Volume 20 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action for alimony.</p> <p>Motion for the dismissal of the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Aggravated Assault and Battery — Offense Against Public Justice. — Unlawfully assaulting a policeman knowing that he is such officer and engaged in the discharge of his duties, with the intention of causing him bodily harm, constitutes the crime of aggravated assault and battery defined in the Act of March 10, 1904, and is distinct from the offense against public justice defined and punishable by section 137 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Oeeense Against Executive Power — Repeal.—Section 84 of the Penal Code punishing the offense of interfering with an executive officer in the lawful discharge of his duties, was not repealed by the Act of March 10, 1904, which defines and punishes the offense of assault and battery.</p> <p>Motive of offense — Degree of Guilt. — The reasons which moved the accused to commit the offense of assault and battery may be taken into consideration by the trial court in fixing the degree of guilt of the defendant and the punishment therefor.</p>

<p>Appeal — Brief.—When the appellant does not file a "brief the court will consider only the fundamental errors.</p> <p>Petty Larceny — Possession op Stolen Property — Presumption.—Perhaps the ' possession of stolen property immediately after the robbery may not of itself alone raise the presumption of guilt in the possessor, but generally there are other circumstances surrounding the transaction which would be taken into consideration in order to determine the guilt of the accused.</p> <p>Id. — Explaining Possession of Stolen Property. — The fact that a person cannot explain how he acquired possession of stolen articles, although given an opportunity to do so, constitutes one of the circumstances of the presumptive commission of the crime sufficient to justify a conviction. The jurisprudence on this point is analyzed in the opinion.</p> <p>Id. — Possession of Stolen Property — Circumstances Establishing Guilt of Possessor. — When a person washing his hands puts a ring on the washstand and, being called out suddenly, the ring disappears and the accused, who had access to the place by reason of being employed in the- same factory, is found in possession of the said ring and upon being questioned about it replies that he purchased it from a little colored boy whom he is unable to produce, and the accused fails to prove at the trial.that he enjoys a good reputation, such circumstances are sufficient to justify a conviction of the accused of the theft of the said ring.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an action for rape.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Evidence — Mistakes as to Dates. — It is immaterial that the witnesses for the plaintiff may have been mistaken as to the dates of the happenings testified to by them, as that error does not affect the essential part of the obligation the fulfilment of which the defendant seeks.</p> <p>Id. — Contradictory Evidence. — The trial court has facilities for weighing the evidence and deciding upon the credibility of witnesses which this appellate eoux-t has not, within the nature of judicial proceedings, and in case the evidence should be contradictory it is the province of the lower court and not of the appellate court to adjust the conflict.</p>

<p>Description of Property — Curable Defect. — Artiele 9 of the Mortgage Law in connection with article 63 of the Regulations for its execution requires that all records of real estate shall set forth the boundaries of the property by the four cardinal points, and it is not sufficient that the grantee alone make said description, but it must be made by the grantor of his right so as to show that the right acquired is the same as that granted, and sueh an omission constitutes a curable defect.</p> <p>Deed of Compromise — Consideration.—A contract of compromise by its nature does not require juridical specification or amount of consideration, because the consideration of the contract is well defined by the fact of the compromise, and the mutual compensation is comprised in the different stipulations agreed upon in the settlement.</p>

<p>Conjugal Partnership Property — Presumption—Rescission op Contract op Sale — Delivery op Consideration. — Property acquired by a married person by the rescission of a contract of sale executed while he was a widower is presumed to be conjugal partnership property if the registry does not show that the consideration for the rescission was delivered before he married the second time.</p> <p>Record oe Title — Documents Presented in the Registry — Registrar not Required to Consult Documents on Pile in Registry.' — The registrar is only required to consider the documents presented to him for record, those accompanying the same and what may appear in the hooks of the registry regarding the property referred to in the deed presented for record. He is not required to consult other documents on file in his office.</p>

<p>Appeal — Adverse Party. — Por the purposes of an appeal the term "adverse party” does not include all persons who have been parties to the suit in the court a quo, but only those who would be affected by a reversal or modification of the judgment appealed from.</p> <p>Id. — Service on Co-defendant — Notice of Appeal. — An action for support having been brought against the father and the paternal grandmother of the children, notice of the appeal taken by the latter should be served on the co-defendant father, because her obligation to furnish the support being subsidiary to that of the father, the reversal or modification on, appeal of the judgment would affect the latter.</p> <p>Id.- — Service op Notice op Appeal. — Failure to serve notice of appeal on the adverse party is ground for the dismissal of the appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action of debt.</p> <p>Motion .of the respondent to dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the ■ opinion.</p>

<p>Libel — Cause op Action — Innuendo.—In a complaint to recover damages for libel it must be shown by an innuendo why the plaintiff considers the words to be libelous and how they particularly affect him. In the absence of such allegations in the complaint, it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.</p> <p>Id. — Cause op Action — Innuendo.-—The statement in a letter dismissing a municipal employe that said employe has brought a suit against the person dismissing him based on false facts, is not a libel in the sense in which the said words are ordinarily used, especially when in the suit for libel no allegation is made in the complaint tending to explain the false facts referred to in the letter.</p>

<p>Community Property — Date of Acquisition. — In determining whether or not a property is community property, the date of its acquisition and not that of its record in the registry will govern.</p> <p>Id. — Record of Title. — When a property is recorded in the registry by virtue of possessory title proceedings from which it is shown to have been acquired more than 14 years before and it is shown by a death certificate presented in the registry that the husband of the possessor had been dead about 14 years, it is impossible to determine from said documents whether the husband was dead at the time of the acquisition, or, therefore, whether the person in whose name the property is recorded is authorized to alienate the same as her private property.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal oe Appeal — Unappealable Order — Deeault. —The defendant demurred to the complaint and the demurrer having been overruled he was given time to answer, and upon his failure to do so the plaintiff moved that default be entered against the defendant, which was granted. The defendant moved to set aside the default entered against him and his motion was sustained. It was held that the appeal from said order should be dismissed for the reason that said order is not appealable.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Jnan, Section 1, in an action to set aside a. judgment.</p> <p>The respondent did not appear.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Mayagüez in an action for the declaration of a servitude and damages.</p> <p>Motion of respondent for the dismissal of the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Ees Judicata — Action to Set Aside Sale of Property for Taxes — Identity of Things, Causes and Parties. — The plaintiff in this ease moved to set aside the sale of a property made for the collection of taxes, which property was bid in by the defendants. The nullity of this sale was formerly raised by the same appellant in another action in which he and the respondents were defendants and the trial court decided the question against him in a judgment which was affirmed by this court on June 26, 1912. A part of the record of the said action was introduced in evidence by the respondents in support of the plea of res jndieata which they had set up. Held: That there existed the most perfect identity of things, causes and parties between this and the previous action, and therefore that the plea of res fudieaia was well founded.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a prosecution for aggravated assault and battery.</p> <p>Motion of fiscal to strike certain documents from the record.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Defects in Deed — Grantor’s Title — Detail Supplied prom Records. — The failure to set forth in a deed the manner in which the grantor of the right acquired title does not constitute a curable or an incurable defect, for the omission of that detail which is exacted by subdivision 3 of article 75 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law, does not prevent the registrar from supplying the same by consulting the records of his office.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action to set aside an execution sale and the marshal’s deed.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated iu tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action of debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated ifi. the opinion.</p>

<p>Possessory Title Proceedings — Jurisdiction.—In accordance with articles 390 and 391 of the Mortgage Law, jurisdiction of possessory title proceedings vests first in the district court, and only when there is no district court in the municipality where the property is located has the municipal court jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an action for the execution of a deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainee — Appeal—Deposit of Rent Due. — In accordance with, section 12 of the Unlawful Detainer Act of March 9, 1905, the defendant shall be denied the right of appeal unless he deposit in the office of the secretary of the court within five days after the date of the judgment the amount of rent due, but when the last day is a legal holiday, the term expires on the day following by operation of law.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Deposit of Rent Due. — When according to a contract of lease the rent is payable at the expiration of periods of six months, the appellant in an action of unlawful detainer is required to deposit in the lower court only the rent due for the six months which had expired when the judgment was rendered without including the rent for the time which had elapsed from the expiration of the last six months to the date when the judgment was rendered.</p> <p>Id. — Deposit oe Rent Due. — In accordance with section 1138 of the Revised Civil Code in connection with section 2588 of the Revised Statutes of' the United States, the deposit to be made by an appellant in the office of the secretary of the lower court of the amount of rent due should be made in the kind of money agreed upon in the contract of lease, or, in the absence of such an agreement, in the legal silver or gold current in Porto Eico, or in legal tender treasury notes.</p> <p>Id. — Checks as Deposit — Deposit op Rent Due. — In accordance with section 1138 of the Civil Code, when a deposit of the amount of rent due is made by an appellant in a case of unlawful detainer in checks accepted by the drawee, if said cheeks are not collected by the creditor, or not having been accepted by him their value is not affected by his fault, such deposit is contrary to law and does not meet the requirements of section 12 of the Unlawful De-tainer Act of March 9, 1905.</p> <p>Id. — Deposit in Check Accepted by Banks — Conditional Indorsement. — In the case at bar the appellant deposited in the lower court the amount of rent due in cheeks accepted by the banks on which they were drawn, said cheeks bearing the following indorsement: "Pay to the order of Don Jorge Silva Sapia, Don Tomás Silva y Rodríguez and the Plamicrondes Agricultural Company, as a deposit made in their favor, when the final judgment is rendered in the appeal which we have taken in an action of unlawful detainer brought against us in the District Court of Aguadilla. ’ ’ Reid: That even supposing (and it is not true) that cheeks accepted by banks have the effect of a real deposit in eases of this kind, the accepted checks deposited in the present ease would not have such effect because of the conditional indorsement upon them.</p>

Section 2, in an action for the refund of taxes paid under protest. Motion of respondent for reconsideration. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Action Against People op Porto Rico — Consent op People op Porto Rico to Be Sued — Destruction op Property by Sanitation Service. — Section 32 of Act No. 81 of March 14, 1912, only authorizes the bringing of suits against The People of Porto Rico by the owner of a property which has been unjustly and illegally destroyed or damaged by order of the Sanitation Service and not by third persons who have suffered indirectly by said destruction.</p> <p>Id. — Construction ■ op Law.' — Section 32 of Act No. 81 of March 14, 1912, in which The People of Porto Rico consents to be sued in certain cases, must be construed strictly, for its provisions impair the Sovereignty and tend to limit its power.</p>

<p>Appeal — Judgment.—An appeal will be dismissed when a copy of the judgment appealed from, as entered in the judgment book of the court, is not included in the judgment roll. It is not sufficient to .include in the statement of the case the decision wherein it is ordered that, a judgment be entered in accordance therewith.</p> <p>ON RECONSIDERATION.</p> <p>Id. — Dismissal without Prejudice — Reconsideration.—When an appeal has been dismissed by this court and the records show that the time for appeal has expired, a piotion to'reconsider the dismissal to the extent of dismissing the appeal without prejudice should be overruled.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an action for damages for libel.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an action for injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an action of . debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Justice Aldrey on an • application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Motion of the fiscal alleging that the decision of the appeal would serve no practical end. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Continuance — Exceptions.—In order that this court may consider the ruling of a trial court denying a continuance asked for by the accused, it is necessary that the ruling had been excepted to in the lower eourt.</p> <p>Evidence — Signatures—Expert Testimony. — In accordance with the provisions' of sections 87 and 90 of the Law of Evidence of March ,9, 1905, in order to prove the genuineness of the signatures to a document it is not necessary that the witnesses should be experts in the sense that they must have special knowledge, for said sections allow the signature to a document to be proved by any person who, although he may not have seen the signature made or be a witness to the document, believes the same to be authentic because he has seen the same signature on other documents.</p> <p>Evidence. — The admission in evidence by a court of documents bearing a signature which had been proven to be authentic by the testimony of persons who were familiar with 'said signature, the court thus deciding the controversy between the parties regarding the admissibility of said documents, is only a ruling that there is some evidence of the genuinesess of the documents which should be submitted to the jury in order that it may pass upon the credibility and weight of said testimony and decide whether it is sufficient to prove that the documents were signed by the person who appears to have executed them.</p> <p>Police — Civil Oepicers. — The police and officials entrusted with the preservation of the public peace are civil officers and the Insular police corps is a civil body.</p>

<p>' Dominion Title Proceedings — Citation of Fiscal and Former Owners. — Citation of the fiscal and of the former owners is an essential requirement in dominion title proceedings according to article 395 of the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>Id. — Citation of Fiscal and Former Owners — Public Policy — Appeal.—Citation of the fiscal and of the former owners in dominion proceedings is a condition precedent which affects public order or public policy and even when its omission is not objected to in the lower court by the contestant the question may be raised by the appellant for the first time on apiieal and the maxim concensus tollit errorem is not applicable.</p> <p>Id. — Ees Judicata — Withdrawal.—The voluntary withdrawal of a dominion proceeding does not constitute res judicata which prevents the bringing of another similar proceeding.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Appeal—Transcript op Record. — An appeal having been taken by the respondent judge from a decision rendered in certiorari proceedings, the appeal should be dismissed if the defendant and appellant fail to file a transcript of the record within the proper time.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Statement oe Case — Parties.—An order refusing to approve a statement of the case submitted by persons who were not parties to the original proceedings in an appeal in certiorari proceedings, is in accordance with law.</p> <p>Id. — Intervention.—A party who deems himself entitled to intervene in the court a quo in certiorari proceedings should assert his right while the cer-tiorari proceedings are pending and not after they have been decided by said court and an appeal taken from the decision to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Appeal — Parties.—Only those who have been parties to the proceedings in which the judgment appealed from was rendered are entitled to the ordinary remedy of appeal therefrom.</p>

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Ponce in an action for acknowledgment of natural children. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.

<p>Intervention — Appeal—Certiorari.—An order allowing a party to intervene in an action is not appealable, but said order may be reviewed on appeal from tlie final judgment without the necessity of resorting to a writ of certiorari.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction.—A court having jurisdiction of an action has jurisdiction also to mate an order allowing a party to intervene in the action. Certiorari — Intervention.—An order of the lower court allowing a party to intervene in an action of filiation causes no real or positive damage to the petitioner nor produces a complete or partial failure of justice.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of tbe Registrar of Property of Arecibo denying admission to record.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San Hermán .denying admission to record.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Consolidation of Properties — Record of Title. — Pursuant to article 61 of the Regulations . for the execution of the Mortgage Law, in order that various properties may be recorded in the registry of property under one number and as one single property, it is indispensable that the said properties belong to one sole owner or to several owners pro indiviso — that is, that each of the-different persons who wish to consolidate the real properties must have a joint ownership in each of the properties to be consolidated.</p> <p>Id. — Private 'Property — Community Property. — In accordance with the doctrine laid down in the foregoing paragraph, the private property of one of the-spouses cannot be consolidated with the community property because the personality of a spouse is distinct from that of the conjugal partnership.</p> <p>Id. — Exchange Between Spouses. — Sections 1361 and 1444 of the Civil Code-forbid contracts for the exchange of properties between spouses, and therefore a consolidation of properties whereby the wife grants to the conjugal partnership the ownership of a lot belonging exclusively to her in exchange for a joint ownership in the whole of the consolidated property is null and void.</p> <p>Record oe Title. — 'When a lot is not recorded or is unrecordable, the house constructed thereon is not recordable.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Record of Title. — When a mortgaged property is not recorded in the registry of property in the name of the mortgagor, the mortgage cannot be recorded in the name of the mortgagee. See Duran et al. v. The Registrar, deeided March 6, 1914.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Jnan, Section 2, in an action for restitution.</p> <p>Motion of the respondents to dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action of unlawful detainer.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court qf Hnmacao in an action of debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an action to rescind promissory notes, to quash proceedings for recovery thereon and for an injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judsment Lien — Record of Judgment. — la accordance with section 6 of the Act of 1906 relating to judgment liens, a property acquired prior to the recording of the judgment in the judgment book of the registry of property of the district is not affected by the lien created by the said act.</p> <p>Id. — Third Parties — Record op Judgment. — A person in whose favor a judgment has been rendered and recorded in the judgment book of the registry of property after the acquisition of a property, cannot claim the character of a third party in order to come within the provision of article 25 of the Mortgage Law, even though the recording of the property may be subsequent to the recording of the judgment.</p> <p>Fraudulent Conveyance- — Presumption.—In order that a conveyance for a valuable consideration may be presumed to be fraudulent, the following circumstances must exist: 1. That a condemnatory judgment be rendered against a 'person or a writ of attachment be issued against his property; 2. That the said person sell his property to another who is cognizant of the judgment or of the attachment-; 3. That a creditor is prejudiced by the conveyance and has no other legal remedy to obtain reparation for the injury.</p> <p>Contradictory Evidence — Findings of Trial Court. — In oases where the evidence is. contradictory the Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless it is shown that the latter was influenced by passion, prejudice, or partiality, or that 'it committed manifest error.</p>

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Arecibo in proceedings to secure the effectiveness of a judgment. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.

<p>Right to Personal Property — Bond op Intervenor — Nature op Obligation.— In accordance with sections 3, 14 and 15 of the Act of March 14, 1907, pro- ■ viding for the trial of right to personal property, the bond to be given by the intervenor who claims the property attached by a third person is not necessarily a penal bond, but its object is to guarantee to the attaching creditor that the intervenor will return the property in the same condition in which he received it, and in case of his failure so to do, to pay the value of said property with legal interest and the damages and costs that may he awarded against him.</p> <p>Id — Abandonment of Claim by Intervenor — Return of Property to Attaching Creditor.- — -When, as in the case at bar, the intervenor abandons his claim and, after having given the proper bond, returns the property to the creditor who attached the same, even in the supposition that the bond had been given for twice the value of the property, Jhe said creditor, if he receive the same, only has the right to be indemnified for such difference as there ■ may be between the value of the property when returned by the intervenor and the value it had when the intervenor received it, together with the actual damages sustained.</p> <p>Id. — Damages—Interest.-:—In view of the facts proven it is not necessary to decide in the present case whether in accordance with section 3 of the Act of March 14, 1907, the creditor who attached the property may claim from the intervenor indemnity for any damage he may have sustained in ease the legal interest on the value of the property were insufficient to compensate for the damage sustained.</p> <p>Id. — Attorney’s Pees — -Discretion of Court. — The allowing of attorney’s fees in intervention proceedings lies entirely in the discretion of the trial court, and this court will not interfere, as a general rule, with the decision of the lower court on this point.</p>

<p>-Administration — Jurisdiction.—In accordance with section 83 of the Law of Special Legal Proceedings of 1905, the court of the district of the last residence of the deceased or the district in which his property is located has jurisdiction over the judicial administration of the estate of a deceased person.</p> <p>Id. — Change of Venue — Contradictory Evidence — Residence.—When application is made for a change of venue in judicial administration proceedings of the property of a deceased person on the ground that his last residence was within another district and the court decides the conflict in the evidence by holding that the residence was within its district, this court will not disturb that finding.</p> <p>Id. — Judicial Defensor — Tutor.—A petition to a court for the appointment of a judicial defensor of a minor and of a tutor for another, does not imply necessarily the bringing of judicial administration proceedings, hence it does not prevent the bringing of judicial administration proceedings in another district where the deceased had his last residence.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in summary foreclosure proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Summons — Service by Person Other Than Marshal — Return oe Service. — In accordance with sections 92 and 97 of the Code of Oivil .Procedure, when a summons is served hy a person other than the marshal, it must be stated in the sworn return, among other things, that the said person was over eighteen years of age when he made the service, that he is not a party to the action and the place where the service was made. The omission of any of these requisites invalidates the service.</p> <p>Id. — Return of Servios. — The failure to state in the return on a summons served "by a person other than the marshal that said person was over eighteen years, of age, is not cured by the fact that the secretary before whom the return was sworn to stated that the said person was over eighteen years of age. Nor is it sufficient to say that the service was made at the residence of then defendant in a certain street without stating the name of the city.</p> <p>Id. — Default—Yoid Service — Pleading After Entry of Default. — When tlur service of a summons .is void the entry of default is also void and the said entry of default does not bar the subsequent filing of a pleading by the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Default—Appeal—Motion to Set Aside Default. — The fact that a defendant against whom judgment was rendered by default appeals therefrom without first moving the lower court to set aside said entry of default, does not bar him from pleading before this court the defects in the service of the summons which annul the entry of default.</p> <p>Default — Demurrer..—An entry of default does not prevent the defendant from filing a demurrer in the lower court or in the appellate court at any time-during the pendency of the action alleging that the plaintiff has no cause of action.</p> <p>Appearance — Waiver of Defective Service. — When the appearance of a defendant has been stricken from the record he is not barred from pleading on appeal the defects in the service of the summons.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an action for disturbance of the public peace.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Guayama in contempt proceedings. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.

<p>Habeas Corpus — Transcript op Record — Appeal—Presumption.—When, as in the present ease, the record brought up to this court in an appeal from a, decision denying a writ of habeas corpus is composed only of the petition, the order of the court granting the writ, the warrant issued to the warden of the jail to produce the petitioner, the return of the marshal thereon, the decision denying the petition, the notice of appeal and the bond for the release of the prisoner, this court lacks the necessary data to determine ■whether the imprisonment of the petitioner is unlawful and therefore it must be presumed that the judgment under which he is imprisoned is lawful.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Evidence.—In an appeal in habeas corpus proceedings this court cannot consider the original record of a proceeding against the petitioner when the said record is sent up by the secretary of the lower court stating that -the same had been offered in evidence during the hearing on the habeas corpus proceedings, but without the certificate of the trial judge that said record' was offered in evidence and when the secretary fails to state that the record was admitted in evidence by the court and when the said record is not complete because it does not include the oral testimony which it appears was introduced at the trial.</p>

<p>'Possessory Title 3?roceemngs — Dominion Title Proceedings — Due Process OF Law. — On September 7, 1900, a possessory title proceeding was recorded in the registry of property and on September 5, 1913, the proceeding converting the possessory title into a dominion title, decided August 22, 1913, in accordance with the Judicial Order of April 4, 1899, was also presented in the registry for record. The registrar denied the admission to record requested and this court held that the title should be admitted to record because the proceeding was not in conflict with the due process of law clause of the Constitution.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Construction oe Law — Prescription. — The Judicial Order of April 4, 1899, cannot he considered unconstitutional merely because it reduced to six years the period of prescription of twenty years provided for in article 393 of the Mortgage Law for the conversion of a record of possession into a record of ownership.</p> <p>In. — Construction oe Law. — The Supreme Court of the United States held, at most, in the case of Ochoa v. Hernández (230 U. S., 139) that the Judicial Order of April 4, 1899, is inconsistent with the due process of law clause of the Constitution as regards its retroactive effect which, in said case, deprived certain minors of their rights.</p> <p>In. — Military Governors — Validity oe General Orders. — Congress having ratified the orders of the American Military Governors of Porto Rico, it cannot be held that the said Governors lacked authority to amend the laws in force in this Island at that time, among which was the Mortgage Law, which, with some modifications, it still in force, unless first the Governors and then the Congress exceeded the limitations prescribed by the Constitution in the exercise of their powers.</p>

<p>Dominion Title Proceedings — Citation by Publication — Construction op Law — Constitutional Law. — The period oí sixty days prescribed by section 6 of the Judicial Order of April 4, 1899, amending article 395 of .the Mortgage Law, for the admission of proofs, also governs the citation of unknown persons who may be prejudiced by the recording of dominion title proceedings. This period is sufficient and cannot be considered in conflict with the due.process of law clause of the Constitution. See Darners et al. v. Registrar, decided March 30, 1914.</p>

<p>Inheritance — Testamentary I-Ieirs — I-Ieirs-at-Law—Record of Title — Third Parties. — According to article 23 of the Mortgage Law, the recording of property acquired by inheritance by testamentary heirs affects third parties after the lapse -of five years from the date of the record, but as to property acquired by heirs-at-law, the record is effective against third parties from the date thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Natural Child — Institution of Heirs — Action for Annulment — Third Parties.' — When, as in the case at bar, a sister applies for and obtains a decree to the effect that she is the heir of a deceased brother and, by virtue of said decree, records the property of her brother in her own name in the registry, and a natural son of the said brother, in an action for acknowledgment, obtains a judgment declaring him to be such natural son, an 'action by the son for the annulment of the said record and of the sale made to third parties brought after the lapse of the five years prescribed by article 23 of the Mortgage Law will not be sustained.</p> <p>Third Parties — Record oe Title. — The provision of article 33 of the Mortgage Law that admission to record does not validate instruments or contracts whieh axe null under the law is subject to the exception in favor of third parties prescribed by article 34 of the said Mortgage Law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action for damages for the fraudulent appropriation of real property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action of debt.</p> <p>. The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an action of debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion. '</p>

<p>Seduction — Chastity oe Victim — Consent to Carnal Act. — The fact that the accused had sexual intercourse with the victim at his mother's house where he had taken her to live is no proof of previous impurity of character.</p> <p>Id. — Punishment by Pine Only. — It is had practice to impose only a fine in cases of this kind.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the District Court of Mayagüez opening a default in an action for damages caused by negligence.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an action for an injunction to recover possession of real property.</p> <p>Motion of the respondent for a dismissal of the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Foreign Corporation — Capacity to Sue — Special Defense. — When the plaintiff is a foreign corporation and the complaint fails to allege whether or not it has complied with the provisions of the laws of Porto Kico governing said corporations, if the defendant desires to question the capacity of the corporation to sue on the ground of failure to comply with said laws, he should make that allegation specifically as a question of fact in the answer to the complaint, and if he does not, it will be considered that he has waived that defense.</p> <p>Id.- — Capacity to Sue — General Denial. — When it is only alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is a corporation constituted under the laws of the State of Texas with its domicile in the city of Houston of the same state, a general denial of the facts alleged in the complaint is not sufficient to raise the question of the capacity of said corporation to sue, nor to compel it to submit proofs of its organization and existence.</p> <p>Houston Packing Oo. v. PagIn, López & Oo. [Yol. 20, P. E. E,</p> <p>Id. — Capacity to Sue — Demurrer.-—The defense of lack of capacity to sue should be pleaded by demurrer on the ground of lack of capacity and not of lack ,of cause of action.</p> <p>Id. — Estoppel-—Contract.—A party contracting with a corporation is estopped from denying its existence in an action accruing from the contract.</p> <p>Pleading — Amended Complaint — Prayer op Complaint — Cause oe Action.— Neither the fact that the complaint is amended by a separate pleading without the preparation of a new complaint containing the amendment, nor the fact that its prayer fails to state that judgment is prayed for in favor of the plaintiff, is sufficient to sustain the plea that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.</p> <p>Evidence — Signature—Expert.-—It is not error to allow a witness to identify the signature to a letter signed by another person without qualifying as an expert when the witness knows the handwriting of the subscriber.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humaeao in expropriation proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Pees of Secretary of Court — Copies of Documents — Copy Prepared by Attorney. — The fees which a secretary of a district court should collect for certifying to a copy of a document are twenty cents per folio plus twenty-five cents for the certificate, and the fact that the copy of the document was made by the attorney and so presented to the secretary does not change this rule.</p> <p>Id. — Inspection of Public Document — Copies of Documents. — The right which every citizen has under section 47 of the Law of Evidence of 1905 to inspect and copy any public document, does not mean that the secretary of a district court is compelled, to certify to said copy of documents of which he is the custodian unless he receive the proper fee.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in a case of the judicial administration of an estate.</p> <p>Motion of the respqndent to dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Motion of the respondent withdrawing his complaint because of the satisfaction of the judgment. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Motion of the respondent withdrawing his complaint because of the satisfaction of the judgment. The facts are stated in the opinion.

. Motion of the respondent to dismiss the appeal. Motion of the appellant for a reconsideration of the decision dismissing the appeal. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San-Juan, Section 1, refusing to record a contract for a life annuity.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Evidence — Findings oe Trial Court. — The findings of the trial court will not be reversed on appeal on the ground of the improbability of the testimony of the witnesses when no partiality or passion is shown to have existed.</p> <p>Xd. — Lottery Tickets. — In view of the circumstances of this case, it was held that the admission in evidence of other lottery tickets seized in the house of the accused was corroborative evidence and that the court did not err in admitting the same.</p> <p>Id. — Dnpkejudicial Error. — The evidence admitted against the accused being strong, he is not prejudiced even supposing that the court committed error in admitting the evidence to which objection was made in this case.</p>

<p>Constitutional Eight — Bight to Assemble — Municipal Ordinance. — Both the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and section 753 of the Revised Statutes of Porto Eico guarantee the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and a municipal ordinance limiting- that right would be absolutely null and void.</p> <p>Municipal Ordinance — Traeeic Through Streets — -Use oe Public Squares. — • The power of a municipal government to make rules for regulating traffic through its streets and the use of its public squares and walks is unquestionable.</p> <p>Id.- — Strict Construction. — All municipal ordinances regulating a right of the people expressly recognized by law should be construed strictly.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Ordinance op Arecibo. — The municipal ordinance of Are-eibo of October 8, 1908, refers only to meetings held by political parties in times of elections, and its intention is to prevent possible conflicts between citizens campaigning for different political parties, rather than to insure free traffic through the streets of the city.</p> <p>Id. — -Meeting bt Organization Not a Political Party. — According to the scope of the municipal ordinance of October 8, 1908, explained in the preceding paragraph, the holding of a meeting by an organization which is not a political party without complying with the provisions of the said ordinance, does not constitute a violation of said ordinance.</p>

<p>Judgment on Admissions of Defendant — New Matter Alleged in Answer— Evidence. — When the defendant admits all the essential allegations of the complaint and offers no evidence in support of the new matter alleged in his answer, the court may render judgment against him without requiring the plaintiff to offer any evidence in support of his complaint.</p> <p>Renewal of Note — Evidence.—The defendant who alleges the renewal of a note as a defense must prove his allegation.</p> <p>Id. — Genuineness of Note — Evidence.—When a promissory note is transcribed in the complaint and the defendant fails to deny its genuineness under oath in his answer, the court is justified in considering its genuineness and also the date of maturity stated therein as proven without requiring the plaintiff to introduce the note in evidence, unless the defendant prove that it was renewed.</p>

<p>Natural Child — Action for Acknowledgment — Prescription.—The complaint shows that the plaintiff was born in 1873 or 1874 and that her putative father died in the year 1906, when the present Civil Code was in force, section 199 of which provides that an action to claim filiation may be filed at any time within two years after the child becomes of age. The complaint was filed on July 8, 1913, and therefore the action had prescribed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4 of the Temporary Provisions of the Civil Code and section 1840 of the code.</p> <p>Id. — Action for Acknowledgment — Declaration of Status as Natural Child. — An action brought under the title of declaration of the plaintiff's status as an acknowledged natural child is in reality an action for acknowledgment to secure a decree declaratory of said acknowledgment, notwithstanding the-fact that the complaint contains allegations that a solemn and authentic acknowledgment had been made.</p> <p>Id. — Prescription—Action for Acknowledgment. — The terms of prescription provided for by section 199 of the Revised Civil Code are applicable to the case because it is an action for the acknowledgment of a natural child; however, if the plaintiff already had in her favor an acknowledgment made in a solemn and authentic manner at the time she brought the action, she may claim such rights as that confers upon her.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an action of ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus directed to the Judge of the District Court of Ponce in an action of filiation and partition. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.

<p>Bape — Consent.—The crime of rape consists essentially in the outrage inflicted upon the person and feelings of the woman and always involves the absence of her consent.</p> <p>Id. — Consent—Presumption.'—The. lack of consent of the victim in a case of' rape is shown by her resistance when she is in full control of her faculties, while in other eases it is presumed, as when she is under fourteen years of age or when at the time of the commission of the crime she is unconscious of its nature or submits in the belief that the accused is her husband, etc.</p> <p>Id. — Information—Duplicity oe Charges. — The allegation in the information that the accused had sexual intercourse with a female under fourteen years of age who was not his wife and overcame her resistance by force, does not imply a duplicity of charges.</p> <p>Id. — Course oe Trial — Discretion oe Court. — The course of a trial is a question which rests largely in the discretion of the eonrt and it must be shown that the court abused its discretional power before this court will reverse a judgment for errors committed in the exercise of that power.</p> <p>Id. — Age oe Victim — Evidence—Estoppel.—A defendant who does not object to the victim’s testimony as to her age is estopped from alleging on appeal that there was no evidence of said age. Besides, the testimony of the victim was corroborated in this case.</p> <p>Id. — Verdict—Assault with Intent to Commit Rape. — In view of the information and the result of the evidence, the crime of assault with intent to commit rape was included necessarily in that of rape with which the accused was charged, therefore the verdict finding him guilty of the first offense is correct according to section 286 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the jurisprudence cited.</p>

<p>Costs — Defective Affidavit — Appeal.—The failure of the notary to certify in- , an affidavit to a memorandum of costs that the affiant was known to him personally or to state clearly that the person before whom the oath was made was a notary public, are defects which cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal if not alleged in the lower court.</p> <p>Id. — Excessive Pees — Appeal—Transcript of Record — A transcript of record which contains only the memorandum of costs and attorney’s fees, the bill of objections, the decision of1 the court, the notice of appeal and the motion-for the approval of the memorandum of costs, none of which documents shows the amount involved in the litigation, the number and importance of the questions raised, the study necessary and the time employed by the attorney for the party claiming the attorney’s fees, etc., is insufficient to enable this court to decide whether the fees approved by the trial court are or are not excessive.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action for acknowledgment as natural child.</p> <p>MotioNs of the respondents to correct the record and to dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a prosecution for violation of the Sanitary Regulations.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San Hermán assigning curable defects.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action of unlawful detainer.</p> <p>The facts are stated in 'the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an action for the performance of a contract for the sale of real property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal oe Appeal — Assignment oe Error — Fundamental Error.— When, as in'the present ease, the appellant fails to comply with the provisions of sections 42 and 43 of the Rules of this court by specifying separately the errors on which the appeal is based and no fundamental error appears from the record, the appeal should be dismissed.</p> <p>Nullity up Will — Reasons Not Alleged in Complaint — Evidence.—The mental and physical incapacity of the testatrix not having been alleged by the plaintiffs as reasons for the annulment of the will, the trial court committed no-error in rejecting evidence tending to prove the said reasons or in failing to-consider them as a ground of nullity.</p> <p>Evidence — Weighing Evidence by Trial Court — Error.—The weighing of the evidence by the trial court cannot serve as a ground for the reversal of the judgment appealed from or for holding that a fundamental error existed, nnless it is shown that the court was influenced by partiality, passion, or prejudice, or that there was a palpable omission in considering the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Nullity oe Will — Presumption—Notarial Documents. — There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of notarial documents and when a will executed before a notary who has since died is attached, strong evidence of its nullity must be submitted.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action for the .annulment of a deed of dissolution of partnership and other matters.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Adulterated Milk — Intention.—In accordance with section 1 of Act No. 59 of 1910, the mere act of adulterating or diluting milk is not punishable unless it is done with the intention of offering the same for sale; therefore, when a person is accused of having committed that act it must be proved that he did so with the intention of offering the same for sale. •</p> <p>Id.' — Sale oe Adulterated Milk — Intention.—Section 1 of Act No. 59 of 1910 also punishes the mere act of keeping or offering adulterated or diluted milk for sale and in this case it is not necessary to prove that the milk was adulterated or diluted with the intention of offering it for sale or that the accused was the one who adulterated it or that he knew that it was adulterated.</p> <p>Id. — Sale oe Adulterated Milk — Liability oe Owner. — In accordance with section 1 of Act No. 59 of 1910, the owner of a milk stall where adulterated or diluted mills is sold, is criminally liable for the said offense, and it is immaterial whether the sale was made by him or by his employe.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an action for the recovery of hereditary property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal oe Appeal — Ex Parte Proceedings — Transcript op Record. — In ex parte proceedings in which, there is only one party because théré. were no contestants, the transcript of the record, in case of appeal, must be certified to by the secretary of the lower court and not by the attorney for the only party, and when the transcript is presented in this court in. the latter form the appeal should be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in a proceeding for the approval of a partition of an inheritance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Damages — Detention op Merchandise. — It appearing from the evidence that the merchandise was detained by the defendant for orily eight days, and it not having "been shown that the plaintiffs suffered any injury or that the goods were damaged, the judgment against the defendant for an indemnity of $200 should he reversed.</p> <p>C/ROSS-COMlPLAINT-MERCHANDISE UNLOADED UNLAWFULLY-FREIGHT AND STORAGE. — The defendant having unloaded and stored the merchandise in litigation against the objection of the plaintiffs and in violation of the bill of lading covering the shipment, it is not entitled to claim compensation for the use of its lighters in discharging said merchandise nor for wharfage, and -therefore the cross-complaint was properly dismissed.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Aguadilla in an action for the execution of a deed or for the payment of a debt and for damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The respondent did not appear.</p>

<p>Bribery — Ways of Committing Bribery — Duplicity of Charges — Information. — In accordance with section 105 of the Penal Code, the crime of bribery may be committed in either of the ways expressed therein, i. e., asking for a bribe, receiving a bribe or agreeing to receive a bribe, but when all three aets are committed at the same time and a person is charged with them as successive acts of a single transaction, they constitute a single crime and the information does not contain the defect of a duplicity of charges.</p> <p>Jury — Challenge to the Array. — A general challenge to the array is an objection made to all the jurors returned to serve as jurors for a term of the court or for the trial of a certain case, and can be founded only on a material departure from the forms prescribed in regard to the drawing and return of the jury or on the intentional omission to summon one or more of the jurors drawn.</p> <p>Id. — Challenge to the Array. — The faet that at a certain time 200 names are not found in the box is not sufficient ground for a challenge to the array, for that faet alone does not imply that the jury commissioners failed to select the 200 names required by law. The names of some jurors may have been stricken from the list because of death, permanent absence or exemption from service.</p> <p>Id. — Challenge to the Array — Special Jurors. — The fact that in addition to the 24 jurors of the regular panel serving in a district court the court ordered other special jurors to be summoned to fill the places of those who might be challenged or excused, is no ground for a challenge to the array.</p> <p>Id. — Challenging Jurors — Discretion op Court. — Every juror is required to take two oaths: (1) The voir dire as to his qualifications and (2) to try the particular case before the court, and challenges should be made after the first oath is taken and before the second, but the court, in the exercise of its discretional power, may vary the order prescribed when there are good reasons therefor, and when it does this it would have to be shown that the court abused its discretional power before the error alleged to have been committed could serve as a ground for the reversal of the judgment.</p> <p>Id.-CHALLENGE OP JUROR FOR IMPLIED PARTIALITY-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Juror and Victim. — A member of the jury in this ease who testified that he was the cousin of the victim in the action for murder, in the trial of which the bribery was committed, was challenged for cause by the defense based on subhead 1 of section. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the court overruled the challenge. Held: That technically the case of the said juror did not come under the provisions of the section referred to.</p> <p>Id. — Challenge op Jurors por Cause — Peremptory Challenge — Error.—An error which a court may commit in overruling a challenge of jurors for cause is immaterial and is cured if the accused peremptorily challenges the same jurors later or is in a position to do so and does not.</p> <p>■Evidence — Testimony of Person Not Party to Action. — The rights of the accused cannot be prejudiced by the testimony of another person unless it is shown, as in this ease, that the accused and said other person had combined in the fraudulent transaction to which the testimony refers. The better practice in such eases is first to prove the relationship existing between the accused and the person about to testify.</p> <p>Motion to Quash. — A motion to quash made by the accused after only some witnesses for the prosecution have testified, is generally premature and improper.</p> <p>Verdict op Jury — Contradictory Evidence. — The verdict of guilty returned by a jury after deciding the conflict arising from contradictory evidence, which verdict served as a basis for a judgment of conviction, should be accepted, by this court unless it is shown that the court or the jury was influenced by passion, partiality, or prejudice or committed manifest error.</p> <p>JTormer Jeopardy — Bribery Committed in Different Ways. — In order that a plea of former jeopardy may be sustained, it is necessary that the two offenses be identical. A juror may commit two distinct crimes of bribery in the same ease — one as such juror .by receiving the bribe directly for the sale of his vote and the other as a private individual acting in combination with the interested party by offering and giving money to another juror for the sale of his vote.</p> <p>Evidence — Accomplice-—Knowledge op Intended Commission of Crime. — The fact of itself that a person is aware that a crime is about to be committed aud keeps silent is not sufficient to make him an accomplice, and his testimony is admissible against the accused.</p>

<p>Consolidation op Actions — Discretion op Court. — The granting of a motion for the consolidation of actions lies in the discretion of the court and its decision will not tie reversed unless it is shown that its discretional power was abused.</p> <p>Postponement op Trial — Setting Cases por Trial — Special Jurors — Special Criminal Term. — The fact that three criminal actions for bribery against three different defendants were set for trial on three consecutive days without stating the order in which they should be tried, that special jurors were summoned and that the court called a special criminal term in the midst of a civil term is not sufficient reason to justify the postponement of a trial in the absence of other and more powerful reasons.</p> <p>Jury — Challenge to the Array- — Drawing Jurors por Another Trial. — The fact that the court drew twenty names of jurors from the box to serve m another trial and that the box did not contain 200 names of jurors when the tickets were drawn, is not sufficient ground for a general challenge to the array.</p> <p>Id. — Challenge éor Cause — Peremptory Challenge. — The refusal of a court to sustain a challenge for cause is not error when the accused has not exhausted the peremptory challenges allowed him by law.</p> <p>Id. — Public Trial — Exclusion on? Juror erom Court-Room. — When the court asks, but does not order, that jurors who are to serve in another case withdraw from the court-room, such request is not error nor does it divest the trial of its public character.</p>

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Aguadilla in injunction proceedings ■ to recover the material possession of real property. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a prosecution for violation of the Internal Revenue Law.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Locus Delicti — Jurisdiction.—After an examination of the evidence introduced in this case, it was held that it had been proven that the offense charged was committed by the accused within the jurisdiction of the lower court.</p> <p>Internal Eevenue Law — Illicit Cigar Factory — Evidence.—In order that a cigarmaker who works in an illicit cigar factory may be convicted of a violation of the Internal Eevenue Law, in that the owner of the factory had no license as required by law, it must be shown that he knew that the said owner had not complied with said requirement.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action for the nullity of a designation of heirs and partition of inherited property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Consolidation of Properties — Joint-Ownership—Record of Title. — When several owners and vendors segregate certain parcels of land from their respective properties for consolidation into one single property, it is necessary that the deed of consolidation and sale state the legal conditions under which the owners made the consolidation constituting themselves joint owners of the consolidated property; for unless this is done, neither the consolidation nor the sale can be recorded in the registry.</p> <p>Execution of Deed Before Mortgage Law Went Into Effect — Failure of Notary to Certify That He Personally Knew the Contracting Parties. — A public deed executed on October 10, 1876, before the Mortgage Law went into effect in this Island, but during the effectiveness of the Notarial Act of 1873, which deed is defective by reason of the failure of the notary . to certify that he knew the contracting parties personally, is null and void according to section 27 of the said Notarial Law.</p> <p>Record of Title — Registrar to Censure Documents. — A registrar of property has authority to censure a deed presented in the registry to prove the acquisition of ownership of a property before the Mortgage Law went into effect, although said deed is not presented for record but for the purpose of recording another deed of sale of the said property.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal of Appeal — Construction.—In accordance with section 8 of the Civil Code in connection with subdivision 4 of section 392 of the Political Code, the period of one month allowed by section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Act of March 11, 1908, and Act No. 70 of March 9, 1911, means a month of thirty days and an appeal taken after the expiration of that time should be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action of ejectment and for damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from an Order of the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, granting a new trial in an action of debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registry of Property of San Germán refusing to record hereditary property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Annuity — Cancellation oe Annuity — Mention oe Annuity — Marginal Note.— The fact that the registry does not contain an entry of record of the annuity sought to be canceled is no bar to the cancellation of the mention thereof made in the first record of the property by means of a marginal note to the last record of the property.</p> <p>Id. — Cancellation oe Annuity — Mention oe Annuity — Catholic Bishop. — The fact that the registry does not show the name of the person in whose favor a chaplaincy or annuity is constituted is no bar to the cancellation of the mention of the said annuity made in the first record of the property by virtue of a. deed of cancellation executed by the Catholic Bishop of Porto Rieo who alone as representative of the Catholic Church may consent to the said cancellation.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a prosecution for keeping á house of ill fame.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San German refusing to admit to record a deed of sale.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Complaint by tbe Attorney General of Porto Rico for tbe disbarment of tbe respondent.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Aguadilla denying admission to record of a voluntary mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action of ejectment and for damages.</p> <p>Motion of the Appellants for a Reconsideration.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ApplioatxoN for Admission to Practice Law without Examination.</p> <p>Motion to reconsider.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the decision.</p>

<p>Appeal to Supreme Court op United States — Translation op Part op Statement op Case — Motion to Strike Out. — When in preparing a translation of the transcript of the record for the purposes of an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States one of the parties translates only that part of the statement of the case approved by the trial court which supports his ease and not the entire statement, such part should be stricken out.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, from an order dissolving an attachment in an action of debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a case of intervention in ownership of real property and for an injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action for the execution of a deed, a survey of property, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Rule for Respondent to show cause why he should not he dismissed from the notarial profession on account of his disbarment on May 8, 1914. The facts are stated iu the decision.

<p>Dismissal op Appeal — Reconsideration—New Facts Alleged in Motion to Reconsider. — When a motion to dismiss an appeal has been overruled a motion to reconsider the said ruling alleging new facts which were not set up in the former motion will be overruled.</p>

<p>Liability of Employer — Action for Damages — Essential Allegations of Complaint. — A complaint in an action for damages based on subdivision 1 of section 1 of the Employers’ Liability Act of March 1, 1901, should contain the following essential allegations: 1. That the relation of employer and employee exists between the plaintiff and the defendant; 2. That when the employee received the injury he was working within the sphere of his occupation; 3. That the employee exercised proper care and diligence; 4. That the proximate cause of the accident was a defect in the ways, works, or machinery of the defendant; 5. That the defect originated or was not discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the employer or of some person in his service entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, or machinery were in good condition. After an examination of the complaint in this case it was held that it did not state a cause of action because the allegation stated above under No. 5 was omitted.</p> <p>Id. — Proximate Cause oe Accident — Negligence.—The allegation in a complaint that the proximate cause of the accident was due to the bad condition or insecurity of the hatches and strong-backs of the holds where the plaintiff ivas working, which were worn by long and constant use, does not supply the omission in the complaint of the allegation that the defect originated or was not discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the employer or of some person in his service entrusted with the duty of seeing that the hatches and strong-backs were in good condition.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an action for the liquidation of a partnership,1 the annulment of a deed, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Mayagüez in an action for the partition of community property originating in the Municipal Court of San G-ermán. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Mayagüez in an action of debt originating in the Municipal Court of San Germán. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.

<p>Promissory Note — Sureties—Abandonment oe Action — Action Against One Surety. — The promissory note in litigation was signed by the debtor and also by two sureties under the following endorsement: “We constitute ourselves sureties and principal debtors jointly and severally for the amount of this obligation * * Held: That the defendant bound himself not only as surety, but also as principal debtor in said promissory note and that pursuant to section 1111 of the Civil Code the fact that the creditor had brought an action against the direct debtor in the note and then abandoned said action, is no bar to his bringing an action later against the' defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Levy—Eelease oe Levy — Action Against One Surety. — The creditor brought an action against the direct debtor in the promissory note and levied on property which, when offered for sale, found no bidders. The creditor and debtor agreed that the levy should he released and that no claim would he made for damages. Held: That this was no bar to the creditor’s bringing an action later against one of the sureties and principal debtors, especially as the surety had suffered no injury thereby.</p> <p>Appeal — Opinion op Tkial Judge. — Although the failure of the trial judge to prepare an opinion is no ground for the reversal of the judgment appealed from, it is the duty of judges of district courts to prepare such opinions.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court .of Mayagüez in an action on a promissory note.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Onus Probandi. — In an action of ejectment the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his title and identify the property in litigation.</p> <p>Id. — Conflict of Titles — Onus Probandi. — When, as in the case at bar, there is a conflict of recorded titles between the plaintiff and the defendant, the property in controversy being recorded in favor of both, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his title from its origin and that not only the civil but also the material possession of the property was acquired by him before the defendant acquired his title, which proofs were not submitted in this case.</p> <p>Id. — Statement of Case — Documentary Evidence — Evidence of Record of Deeds. — While it is true that it is not necessary to transcribe the documentary evidence in full in the statement of the case, nevertheless, when it is important to show that the deeds were' recorded in the registry, the part of the documents proving this fact should be inserted in the statement of the case.</p> <p>Id. — Conflict of Titles — Presumption.—Priority of Title. — When a property appears recorded in favor of both the plaintiff and the defendant and the lower court decides the conflict between the titles in favor of the defendant, ' in the absence of proof to the contrary it is to be presumed that the defendant's title is older than that of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>TPormer Jeopardy — Autrefois Acquit — Transcript of Record — Presumption.—■ When the defendant pleads former jeopardy and autrefois acquit before the trial court, but does not include in the transcript on appeal a copy of the complaint or of the judgment of acquittal on which the plea is based, this court must presume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the lower court committed no error in overruling said plea.</p> <p>Barber Shops — Commercial and Industrial Establishments. — Although a barber shop is not a commercial establishment, it may be considered as an industrial establishment in the broad sense frequently given to the word ‘ ‘ industry. ’ ’</p> <p>Id. — Industrial Establishments — Construction of Law. — The provisions of section 553 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 131 of August 9, 1913, show that it was not the intention of the Legislature to give to the word ‘ ‘ industry ’ ’ the single meaning which it has 'in economic science, but a more general meaning in harmony with the ends of the said act, and that the purpose of the act was to include within its provisions places dedicated to lucrative purposes not expressly excepted, barber shops being included, therefore, in the penal law as industrial establishments in the broad sense of the term, or as places dedicated to labor for the purposes of profit or gain.</p> <p>I'd. — Construction of Law. — Prom the provisions of Act No. 134 of August 12, 1913, enacted by the same legislative assembly which passed Act No. 131 of August 9, 1913, amending section 553 of the Penal Code, it is inferred that the Legislature had no intention of giving to the word “industry” a different meaning in the two acts, and that inasmuch as barber shops were included in the provisions of the former act it should be inferred also fhat they were included in the latter act.</p>

<p>Property op Minors — Tutor—Conveyance or Property in Payment op Mortgage — Cancellation op Mortgage — Authorization with Retroactive Effect. — When, as in the ease at bar, the admission to record of a deed to a mortgaged property in payment of the mortgage and for its cancellation, executed by a tutor in the names of his wards, was denied previously because . said tutor was not authorized judicially to execute the same (Quinones v. The Registrar, decided March 5, 1914), and the necessary judicial authorization is obtained later from the district court mme pro tunc as of the date when the deed was executed by the tutor, said judicial decree cures the defect which existed formerly and malíes it unnecessary for the tutor to execute a new deed under said judicial authorization.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Gfuayama in an action for the recovery of alimony.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Leave to Pile Another Complaint — Pinal Judgment. — When, as in? the present ease, a judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and granting leave to file another complaint, the judgment rendered is considered as final • and is appealable in accordance with subdivision 2 of section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the Act of March 9, 1905.</p> <p>Id. — Trial de Novo — Appeals prom Municipal Courts — Amendment op Complaint. — District courts are authorized to allow amendments to complaints, in trials de novo of cases appealed from municipal courts in the same cases, in which they are authorised to grant the same in eases coming under their original jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari to tlie Judge of the District Court of Mayagüez in an action of debt begun in the Municipal Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Tbe respondent did not appear.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a proceeding for the partition of property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The respondent did not appear.</p>

<p>Appeal — Allegation Not of Record. — When the appellant makes an allegation on appeal which is not borne out by the record, this court has no basis upon which to consider and decide the same.</p> <p>Record of Title — Curable Defect. — When a deed of sale of a house, stating that the vendor acquired the same by purchase, is presented for record in the registry and the records of the registry show that the house was acquired by construction, the registrar is warranted in considering said contradiction a curable defect.</p>

<p>Disinheritance — Construction—Will.—The general rule that wills should be construed so that the intention of the testator may prevail is not applicable to clauses of disinheritance, but in such cases the provisions of law allowing disinheritance must be strictly observed.</p> <p>Id.' — Will—Reference to Action for Divorce. — Pursuant to the provisions of section 826 of the Civil Code, the disinheritance of .an heir, without stating the legal reasons of the testator therefor, is void, and reference in the will to the grounds set up in an action for divorce filed in a court is insufficient and without eifect.</p> <p>Id. — Action to Annul Will — Motion to Strike Out. — When in an action to annul a will based on the fact that the disinheritance by the testator is void because of failure to state the reasons therefor in the will, the defendant in his answer alleges as new matter of defense the grounds for divorce set up in a complaint filed in a court but not stated by t.he testator in the said-will, in which only reference was made to the said complaint, a motion to strike out the said reasons alleged in the answer should be sustained on the ground of irrelevance.</p>

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Aguadilla in an action for contempt. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action for the annulment of a contract and for damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Discharge ce Petitioners — Appeal.—A decision of a district court in hateas corpus proceedings may Ire appealed from to this court by any of the parties aggrieved, and when the discharge of the petitioners is ordered the party aggrieved is the person in whose custody the petitioners were.</p> <p>Id. — Petition bt Attorney General — Appeal by Fiscal from Decision Sustaining Petition — Appeal.—When, as in the case at bar, the district court sustains the application for a writ of habeas corpus- presented by the Attorney General of Porto Rico in the name of the petitioners, The People of Porto Rico is estopped from appealing by a fiscal from said decision which was rendered at its instance and in its favor, and the appeal should be dismissed.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Amicus Curiae. — The fact that the court allowed a municipal judge to appear as amicus curias is no bar to the dismissal of the appeal when the circumstances of the case so require.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action for restitution and for damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainer — Conflicting Titles. — Although it is true that in unlawful detainer proceedings questions of ownership arising from a conflict of titles between plaintiff: and defendant cannot be considered, the said doctrine is not applicable to this case because no conflict of titles exists.</p> <p>Id. — Title op Plaintipp — Execution Sale. — It appearing that the plaintiff acquired the property occupied by the defendant by purchase at a public auction in execution of a judgment rendered against the said defendant, it was held that the plaintiff has a right to require that the defendant vacate the property.</p> <p>Judicial Knowledge — Stake Decisis.: — This court should give legal effect to its decisions and apply them to subsequent cases although they may not be cited by the parties.</p>

<p>Transcript of Record — Certification by Secretary of Supreme Court — Copy Prepared by Attorney — Fees.—-The Act of March 12, 1908, fixing certain fees, applies to a copy of the transcript of the record certified to by the secretary of the Supreme Court in a case on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, and, in accordance therewith, the said official should collect fifteen cents for each 100 words and fifty cents for the certificate, and the fact that the transcript of the record was prepared by the attorney does not exempt him from the payment of the whole of said fees.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property of Caguas finding certain curable defects.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Law oe the'Case — New Trial — Questions oe Fact and oe Law. — The doctrine . of the law of the case consisting in that what lias been decided by the appellate court is obligatory upon the lower court in a new trial and upon the appellate court in a second appeal, is applicable to questions of law, but not to questions of fact.</p> <p>Evidence — Preponderance ce Evidence — Findings oe Trial Court. — A preponderance of the evidence does not consist in the mere numerical majority of the witnesses of one of the parties, but in the weight, credit, and value given by the court to the whole of the evidence introduced by each party. However, if the witnesses are of equal honesty, candor, intelligence and veracity and are corroboratel equally well by the remaining testimony and are equally disinterested in the suit, then the greater number will determine the preponderance. Wilcox v. Sines, 100 Tenn., 542. In questions of this nature the weighing of the evidence by the lower court will be sustained unless it is. shown clearly to be erroneous.</p> <p>Id. — Witnesses—Favorable and Adverse Testimony'. — The fact that the same witnesses of one party testified to details of an accident both favorable and adverse to the ease of the party introducing them, does not imply necessarily that they are not worthy of belief. On the contrary, this fact may be taken rather as demonstrative of the veracity of their testimony on both points.</p> <p>Electricity — Voltage Necessary to Cause Death — Error -oe Trial Court. — - Although it is true that there is no fixed rule as to the number of volts necessary to cause a person’s death, it may be said that the number must be more than 110, which is generally considered harmless. When an electric-current violently lifts a strong man and throws him against the balcony of a house adjoining the one in front of which he was standing, inflicting severe shocks and producing deep burns in nearly every part of his body and, ultimately, death, there is no doubt that the said electric current was of more than 110 volts and, therefore, of greater intensity than that usually transmitted for the purpose of furnishing light to residences, and in failing so to find -the lower court committed error.</p> <p>Negligence — Res Ipsa Loquitur — Onus Probandi. — Applying the doctrine of res ipsa, loqwitw to the present case, it must be concluded that the death under consideration was caused by the fact that the defendant allowed certain wires ordinarily carrying a current of 110 volts to transmit a greater voltage capable of causing death, and that the burden is on the defendant to prove that it was not negligent in so doing.</p> <p>Contributory Negligence — Lineman-—Instructions by Manager. — General instructions given by the manager of a telephone company to his employes that they should bear in mind that all electric wires are dangerous, are not alone sufficient to make one of said employes who was charged with repairing the line guilty of contributory negligence, if in handling a wire he had sufficient reasons to believe that it was not dangerous.</p> <p>Id. — Onus Probandi.. — The contributory negligence of the plaintiff! is a defense . which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Known Danger. — In order to charge a person who risks a danger with contributory negligence, it must be shown that he did so knowingly or was wil-fully and unnecessarily negligent in not knowing of it, but said negligence cannot be imputed to a person because he did not inquire into the danger if the circumstances of the case show that he had no reason to believe that such danger existed.</p> <p>Experienced Workman — Ordinary Workman. — The obligation which the law imposes upon an experienced workman in cases of accident is different from that which it imposes upon an ordinary workman.</p> <p>Proximate Cause — Electric Wires Abandoned for Years and Transmitting a Deadly Current. — In view of the circumstances of this case and of the evidence introduced, it was held that the action of the defendant company in unnecessarily leaving the electric wires connected with the house where the accident occurred for more than seven years without taking care to insulate them and in such condition that, instead of carrying a harmless ■current like others of the same class, they .transmitted a deadly current, constitutes the real proximate and immediate cause of the injury for which the indemnity is sought.</p> <p>Appeal — Reversal op Judgment — Judgment—Damages—Denial op Damages Claimed — Damages Eixed by Appellate Court. — When, as in this case, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant in his answer had only denied "the extent and amount of the damages alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff,” such denial is sufficient, and this court in rendering a new judgment in favor of the plaintiff can fix the amount which it deems fair and is not obliged to accept the amount claimed in the complaint.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—Amount op Indemnity. — The evidence showing that the deceased person in this ease was a strong, sober, intelligent, and active man of twenty-two years of age, who provided for the maintenance and support of his family with his earnings of one dollar daily, and that at his death he left two young daughters who depended upon him for their support, the court found that the defendant should pay an indemnity of $3,000 to the said children, together with the costs, disbursements, and attorney’s fees.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an action to recover costs in a criminal action.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>