Volume 195 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The defendant, who had been convicted of the crime of murder, appealed to this court from the trial court's dismissal of his motion for a second sentence review hearing. He claimed that the trial court violated his due process rights when it dismissed the motion after finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Held that the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion for a second sentence review; the sentence review committee previously had reviewed the defendant's sentence and issued a final decision, and the defendant had no right to a second sentence review hearing. Argued September 24—officially released December 24, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of two counts of risk of injury to a child in connection with his alleged conduct in sexually abusing the minor victim on three separate occasions between 2001 and 2003, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he received ineffective assistance from the counsel who had represented him with respect to his criminal trial. Specifically, he claimed, inter alia, that his trial counsel had ren- dered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the admission into evidence of a pornographic magazine in which young females were depicted in sexually suggestive settings and poses by ensuring that the trial court conduct an in camera review of the magazine. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly determined that trial counsel's conduct in attempting to preclude the magazine did not constitute deficient perfor- mance; the petitioner's trial counsel testified regarding the numerous steps they took in their attempt to preclude the admission of the maga- zine, including filing a motion in limine, presenting expert testimony, and making two requests on the record that the magazine be reviewed by the court, which stated that it would review the magazine's contents, and the habeas court found that trial counsel's failure to make an in camera request in writing, or to further press the court on whether it actually had reviewed the magazine, after counsel at least twice had made the specific request on the record that the court do so, did not constitute acts or omissions serious enough to establish that they were not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the factual basis for each guilty verdict; although the petitioner claimed that a unanimity instruction should have been provided to the jury given that the three alleged incidents of sexual assault were separate and distinct, and that if counsel had requested a unanimity instruction, there was a reasonable probability that the trial would have resulted in a more favorable verdict, the habeas court prop- erly determined that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice resulting from trial counsel's failure to request a specific unanimity instruction, as the trial court gave a general unanimity charge to the jury prior to its deliberations and instructed the jury to consider each count sepa- rately and independently from the others, and the habeas court found that there was no evidence that jurors relied on different incidents and facts to support their verdicts without the specific unanimity instruction. Argued September 18—officially released December 24, 2019

The plaintiffs, S Co. and R Co., sought to recover damages arising out a dispute over real estate investments and the disentanglement of business relationships with the defendants, G and G Co. The plaintiffs brought counts against the defendants sounding in vexatious litigation, breach of a general release benefitting S Co. and its individual members, slander of title, intentional interference with a contract pertaining to certain property, breach of a fiduciary duty, and breach of a promissory note. Following a trial to the court, the trial court rendered judgment in part for the plaintiffs, form which the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendants' claim that the trial court improperly determined that they breached a general release with S Co. by pursuing a civil action against the plaintiffs was not reviewable; the defendants failed to brief their claim adequately, as their brief was utterly devoid of any citations to or analysis of applicable contract principles or case law that supported their claim, let alone any application of law to the facts of the case. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improp- erly found that they slandered R Co.'s title to certain property by filing a lis pendens and an affidavit of fact pertaining to that property on certain land records; the trial court, as the trier of fact, was free to discredit evidence provided by G at trial that a reasonable and good faith belief existed for his claim of ownership of R Co., which equated to an interest in the property, and having thoroughly reviewed the defen- dants' arguments on appeal, this court was not persuaded that the trial court's finding of a slander of title was either legally incorrect or factu- ally unsupported. 3. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improp- erly found that they intentionally interfered with R Co.'s contract to sell certain property to a third party: although the defendants baldly stated that the trial court's finding that they acted intentionally and with bad faith to interfere with the property sale was erroneous, they failed to brief that argument beyond mere abstract assertion, and the defendants' claim that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find that their interference caused any actual loss lacked merit, as the defendants failed to address the additional attorney's fees and costs incurred, focus- ing entirely on the escrow funds and arguing only that the escrow could not be a basis for establishing an actual loss, and the loss the court attributed with respect to the escrow funds had nothing to do with the establishment of the escrow or the original purpose for the funds but, rather, concerned R Co.'s inability to utilize those funds because they remained in the escrow account due to the actions of the defendants; moreover, the defendants' claim that the court improperly awarded R Co. interest on a certain amount that R Co. was forced to hold in escrow due to the defendants' actions also failed. 4. The defendants' claim that the trial court improperly awarded punitive damages without providing them with adequate notice of a hearing in accordance with the rules of practice was unavailing; the defendants failed to demonstrate that their due process rights were violated or that the trial court committed reversible error in calculating the amount of punitive damages, as the record demonstrated that the defendants had ample notice of the hearing on punitive damages, attended the hearing, and were afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the merits, and the trial court record having contained a proper notice of the hearing date, the defendants had notice of the hearing and knew that the purpose of the hearing would be to determine the amount of common-law puni- tive damages. Argued October 7—officially released December 24, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for breach of contract. Specifically, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant breached the parties' marital separation agreement by failing to disclose certain assets. Following a trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. On appeal, he claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred by concluding that his action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (§ 52- 576 [a]) and determining that it lacked continuing jurisdiction to enforce the parties' separation agreement. Held that the plaintiff's appeal was moot; because the plaintiff failed to challenge an independent ground for the court's adverse ruling, namely, the court's determination that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim failed on the merits due to insufficient evidence that the defendant had breached the separation agreement, even if this court agreed with the plaintiff's claim that his action was not barred by the statute of limitations, there would be no practical relief that could be afforded to the plaintiff because of his failure to challenge the trial court's finding on the merits. Argued October 21—officially released December 24, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a firearm in connec- tion with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, C, had provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation into the petitioner's theory of self-defense and referring to the petitioner as a bully during closing argument. At the habeas trial, the petitioner testified regarding his version of the shooting, stating, inter alia, that during an altercation with the victim, his previously injured knee buckled when the victim punched him, causing him to fall to the ground, and, being unable to stand, he shot the victim when he reached for the petitioner's pistol. In addition, C testified regarding his extensive pretrial investigation, which included reviewing statements and recordings prior to trial, obtaining information from an investigator who was working on an ancillary mat- ter, personally canvassing the neighborhood where the shooting occurred with an associate, interviewing every witness except for one and visiting the location where the body was found. C also testified that he believed that the petitioner did not have a valid self-defense claim in light of the evidence. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that the petitioner had not proven that C's pretrial investigation was inadequate or that there was a reasonable probability that, but for C's alleged deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. In reaching its conclu- sion, the court discredited the petitioner's testimony, finding it to be phony, and credited C's testimony. Thereafter, on the granting of certifi- cation, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly rejected his claim that C rendered ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation into his theory of self- defense: the petitioner failed to establish that C's performance was deficient, as the habeas court properly determined that the thorough pretrial investigation conducted by C was not deficient, the petitioner made only a bare allegation in his appellate brief that C failed to investi- gate the self-defense theory properly and did not specify what benefit additional investigation would have revealed, and, at the habeas trial, the petitioner did not present the testimony of the witness whom C did not interview, nor did he present any medical evidence regarding the condition of his knee at the time of the shooting; moreover, given the weight of the evidence against the petitioner at his criminal trial, which included his own trial testimony that he shot the victim three times, disposed of the murder weapon and hid the victim's body, the petitioner failed to establish that he was prejudiced as a result of C's alleged deficient performance. 2. The habeas court properly rejected the petitioner's claim that C rendered ineffective assistance by referring to the petitioner as a bully during closing argument: C's use of the term bully during closing argument constituted sound trial strategy, and, therefore, it did not amount to deficient performance or fall below an objective standard of reasonable- ness, as C, given the evidence before the jury of a litany of oppressive conduct by the petitioner, chose to use that term in an effort to bond with the jury by stating the obvious and using a term that the jury understood; moreover, given the weight of the evidence against the petitioner at his criminal trial, it was not reasonably probable that, but for C's alleged deficient performance, the result of the criminal trial would have been different, and, therefore, the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner had not proven prejudice. Argued October 16—officially released December 24, 2019

The plaintiff bank, B Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant D, who filed special defenses and counterclaims, alleging, inter alia, vexatious litigation. Specifically, D alleged that a previous foreclosure action brought against D by B Co.'s predecessor in interest, which concerned the same property, was dis- missed in 2009 for failure to establish probable cause with respect to the chain of custody of the loan, and that B Co.'s present action, without evidence of loan assignment documents demonstrating probable cause to bring the present action, constituted vexatious litigation, as the same counsel who brought the prior foreclosure action also commenced B Co.'s foreclosure action. The trial court granted B Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability only on the complaint and on D's counterclaims and, subsequently, rendered judgment of strict foreclo- sure. On appeal, D claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred in conclud- ing that her vexatious litigation counterclaim was barred by the statute of limitations (§ 52-577). Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment as to D's vexatious litigation counterclaim, as such claims may not be brought until the underlying action that is the source of the alleged misconduct has con- cluded in the claimant's favor; contrary to D's claim that her counter- claim was centered on a combination of the dismissal of the 2009 foreclo- sure action and the commencement of the present action, D's vexatious counterclaim was based on conduct occurring in the present foreclosure action, and therefore, D's counterclaim was premature, as it could not be brought in the same action as that which D claimed was vexatious. 2. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment as to D's abuse of process counterclaim: although D alleged that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the court's dismissal of the 2009 action for failure to establish a proper chain of custody, the record revealed that the 2009 action was dismissed for dormancy, the trial court properly determined that no genuine issues of material fact existed that the primary purpose of B Co.'s filing of the present action was to prosecute a foreclosure action and that B Co. was the owner of the note and the mortgage, and D failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether B Co.'s primary purpose in filing the foreclosure action was to accomplish a purpose for which such an action was not designed; moreover, because abuse of process claims require that the underlying litigation has been completed and, in the present case, the counterclaim was raised in the action claimed to be an abuse of process, the trial court properly determined that D's abuse of process counterclaim was premature, as the foreclosure action was ongoing at the time the counterclaim was made. 3. D could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly relied on B Co.'s uncontested evidence of the debt without holding an evidentiary hearing, as the trial court was not required to hold a hearing where, as here, there was no genuine contest as to the amount of the debt owed; B Co. presented an affidavit of debt, a foreclosure worksheet and an oath of appraisers with its motion for judgment of strict foreclosure, D failed to file an objection nor referenced any evidence contesting the amount of the debt, and although D requested a hearing, the request lacked specificity in that it failed to state a basis for the objection, it was not based on an articulated legal reason or fact, and the court had already rendered summary judgment in favor of B Co. on D's special defenses and counterclaims at the time of the request for a hearing. Argued September 16—officially released December 31, 2019

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of murder in connection with the death of the victim, the defendant appealed. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he caused the victim's death, dragged her body out of their shared apartment, drove to a used car shop where the body was left in the defendant's vehicle all day until the defendant drove back to the apartment and put the body in a bathtub, after which he made a 911 phone call claiming that he found the victim in the bathtub. At trial, the court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, which was made at the close of the state's case-in-chief, the defendant rested without putting on evidence, and the jury found the defendant guilty of murder. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, as there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt: even though the defendant claimed that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he caused the victim's death or that he had the specific intent to cause her death, the defendant conceded that there was sufficient evidence to support an inference that he dragged the victim's body out of their apartment, down the stairs and across the grass, that he put the body into his vehicle and drove, in broad daylight, to a used car shop, where he left the body in his vehicle all day, and that he subsequently transferred the body to another vehicle and drove the body back to the apartment, where he remained for several hours before calling 911, and, therefore, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to have concluded that the defendant intended to kill the victim and did succeed in killing the victim; moreover, there was substantial evidence of con- sciousness of guilt, including that the defendant declined to provide emergency assistance to the victim and repeatedly lied to the police and emergency personnel, and the jury could have inferred an intent to kill from the infliction of numerous superficial wounds caused by a sharp weapon, followed by the defendant's failure to summon help as the victim bled to death. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that this court should change its long-standing standard of review with respect to sufficiency of evidence claims to a more rigorous standard that would require this court to determine if there was a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a hypothesis of innocence; our Supreme Court recently addressed and rejected a similar claim, determining that a reviewing court does not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence but, rather, asks whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty, and as an intermediate appellate court, it was not within this court's power to overrule Supreme Court authority. Argued October 17—officially released December 31, 2019

The plaintiff in error, A, who was the attorney for the defendant, H, filed a writ of error, challenging the imposition of sanctions and the award of attorney's fees against him by the trial court. In the underlying personal injury action, the defendant in error, K, by and through his mother and next friend, sought to recover damages from H for, inter alia, negligence in connection with personal injuries sustained by K when K, who was riding his bicycle, and a motor vehicle operated by H collided. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that H was operating his vehicle while typing, sending, and/or reading text messages from his cell phone. During the discovery phase, H testified at his deposition that, minutes before the collision, he had sent a text message on a cell phone. H stated that the cell phone was a company work phone and that the account was in the name of his employer, H Co. Subsequently, the law firm represent- ing K filed a motion to compel production of the relevant cell phone records from the date of the collision, which the trial court granted. A did not provide the requested cell phone records, and K's attorney, R, filed motions for sanctions for A's alleged violation of the court's order. In response to R's motions, A claimed that he had fully complied with the court's order to the best of his abilities because A's client, H, did not own the cell phone records requested by R, and that it would have been illegal and unethical for him to provide R with records that H did not own. Prior to the hearing on R's second motion for sanctions, R obtained the relevant cell phone records from an attorney representing H Co., but the court, nevertheless, granted R's second motion for sanctions against A. Thereafter, R filed a request for attorney's fees, which the trial court granted in part. Subsequently, A filed a writ of error in our Supreme Court, which transferred the matter to this court. Held: 1. K could not prevail on his claim that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, which was based on his claim that A's writ of error should be dismissed because it was not taken from a final judgment in that the sanctions and the attorney's fees against A did not terminate a distinct and separate proceeding because the relevant orders were issued during the discovery phase of his personal injury case, the requested cell phone records were necessary to resolve K's case, and those records were inextricably intertwined with K's case: although the requested records may have been integral to K's personal injury action against H, those records were the property of H Co., and, thus, neither A nor his client, H, owned or had possession of the cell phone records, and K's reliance on the general rule that an interlocutory order requiring a witness to submit to discovery is not a final judgment and, therefore, is not immedi- ately appealable was unavailing, as A was neither a witness nor a party to the underlying personal injury action but, rather, was an attorney representing H, the defendant in the underlying action; moreover, K could not prevail on his claim that the imposition of sanctions and attorney's fees against A did not terminate a distinct and separate pro- ceeding because the trial court did not find A to be in contempt, as our Supreme Court previously has concluded that a law firm that was not a party need not wait to be found in contempt for its good faith failure to comply with a discovery order to seek appellate review of that discovery order, and, in the present case, A did not comply with the trial court's discovery order on the basis of his good faith belief that to do so would violate a statute because H did not own the cell phone records, and, thus, A did not have to be found in contempt to seek judicial review of the sanctions and the attorney's fees awarded against him; accordingly, the imposition of sanctions and the award of attorney's fees against A, a nonparty to the underlying personal injury case, terminated a separate and distinct proceeding, and, thus, the writ of error was filed pursuant to a final judgment. 2. The trial court erred as a matter of law by ordering A to produce cell phone records that neither he nor H owned or possessed, issuing sanc- tions against A and awarding attorney's fees to counsel for K, as the court's orders regarding the imposition of sanctions and the award of attorney's fees against A constituted an abuse of discretion; this court has previously determined that a party may not be ordered to produce documents owned by or in the possession of third parties, and, in the present case, the trial court's order that A, a nonparty, turn over the relevant cell phone records that belonged to H Co., a separate, nonparty entity, constituted an abuse of discretion, and although R claimed that H's parents owned H Co. and that H, therefore, easily could have obtained the relevant cell phone records had A instructed him to do so, H and H Co. were separate legal entities, and A was sanctioned for failing to do something that he, in good faith, believed would violate a statute because H did not own or possess the cell phone records. Argued October 15, 2019—officially released January 7, 2020

Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crime of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony from the victim's wife and the victim's business partner, A. The victim, a taxi cab driver, was stabbed to death during his evening shift on a Tuesday night, and money was stolen from the taxi's glove compartment. During the trial, the victim's wife stated that on the night of the victim's murder, he returned home briefly to retrieve money to pay for his portion of a certain taxi fee and to send money to his family overseas. A testified that the victim regularly placed his portion of the taxi fee in the glove compartment on Tuesday nights for A to pay the following day. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the wife's testimony regarding statements made to her by the victim was irrelevant as to whether the defendant killed the victim or whether he acted with crimi- nal intent; the wife's testimony regarding the victim's statements reason- ably could have made it more likely that the defendant had a financial motive in killing the victim and less likely that the killing was the result of self-defense, as claimed by the defendant, and the defendant's claim that the victim's statements to his wife were self-serving and backward looking and, thus, did not satisfy the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule was unavailing, as the victim's statement to his wife indi- cated his intention to take money to pay the taxi company in the immedi- ate future, and although the part of the statement indicating that he had taken money for that purpose was retrospective, it provided context as for the expression of his intention to pay his taxi fees and send money to his family, and at the time the victim made those statements to his wife, no crime had been committed nor was one foreseeable. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly allowed testimony from A, pursuant to the habit exception of the hearsay rule, regarding the victim's customary habit of leaving his portion of the taxi fee in the glove compartment of the taxi on Tuesday nights, as A's testimony was relevant to the issue of motive for the defendant to kill the victim; the jury reasonably could have inferred from A's testimony that the victim had placed money in the glove compartment of the taxi that was, thereafter, taken by the defendant, and that financial gain could have been the motive for murder, and the defendant's claim that the state failed to provide an adequate foundation for the admission of A's testimony regarding habit evidence was unavailing, as there is no particular numerical threshold that must be met in order for a person's conduct to rise to the level of habit, and A's testimony established that the victim's specific conduct of leaving his portion of the taxi fee in the glove compartment of the taxi on Tuesday nights constituted a sufficiently regular practice. 3. The trial court properly instructed the jury with a general unanimity charge and did not err in failing to grant the defendant's request for a specific unanimity charge as to the claim of self-defense; the jury instructions, viewed in their totality, were correct in law and fairly presented the case to the jury, as each of the four elements of a claim of self-defense were explained in detail and in accordance with the model jury charge, the factual scenario in the present case was not especially complex and the defendant's course of conduct did not com- prise separate incidents, and because the trial court did not sanction a nonunanimous verdict, a unanimity instruction on the claim of self- defense was not required. Argued September 23, 2019—officially released January 7, 2020

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant C, who, together with the defendant K, had executed a certain promissory note in 2006, which was secured by a mortgage on the subject property. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the note was affected by a 2010 loan modification agree- ment, that the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff in 2012, that the plaintiff was the holder of the note, that the note was in default for nonpayment, and that the plaintiff had elected to accelerate the balance due on the note and to declare the note due in full. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability and attached an affidavit from D, the vice president for loan documentation for the plaintiff's servicing agent, who attested concerning the history of the 2006 note, including averring that the defendants had defaulted on the note by failing to make their May, 2013 payment or any payment there- after. D attached to her affidavit a copy of the 2006 note and mortgage, the 2012 assignment and a notice of default letter sent by the plaintiff to the defendants in November, 2013, but she did not mention or attach the 2010 loan modification agreement. The defendants did not file an objection to the motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability and, thereafter, rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability, the plaintiff having failed to establish an undisputed prima facie case for foreclosure: despite the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, D's supporting affida- vit and the attached documents regarding the defendants' default on the 2006 loan, the plaintiff pleaded that a 2010 loan modification agreement affected the 2006 note but, thereafter, failed to provide the trial court with a copy of that agreement or any evidence of its terms, and, therefore, that court had no way to assess whether the agreement had a substantive effect on the 2006 note or to ascertain whether the agreement modified any conditions precedent to foreclosure, whether the defendants were in default of the agreement or whether the plaintiff was in compliance with its terms, and although the defendants did not file an objection to the motion for summary judgment or raise an issue concerning the absence of the agreement via a special defense or otherwise before the trial court, it was the plaintiff's burden to establish its prima facie case; moreover, there was no merit to the plaintiff's contention that it presented evidence that the defendants defaulted on the loan as modified in 2010, as the notice of default letter was not proof of any default, D did not aver in her affidavit to a default on the modified note, and the fact that the plaintiff provided the trial court with an affidavit averring to a default without producing evidence of the underlying obligation that is in default was insufficient to establish entitlement to summary judgment. Argued October 25, 2019—officially released January 7, 2020

The plaintiff bank, H Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants L and W and the defendant trust, who filed special defenses and a counterclaim. Specifically, they alleged, inter alia, that the equitable doctrine of laches applied to the plaintiff's conduct and that the plaintiff had violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the first amended laches defense and the counterclaim in its entirety. L and W and the trust then filed a second amended counterclaim and special defenses, in which, inter alia, they repleaded four counts of their first amended counterclaim and repleaded laches as a special defense. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the second amended laches defense and the counterclaim in its entirety and, subsequently, rendered judgment of strict foreclosure, from which L and W and the trust appealed to this court. On appeal, they claimed that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's first motion to strike as to the nonrepleaded counts and the second motion to strike the second amended laches defense and second amended counterclaim. The plaintiff claimed that certain nonrepleaded counts of their first amended counterclaim as well as a special defense of unclean hands had been abandoned. Held: 1. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim, L and W and the trust preserved their right to appeal the nonrepleaded counts of their first amended counter- claim: the correct course of action for a litigant to take in order to preserve appellate rights as to a stricken pleading is to forgo pleading over, await the rendering of a final judgment and appeal therefrom, and the defendants' statement in their objection to the plaintiff's second motion to strike that they were not reasserting counts involving only postdefault conduct was a decision by the defendants, in an effort to preserve their appellate rights, not to replead those counts with modified allegations in an effort to cure the purported deficiencies therein, rather than an abandonment of the counts; nevertheless, the defendants having expressly stated in their objection that the first amended unclean hands defense had been abandoned, that statement was an unequivocal relin- quishment of the first amended unclean hands defense, and the defen- dants, having abandoned that defense, could not now ask this court to consider whether the trial court's striking thereof constituted error. 2. The trial court erred in striking the nonrepleaded counts, the second amended laches defense and the second amended counterclaim on the ground that they did not satisfy the making, validity or enforcement test; the allegations in the pleadings of L and W and the trust related to the enforcement of the note or mortgage in that those defendants raised allegations of postorigination misconduct by the plaintiff that, inter alia, increased their debt and hindered their ability to cure their default. Argued January 15, 2019—officially released January 14, 2020

The defendant, who previously had admitted to a violation of probation and been convicted on guilty pleas of two counts of possession of a controlled substance, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his amended motion to correct an illegal sentence. In June, 2003, the defendant admitted to a violation of probation, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance, and entered into a Garvin agreement. In October, 2005, the trial court found a Garvin violation, revoked the defendant's probation, and sentenced him to six years of incarceration for violating his probation and one year of incar- ceration for each of the possession charges to be served concurrently. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which the trial court denied. In his motion, the defendant alleged that the conditions imposed on him by the Garvin agreement expired on March 12, 2004, and that the sentence was imposed illegally because he did not receive notice of the October, 2005 sentencing date as required under the applicable rule of practice (§ 43-29). On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner in violation of Santobello v. New York (404 U.S. 257) because he was sentenced after the nine month period of the Garvin agreement had ended. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner in violation of Santobello; although the defendant contended that he was to be sentenced within nine months of the plea agreement, there was no indication that the terms of the plea agreement included a requirement that the defendant be sentenced within the nine month period and, during the plea canvass, the trial court recited the terms of the plea agreement twice to the defendant and neither of those recitations included language requiring sentencing to take place within the nine month period. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because he was not given adequate notice of the sentencing hearing; although the defendant claimed that he did not receive notice of the sentencing hearing, he waived any challenge to notice where, as here, his counsel told the trial court that the defendant was prepared to be sentenced that day, he declined to speak at the hearing, and he expressed no opposition to defense counsel's statement at the hearing. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to correct an illegal sentence, as the defendant's claim that he was not provided the opportunity to be heard or to present evidence at the sentencing hearing was unavailing; defense counsel told the trial court that the defendant was ready to proceed, neither defense counsel nor the defendant protested to the trial court that the defendant was being denied the opportunity to be heard or to present evidence, and the trial court asked the defendant twice if he had anything he would like to say to the trial court during the hearing and in both instances he declined. 4. The defendant's claim that his sentence was illegally imposed because it did not comply with the requirements of Practice Book § 43-29 was unavailing, as the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it con- cluded that the defendant confused notice for a violation hearing with notice for a sentencing hearing and denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence; although the defendant claimed that, as a probationer, he should have been notified of a revocation of probation hearing, there was no evidence in the record that would allow for an interpretation of the plea agreement in which the defendant could violate the terms of the agreement and still be continued on probation, and the defendant admitted the violation of probation at the time he entered his Garvin plea. Argued October 9, 2019—officially released January 14, 2020

The plaintiff K sought to recover damages from the defendants for medical malpractice in connection with the alleged failure of the defendant D, a podiatrist, to rule out the possibility of impaired blood flow to K's feet and to refer K to a vascular specialist, resulting, inter alia, in the partial amputations of K's feet. K filed an expert witness disclosure identifying G as an expert on the standard of care and causation, and later filed an amended expert witness disclosure. The defendants filed a motion to preclude the amended expert witness disclosure, which the court denied without prejudice, but also ordered, on January 13, 2016, that K was precluded from disclosing additional experts. After the court denied K's motion for reargument and reconsideration of that order, K filed a motion to modify the court's scheduling order dated January 19, 2016, and filed an expert witness disclosure identifying R as an additional expert. The court sustained the defendants' objections thereto and granted their motion to preclude R's testimony, stating that it was adher- ing to its January 13, 2016 order. The court subsequently precluded G from offering expert testimony and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, from which K appealed to this court. Thereafter, S, the administratrix of K's estate, was substituted as the plaintiff. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in ordering that K could not disclose addi- tional experts: a. S could not prevail on her claim that the trial court's January 13, 2016 order constituted a sanction of preclusion subject to the applicable rule of practice (§ 13-4 [h]), which establishes procedures for the disclosures and depositions of experts in civil matters: the order was a case manage- ment decision that the court had the inherent authority to enter, as the court had expressed concern during argument on January 13, 2016, concerning a representation made by K's counsel that he might seek to disclose additional experts, because at that time, the trial in this action, which had been pending since 2012, was scheduled to begin on January 19, 2016, and nothing in the record indicated that the court entered the order as a result of a violation by K of any of the provisions of § 13-4; moreover, notwithstanding that the defendants did not request such an order and that S claimed that good cause existed to allow K to disclose additional experts, it was within the court's broad discretion, exercised pursuant to its authority to manage its docket, to preclude K from disclosing additional experts, particularly where the parties were on the eve of trial, which had been rescheduled, and where the date by which K had to disclose his experts had passed. b. The trial court did not err in adhering to the January 13, 2016 order; that court determined that it would not hear reargument on the January 13, 2016 order because a different judge had entered the order and had subsequently denied K's motion for reargument and for reconsideration, there was no basis for S's contention that the court improperly relied on the law of the case doctrine, and S did not present any other cognizable argument challenging the court's decision. 2. The trial court did not err in precluding G from offering expert opinions as to the standard of care and causation: that court reasonably deter- mined that there was an inadequate factual basis to conclude that G knew the prevailing professional standard of care applicable to D in Connecticut in 2011, when the defendants' alleged professional negli- gence occurred, because G's knowledge of that standard of care was scant and there was no foundation for G to aver that the podiatric standard of care in Connecticut was the same as the standard of care in Pennsylvania, where G was licensed and had practiced exclusively; moreover, G averred that he did not know whether the partial amputa- tions of K's feet could have been prevented and that a vascular surgeon was needed to opine as to whether the amputations could have been avoided but for the defendants' alleged breach of the standard of care, and S did not cite any part of the record that would have undermined the court's determination that G could not testify that the defendants' breach of the standard of care led to K's injuries. 3. S could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendants; that court properly pre- cluded K from disclosing additional experts and G from offering standard of care and causation opinions, and, as a result, K was unable to produce expert testimony establishing the applicable standard of care, a breach of that standard and causation, and he, therefore, could not establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice. Argued October 8, 2019—officially released January 14, 2020

Convicted under two informations of the crimes of breach of peace in the second degree, criminal violation of a protective order and assault in the third degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's convictions stemmed from two incidents, which occurred a few days apart, in which he assaulted his roommate at their apartment in a dispute involving the defendant's wife. After the first alleged assault, the trial court issued a protective order against the defendant, and shortly there- after, the defendant violated the order by assaulting the victim again. During voir dire, the state characterized the allegations against the defendant as ''domestic violence,'' and ''family violence,'' to which the court advised the state against using such language. Thereafter, the state described the allegations as a ''dispute between roommates.'' On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly granted the state's motion for joinder of the cases for trial by allowing the jury to consider prejudicial evidence of two different crimes and that the trial court improperly allowed the state to use prejudicial language during voir dire questioning, violating his federal right to a fair trial. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the state's motion for joinder, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that joinder resulted in substantial prejudice to him; the two incidents leading to the charges against the defendant were discrete and easily distinguishable, even though they concerned the same victim and defendant, the record dem- onstrated that the events occurred at different times and locations, and resulted in different injuries, and although the assaults were violent, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that both assaults were so brutal or shocking as to interfere with the jury's ability to consider each offense fairly and objectively. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court allowed the state to use prejudicial language during its voir dire questioning of potential jurors and, thereafter, allowed the facts of the case to be introduced in an effort to remedy the use of the prejudicial language; the introduction of phrases such as ''domestic violence,'' ''family violence,'' and a ''dispute between roommates'' was not improper because the defendant did not dispute that the alleged crimes concerned disputes between roommates and the title of the protective order, which was admitted into evidence, referred to family violence, and, therefore, under the circumstances of the present case, the defendant failed to prove that a constitutional violation existed and that he was deprived of a fair trial. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a continuance at the start of trial to accommodate the pres- ence of a witness that the defendant claimed was crucial to his defense of property argument; because the defendant's request was made at the last moment, substantial delay of the jury trial was likely to result if the request had been granted, there was no guarantee from the defendant that the witness would have appeared had the request for the continua- tion been granted, and the defendant, at the time of the ruling, did not provide any additional reasoning for the importance of the witness' testimony, which had been discussed at earlier proceedings, nor did he make any representation regarding the witness' specific testimony. Argued September 10, 2019—officially released January 14, 2020

The plaintiff registered nurse sought to recover damages from the defendant for negligence in connection with injuries she sustained while providing medical care to the defendant, who was a patient in the radiation oncol- ogy department at the hospital where she worked. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that as she was assisting the defendant during the diagnostic procedure or medical treatment he was undergoing, he grabbed hold of her while he attempted to transition from a supine to a seated position on the examining table, and, as a result, she suffered several physical injuries. She claimed that her injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff's action was not viable because allowing a medical care provider to recover damages from her patient was contrary to public policy. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant, as a patient at the hospital, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, who was providing him medical care as a registered nurse. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment because the defendant's motion for sum- mary judgment effectively challenged the legal sufficiency of her cause of action, and, therefore, that court should have treated the motion as a motion to strike to provide her with the opportunity to replead; because the plaintiff failed to object to the trial court's deciding the case through summary judgment or, in the alternative, to offer to amend her complaint if the court determined that the allegations were legally insufficient, she waived any claim that the trial court improperly failed to treat the motion for summary judgement as a motion to strike. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the question of whether the defendant owed her a duty of care involved a question of fact reserved for the jury, which was based on her assertion that the court was obligated to first address, but failed to do so, whether the harm that she suffered was foreseeable before concluding whether a duty existed; the determination of whether a duty of care existed under the circumstances of this case was a question of law that the court was permitted to make at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, and, in making that determination, the court was permitted to decide that no duty existed solely on public policy grounds. 3. The plaintiff's claim that applying the test articulated in Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Assn., Inc. (264 Conn. 474) to determine whether recognizing a duty of care is inconsistent with public policy conflicts with this state's abolition of the doctrine of assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery was unavailing; because our Supreme Court has continued to consider in cases involving medical treatment the normal expectation of the participants in analyzing the activity under review, including the statuses of the parties, even after the state's abolition of the doctrine of assumption of risk, this court was not prohibited by the abolition of that doctrine from applying the test articulated in Murillo to determine whether recognizing a duty of care was inconsistent with public policy, and the plaintiff reliance on Sepega v. DeLaura (326 Conn. 788) was misplaced, as there was no language in that case that even implied that our Supreme Court intended to abolish or retreat from the test in Murillo. 4. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that imposing a duty of care on the defendant while the plaintiff was furnishing medical care him was inconsistent with public policy, this court having declined to recognize, as a matter of law, that a patient owes a duty of care to avoid negligent conduct that causes harm to a medical care provider while the patient is receiving medical care from that provider: this court's application of the relevant public policy considerations articulated in the test in Murillo indicated that all four factors weighed against recognizing a duty of care, specifically, the normal expectations of registered nurses and patients under the circumstances, balancing the unlikely enhancement to medical care provider and patient safety by recognizing a duty of care against the potential for higher medical care costs for patients caused by increased litigation, jeopardizing the confidentiality of medical information and the availability of a workers' compensation remedy for medical care providers, and the fact that no other jurisdiction has imposed a duty of care on a patient while receiving medical care from a medical care provider all weighed against recognizing a duty of care; moreover, this court's decision not to recognize a duty of care was predicated on the conclusion that uninhibited access to medical care for all prospective patients, the goal of encouraging patients to share sensitive information with their medical care providers without fearing the loss of confidential- ity, and the safety of patients and medical care providers alike are vitally important to the integrity of the health care system in Connecticut. Argued September 17, 2019—officially released January 14, 2020

The plaintiffs appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction their third-party petition for visitation as to the minor children of the defendant. On their petition, the plaintiffs checked the boxes stating that they have a relationship with the children that is parent-like and that denial of visitation will cause real and significant harm to the children, and they referenced an attached affidavit. In the attached affidavit, the plaintiffs averred that they are the children's maternal grandparents, and they detailed their involvement with the children. They also averred that the defendant was preventing them from having any relationship with the children because she was angry with the plaintiffs and that, in doing so, the children were being harmed by deracinating them from their extended family and family roots. The defendant moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to plead the necessary factual allegations to satisfy the second jurisdictional prerequisite set forth in Roth v. Weston (259 Conn. 202), specifically, that the denial of visitation will cause real and significant harm to the children. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an expert witness disclosure, in which they indicated that a clinical and forensic psycholo- gist would testify as to the real and significant harm that would result from the sudden exclusion of the plaintiffs from the children's lives. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, determining, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' petition failed to satisfy the second jurisdictional element set forth in Roth. Held: 1. The trial court properly limited its consideration to the allegations con- tained in the plaintiffs' petition and the attached affidavit in ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss; contrary to the plaintiffs' claim that that court improperly failed to consider their expert witness disclosure, our case law instructs that it would have been inappropriate for the court to look beyond the petition and accompanying affidavit to the expert disclosure, as the court was required to scrutinize the petition to determine whether it contained specific, good faith allegations of harm, and the expert disclosure, which was not attached to the petition and was not filed until months after the parties' briefing on the motion to dismiss was complete, constituted an attempt to supplement the petition with additional allegations in an effort to satisfy the second jurisdictional element set forth in Roth. 2. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs having failed to plead the requisite level of harm under the second jurisdictional element set forth in Roth; the only allegations as to harm in the plaintiffs' petition and accompa- nying affidavit were general allegations that neither rose to the level of neglect, abuse or abandonment contemplated by Roth, nor specified the type of harm that the children would suffer if the plaintiffs were denied visitation with them. Argued October 10, 2019—officially released January 21, 2020

The plaintiffs appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction their third-party petition for visitation as to the minor child of the defendant. In dismissing the petition, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs failed to set forth the specific, good faith allegations required to satisfy the jurisdictional pleading requirements set forth in Roth v. Weston (259 Conn. 202), specifically, that the plaintiffs have a parent-like relationship with the child and that the denial of visitation will cause real and significant harm to the child. Held that the trial court properly dismissed the plain- tiffs' petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs having failed to plead the requisite level of harm under the second element of Roth; although the plaintiffs alleged that the denial of visitation would cut the child off from the maternal side of her family, have the effect of the child feeling that the plaintiffs abandoned her, compound the child's early childhood trauma and harm her, the plaintiffs did not allege with sufficient specificity how the child would be harmed, and, without more, those allegations did not rise to the level of abuse, neglect or abandonment contemplated by Roth. Argued October 8, 2019—officially released January 21, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, G and M, for negligence in connection with personal injuries she allegedly sustained when she was bitten by a dog owned by M on property that M leased from G pursuant to a written lease agreement. The lease permitted the tenant to keep a pet on the property in exchange for increased rent but required that the pet pose no threat to anyone entering the property and provided that that was to be determined by the landlord. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that G was negligent because she knew or should have known the vicious propensities of M's dog and by allowing the dog to stay on the property, G failed to use reasonable care to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the lease imposed on G a duty of care that extended to third persons who were not parties to the lease. Following a hearing, the trial court granted G's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. She claimed that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of G because it erroneously concluded that G did not owe her a duty of care on the basis of the lease between G and M. Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in G's favor, there having been no genuine issue of material fact that the plain language of the lease did not require G to investigate the behavioral propensities of M's dog and that the lease did not create a duty on the part of G to third persons who might encounter the dog on the property; the relevant language of the lease clearly did not impose a duty on G to perform an extraneous investigation of the dog's behavioral propensities but, rather, simply provided G with discretion to approve or deny the ability of the tenant to own or keep pets on the property and was included for the exclusive benefit of G in her capacity as the landlord, and the obligations under the lease were limited to its signatories and did not extend to third persons, as the language of the lease clearly demonstrated that G and M did not intend to create an obligation to any third persons. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the language of the lease related to G's discretion to approve a tenant having a pet on the property created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether G retained control over the property and, therefore, whether the lease imposed on G a duty of care to keep in a reasonably safe condition those portions of the property over which she reserved control: G submitted a copy of the lease and various affidavits demonstrating that the entire property was leased to M and thereby established that she did not have control or possession over the property where the plaintiff was injured and, therefore, did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether G had possession or control over the property; moreover, the plaintiff's reliance on Giacalone v. Housing Authority (306 Conn. 399) was misplaced, as that case was distinguish- able because, in the present, case there was no common area of the property for G to keep reasonably safe due to M's exclusive possession under the lease, and, therefore, G had no right to enter the property and to physically remove M's dog, and the issue of whether the landlord knew or should have known of the dog's vicious tendencies was not before this court. Argued October 15, 2019—officially released January 21, 2020

The respondent attorney appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for one year. The respondent, who was admitted to practice law in both Maine and Con- necticut, had been involved in civil litigation in Maine involving water- front property that he owned in joint tenancy with several members of his family. After the trial court rendered judgment in that action, the respondent appealed as a self-represented party to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Maine Superior Court and concluded that the respondent had engaged in misconduct while prosecuting the appeal. Accordingly, sanctions were imposed against the respondent in the form of an award of attorney's fees and costs. Subsequently, Maine's Board of Overseers of the Bar suspended the respondent from practicing law in Maine for one year on the ground that he had violated Maine's Rules of Professional Conduct. Thereafter, in the present case, the petitioner, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, filed an application seeking commensurate disciplinary action against the respondent pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-39). Subse- quently, the trial court found that commensurate discipline was appro- priate with respect to the respondent's Connecticut law license and ordered the respondent suspended from the practice of law in Connecti- cut for one year. On appeal, the respondent claimed, inter alia, that because he was a self-represented party at the time he engaged in the alleged misconduct that led to his suspension in Maine, the disciplinary action against his law license in Maine, and by extension, in Connecticut, violated his right as a citizen to petition the government for a redress of grievances as protected by the first amendment to the federal constitu- tion and violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in determining that the respondent failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the reciprocal suspension of his law license was a violation of his federal constitutional rights to petition the government without the fear of reprisal; the respon- dent failed to cite to any legal authority in which a court has ruled that the enforcement of attorney disciplinary rules on an attorney engaging in self-representation before a court implicates that attorney's right to petition as protected by the first amendment, nor did he cite to any authority for the proposition that an attorney acting as a self-represented litigant should be held to a different standard of professional conduct than that applied to an attorney acting on behalf of a client, and the respondent's attempt to differentiate for disciplinary and constitutional purposes between an attorney's actions taken on behalf of a client and actions taken in representing himself in his role as a citizen was unavailing, as this court has recognized that an attorney, as an officer of the court, must always conduct himself or herself in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct, the respondent had the same professional obligation to the court when representing himself as when representing a client, and the fact that he appeared in a self-represented capacity did not lesson his duty to comply with those rules. 2. The respondent could not prevail on his claim that the trial court's finding that he failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a cogniza- ble defense to the Maine disciplinary proceedings was clearly erroneous; although the failure to receive due process in a disciplinary proceeding in another jurisdiction would be a proper defense to the imposition of reciprocal discipline in Connecticut, there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that the respondent raised a colorable claim that he was denied due process in the Maine disciplinary proceedings, nor did he make any credible claim that he lacked sufficient notice or an opportu- nity to be heard, the respondent's arguments and reasoning, both in his pleadings before the trial court and to this court on appeal, were circuitous, repetitious, and lacked a cogent discussion that was logically and legally tethered to the issue under consideration, which made it difficult to evaluate whether his claim was properly raised and preserved for appellate review, and even if the claim were deemed to be preserved, much of the veritable laundry list of constitutional arguments and alleged violations of rights, including fleeting references to the ninth amend- ment, the supremacy clause, the commerce clause, and the full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution, consisted of no more than generalized statements of legal propositions, devoid of any cogent analysis or application of the facts to any of the asserted constitutional doctrines relative to the subject matter at hand, namely, the reciprocal enforcement of rules governing attorney professional misconduct. Argued October 17, 2019—officially released January 21, 2020

Convicted, following a trial before a three judge panel, of the crime of murder and, following a trial to the court, of the crime of sale of narcotics, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he sold crack cocaine to the victim, who later refused to leave the defendant's home. Thereafter, the defen- dant engaged in a physical altercation with the victim and stabbed him fifty-one times, resulting in the victim's death. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the state failed to disprove his defenses of self- defense and defense of premises beyond a reasonable doubt. Held: 1. The panel properly concluded that the state presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of disproving the defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of premises beyond a reasonable doubt: the defendant's claim that he experienced a blackout following his physical altercation with the victim was inconsistent with his statement to the police, which included multiple details of events that he alleged happened after he claimed to have blacked out, his statement to the police included other irregularities regarding what occurred following the stabbing, the nature and extent of both the victim's and the defendant's wounds did not support the defendant's self-defense narrative, and the defendant's actions following the stabbing, in which he acknowledged that the victim lay on the floor bleeding significantly but failed to seek medical assis- tance, changed his clothes upon leaving his apartment and purposefully avoided his apartment and the police for thirty-six hours following the stabbing, belied an actual belief on the defendant's part that he was acting in self-defense; furthermore, the panel was not obligated to accept as credible the defendant's evidence or version of events, and the evi- dence supported the panel's findings that the defendant did not believe that the victim was using or about to use deadly physical force or that deadly physical force was necessary to prevent the victim from committing a crime of violence. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly precluded the testimony of his expert witness: the expert's proffered opinion that an individual in a stressful situation may overreact consti- tuted knowledge that was common to the average person and, thus, did not require expert testimony, and the defendant's claim that the court improperly subjected the expert's proffered opinions on certain physio- logical effects and blackouts caused by stressful situations to the stan- dard set forth in State v. Porter (241 Conn. 57) for the admissibility of scientific evidence was unavailing, as the proffered expert's testimony was premised on scientific studies and, thus, needed to be evaluated pursuant to the threshold admissibility standard set forth in Porter; accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in subjecting the two proffered opinions to a Porter analysis. Argued September 18, 2019—officially released January 21, 2020

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for contempt. The plaintiff had filed five postjudgment motions for contempt alleging the defen- dant's noncompliance with various dissolution orders. The court granted three of the motions and issued orders thereon, after which the plaintiff filed a sixth postjudgment motion for contempt, seeking an order holding the defendant in contempt for failing to comply with the court's orders. By the time the plaintiff filed this motion, the defendant had moved his residence to Georgia. The plaintiff's counsel certified the motion to an address in Georgia on file for the defendant and to his e-mail address on file, but the defendant was not served personally. Held that the trial court improperly granted the motion for contempt because the plaintiff did not properly serve the defendant with process: the defendant's claim was reviewable because it challenged the court's personal jurisdiction, and that issue was not waived because there had been no service of process or attempt of service; moreover, a postjudgment motion for contempt filed for the purpose of enforcing an antecedent judicial order requires proper service of process and the plaintiff made no attempt to serve the defendant with process, rather, the plaintiff's counsel certified that a copy of the motion was mailed to the defendant's address in Georgia and e-mailed to the defendant's e-mail address on file, and whether the plaintiff's attempts to provide the defendant with mail or e-mail actually occurred, or whether they provided the defendant with actual notice of the motion, was immaterial because knowledge of the motion, without proper service, was insufficient to confer personal juris- diction. Argued November 13, 2019—officially released January 28, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages arising out of a dispute over his purchase of a motor vehicle from the defendant A Co. The plaintiff's revised complaint alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and claimed that the vehicle was not in good condition when he purchased it and that the defendants had failed to make certain promised repairs. The defendants filed a motion to strike several counts of the complaint, including counts four and eight, which alleged unjust enrichment. The defendants claimed that because paragraph 5 of count one, which sounded in fraud, alleged that the plaintiff had relied on the defendants' representations, both oral and written, that the motor vehicle was in sound condition, and because paragraph 5 was incorporated by reference into counts four and eight, the plaintiff had alleged that there was an oral and written contract that was breached and, therefore, could not properly allege unjust enrich- ment. The trial court granted the motion to strike as to counts four and eight, and the remaining counts were tried to the jury, which found in favor of the defendants. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plain- tiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion to strike the unjust enrichment counts of the revised complaint, as the court mistakenly concluded that the plaintiff had incorporated allegations of breach of an express contract in the unjust enrichment counts: parties routinely plead alternative counts alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment, although in doing so, they are entitled only to a single measure of damages arising out of those alternative claims, given that reliance is an essential element of a claim of fraud and that false representations can be oral and written, this court did not construe paragraph 5 of count one as alleging an express contract or agreement between the parties, and given that count four sounded in unjust enrichment and incorporated the first nine para- graphs of count one, which established the relationship between the parties and did not allege a breach of contract, the plaintiff did not allege an express contract in the unjust enrichment counts, nor did he incorporate the breach of contract allegations in the unjust enrichment counts but, rather, separately alleged breach of contract in counts three and seven and unjust enrichment in counts four and eight; accordingly, the trial court should not have granted the motion to strike counts four and eight of the revised complaint. Argued October 24, 2019—officially released January 28, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted on a plea of guilty of the crime of sexual assault in the second degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea. Pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-24 [a]), the habeas court declined to issue the writ because, at the time of filing, the peti- tioner was not in the custody of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction. Thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that because the petitioner failed to address the threshold question of whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal, he was not entitled to appellate review and this court declined to review his claims on appeal. Argued December 10, 2019—officially released January 28, 2020

The petitioner, who previously had pleaded guilty to burglary in the first degree and had admitted to five violations of probation as part of a plea agreement, filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily given because the petitioner was under the influence of several heavy narcotics administered by Department of Correction personnel, rendering him unable to understand the plea agreement, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to determine that the petitioner was so heavily medicated that he was unable to understand and voluntarily enter a guilty plea. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certifi- cation to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court declined to review the petitioner's claim that the habeas court erred in determining that his guilty plea was made knowingly, intelli- gently and voluntarily because the petitioner failed to address the thresh- old issue of whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal on this issue and addressed only the habeas court's purported error in concluding that his due process rights had not been violated; generally, a petitioner is not afforded appellate review of the habeas court's decision if he has failed to estab- lish that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal regarding the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim: although the habeas court did not make an explicit finding regarding the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of coun- sel, in light of the findings supported by the record, including findings that the petitioner was not impaired by the prescribed medications to the extent that he could not understand the proceedings or the terms of the plea agreement, that his decision to accept that offer was made cogently and voluntarily, that the petitioner responded appropriately to the trial court's questions during the plea canvass, and its determination that the petitioner's testimony was not credible, the habeas court did not err in concluding that the petitioner was not impaired by his prescribed medications to the extent that he could not understand the plea agree- ment and the plea proceedings; accordingly, the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. Argued October 24, 2019—officially released February 4, 2020

The defendants B Co. and its insurer appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming the decision of the Work- ers' Compensation Commissioner, which determined that B Co., a gen- eral contractor, was the principal employer of the plaintiff D, when he suffered a compensable injury while working for an uninsured subcon- tractor, M Co. B Co. had contracted with the state on a construction project, and B Co. then subcontracted work to M Co. and C Co. D was an employee of C Co. and worked on the construction project installing siding and gutters until he was laid off in November, 2014. B Co. war- ranted all the work performed against failures of workmanship and materials for one year after it left the worksite in September, 2014. In November, 2014, the state contacted B Co. about repairing a leaking gutter. Thereafter, B Co. contacted M Co. and indicated that it was refusing final payment until the repairs were made. Subsequently, the president of M Co., R, hired D directly to repair the leaking gutter. On December 4, 2014, D and R traveled to the worksite to make the repairs, during which D fell from a ladder and sustained injuries. After a formal hearing, the commissioner found, inter alia, that D was an employee of M Co. and sustained a compensable injury, and ordered M Co. to accept compensability for D's injuries. Thereafter, the commissioner made a subsequent finding that B Co. was a principal employer pursuant to statute (§ 31-291) and, thus, also was liable for compensation benefits due to D, on the basis that B Co. initially subcontracted with M. Co. and that D's injuries were sustained as the result of B Co.'s direct communication and directive to M Co. to repair the gutters. On appeal, the board, inter alia, affirmed the commissioner's decision, finding that more than one entity may be deemed a claimant's principal employer. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the board committed error in affirming the commissioner's finding that B Co. was a principal employer pursuant to § 31-291, because B Co. was not in control of the worksite when D was injured: although B Co. was not present to oversee the repair, B Co. was in control of the worksite, as the state directed B Co. to repair the gutter and, thereafter, B Co. directed M. Co. to send a representative to the worksite, B Co. was obligated, pursuant to the contract, to complete the worksite project to the state's satisfaction, and B Co. was aware of the risks and dangers worksites presented but did not elect to supervise the gutter repair and did not repair the gutters itself; furthermore, B Co. could not prevail on its claim that the board's decision was unreasonable because a general contractor has no legal right to require a subcontractor to maintain workers' compensation insurance indefinitely; workers' compensation law provides benefits for workers who sustain injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, and the facts of the present case did not concern a future claim, as D was injured while he made repairs pursuant to B Co.'s direction to M Co., B Co. was in control of who made the repairs, and B Co. had the ability to supervise the repair or make the repair itself, if M Co.'s workers' compensation coverage was in doubt. 2. The board did not err in affirming the commissioner's ruling denying the defendants' motion to correct regarding communication between B Co. and the state concerning a warranty, as this claim was not relevant to employees or workers' compensation benefits in the present case; instead, the issue of warranty was relevant to B Co.'s relationship with the state, and any error the commissioner made in finding that B Co. warranted the construction at the worksite was harmless, as B Co. controlled the worksite by directing M Co. to send a representative to the worksite to repair the leaking gutter. Argued November 21, 2019—officially released February 4, 2020

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, W, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inform him adequately about his ineligibility for presentence confinement credit and by failing to request that the trial judge award him that confinement credit. On March 31, 2009, the petitioner, while serving a sentence for a narcotics offense and a violation of probation, was arrested for conspir- acy to commit murder. The petitioner pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and, on December 10, 2013, received a sixteen year sentence. Although the petitioner was held in custody on the homicide case, in lieu of bond, since March 31, 2009, pursuant to statute (§ 18-98d [a] [1] [B]), he did not receive credit for the time he spent in confinement from that date to September 9, 2011, the date his sentence for the narcotics offense and violation of probation terminated. The petitioner only received presentence confinement credit toward the sixteen year sen- tence from September 10, 2011, to December 10, 2013. The habeas court conducted a trial, during which the petitioner and W testified. The court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that W had not rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and that he informed the petitioner adequately about the length of his sentence. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner's claim that W rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to properly inform the petitioner that he would not receive credit for the time he spent in presentence confinement from March 31, 2009, to September 9, 2011, before the petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, was unavailing; the habeas court found that W had specifically informed the petitioner that the petitioner's resolution of the narcotics and violation of probation case created a dead time scenario whereby the petitioner would receive no confinement credit against any prison sentence for the homicide case that preceded the completion of that earlier sentence, and, thus, because the habeas court found that W's testimony was credible as to his communications with the petitioner regarding the dead time he would be serving, it did not abuse its discre- tion in denying the petition for certification to appeal with regard to that claim. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that W provided ineffective assistance by failing to ask the trial judge to order the Department of Correction to award presentence confinement credit, despite the fact that the petitioner was ineligible for such credit under § 18-98d (a) (1) (B), which was based on the petitioner's claim that because the Department of Correction has a policy of honoring court awarded con- finement credit, even if the petitioner did not qualify for it under § 18- 98d, and requesting the credit would not have harmed the petitioner, W rendered deficient performance by not making such a request; con- trary to the petitioner's claim, our Supreme Court previously has made clear that awarding credit for presentence confinement is permissible only for defendants who qualify under § 18-98d, and, therefore, W could not have rendered deficient performance for failing to request confine- ment credit for which the petitioner was not eligible under the applica- ble statute. Argued October 23, 2019—officially released February 4, 2020

The defendant, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of attempt to commit murder, conspiracy to commit murder, kidnapping in the first degree, conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree, conspiracy to commit sexual assault in the first degree, assault in the first degree, conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a firearm, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed that the court improperly concluded that his convictions for sexual assault in the first degree and assault in the first degree, both predicated on liability under Pinkerton v. United States (328 U.S. 640), did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy when considered in light of his conviction for conspir- acy to commit kidnapping in the first degree. Held that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, as the double jeopardy claim advanced by the defendant was untenable: each of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, assault in the first degree and conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree plainly required proof of a fact that the others did not, and they were not the same offense under the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299); moreover, this court could not conclude that the statutes in question evinced a clear legislative intent to prohibit a defendant from being punished for the offenses of conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree, and assault in the first degree when they arise from the same transaction, as the burden of demonstrating a contrary legislative intent rested with the defendant, and he made no attempt to demonstrate such contrary legislative intent; furthermore, like the defendants in Pinkerton, the defendant's convictions and subsequent punishments for the conspiracy count and the substantive counts that were predicated on Pinkerton liability did not violate the double jeopardy clause, as the commission of a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit that offense are separate and distinct offenses, and such claims have been rejected by both federal courts and by our Supreme Court in State v. Walton (227 Conn. 32). Argued October 9, 2019—officially released February 11, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of home invasion, robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree and tampering with a witness, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he and two other men, D and L, pursuant to their plan to commit a home invasion and robbery, followed the victim to his residence, forced him into the residence at gunpoint and robbed him of various possessions, including his credit and ATM cards, two rifles, a box of shotgun shells, and a vase containing approximately $75 in coins. During their investigation, the police obtained a warrant to search the defendant's residence and to seize any items that were described in the warrant application and supporting affidavit as either having been removed from the victim's residence or used or worn by the defendant during the commission of the home invasion. Upon execution of the warrant, the police seized several items, including a box of 20 gauge shotgun shells and a black ski mask. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress any and all evidence that the police seized from his residence. The trial court denied the motion, concluding, inter alia, that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. During the trial, the state called D, who testified in detail about the events leading up to and including the home invasion, and the defendant's involvement therein. D also testified that he had entered into a plea agreement with the state, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to the crime of burglary in the first degree and agreed to testify for the state in exchange for a sentence of between seven and nine years of imprisonment. The plea agreement, which was admitted into evidence without objection, expressly provided that the ultimate decision as to the sentence that D received would be decided by the judge who presided over the defendant's trial, after consideration of the credibility of D's testimony at trial, as well as other factors. On appeal, the defendant claimed that he was deprived of a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety and that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence that was seized pursuant to the search warrant. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that prosecu- torial impropriety that occurred during the state's examination of D and closing argument deprived him of a fair trial: a. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the prosecutor's inquiry during his redirect examination of D about D's reasons for entering into the plea agreement with the state, which elicited testimony from D that the prosecutor had not made an offer until he was satisfied that D was being truthful, was not improper; the prosecutor's inquiry was based on the evidence and did not suggest that the prosecutor was vouching for D's credibility on the basis of facts outside of the record. b. The defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly vouched for D's credibility during the state's rebuttal closing argument was unavail- ing: the prosecutor's reference to the fact that D's plea agreement required the presiding judge to make a determination of D's credibility was based on the evidence and did not suggest to the jury either that the court already had found D to be credible or that the jury was not required to evaluate D's credibility because the court would do so; moreover, contrary to the defendant's assertion, certain challenged argu- ments of the prosecutor concerning D and the plea agreement were not an attempt by the prosecutor to inject his credibility into the trial or to ask the jury to trust his professional judgment and integrity when assessing D's credibility, as the arguments were properly limited to the evidence and the rational inferences to be drawn therefrom; furthermore, the prosecutor did not mischaracterize defense counsel's arguments that the state had ''bought and sold'' D's testimony and that the prosecu- tor was supporting perjury, the prosecutor having properly attempted to refute these challenges to D's testimony by arguing that because the plea agreement was contingent on D testifying credibly, it did not logi- cally provide him with a motive to be untruthful, and there was no merit to the defendant's contention that the prosecutor vouched for D by suggesting that, by testifying, he risked being prosecuted for perjury. 2. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evi- dence that was seized pursuant to the search warrant, the warrant having been supported by probable cause: the defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the facts set forth in the search warrant affidavit did not provide probable cause to believe that he would have retained the items sought to be seized in his residence four months after the home invasion, because the affidavit set forth facts that either implicated the defendant as a participant in the home invasion or as being in the company of L, who was known to be a participant, shortly after the home invasion occurred, it was reasonable to infer that the defendant may have possessed items taken from the victim's residence or that he possessed devices, such as a cell phone, that would have been used in the commission of the crime, and, on the basis of certain averments set forth in the affidavit, it was reasonable to infer that, four months after the home invasion, the defendant probably possessed a cell phone or a GPS device that he had possessed at the time that the crime occurred, that he still would have possessed the types of items that were stolen from the victim and that, in light of the variety of the items taken, one or more of the items would be kept by the defendant in his residence, and the judge who issued the search warrant reasonably could have relied on the training, experience and expertise of the detec- tive affiants in this regard; moreover, the defendant's contention that the facts set forth in the affidavit were insufficient to demonstrate that he was a participant in the home invasion because the facts concerning his friendship with L and his presence with him at a supermarket on the morning following the home invasion reflected innocent behavior that did not give rise to a suspicion that he was a participant was unavailing, as it was reasonable to infer, in light of other facts in the affidavit, that the defendant's act of exchanging approximately $68 in coins by means of the supermarket's Coinstar machine, which was recorded by the store's surveillance camera, was suspicious and tended to give rise to probable cause that he possessed evidence related to the home invasion, and the affidavit reflected that, while the defendant was cashing in the receipt for the coins, L was at a cash register attempting to use the victim's stolen credit card; furthermore, the finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant did not depend on facts in the affidavit that tended to demonstrate that the defendant was a perpetrator of the home invasion, and the affiants presented facts that gave rise to a probability that the defendant was in possession of items connected with the home invasion not only due to his participation in the criminal endeavor but also due to his relationship with and activities with L, who was identified as a suspect in the crime within hours of its commission. Argued September 9, 2019—officially released February 11, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the death of his wife, sought a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his trial counsel, M, rendered ineffective assistance to him by failing to present the testimony of an independent defense forensic pathologist to rebut the testimony of the state's chief medical examiner, C, as to the cause of the victim's death, and by presenting an inadequate argument in support of his posttrial motion for a judgment of acquittal. C determined that the cause of the victim's death was traumatic asphyxia due to neck compression, and C testified at trial that the cause of death was consistent with a certain type of wrestling hold previously used by the petitioner. M hired as a defense consultant a forensic pathologist, T, who previously had concluded that the victim's injuries were consis- tent with a choke hold neck compression, although T could not rule out choking on food as a cause of death. In subsequent discussions, C and T each explained to M that the presence of food in the victim's mouth was probably the result of agonal regurgitation, i.e., vomit expelled as the body ceases to function. T also informed M that he believed that his testimony would be unhelpful for the defense and suggested that the petitioner consider a plea disposition. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner's claim that M rendered ineffective assistance of counsel to him by failing to present expert testimony from an independent forensic pathologist to refute C's testimony as to the cause of the victim's death was unavailing; M sought out the opinion of a highly trained and experienced forensic pathologist, T, on which he was entitled to rely, and, although M made the strategic decision not to call T as a defense witness after T told M that he would not be helpful as a trial witness because he agreed with the opinion of C, M did request and receive valuable information from T, which he used in his cross-examination of C, and M was not required to search for a different, more favorable expert than T to contradict C's testimony at trial. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that M rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial by presenting an inadequate argument in support of his motion for a judgment of acquittal and, specifically, that M failed to argue that, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the state could not prove the essential element of intent to kill because it could not disprove an alternative hypothesis, that he had caused the victim's death inadvertently by applying compres- sion to her neck without intending to cause her death: M's decision not to base the petitioner's defense on the theory of inadvertent death by neck compression without intent to kill was neither professionally inappropriate nor constitutionally deficient under the circumstances, as there was no physical evidence at the crime scene of any physical struggle between the petitioner and the victim, and M raised that theory with the petitioner for the purpose of having him consider relying on it but the petitioner adamantly refused to do so, for he was aware that by raising that defense he would have to admit and argue certain important and highly incriminating facts that he vehemently denied, and M, faced with the petitioner's denial, understandably avoided any mention of that theory when he argued the petitioner's posttrial motion for a judgment of acquittal, which also avoided the possibility that the jury might be instructed on, and thus might find the petitioner guilty of, a lesser included offense instead of acquitting him entirely if it had reasonable doubt as to his alleged intent to kill; moreover, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that he was prejudiced because a properly argued motion for a judgment of acquittal would probably have led the trial court to grant the motion on the theory that there was insufficient evidence before the jury to prove that he had acted with the intent to kill the victim, as there was more than ample evidence in the record to support the inference that the petitioner had intentionally killed the victim, and such evidence supported the complementary inferences that the petitioner had the motive, the means and the opportunity to kill the victim. Argued October 8, 2019—officially released February 11, 2020

The plaintiff, who had been operating her motor vehicle when it collided with a vehicle operated by a third party, sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits allegedly due under a policy of automobile insurance issued to the plaintiff by the defendant insurance company. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate the plaintiff's underin- sured motorist claim from her two other claims, alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, and subsequently referred the underinsured motorist claim to an arbitrator. The arbitrator issued a decision for the plaintiff, awarding her $19,500, which became a judgment on the underinsured motorist claim after the defendant did not move for a trial de novo. The plaintiff, pursuant to statute (§ 52-351b), thereafter served the defendant with interrogatories, seeking discovery as to the defen- dant's assets. After the defendant failed to respond to the interrogatories in a timely manner, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order of compliance, asking the court to compel the defendant to respond, which the court denied. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the court improperly denied her motion for an order of compliance with her postjudgment interroga- tories. Held that the appeal was premature and jurisdictionally defective; the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to compel was an interloc- utory order in an ongoing civil action that was not immediately appeal- able because it neither terminated a separate and distinct proceeding nor deprived the plaintiff of a presently held statutory or constitutional right that would be irretrievably lost in the absence of immediate appel- late review, the judgment on the underinsured motorist claim did not dispose of all the causes of action in the plaintiff's complaint brought against a particular party; moreover, the plaintiff was not deprived of her right to enforce at some later time the monetary judgment, which she retains, but merely her right to compel the defendant's present response to her interrogatories, a right she does not presently hold and one that is subject to the discretion of the court, and the discovery dispute remained enmeshed and intertwined with the adjudication of the issues remaining in the action. Argued November 19, 2019—officially released February 11, 2020

The plaintiff subcontractor, E Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant, S Co., for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with a dispute arising from a project relating to the expansion and renovation of a hospital. Pursuant to its contract with S Co., E Co. agreed to perform all electrical work for the project. The contract provided that E Co. had a duty to coordinate with S Co., that E Co. had made allowances for all hindrances and delays to its work, and that E Co. would work within S Co.'s schedule, which S Co. may revise from time to time. S Co. had the right to direct a change in E Co.'s work on written notice and, during the course of the project, thirty-eight change orders were issued. After several months, E Co. sent S Co. a notice, alleging a cardinal change to the contract due to issues that arose during the preceding months and asserting that it could only continue to perform under the contract if S Co. agreed to additional financial terms. S Co. responded that E Co.'s refusal to proceed under the contract constituted default and, the next day, S Co. terminated E Co. E Co. alleged that S Co. had breached the contract by its wrongful termination of E Co., and S Co. filed a counterclaim, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. S Co. also filed a third-party complaint against K and T, the chief financial officer and president of E Co., respectively, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent conduct. The case was tried to the court, which rendered judgment in part for S Co. on its counterclaim, and in favor of K and T on the third-party complaint. On S Co.'s appeal and E Co.'s cross appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly rejected E Co.'s claim that there had been a cardinal change in the contract terms and properly concluded that E Co. breached the contract by abandoning the project: the court properly focused on the nature and impact of the delays on the work expected of and performed by E Co., which were not extraordinary in a project of this magnitude, and neither the character nor the nature of the work expected of or performed by E Co. was altered in any way, and E Co. was compensated for the changes in its work up until the time that it issued its notice of cardinal change to S Co., E Co. was required to anticipate unforeseen modifications to E Co.'s sequence of construction and the schedule parameters of the contract when it signed the contract, as the contract language demonstrated that the parties contemplated the possibility of scheduling delays and changes; moreover, there was no evidence that the change orders altered the nature of E Co.'s work, and, in executing each change order, E Co. attested that it was compen- sated for associated costs and delays, and it was clear that the changes were not so profound that they were not redressable under the contract, as they were, in fact, redressed via the change orders. 2. The trial court properly concluded that S Co. materially breached its contract with E Co. by failing to provide E Co. with a forty-eight hour cure period before terminating its contract with E Co.: even though S Co. claimed that the court erred in assuming that it had terminated E Co. pursuant to the contract provision requiring it to give E Co. forty- eight hours to cure its breach, because S Co. pleaded in its counterclaim that it had declared E Co. in default pursuant to the contract, the court properly held the parties to their contractual obligations; moreover, S Co.'s reliance on certain common-law principles overlooked the clear contractual language requiring a cure period, which did not include any exceptions, and which outlined the procedure if E Co. abandoned the project or defaulted on its obligations and the court correctly determined that S Co. should be held to the contract provisions because to hold otherwise would excuse S Co.'s noncompliance with the contract and would create a new and different agreement, which courts cannot do; furthermore, the court's enforcement of the cure period did not render meaningless another provision of the contract stating that S Co.'s con- tractual remedies were not exclusive, because S Co. could not turn to the common law to avoid an express contractual obligation. 3. The trial court's award of damages was not erroneous: this court disagreed with S Co.'s claim that, due to E Co.'s material breach, S Co. was excused from further performance of its contractual obligations and was entitled to expectation damages, because S Co. also breached the contract by failing to afford E Co. a forty-eight hour cure period, transforming its termination for cause of E Co. into a termination for convenience and, accordingly, S Co. could not claim entitlement to a common-law remedy after forfeiting its right to a contractual remedy as a result of its own breach; moreover, E Co. could not prevail on its claim that the court erred in not awarding a termination payment pursuant to the contract, because, although the court concluded that E Co. was entitled to a termination payment, the court found that E Co.'s billing practices were too irregular to award damages on the basis of its invoices, which the contract had provided for, and, instead, calculated the payment by determining the percentage of the project E Co. had completed and multiplying that percentage by the contract price; although potentially imprecise, it could not reasonably be argued that this method ran afoul of the contract or was unfair to E Co. 4. The trial court did not err in finding that K and T did not commit fraud when they swore under oath to the accuracy of invoices submitted to S Co. for goods and services they represented to S Co. that they had paid to other subcontractors, but actually never did pay; K's and T's conduct strained the bounds of fraud, revealing, at best, gross incompe- tence, but the court nevertheless found that, on the basis of its observa- tion of K's and T's demeanor and attitude, neither K nor T acted with fraudulent intent, and this court does not second-guess the court's credi- bility assessments. Argued October 16, 2019—officially released February 11, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of five counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from his alleged sexual abuse of five female victims, including C, on various dates while they were under the age of sixteen. The minor victims were often in the presence of the defendant in his home, where the defendant had contact with their intimate parts on multiple occa- sions. Specifically, the defendant grabbed C's breasts over her shirt on multiple occasions from September, 2005 to September, 2006. After the close of the state's case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court granted as to a count alleging sexual assault in the second degree but denied as to the five remaining counts that charged the defendant with the crime of risk of injury to a child. Subsequently, the defendant requested that the court provide a specific unanimity instruction to the jury on the remaining five counts, which the court granted only as to one of those counts. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him on the count involving C, as the three factor test used by our Supreme Court in State v. Stephen J. R. (309 Conn. 586) to determine whether a child victim's general or nonspecific testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction in a sexual abuse case was inapplicable to the present case because C was not a very young child at the time she was abused by the defendant and when she testified at trial. Held: 1. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal was unavailing: a. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the test used by our Supreme Court in Stephen J. R. was inapplicable to the present case because the leniency with respect to proof that has been formulated to apply in such cases involving very young children should not be applied with equal force in the present case: although C was older than the child victim in Stephen J. R. when she was sexually abused by the defendant and when she testified at trial, the test articulated by our Supreme Court in Stephen J. R. was not dependent on the child's age and was applicable to the present case to assess whether C's testimony was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction because, according to C's testimony at trial, the defendant had access to her on multiple occasions at his home between September, 2005, and her sixteenth birthday in September, 2006, and the test used in Stephen J. R. applies to cases, such as the present case, where an alleged abuser has ongoing access to the child victim and, as a result, the victim testifies to repeated acts of abuse occurring over a period of time but, lacking any meaningful point of reference, is unable to furnish many specific details, dates or distinguishing characteristics as to individual acts or assaults; moreover, the exact number of times that the defendant had contact with C's breasts and the specific dates on which these acts occurred are not elements of committing the offense of risk of injury to a child, and the state was only required to prove that the defendant had contact with C's intimate parts on one occasion before her sixteenth birthday. b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that, even if the three factor test articulated in Stephen J. R. applied to the present case, there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the count involving C because C's testimony failed to satisfy the second and third factors of the test and, thus, that it was unreasonable for the jury to conclude from the evidence presented and the inferences drawn therefrom that the defendant had contact with C's intimate parts before she was sixteen years old: the defendant could not prevail on his claim with respect to the second factor of the test, that C's testimony failed to establish sufficiently the number of times that the defendant had contact with her intimate parts because her testimony was inconsistent, as that claim merely attacked the credibility of C's testimony and did not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence on which the jury based its guilty verdict, and C satisfied the second factor by testifying with sufficient specificity that the defendant, who was charged with one count of risk of injury to a child for having contact with C's intimate parts in a sexual and indecent manner, touched her breasts at least once; moreover, with respect to the third factor of the test, which requires a child victim to describe the general time period in which the illegal acts occurred to assure that those acts were committed within the applicable limitation period, the state did not need to prove the time period during which each incident occurred because the defendant failed to claim that any of the conduct for which he was charged occurred outside the limitation period and, although the third factor was, nevertheless, applicable to the present case because the state was obligated to prove that the defendant had contact with C's intimate parts on one or more occasions before her sixteenth birthday, C's testimony was sufficient in this regard because it tended to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct occurred after he moved to Connecticut in September, 2005, but before she turned sixteen years old in September, 2006, and the jury could have reasonably found that C's testimony regarding the general time period during which the defendant had contact with her intimate parts was corroborated by other testimony at trial, including the testimony of the defendant's wife, who testified that C was in the defendant's home on multiple occasions before her sixteenth birthday. 2. The defendant's claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict because the trial court improperly denied his request for a specific unanimity instruction as to four of the counts in violation of his rights under the federal and state constitutions, which prohibit the conviction of a criminal defendant by a jury unless it is unanimous as to the defendant's guilt, was unavailing; although the defendant was charged in four counts with having violated one statutory subdivision (§ 53-21 (a) (2)) by touching the intimate parts of each child victim on one occasion, and, at trial, the state proffered evidence that the defendant had contact with each child's intimate parts on multiple occasions, there was no requirement for the jury to be unanimous as to the specific occasion on which the prohibited contact occurred and the court was not required to provide a specific unanimity instruction, unlike the situation in which the jury must decide whether the defendant violated one of multiple statutory subsections, subdivisions or elements. Argued October 10, 2019—officially released February 11, 2020

Convicted of the crime of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that certain of the trial court's evidentiary rulings constituted harmful error that entitled him to a new trial, and that other evidentiary rulings by the court deprived him of his constitutional rights to present a defense and to confront witnesses. The defendant and his brothers, B and S, robbed the victim when he returned home at night after closing the bar that he owned. The defendant then shot and killed the victim. Twelve years later, A, the estranged wife of S, gave the police a written statement that implicated the defendant, B and S in the victim's death. A, who knew that the defendant, B and S were affiliated with gangs, delayed providing information to the police out of fear that the defendant and S would retaliate against her or her family. S, who had regularly abused A throughout their relationship, beat her on the night of the shooting and threatened to kill her mother. While the defendant was incarcerated on unrelated charges during the twelve years after the shooting, he instructed A to write intimate and salacious letters to him so that he could discredit her in the event that she were to testify against him. The trial court admitted evidence that the defendant and S were affiliated with gangs, and that A and her children had been relocated out of state multiple times after A gave her statement to the police. The court refused to permit defense counsel to introduce the letters into evidence, limited his inquiry into A's birth control practices and precluded him from cross- examining her about the termination of her employment. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence A's testimony that the defendant and S were affiliated with gangs or that she and her children were relocated after she gave her statement to the police: a. Evidence that the defendant and S were affiliated with gangs was relevant and highly probative to explain why A delayed twelve years before informing the police about the victim's murder, as she testified that she deeply feared gang reprisals and was afraid for her safety and that of family members, the court carefully balanced the probative value of her testimony against its potential for unfair prejudice, the court's limiting instructions to the jury after A testified minimized the prejudicial impact of her testimony, and the court instructed the jury in its final charge that the purpose of her testimony was to show why she was afraid to disclose information about the murder or why she disclosed it at the time that she did; moreover, A's testimony was not cumulative in establishing that she feared the defendant, B and S, as S's threats and history of physical abuse of A was a distinct and separate basis for her fear, and evidence of the defendant's gang affiliation was pertinent to establish that her fear extended to the defendant and B, and illustrated the extent to which she feared retaliation by other gang members. b. Evidence of A's relocation was highly probative and relevant with respect to her delay in providing information to the police about the shooting, which was a central issue in the case, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that A's willingness to subject herself to the upheaval and disruption of moving herself and her children multiple times was credible evidence of her belief that she and her family were not safe; moreover, the probative value of A's relocation testimony was not outweighed by its prejudicial impact on the defendant, as the court restricted the prosecutor from referencing the state's witness protection program (§§ 54-82t and 54-82u), A testified without referencing the wit- ness protection program or the phrase, ''at state expense,'' and, although the prosecutor's use of the phrase, ''was relocated,'' in closing argument to the jury was prejudicial to the defendant, it did not have the same unduly prejudicial impact as ''witness protection program'' or ''at state expense''; furthermore, references to the witness protection program were passive and infrequent, and the prosecutor did not exploit that evidence. 2. The trial court improperly refused to admit into evidence the letters that A wrote to the defendant but properly precluded defense counsel from questioning A about the termination of her employment and limited his inquiry of her as to her birth control practices: a. Contrary to the defendant's assertion that the trial court's rulings violated his rights to present a defense and to confront witnesses, the defendant's claims were evidentiary, rather than constitutional, as the record demonstrated that he was afforded multiple avenues of impeach- ment in cross-examining A, who was the state's key witness, and that he took full advantage of that latitude by rigorously cross-examining her with respect to relevant lines of inquiry, most importantly, her fear of the defendant, B and S, and that he sought to undermine A's credibility through the testimony of other witnesses. b. The trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence the letters that A wrote to the defendant but the defendant did not satisfy his burden to establish that the error substantially affected the verdict and therefore was harmful; defense counsel took full advantage of the court's permission to provide the gist of the graphic content of the letters and was entitled to quote the nonsalacious details of the letters, counsel was afforded wide latitude in his cross-examination of A, which lasted one and one-half days and included examination about the veracity of her explanation for authoring the letters, the cross-examination of A sought to establish the defense theory that she was motivated to come forward to retaliate against the defendant and S for the ending of her relationship with S, and there was corroborating evidence that supported A's testimony. c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defense counsel to examine A about the termination of her employment, as the reasons for the termination would have injected a collateral issue into the trial. d. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly restricted his ability to cross-examine A about her birth control regimen; the court allowed some inquiry into the topic but properly determined that further questioning was irrelevant because it would have inappropriately focused on a matter far too attenuated from the material issues in the case. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor made numerous statements during closing argument to the jury that referred to facts not in evidence; the prosecutor's remark that A had testified consistently in previous proceedings was based on reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence and was a response to defense counsel's having highlighted a single prior inconsistency in A's testimony, the prosecutor's remark that the state had received no benefit from A's testimony was merely an inadvertent misstatement in reference to reward money that was disbursed by the governor's office for informa- tion about the shooting, as it was obvious from the context of the statement that the prosecutor meant to refer to evidence that the state's attorney's office did not provide any reward to A, the prosecutor's ambiguous statement about who was with A when she withdrew money from her bank account was not intended to suggest that A had testified consistently as to that fact at previous proceedings but that she had testified consistently as to that fact at the defendant's trial, the prosecu- tor's remark that A knew of the reward at the time of the prior proceed- ings was clearly an invitation for the jury to draw a reasonable inference from the fact that she knew of the reward before any proceedings had taken place, the prosecutor's remark that B had moved in with A, uninvited, to keep watch over her when the defendant and S were incarcerated was a reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence, and the record substantiated the prosecutor's statement that the letters A had written to S were a means to discredit her and was a proper summation of A's testimony about the letters. Argued September 6, 2019—officially released February 18, 2020

The plaintiff, the decedent's widower and trustee of a charitable trust formed by the decedent's estate, appealed to this court from the trial court's denial of his motion to open the judgment dismissing his probate appeal. Held that the plaintiff lacked standing to represent the trust, as he was not an attorney and he was not representing his own cause in his capacity as a trustee of the trust. Argued November 20, 2019—officially released February 18, 2020

The plaintiff bank, U Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants A and C. A and C were defaulted for failure to plead and the trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. Thereafter, the court denied C's postjudgment motion to dismiss, which alleged that U Co. did not have standing. The court granted C's motion to reargue and ordered that the motion to dismiss be reheard. The court subsequently denied C's motion to dismiss and C's motion to reargue that decision. C then filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of standing, which the court denied, and A and C appealed to this court. This court thereafter granted in part U Co.'s motion to dismiss this appeal. Held that this court could not review A and C's challenge to the judgment from which they had appealed; A and C failed to brief, or even mention, the trial court's judgment denying their second motion to dismiss, the defendants' brief was limited to their challenge of the court's findings of standing and jurisdiction, which were decided in earlier rulings from which a timely appeal was never taken, and the defendants failed to challenge the bases on which the court denied the second motion to dismiss, which were the law of the case doctrine and the denial of C's motion to reargue. Argued November 20, 2019—officially released February 18, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. He claimed, inter alia, that his trial counsel were deficient in representing him at a pretrial hearing on a motion in limine filed by the state, which sought permission to videotape the testimony of the child victim in the petitioner's absence, pursuant to State v. Jarzbek (204 Conn. 683). The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. The habeas court had found that the petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient perfor- mance of his trial counsel. This court thereafter reversed in part the habeas court's judgment and remanded the case to the habeas court for further proceedings. This court concluded that the habeas court's prejudice analysis was improper. This court's remand order directed the habeas court to consider prejudice and, if necessary for the ultimate resolution of the petitioner's ineffective assistance claim, to consider the petitioner's allegations of deficient performance. Thereafter, on remand, the habeas court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the habeas court improperly concluded that his right to effective assistance of counsel was not vio- lated by the performance of his trial counsel in challenging the reliability of the state's witness, G, at the Jarzbek hearing. Held that the habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate deficient performance of his trial counsel: trial counsel challenged G's testimony on multiple grounds, including, inter alia, reliability and G's qualifications; moreover, trial counsel's performance was not deficient for not asking specific questions or inquiring more extensively into certain areas, as the cross-examination strategy was tactical in nature and this court would not second-guess counsel's strategy; furthermore, trial counsel's failure to present the testimony of a defense expert at the Jarzbek hearing was not deficient performance, as the trial court had denied the petitioner's motion to have the expert interview the victim pursuant to State v. Marquis (241 Conn. 823), and counsel's decision not to present that testimony without the court having granted the Marquis motion constituted sound trial strategy. Argued October 21, 2019—officially released February 18, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes of attempt to commit criminal mischief in the third degree and attempt to commit criminal trespass in the third degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. In his petition, the petitioner sought to vacate his conviction, claiming, inter alia, that there had been no probable cause for his arrest on the initial charges of attempt to commit burglary in the third degree and attempt to commit larceny in the sixth degree. The court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction and denied the petition. Held that the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's petition for a writ of error coram nobis: the petitioner could have filed a petition for a new trial, as opposed to the petition for a writ of error coram nobis, but the record reflects that he failed to do so, and, therefore, the peti- tioner failed to avail himself of an alternative legal remedy available to him, which deprived the court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of his petition; accordingly, because the court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for a writ of error coram nobis, it should have rendered judgment dismissing rather than denying the petition. Argued November 20, 2019—officially released February 18, 2020