Volume 194 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The respondent, B.H., appealed a Family Court order requiring him to register as a sex offender after being found delinquent on two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault. In this appeal, respondent argued that: (1) the language of G.L. 1956 § 11-37.1-4(j), pertaining to registration by juvenile offenders, that "the court shall assess the totality of the circumstances of the offense and if the court makes a finding that the conduct of the parties is criminal only because of the age of the victim, the court may have discretion to order the juvenile to register as a sex offender," plainly applied to give the trial justice discretion to waive sex-offender registration in this case and (2) the trial justice should have exercised the discretion granted to her by § 11-37.1-4(j) to waive sex-offender registration. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that a trial justice has discretion under § 11-37.1-4(j) only when, under the circumstances of a particular case, the age of the victim is the sole reason that the charged conduct is criminal. The Court agreed with the trial justice that she did not have discretion in this case, based on her finding that respondent had accomplished the acts constituting second-degree child molestation sexual assault through threats, manipulation, and coercion—conduct which made those acts criminal apart from the ages of the victims. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Family Court's order.

The defendant, Victor Arciliares, appealed from his conviction of one count of second-degree murder and one count of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence. Subsequently, this Court granted defendant's motion to remand the matter to Superior Court so that defendant could file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and alleged violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Superior Court, defendant filed three supplemental memoranda—the last two of which raised arguments for a new trial based on the issue of the propriety of the trial justice's jury instructions at trial. Defendant argued that, in light of this Court's decision in State v. Diaz, 46 A.3d 849 (R.I. 2012), the trial justice erred in instructing the jury at trial as to involuntary manslaughter. The trial justice granted defendant's motion based on Diaz, and we granted the state's petition for a writ of certiorari. The state contended that the trial justice erred procedurally in considering defendant's arguments for a new trial based on the trial justice's jury instructions. The state further argued that, even if the trial justice properly heard defendant's arguments with respect to jury instructions, the trial justice nevertheless erred in granting defendant's motion for a new trial because Diaz did not establish a new rule of law. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice improperly expanded the scope of the Court's remand order when he considered defendant's arguments in support of his motion for a new trial that were not related to the issue of newly discovered evidence. The Court did not reach the question as to whether Diaz created a new rule of law, but noted its grave doubt that it did. Accordingly, the Court quashed the Superior Court's order.