing the money into court, do not apply to the present, where the judgment was confessed by order of the court, and especially where neither an answer nor affidavit is filed. 2 Har. (Del.) 174; 2 Madd. 2S3; 4 Johns. Ch. 547.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,607.</p> <p>Pleaiiina in Equity — Answer Taken in Foreign Country — How Swoax to — Exceptions.</p> <p>1. An answer in chancery by a defendant beyond sea, must be taken and sworn to by a commission under a dedimus issued by this court, directing him to administer the oath in the most solemn forms observed by the laws and usages of that country.</p> <p>2. An answer from China being objected to as not responsive to all the charges on the bill, the court directed the plaintiff to file his exceptions in ten days, and that if the new answer was clear of those exceptions, no new exceptions to it would be listened to.</p>

[This was an action of debt by G. W. Read and J. Read against F. Haynie.] made an affidavit for the continuance of the case, founded on statements made to him by the defendant, as to the matter he expected to prove, and thereupon moved for a continuance. This, among other objections, was made to the affidavit by A. Pike, namely, that it was not such as the law required; the statement of the client to the counsel being an unsworn statement.

<p>Case No. 11,609.</p> <p>Maritime Liens—Statutory Lien—General Employment.</p> <p>1. Courts of admiralty have jurisdiction over such liens only as arise from work and labor connected with maritime affairs, navigation, or shipping.</p> <p>[Cited in The Infanta, Case No. 7,030; Lud-ington v. The Nucleus. Id. 8,098; Hill v. The Golden Gate, Id. 6,491; The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. (70 U. S.) 450: The Edith, Case No. 4,283; The Ella, 48 Fed. 571.]</p> <p>[2. Cited in Parmlee v. The Charles Mears, Case No. 10.766; Cunningham v. Hall. Id. 3,-481; The Richard Busteed, Id. 11,764; and Petrie v. The Coal Bluff No. 2, 3 Fed. 534,—to tlie point that contracts for the building of ships are maritime contracts.]</p> <p>3. No lien attaches upon a domestic vessel for work and labor done and performed on her, except by statute.</p> <p>[Cited in Macy v. De Wolf, Case No. 8,933; The Infanta, Id. 7,030; Nall v. The Illinois, Id. 10,005.]</p> <p>4. The statute of Maine, of the 19th of February. 1839. giving effect to such a lien, in cases where work and labor are performed, or materials are furnished, in virtue of a “written or parol agreement,” includes all parol agreements, whether expressed or implied; and any lien, however limited in point of duration of time, may be enforced by proceedings commenced within that period, in any proper tribunal having cognizance thereof.</p> <p>[Cited in The Velocity, Case No. 16,911.]</p> <p>5. Where the libellant was hired at monthly wages, upon a quantum meruit to perform any kind of work or labor in which the hirer might choose to employ him. under a general agreement and retainer, without any specific application thereof, fixed by the agreement, to any partieular vessel or vessels, or to any other specific objects, it was held, that the statute was inapplicable to such a case, inasmuch as the agreement could not be apportioned according to the various services upon various vessels, or upon other objects.</p> <p>[Cited in Purinton v. Hull of a New Ship, Case No. 11,473; The Barges 2 and 4, 58 Fed. 426.]</p> <p>6. The statute was applicable only to cases of an agreement for work and labor to be performed upon a particular vessel, as a distinct and independent service, and not as a part of the general services of the libellant, which he was bound under his agreement and retainer to render in the common business and employment of the party, by whom he was hired, at the pleasure of the latter. °</p> <p>[Cited in Purinton v. Hull of a New Ship, Case No. 11,473; Sewall v. Same, Id. 12,-082: The Young Sam, Id. 18,186; The James H. Prentice, 36 Fed. 783.]</p> <p>[Oited in Rogers v. Currier, 79 Mass. 133; Barstow v. Robinson, 84 Mass. 606.]</p>

[This was a demurrer io special pleas in an action on the case for the infringement of letters patent for “an improvement in harvesters,’’ granted to Jonathan Read, April 12, 1S42 [No. 2,4SS], and extended for seven years from April 12, 1856. The patent expired April 12, 1S63. Suit was brought, in the spring of 1S67, to recover damages which had accrued from the infringement of the patent during its lifetime.

The action was founded, amongst other items of account, upon a bill of exchange for six hundred and twenty pounds, drawn by the defendant on P. Noland, February 2nd, 1790, in favour of the plaintiff, dated in Kentucky, which was never protested; but Wilkinson was informed that it was not paid. He afterwards paid a part of it, for which a receipt was endorsed.

This case arose on the will of Henry Harrison, of Princeton, New Jersey, which is as follows: “In the name of God, amen, this is the last will and testament of Mr. John Harrison, of township of West Windsor, county of Middlesex, and state of New Jersey.

[This was a bill in equity by the Ready Roofing Company and William H. H. Childs against Benjamin H. Taylor and others, for the infringement of a patent.]

By JOSEPH MASON, Register: I, Joseph Mason, a register in bankruptcy of said court, to whom the above matter was referred, do certify that on the 17th day of April. 1871, during the course of the examination of John Reakirt, a witness summoned in said matter, the following questions were asked him by Mr. Gilpin, of counsel for the People’s Bank, an alleged creditor, a deposition for the proof of whose debt had been made. “Q. Where is your son?

[This was an action by Reuben Reason, a negro, against John Bridges.] The defendant having challenged twelve of the jurors peremptorily, challenged Mr. Smith, one of the tales, for favor. Eight jurors having been sworn, were sworn as triors.

This was a libel in rem, for collision. The schooner Richard and Douglass, of which the libellants were owners, was on a voyage from York River, in Virginia, to New-York. The schooner Rebecca was proceeding from New-York to Philadelphia. The two vessels came into collision early in the morning, on the 1st of September, 1S32, off the great swamp near Barnegat Inlet, New-Jersey, several miles from the shore.

The libel in this case alleges that the libel-lant, on the 20th of March last, shipped at New York, on board the schooner Kebecca, of which T. B. Cobb was master, ten hogsheads of liquor, consigned to E. Greely & Son, of Portland, to be there safely delivered, the dangers of the seas only excepted, at the stipulated freight of seventy-five cents the hogshead; that the vessel arrived at Portland, and the consignees offered to pay the freight, and demanded the delivery of the…

Libel, for collision, filed by the master of the barque Rebecca against the steam tug America. A decree having been made against the steam tug, the cause was referred to a commissioner to ascertain and report the amount of damage.

<p>Libel for .salvage.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] In this ease, which was a libel for salvage, tiled in the district court, that court awarded to the libellants a sum of money, as salvage. [Case No. 11,621.] Both parties appealed to this court, which decided that the sum awarded by the district court was a proper allowance. [Case unreported.] The libellants now applied to be allowed, by the decree, interest on such sum, from the…

<p>Case No. 11,623.</p> <p>Bankruptct — Requisite Number and Amount or Creditors — Notice — Time por Others to Join.</p> <p>Under section 12 of the act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat. 180), the ascertainment as to whether the requisite number and amount of creditors have joined in an involuntary petition in bankruptcy, is to be made “upon reasonable notice to the creditors,” and it is only when it is made on such notice that the power of the court to errant time for other creditors to join, is limited by said section 12.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Joseph Reck-endorfer against Eberhard Faber, to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 19,7S3, granted to H. L. Lipman March 30, 185S, and letters patent No. 36,854, granted to Joseph Reckendorfer Nov. 4, 1862, reissued March 1,1S70 (No. 38G3). The bill also prays for an accounting and damages.]

<p>Case No. 11,686.</p> <p>Collision — Steam and Sail — Right of Wat — Fore-Reaching.</p> <p>1. The rule of navigation is emphatically settled that a vessel with the wind free must give way to one close-hauled; and a steamboat having the control of her own movements by means of her motive power, is always treated as a vessel with the wind free.</p> <p>2. The manoeuvre of fore-reaching, even in a harbor, is not objectionable, unless there be some reason to apprehend a collision by reason of making it.</p>

The bill in this case sets forth: (1) That one Joseph Hodgson, late of White Haven, in Great Britain, deceased, on the 29th of October, 1798, pretending to be in partnership with W. I. Hall, of Alexandria, purchased, for the partnership, goods to the amount of £500. 7s. Od. sterling, and gave to the complainants a promissory note, dated at White Haven, on that day, for that amount, signed Hodgson & Hall.

[In the matter of Justus S. Redfield, a bankrupt. This was a hearing on petition for an order directing that the fees and costs shall not exceed the amount of the deposit. The court refused the application, except after the personal examination of the bankrupt as to his means. Case No. 11,628. The case is now heard upon the examination.]

<p>Case No. 11,628.</p> <p>Bastkbcptct — Poor Debtor — General Order No. 30.</p> <p>An order, directing that the fees and costs in a bankruptcy case shall not exceed the amount of the bankrupt's deposit, should only be made after a personal examination of the bankrupt.</p> <p>[Subsequently the court refused the application after the personal examination of the bankrupt. Case No. 11,G29.]</p>

Motion to remand case to state court. This action had been begun in the common pleas of Philadelphia. A declaration was filed which was demurred to. Pending the demurrer the defendant removed the case to the circuit court, the affidavit for removal setting up that it had a defence arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, to wit, that the defendant was a corporation organized under an act of congress.

Claim [by J. W. Redman and others] for about ten acres of land in Santa Clara county [part of the orchard of Santa Clara], rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimants.

In bankruptcy. The petition is filed against the debtors as partners composing the firm of Redmond & Martin, and on behalf of several creditors, the aggregate of whose demands, it is alleged, exceeds two hundred and fifty dollars.

<p>Case No. 11,633.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proof of Claim — Surrender of Assets.</p> <p>1. The clause of section 39 of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 036)] providing that a creditor of a bankrupt, who, knowing the insolvency of the debtor, receives money or property from him in payment, “shall not be allowed to prove his debt in bankruptcy," does not apply, if the creditor, before presenting his claim to the assignee in bankruptcy, makes a full surrender of the money or property transferred to him.</p> <p>2. Section 23 of the bankrupt act, by clear implication, allows the creditor to make such surrender, and on doing so, permits him to prove his claim against the bankrupt’s estate, and entitles him to his dividends as a creditor.</p> <p>3. The clause above quoted from section 39 is limited in its operation to cases where the as-signee in bankruptcy is compelled to resort to legal measures for the recovery of the property' illegally transferred to the creditor.</p>

Eskridge, James Woodson Bates, and Wil-liam Trimble, Judges. [This was an action on the case by James Johnson against Alexander Reece for unlawfully taking possession of a slave.]

In bankruptcy. This was a re-examination of the claim of J. Willard Fox, a creditor of said bankrupt [C. W. Reed], whose claim was disputed by the assignee. cited, in support of the plea, In re Kingsley [Case No. 7,819]; In re Hardin [Id. 6,048]; In re Cornwall [Cases Nos. 3,250, 3,251]; Ang.

on the 14th April, 1879, filed his petition, duly signed and sworn to, in the circuit court, addressed to Judge LOWELL, circuit judge, in which he complains that he is unlawfully imprisoned on the United States ship Wabash, now in the harbor of Boston, and at the navy-yard in said Boston, by Captain S. L. Breese, the officer in command of the said Wabash, and avers that the said S. L. Breese claims to restrain him of his liberty, as he is informed and believes, by virtue of…

<p>Case No. 11,637.</p> <p>Injunction — Proceedings in State Court— Bankruptcy.</p> <p>The United States district court, sitting in bankruptcy, has power, by injunction, to stay proceedings in the state courts against a bankrupt.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Wright. Case No. 18.065; Re Mallory, Id. 8,991; Re Brinkman, Id. 1,884.]</p>

This case came into the circuit court upon an appeal from the district court. [Case unreported.] The district court had decided that the opposing creditor could not properly file objections to the final discharge of the bankrupt, until he had proven his debt. The question is now upon a motion to dismiss the appeal.

<p>Case Wo. 11,639.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Books op Account — Invoice-Book.</p> <p>A retail dealer in groceries who keens no invoice-book. but keeps all his invoice-bills carefully together, so that a complete account of all goods received by him can be made out from them (the other customary books being also kept), keeps proper books of account. The question of book-keeping is a question of fact in each case.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Graves, 24 Fed. 554.]</p> <p>[Cited in Re Howard, 59 Vt. 594, 10 Atl. 719.]</p>

Rachel Campbell, the widow of William Campbell, after receiving the portion of her husband's estate as devised and bequeathed to her, claimed in her petition the surplus remaining in the hands of the executor under the will after payment of the debts and legacies. The executor denied her right to the surplus. Mr. Wylie offered in evidence the testimony of an old colored woman, Kitty Pad.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States, for the district of Massachusetts.] This was the case of a libel in personam, filed [by William Canfield] against [Sheffield Reed and others] the owners of the ship Albion, of New Bedford, belonging to the original respondents, (now appellants,) for compensation for expenses incurred in curing the libellant, who was a sea man on board of the ship, and severely injured, as is alleged, while in the service of the ship.

This was an action of debt [by George B. Reed against Samuel Carusi], under the act of congress passed 3d February', 1S31 (section 7 [4 Stat. 438]), for the infringement of a copyright obtained in the year 1840, by the assignor of the plaintiff, for the music of the well-known ballad called “The Old Arm Chair.” The action was, on the 4th November, 1844, docketed, by consent, “as of April Term, 1844,” the April term commencing on the first Monday in that month. [This was an…

<p>[This was a proceeding in bankruptcy by-Reed and others against Frederick C. Cowley and William L. Hoblitzell. Heard on motion to amend creditor’s petition.]</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by Reed & Mix against Clark.]</p>

Case for infringement of two patent rights; one for “a new and useful improvement in the pump”; the second for “a new and useful improvement in the cast-iron pump.” The declaration contained two counts, one applicable to each patent. The first patent was to Jesse Eeed, the plaintiff, and was dated August 5th, 1S31.

[This was a libel for seamen's wages by Mills Reed and others against the schooner Fanny, James S. Henkle, claimant Heard on claimant’s motion to set aside the process.]

<p>These actions, one in personam, against Frederick Hussey, a part owner of the ship Franklin, and the other in rem, by John Monroe, against the remnants of the ship and the proceeds of part of her cargo, were brought by two seamen to recover wages for their services on board that vessel, on a whaling voyage to the Pacific Ocean, and also salvage for saving portions of the apparel and cargo from her wreck, on the coast of Brazil. It appeared that, in June, 1S31. the Franklin sailed from Nantucket on a whaling voyage. The libellant Henry Reed went out in her. The other libellant. Monroe, shipped at Callao, Peru. Each of them signed the shipping articles, by which Reed was to have a lay of one one hundred and twenty-fifth, and Monroe a lay of one one hundred and twentieth, “of all that shall be obtained during the voyage.” Nantucket was the home port of discharge. The ship obtained, during her voyage, from 1,300 to 1,350 barrels of oil, 100 barrels of which were shipped to the United States in another vessel, and were received and sold by the owners. In March, 1834, the Franklin left the whaling ground and sailed for the United States. The master, the mate and five seamen died on board, between Cape Horn and the Falkland Islands, and the command devolved on the third mate, wdio put into Montevideo in distress. The vessel remained at that port about a month refitting, and having, with the assistance and advice of the consul, shipped there a first mate and five seamen, at monthly v'ages, sailed for the United States about the middle of August, 1S34. On the 5th or 6th of October, about midnight, she was wrecked on the Diego Roderiguez Shoals, off Coraipa, on the coast of Brazil. She struck upon a rock about six miles from shore, and bilged, and was entirely lost. With the assistance of lighters and persons from the coast, and with the aid of her crew, three anchors and a part of her rigging and a quantity of the oil which composed her cargo, were got on shore. During the period they were at work on the wreck, the upper works of the ship broke off in a gale, and were driven ashore, carrying 150 or 200 barrels of oil. In all, 450 barrels were saved. The oil, in many of those which reached the shore, wras lost from leakage. The persons who were employed in saving the cargo were engaged at first under the authority of the British consul, and, subsequently, under that of the American consul, as soon as his interference could be obtained. The master stated in his testimony that the crew were employed for forty-five days in saving and securing the cargo, about a fortnight of which time was employed on the wreck. The persons hired on the coast were paid sixty-two and a half cents per day. Laborers were abundant at that price. A vessel was chartered, which brought to New-York the oil saved and the remnants of the ship, and they were all sold at auction, under the direction of Josiah Maey & Sons, who were the claimants of the proceeds of the oil, as agents or trustees of the owners. The nett surplus, over and above all disbursements, held by them for the owners, was about $717. The expenses of savins the property and transporting it to this country were all discharged by the American consul. The ship’s company, except the libellants and the master, were discharged at the place of wreck, their claim of wages being satisfied by the consul. Those payments were brought into the account as part of the charges and disbursements. The oil was worth at the place of wreck twenty cents per gallon, and would not, if sold there, have defrayed the expenses incurred there. Both of the libels charged that the ship was intentionally ran on shore and wrecked by the master. The evidence in support of this allegation consisted only of the testimony of the libellants themselves, each testifying for the other. The other facts are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>[Libel in admiralty by AVilliam D. Reed against the steamboat New Haven for collision. The New York & Erie Railroad Company appeared as claimants.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by George A. Reed against Louis Reed and George Folts for the infringement of letters patent No. 136,763, granted to plaintiff March 11, 1873.]

Libel in rem by [Charles Reeder, Jr.] a materialman [against the steamship George’s Creek] for repairs to ship. This ease was argued and submitted to the court upon the following statement of facts: The steamer George’s Creek belongs to the port of New York, and on the 24th of December, 1S53, she was mortgaged by her owners to Messrs. Knapp & Stacey, of New York, to secure the payment of ⅞30,000.

This was a petition of Mary Reeside, executrix of Janies Reeside, for a writ of mandamus commanding the secretary of the treasury of the United States, first, to cause to he entered upon… Held: in the case of Chissell v. Georgia, 2 Dali. [2 U. S.] 478, that, under the constitution as it then existed, states were suable. This led to an amendment of the constitution, by which states were exempted from suit. In 1801, an act was passed re-organizing the courts. See 2 Stat. 02.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Libel on a bill of lading in rein for damages done to certain goods shipped on a voyage from New York to Boston. There was a special claim and answer; and the decree of the district court was in favor of the libel-lants [case unreported]; from which the claimants [Gilman Stanley and another] appealed to the circuit court.

On the 7th August, 1835, the steamboat William Wray, belonging to the libellants [Josiali Reeves and Isaiah Toy] was employed in towing the ship Constitution, to which she was fastened, up the river Delaware. There was a licensed pilot on board of the ship, under whose directions both vessels were steered.

[This was a bill in equity by Samuel J. Reeves against the Keystone Bridge Company and others for an injunction and account.] Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 35,-582] for an “improvement in the construction of columns, shafts, braces,” etc., granted to complainant, June 17, 1S62. [The defense relied upon an alleged lack of priority on the part of Reeves and the subsequent validity of his patent.]2

2 [Petition for a rehearing. Bill in equity filed by [Samuel J.] Reeves in 1868 for infringement of letters patent No. 35,582.

The ease in evidence was this: The Rev. Francis Neale, as the agent, and at the request of the defendant [Eleanor Pye], wrote a letter to the plaintiff [Thomas Courtney Reeves], residing in Charles county, (Maryland,) to know tlie terms on which be would sell a certain bouse and lot in Georgetown; and, afterwards, at ber request, made a verbal agreement with him for the purchase, which was not reduced to writing.

This suit [by Mark 15. Beeves against Thomas Yinacke and others] is brought to foreclose a mortgage executed June 25, ISOS, by O. B. Jordan, and to correct a description of the property in the same. The facts are these: On the above date, C. B. Jordan, to secure a note given R. Morrison for the benefit oP the linn of Messrs.

<p>Case No. 11,664.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Lien — Stevedore— Costs.</p> <p>[1. A federal court sitting in admiralty has no jurisdiction of a claim founded upon a contract for services rendered by a stevedore in removing ballast from a ship, as such service is not maritime in its nature, and it is immaterial whether a state statute gives a lien for service or not.l</p> <p>[Cited in The Mary E. Taber. Case No. 9.209.]</p> <p>[2. In the absence of the existence of strong equities to the contrary, costs in admiralty, though given or denied in the discretion of the court, must be awarded to the prevailing party.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem to enforce a maritime lien upon the steamer Regulator for supplies and materials, necessaries furnished at the request of the owners at the port of Portland, Maine.

[This was an action at law by Charles Reiche and Henry Reiche against Henry A. Smythe, collector of the port of New York, to recover duties, alleged to have been illegally exacted.]

Assumpsit [by Reid, Irvin & Co., against W. Hodgson] upon the defendant’s letter of guaranty for £10,000 sterling for Sanderson & Rumney. offered to read a copy of a letter, dated 11th August, 1799. from Sanderson The defendant proved that Rumney. the writer of the letter, resided with his family in the Genesee county, in the state of New York.

In equity. Heard on pleadings and evidence for final decree. This was a bill filed by Mrs. Ellen C. Reid, her husband, Andrew J. Reid, appearing as her next friend [against A. Rocliereau & Co. and others], to set aside a sale of certain real estate in the city of New Orleans, made by the assignee in bankruptcy of the said husband, Andrew J. Reid, the property having been sold as part of the-bankrupt estate.

<p>Case No. 11,670.</p> <p>Neutrality — Capture bv Prisoners — Restitution'.</p> <p>French prisoners on their way to England, seized the ship in which they were, and brought her into this port. The court has not power to order restitution, either by the law of nations, or consistently with the treaty between the United States and France.</p>

Motion by C. C. Lee and Mr. Jones, for •defendant, to set aside an interlocutory judgment by default, and quash the writ of inquiry; upon affidavit of merits, payment of costs, pleading to issue of the merits instanter, and offering ready for trial. Tidd, Prac. 507, 508.

The declaration alleges that the defendant took and detained the goods of the plaintiff. The defendant avows the taking and that they were taken in distress for rent in ar-rear.

<p>Case No. 11,673'.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition with Creditoks — Constitutional Law — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. A petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed on August 3d, 1874, against R. & Co., by fourteen of their creditors, representing that they constituted one-fourth in number of the creditors, and that their debts amounted to one-third of tlie debts of the firm. While proceedings on this petition were pending, the debtors filed a petition, requesting that a meeting of their creditors, whom they named, might bo called for the purpose of their offering á composition to their creditors. The meeting was called, ten days’ notice being sent to the creditors. The meeting was held, and the debtors presented a statement of their debts and assets. and offered a composition: whereupon a resolution was- passed to accept the same, it being an offer of thirty cents on the dollar, ten cents in cash, and the rest in notes, “said notes to be satisfactorily indorsed,” and the whole to be void as to any creditor in case of any default in payment as to him. This resolution was signed by the debtors, and by two-thirds in number of the creditors, representing one-half in value of the debts. The court then made an order directing the clerk to call a meeting at his office, to ascertain if the resolution had been passed as directed by the 43d section of the bankruptcy act as amended (18 Stat. 178). five days' notice of the meeting to be given to all creditors named in the debtors’ petition. The meeting was held, and the cleric certified to the court, that the resolution had been adopted as directed by the 43d section; that it had been approved by two-tliirds of the creditors, representing one-half in value of all the debts; that tile creditors were seventy-four in number: and that it was for the best interests of all concerned. that the resolution be recorded, and the statements showing the whole of the debts and assets be filed. At the meeting a creditor raised the objection, that the amendment of the bankruptcy act, tinder which the composition was offered, was unconstitutional, because it provided for the discharge of debtors from their liabilities, without the surrender of their property, contemplated by a bankrupt act. The objection was also raised, that the composition offered did not conform to the law, because it provided for a payment partly in notes, instead of money. At the hearing before the court, the objection of jurisdiction was raised, that, while the number of creditors was seventy-four, only fourteen joined in the petition in bankruptcy, being less than one-fourth: Held. that, in order to authorize proceedings for a composition, a case in bankruptcy must be pending.</p> <p>2. In this case, although the number of creditors was seventy-four, the number whose debts respectively exceeded $250. was only thirty-four, and, therefore, the act of June 22d. 1S74. had been complied with, and the objection to the jurisdiction was not tenable.</p> <p>3. The power given to congress by article 1, § S. of the constitution must be held to be general. unlimited and unrestricted over the subject of bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in Re California Pac. R. Co., Case No. 2,315; Re Jackson, Id. 7,124.]</p> <p>4. The statute, providing for compositions, is not unconstitutional.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Chamberlin, Case No. 2,5S0.]</p> <p>5.The composition offered did not provide, when properly construed, for a payment otherwise than in money, and the provision for the giving of the notes did not prevent the composition from being conformable to law.</p> <p>TCited in Re Cavan, Case No. 2.528; Re Hurst. Id. (¡.925; Re Louis, Id. S,52S. Quoted in Re Weber Furniture Co., Id. 17,331. Cited in Re McKeon, Id. 8.858; Ex parte Hamlin, Id. 5.993; Re Wilson, Id. 17,781; Re Shaw, 9 Eed. 498.]</p> <p>[Cited in Harrison v. Gamble, 09 Mich. 107, 30 N. W. 087.]</p> <p>0. The resolution accepting the composition, however, was defective, because it did not define how the notes should be “satisfactorily indorsed.” It should either have named the in-dorser or provided for his being named.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Hannahs. Case No. 6.033. Cited, but not followed, in Re Wilson. Id. 17,785.]</p> <p>7. An additional resolution providing for such security might be presented to the court, but it must be adopted at another meeting of creditors, and presented to the court, in the same way as the original resolution.</p> <p>[NOTE. The resolutions of composition were affirmed by the district court. Case No. 11,674. The cause was then taken to the circuit court on a petition of review, when the judgment of the district court was affirmed. Id. 11,675.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a petition of review, seeking to set aside an order of the district court, confirming a composition claimed to have been made by the debtors with their creditors, in the manner directed by the bankruptcy act [of 1807 (14 Stat. 517)].

This was an action [by Joseph W. Reimcr and others] against [Augustus Schell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties paid under pretest.

2 [The marshal presented to the clerk the following bill for taxation, to wit: [Amended Bill of Pees of Oliver Fiske, U. S. Marshal. 1874. Nov. 6. Serving provisional warrant, and mileage. $ 2 20 “ 14.

<p>Case No. 11,680.</p> <p>Prize — Violation- op Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,681.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

Assumpsit by [Benedict Reiser] a resident of London, England [against F. E. Parker, administrator], to recover a balance of account of £849 6s. for goods sold. The case was submitted to the court, without a jury, and most of the facts were agreed in writing. Upon the rate of exchange at different times evidence was taken. The date of the writ. 15 September, 1864, was agreed to be the day of the breach by non-payment.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] This was a contest between two creditors of the bankrupt. The only assets of the bankrupt estate were about $1.000 in cash in the hands of the assignee, being the insurance. received on certain goods and chattels which had been the property of the bankrupt. and had been destroyed by fire.

<p>Case No. 11,688.</p> <p>Patents — Pleading in Equity — Pleas — Election.</p> <p>1. The defendants, in answer to a bill for infringement, filed a plea containing three distinct points of defence. The matters pleaded all related to the invalidity of the complainants’ patent, but alleged separate and distinct grounds for such invalidity: Held, that where more than one point of defence is relied on, such points should be stated by way of answer and not of plea, the latter being in such case, bad for duplicity.</p> <p>2. A plea may contain an averment of several facts, but they must all conduce to a single point of defence. The practice is, not to confine'the defendant to his first ground of defence by striking out the others, but to allow him either to set down the pleas as an answer, or to put him to his election as to which of the pleas he will abide by.</p> <p>[NOTE. The defendants elected to stand by tlie second defense in their plea. They claimed the right, upon plaintiffs’ replication, to begin and close the proofs. This was denied. Case No. 11,687. Upon the final hearing, there was a decree in favor of complainant. Id. 11,688. For another case involving this patent, see Id. 11,689.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Christoph Reissner and others against S. W. Anness and others for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 7,751, granted to John A-Frey June 19, 1877, the original letters patent, No. 156,149, having been granted October 20, 1874. The defendants pleaded to the bill, but the court held the plea to be multifarious, and required them to elect as to the ground of defense. Case No. 11,686.

<p>Case No. 11,689.</p> <p>Patents — Limitation or Foreign Grant — Foreign Extension.</p> <p>Under section 4887 of the Revised Statutes, which provides, that “every patent granted for an invention which has been previously patented in a foreign country shall be so limited as to expire at the same time with the foreign patent, or, if there be more than one. at the same time with the one having the shortest term.” a patent granted by the United States. October 20th, 1874. for 17 years from that day. was held to have expired on the 15th of May, 1878. because a patent was granted in Canada, under the authority of the patentee, for the same invention, on the 15th of May. 1S73. for 5 years from that day. although, in March, 1878. the Canada patent was extended for 5 years from the 15th of May. 1S7S. and, also, for 5 years from the 15th of May, 1883.</p> <p>[Cited in Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Gillett, 13 Fed. 558: Holmes Electric Co. v. Metropolitan Burglar Alarm Co., 21 Fed. 459: Canan v. Pound Manuf'g Co.. 23 Fed. 187; Paillard v. Bruno. 29 Fed. 865: Huber v. Myers Sanitary Depot. 33 Fed. 49: Huber v. N. O. Nelson Manuf'g Co.. 38 Fed. 831: Pohl v. Anchor Brewing Co.. 39 Fed. 784; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Hammond Co., 129 U. S. 153, 9 Sup. Ct. 228.]</p> <p>i [For other cases involving this patent, see Reissner v. Anness, Cases Nos. 11,6SG-11,68S.]</p>

[This was a libel by George F. King and wife against the owners of The R. E. Lee to recover the value of jewelry lost while on board the vessel.] The cause was submitted upon an agreed statemfent or facts, the. substance of which is stated in the opinion.

This prize was taken by the gunboat James Adger, off Beaufort Harbor, North Carolina, on the ninth day of November, 1863, at about fifteen minutes past seven o’clock in the morning. Four vessels of the navy were lying in the harbor of Beaufort, and two of them, the Iron Age and Newbern, asserted a title as joint captors. The only question necessary to the decision of their right was, whether they were within signal distance of the James Adger at the time of the capture.

The question principally turned on the case of Relf, the owners having settled with the whole, or greater part of the crew, the complainant Relf excepted. It appears that the ship had been armed, in the port of Philadelphia, with twelve guns; before congress had passed any law on the subject. • There were on board five officers, and forty-two men.

This was a cause of collision between two steamboats. The libel charges that the tugboat Jacob Bell, on the 26th of April. 1S44, left her moorings at pier No. 20, East river, between 8 and 9 a. m., to proceed to pier No. 23, East river, alongside the ship Cambridge, a distance of about six hundred feet;, that she had passed the ferry slip at Fulton-street, and had lapped twenty-live feet on the ship Cambridge; that the steamer Relief, plying as a ferry boat between Brooklyn…

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>This was a libel in personam, filed in the district, court [by Joshua Remington and other’s], to recover damages for a collision, alleged to have been caused by the steamship Indian Empire, a vessel owned by the respondents, a corporation. On the hearing in the district court, objections to a recovery, on the ground that there was no such corporation as the respondents, and that they were not the owners of the vessel in question, were sustained, and the libel was dismissed on those grounds, without any * testimony having been put in on the part of the respondents, in respect to the merits. TCase unreported.] The libellants appealed to this court, and, by further testimony, taken on the appeal, the objections in question were removed.</p>

In admiralty. Tyson & Judah filed their libel and petition, seeking to have the proceeds or remnants of the ship Panama paid to them :n satisfaction of their debts, and to prohibit the payment of the moneys to Cameron or Quincy, the claimants in the action which produced the remnants.

[In the matter of George B. Remsen, a bankrupt.] Resolutions of composition were proposed by the bankrupt, and were duly passed and confirmed, providing that the creditors should receive sixty cents on the dollar, payable in instalments, to be evidenced by the promissory notes of the bankrupt, and to be secured by the execution and delivery of a mortgage for the full amount of the notes upon a homestead farm at Hempstead, and by the execution and delivery of an assignment of…

<p>[This was an action at law by Charles S. Reno against James Wilson, sheriff.]</p>

2 [Motion for provisional injunction. 1 Suit brought [by Edward S. Renwick and others against Albert Cooper and others] upon letters patent for “improvement in breech-loading fire-arms,” granted to William C. Hicks, March 10, 1857 [No. 16,797]; reissued May 9, 1865 [No. 3798]; again, January 18. 1870, and again, March 10, 1870, and extended for seven years from March 10, 1871.

In equity. [Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [by Edward S. Renwick and others against Charles H. Pond] upon letters patent for “improvement in breech-loading fire-arms,” granted to William C. Hicks, March 10, 1S37 [No. 16.797], reissued May 9, 1805 [No. 3,798], again January IS, 1870, and again March 1, 1S70.

<p>Case No. 11,703.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — Effect of Taking Note — Op PER TO SUKRENDEK — Sea NAVIGATION — ADMIRALTY Practice- Appeal — Amendment.</p> <p>1. The case of Ramsay v. Allegre. 12 Wheat. [25 U. S.] 611, commented on and explained.</p> <p>2. The question whether a note or other security taken for a maritime contract is a bar to the admiralty jurisdiction or not. depends upon the effect which the note or other security has (by the laws of the place where it is made), upon the original contract. If it discharges and extinguishes it, and stands in its place, it puts an end to the admiralty jurisdiction; and the surrender of the note cannot renew the original debt, nor restoie the admiralty jurisdiction over it.</p> <p>[Cited in The Napoleon, Case No. 10,011.]</p> <p>[See Allen v. King. Case No. 226.]</p> <p>3. The case of Glenn v. Smith. 2 Gill & J. 508. is decisive upon the %>oint that, in Maryland, taking a due-bill does not discharge the original contract, nor extinguish the remedy upon it; and therefore, a due-bill or promissory note taken in that state, is no bar to a recovery on the original cause of action, under a libel filed in admiralty, provided the due-bill or promissory note be produced and filed at the trial, and offered to be surrendered to the respondent.</p> <p>[Followed in Mclvim v. Kelsey, Case No. 8,-861. Cited in The Napoleon, Id. 10.011.]</p> <p>4. Where repairs are made upon a small vessel of twenty-seven or twenty-eight tons, engaged exclusively in transporting the products of the farms of the respondent, lying in Maryland, to the city of Baltimore, and a libel is filed against him to recover the value of those repairB, alleging that they were useful and necessary for the vessel, and for her safety and navigation on the high seas, and this allegation is not denied, nor is any testimony taken in reference to it: Held, that whether a vessel be one of that class which is fitted for the navigation of the sea or not, is a question of fact, not of law, and if disputed, must be tried by the testimony of witnesses.</p> <p>5. If the respondent mean to rely upon the character of the vessel in this respect, he must put it in issue by his answer, otherwise no evidence can be received upon the subject.</p> <p>6. The manner in which the vessel is actually employed cannot affect the question of jurisdiction; it depends upon her character; if the repairs fitted her for the navigation of the sea, the contract was maritime; and it does not rest with the owner to confer or take away the admiralty jurisdiction, at his pleasure, by the mode or trade in which he afterwards employed her.</p> <p>[Cited in The Wilmington, 48 Fed. 567.]</p> <p>7. The circuit court, upon appeals from the court of admiralty, has the power to suffer amendments to be made to the pleadings, so as to let in new evidence and new grounds of de-fence.</p> <p>8. But this power ought always to be exercised with caution, and for the purposes of justice, and to bring the merits of the controversy fairly before the court; it would hardly be consistent with these principles, to permit an amendment to be made, where the only effect it could produce would be. the defeat of the present suit, and driving the libellant to another forum to recover a claim, admitted to be due, and the justice of which is not disputed: Held, also, that the same objection applied to a de-fence raised in the circuit court, that the repairs were made by the libellant and another as partners, both of whom were still living, and both of whom had taken the benefit of the insolvent laws, since the work was done, and since the due-bill had matured; that it was purely a technical defence, and if it had been raised in the district court, the libel could have been amended so as to obviate the difficulty.</p> <p>9. If it appeared on the proceedings that when the suit was brought, the due-bill was held hy an assignee, and the suit was brought for his benefit, the admiralty-jurisdiction could not be maintained.</p> <p>[Cited in The Champion, Case No. 2,583: The Napoleon. Id. 10,011; The Sarah J. Weed, Id. 12,350.)</p> <p>10. The right to sue in admiralty upon claims of this description, is personal, and is maintained upon principles and reasons which do not apply to an assignee.</p> <p>[Cited in The Champion, Case No. 2,583; The R. W. Skillinger, Id. 12,181.]</p> <p>11. An assignment, after the suit was instituted, and after the court had taken jurisdiction of the case, would perhaps stand upon different grounds from an assignment made before.</p> <p>12. The entry of a suit to the use of another has, in modern practice, been recognised in the Maryland courts of common law, as evidence of title in the party for whose use it is brought; but it is not, according to the established proceedings in courts of admiralty.</p>

In bankruptcy. This was an application by Joseph R. Pay son, the assignee of the Republic Insurance Company of Chicago, bankrupt, for an order of court directing an assessment upon the stockholders of said company, for such a per-centage of the unpaid capital yet standing subject to call as should, in the judgment of the court, be necessary to liquidate the known liabilities of the bankrupt.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

A petition was filed by Levi Z. Leiter and other stockholders to set aside the whole bankruptcy proceedings against the Republic Insurance Co. After hearing the petition read, the judge, before hearing any arguments. expressed his opinion on the merits of the case. [For the prior proceedings in this case, see note to Case No. 11.704.]

This was a motion by defendant to set aside a judgment entered by default at the La Crosse term. The suit was commenced by the service of a summons in the form in use in the state courts in an action on contract for the recovery of money, which required the defendant to answer within twenty days after service. The complaint was not served, but was filed and sworn to in the form provided by the state statutes.

This was a libel in rem for damage by collision with libellants’ bark. There were two-separate eases of collision, at two different times, with the same bark, charged: but the one about which there was most controversy, occurred while the libellants’ vessel was lying at the end of their wharf at Charlestown.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was the case of a vessel licensed for the coasting trade, and seized for an alleged forfeiture.

This was an action to recover damages for the invasion of the plaintiff’s patent right to a machine for rounding iron. It appeared in evidence, that the defendant, Kanowrs, was a farmer, and had on his farm, a common tilt, or hammer and anvil, worked by water. The plaintiff, a German, and poor; informed Kanowrs, that he had invented a machine for rounding iron; but, from want of funds, had not been able to bring his theory to practice.

This was an appeal from a decree of the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. On the 5th of April, 1834, Oakley & Roome, of the city of New York, and John C. Graves, of the same place, were registered owners of the brig Emolument, of New York, Oakley & Roome owning three-quarters, and Graves one-quarter, and commanding the brig.

Application by the United States as claimant for the discharge of the vessel upon stipulation under section 3754 of the Revised Statutes.

This was one of some thirty or more separate libels filed by these libellants and others against revenue cutters numbered (originally) one, two, three, four, five, six, built by Merry & Gay, ship-builders, at Milan, Ohio, under contract with the government, in 1858, and designed for service on the Western lakes.

Suit to enforce lien for labor and materials furnished to rig and equip the vessel called the United States Revenue Cutter.

<p>Case No. 11,716.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade — False Papers..</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo condemned for an at-temnt to violate the blockade.</p> <p>2. False and simulated papers as to the destination of the vessel.</p>

This was a cause of prize. The libel simply alleged the vessel to be a prize, taken by the United States ships of war Susquehanna and Cambridge, with the names of the parties interested as captors, that the vessel was within the jurisdiction of the court, and prayed her condemnation. The vessel’s papers were filed in court, and the master, chief mate, and cook were examined on the standing interrogatories.

<p>Case No. 11,718.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Priorities — Mortgage for Purchase Money — Materials and Supplies— Foreign and Domestic Material-Men.</p> <p>1. A purchase money mortgage to secure the payment of a balance due on the purchase of a vessel, and which has been duly recorded in "the collector of customs’ office (at the home port of the vessel, or at the place the owners reside), under act of congress passed the 29th day of July, A. D. 1850, — Rev. St. § 4192 [9 Stat. 440). Held-, a mortgage against a vessel is not in its nature a maritime contract. That the recording of a mortgage against a vessel under said recording act, is notice to all domestic material-men who have liens of the second class under the law of the lex loci, for materials and supplies furnished at the instance and request of the master or owners, said mortgage takes the precedence, and is paid in full from the fund arising from the sale of the vessel at United States marshal's sale; providing said materials and supplies were furnished subsequent to the recording of the mortgage.</p> <p>2. Foreign claimants of the second class, for materials and sunnlies furnished, take precedence and are paid in full before domestic claimants of the same class.</p> <p>3.A purchase money mortgage against ⅛ vessel does not take precedence over foreign claims or liens for materials and supplies furnished, for the reason that the lien for materials and supplies furnished at a foreign port is in its nature maritime.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,719.</p> <p>Indians and Their Offspring — Criminad Jurisdiction or the Federal Courts over Indians — Who is an Indian — Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>1. Indians who maintain their tribal relations are the subjects of independent governments, and, as such, not in the jurisdiction of the United States, within the meaning of the constitution and laws of the United States, because the Indian nations have always been regarded as distinct political communities, between which and our government certain international relations were to be maintained. These relations are established by 'treaties to the same extent as with foreign powers. They are treated as sovereign communities, possessing and exercising the right of free deliberation and action, but, in consideration of protection, owing a qualified subjection to the United States.</p> <p>2. When the members of a tribe of Indians scatter themselves among the citizens of the United States, and live among the people of the United States, they are merged in. the mass of our people, owing complete allegiance to the government of the United States, and. equally with the citizens thereof, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts thereof.</p> <p>[Cited in Ex parte Kenyon. Case No. 7,720; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 10S. 120, 5 Sup. Ct. 49. 55.]</p> <p>3. The condition of the offspring of a union between a citizen of the United States and one who is not a citizen, e. g., an Indian living with his people in a tribal relation, is that of the father. The status of the child in such case is that of the father. The rule of tho common law and of the Roman civil law, as well as of the law of nations, prevails in determining the status of the child in such case.</p> <p>[Quoted in United States v. Ward, 42 Fed. 322.]</p>

At the April term of the circuit court of Patrick county, Virginia, Burwell Reynolds and Lee Reynolds, under the age of 21, were arraigned and led to the bar for trial under an indictment charging them with the murder of one Aaron C. Shelton.

<p>Case No. 11,721.</p> <p>Jurisdiction or State Courts ox Habeas Corpus — Prisoner Held bt United States Officers — Res Judicata — Jurisdiction of Courts-Maiitiad- Nature of Habeas Corpus Proceedings— Competency of Prisoner as Witness.</p> <p>[1. State courts have jurisdiction not only to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of detention, where one is claimed to be held under authority of the United States, but that jurisdiction is not ousted upon the making of a return alleging that such is the fact (as where an army officer returns that the prisoner is held as a deserter from the army); and if the return is traversed the court may proceed to inquire into the truth of the facts alleged, and may discharge the prisoner if it appears that he is illegally held. Explaining Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. (62 U. S.) 506.]</p> <p>[2. The decision of a state court, remanding the prisoner, in habeas corpus proceedings, is no bar to the subsequent issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court, nor to a full investigation by the latter court of the cause of detention.]</p> <p>[Cited in Re Farrand, Case No. 4,678.]</p> <p>[3. Upon a writ of habeas corpus from a civil court to an officer of the United States army, where his return shows that the prisoner is held for trial by a court-martial for desertion from the army, the court is not thereby precluded from further investigation, and, if the return is denied, may inquire into the matter of the enlistment of the prisoner; and if it appear that he never, in fact, was enlisted in the army, he will be discharged. Distinguishing Wilbur v. Grace, 12 Johns. 68, and Com. v. Gamble, 11 Serg. & R. 93.]</p> <p>[4. A proceeding by writ of habeas corpus is not a criminal proceeding, but is a “civil action.” within the meaning oi the proviso to the sundry civil appropriation bill of July 2, 1804, ■which declares that no person shall be excluded from testifying in a civil action because he is a party thereto; and hence the prisoner is competent to testify in his own behalf.]</p>

The creditors appearing to oppose the petition of Gideon Reynolds for the benefit of the insolvent law of the state, filed a motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground that the jurisdiction of the court over such cases had ceased to exist after the passage of the bankrupt law of the United States in 1867 [14 Stat. 517], it being apparent upon the record that the petitioner’s debts exceeded three hundred dollars. 1st. The exercise by congress of its constitutional powers…

<p>On the 7th day of October, 1875, H. J. Mc-Gehee and others endorsed for Wm. P. Reynolds a note to the Planters’ Bank of Danville for the sum of six thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars. On the same day McGehee took from Reynolds an assignment of a bond for title to a tract of land in Stokes county, in said district, which assignment was made to indemnify McGehee and the other sureties against loss upon the said note. The tract of land in Stokes county was valued at about eighteen hundred dollars, and there remained unpaid of the purchase money about one hundred dollars. At the same time said Reynolds, in writing, assigned to said McGehee to indemnify him and others, as aforesaid, his right to a title for two tracts of land in the town of Madison valued at five hundred and fifty dollars, for which all the purchase money had been paid. The said assignments were not recorded. Reynolds failed to pay the note to the Bank of Danville, and his sureties are liable for the same. Afterwards on November 25th and 26th. 1875, W. B. Carter, C. A. Reynolds and others obtained judgments against W. P. Reynolds, which were docketed in the counties of Rockingham and Stokes on the days mentioned. On the 27th day of November, 1875, W. P. Reynolds filed his petition in bankruptcy, and was thereafter adjudged a bankrupt. The following question was certified by the register for the opinion of the court: Is McGehee as assignee, as aforesaid, entitled to the proceeds of the real estate, before mentioned, as against the said judgment creditors?</p>

Motion to enforce the provisions of a composition by a bankrupt. The resolution of the creditors provided for the payment by the bankrupt [Alfred P. Reynolds] of his composition settlement in deferred payments, to be evidenced by the promissory notes of the bankrupt payable in six, nine and twelve months.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Reynolds against Badger for injunction to restrain the infringement of letters patent.]</p> <p>Plea, trial at law, and verdict and judgment against the validity of plaintiff’s right, in an action between the same parties.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,729.</p> <p>Ejectment— Occupying Claimant Law — Value OF I.MPHOVEMENTS — TlTLE.</p> <p>An individual acting under an informal power, sells lands in his own name, having no claim to the same. His contract will not enable the purchaser to claim compensation for his improvements under the occupying claimant law. He cannot be said to claim the title, or hold the same, “from and under any person who can show a plain and connected title in law or eu-uity,” etc.</p>

Libel in admiralty. The new ship Joseph, of Maitland, Nova Scotia, H. D. McArthur, master, arrived at Norfolk on the 1st day of November, 1876, for cotton for Liverpool. She came in ballast, having 400 tons of stone in her hold. She came under charter-party to W. D. Reynolds & Bro. Her register shows a tonnage of 1,565 tons; of which l,542areforfreight,and 23 tons reserved for the uses of the steamer.

<p>Case No. 11,731.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Invoice — Valuation in Depreciated CumtENCY — CONSULAR Certificate — Protest.</p> <p>Where two entries on importations from the same Austrian port were made, not much over one mouth apart, and the goods were valued jn the invoices, in both cases, in a depreciated paper currency, and a deduction was claimed in both cases on that account, a proper consular certificate having been presented to the collector in the first case, and rejected on the ground that no allowance for depreciation could be made, and there being a prooer written protest in the second case: Mcltl that, although the importer presented no consular certificate, with his entry in the second ease, he was entitled, in that case, to a deduction of the rate of depreciation stated in the certificate in the first case.</p>

[This was a libel for seamen’s wages by John Reynolds and others, British subjects, against the British bark Simoon, filed with the assent of the British consul.] This was a libel for seamen’s wages.

[This was an action at law by William F. Reynolds against John S. Williams to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally exacted under protest. Heard on demurrer.]

<p>Case No. 11,735.</p> <p>Towage — Unlawful Agueement of Mastek — Liability of Employee.</p> <p>1. The act of a servant must be done in the course of his employment, iu order to make his master liable civilly for the tortious or negligent acts of the servant.</p> <p>2. Where the master of a steam-tug was not using her in the service of her owner, or in the course of his employment, or in the business of her owner, and both such master and the owner of a canal boat which the tug was towing knew that the tug was towing at a place forbidden by the owner of the tug, and the master of the tug was to receive, by agreement with the owner of the canal boat, a special compensation for doing such unlawful act, and the two agreed to withhold knowledge of it from the owner of the tug. it was held that the tug was not liable for damages sustained by the canal boat while being so towed.</p>

This was a libel filed by Daniel NewhaH' against the bark R. G. Winslow for the loss of seven hundred bushels of wheat while being discharged from a warehouse into the vessel. The loading commenced about twelve-o’clock on the morning of the third of October, 1S50, the wheat being weighed by the shipper, in the cupola of the warehouse, in one hundred bushel drafts, which were tallied by the first mate, there present.

This was a suit brought in the supreme court of New York [by John C. Rheimer] to recover back an excess of duties imposed by the defendant [Hugh Maxwell], as collector of the port of New York, upon importations of twisted straw. The defendant had the cause removed into this court by certiorari.

This was an ejectment [by lessee of Daniel Rhoades and Anthony Snyder) to recover two hundred and fifty acres of land in Union county. The lessors of the plaintiffs claim as the representatives of John Snyder.

This was a libel in rem by the Naugatuck Transportation Company, a corporation created under the laws of Connecticut, and own, ers of the steam propeller Naugatuck, against the steamboat Rhode Island, to recover damages for a collision between the Naugatuck and the Rhode Island. The cause was before the court on the merits of the action in July, 1847, and the proceedings then had are reported [Case No. 11,745],3 where the facts of the ease are fully stated.

<p>Case No. 11,741.</p> <p>Colpisiox — Long Island Sound — Steamer and Tow--Light — Lookout—Damages.</p> <p>1.The Rhode Island, a passenger steamer, hound westwaid to New York through Long Island Sound in the night, met a tug, bound to the eastward, towing two barges, one astern of the other, upon hawsers. The ().. which was the stern boat, was distant about a thousand feet from and directly behind the tug. There was a bright light upon the O., and the tug had proper side lights, and a bow and stern light, but as to whether one of these was not so dim as to prevent its being seen at a proper distance, the evidence was conflicting. The night was starlight, and vessels without a light could be seen at a considerable distance. The vessels were approaching each other at an angle, so that the tug showed her green light to the steamer, and that without change of course the first barge was brought directly ahead of the steamer. The speed of the tug was about three miles an hour, and that of the steamer thirteen or fourteen miles. The tug made no change of course or speed. The steamer held her.course at full speed till she was close to the first barge, when, discovering the barge for the first time, the steamer was sheered sharply to port, and her engine was stopped and backed, avoiding that barge, but striking the O., which was about twenty-five fathoms behind. Held. that, if the lights on the tug and on the O. were not seen from the steamer till too near to avoid the collision, the steamer was in fault for not keeping a careful lookout; and that, if those lights were seen as soon as they could be, the steamer was in fault for attempting to cross between them when so close that no change of her course was possible without bringing her in contact with the one on her port bow.</p> <p>2. If the light on the tug was dim, it furnished no excuse to the steamer, under the circumstances.</p> <p>3. The steamer was liable for the damages to the O. and in such damages might be recovered a sum necessary to be expended to repair injuries that were caused by the collision, although the libellant luid sold the O. without repairing such injuries.</p>

3 [New allegations were filed in the circuit court in behalf of the appellants, for the purpose of bringing under consideration material testimony showing bad navigation by the propeller, which was supposed not to, have been allowed weight in the district court, for the reason that the answer was held not to be specific enough to admit of its application. • (See opinion of district court, Case No. 11,745.) The collision in question took place during daylight, about abreast…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] A libel in rem was filed in the district court against the steamboat Rhode Island, to recover for damage done to a propeller by a collision.

<p>Case No. 11,745.</p> <p>Collision — Burden of Proof — Attempt to Pass —Privilege of Leading Vessel — Hell Gate . —Damages—Practice—Decree.</p> <p>1. A decree must be in consonance with the pleadings and proofs in the cause, and evidence outside the allegations made by either party cannot be regarded in support of his charge or de-fence.</p> <p>[Cited in Cobb v. Howard. Case No. 2,925; The Morton, Id. 9,864; The Maryland, 19 Fed. 557.1</p> <p>2. In cases of tort, if the injury complained of is admitted by the answer, the burthen of proof is cast upon the defence to show affirmatively the matters of justification or defence set up.</p> <p>3. When two steamboats are running in the same direction, the leading one is entitled to hold her course, and the one pursuing must at her peril select one safe to herself if she makes an attempt to pass.</p> <p>[Cited in Whitridge v. Dill, 23 How. (64 U. S.l 454: The Charles Morgan, 6 Fed. 914'; The Commodore Jones. 25 Fed. 509; The Jesse Spaulding, 50 Fed. 585.]</p> <p>4. One steamboat cannot approach another, within a distance of twenty yards, in an attempt to run by.</p> <p>[Cited in Vandewater v. Westervelt, Case No. 16,846a.]</p> <p>5. The leading boat must, however, so use her privilege as not intentionally to thwart or prevent the one m the rear from using her superior speed; but is not bound by law to accommodate her by moving to either side to give her more ample room.</p> <p>[Cited in The City of Macon, 47 Fed. 925.]</p> <p>6. This rule equally applies to the narrow and dangerous passage in Hell Gate. The stern boat cannot compel the forward one there to make place for her. but must avoid going into the Gate, or must slack or stop her speed, if she is likely to endanger the one ahead.</p> <p>7. The direct damages occasioned by a collision. and also reasonable demurrage for a period necessary to reinstate the injured vessel, will be charged upon the colliding vessel in fault.</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the circuit court the decree of this court was affirmed. Case No. 11,748. The cause again came before the district court upon exceptions to the commissioner’s report. The exceptions were overruled except as to the award of compensation. Id. 11,-740a. Appeal was then taken to the circuit court, where the decree of the district court was affirmed. Id. 11,744.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Western district of Pennsylvania.] [These were proceedings in the matter of Charles Rhodes and Anthony Smith, bankrupts.]

Assumpsit by the indorsee of the defendant’s promissory note for $132, dated November 19, 1S14, payable, with interest, two years after date, to the order of W. Rhodes, father of the plaintiff [William Rhodes]. The present action was commenced on the 4th of September, 1822. The defendant [George Hadfield] pleaded non assumpsit and the statute of limitations. At the bottom of the note was written the following receipt: “February 12, 1S21, received $5 on the above.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

Debt on bond, payment, non-payment, and issue. The defendant [John Rigg] offered an account in set-off. The plaintiff [William Rhodes] produced the defendant’s receipt, to which George Rhodes was a subscribing witness. The defendant objected to its being admitted in evidence unless proved by the subscribing witness, George Rhodes.

[This was an action at law by Harvey W. Rico against John L. Heald, to recover dam-iiges for tlic infringement of a patent relating to steam boilers for threshing machines.]

<p>Case Wo. 11,753.</p> <p>Factors — Purchase rou Principal — Default-Place of Delivery — Reasonable Time —Quantum Meruit.</p> <p>1. Where a factor agreed with his principal to purchase for him fifty thousand bushels of wheat, in consideration that the latter would immediately forward to him by express ten thousand dollars, and the residue to pay for such purchase in four or five days, and where the principal wholly failed to forward the money, though the factor had immediately purchased twenty thousand bushels of the wheat: Held, that the factor was under no obligation to purchase the residue of the fifty thousand bushels.</p> <p>[Cited in Burke v. Partridge, 58 N. H. ’351.]</p> <p>2. In the absence of any special agreement touching the place of delivery of wheat to be purchased by a commission merchant for his principal, the law will presume the place where the commission merchant does business to be the proper place of delivery.</p> <p>3. What is a reasonable time to send money by express from Muncie. Indiana, to Chicago. Illinois, is a question of fact for a jury. And if a declaration avers that three days are reasonable time, it is not subject to demurrer on that account.</p> <p>4. An averment that the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff reasonable commission as a factor, ought to be followed by an allegation of the reasonable value of such commission.</p> <p>NOTE. For a lucid discussion of what are-conditions dependent and independent, see 2 Pars. Cont. 529, note r.</p> <p>That it is necessary in pleading quantum mer-uit and quantum valebat counts, to aver what services or materials were reasonably worth, see 1 Chit. PI. 34.</p>

<p>[This was a libel for wages by Rice and others against the Polly and Kitty (James-Eggleston, master) .J</p>

<p>Case No. 11,756.</p> <p>Fishing Voyages — Shipping Paper — Different Parol Agreement — Usage.</p> <p>[1. The contract expressed in shipping paper signed at the commencement of a fishing voyage must control, as against any parol agreement or understanding at variance therewith, and which constitutes a departure from the laws of the United States.]</p> <p>[2. The usage prevailing at Marblehead, of giving the master only an equal share with the members of the crew in the part assigned to the crew, must prevail, where the vessel is owned at Marblehead, and the voyage is made from there, although an additional one sixty-fourdi is allowed the master for his privilege by the custom of Cape Cod and the South Shore.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,755.</p> <p>Prize — Right of Vessel in Sight to Participate —Possibility of Joining Battle.</p> <p>If at the time of a prize taken by a vessel of war, another armed vessel be in sight and in a possible condition to join in the battle, she will be allowed a share of the prize in proportion to her men and guns, but not if it be manifestly impossible for hei to take any part in the battle.</p>

This was an action on the case [by Julia Rich, administratrix, against Beroth Close] for the infringement of letters patent [No. 2,70S] granted to Reuben Rich, July 8th, 1842, for an “improvement in water-wheels.” The specification called the improvement the “pressure center-vent water-wheel.” The specification said: “The nature of my invention consists in receiving the water on the wheel at its periphery, from the flume, by a spiral conductor, and discharging it as soon as…

This was an action on the case [by Cran-dale Rich, Almon Buff, and John G. Stephen against Joseph Lippincott and William C. Barr] tried by Mr. Justice Grier and a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 3,117] granted to Daniel Fitzgerald, June 1, 1S43, for an “improvement in fire-proof chests and safes.” The same patent was involved in the case of Adams v. Edwards [Case No. 53], The patent was by mesne assignment vested in the plaintiffs, with…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Appeal in admiralty from a decree of the district court. In September, 1858, the libel-lant [Abraham Rich] let to freight the ship Martha to the respondents [William F. Parrott and others] for a voyage from Boston to Calcutta and back; and the respondents, as charterers, engaged to provide the vessel at Calcutta with a full cargo for Boston.

<p>Case No. 11,769.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Invoice—Depreciated Foreign Currency — Consui.au Certificate — Allowance por Depreciation.</p> <p>1. Under the provisions of section 61 of the act of March 2. 1799 (1 Stat. 673), the president has. through circulars from the treasury department, regulated the manner in which the cost of goods invoiced m a foreign depreciated currency shall be estimated in United States currency, in order to determine the rate of duties thereon.</p> <p>2. Such regulation is in force in respect to de-preciations of the Austrian florin, occurring since the passage of the act of May 22d, 1846 <9 Stat. 14).</p> <p>3. To entitle an importer to an allowance for any depreciation of the Austrian currency, his invoice must be accompanied by a consular certificate of the value of such currency.</p> <p>4. It is not necessary for the collector to demand such certificate from the importer; but the importer must offer to the collector such certificate, or a bond to produce it thereafter, in •order to be entitled to an allowance for such depreciation.</p>

<p>[This was a libel by Abraham Rich against William F. Parrott and others for the breach of a charter-party.]</p>

This was an action on the case [by Julia Rich, administratrix, against Jonathan Rick-etts] for the infringement of letters patent. The defendant pleaded “actio non accrevit infra sex annos.” The plaintiff demurred to this plea, and the defendant joined in demurrer.

<p>This was a suit in rem, to enforce a lien given by a statute of Massachusetts. The claim was for labor performed in the construction of a sea-going ship, of above'six hundred tons burden, built at Quincy.</p>

<p>This was a libel for a collision. It stated that David N. Woolman, the libellant, was the part owner and master of a certain canal-boat, which was injured by a collision with the propeller Richard Doane, through the fault of the propeller. The libel prayed process against the propeller and against John H. Willis, her owner, and asked that the court would decree the payment of damages against Willis and the vessel, and that the vessel might be condemned and sold to pay the same. To this libel, Willis, as claimant and respondent, excepted, on two grounds: (1) Because the libel improperly joined a suit in rem against the vessel, and a suit in person-am against her owner; (2) because it presented, on its face, a nonjoinder of proper parties as libellants.</p>

In admiralty. The libellants shipped, under the usual articles, on the 12th of October, 1863, for a trip from Chicago to Oconto, Oreen Bay, Wisconsin, and back at $2.25 per day. The schooner arrived at Oconto on the 17th of October, in the evening, and anchored at some distance from the shore. The next day was Sunday.

<p>The Richard O’Bryan, a British schooner of about one hundred tons burden, was discovered July 4, 1862, by the United States gunboat Rhode Island, Commander Trench-ard, at St. Louis Pass, near Galveston, Texas, close in shore, landing cargo by boats. When discovered, her crew made sail on her, ran her ashore, and deserted her. She was boarded by boats from the Rhode Island, under charge of Acting Master Pennell, who found her bilged, and a large part of her cargo taken out. The rest of the cargo was taken from her and transferred to the Rhode Island, and the schooner set on fire, as unfit to bring off. The cargo was sent into this district for adjudication. The log-book, certificate of registry, certificate of clearance, bills of lading and invoice, were found on board. No claimant appeared.</p>

The libellant’s case was that his schooner, the Emma Bacon, was on a voyage from Philadelphia to Boston, with a full cargo of coal, and between one and two o’clock at night, on the 3d of June, 1867, had arrived at a point about two miles to the northward and eastward of the Pollock Rip light-ship, when a red light was discovered about one and a half points on the starboard bow; that the master and two mates were on deck, besides one or more men forward on the lookout, the…

In equity. The Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, a consolidated company, the component parts of which were the Virginia Central Railroad Company, the Blue-Ridge Railroad Company, and the Coving-ton and Ohio Railroad Company, became insolvent. There are secured and unsecured creditors of the road.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

Ejectment for land in Bristol, Rhode Island. Plea, the general. issue. At the trial, the plaintiffs [John Richards and others], to support their action, offered a deed from George D’Wolf (who was admitted to be the then owner of the land) to them, dated the 9th of December, 1825, in Boston, in Massachusetts, and acknowledged on the same day before a magistrate there, but the acknowledgment was not under his seal, and recorded on the 10th of December, 1825, in Bristol records.

<p>[In the matter of the petition of Henrietta A. Richardson and Josiah B. Kiehardson, ■bankrupts.]</p>

On the 15th of'December, 1873, four brothers, composing the firm of S. H. Richardson & Co., were adjudged bankrupts. An as-signee was duly appointed, who collected a large amount of money belonging to the firm. All of the members of the copartnership were heads of families, but none of them had any individual estate. S. H. Richardson claimed certain exemptions under the state law, and applied to the court to have the amount allowed to him out of the assets of the firm.

[In the matter of Joseph Richardson and another, bankrupts.] The following statement of facts, and the question arising thereon, was adjourned into this court from the district court of… Held: that an act to take effect from and after its passage, operated by legal relation from the first day of the session, and the court relied upon Panter v. Attorney General, just cited.

In this case Mr. Justice CURTIS having been of counsel with the plaintiff, while at the bar, and the district judge being an inhabitant of the city of Boston, and therefore interested in the result of the ease, it became necessary to enter an order to remove the case to another circuit court, under the act of congress of February 28, 1839, § 8 (5 Star. 322).

<p>Case No. 11,780a.</p> <p>Administrator — Additional Securitt — Assets.</p> <p>1. Where a large sum of money may be appropriated by congress, the administrator should give a bond sufficiently large to cover the amount that is in equity due to the representatives.</p> <p>2. The orphans' court has no jurisdiction over the conflicting powers of attorney. It belongs to another tribunal.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,781.</p> <p>Limitation op Actions — Running ■ of Statute— Removal of Disability — Collector of Customs — Action against.</p> <p>1. The decision of this court in Dorr v. Swartwout [Case No. 4,010], as to the interpretation of the statute of limitations of the state of New York (2 Rev. St. p. 297, § 27), will be adhered to by this court, until it has authentic evidence that the interpretation of that statute' has been definitely settled by the highest court of that state.</p> <p>2. A collector, who had paid' into the treasury monies collected by him officially for duties, was, by virtue of section 2 of the act of March 3, 1839 (5 Stat. 348), exempted from liability to be sued personally for the repayment of such duties. Such exemption continued until the passage of the act of February 26, 1845 (5 Stat. 727).</p> <p>3. Where an action for the repayment of duties exacted by a collector, and paid by him into the treasury, be-ween the time of the passage of the said act of March 3, 1839, and the time of the passage of the said act of February 26, 1845, was commenced within six years after the 26th of February. 1845: Edd. that the claim was not barred by the New York statute of limitations.</p>

<p>[This was a libel by John Richardson against Eldridge, master of the ship Garrick, for seaman’s wages.]</p>

objected to certain depositions taken under a commission returned from North-Oarolina — 1. Because there is no answer given to, or notice taken of, the general interrogatory, viz. “Do you know any thing further, material?” &c. 2. Because an ex parte certificate of facts, having been given by some of the witnesses, they were asked if the certificate contained the truth, instead of being interrogated as to the facts stated in it.

<p>Case No. 11,784.</p> <p>Seamen — Suit for Injury Sustained — Expenses —Provision Made bt Vessel.</p> <p>Where a seaman received an injury on board a vessel, resulting from the freezing of his feet, and amputation of his toes, and when the vessel arrived in Norfolk he was, with the consent of the captain, placed in a hospital, where he received proper support and meuical attendance. but left before lie was entirely cured, and it appeared that when he left the wounds were fast healing, and he was told by the physician attending lum that his foot should be kept still until it was perfectly recovered, and the libel-ant, disregarding the advice of the physician, came to the city of New York, and was obl.ged immediately afterwards to employ a surgeon to dress the wound, and still continued to so do, and he incurred large expenses for board, and he sought tc recover all disbursements and liabilities incurred since he left the hospital, and also the worth of the care and treatment as if provided by himself during the period he was in the hospital, and compensation by way of damages for the loss of time and general debility, superinduced by the injury received, and it apDeared, by the evidence of the physician who attended him, that if the seaman had remained at the hospital the wound would have entirely healed, held, that such suit could not be sustained.</p>

This was an action [by Thomas Richardson and William Watson] against [Cornelius W. Lawrence] the collector of the port of New-York, to recover back an excess of duties upon linen pocket handkerchiefs, hemstitched or hemmed.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Francis B. Richardson against Hamilton D. Lockwood fortheinfringerment of letters patent No. 28,-196, granted to F. B. & B. L. Richardson, May 8, I860.]</p>

In equity. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [by Francis B. Richardson against Hamilton D. Lockwood] upon reissued letters patent [No. 2,005] for “improvement in enema syringes,” granted to complainant June 20, 1865. The original letters patent [No. 31,626] were granted to same March 5, 1861. The claim of the reissue is stated in the opinion of the court.

Rule to show cause why an exoneretur should not be entered on the bail piece, the defendant having given special bail, and having been duly discharged on the 13th of the present month under the insolvent law of this state. The writ in this suit issued in June, returnable to this term.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Ivory W. Richardson against William F. Miller and others for the infringement of a copyright.]</p>

[This was a suit by Richard J. Richardson against Henry C. Mattison. Heard on motion for an injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding in an action at law against complainant.]

[This was a bill in equity by Lorenzo H. Richardson and others against Baxter B. Noyes and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 74,284, granted to Bein & Ulrich, February 11, 1867.]

<p>Case No. 11,793.</p> <p>Shipping — Liability to Seaman for False Arrest — Loss of Clothing.</p> <p>Whore a seaman was arrested and imprisoned by the local authorities of Panama, on a charge of robbery committed in that port, but not on the complaint, or at the instigation, of the master, held, that the ship-owner was not liable, although the accused may have been innocent. Nor is the ship-owner liable for the loss of his clothing and effects left on board the vessel, unless negligence on the part of his servants be shown.</p>

Assumpsit, for money had and received, and for non-delivery of flour on a contract. THE COURT refused to suffer the plaintiff to give parol testimony to prove the contents of a letter, written by the defendant to Craven Thompson, who was no party to this suit. The plaintiff produced a hill of parcels: “Messrs. R. & W. P. Richardson.

• [Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Libel by the owners of the ship against the charterers to recover charter-money. Damages were claimed by the libellants [Henry L. Richardson and others] of the respondents [Nathaniel Winsor] for a breach of the covenants and agreements contained in the charter-party annexed to the libel.

<p>Case Ño. 11,795a.</p> <p>Libel bt Masteb foe Wages — Sale of Vessel— Pkesumftions.</p> <p>[1. Where, after the Bale of a vessel, a libel was filed to recover for services as master and mate during several years preceding the sale, held, that the presumption was that the wages had been paid from the freight money earned on the several voyages in which the services were rendered.]</p> <p>[2. Libelant, as agent of his father, induced the claimants to advance money to build a brig, the same to be repaid from her earnings. Li-belant acted as master of the brig during several voyages, and afterwards as mate. The advances were not repaid, and the vessel became the property of the claimants by bills of sale, first of a part interest, and finally of the remainder. At the time of the sale, the claimants had no knowledge of any claim by libelant for wages, and he gave no notice thereof. Held, that he was estopped, and could not maintain his libel to recover wages.)</p>

in admiralty. The libel in this case alleges that the libellant made a contract of affreightment with the captain of the schooner, by which the latter agreed, in August, 1851, to transport six tierces and one hundred and twelve hogsheads of sugar belonging to the libellant, of the value of eight thousand three hundred and thirty-nine dollars, from Buffalo to Chicago, and to deliver the same in good order to the libellant, dangers of navigation excepted; that the vessel did…

<p>[This was a motion to confirm a composition by Archibald M. Richmond and H. Murray Richmond, bankrupts.]</p>

This was an action of trover [by Franklin Richmond against Simeon Dreyfous].

<p>Case No. 11,800.</p> <p>Pakties in Admiralty — Refusal to Join — Joint Owners.</p> <p>1. Courts of admiralty, within the limits of their jurisdiction, resemble courts of equity in their practice and modes of proceeding, but are even more free from technical rules.</p> <p>[Cited in Paterson v. Dakin, 31 Fed. 685; Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 301, 6 Sup. Ct. 94.]</p> <p>2. If a court of equity would not dismiss a case because some of the joint plaintiffs refused to proceed, a court of admiralty would not dismiss a libel under similar circumstances.</p> <p>3. It seems that at law one of two joint contractors has the right to sue in the name of both, subject to the right of the other to be indemnified for costs, and to give a release of the joint cause of action.</p> <p>4. A similar rule applied in the admiralty, where ten out of thirteen owners, having a majority of the shares in a ship, brought a suit in the name of all the owners.</p> <p>5. Motion by the three unwilling plaintiffs to have their names struck out of the libel denied, with leave to apply to have the suit stayed until they were indemnified for costs.</p> <p>6. It seems that part owners of a ship cannot release a debt due to all the owners, if the debt- or knows that the debt is due to all the owners as such.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,801.</p> <p>Mortgage — Absolute Deed Considered as— Partnership.</p> <p>When an absolute deed may be considered a mortgage, and under what circumstances such deed may become absolute as it appears on its face.</p>

Assumpsit against the defendants [Henry Starks and others] as factors of the plaintiffs, for the sale of certain cotton goods. Plea, the general issue. At the trial the facts were, that the plaintiffs had consigned to the defendants, who were merchants at New Orleans, sundry cotton goods for sale, with orders not to sell the same at a price below eighteen cents per yard.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Iowa.] The following are the facts as they appear from tne evidence in the case: Richter was adjudged a bankrupt on his own petition, filed on the 19th day of October, 1868. Crag'n is the assignee in bankruptcy. The present controversy is between the assignee and Messrs.

<p>[This was an action of ejectment by Wil-liam Rickards and wife against William S. Ladd, in place of J. G. Richardson.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,805.</p> <p>Assumpsit — Waivek — Commissions — Interest — Goods Uni,awfully Taken.</p> <p>Assumpsit was brought for the proceeds of & cargo, which was taken, under legal process by the defendants, (the consignees) in a foreign port, for the debts of the prior owners of the ship. Held, that the plaintiffs, (the consignors), by bringing assumpsit, had waived the tort, so that the customary commissions should be allowed the defendants; but that the defendants were chargeable with interest from the time of the receipt by them of the proceeds of the cargo.</p>

Assumpsit for money had and received. The evidence was a note made by Vincent Gray, March 2d, 179S, to Mandeville & Jamesson, or order; by them indorsed to James McClena-ehan, and by him to the plaintiffs; and the record of a suit by the plaintiffs against Gray, the maker of the note, prosecuted to judgment, execution, and insolvency.

A justice of the peace for Alexandria county issued a fi. fa. on the 30th of September, 1801, in th» case of Riddle v. Kell, for $19.44, and 58 cents costs, which was delivered to Abercrombie, a constable, on the 11th of March, 1S02.

[This was a libel by I. B. Rider and others against the Pacific, for damages for collision.] A collision occurred on the 3d of November, 1S70, between the schooners Pacific and Dreadnought, in the bay, at the foot of Market street, which resulted in an action for damages brought in the United States district court.

Plea in abatement — pendency of a former suit in Fairfax county, Virginia. Demurrer, special; because, 1. A suit in Fairfax is no bar to a suit here. 2. A suit in chancery is no bar to a suit at law. 3. There is no profert of a record of the case in Fairfax.

[This was an action of ejectment by Jacob Ridgeway against John Ogden, Jr.] This case came before the court upon a case agreed, which differs from that of Same Plaintiff v. Underwood, see [Case No. 11,815], only in the following particulars.

[This was an actjon by Coats Ridgeway against Bernard Ghequier.] A deposition of a witness residing in Baltimore taken under a dedimus, by virtue of the laws of Virginia, was offered by the plaintiff. The deposition was taken in chief.

This was an ejectment brought [by Jacob Ridgeway against Jacob G. Underwood] to recover a tract of land called the lower or Griffith farm, containing one hundred and seventy-seven aeres; and the cause came before the court for judgment, upon a case agreed, with liberty to either party to turn it into a special vei diet The facts stated in the case, and which are material to notice, are the following: Joseph Jones being, in February, 1814, seis-ed of a tract of land, lying in…

Debt, on two promissory notes; one for twelve dollars, and the other for twenty dollars. objected that neither of the notes was large enough to support the jurisdiction of the court

On motion to dissolve injunction. The bill in this case is filed by the plaintiff, in its capacity and right as a stockholder in the Lawrence and Carbondale Railroad Company-hereafter called the Carbondale Company.

<p>Ejectment [by Lawrasson Riggs against Patrick Boylan] for land in Cook county.</p>

This was an action brought to recover the balance of a sum of money received by the defendant [James W. Phillips] as the proceeds of a quantity of damaged corn, which had been shipped for the plaintiffs [William Ridyard and others], at New York, consigned to them at Liverpool, by the ship Ohio, belonging to the defendant. The balance was the amount of the freight on the com.

This was an action [by Enoch Riess and others] against [Heman j. RedfieldJ the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties paid under protest.

Ejectment for section 26, T. 34 N., range 7 east, in the county of Grundy, state of Illinois. The suit was commenced March 13, 1867. By agreement of parties a jury was waived, and the law and facts were submitted to the court. The adverse title asserted by the defendants has no force or credit because it is hostile to the decree of foreclosure, to which Jo-siali S. Breese, through whom they claim, was a party, and by which he and they are bound.

This suit was instituted by the plaintiffs [Samuel Riggs and George Peabody], on the 7th of April, 1840, against [William Prick] the collector of the port of Baltimore, to recover back certain duties upon an importa - tion of hearth-rugs, paid by them in cash, under protest.

In admiralty. This is a suit to recover possession, and determine the title of the vessel. Libelant’s title is under a sale, by virtue of the decree of the United States district court, in admiralty. Respondent’s title is under a bill of sale, from the sheriff of Wayne county, by virtue of proceedings under the boat and vessel law. The vessel was originally seized September 8, 1S55, in this court, under a libel filed by Joseph Riggs, a citizen of Michigan.

Assumpsit upon F. L. Hamilton’s note indorsed by the defendant, 28th of May, 1808, at sixty days; protested 2d of August. The demand ought to have been on the 30th or 31st of July. in which the defendant requested the plaintiff to pursue Hamilton and expressed uneasiness, is evidence of a due remand and notice, or of waiver of notice. Mr. Caldwell. If the .conversation was under ignorance of the fact that due notice was not given, it is immaterial.

<p>[In the matter of George Biker, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,834.</p> <p>Army — Enlistment — Oath op Recruit — Eighteen Years op Age —Power op Court — Dun op Secretar? op War.</p> <p>1. The oath taken by a recruit, on his enlistment into the army of the United States, as to his age, is conclusive as against himself and every one else.</p> <p>TCited in Seavey v. Seymour, Case No. 12,-590.]</p> <p>2. Enlistments of minors over eighteen years of age, into the army of the United States, without the consent of their parents, masters or guardians, are valid, but it is not lawful to muster into the service a person under eighteen years of age.</p> <p>[Cited in Seavey v. Seymour, Case No. 12.-590; Re Davison, 4 Fed. 509; Id., 21 Fed. 622.]</p> <p>3. The whole power of discharging minors from the army, is given to the secretary of war, and cognizance of such matters is taken from the courts.</p> <p>TCited in Re Neill, Case No. 10.089.1</p>

<p>Case No. 11,835.</p> <p>Notes — Assignment—Consideration—Fraud —Notice.</p> <p>1. A precedent debt constitutes a good consideration on the assignment of a note.</p> <p>2. And although there may have been fraud or deception in obtaining the note, yet if the holder had no notice of it, the equities between the original parties are not open.</p> <p>3. A note received in payment of a debt is a transaction in the ordinary course of business.</p> <p>4. Circumstances may show that a note was given and received in payment of an account.</p> <p>[Cited in Leland v. The Medora, Casé No. 8.-237.]</p> <p>[Cited in Bantz v. Basnett, 12 W. Va. 814; Merrick v. Boury, 4 Ohio St. 65.]</p> <p>NOTE. The very point ruled in this case has •since been decided in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. [41 U. S.] 1. The supreme court of Ohio have «ince overruled their first decision.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,837.</p> <p>Patents for Inventions — Novelty — Evidence —Woolen Lamp Wicks.</p> <p>[In an action for infringement of letters patent issued December 13, 1864, to Thomas Bing-ham, for woolen lamp wicks, on an application filed July 14. 1862. the testimony of one witness that he formed a lamp wick from woolen cloth and peddled flat woolen wicks in January, 1862, is sufficient to overcome the prima facie evidence furnished by the letters patent that plaintiff was the original inventor.]</p>

<p>[This was a libel by Theodore W. Riley against the ship Obeli Mitchell, Thomas W. Napier, claimant, upon a bottomry bond.]</p>

This ease arose on the will of Henry Harrison, which is set out in Reading v. Blackwell [Case No. 11,612). The following case is agreed on by the parties. John Harrison, late of the county of Somerset, and state of New Jersey, made his last will and testament, bearing date the 17th day of June, 1815, and died on the 22d day of June, 1816, without revoking or altering the same, prout the said will, which is made a part of the statement of the case.

This was a libel in personam, by Washington Ringgold, against Ebenezer B. Crocker and others, owners of a ship, to recover seamen’s wages. The libellant shipped for a voyage from New York to the East Indies, and back to New York, on board the ship, at $17 per month wages. The voyage covered a period of fourteen months. This action ■was brought to recover the wages earned on the voyage, including the expenses of his cure on shore.

<p>Case No. 11,851.</p> <p>Life Insurance — Suicide—Questions for Jury.</p> <p>NOTE. The authority referred to by his hon- or, Judge Morrill, is embraced in the following extract from the opinion of the supreme court of the United States in the case of Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 439, decided in 1875: “Questions of law are to be determined by the court: question of fact, by the jury. No question of fact must be withdrawn from the determination of those whose function it is to decide such issues. The line which separates the two provinces must not be overlooked by the court. Care must be taken that the jury are not misled into the belief that they are alike bound by the views expressed upon the evidence and the instruction given as to the law. They must distinctly understand that what is said as to the facts is only advisory, and in no wise intended to fetter the exercise finally of their own independent judgment. Within these limitations is the right and duty of the court to aid them by recalling the testimony ⅛> their recollection, by collating its details, by suggesting grounds of preference where there is contradiction, by directing their attention to the most important facts, by elucidating the true points of inquiry, by resolving the evidence, however complicated, into its simplest elements, and by showing the bearing of itB several parts, and their combined effect, stripped of every consideration which might otherwise mislead or confuse them. How this duty shall be performed depends in every case upon the discretion of the judge. There is more importance resting upon those who preside at jury trials. Constituted as juries are, it is frequently impossible for them to discharge their function wisely and well without this aid. In such cases, chance, mistake, or caprice may determine the result.”</p>

<p>Case No. 11,850.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages — Unusual Clause in Articles —Releases in Pull.</p> <p>1. The crew of the Ringleader shipped at San Eraneisco for a voyage to Hong Kong and other ports, and back to a port of discharge in the United States, under articles, in the heading of which was written a clause reducing their wages after leaving Hong Kong. On the arrival of the ship at the port of discharge, the men were offered pay at the reduced rate. They protested against the reduction, claiming ignorance of the clause inserted, but finally took the reduced pay and gave releases in full. They now brought suit for the balance due, reckoned at full pay for the whole voyage: Held, that as the clause reducing the sailors’ wages was unusual. and inserted in an unusual place in the articles, the ship owner must give clear proof that the sailors were clearly informed of and agreed to it.</p> <p>2. Whether such a clause, so written, is valid, quiere.</p> <p>3. On the evidence the agreement with the men was for $25 a month for the voyage.</p> <p>4. All agreements and arrangements with sailors are subject to examination in a court of admiralty, and if unjust will be set aside and disregarded.</p> <p>5. The libellants were entitled to recover the balance due them, notwithstanding their having signed releases in full.</p>

In equity. This was a bill for foreclosure of a mortgage brought by the complainant against Charles L. Harris and wife, John Reynolds, the First National Bank of Madison, Napoleon B. Van Slyke, Andrew Sexton, and other lien creditors. Harris and Reynolds were partners in business at Jack-sonport, in Door county, Wisconsin.

<p>Case No. 11,854.</p> <p>Accident Insurance — Construction of Contract — Vvhat is an Accident.</p> <p>[1. While contracts of insurance are subject to the rule that a contract is to be construed most strongly against the promisor, yet, in the absence of anything to show that the terms thereof are intended to be understood in a special sense, the court will go no further than to hold the promisor liable to the extent indicated by the words used, when viewed in their ordinary and commonly received meaning.]</p> <p>[2. Insurance against accident “while traveling by public or private conveyance” does not cover an accident occurring to the assured while journeying on foot ■ along a public road.]</p> <p>[3. “Accident,” as used in an insurance policy, includes any event which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected by the event, and hence includes an assault made upon the assured by persons who have waylaid him for purposes of robbery or otherwise.]</p> <p>[Affirmed by the supreme court, 16 Wall. (S3 Ü. S.) 336.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,856.</p> <p>Payment — Taking Note — Intention — Maritime Lien — Pilot’s Wages.</p> <p>1. In general, unless otherwise specially agreed, the taking of a promissory note for a preexisting debt is treated prima facie as a conditional payment only, and is a payment if the note is paid.</p> <p>2. A negotiable promissory note will operate as an extinguishment of a prior existing debt if it is so intended by the parties.</p> <p>3. Where a pilot held an account for wages against a steamboat, and took the note of the owner of the boat for the amount, signed by another person as security, due in 30 days, with interest at a rate higher than the account bore, and receipted the account as paid in full by the note; held, that these facts, with other circumstances, showed a purpose on the part of the payee to take the note in extinguishment of his debt, and that his lien upon the steamboat was lost.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,857.</p> <p>Prize — Former Release — Approaching Blockaded Coast.</p> <p>1. This vessel was seized as prize and taken to Key West, and released by the prize court there on bonds, and permitted to proceed on her voyage. She was afterwards arrested again as prize, for an alleged attempt to violate the blockade after leaving Key West. livid, that her release at Key West did not absolve her from her obligation not to violate the blockade aft-erwards.</p> <p>2. Approaching a blockaded coast from necessity. Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p> <p>3. Leave given to the claimants to move within four days for a rehearing on further proofs.</p>

This was a case of salvage. The schooner Albion, belonging to the libellant, on her return from a fishing voyage on the Grand Banks, on the 13th of September, 1836, fell in with the Rising Sun [Sponagle, master] about twenty miles south of Cape Sables, deserted by her crew, lying on her beam ends, and filled with water. The master and crew of the Albion took possession of her, and cut away her masts, when she righted.

<p>Case No. 11,859.</p> <p>Evidence — Proof of Handwriting — Variance in Signature — Weight of Evidence.</p> <p>1. A variance in a signature is not necessarily proof of its being a forgery. Dissimilitude may be occasioned by a variety of circumstances, by the state of health and spirits of the writer, by the materials, by his position, or by his hurry or care.</p> <p>2. If a witness swears that he was present and saw a party sign a disputed instrument of writing, his evidence ought to outweigh the statement of another (both witnesses being equally credible) who testifies that he is acquainted with the handwriting of the alleged signer and that he does not believe the signature to be genuine.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Arkansas.] The complainant’s bill was dismissed, and the assignee appeals.

<p>Case No. 11,861.</p> <p>Bankrcptcy — Fraudulent Preference — Knowledge — Insolvency—Presumptions.</p> <p>1. Where the bankrupts had knowledge of facts sufficient to bring home to the minds of reasonable men knowledge of their insolvency, they must be held to have had that knowledge, and a mortgage to a creditor with knowledge of these facts of their stock of goods is in fraud of the bankrimt act. and the assignee in bankruptcy can maintain an action of trover to recover the value of the property.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Cook v, Whipple. 55 N. Y. 156: Work v. Jacobs (Neb.) 53 N. W. 995.]</p> <p>2. The word “insolvency.” as used in the.existing bankrunt act |of 1S67 (14 Stat. 517)], must be construed to mean, not an absolute inability to pay debts at some future time, upon the settlement and winding up of the party's affairs, but a present inability to pay, as debts mature in the ordinary course of business, al-ihough this inability be not so great as to compel an absolute suspension. Arguendo, per Caldwell, J.</p> <p>3. A debtor does not cease to be insolvent because, being unable to pay his debts as they mature, his creditors have agreed to extend the time of payment (see Kinsing’s Assignee v. Bartholew [Case No. 7.831]); and the payment of a pre-existing debt by an insolvent is on his part illegal under the bankrupt act, though made in the expectation by him that he will eventually be able to pay all. Arguendo, per Caldwell, J.</p> <p>4. The conveyance of the whole of the property of a party to one creditor to secure a pre-ex-isting debt is fraudulent and void, and the party must be presumed to have known the natural consequences of his own act; and the intent to prefer may be inferred from the fact of preference.</p> <p>[Cited in Martin v. Toof, Case No. 9.167; Re Heller, Id. 6.337.]</p> <p>[See In re Batehelder, Case No. 1,098.]</p> <p>5. A conveyance not made in the usual and ordinary course of business of a debtor is prima facie fraudulent and void. The phrase “usual and ordinary course of business,” construed.</p> <p>[See Babbitt v. Walbrun, Case No. 694.]</p> <p>6. The doctrine of pressure bv a creditor to force the giving of security for the payment of a debt is not applicable under the present bankrupt act, and it is no answer when a debtor mortgages his property to secure such a debt to say that he was “pressed to do it.”</p> <p>7. When a party knows at the time of purchasing goods that the bankrupts had failed in business, and that his vendors held the goods under mortgage from the bankrupts, these facts are sufficient to put him on his guard, and he is bound to inquire into the transactions between the bankrupts and his own vendors.</p> <p>8. To constitute a bona fide purchaser for value, he must not only show that he had no notice, but he must have paid a consideration at the time of the transfer, either in money or in other property, or by a surrender of existiría debts or securities.</p> <p>[Cited in People’s Sav. Bank v. Bates, 12(1 ü. S. 507, 7 Sup. Ct. 6S3.]</p> <p>NOTE. ¡since tms opinion was delivered, this question of the effect of pressure on the part of creditors has been passed upon bv other judges, and the ruling has been uniform‘that it constitutes no defence. Foster v. Hackley [Case No. 4,971]; Wilson v. Brinkman [Id. 17,794]; Graham v. Stark [Id. 5,670]; Biddings v. Dodd [Id. 5,405]. As to fraudulent preferences, see Andrews v. Graves [Id. 376]: Giddings v. Dodd [supra]; Linkman v. Wilcox [Case No. 8,374]; Darby's Trustees v. Boatman’s Sav. Inst. [Id. 3,571]; Vanderhoof v. City Bank of St. Paul [Id. 16,842]; Martin v. Toof [Id. 9,167].</p>

The defendants [Simon and Moses Content,] merchants, residing in Philadelphia, purchased of the plaintiff TGeorge Riston], a merchant, residing in ■ Baltimore, in the year 1817, a parcel of goods, for the price of which this suit is brought, and the declaration is for goods sold and delivered. At the same time, or soon after, the defendants gave their two notes of hand for the debt so contracted, dated in Philadelphia.

The title of the plaintiff was under a proclamation warrant, issued by Lord Dunmore, governor of Virginia, to B. Lucas, in 1774; by him assigned to the lessor of the plaintiff, who had the same regularly surveyed in 1775, and a patent granted to him by the governor of Virginia, 20th July, 1780.

<p>Case No. 11,866.</p> <p>Patents — Tkrritohiai, Grant — Limitations— Subsequent Grant.</p> <p>Where W. granted to V. an exclusive right to construct and use and vend to others to construct and use ten planing, tongueing and grooving machines under the Woodworth patent within a particular territory, and the grant declared that V. was to enjoy an exclusive use of the patent within the territory, limited to said ten machines: Held, that the entire interest in the patent for that territory was thereby vested in V„ and that a subsequent grant by W. to R. of the exclusive right under the patent, for the same territory, to make, use and vend moulding planing machines, was void.</p> <p>[Por other cases involving this patent, see note to Bicknell v. Todd. Caso No. l.SSS.j</p>

This was a libel for collision. By consent, Captains Caleb Curtis and Samuel Quincy, were called as experts, somewhat analogous to the trinity masters in the admiralty in England, to whom questions were put, and answers were returned, as follows; On the 27th of November. 1845, the brig Rival, of 214 tons, with a cargo of molasses, arrived in the port of Boston, and was anchored by the pilot nearly off the end of Long wharf, about one hundred and twenty-five fathoms…

This is a bill brought by [Charles N. Rix] the assignee in bankruptcy of James R. Stil-well to set aside a mortgage made by the bankrupt and his wife to the defendant within four months of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. The averments of the bill make a case of fraudulent preference within the 35th section of the bankrupt act. After the bankruptcy the defendant commenced suit in the state district court for Shawnee county to foreclose its mortgage.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.) This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, by Russell Sturgis, owner of the steam-tug Hector, against the steam-tug R. L. Maybey, to recover damages growing out of a collision between the two vessels, which occurred outside of Sandy Hook, on the morning of the 11th of August, 1854.

This was an appeal by the claimant from a decree of the district court confirming the report of a commissioner as to the damages in a ease of collision.

Bill in equity to stay execution on a judgment ai iaw, obtained, it was said, by surprise, in a case where the judgment rendered without the actual knowledge of the defendant, or his counsel, in a case in which the defendant had taken a bill of exceptions, and intended to prosecute a writ of error to the supreme court of the United States; and to obtain a supersedeas, after the expiration of the ten days allowed by -law.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] In this case there was an appeal from a decree of the district court, in admiralty, on a libel for salvage filed by John Livingston and others against the brig Roarer. The decree of the district court was in favor of the libellants. [Case unreported.] Of the respondents in the district court only one appealed.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>In this case, which was a libel in rem, after this court had, on the appeal of the claimants, afftrmed the decree of the district court in favor of the libellant, the claimants took an appeal to the supreme court, but omitted to serve a copy of their petition of appeal, and of its allowance, by lodging a copy thereof in the office of the clerk of this court, for the li-bellant, within ten days, Sundays exclusive, after the decree of this court was made, as is required by the second section of the act of March 3, 1803 (2 Stat. 244). adopting, in relation to appeals, the provisions of the twenty-third section of the act of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. 85), in regard to writs of error, to make an appeal operate as a stay of execution. After the ten days had expired, the claimants obtained from Judge Ingersoll, on notice to the libellant, an order allowing them to lodge a copy of their petition of appeal, and of its allowance, in the clerk’s office, for the libellant, nunc pro tunc, as if done within the ten days. The libellant now moved to set aside the order.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,877.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Federal Jurisdiction—Illegal Tax—Remedy—Constitutional Law.</p> <p>1. A court of the United States has no jurisdiction in case of a bill by a citizen of the state in which the bill is filed, to restrain a collector of internal revenue from the collection of an alleged illegal income tax.</p> <p>2. The only remedy given by law is by appeal to the district assessor; and failing thus to obtain redress, by appeal to the commissioner of internal revenue.</p> <p>. 3. The provision of the constitution of the United States, declaring that the judicial power should extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States, is not a seli'-execut-ing power, and does not vest the courts with jurisdiction without the action of congress for that purpose.</p>

<p>[This was a claim for attorney's lees.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,880.</p> <p>Practice in Equity — Evidence — Documents — Pleading — Answer—Production of Books.</p> <p>1. A plaintiff in a suit in equity, is entitled, on a motion for that purpose, to have produced for inspection and to be used in aid of his suit, documents in possession of the defendant or his agents, which are referred to in the answer, without being set forth at large, and are material to the support of the plaintiff’s rights.</p> <p>2. But he is not entitled, by motion, to call for the production by the defendant, of papers to which no allusion is made in the answer.</p> <p>3. If his bill alleges the existence of such papers, and their possession by the defendant, and the answer fails to reply to the allegation, be should except to the answer.</p> <p>4. Where the answer sets forth extracts from the defendant’s books, which are sworn to embrace every thing in the books that relates to the subject matter of the suit, the plaintiff cannot, upon motion, and on a suggestion that the extracts given are. if not garbled, at least liable to suspicion, entitle himself to a general inspection of the books of the defendant relating to other matters.</p> <p>5. He is entitled to the production, for inspection, of the books which contain the extracts given, but the defendant is at liberty to seal up the other parts of the books, and the inspection must take place under the supervision of an officer of the court.</p> <p>6. But he is not entitled to the production of a book, where his bill does not in any way call for its production or discovery, or show its materiality to the matters in controversy.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,881.</p> <p>Insurance — Fire—Goons Help ox Commission-Double Insurance — Contribution.</p> <p>1. R. took out a policy of insurance on merchandise. his own, or held by him in trust or on commission: Held, that the insurance was on the merchandise and not on the interest of R. in it, and that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the intent of the parties to the policy was to insure only the goods of R., or his interest in the goods.</p> <p>2. The owner of the property so held on commission by R., and so insured, insured it himself, also: Held, that the insurance on such property was double, and that the policy of R. on such property was contributory with the policy of the owner on the same property.</p> <p>[NOTE. A motion was made for a certificate of division of opinion, which was denied upon the ground that it would be unavailing as a basis for re-examination by the supreme court. Case No. 11.882. For an action by plaintiffs against the People’s Insurance .Company on a similar state of facts as in this case, see Id. 11,885.]</p>

[This was a motion for a new trial in an action by Henry A. Robbins and Daniel F. Appleton against the Firemen’s Fund Insurance Company of San Francisco. See Case No. 11,881. It is now heard upon motion for certificate of division of opinion.]

This action was commenced in the supreme court of the state of Newr York, on a motion made for an injunction restraining the defendant, who is collector of internal revenue for the First district, from collecting the tax on the income of the plaintiff, and an order was made by Judge Gilbert for the defendant to show cause why the injunction should not be made permanent. The case was afterward removed by writ of certio-rari into the United States court.

The libel propounded that the schooner Z. L. Adams, commanded by the libellant [W. E. Robbins], took on board a cargo of three hundred and fifty-three tons of coal at Philadelphia, 29th November, 1S71, for which a bill of lading was given, reciting that the vessel was bound to “the Lowell R. R. wharf, Boston, Mass.,” and the delivery was to be at the aforesaid port of Boston, to tne respondent [J. E. McDonald] or his assigns.

<p>Case No. 11,885.</p> <p>Insurance — Fire —Policies—Apportionment— RUItE.</p> <p>When a policy of fire insurance contains a clause that in case of any other insurance the assured should be entitled to receive of the company no greater proportion of the loss sustained than the loss bore to the whole amount insured, the adjustment is made by the following proportion: As the total insurance of a person insured is to his total loss, so is the company’s policy to that part of the loss for which it is liable to that person.</p> <p>[Por a similar case by the plaintiffs against the Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company of San Francisco, based upon the same state of facts, see Case No. 11,881.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,887.</p> <p>Bill of Latiixg — Right of Coxsioxee to Desig-xate Place of Discharge — Selection.</p> <p>A consignee who has a right to designate where to discharge the cargo must select a suitable and safe place for its discharge.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,888.</p> <p>Winns — Sai.e or Lands — Executohs—Commis-sions.</p> <p>1. The testator having bequeathed a certain annual allowance to his three younger children, to be paid out of the rents of his real estate, and having by his will disposed of all his property ■except the reversion of certain land, directs his executors, in ease the rents should not be sufficient to pay the allowance, to adopt some mode for raising the deficiency out of the other parts ■of the estate not devised to his wife. hrld. that the executors had. thereby, power to sell the reversion of the lands.</p> <p>2. The widow is to boar her proportion of the ■executors’ commissions.</p>

This was an appeal from a decree of the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New-York. The ship Robert Fulton was attached in the court below, on a libel, filed by Francis H. Nicoll and Henry W. Nicoll, the respondents, on the 11th day of May, 1826, praying for the condemnation and sale of the vessel, to satisfy their demand for materials furnished by them to the amount of 5,981 dollars 42 cents, in the necessary repairs of the vessel.

<p>Case No. 11,889.</p> <p>Prize — Violation of Blockade — False Papers.</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p> <p>2. False and simulated papers as to the destination of the vessel.</p>

<p>This was a libel in rem to enforce a lien -against the schooner Robert J. Mercer, promoted by Ittal Perry, one of the pilots of Salem Harbor. The libel alleged that the vessel was' of more than 200 tons burden, hound from another state, that the libellant hailed the vessel, outside the pilot’s line, and offered to pilot her in, and that his offer was refused. He claimed compensation, under Rev. St. Mass. e. 32, § 12: “Any master of a vessel . . . who may choose to pilot his •own vessel into or out of any port, shall be permitted so to do; but he shall, notwithstanding, be liable to pay to such pilot of the port as shall first come on board of his vessel, the full pilotage, according to the fees ■specified in his warrant.” The owners of the vessel appeared, as claimants, and resisted the action, on the ground that if all the facts alleged by the libel were proved, (some of which were denied,) they gave the libellant no lien upon the vessel, but only a personal claim upon the master, or at most, upon the master and owners.</p>

This large and valuable ship was built in New York, but owned in Glasgow.

[This was a libel for salvage by Pourtland Williams and others against the cargo and materials of the bark Robert Morris.]

<p>Case No. 11,894.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages — Contract — Volunteered Services.</p> <p>A., a shipmaster, discovered a deposit of guano on an unclaimed island, and agreed with B. that the latter should charter a vessel, and assume the risk and expense of a voyage to test the value of the discovery; and that A. should command the vessel and conduct the adventure, and the two should share the profits in a certain proportion. B. chartered a schooner, and agreed to furnish a master, and the'owners supplied the mate and three seamen. Several other persons were sent out in the vessel by B., and those of them who were seamen signed the articles, but only at nominal wages. C., the son of A., went out in the vessel, and upon her return, after the entire failure of the adventure, libelled the vessel for wages as an able seaman. It was proved that C. was represented by his father, upon the inquiry of the charterer, before the vessel sailed, to be a passenger; that he acted as such during the passage out; and that on the return trip he did all the duty of an able seaman. His name was signed to the ship’s copy of the articles, as an able seaman; but when and by whom the name was written, excepting that it was after the copy had been put on board the vessel, did not appear. It was shown that C. knew of the contract between A. and B., and of the charter-party. Eeld, that C. could not recover wages, because he had not proved the contract as alleged, and because his services must be taken to have been volunteered, with knowledge that the vessel Was fully manned; and under such circumstances, would not be presumed to be worth more than the cost of his maintenance.</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois.] In bankruptcy. cited Ilale’s Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 488; Herm. Ex’ns. 299; Baker v. Davis, 22 N. H. 27; Owens v. Ran-stead, 22 Ill. 101; Metzler v. Kilgore. 8 Pen. & AW 247; Johnson v. Smith, 2 Burrows, 900; Michaels v. Shaw, 12 AATend. 5S7; Bump, Bankr. (9th Ed.) 378; AA’ells v. Brackett, 30 Me. 01; Garlick v. Sangster, 9 Bing. 40, and others.

[Final hearing on pleading» and proofs. Suit brought [by George C. Roberts against Joseph Buck, Jr.] on letters patent [No. 13,-802] for “improvement in refrigerators,” granted D. W. O. Sanford, November 13, 1855; reissued April 21, 1857 [No. 455]. extended for seven years, and assigned to complainant. This is the same patent involved in the suit of Roberts v. Ryer [Case No. 11,913], and a full description of the patent will he found in the statement of that case.

<p>Case No. 11,898.</p> <p>Seamen — Suit for Assault and False Imprisonment — Previous Misconduct — Discharge.</p> <p>The voyage being ended, the captain might have discharged the offending seaman, the actor. But, having again taken him on board, was not justified in assaulting and imprisoning him, without any new crime.</p> <p>[Cited in Fuller v. Colby, Case No. 5,149; New Jersey Steam-Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. (47 ü. S.) 430, 432.)</p>

This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain the defendant [James Dickey] from infringing letters patent [No. 59,936] for “improvement in method of increasing capacity of oil wells,” granted to Edward A. L. Roberts, November 20, 1S66, for seventeen years from May 20, 1S66 [reissued January 26, 1875, No. 6,258].

<p>Case No. 11,901.</p> <p>Seamen — Mutiny—Deadly Weapon — Action for Injury- by Mutineer.</p> <p>The master of a vessel may use a deadly weapon, when necessary in order to suppress a mutiny. A mutineer, although severely injured thereby, can maintain no action for damages.</p> <p>See U. S. v. Lunt [Case No. 15,643]; U. S. v. Colby [Id. 14,830]; and U. S. v. Borden [Id. 14,625].</p>

This was a motion for a new trial; and 2 W. Bl. 955, $nd 5 Burrows, 2633, were cited. to show cases in which they had been granted, and supposed to apply to this case. To prove that the bill of exchange, remitted by defendant to plaintiff, ought, if by plaintiff’s neglect it was made his own, to amount t.o a payment, 2 Wils. 353, was cited.

Bill in equity [by George C. Roberts against Sylvester Harnden] for tbe alleged' infringement of a patent for an improvement in refrigerators, of which the complainant was the assignee. The original patent was granted to one D. W. C. Sanford of Cincinnati, November 13,1855 [No. 13,802], and was reissued April 21, 1857 [No.. 455].

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of Georgia. [This was a libel by Joseph A. Roberts and Joseph Bramell against the steamship Huntsville for advances made for necessaries supplied, and for their indemnification as sureties.] cited 2 Pars. Shipp. & ' Adm. 233, 234; Carroll v. The Leathers I Case | No. 2,455]; The Union [Id. 14,340]; The White : Squall [Id. 17,570]; The Larch [Id. 8,085.1. j

This was an action of ejectment for an undivided portion of a large tract of land in Atlantic county, New Jersey, kuo-gm as the “Weymouth Furnace Tract,” tried before bis honor, Mr. Justice Grier, at Trenton, at September term. 1SC0. Both parties claimed under Joseph Ball, who died in 1S21 intestate, without issue, or brother or sister of the whole or half-blood, or representative of such brother or sister, or father or mother, capable of inheriting.

<p>Case No. 11.906.</p> <p>Copyright — Effect of Record — Literary Property — Printing—Drama—Assignment— Publication.</p> <p>1. The record of a copyright made in the form prescribed by the statute of 1831 [4 Stat. 436] is at least prima facie evidence that a printed title of the book was duly deposited in the clerk’s office.</p> <p>[Cited in Boucicault v. Fox, Case No. 1.691.]</p> <p>2. Where a copyright of a book has been taken out, a copy must be deposited in the clerk's office within three months after the publication: but public representation of a drama is not a publication so as to require a copy to be so deposited.</p> <p>[Cited in Boucicault v. Hart. Case No. 1.692.]</p> <p>[See Boucicault v. Wood, Case No. 1,693.]</p> <p>3. A literary composition may be a book entitled to copyright without being printed.</p> <p>4. Where a person employed as an actor and stage manager by the proprietor of a theater agreed with him to write a drama, which should be performed in his theater as long as it should draw good audiences, held, that a copyright of the drama, when written, was properly taken oul by the author, and that the proprietor had no other right than that of having the drama acted in his theater.</p> <p>[Cited in Boucicault v. Fox. Case No. 1.691.]</p> <p>0. An assignee of the exclusive right of acting and representing a drama for one year throughout the United States, excepting five specified cities, may maintain an injunction suit in his own name against a mere wrong-doer.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,907.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — Jurisdictional Amount— Summons — Subsequent Reduction — Assignment.</p> <p>1.This suit was commenced in a state court, August 1st, 1870. by the service of a summons for a money demand, on contract, demanding $330.25, and interest from July 1st, 1858. and costs of suit, and was removed into this court by the defendant, under the 12th section of the act of September 24th. 1789 (1 Stat. 79), the petition for removal stating that the matter in dispute in the suit exceeded the sum of §500, exclusive of costs. The plaintiff moved this court to remand the cause to the state court, on the ground that, by the summons, the amount in dispute could not be properly said to be over $500: Eeld, that the case was a proper one for removal, and that the motion must be denied.</p> <p>2. The right of removal depends upon the facts as they exist when the suit is commenced.</p> <p>[Cited in Garrick v. Landman, 20 Fed. 210.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Iveiser v. Cox, 116 Ill. 26, 4 N. E. 384.]</p> <p>3. The jurisdiction of this court having once attached, no subsequent event can divest it. It cannot be divested by a reduction, by the declaration filed in this court, of the amount of the claim.</p> <p>4. Where, by the declaration filed in this court, it appeared that a part of the demand was a claim for merchandise sold to the defendant by one P., who afterwards assigned such claim to the plaintiff, and neither P. nor the defendant was a citizen of the state where the suit was brought, and the plaintiff moved to remand the cause to the state court, on the ground that the suit, so far as such claim was concerned, was a suit to recover the contents of a chose in action, and could not, under the 11th section of the said act, have been brought by P., if he had not assigned such claim: Held, that this court had a right to proceed in the suit in respect to the rest of the demand, even though it was not over $500 in amount, exclusive of costs, and that the motion must be denied, both in respect to the entire suit, and in respect to such claim.</p>

[This was a libel for salvage by Joseph W. Roberts and others against the American ship Ocean Star and cargo. A decree was rendered for libelants. (Unreported.) The hearing is now upon the apportionment of salvage and expenses between ship and ear-go.]

<p>[This was an action in ejectment by True-man Roberts against Jerome B. Pillow, for 160 acres of land.]</p>

This was a bill in equity, filed [by Edward A. L. Roberts against the Reed Torpedo Company] to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent for “improvement in explosive torpedoes in artesian wells,” granted to complainant April 25, 1865 [No. 47,458]. The invention consisted .in the provision of certain devices to secure the prompt ignition of the powder in a torpedo, designed to be exploded in an artesian well, and also to protect it from water.

Suit brought [by Edward A. L. Roberts against F. A. Roter] on letters patent [No. 59,936] for “improvement in method of increasing capacity of oil-wells,-’ granted to complainant November 20. 1866. for seventeen years from May 20, 1866 [reissued January 26, 1875; No. 6,258]. The nature of the invention is fully set forth in the report of the case of Roberts v. Dickey [Case No. 11,899], where the specification is given in full.

<p>Case No. 11,913.</p> <p>Patents — Novelty—Reissue—Combination—Re-ERIGEHATOHS.</p> <p>1. The reissued letters patent granted, April 21st, 1857, to D. IV. C. Sanford, for an “improvement m refrigerators,” and extended. October 20th, 18G9. for seven years from the 13th of November, 1869, the original patent having-been granted to Sanford, as inventor. November 13th, 1855, are void, for want of novelty.</p> <p>2. The first claim of such reissue is a claim to a combination of three elements: (1) An open-bottomed ice-box. constructed in such manner that, by the perforation of holes in the-sides and bottom of the box, the air will pass freely down through, and in contact with, the ice in the box, so that it can fall directly from the ice upon articles to be refrigerated; (2) a dividing partition, open above and below, so. placed in relation to such ice-box that, by means of self-operating internal circulation, in a closed refrigerator, the whole of the contained air shall be kept in motion, and caused to revolve around such partition, in currents moving downwards only on one side of such partition, and upwards only on the other side; (3) a chamber for the refrigeration of food or provisions, placed directly under the ice-box. whether there arc shelves or fixtures, in such chamber, to hold the articles in the descending current directly under the open-bottomed icebox. or whether such articles are placed in such current, in such chamber, directly under the open-bottomed ice-box not by means of shelves or fixtures placed there, but by being suspended there, or placed on the floor, or otherwise kept in position.</p> <p>3. The second claim of such reissue is a claim-to a combination of three elements, namely, the first and third elements of the first claim, combined with the described arrangement for carrying off the water, whereby the cold air can fall directly down upon articles to be refrigerated, while the watei is prevented from dripping into the apartment.</p> <p>4. The invention of Azel S. Lyman, set forth in his caveat, filed August 20th. 1S52, and perfected by him prior to 1855, and described in his application fer a patent, of September 21st, 1854, and covered by the patent granted to him March 25th, 1850, embraces everything claimed in the reissued patent of Sanford.</p> <p>[On appeal to the supreme court the decree of this court was affirmed.” 91 U. S. 150</p> <p>[¿'or other cases involving this patent, see note to Roberts v. Buck, Case No. 11,897].</p>

<p>Case No. 11,914.</p> <p>Witness —Interest—Admiralty — Salvage — Licensed Wreckers — Merit — Falsehoods — Master’s Protests.</p> <p>[1. In admiralty, interested parties may testify, but their testimony relating to what can be construed into their own misconduct should be received with suspicion.]</p> <p>[2. Licensed wreckers are entitled to greater compensation, and charged with a higher degree of care and skill, than other salvors.]</p> <p>[3. A salvor who shrinks from imperiling his person and property greatly lessens his merit thereby.]</p> <p>[4. Saving a cargo in midwinter by diving in the hold of the wreck on an exposed reef, far from land, is salvage service of great merit.]</p> <p>[5. Falsehood by salvors touching the amount of cargo saved by especially meritorious service should diminish their compensation.]</p> <p>[6. A licensed wrecker who proceeds in opposition to the master’s protests is liable in an extraordinary degree to forfeiture of .all compensation for anything short of final success.]</p> <p>[7. Delay by salvors in bringing their vessels to the assistance of a wrecked ship, while each strives with the other to be the first to board her in small boats, and their use of insufficient tackle and inadequate means to get her afloat promptly, are evidence of such gross and willful negligence as merits the forfeiture of all eomnensation.]</p> <p>[8. The master of a wrecking vessel, by countenancing a wrongful injury to a wrecked vessel by one of his crew, and by falsely denying knowledge thereof, forfeits all right to salvage.]</p> <p>[9. A salvor, by his failure to bring in and report salved property, though it be of little value and abandoned as worthless, forfeits all rights to salvage as against other property saved by him.]</p> <p>[10. Salvors, by wrongfully burning a wrecked vessel, forfeit salvage on the cargo saved by them.]</p> <p>[11. All salvors present when one of their number is guilty of willful wrong to the property are liable to forfeiture of their compensation if the wrongdoer cannot be discovered.]</p> <p>[12. When the compensation of certain sal-vors has been forfeited for misconduct, it rests in the discretion of the court to determine what interest shall be benefited by the forfeiture.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,915.</p> <p>Patents — Results — Mechanism — Breech-Loading Fire-Arms — New Trial — Weight of Evidence.</p> <p>1. A patent for an “improvement in breech-loading fire-arms” claimed a combination of three elements, namely, a tapering chamber or cartridge-seat, a suitably constructed and operating breech-piece for closing and opening the breech, and a device for extracting or starting the cartridge-case from the barrel, that is operated by the movement of the breech-piece, made in opening the breech, “substantially as and for the purposes specified:” Held, that the patent did not cover every mechanism which would practically perform the office of starting the cartridge-case from a tapering chamber by the movement of the mechanism employed for opening and closing the breech, but included devices equivalent to those described in the patent, and which respectively performed the same offices, by a mode of operation substantially the same, and in substantially the same way.</p> <p>2. In an action at law for the_ infringement of the patent, certain alleged prior inventions were put in evidence by the defendant, to affect the novelty of the invention patented. The jury were instructed, in reference thereto, in accordance with the foregoing construction of the patent, and found a verdict for the plaintiff. On a motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence: Held, that, although the court might have arrived at a different conclusion, the verdict would not be set aside unless the court could see that the jury was palpably mistaken, and that the weight of the evidence was decidedly against their verdict.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Robert J. Roberts against George W. Sheldon and others for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a trade-mark.]

<p>Case No. 11,917.</p> <p>Pleading in Admiralty—Torts—Joinder—Con-stitutional Law—Maritime Law — Power to Regulate Commerce — Seamen — Action for Personal Injuries.</p> <p>1. An action .for a joint tort against two or more cannot, in the admiralty, he united with a tort against one separately, if the objection be taken.</p> <p>2. The general maritime law' was adopted by the constitution of the United States, and no state can have a separate and distinct maritime law by itself.</p> <p>3. This law governs the crews of the vessels of the United States, wherever they go, whether in a port of the Union, or in a foreign port.</p> <p>4. When the constitution adopts the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it adopts also the law by which it is governed.</p> <p>5. The pou'er of the United States to govern seamen, may also be derived from the commercial power. The power to regulate commerce includes that of navigation.</p> <p>6. When a seaman engages in a commercial adventure, the law's of the United States follow him until the voyage is completed, whether in a foreign country, or the Union.</p> <p>7. The commerce of the country is a unity, and w'herever it goes it is governed and protected by the laws of the United States.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,918.</p> <p>Patents — Novei.tt—Tjtii.itv.</p> <p>To entifie a person to a patent, his invention or improvement must be new. It must also be useful. These points being submitted to a jury, they found against the plaintiff.</p> <p>[Cited in Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 62.]</p> <p>Evidence was given to the jury conducing to prove a want of novelty to the jury. And the case was submitted to them on principles as above stated. The jury found for the defendants. A motion for a new trial was made, which the court overruled.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,919.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Colored Seamen.</p> <p>[The statutes of South Carolina, requiring the arrest and detention in jail of colored seamen coming into ports of the state, during the time their vessel remained in such ports', are valid and constitutional.]</p>

This was an opposition by creditors showing cause against a decree of bankruptcy being granted to the petitioner [David H. Robertson]. The case had been referred on the objections filed, and was now submitted to the court on the report of the commissioner.

The libel in this case was filed [by Caesar A. Roberts against the bark Tuba] to enforce a bottomry bond upon the bark and her cargo, executed in New Orleans, January 25, 1857, to secure the payment, five days after the arrival of the bark in New York, of the sum of 87,700, with 20 per cent, interest.

In admiralty. Libel by William Young against the steam barge Robertson to recover $308.13, which he had paid on a decree against him as surety on a bond given to release the barge from seizure under a former libel for supplies.

[Final hearing on pleading and proofs. Suit brought by Thomas J. W. Robertson against John Garrett and Michael Holihan on reissued letters patent for “improvement in hand stamps,” granted to Thomas J. W. Robertson, December 12, 1871, No. 4,675. The patent is the same upon which the suit of Robertson v. Secombe Manuf’g Co. [supra] was brought, where will be found the history of the patent, the claims, the engravings, and description of the device.] 2

In equity. Motion for preliminary injunction. Suit brought [by Thomas J. W. Robertson against Benjamin B. Hill] on letters patent for “improvement in hand-stamps. granted to Thomas J. W. Robertson, September 22, 1857 [No. 1S.249]; extended and reissued December 12,,1871 [No. 4,675]. The claims of the patent were: “1.

<p>Case No. 11,926.</p> <p>Partnership — Real Estate — Surviving Partner —Articles of Partnership — Aliens—Escheat.</p> <p>1.B. M., W. B., and I. M., entered into articles of copartnery in 1803, to continue in force for four years, wmch might be renewed by the joint consent of the whole, given in writing, one year before the expiration of the term. By one of the articles, it was stipulated, “that in case of the death, or bankruptcy of any of the said parties, in order to prevent any altercation with the heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns of the deceased, or bankrupt, the shares of the profits, as well as capital of the deceased, or bankrupt, shall be paid by the survivors, or solvents. agreeably to the yearly statements of the company’s affairs, prior to his death, or bankruptcy.” The first named partner, was an alien, and W. B. was a citizen; I. M., the third partner, also a citizen, died in 1807, and the surviving partners settled with his representatives, and conducted the business, without any new articles between themselves, but without any other change in the circumstances, or in the expression of the terms of the original articles, until December, 1811, when W. B.. the second named partner, also died. During the partnership, the said W. B. had purchased a house and lot in Lynchburg, with the funds and for the benefit of the company, but took the conveyance to himself. By his will, the said W. B., devised his estate to his relations in Scotland, who are British subjects. By an act of the legislature of Virginia, passed in February. 18Í3. it was enacted, that if an alien, residing within the United States, and holding lands here, shall sell the same to a citizen, before any proceedings instituted by the eseheator to escheat them, the purchaser shall hold and enjoy the same, saving the rights of other persons. In November, 1815, B. M.. the surviving partner, being an alien, but a resident here, sold the house and lot to R.. a citizen, who paid the greater part of the money, but becoming apprehensive that the property was escheatáble, filed his bill, praying, that, if his title was good, the eseheator might be enjoined from proceeding, or if not, that B. M. might refund the purcliase-monoy. Meld that, if there had been nothing peculiar in the articles of copart-nery, the said house and lot would have passed in moieties to the devisees of W. B., the deceased partner, and to the surviving partner, subject to the title of the commonwealth, but chargeable with the debts of the firm, in the event of the personal fund being insufficient.</p> <p>2. But these articles substitute a new rule for that which the law would have made, if the parties had been silent, and, according to the true import of those articles (alienage apart), the whole subject, real, as well as personal. passed to B. M., the surviving partner, he being, however, bound to render to the representatives of W. B., the deceased partner, his share of the capital and profits, according to the last yearly statement on the books of the firm; and, on such shares being accounted for, a court of equity would, if necessary, decree a conveyance of the house and lot to the said surviving partner.</p> <p>3. Although the time for which the articles of copartnery were formed had expired, yet as the business was still carried on. without any change in the circumstances, or in the expressions of the articles, it was still conducted on its original principles, and was a continuing partnership.</p> <p>4. As the partner who purchased the lot. and the partner who sold it, were aliens, it was es-clieatable; but as there were no proceedings instituted to escheat it. and it was sold to a citizen, the right of the commonwealth was released by the act, although the estate of the surviving partner was only an equitable one.</p>

<p>[This was an action in ejectment by John W. Robertson against the town council of Wellsville. Heard on motion to dismiss.]</p>

[Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon reissued letters patent for “improvement in hand-stamps,” granted December 12, 1871. to Thomas J. W. Robertson, No. 4,675. The original letters patent were granted to said Robertson, September 22, 1857, No. 18,249, and extended for seven years from and after September 22, 1871.

<p>Case No. 11,930.</p> <p>Dedication — How Established — Fee — Verbal. Declarations — Presumption—Evidence —Deed.</p> <p>1. To constitute a valid dedication of property to public use, there muát be not only an intention to dedicate, but an act manifesting such intention.</p> <p>2. The law is liberal in its spirit and policy-in regard to appropriations of property for a public use, and requires no particular formality to give them validity.</p> <p>3. A dedication may be established by proof of verbal declarations, or by a written instrument, and. under some circumstances, it may be presumed from a long continued acquiescence of the owner in the use of the property by the public; but such presumption does not arise where such user is by the license of the owner, and not adverse to the title asserted by him.</p> <p>4. There may be a good dedication of property to a public use, without a divestiture of the fee of the owner.</p> <p>5. Verbal declarations of the owner, that he had surrendered the control of the landing, or beach of the river, to the municipal authorities of a town, temporarily, and for a reason specified by him, do not import a legal dedication to the public.</p> <p>6. Evidence of continued claim of title, and the eN°rcise of acts of ownersh'u over the property, by the person claiming title, may be conclusive to remit a presumption of a dedication to the public.</p> <p>7. The consent of the owner of land to the construction of a road upon it, for his own and the public use, does not make out a valid dedication.</p> <p>S. Evidence of the execution and contents of a quitclaim deed, alleged to have been executed many years before the commencement of the suit and which was never put on record, and never heard of or seen by those who might be supposed to be cognizant of it, at the time of its alleged execution, or those officially charged with its custody afterward, should be received with great caution.</p> <p>The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff.</p> <p>NOTE. The foregoing case was commenced prior to the division of the state in 1855 into two judicial districts, and transferred to the Southern district for trial.</p>

This was a ease of importance to the maritime world. The libellants [Rene Louis Robin and others]' were seamen who arrived in the port of Philadelphia, on board the French brig Cacique, Capt. Raymond Roy, which vessel was dismantled here, and her crew transported to another French vessel, called the Robert Eugene, Capt. Saulnier, by Mr. Delaforest, the French consul, pursuant to the official authority, for such purpose, conferred by the French government on its consular…

[Error to Phillips county circuit court. [This was an action of debt by John Pope, governor, for the use of William B. K. Homer, administrator of William H. Smith, against Joseph Robins and Alexander Reece.]

This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, heard before Mr. Justice DAVIS, Circuit Justice. In April, 1869, the legislature of Indiana passed the following act [St. Ind. Held: in McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. [42 U. S.] 206, and Blanchard v. Sprague [Case No. 1,518], that the jiower of congress to legislate, under this article of the constitution, upon the subject of patents, is plenary.

<p>[In the matter of Robinson & Henshall, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,934.</p> <p>Rabeas Corpus — Act Done in Pursuance of Federal Law — Fugitive Slave Act — Void Proceedings.</p> <p>1. Section 7 of the act of Congress of March 2, 1833 [4 Stat. 634], authorizes any judge of the United States to issue the writ of habeas corpus where an officer of the United States is imprisoned “for any act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States.”</p> <p>2. It is the proper remedy where a marshal is imprisoned by the sentence of a state judge, as for a contempt in not producing the bodies of certain persons named in a writ of habeas corpus issued by such judge, and if it appears from the evidence that such persons were legally in the custody of the marshal, pursuant to the provisions of the fugitive slave act, and that his refusal to produce them before the state judge was a paramount duty by the terms of the said act, the marshal is entitled to his discharge under said section 7 of the act of 1833.</p> <p>3. In ordering his discharge upon a habeas, a judge of the United States does not assume a jurisdiction to review or reverse the sentence or judgment of the state judge, but merely exercises a power expressly conferred by an act of congress.</p> <p>4. Although the authorities are not uniform as to the right of a state judge to issue the writ of habeas corpus, where the imprisonment is under the authority of a law of the United States, it is well settled that when the fact is proved that the imprisonment is under such authority, the jurisdiction of the state judge is at an end, and all subsequent proceedings are coram non judice.</p>

<p>At chambers.</p> <p>[This was a petition by H. H. Robinson, marshal of the United States, for a writ of habeas corpus.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of Jesse H. Robinson, a voluntary bankrupt.]</p>

2 [In this case questions arose as to the costs, which, on .application of the bankrupt [Jesse H. Robinson], were certified to the judge for his opinion. The following bill of fees was rendered by the register: No. 7 Beekman Street, New York. In said district, before Mr. James F. Dwight, register in bankruptcy. Register’s Bill of Costs 1867. July 21. Examining petition and schedules under special order of this date, and certifying same for adjudication. $5.

<p>Case No. 11,939.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Debt Created by Fraud — Dis-oh a rg e — Records—Practice.</p> <p>1. A judgment which, by section 33 of the bankruptcy act of March. 2d, 1867 (14 Stat. 533). will not be discharged by a discharge, because it is a debt created by the fraud of the bankrupt, is not. when proved in bankruptcy, subject to the provisions of the first clause of section 21 of that act, in regard to judgments on debts proved being deemed to be discharged.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Migel, Case No. 9,538; Re Clews, Id. 2.891; Re Pitts, Id. 11.190; Lamp-Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 ü. S. 603.]</p> <p>[Cited in Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. New Lamp-Chimney Co.. 53 N. Y. 124; Bennett v. Goldthwait, 109 Mass. 495; Brandon Manuf'g Co. v. Frazer, 47 Vt. 93; Donald v. Kell. Ill Ind. 3, 11 N. E. 782; Hamilton v. Reynolds, 88 Ind. 195; Palmer v. Preston. 45 Vt. 158: Stokes v. Mason, 10 R. I. 262, 264: Wade v. Clark, 52 Iowa, 159, 2 N. W. 1040; Young v. Grau. 14 R. I.342.]</p> <p>2. A record of a state court, which sets forth proceedings warranted by the law of that state, is entitled to verity, although not formal in some particulars.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Jacobs. Case No. 7,160.]</p> <p>[Cited in Palmer v. Preston, 45 Vt. 158. Cited in brief in Chafee v. Blatchford, 6 D. C- 464.]</p> <p>3. This court refused to review an incidental question of practice in a bankruptcy proceeding in the district ?ourt.</p> <p>[Cited in Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 428.]</p>

[In the matter of Julius A. Robinson, a bankrupt. On certificate of the register.] By I. T. WILLIAMS, Register: I, the undersigned register in charge of the above entitled matter, do hereby certify, that the petition of Charles H. Woodbury, hereto annexed, was duly filed on the 22nd day of December, at my chambers, in support of the prayer of the petition.

Three meetings were duly held in this case, a dividend was paid, and the bankrupt [J. S. Robinson] received his discharge. About five years afterwards funds came to the hands of the assignee from assets which had been considered worthless, and a fourth meeting was called, at which a second dividend was declared. A creditor holding a debt admitted to be just, and to be provable, unless he was too late in applying, offered to prove at this meeting.

<p>[In the matter of Edward Robinson and Enoch Chamberlain, bankrupts. For prior proceedings in this litigation, see Case No. 11,942.]</p>

By the Register: I, Arthur W. Andrews, register of said court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that in the course of the proceedings in said cause before me, the following question arose, pertinent to the proceedings, and was stated and agreed by the counsel for the opposing parties, to-wit: Mr. E. P. Turner, Esq., who appeared for H. S. Eox, a deposing creditor, having a claim for the sum of two hundred and twelve dollars against said estate, alleged to have accrued for…

This was a bill in equity, filed by William Robinson against James Leander Cathcart and others, for the specific execution of a contract for the sale of a tract of land in Fairfax county, in Virginia, by the plaintiff to the defendant, J. L. Cathcart.

This was an action brought on a policy, on the profits of a cargo on board ship Hary, at and from Batavia to New-Yorlc, on the voyage insured. The vessel having met with severe weather, by which she received considerable injury, the captain, with the approbation of his officers and crew, bore away for the West Indies, and was captured on his way thither by a British cruiser, and carried into St. Christopher’s, libelled and acquitted.

This was an action on a policy of insurance, dated on the 16th of January, 1837, whereby the company insured for the plaintiff, “one thousand dollars, on property on board the schooner Pantaloon, at… Held: that they were to be deemed perishable. (2) That the potatoes were injured by frost, when they were taken on board at Portsmouth, and they were, therefore, not injured or destroyed by a peril insured against.

<p>Case Ho. 11,950.</p> <p>False Impiusoxment — Justice of Peace — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>A justice of the peace who either requests, directs or commands a constable to arrest a party outside of his jurisdiction will be liable for damages to the said party in a suit for false imprisonment.</p>

Action at law [by William Robinson against Josephine A. Gallier, and others]. The suit was brought by the heirs at law of Mrs. Catharine R. Gallier, who was in her lifetime the wife of James Gallier Sr., against the heirs at law of said James Gallier Si-., to recover certain valuable real estate in the city of New Orleans, and $5,000 in coin.

In the United States admiralty court, district of New York, on the 14th inst., was tried the case, Jacob Robinson v. James Gif-ford, master, and Jno. Ogden and Jno. Mc-Comb, owners, of the schooner Agenora.

<p>[These were actions in bankruptcy, one by Charles Robinson, assignee, against James Hall and others, to set aside a mortgage, and the other by James Hall and others, trustees, against John Schneider and others, to foreclose the same mortgage.]</p>

<p>This was a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy [by J. Q. Robinson and others against Castner Hanway.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New' York.] The libellant filed his libel for wages, as master of the ship Majestic, at the rate of $60 per month, as stated in the libel.

<p>Case No. 11,955.</p> <p>Bail — Affidavit—Amount of Debt — Certainty —Capias.</p> <p>1. An affidavit to hold to bail must state the indebtedness positively, and specify the exact amount due. leaving nothing to inference; otherwise it will be fatally defective, and the order allowing a capias will be vacated.</p> <p>2. Affidavits to hold to bail must be strictly construed.</p>

This was a bill in equity for a discovery and account under the following circumstances: In August, 1813, the plaintiff [John Robinson], with some other persons, in a small boat, took possession of a small vessel, of a suspicious appearance and conduct, then hovering on the coast of Maine, and which was employed in making collusive captures of vessels coming from the British provinces, loaded with goods of British manufactures, on American account.

<p>[This was an action by William. Robinson against James P. Kilbreth.]</p>

This was a bill in equity [by Hetty H. Robinson against Thomas Mandell and others] setting up a special contract for an exchange of wills between the complainant and Sylvia Ann Howland, and that neither should make any other will without notice to the other, and the return of other’s will.

[This was a libel for wages by James Eob-inson and others against the brig Lillie Mills (James Nesmith and others, claimants). The case was heard upon a motion to vacate the .arrest of the vessel on the ground that a summons to the master, and certificate of cause whereon to base admiralty process, was not procured, as required by the act of congress ■of July 20, 1790.]

<p>Case No. 11,959a.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — Agent to Procure Freight — Ch a rter — N OTIOE.</p> <p>[An agent employed by the charterer of a ship to procure freight, having notice from the owner that he must rely on the personal credit of the charterer, has no lien on the ship for his services.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,960.</p> <p>Svkvey — Masked Lines — Surplus—Established Boundaries.</p> <p>1. Marked lints and corners control courses and distances.</p> <p>2. Within the Virginia military tract, surveys were run early, and at the hazard of the lives of those making them. The Indians were numerous and hostile, and under such circumstances great accuracy could not be expected.</p> <p>3. Surplus lands do not vitiate a survey, nor does a deficiency of acres called for in the survey, operate against it.</p> <p>4. Wherever the boundaries can be established, they must prevail. In the present case several of the courses were established, and parts of lines; and'they conduce to show the claims of the respective parties.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,961.</p> <p>Arbitration — Consent—New Trial — Practice-Life Insurance — Assignment—Husband and Wife.</p> <p>1. When the parties to an action at law have stipulated in writing to refer it to a referee, “to hear, try and determine the issues therein, and that an order may be entered accordingly,’’ and, without such order being entered, the trial before the referee has been had, and he has made his report, such order will be considered as having been entered, and may be entered nunc pro tunc.</p> <p>[Cited in Town of Lyons v. Lyons Nat. Bank, S Fed. 374.]</p> <p>2. The stipulation is to be regarded as referring to the practice of the courts of the state in respect to references by consent.</p> <p>3. A reference, by consent, of such an action, in this court, is lawful.</p> <p>4. After a trial before a referee, under such a stipulation, the court has the power to grant a new trial.</p> <p>5. What is a sufficient conformity, in practice, in this court, to the practice of the courts of the state, in respect to the review of a trial before a referee.</p> <p>6. A New Jersey life insurance company issued. at Rochester, New York, a policy insuring the life of R., in a sum named, for life, making the sum payable to the wife of R., “or assigns.” The policy was to cease, if the annual premium should not be punctually paid. R. and his wife resided, at the time, at Rochester. Afterwards, R. and his wife assigned the policy to M., with the assent of the company. The assignment was, by its terms, absolute, but was intended by the parties as collateral security to M. for any premium he should thereafter pay on the policy. The annual premiums which became due after the assignment, down to the death of R., were paid to the company by M. The company paid to M. the sum insured. Afterwards, M. paid to the widow of R. a certain sum, under an agreement with her that she should receive it in full satisfaction of her interest in the policy. Afterwards, the widow sued the company to recover the sum insured, claiming that the assignment of the policy was void, under the acts of the legislature of New York, of April 1st. 1840, April 14th, 1858, March 28th, 1862, and April 18th, 1866 (Laws N. Y. 1840, p. 59, c. 80; Laws N. Y. 1858, p. 306, c. 187: Laws N. Y. 1862. p.214, c.70,and LawsN. Y. 1866. p. 1413, c. 656), respecting insurances of the life of a husband for the benefit of his wife: Held, that such assignment was valid, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.</p> <p>7. There is no decision of the courts of New York holding that such an assignment of such a policy is not valid.</p> <p>8. The case of Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9; Barry v. Equitable Life Soc.. 59 N. Y. 587; Wilson v. Lawrence, 8 Hun, 593; Id., 13 Hun, 238; Id., 76 N. Y. 585, — examined.</p> <p>9. The agreement of the plaintiff with M., and her receipt of the money from him, was a ratification of his authority to collect from the company the amount insured.</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Mary A. Robinson and others against Reúne R. Randolph.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Mary A. Robinson and others against Reúne R. Randolph. For the hearing upon motion for preliminary injunction, see Case No. 11,962.]

The plaintiff originally brought an action at law to recover on a policy of insurance. The company set up a failure to pay certain interest whereby the policy became forfeited. The plaintiff replied that the company had waived such a cause of forfeiture by a circular addressed to shareholders which stated in effect that if interest were not paid no forfeiture should for that reason follow.

<p>Case No. 11,967.</p> <p>Judges — Circuit Court — Rui.es of Court — Laches — Leave to Renew Motion — Answer — Former Judgment.</p> <p>1. Where one judge has denied a motion, another judge of the same court has jurisdiction to grant leave to renew the motion.</p> <p>2. A judge of a United States district court, while sitting alone as circuit judge, in the United States circuit court, has the same powers and jurisdiction as any other judge sitting in the same court.</p> <p>[Cited in Commercial & Sav. Bank v. Corbett, Case No. 3,057; Vulcanite Co. v. Folsom, 3 Fed. 513; Industrial & Min. Guaranty Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 7 C. C. A. 471. 58 Fed. 737.]</p> <p>3. Under the sixty-sixth equity rule prescribed by the United States supreme court, the order dismissing the complainant’s bill for want of a replication is of course, and may be entered in the clerk’s office without any application to, or action by the judge.</p> <p>4. The dismissal is final unless set aside by the court upon application duly made within the proper time in pursuance of the provisions of the rule.</p> <p>5. Where a bill has been dismissed for want of a replication under the sixty-sixth equity rule, a motion to set aside the dismissal made nearly five years after the entry of the order of dismissal, without offering any excuse for the delay, will be denied.</p> <p>6. Where leave to set up by way of amended answer a former judgment between the same parties upon the same subject-matter had been denied, pending an appeal from the judgment sought to be set up, leave to file a supplemental answer setting up said judgment was granted upon renewal of the motion upon leave after the judgment had become final by affirmance on appeal. (Per Hoffman, J. See statement of the case.)</p>

In equity. Bill by [Daniel C. Robinson] the assignee in bankruptcy of Benoice Loom-is [against Chandler Tuttle and Josiah Til-ton], to set aside a conveyance as a fraudulent preference under the bankrupt act. Involuntary proceedings were begun February 22, 1875.

The facts in this case were as follows: Prior to the 6th day of August, 1875, the Com Exchange Bank was a private banking concern, owned by William Hobkirk, and doing business at Waupun, Wisconsin. Hobkirk was the cashier, and C. W. Henning was the teller of the bank. On that date Hobkirk absconded, taking with him the larger part of the funds of the bank.

<p>Case No. 11,968a.</p> <p>Estoppel — Accounts—Previous Trial— Evidence-Admissions.</p> <p>1. A party who, does not bring forward and submit his claim for adjudication when he might do so, may nevertheless subsequently sue for and recover it, and the previous trial will be no obstacle.</p> <p>2. The admissions or confessions of the party to the record are admissible in evidence.</p>

This was a bill in equity, brought to determine the respective rights and interests of the several parties, plaintiffs and defendants, in certain lots of land in Portland, under the circumstances set forth in the bill. The bill was substantially as follows, those parts of it being omitted which are' not necessary to a correct understanding of the points submitted by the parties, and decided by the court.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] The Huntress, an American brig, bound on a trading voyage to Sierra Leone, and other places on the west coast of Africa, was fallen in with, off Cape Lopez, (lat. 2° 30' N., Ion. 9° 45' E.,) by the Jaekall, a steam tender to H. B. M.’s ship Gladiator. The brig had her flag hoisted union down, which is the ordinary signal of distress.

<p>Case No. 11,973.</p> <p>Seamen—Wages — Contract—Payment—Depreciated Currenct.</p> <p>1. The price of seamen’s wages ought to he fixed according to the plain meaning oí the parties, when that can be understood.</p> <p>2. Seamen are a plain people and are not to be presumed to advert to refined distinctions of law when they are not alluded to in the terms of tire contract, or mentioned when it was made.</p> <p>NOTE. This case was carried by appeal to the circuit court, where it was “Held there was no question of the relation of one currency to another involved in the case, the contract for wages being expressed in dollars and cents, and the payment to be made in this country, the plaintiff (libellant) could recover no more than the amount snecified in the contract.” Tre-cartin v. The Rochambeau [Case No. 14,163].</p>

<p>[This was a proceeding by Patrick J. Roche and others against Michael A. Fox. Heard on motion to dismiss a petition in bankruptcy.]</p>

<p>Motion for a new trial, determined before Benjamin Johnson, Andrew Scott, and Wil-liam Trimble, Judges of the Superior Court.</p> <p>[This was an action by Reuben L. Roehell and Hunt M. Shiff against Sylvanus Phillips. Heard on motion for a new trial.]</p>

In admiralty. The libellants shipped on board this propeller, at Buffalo, for Milwaukee, several boxes and packages of goods, which, by the bills of lading, were to be delivered in good order, “the dangers of navigation excepted.” It is charged in the libel that through the negligence, carelessness, and improper conduct of the master, his mariners and servants, the propeller was run aground on the western shore of Lake Michigan; and by reason whereof, she sprung a leak, and…

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Petition that the assignees of the bankrupts be required to deliver an engine in their possession. The bankrupts, through Nathaniel McKay, the business partner, who did all the acts, and conducted all the correspondence hereinafter mentioned, made an oral contract in the city of New York,.on or about the 1st of September, 186S, to build a locomotive engine for the petitioners, a railroad corporation established in the state of-, whose principal business office was in the city of New York, where Mr. Boody, their treasurer resided. The terms of the contract were not very fully disclosed by the evidence, but from the subsequent dealings of the parties, it is to be inferred that the engine was to be finished as soon as practicable, and dispatched to the road of the petitioners, and to be paid for in cash at. the same time. On the 3d of September, the bankrupts wrote to the president of the company that they were at work on the engine, and would finish it with all possible dispatch. On the 3d of November, they wrote to the treasurer that they had drawn on him at sight for $9,000, as the amount due for the engine, and had forwarded the receipt and invoice. This paper, called receipt and invoice, was not produced, but it appears by the correspondence to have been a paper purporting to be signed by a transportation company for the delivery of the engine at Cedar Rapids. Mr. Boody replied on the next day that he had received and paid the draft, but that there was a mistake in the bill of lading, which should have been for Chicago instead of Cedar Rapids. The bankrupts replied on the next day that they had corrected the mistake, and had ordered the engine to be sent to the proper address. On the 4th of December, Mr. Boody wrote that the engine had not yet arrived, and asked McKay to trace it and hurry it forward. On the 14th he wrote again, and complained that six weeks had passed since the engine was shipped, and it had not arrived, and that he thought the transportation company were liable in damages. On the same day, McKay & Aldus wrote him that they had had some trouble in their business, which had caused the delay; that this was now all over, and the engine would go forward the next day. December 15, Mr. Boody replies: “I am glad to be informed that our engine will go forward to-day. I am at a loss, however, to understand how trouble in your business should affect the delivery by the Sol. Tr. Co. of an engine receipted for by them six weeks ago, and which was in no sense whatever your property.” At what precise time this letter was mailed did not appear. On the same day, McKay & Aldus filed their petition in this court on which they were adjudged bankrupts; and this proceeding was against their assignees, to have the engine delivered up to the railroad company. It appeared at the hearing that McKay & Aldus had not finished this engine on the 4th of November, and, indeed, that it did not then exist as an engine; and it did not appear that they then had any engine corresponding to the order, or that any was ever delivered, formally or otherwise, to the transportation company. During November they were at work on-two engines, precisely alike, either of which would have answered the contract. When the first was nearly finished, Mr. McKay at one time expressed an intention to send it to the petitioners, but did not do so, and delivered it to the Hartford & Erie Railroad Company of Boston. The engine now in question was afterwards proceeded with rapidly, and was known in the shop as the Boody engine, and was marked with the name of the petitioners. On Saturday, the 5th December, it was within a few hours of completion, and would have been finished that day, and shipped on the Monday following, but for an injunction which was issued out of this court upon a petition of creditors asking for an adjudication of bankruptcy against the firm. On the 14th day of December, the petitioning creditors’ attorney agreed with the attorney of the bankrupts that the injunction should be so far modified as to release this engine, and it was then finished, or substantially so; but afterwards a creditor attached it, under the state law, and it could not be shipped. After the voluntary petition was filed, the proceedings in invitum were given up, and the assignees were elected under the former, so that their title related to the 15th of December. After the bankruptcy, and before the appointment of assignees, Mr. Boo-dy’s son came to Boston and demanded the engine, by the authority and in the name of the petitioners, but was not allowed to take possession of it.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,980.</p> <p>Judgment — Lien on Lands — Pro Rata Distribution.</p> <p>1. Under the laws of Indiana on all judgments there is a lien on the lands of the defendant ten years.</p> <p>2. Judgments entered on the same day, create equal liens, and the issuing of an execution on any one of them does not affect the lien on the others.</p> <p>[Cited in Elston v. Castor, 101 Ind. 437.]</p> <p>3. The land of the defendant being sold, a pro rata distribution of the proceeds should be made in satisfaction of the judgments.</p> <p>4. The diligence of a plaintiff can not give him an advantage over the others.</p> <p>5. The judgment lien, in its effect, is similar to mortgage liens.</p> <p>6. A sale on one mortgage, the other mortgagees not being made parties, can not affect their liens.</p> <p>7. The sale will be considered as subject to the other mortgages, to the same extent, they being equal liens, etc.</p>

In admiralty. Application for process in rem in a cause for wages.

<p>Case No. 11,981.</p> <p>Salvage — Vessel Aground — Amount and Nature or Service — Compensation.</p> <p>[This was a libel by Jeremiah Roberts and others against the ship Rockland and cargo for salvage.]</p>

The plaintiff’s claim was upon 84 coupons upon bonds of the first subscription to the Pittsburgh & Steubenville Railroad Company; 127 coupons of the second issue to the same company; 166 coupons of the Pittsburgh & Connellsville bonds, and 143 coupons of the issue to the Ohio & Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

<p>Case No. 11,983.</p> <p>Execution — Marshal’s Sale — Defendant’s Title — Purchaser—Motion to Set Aside Sale.</p> <p>1. A marshal’s sale of land on execution, where the defendant had no interest in the land, will be set aside on motion.</p> <p>2. In such sale there is no warranty by the defendant. The purchaser must, understand what he buys.</p> <p>3. But where he has been deceived or misinformed, the court will release him. by setting the sale aside. This is a proper inode of giving relief, if application be made before the sale shall be completed.</p> <p>[Cited in Brunner t. Brenan, 49 Ind. 100.]</p>

<p>Case No. 11,987.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge—Assets—Fifty per Cent.</p> <p>1. Where an application for a discharge had .been made prior to July 14th, 1870, and a reference ordered to a register in bankruptcy to take necessary proofs and ascertain if the assets were not equal to fifty per cent, of the claims proved against the estate of the bankrupt, upon whieh he was liable as principal debt- or, the register not having made his report thereon until after the amendment, to the bankrupt act Í16 Stat. 276], approved July 14th, 1870. the bankrupt filed a supplemental petition referring to the amendment of July 14th, 1870, and the court modified its original order of reference, and directed the register, in addition to the requirements of the first order, to determine and report whether the assets were equivalent to fifty per cent, of the debts and liabilities contracted after January 1st, 1869.</p> <p>2. Upon the report of the register to the effect that he had examined the several papers before him (including a consent to the bankrupt’s discharge), that the proofs appeared satisfactory; and there being no opposing interest. that the assets of the bankrupt were equal to fifty per cent, of claims proved on account of debts and liabilities contracted subsequent to January 1st, 1869, upon which he was liable as principal debtor, that the assent in number and value of creditors who had proved their claims on debts contracted subsequent to January 1st, 1869, bad not been filed, and that under the amendments to the bankrupt act, approved July 27th, 1868 (15 Stat. 227], and July 14th. 1870 [16 Stat. 270], the bankrupt was entitled to his discharge. Discharge granted by the court.</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Western district of Pennsylvania.) On the 5th day of June, 1861, suit was brought against John D. Roddy and D. We-yand, sureties upon the official bond of H. C. Marks, late postmaster at Somerset, Pennsylvania. Bond in six hundred dollars, dated the 17th day of June, 1833, conditioned that the said Harvey C. Marks shall well and truly execute the duties of postmaster according to law.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois.)</p> <p>In bankruptcy. Appeal from the district court by “William E. Hale, assignee of Rod-din & Hamilton, bankrupts, against Marietta A. Roddin, wife of the senior member of the firm. Mrs. Roddin had obtained a decree in the superior court of Cook county, for alimony in a divorce case against her husband, and Roddin and Hamilton, who were partners, both executed a bond for the due payment of the amount of the decree. Roddin & Hamilton going into bankruptcy, Mrs. Roddin proved up her claim for alimony against the estate, claiming that she was entitled to be paid out of the partnership assets pro rata with the other creditors of the partnership.</p> <p>cited: In re Bucyrus Mach. Co. [Case No. 2,100); In re Webb [Id. 17,313); Ex parte Weston, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 1; Forsyth v. Woods, 11 Wail. [78 U. S.) 4S4.</p> <p>cited: In re Melick [Case No. 9,399); Mead v. National Bank of Fayetteville [Id. 9,366); Col: Partn. 016; In re Ivahley [Case No. 7,594)-, Hapgood v. Cornwell, 4S Ill. 04.</p>

<p>Case No. 11,991.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Fiduciary Debts — Composition— Discharge.</p> <p>Fiduciary debts are discharged by a composition in bankruptcy.</p> <p>[NOTE. Subsequently an injunction was issued to restrain a creditor from further proceedings who had instituted proceedings in the state court for the purpose of setting aside the agreement entered into in a composition between the bankrupts and a majority of their creditors. Case No. 11,992],</p>

<p>[In the matter of Jane S. Rodger and James Wardrobe, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>In admiralty. The libel in this case was filed in rem, by material men, for necessaries furnished the brig Rodney. A stipulation was entered into by the several parties, that the vessel should be valued at $1,350, and be discharged on the claimant’s filing a bond to that amount, which was done accordingly. Afterwards, a petition was filed by other material men, and by the mate and seamen for wages. The mate included, under his charge for wages, the value of some hams on board belonging to him, which were consumed for the necessary support of the crew. The consignee of the vessel also claimed a lien upon her for light-money, pilotage, tow-age and port duties, advanced by him. The funds in court not being adequate to the discharge of all the claims, a question arose as to the order of priority in their distribution.</p>

During a trial, upon an indictment, Hallett, district attorney, stated to the court that he had several witnesses for the government, who spoke only the German language; that a subpoena had been served on Mr. Roelker, as an interpreter, but he had neglected or refused to attend; and he moved for a capias to bring him in.

<p>Case No. 11,996.</p> <p>Patents — Patentability—Fastenings ron Bags —Equity Pleading — Sckplusage.</p> <p>[1. In equity pleading, after alleging the infringement of a valid patent, it is surplusage, and not multifariousness, to aver the infringement of a void reissue thereof.]</p> <p>[2. A new device, though inferior to prior devices for the same purpose, is “useful” and patentable, if it be not frivolous, nor injurious to public morals or to the well-being of society.]</p> <p>[3. The novel combination of movable staples at the corners of a travelling bag frame, with a lock in the middle of the frame, is patentable as a fastening device, although staples and locks had been in use separately theretofore.]</p> <p>[4. A device known and used in foreign countries, but not patented there, nor described in a printed publication, is patentable in the United States by a person without notice thereof.] •</p> <p>T5. Bending the metal top of a travelling bag frame into sockets for fastening-staples at the corners is a patentable novelty, with respect to a device whereby such sockets are made by other pieces of metal attached to the plate.]</p> <p>[6. The patent granted to William Roemer, July 31, 1866 (No. 56,801), for “improvements in travelling bags,” held valid.]</p> <p>[Disapproved in Roemer v. Simon, Case No. 11,997.]</p> <p>[NOTE. In a subsequent action, Roemer’s patent was held invalid. See Roemer v. Simon, Case No. 11,997.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by William Roemer against Edward Simon and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 56,801, granted to complainant July 31, 1866.]

<p>Case No. 11,999.</p> <p>Salvage — Tugboat —Who Entitled to Shake.</p> <p>1. The pilot act of Oregon (Sess. Laws 1868, p. 23) provides that the steam tug and pilot-boat at the mouth of the Columbia river shall tow and pilot sail vessels “upon the pilot grounds between Astoria and the open sea, outside the bar,” “in all weather,” when the bar “can be crossed by first-class steamers and sail vessels,” for a uniform compensation in proportion to the draught of the vessel, called pilot fees: Ueld. that so long as it is reasonably safe to take a vessel in tow anywhere on this pilot ground, the tug is bound to do so, and is not entitled to compensation therefor as a salvor, but that she is not bound to incur extraordinary risk to tow a vessel, or to rescue it from danger of wreck, and when she does so, she is entitled to compensation therefor, as a salvor.</p> <p>[Cited in The James P. Donaldson, 19 Fed. 272.]</p> <p>2. Where the master and owners of the steam tug Astoria received the sum of $5,000 from a vessel and her cargo, for rescuing them from danger of wreck and loss below Sand Island, they are accountable to the crew of the former as salvors for their shares of such sum.</p> <p>3. Semble, that the receipt of said sum of 85,000 by said master and owners, as extra compensation for extraordinary services and risk, is an admission that the service was a salvage one, and not mere towage, and as against the crew, they are estopped to deny it.</p> <p>[Cited in McMullin v. Blackburn, 59 Fed. 179.]</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court the decree of this court was affirmed. Case No. 12,000.]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by William Roe-mer against Edward Simon and others.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States tor the district of Oregon. [This was a libel by Eliza E. Roff, admin-istratrix of William Roff, and others, against A. D. Wass and others, to recover proportionate part of money paid to defendants for salvage service, in which plaintiffs claim an interest. From a decree of the district court in favor of libellants (Case No. 11,999), respondents appeal.]

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

This is an application by A. B. Stoddart, a judgment creditor of the bankrupt, for an order that the'assignee sell- certain real estate of the bankrupt, and apply the proceeds to the payment of the petitioner's Judgment, which was recovered on the 20th day of December, A. D. 1S73, in the district court of Neosho county.

[This was a libel by Lieut. Henry J. Rogers and the United States against the Mexican schooner Amado and cargo. Heard on application for a decree of forfeiture.]

<p>Case No. 12,004.</p> <p>Patents — Preliminary Injunction — Conditions Necessary to Granting.</p> <p>Terms imposed, and an affidavit required on granting an injunction to restrain the defendant from making and vending a machine, for which plaintiff had obtained a patent.</p> <p>[Cited in Hovey v. Stevens, Case No. 6.745; National Hay-Rake Co. v. Harbert, Id. 10,-044.]</p>

[This was a bill for injunction by Charles J. Rogers against the city of Cincinnati to restrain the city from further proceedings in suit instituted against complainants under city license ordinances.]

Assumpsit, on a physician’s account, amounting to twenty-five dollars, all in one year. The account itself sworn to by the plaintiff, within the year, was offered in evidence by the plaintiff.

[This was a bill in equity by James J. Rogers against Albert G. Ennis for the infringement of letters patent Nos. 193,038 and 198,-407, granted to plaintiff July 10, 1877, and December 25, 1877, respectively.]

<p>Case No. 18,012.</p> <p>Copyright — Infringement—Statutory Pe natty.</p> <p>Under the act of congress of 1831 [4 Stat. 436], the statutory penalty for violation of a copyright is not incurred unless the defendant reprint a transcript of the entire work; it is not enough that it amounts to an infringement of plaintiff’s copyright.</p>

This is an action on coupons which were attached to bonds issued by the county of Lee, in the state of Iowa, in payment of subscription to the stock of a railway company. These coupons are on their face made payable at a banking house in the city of New York, and contain no provisions whatever in relation to interest, or the rate of interest.

The libellants [Thomas Rogers and others] were shipped at Boston in September last, on board the American steamer Maratanza, and signed articles which contained the following description of the voyage: “From the port of Boston to port or ports in Hayti one or more times, or other West India ports, and back to port or ports in the United States on this or any other vessel, term not to exceed six months.” The reason for this peculiar contract was that the steamer had been sold…

<p>Case No. 12,015.</p> <p>Parties — Assignee — Right of Assignor to Bring Suit.</p> <p>1. The assignee, who sues in his own name, must show, to give jurisdiction to the circuit court, that his assignor, at the time of the assignment, might have brought the suit in his own name.</p> <p>[Criticised in Chamberlain v. Eckert. Case No. 2,577. Cited in Varner v. West, Id. 10,-885.]</p> <p>2. The circuit court having only a limited jurisdiction, it must be shown in the pleadings.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit [by Robert Rogers against the Mechanics’ Insurance Company] on a policy of insurance, dated the 23d of August, 183S, whereby the Mechanics’ Insurance Company, of New Bedford, insured ten thousand dollars on the bark America and outfits, from Bristol, Rhode Island, on a whaling voyage, until her return to Bristol, with liberty to touch at all ports and places for refreshments, and to sell catchings.

who prays for letters of administration heretofore granted to Henry May. to be revoked. He claims that he is the cousin or next of kin to the deceased. That Thomas Law, Sr., was formerly a resident of Washington, by birth an Englishman, and came to this country at the close of the last century; he had three sons —Thomas, Edmund and George — the last died in infancy.

2 [This was' an action [by Robert Rogers] against the Mechanics’ Insurance Company, of New Bedford, on a policy of insurance, dated August 23d, 1S38, whereby that company insured $10,000 on the bark America and outfits, from Bristol, Rhode Island, on a whaling voyage, until her return to Bristol.

Bill in equity [by William B. Rogers and others against David B. Parker, United States marshal]. The bill alleges the following series of facts: Jesse J. Simpkins was appointed United States collector at the port of Norfolk, Virginia, and the complainants became his sureties for the sum of $50,000, prior to the war. On the breaking out of the war Simpkins was indebted to the United States in the sum of $11,000 and upwards.

<p>Case No. 12,019.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — Judgment in State Court — Estoppel.</p> <p>The fact that the holder of an admiralty lien has intervened and recovered judgment for the amount of his claim in a state court, in an action in. personam, the same remaining unsatisfied. is not a bar to a proceeding in admiralty to enforce the lien.</p>

This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs, in a suit in equity, brought by the plaintiffs, [C. B. Rogers & Co.,] a Connecticut corporation, [against George H. Sargent and others,] founded on the alleged infringement of reissued letters patent, granted to Byron Boardman, March 6th, 1866 [No. 2,1S3], for an “improved wire staple.” The original patent was granted to Boardman, as inventor, March 30th, 1858 [No. 19,747].

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Compensation was claimed by the libellants [Henry C. Rogers and others] for the total loss of the schooner Charles F. Beebee, valued in the libel at $3,500, and for the loss of her cargo, consisting of fresh halibut, valued at $1,000; and also for the loss of certain books and nautical instruments, which were -on board the schooner, and for the loss of the ■clothing belonging to the…

Action of ejectment [by George W. Rogers against Lafayette M. Weller] submitted to the court for trial upon the following facts as agreed upon by the parties. Theodore Rogers died intestate and without issue seized of the premises in question. He was the illegitimate son of Maria Purcell, who had also another illegitimate son, the plaintiff in this case. Maria Purcell died about 1840. Theodore Rogers died in 1869, unmarried and without issue.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

Replevin for one locomotive engine, called the James W. Lewis, No. 1, and tender.

This was an action [by George P. Roller] against [Hugh Maxwell], the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties and a penalty. Two invoices of long shawls were imported by the plaintiff from Bremen, and entered by his consignees and agents, August 1, 1851. The appraisers raised the invoice .prices more than ten per cent, to make them equal to the foreign market value.

This was a suit for an infringement of a patent. The plaintiff had obtained a patent in the year 1849 for a cooking range. The subject of the patent was a peculiar combination of flues and dampers, and in the specification he had spoken of his flues as “inclined,” and described the advantages which were gained by the use of inclined flues.

Assumpsit [by Franklin J. Rollins, assignee, against John I. Twitchell and others] upon a promissory note signed by the defendants payable to the bankrupt. The defendants pleaded in set off a non-negotiable demand against the bankrupt that they had purchased from other creditors before bankruptcy proceedings were commenced, but after the bankrupt had become insolvent.

Action for a libel, published in the Aurora, which charged the plaintiff with being a conspirator, and recorded as such on the journals of congress. Plea, not guilty, with leave to justify. William Duane admitted himself to be the editor of the Aurora. The other defendant did not; and in order to prove that he was concerned- in the paper, the plaintiff asked one of his witnesses, if he had not seen William J. Duane sign receipts in the name of himself and Wm. Duane.

[This was a claim by Inocencio Romero and others for El Sobrante, being five leagues of land in Contra Costa county. The claim was rejected by the board, and appealed by plaintiffs.]

<p>Case No. 12,030.</p> <p>FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES —POSSESSION — BONA PrDES — Conditional. Sales — Laches— Enforcement op Mortgage.</p> <p>1.By the common law. an absolute bill of sale of chattels, unless accompanied by possession, is void as to creditors and bona fide purchasers. The bona fides of the transaction, as between the Darties. and the fact that the possession remained with the seller for justifiable purposes, would not vary the rule.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in MeKibbin v. Martin, 64 Pa. St. 355.]</p> <p>2. Even if the arrangement between the mortgagee and mortgagor was that the latter was to remain in possession of the vessel until the mortgagee had a reasonable opportunity to enforce his mortgage, still this would not affect the rights of bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration.</p> <p>3. Upon the question of the bona fides of a purchase of a chattel, this court will determine the facts upon the principles which govern trials by jury.</p> <p>4. Conditional sales, which may be regarded valid without a change of possession, have reL erenee to a conveyance upon a condition, other than the repayment of money loaned.</p> <p>5. The sale of a vessel at public auction for a valuable consideration to a purchaser ignorant of any mortgage, and who had bought after seeing her papers, if it would not give an absolute title of itself, would show such laches on the part of the mortgagee, that he would not be permitted to sei up any priority.</p> <p>[Cited in The D. M. French, Case No. 3,938.]</p> <p>6. The mortgage lien will not be sustained, although put in suit the first opportunity by the mortgagee, against subsequent purchasers without notice.</p> <p>7. It is a principle of equity that an encum-brancer upon various parcels of property must exhaust his remedy against that remaining with his debtor, before he resorts to that portion held by bona fide purchasers, or under junior encumbrance.</p>

In November, 1799, Anne Barkley obtained a judgment in this court, against Elizabeth and Anne Ronald, infant heirs of-Ronald, for the sum of $3,011.50, with interest, at the rate of five per cent., from the 20th of June, 1791, till paid.

Debt. .The action was brought upon twenty bonds of the defendant corporation, each in the sum of $1,000. Sixteen of the bonds were dated July 1, 1873, the rest October 1, 1873.

<p>Case No. 12,032.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Fkaudui.ent Conveyance — Date op Deed — Execution—Evidence— Admissions — Copy.</p> <p>1. A debtor made a transfer of real estate to his brother-in-law, who on the same day re-conveyed the property to the wife of the debtor. Mdd. that the transfer took place at the time of the actual execution and delivery of the deeds, and not at their date, and was therefore within the six months limited by the act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)].</p> <p>2. An exemplified copy of an examination of the debtor, taken under the laws of the state of New York, under supplemental proceedings upon a judgment, was offered, for the purpose of proving admissions of the' debtor. Mdd, that under the act of congress approved May twenty-sixth, seventeen hundred and ninety [1 Stat. 122], such copy was proper evidence, such examination being “judicial proceedings” within the meaning of said act.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] [This was a libel by Roosevelt and others against the brig C. H. Frost to enforce an alleged lien for repairs. The district court dismissed the libel (case unreported), and the libellants appealed.]

This was an action [by Cornelius V. S. Roosevelt and others] against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties paid by the plaintiffs on an importation from Bremen of an article known in commerce as polished window glass, and sometimes called polished crystal plate window glass, and sometimes German plate, or crystal glass, or polished plate.

<p>Case No. 18,035.</p> <p>Patents — Public Use — Abandonment—Two Machines — Combination—PLEADING AT Law.</p> <p>1. To an action for an infringement of a patent right, a plea that the thing claimed to have been invented was in use and for sale before the application for the patent, is demurrable, unless the plea aver an abandonment, or that such sale or use was more than two years before the application.</p> <p>2. Where the use or sale has not exceeded two years before the application, the act of the 3d of March, 1839 [5 Stat. 354], declares it shall not, invalidate the patent.</p> <p>[Cited in Anderson v. Eiler, 46 Fed. 778.]</p> <p>3. The same patent can not include inventions for two distinct machines. But a claim for a combination of mechanical powers, and the invention or improvement of one or more parts of which the combination consists, may be in one patent.</p> <p>4. There must be special pleas or the general issue, and notice of special matters.</p> <p>[5. Cited in Sewall v. Jones. 91 U. S. 184, and in Ripley v. Elson Glass Co., 49 Fed. 929, to the point that, to infringe a patent, it is not necessary that the thing patented should be adopted in every particular. If the patent is adopted substantially by the defendant, he is guilty of infringement.]</p>

<p>Casé No. 12,036.</p> <p>Deed — Execution—Lex Reí Sitje — Residence op Grantors — Michigan Statute.</p> <p>1. A deed executed in any other state, for lands in Michigan, is valid. This validity is imparted by the statute of Michigan.</p> <p>2. Each state has a right to regulate the transmission of real property, by deed, or by operation of law.</p> <p>3. To a deed executed in New York for land in Michigan, it is objected, that it does not appear, the parties making the deed resided in New York. The statute refers to the place where the deed was executed, and not to the residence of the persons who made it. It is admitted the deed was made in pursuance of the laws of New York. This is sufficient.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,037.</p> <p>Notes — Given tn Violation of Law — Notice— Bona Fide Holder — Coupouatioxs.</p> <p>1. Notes given by a corporation in violation of law are void.</p> <p>[Cited in Root v. Wallace, Case No. 12,039.]</p> <p>[Cited in Bissell v. Michigan Southern R. Co., 22 N. Y. 304; Leavitt v.-Palmer, 3 N. Y. 34. Distinguished in Blunt v. Walker, 11 Wis. 351.]</p> <p>2. Public laws limiting corporate powers are notice as well to persons out of the state where the laws were passed, as to those within it.</p> <p>3. Such notes being void in their inception, are void in the hands of a bona fide holder.</p> <p>[Cited in Root v. Wallace, Case No. 12,039.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Cooke v. State Nat. Bank of Boston. 52 N. Y. 103; Cited in Land v. Coffman, 50 Mo. 248.]</p>

This was a bill in chancery,. filed originally in the district court of the late territory of Nebraska. The plaintiff having had a decree there, the defendants carried it by appeal to the supreme court of the territory, where it was pending when the state was admitted into the Union.

<p>Case No. 12,039.</p> <p>Notes — Banks—Charter—Issue in Violation or Law — Notice—Recovery—Coxsidekatiox.</p> <p>1. A note issued by a bank, in violation of its charter, is void.</p> <p>[Cited in Bissell v. Michigan S. & N. I. B. Co., 22 N. Y. 304.]</p> <p>2. It is also void if issued in contravention of a general lavs' in force at the time the charter was adopted, and such note is void in the hands of a bona fide holder.</p> <p>3. All who receive notes of a bank are bound to take notice of the powers of the bank, as granted in its charter.</p> <p>4. A void note being indorsed, can not be given in evidence, to support an action by the in-dorsee against the indorser.</p> <p>H. The contents of such note can not be admitted, in support of an action brought on the note.</p> <p>6. The indorsee may recover against the in-dorser by showing the consideration paid for the note.</p>

Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent for an “improvement in cases for rotary blowers,” granted P. H. and F. M. Roots, July 27,1869. The claims were as follows: “(1) A rotary blower-ease, the interior of which is rendered true and accurate by means of plaster of Paris, or its described equivalent, applied substantially as described.

This was an action [by William Ropes and others] against [Charles P. ClinehJ the collector of the port of New York to recover back duties paid under protest on unmanu-factured Russia hemp.

Motion on the part of claimant to open the decree, and for a new trial, on the ground that certain depositions on behalf of claimant, which arrived after the hearing and decree, showed a complete defense, and that the same were not received in time to be used on the hearing, on account of unavoidable delays.

The information alleged, that sixty casks of rum, being of the growth, produce and manufacture of a colony or dependency of Great Britain were, at Matanzas, with the knowledge of the owner and master of the brig, laden and put on board thereof, with intention to import the same into the United States, and were afterwards actually imported into the United States, to wit, at Boston, [ contrary to the act 1st March, 1809 [2 Stat. ¡ 529] c. 91, and the act 2d March, 1811 [2…

By agreement of counsel, the following statement was submitted as setting forth the grounds of the claim of the plaintiff [Noah Walker] against Randolph Barton, assignee in bankruptcy of Rose, Lyon & Co.: Rose, Lyon & Co., on the 5th day of September, 186S, petitioned for the benefit of the bankrupt act [of 1SC7 (14 Stat. 517)], and Randolph Barton was in the course of proceedings appointed assignee.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of South Carolina.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of South Carolina.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,047.</p> <p>Prize — Foreign Capture of American Vessel— Bringing into Jurisdiction-Time of Condemnation.</p> <p>Property captured by a French privateer, sold in a Spanish port before condemnation, and brought by the purchasers to this place, will be restored by this court, upon suit brought by an agent of the first owners; the property being sufficiently identified, and the original owners being citizens of the United States.</p> <p>[NOTE. There was a third libel between the same parties. This case was subsequently heard, and the court affirmed the principles laid down in the opinion above, and ordered a restitution. Case No. 12.048. Appeals were then taken in all three cases to the circuit court by the claimants. Upon a hearing the judge ordered that the appellants have time to adduce evidence to prove the assent of the libelants to the sale of the articles libeled or the legal condemnation thereof. Case No. 12.045. Upon the hearing of the cause on appeal the decree of the district, court was reversed, and the libel dismissed, each party paying his own costs. Id. 12,046. An appeal was then taken to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was reversed, and the cause remanded for final decree. 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 241. The decree of the supreme court directed “the cargo of the Sarah to be restored to the original owners, subject to those charges of freight, insurance, and other expenses which would have been incurred by them in bringing the cargo into the United States.” In carrying this decree into execution the circuit court made no allowance for expenses at the port of landing, nor for insurance. It also charged the claimants with interest on the money into which the cargo had been converted. (Opinion of the circuit court not reported, but see dissenting opinion in the case on appeal by Mr. Justice Johnson, who delivered the opinion below.) An appeal from this ruling was taken to the supreme court, where the decree below was upon these points reversed. 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 313.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,048.</p> <p>Piuze — Foreign Condemnation — Regulation Made after Capture — Restoration.</p> <p>A sentence of condemnation, founded upon a municipal regulation, which was not made till after the capture of the property on the high seas, shall not avail to prevent restitution of such property to the original owners, if it be brought within the jurisdiction of the courts of this country, of which those owners are citizens.</p> <p>[See note to Case No. 12,047.]</p>

This was a libel in personam, filed by George Rose against Hiram Niles and John R. Wheeler, to recover seamen's wages. The libel demanded wages for navigating tha-canal boat Emerald, owned by the respondents, from Troy to New York, and for remaining with and keeping her afterwards, •upon an alleged agreement to pay libellant one dollar per day, with board, for these services. The answer denied the agreement charged, and that the services alleged were rendered.

Action of assault and battery to try the plaintiff’s right to freedom. She was brought into Virginia in the year 1792, and she claimed to be free because her owner had not taken the oath prescribed by the act of’ Virginia of December 17, 1792, § 4 (Rev. Code, p. 196; Ed. 1803, p. 187).

<p>[Suit in equity by Peleg Rose against the Sibley Machine Company to restrain infringement of patent.]</p>

[This was a proceeding by M. Rosenbaum against E. M. Garnett, assignee in bankruptcy of Engel & Son.) Petition invoking supervisory power of the circuit court from decree of district court in bankruptcy. See Storrs v. Engel [Case No. 13,494). The facts are shown in the report of the same case (Storrs’ v. Engel, supra), and in the opinion of the circuit judge, which was as follows:

<p>[In the matter of Myron Rosenberg, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,055.</p> <p>Bankruptcy— Removal of Pkopertt aftek Assignment.</p> <p>1. Where property, which had been mortgaged by the bankrupt in such wise as to constitute the mortgage a valid security as against the assignee, under the 14th section of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 522)] was taken, by an assignee of the mortgage, from the possession of the bankrupt, after the appointment of the assignee in bankruptcy: Meld, that, from the time of the appointment of the as-signee, the possession of the property by the bankrupt was the possession of it by the as-signee ;</p> <p>[Cited in Phelps v. Sellick, Case No. 11,079.]</p> <p>2. The taking of it was unlawful, and it must be restored to the assignee, or, if any part of it was not restored, the parties concerned in taking it must account for its value as of the time when it was taken.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Hufnagel, Case No. 6,837.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,057.</p> <p>Bankruptcy— Fraudulent Preperences — Credits Allowed on Sale — Insurance.</p> <p>1. A, before insolvency, and not in contemplation of bankruptcy, indebted to B in the sum of two thousand four hundred and eleven dollars, sold to him an estate to the value of ten thousand dollars, and credited him on his books for the said sum of two thousand four hundred and eleven dollars, at the time of sale. After-wards A, when insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, had a settlement with agent of B, when the sum of two thousand four hundred and eleven dollars was deducted from the amount of purchase money. Meld, that the payment was really made at the time of sale; that it was not an appropriation of payments, and that it was a legitimate transaction and not a fraudulent preference within the meaning of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)].</p> <p>2. Where specification charges that a particular debt was paid after passage of bankrupt act, and the proof shows that it was paid before, and proof is offered that there were other debts not mentioned in specifications that were paid after passage of said act, held, that the creditors are bound by the specification, and such proof is inadmissible.</p> <p>[Cited in Re .Tayeox. Case No. 7,239; Re Clark, Id. 2.812,]</p> <p>3. Servants’ wages paid after the passage of bankrupt act, as necessary family expenses, cannot be allowed as objection to discharge..</p> <p>[Cited in Re Seeley, Case No. 12,628.]</p> <p>4. Payments made to counsel for services “rendered and to be rendered” by bankrupt without fraud, is not a ground for refusal of discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Comstock, Case No. 3,074; Re Thompson, Id. 13,938; Re Boynton, 10 Fed. 279.]</p> <p>[Cited in Re Parsons, 150 Mass. 345, 23 N. E. 50.]</p> <p>5. Where a bankrupt, insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, insured his life, it is an improper transaction.</p> <p>6. Insurance made upon house and furniture in pursuance of covenants in lease is not a fraudulent preference.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Seeley, Case No. 12,628.]</p> <p>7. Expenditures incurred by bankrupt while insolvent, in support of family, and the evidence is silent as to their character, the court cannot admit such expenditures as a ground for refusal of discharge.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,058.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge — Specifications against — Df.ht Cheated nr Fraud.</p> <p>1. .The creation of a debt by fraud is not a ground for refusing a discharge to a bankrupt.</p> <p>TCited in Re Seeley, Case No. 12.62S.]</p> <p>[Approved in Re McEachran, 82 Cal. 224, 23 Pac. 48.]</p> <p>2. A specification stating that a debt had been created by fraud is not a good specification, and will be stricken out on motion.</p> <p>3. A bankrupt cannot be examined for the purpose of showing that the debt was created by fraud.</p> <p>4. A fraudulent conveyance made, or a fraudulent preference given, before the passage of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)], are neither of them good grounds upon which to oppose a discharge. Such a conveyance or preference does not come within the terms of section 29 of said act, and a specification alleging such a conveyance or preference will be stricken out on motion.</p> <p>[Gited in Re Moore, Case No. 9,751. Followed in Re Hollenshade. Id. 6,610. Cited in Re Hussman, Id. 6.951. Approved in Re Kee-fer. Id. 7,636. Disapproved in Re Cretiew, Id. 3,390.]</p> <p>5. The difference explained between the meaning of the following phrases in section 29, namely, “since the passage of this act,” and “subsequently to the passage of this act.”</p> <p>[Criticised in Re Cretiew, Case No. 3,390.]</p> <p>6. By the term “fraudulent preference,” used in item 9 of section 29, is meant only a preference in fraud of the bankrupt act; that is, contrary to its provisions.</p> <p>[Followed in Re Hollenshade. Case No. 0.610. Cited in Re Seeley, Id. 12,628.]</p> <p>[For subsequent proceedings in this litigation, see Case No. 12,057.]</p>

[In the matter of Isaac Bosenfield, Jr., a bankrupt.] At the examination before the register, Thos.

The parties having filed a written stipulation waiving a jury, the cause was submitted to the court upon the issues of fact as well as of law'.

<p>On motion to vacate the order to show ■cause.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,063.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Draft — Action to Recover Amount Paid.</p> <p>1. A bank in Missouri, having money on deposit in a bank in New York, to the amount of over $2,000, drew a draft on the latter on August 1st, for the sum of $1,998, to the order of R., for which R. paid the former $2,000. On the 3d of August, the Missouri bank assigned to C. all its property, in trust for its creditors, by an assignment valid by the laws of Missouri, and the New York bank was notified of such assignment on the same day. On the 5th of August the draft was presented by R. to the New York bank. Payment of it was refused. R.. on the 5th of August, attached the money held by the New York bank, by judicial process, in a suit against the Missouri bank, on the draft, and aft-erwards recovered a judgment therein. He then brought this suit, against the two banks and ri-to have the $1.998 paid to him. On a demurrer to the bill: Held, that the right of C. to the money was superior to that of R.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Covert v. Rhodes, 48 Ohio St. 74, 27 N. E. 94. Cited in Harrison v. Wright, 100 Ind. 519.)</p> <p>[Cited in brief m Appeal of Waynesburg.Col-lege, 111 Pa. St. 130, 3 Atl. 20.)</p> <p>2. The draft was not accepted by the drawee, nor charged by it against the drawer, nor did the draft operate as an assignment of the funds of the drawer in the hands of the drawee.</p> <p>[Cited in Seligman v. Wells. 1 Fed. 302.)</p> <p>[Cited in Moore v. Davis, 57 Mich. 255, 23 N. W. 802.)</p>

<p>[In the matter of H. & M. Rosenthal, bankrupts.)</p>

By I. T. WILLIAMS, Register: [I, the undersigned register in charge of the above entitled matter, do hereby certify and report: That at the final meeting of creditors it appeared that the sum of eight hundred and forty-three dollars and twelve cents was in the hands of the as-signee for distribution among the creditors of the said estate.

<p>[In the matter of Louis H. Rosey, a bankrupt.]</p> <p>The register in this case certified to the court, that the assignee had applied to him in writing to call a second general meeting of creditors, under the provisions of the 27th section of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 529)3, which request was accompanied by the report and account of the assignee, in compliance with an order of the register; and that he had, for reasons which he deemed sufficient, and which he certified to the court, refused to call the meeting.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,067.</p> <p>Courts — Conflict of Jukishiction — Receiver and Marshal — Practice—Intervening under 34th Rule.</p> <p>1. Libels were filed on June 9, 1875, against two steamboats to enforce liens for repairs and supplies. Processes were issued, and the marshal returned that he had attached them. On the return, J,, as trustee under a mortgage on the boats, appeared in the causes and took time to answer, which afterwards expired, and the default of all persons was entered. J. then presented to the court petitions, as receiver of the boats, setting up that, prior to the issuing of the processes against the boats, they had been attached by the sheriff of the city and county of New York, and had remained in possession of the sheriff until the appointment of J. as receiver of them, which was made in an action in the supreme court of the state, commenced on July 12th, 1875: and that on the 28th of July, 1875, the sheriff had surrendered the possession of the boats to him; but that the marshal claimed to hold possession of the boats under the processes in these actions; and the petitions prayed that the marshal might be directed to amend his return, or that it might be vacated, and that the marshal be instructed not to interfere with the possession of the boats by the petitioner as receiver. On the presentation of these petitions, the court ordered the petitioner to file in each of the causes a stipulation under the 34th admiralty rule, in the full amount of the libellant's claim, which was done. Thereafter answers to the petitions were filed, and the matter was heard before the court on the netitions and answers and evidence. It anneared in evidence that after the filing of the stipulations, the petitioner had acquired possession of the boats and had run them without interference by the marshal. Held, that, as the petitioner had obtained possession of the boats without the order of the court, the order of the court directing the marshal to withdraw from the boats was unnecessary, and the petitions, so far as they prayed for such order, must be dismissed.</p> <p>2. The court would not compel the marshal I to amend his return, nor would it set aside the return which he had made, and the prayer of the petitioner in this regard would he denied.</p> <p>[NOTE. Interlocutory decrees were entered in the two cases in favor of the libelants, and reference was had to a master to ascertain the amount due. The libelants then moved for a decree upon the stipulation, which was opposed by a petition to be relieved from the stipulation, and for leave to take testimony, and show that the libelants were not entitled to the decree. Leave was given, and testimony taken, and the cause was then heard, on a motion for a decree against the stipulators, and the petition of the stipulators to be relieved from their stipulation. It was held that the. libelants were entitled to a decree upon the stipulation for the amount of their liens as established. Case No. 12,068.]</p>

<p>[This was an action by Reuben L. Roshell and Hunt M. Shift against John Maxwell. Heard on motion for an alias execution.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,068.</p> <p>■Courts — Conflict of Jurisdiction — Sheriff’s and Marshal’s Lbvt — Receiver — Stipulation — Possession—Admiralty—Process — Collusion.</p> <p>1. Libels having been filed against the ferryboats R. and M. and processes issued they were seized by a U. S. marshal and keepers placed on board but the running of the boats was not stopped. On the return day of the processes the marshal made return that he had attached the vessels, and J., who was trustee under a mortgage on the boats executed to him to secure certain bonds, appeared as “trustee and claimant.” and McC. and H., the receivers of the N. J. M. R. R. Co., also appeared. Time to answer the libels was given and extended by various orders and finally expired without any answer being filed. The title to the boats was in the W. T. Co. of N. J. Prior to the marshal’s seizure, the boats had been levied upon by the sheriff of the city and county of New York by virtue of certain attachments and executions issued out of a state court, against the N. J. M. R. R. Co. Prior to the receipts by the sheriff of the attachments, the property of the N. J. M. R. R. Co. had passed into the hands of McC. and H. as receivers. The running of the boats had continued, and when the marshal seized them the sheriff made no objection, but the sheriff’s keepers were kept on board. The sheriff required bonds of indemnity to secure him against the results of suits for trespass, and because of the marshal’s seizure, the sheriff at once stopped a sale of the boats that he had advertised, and no proof was offered that he ever made return to the state court that the boats were held by him. J. then commenced an action in the New York supreme court to have the sheriff’s levies declared void and to obtain the possession of the boats. To this action ho made defendants the sheriff of the city and county of New York, the various parties in whose favor the sheriff had levied on the boats, and also McC. and H., but neither the libellants nor the marshal were made parties. An order was obtained enjoining the sheriff from further interference with the boats, and directing him to surrender possession to J., who was appointed receiver of the boats. J, appeared at. the boats the next day with the order and the sheriff withdrew, but the marshal remained. Thereupon J. applied to the U. S. court for an order vacating the marshal’s return, but the motion was denied because proper security had not been given, whereupon .T. filed a petition in which he averred that the United States court had not legal possession nor jurisdiction, and asserted for himself, as receiver, the right to have exclusive possession, on the ground of the seizure and subsequent surrender of the boats to him by the sheriff, and the petition prayed for a like surrender by the marshal. J. at the same time filed a stipulation in each cause for $250. It was objected that this security was not enough, and J. was ordered to eomply with the 34th admiralty rule. He thereupon, in compliance, filed security to double the amount of the claims in the usual form. No application for an order for the discharge of the boats was made after the stipulation was given, and no such order was made. Answers to the petition were then filed by the libellants and the marshal. Upon a hearing the petition was dismissed, interlocutory decrees were entered in the two cases in favor of the libellants and references were directed to ascertain the amount due. This having been done, the libellants moved for a decree upon the stipulations, which was opposed by a petition to be relieved from the stipulation, and for leave to take testimony and show that the libellants were not entitled to the decrees. Leave was given, and testimony was taken, and the causes being before the court on the motion for decree against the stipulators, and the petition of the stipulators to be relieved from their stipulation on the ground that it was simply a stipulation for costs, and that a stipulation of this character is void and cannot be enforced unless it appears that the boats are in the custody of the court: Held, that the stipulation was something more than a stipulation for costs, and that the language of the stipulation is the language of a security for the demand; that it is plain that the intention of the court in directing the security was to take security for the demand because it was ordered that the amount of the security be double the amount of the demands; that the stipulation is not simply a stipulation for costs, but is a security which permits resort to be had to it for the payment of the amount of the liens as ascertained by the proceedings had.</p> <p>[Cited in The Berkeley, 58 Fed. 921.]</p> <p>2. While in the ordinary case it might be contended that after giving a general appearance and a stipulation to secure the debt, it is too late to raise a question as to the service of the process, and that the legality of the custody of the property proceeded against has become immaterial, where a question is made as to the legality of the marshal’s custody of the property proceeded against, and when it is at the same time desirable that security be given, the court has the power to permit a stipulation to be given to satisfy the decree, at the same time reserving to the party giving the stipulation a right to deny the legality of the custody claimed by the marshal, and, if successful in such denial, to ask to be relieved from his stipulation.</p> <p>[Cited in The Monte A, 12 Fed. 335.]</p> <p>3. Upon the assumption that the sheriff’s levy was valid, it was terminated by the order of the state court appointing a receiver, and the marshal, being then on hoard the boats, immediately acquired possession, which he held without dispute until the next day, when the receiver appeared at the boats, and the result is the same if it lie considered that the sheriff’s authority was not discharged until the receiver appeared to demand possession.</p> <p>4. Although the processes in rem had been returned by the marshal before the sheriff’s custody was terminated, the life of such a process does not end with its return, and it affords authority and protection to the marshal until it is discharged or superseded by some other writ, and it is by virtue of the process alone, although return has been made, that the vessel is held in custody during the whole progress of the litigation. If at any time before the marshal was discharged his custody became legal, from that time at least the jurisdiction of the court was complete.</p> <p>5. There is little room to doubt that the appointment of the receiver of the boats was collusive and procured for. the sole purpose of defeating the jurisdiction of the court of admiralty. Therefore the claim of the receiver must be held to furnish no reason why the cases should not proceed to a final decree upon the stipulation.</p> <p>6. The libellants are entitled to a decree upon the stipulation for the amount of their liens as established.</p> <p>7. Afterwards J., the receiver, having applied to have the default against him opened and for leave to answer: Bekl, that his right to answer had been absolutely waived and that the court had no power to open the default.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,069.</p> <p>Extradition' — Warrant for Arrest — Copies of Original Papf,rs.</p> <p>1. Under the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, of August 9, 1842 [8 Stat. 5721. and the legislation of congress for carrying into effect its stipulations, no authority is required from the executive department of the United States to enable a judge, magistrate, or commissioner to issue a warrant for the arrest of an alleged fugitive from justice.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Thomas, Case No. 13,8S7.]</p> <p>2. Upon the hearing of a ease arising under said extradition treaty, not only copies of depositions, but also copies of warrants and other papers, certified under the hand of the person issuing the same, and attested upon the oat.h of the party producing them, to be true copies of the originals, are admissible as evidence of the criminality of the person apprehended.</p> <p>3. The act of June 22, 1800 [12 Stat. 84], which enacts as a mode of proof of the authenticity of such papers the certificate of the minister or consular officer of the United States in the foreign country, does not repeal or alter-the act of congress of August 12, 1848 [9 Stat. 3021. It merely provides another mode of authenticating the papers additional to the one provided by that act.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.] This was an appeal upon a decree entered, pro forma, in the district court, upon the following proceedings, filed in that court: The libel of Charles Boss, of Philadelphia, merchant, respectfully showeth: That the ship Active, commanded by Captain Elihu E. Morris, belonging to William Davy and John B. Davy, merchants, of Philadelphia, did, on her last voyaye from Canton, put into the Isle…

<p>[This was a bill to equity by P. A. Ross and others against Thomas D. Carpenter and others. Heard on motion for leave to amend.]</p>

In equity. On exceptions to answer. Suit by Charles B. Ross and William S. Ross, citizens of Kentucky, and Thos. B. Ross, an alien, against James Gibson and Elizabeth, his wife, and Joseph Reed, to enforce the conveyance of certain trust estates and for an account. First exception was not passed on by the court.

This was an action [by Henry W. Ross and' others against Charles H. Peaslee] for money had and received, to recover back money alleged to have been illegally exacted by the defendant, who is collector of the customs of the port of Boston, in payment of duties. The import in question was entered as “7 casks of brown tartar,” paying a duty of five per cent, ad valorem. It was charged with a duty of twenty per centum ad valorem.

[This was an action by Elizabeth Boss against Nicholas Kingston. Heard on] motion to compel the father of a bastard to support it. This court has no jurisdiction — it is not within the words of the act of congress of February '27, 1801 (2 Stat. 103), or of the act of the 3d of March, 1801 (2 Stat 115). The act of assembly of Virginia gives a peculiar jurisdiction to the county court only. Eev. Code 1792, c. 102, § 23. This is no crime or offence.

<p>Case Wo. 13,078.</p> <p>Pleading in Equitt — Bill of Review — Deeds— Recording — Effect of — Who are Creditors.</p> <p>1. A bill of review will lie for errors in law, or on the ground of newly discovered evidence.</p> <p>2. On the latter ground, the bill is filed by leave of the court. On the former, it is filed without leave.</p> <p>3. In Illinois, a deed takes effect from the tame it is filed for record; and all conveyances are void against creditors, which are not so-filed.</p> <p>4. The United States are' creditors within the law. against a delinquent postmaster and his sureties, against whom a judgment has been entered.</p> <p>5. On this ground the conveyance of property, the deed not having been left for record, until after the defalcation occurred, was declared void.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,079.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Supplies Purchased in Foreign Port — Authority of Master.</p> <p>[1. When necessary supplies are properly furnished to a vessel, on her credit, in any state out of which she belongs, a lien upon her is given by the general maritime law.]</p> <p>[2. The authority of a master to bind a vessel in a foreign port for necessary supplies is not, affected by the fact that he is also one of the charterers and owners pro hac vice.]</p> <p>[3. A vessel is' liable for necessary supplies purchased in a foreign port by its master, who is also one of the charterers, and consequently without authority to bind the owners, and who has no funds or credit belonging to himself or the vessel.]</p> <p>[Cited in The James Guy. Case No. 7,195: The A. R. Dunlop, Id. 513.]</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this-court was affirmed. Caso No. 10,133.]</p>

The act of congress incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company granted the same aid to the Leavenworth, Pawnee, and Western Railroad Company as it did to the main line; that is, a certain amount of land and of government bonds per mile. The last-named company was incorporated by tlie legislature of Kansas, and by an act of the same legislature, its name was changed to the Union Pacific Railway (Eastern Division).

<p>Case Wo. 12,081.</p> <p>Patents — Combination of Cabinet and Sewing M ACRIN E — N O VEJ.TY — 1.\ VENTI ON.</p> <p>1. A cabinet and a sewing machine being each of them old and well-known articles, and it having been the practice of some manufacturers, previous to the plaintiff’s patents, to forward sewing-machines 'o the purchasers packed in a box large enough to contain the treadle and pitman, and with a hole in the top for connecting the pitman with the machine placed upon it: Held, in view of these circumstances, that it required no invention to inclose the treadle of a sewing-machine within a cabinet provided with a door, and to place the stock on the top, so that both should be connected; and a claim for such a combination of a cabinet and a sewing-machine was held invalid.</p> <p>2. There is no invention in placing a box over a sewing-machine when not in use in order to nrotect it from dust, and a claim for it cannot be sustained.</p> <p>3. Doubted whether protecting the treadle and1 pitman of a sewing-machine from dust involves sufficient utility to sustain a patent.</p>

In equity. This was an application [by Thomas P. Rossiter and Louis It. Mignot] for a provisional injunction, to restrain the defendant L.Toseph Hall] from making and selling photographic copies of a copyrighted engraving called “The Home of Washington.” The copyright was secured in 1SG3.

[This was an action at law by Frederick Roth against the City Insurance Company to recover damages for the nonperformance of an insurance policy.]

<p>Appeal from Pulaski county court.</p> <p>[This was a bill by John McLain against Tennessee Roundtree, administratrix of Jesse Roundtree.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,080.</p> <p>Patents — Appealable Orders — Refosal to Grant Rehearing.</p> <p>[The refusal of the commissioner to declare a new interference, and grant a rehearing between the same parties, after the unsuccessful ■party has allowed the time for appeal to expire, is a matter which, by analogy to the practice at law and in equity, must be held to rest within his discretion, and no appeal will lie from his order.]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Roswell R. Rouse against Ingram Fletcher, Albert E. Fletcher, Thomas H. Sharpe, and Ebenezer Sharpe.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,088.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Mississippi Levee Taxes —Validitt of Tax Titles — Stamp Tax.</p> <p>|1. The Mississippi statute of November 29, 18(55, creating a levee district, and imposing a specific tax of 10 cents per acre upon the land included therein, and making the act itself notice to all persons interested therein to pay the tax by a day named, in default whereof the land would be sold, was a valid exercise of the power of taxation, and not in violation of the constitution of the state or of the United States.]</p> <p>[2. The sheriff and tax collector are officers of a county, within the meaning of the act of congress of .1 uly 13, 180(5. amending the former statute so as to exempt from the stamp tax all official documents issued by the officers of the United States, or any state, county, town, or municipal corporation: and a tax deed made by them no longer requires a stamp.]</p> <p>[3. The deed of the sheriff and tax collector for lands sold under the Mississippi act of 1805, for taxes due to the levee board, were not. required to be executed and filed in the office of the probate c-lerk upon the day of the sale: and where they were executed soon after, and placed in possession of the clerk, and were subsequently found in the office of his successor, t.he presumption is that they remained there during the intermediate time.]</p> <p>[4. Under the levee tax act of 18G5, the first payment became due on March 1. 1807. and the last, on March 1, 1S78. the whole of which must be collected before the 1st of March, 1879.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The judgment in this case was joint against the throe defendants, — Wade Hampton, Wade Hampton, Jr., and J. M.'Howell. A writ of error in the supreme court, sued out by Wade Hampton alone, was, upon motion of plaintiff (defendant in error) dismissed for nonjoinder of other defendants. 13 Wall.' (80 U. S.) 1S7. Another writ of error was sued out by all the defendants, and leave was given them, in the supreme court, to amend the return day tnereof. 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 6S4. Upon the final hearing the court reversed the judgment below upon grounds only incidentally touened upon in the opinion above, viz., the effect of the attempt of Wade Hampton, Jr„ to redeem the land on behalf of his father. The .circuit court ruled that the defendant Wade Hampton, “having been adjudged a bankrupt, upon his own application, after the land was sold for taxes, had thereby ceased to be the owner of the land, and lost the right to redeem.” This ruling the supreme court held to be error. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court. 22 Wall. (89 U. S.) 263.]</p>

This was an action on a time policy of insurance upon a vessel lying at the time of the insurance made, in her home port; and by the terms of the policy to be employed as a passenger vessel between New York and Galveston, in Texas. [The facts, as found by special verdict, were .these: The policy, dated the 30th January, 1800, was on a steamboat named the Commerce, then lying in the port of Baltimore.” and by it the defendant agreed to insure the boat, “for one year,…

This was a libel for wages. The libellant alleges that he shipped at Portland.

[Appeal from the district court of the Unit•ed States for the district of Massachusetts.] In this case, a monition to proceed to adjudication had been issued, upon… Held: that public and private armed ships may seize for the breach of a statute. But it is at the peril of the party making the seizure. Mr. Dexter. The commission does not extend to such a seizure. STORY, Circuit Justice. The party, who has been guilty of illegal conduct, will not be permitted to claim in court.

<p>Case Wo. 12,092.</p> <p>.Rankiu'ptot — Patmext or Counsel Pees bt BaNKUUPT — PllEFEKENCE—CoMPHOMISE of Disputed Claims.</p> <p>1. The bankrupts, prior to filing of their vol-»mtnry petition, paid their attorneys one hundred and fifty dollars, and assigned to them a large amount of uncollected claims, to secure •them, as alleged, for services rendered and to he rendered in the bankruptcy procéedings. An .•action was commenced against them by the ^assignee to recover back the moneys paid and ■the property assigned, on the ground that the .same were illegal, fraudulent, and void under the bankrupt liiw [of 1807 (14 Stat. 517)]. On .an application made by the assignee after issue .Joined, to compound the claim by accepting from the attorneys the claims still uncollected, and ■releasing them from all claims on those which •they had collected, held, that, the case was not a proper one for the compounding of disputed •claims under Gen. Order No. 20.</p> <p>2. The expense and delay of a litigation, ■though considerable, does not jnstify a com.promise in a case where public interests and the due administration of the bankrupt law require ■the settlement of the questions of law involved t>y the judgment of the court.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Libel for salvage. The material facts were as follows: On the 28th day of October, 1817, the schooner Hope, owned by the libellants [Isaac F. Rowe and others], sailed from Boston on a fishing voyage, with a crew of four men, commanded by Henry Geyer.

This action was brought to recover damages for undue delay in delivering a case, of merchandise shipped in the steamer City of Dublin, consigned to the libellant [Edward Rowe]. The steamer arrived in this port on. the 17th of September, and proceeded at once to discharge. The case in question, however, was not delivered with the rest of the cargo, and, on application of the consignee, was reported not to be on board.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Virginia.]</p> <p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,097.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — Agreement not to Remove.</p> <p>An agreement of a foreign insurance company, filed with the state commissioner of Ohio, waiving the right to remove causes against it to the federal courts, is void, and does not authorize the state court to proceed with the case, after the proper steps for the 'removal of the cause have been taken by such company.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,099.</p> <p>Practice in Admiralty — Costs — Unnecessary Libel.</p> <p>When two libels are filed where one only is required, costs only in one are allowed. 3 Stat. 19.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in The Pathfinder, Case No. 10,-797.]</p>

This was an action against the defendant, as an underwriter, upon a policy effected at the office of Shoemaker & Barret, in the name of Henry Sparks, and all others interested, (in the usual form,) on five hogsheads of sugar, marked D, on board the Brothers, at, and from, Santa Cruz, to Philadelphia; valued at 551 dollars. The vessel, on her passage, was captured by a Spanish privateer, and carried to Porto Rico.

[This was a bill in equity by the Rubber Step Manufacturing Company against the Metropolitan Railroad Company for the infringement of letters patent No. 135,815, granted to G. A. Keene, February 11, 1873. The bill prays for an injunction and account.]

[This was a bill in equity by the Rubber Tip Pencil Company against Samuel E. Howard and others.] [Pinal hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent for an “im- j proved rubber head for lead pencils,” granted i to J. B. Blair, July 23, 1S67, and assigned ¡ to complainants. The nature of the inven- ! tion is fully stated in the opinion. Two of the forms of application described in the patent are shown by the engraving.] 3

This was a case of seizure. At the last May term of this court (1829), upon motion, the following order was made: “The court order this cause to be continued, on the motion of the district attorney, he assenting to the following terms and conditions: (1) That the testimony of any of the witnesses of the defendant, who have attended at the present term in behalf of the defendant, may be taken down by the clerk and used as evidence in the court (2), That all other testimony,…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] This was a libel of seizure of the schooner Ruby, for an asserted forfeiture under the coasting act of 1793, c. 52. The libel contained two counts, or allegations.

Ejectment [by John Ruch against the city of Rock Island] for a block of laud in Spencer & Case’s addition to the town of Stephenson, the former name of Rock Island. The defendant claimed by virtue of an alleged dedication.

<p>Case No. 12,106.</p> <p>Shipping — Master—Bepaiks—When Authorized to Hypothecate Ship.</p> <p>1. Case stated. Under what circumstances the master is authorized, by the general powers legally incident to his station, to hypothecate the ship for repairs.</p> <p>[Cited in Purniss v. Mngoun, Case No. 5,163; The Panama, Id. 10.703.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Dunning v. Merchants’ M. M. Ins. Co., 57 Me. 112.]</p> <p>2. The maritime interest and legality of the bond disputed. Great utility and sacred obligation of contracts of bottomry, where necessary and legal.</p> <p>[Cited in The Hunter, Case No. 6,904.]</p> <p>3. This should induce caution to prevent their being diverted to improper purposes.</p> <p>4. Circumstances and causes justifying bot-tomry bonds: (1) For the safety and progress of the ship. (2) In a foreign port, and not where the owners- reside. (3) Not where the master has goods of his own, or of the owners. For he may pledge goods, freight and ship, or may sell part of the cargo to repair the ship. (4) There must be no other means of procuring money. (5) The sum loaned must be at the risk, and only on the faith of the ship.</p> <p>[Cited in The William and Emmeline, Case No. 17,687; Leland t. The Medora, Id. 8,237; Greely v. Smith, Id. 5,750.]</p> <p>[Cited in Braynard v. Hoppock, 32 N. Y. 573.]</p> <p>5. Hypothecation by the master cannot be for securing engagements not founded solely on credit of ship. Cannot be for advances on the persona] credit of owners.</p> <p>[Cited in Leland v. The Medora. Case No. 8,-237; Greely v. Smith, Id. 5,750.]</p> <p>6. Whether a consignee may take a bottom-ry bond, and under what circumstances.</p> <p>7. The amount of repairs to be charged; but bond and premium declared illegal by the court.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,107.</p> <p>Collision — Vessel at Anchor — Lookout—Lights —Apportionment of Damages.</p> <p>This was a libel filed [by Elisha Ruckman] to recover damages occasioned to the schooner Ney by a collision with the Five Boys in Hampton Roads, on the night of May 17, 1857. The libelant and one Henry W. Ward owned the Ney at the time, and, before the suit was commenced, Ward assigned his interest in the claim to the libelant. The Five Boys lay at anchor in Hampton Roads. The libelant alleges that she lay there without a light, which was denied. The Ney, coming into anchor, ran foul of her; another vessel, the Caroline Cole, came in shortly before, and anchored near, seeing the Five Boys there, and avoided her. The owners of the Five Boys claimed that the libelant was not entitled to recover, because, as they alleged, the Ney had no lookout; she was going at too great speed; the libel was too vague and general; and the cause of action was not one that could be assigned.</p>

<p>Application by a creditor, whose debt had been duly proved, to expunge the proof made by George W. Chipmau & Co., upon certain promissory notes indorsed by the bankrupt [Jane Ruddell], and upon an account guaranteed by her. The allegations were, that the bankrupt was a married woman, and that the debts in question were contracted for the accommodation of her son-in-law. This was admitted; but it was further alleged and proved, in support of the claim, that the bankrupt was a native of Great Britain, was married there, and was forced to leave her husband, by his neglect and inability to support her; that she had come to Boston without her husband several years ago, and had never cohabited with him here, nor been supported by him since her arrival, but had traded in her own name and on her own account.</p> <p>The statute which permits married women to hold separate estate, and to trade and contract debts, does not make valid all contracts into which they may choose to enter, but. only such as relate to their trade, or to their separate estate. Such a woman cannot enter into partnership with her husband, nor contract with him at law, nor bind her separate estate by an ordinary contract which does not relate to that estate, or does not pledge it explicitly; nor can she bind herself for the accommodation or as the surety of her husband or any other person. Willard v. Bastham, 15 Gray, 32S; Harrington v. Thompson, 9 Gray, 65; Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305; Plumer v. Lord, 7 Allen, 481; Gen. St. Hass. c. 108.</p> <p>Our rights do not depend upon the law of 1S55, but upon the Revised Statutes of 1830, c. 77, § 18, which, in the General Statutes, is found in section 29 of the chapter cited by the petitioner, and which gives full power to married women coming into this state without their husbands to contract as if they were sole. This is only a slight modification of the common law of Massachusetts, by which such women were held to have full power of contracting, if their husbands had •deserted them, or obliged them to leave their home. Gregory v. Paul, 15 Mass. 31; Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89.</p> <p>We admit that the bankrupt had power to contract for many purposes, but not for the accommodation of a third person. The common-law rule, applicable to women whose husbands had abjured the realm, did not extend beyond the reason for it, that is, to contracts for the support of the wife and her family; and the statute should be limited in the same way.</p>

This was a writ of error to the district •court. It was sued out by [Eliza J.] Buddick, .a creditor, in order to bring into this court for review an order granting a discharge in •bankruptcy to [J. B.] Billings. The proceedings were voluntary, and the discharge was resisted by the creditor on the ground that the bankrupt had, pending the proceedings, •made fraudulent entries in his books. A large .amount of testimony was taken.

<p>[This was a libel by George Ruddy and others against the schooner Golden' State for seamen’s wages.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,113.</p> <p>Execution — Sai.e of Land — Law in Fokce.</p> <p>Under the decisions of the supreme court, land must be sold on execution, under the law in force at the time the contract was entered into.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit for the recovery of freight. The defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice of set-off for mqn-ey paid, &c. At the trial a case was made for the opinion of the court, and now argued.

[This was a bill in equity by Horace M. Ruggles against Charles Eddy and Jacob Shaver for the infringement of letters patent No. 3,S76, granted to Henry Stanley, January 4, 1S45. A decree had been entered for plaintiff for an injunction and an account, with a reference to a master (Case No. 12,-117), and the cause is now heard on exceptions to the master’s report.]

[This was a bill in equity by Horace M. Ruggles against Charles Eddy and others.] [Pinal hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought on letters patent for an “improvement in coal stoves,” granted to Henry Stanley, January 4, 1845 [No. 3,S76] and extended* for seven years from January 4, 1859.] 2

(This was a bill in equity by Horace M. Ruggles against Charles Eddy and Jacob Shaver for the infringement of letters patent No. 3,876, granted to Henry Stanley, January 4, 1845. A decree had been entered for plaintiff, for an injunction and an account (Case No. 12,117), and the cause is now. heard on a motion for a rehearing.]

This was an action on a policy of insurance, dated the 9th of February, 1824, for 3,000 dollars, on the sloop Harriet, lost or not lost, at and from Newport in Rhode-Island, to, at, and from, all ports and places, to which she may proceed, in the United States, •during the term of six months, beginning on the 12th of January, 1824. Also, GOO dollars property on board said sloop, at and from Newport to Charleston or Savannah, or both.

The complainants, as mortgagees of the real and personal property, rolling stock, .furniture and fixtures of the Southern Minnesota Railroad Company, in trust, for securing the payment of the bonds of the said company, filed this bill to enjoin the defendant Simon-ton, the sheriff of the county of La Crosse, from selling certain cars and furniture of the railroad company, which he had seized and levied upon within his county, by virtue of an execution issued out of the state…

[This was a bill of complaint by Samuel B. Buggies and Albon P. Man, trustees, against the Southern Minnesota Bailroad Company. Heard on motion for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver.]

This is an application on the part of Manuel Ruhl for his discharge from custody, upon habeas corpus. The facts are that at the last term of this court he was convicted of a violation of the revenue laws, and sentenced to be imprisoned six months and pay a fine of one hundred dollars and costs, and stand committed until such fine and costs were paid.

<p>[In the matter of a rule of court prescribing the duty of circuit court commissioners in certain cases.]</p>

[Action for the infringement of a patent. On motion for a new trial, among other grounds, the defendants offered affidavits of certain of the jurors, showing the method of calculation adopted by the jury, with all the items of debit and credit as allowed in determining the verdict, to demonstrate, as they alleged, that the verdict was contrary tc the law as charged by the court, and - not supported by the evidence.] 2

[This was a bill in equity by the Rumford Chemical Works against George X. Heoker for the infringement of letters patent No. 14,722, granted to E. N. Hosford. April 22. 1856, reissued June 9, 1S6S, No. 2,979. Heard on motion for a continuance.]

[This was a bill in e'quity by the Itumford Chemical Works against John I-Ieclcer and George V. Heeker for the infringement of letters patent No. 14.722. granted to E. N. Hos-ford, April 22. 185(1. reissued June 0. 1868, No. 2.971). Heard on application for an injunction to restrain plaintiffs from prosecuting other suits.]

[This was a bill in equity by the Rumford Chemical Works against George V. Hecker-for the infringement of letters patent No. 14,722, granted to E. N. Horsford, April 22r 1850, reissued June 9, 1808, No. 2,979.]

[This was a bill in equity by the Rumford Chemical Works against George Y. Hecker, for the infringement of letters patent No. 14,-722, granted to E. N. Hosford, April 22, 1856, reissued June 9, 1868, No. 2,979.]

This was a bill in equity, brought by the Rumford Chemical Works, a Rhode Island corporation, founded on reissued letters patent granted… Held: that, as the alleged infringement charged in the bill was confined to the making and selling of pul-verulent acid, in infringement of the patent, only the first two claims of the patent were' involved; that the first claim was a claim to the described pulverulent phosphoric acid, as a new article of manufacture; and that whether the…

[These were bills in equity by the Rumford Chemical Works against Thomas C. Vice and various other defendants for the infringement of letters patent No. 14,722, granted to E. N. Horsford, April 22, 1856; reissued June 9, 1868, No. 2,979. Heard on motions for preliminary injunctions.]