Volume 196 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff M Co. sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants A and T following their default on a promissory note secured by the mortgage. Thereafter, W Co., which had been substi- tuted as the plaintiff in the action following its acquisition of M Co., filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability. In support of its motion, W Co. attached an affidavit from H, the vice president of loan documentation for M Co., who attested concerning the debt owed under the note and that W Co. was the current holder of the note. H included with his affidavit a copy of both the note and the mortgage, which he referenced therein. No objection to the motion was filed. The trial court granted W Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability, which it treated as unopposed, concluding that H's affidavit in conjunction with the note and mortgage constituted a prima facie case for a judgment of strict foreclosure and that W Co. had met its burden of showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thereafter, the trial court granted W Co.'s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon. The trial court subsequently denied A's motion to reargue, and A appealed to this court. Held: 1. A could not prevail on her claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because W Co. did not have standing because it was not the holder of the subject note, which was premised on her claim that the note was a nonnegotiable instrument pursuant to the relevant statute (§ 42a-3-104 (a)) because it was not for a fixed amount of money and was governed by federal law; because A's claim challenged the validity of the note, as opposed to W Co.'s actual possession of the note or ownership of the mortgage, it implicated the merits of the foreclosure action and, therefore, was not jurisdictional. 2. Contrary to A's claim, the trial court properly granted W Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability, as W Co. established its prima facie case for foreclosure by pleading that it was the holder of the note on which A had defaulted and submitting H's affidavit, which included and incorporated by reference copies of the note and mortgage, the record did not reflect any issues with regard to conditions precedent to foreclo- sure, and A did not attempt to rebut W Co.'s status as the holder of the note and, in fact, failed to file any opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting W Co.'s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure; contrary to A's claim that W Co. failed to follow the procedures set forth in the rule of practice (§ 23- 18) pertaining to proof of debt in foreclosure actions because it did not provide a preliminary statement of debt or affidavit of debt no less than five days before the hearing on the motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, W Co. complied with § 23-18, as the plain language of that rule of practice only requires that the preliminary statement of the plaintiff's monetary claim be filed no less than five days prior to the hearing, and W Co. filed its preliminary statement of its monetary claim almost nine years prior to the hearing and, thereafter, filed several additional affidavits of debt, informing A as to how much she owed under the note. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied A's motion to reargue the judgment of strict foreclosure: A's claim that that court overlooked the fact that the requirement in the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-18) that the plaintiff's preliminary statement of debt be filed no less than five days before a hearing on a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure was mandatory was unavailing, as the court had before it several affidavits containing a preliminary statement of W Co.'s monetary claim that were filed far in advance of five days before the June, 2018 hearing, including the preliminary statement of monetary claim filed in September, 2009; moreover, A failed to proffer any additional or new evidence separate from that which the trial court heard in the prior proceeding, nor did she demonstrate a misapprehension of facts or claims of law that the court failed to address. Argued October 17, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and issuing certain financial orders. Held: 1. The trial court's finding that the defendant was at fault for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage was not clearly erroneous; sufficient evi- dence supported the court's finding, including evidence that the defen- dant abruptly left the marital home with little explanation. 2. The trial court properly found that the defendant was intentionally under- employed when calculating his earning capacity: even though the defen- dant claimed that the court erred in basing his earning capacity on his prior work as an information technology consultant because he claimed his qualifications were outmoded to work in that field, this contention relied on the defendant's testimony regarding the amount and sources of his income, which the court expressly found was not credible, there was little support in the record for the defendant's claim that he could not pursue additional employment in his field, and there was evidence that the defendant had, as recently as 2013, worked in the field of information technology, but had done little since then to improve his qualifications or pursue additional employment in the field; thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the court to to calculate its support orders on the basis of the defendant's earning capacity rather than his actual income. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly determined which properties were part of the marital estate; although the defendant claimed that numerous properties should not have been included in the marital estate because the plaintiff made no contribution to the acquisition of these properties and the defendant did not have title to these properties when the marriage was dissolved, the court recognized that the marital home was foreclosed because of the defen- dant's misconduct and, in lieu of the marital home, the court awarded the plaintiff a single property and, at the same time, awarded the defen- dant his current residence along with seven additional properties; the court acted within its broad discretion in dividing the properties as it did, having been confronted with a complicated record regarding the defendant's property ownership, and its decision to award the parties separate residences and to allow the defendant to retain whatever inter- est he possessed in seven other properties was reasonable. Argued October 22, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiff, as executor of the decedent's estate and in his individual capacity, sought a declaratory judgment as to certain real property that the decedent had devised to the defendants, the decedent's widow and stepsons, and that the plaintiff's brother, in his will, later devised to the decedent's widow. The brother's will was filed in the Probate Court, and the plaintiff objected to the will on the ground that it conflicted with the decedent's will as to who was to inherit the property. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, concluding that the plaintiff's claims were not ripe for adjudication in the Superior Court because, at the time of the filing of the complaint, they were still pending before the Probate Court. The trial rendered judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, which dismissed that portion of the appeal filed by the plaintiff in his capacity as executor of the decedent's estate. Held that the judg- ment of the trial court was affirmed; because the trial court thoroughly addressed the arguments raised in this appeal in its memorandum of decision, this court adopted the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues. Argued December 11, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiff sought a legal separation from the defendant, and the defendant filed a cross complaint seeking to dissolve her marriage to the plaintiff. The court thereafter entered certain orders pendente lite regarding inter- national travel and education for the parties' minor child, M. From that judgment, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Following a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage and entered certain orders, and the plaintiff filed an amended appeal. Held: 1. There was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that the trial court violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment to the United States constitution by rendering a judgment of marital dissolution: although the plaintiff argued that, by dissolving the parties' marriage, the court violated his right to free exercise of religion, he provided no legal author- ity to substantiate that assertion, and he did not allege that claim in his operative complaint or at trial; moreover, following the commencement of the plaintiff's action, the defendant filed a cross complaint seeking a judgment of dissolution pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46b-40 (c) (1)), the constitutionality of which has previously been upheld by this court and, in light of that precedent, the plaintiff's claim failed. 2. The trial court properly entered orders regarding the education of M and his ability to travel internationally with either parent as part of its judgment of dissolution: a. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting M to remain enrolled at a public elemenatary school in West Hartford as the record contained evidence to substantiate the court's factual findings and thus this court was not left with a firm conviction that a mistake had been made: the court found that M had made great strides in his educational development at the West Hartford school, and the court credited certain testimony from M's guardian ad litem and the defendant that it was in M's best interest to attend the West Hartford school given its close proximity to his home, and that the testimony adduced at trial was consistent with the court's prior findings, which were made in connec- tion with its pendente lite orders relating to M's education, including findings that the defendant had worked with special needs children for ten years as a paraprofessional and demonstrated extensive knowledge of M's issues and diagnoses. b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting M to travel internationally on vacations with either party: the evidence supported the court's findings that, because the parties both were born in foreign lands, M was learning three languages, and the defendant wanted M to visit her country of origin, Peru, to meet his extended family and to allow him to immerse himself in her culture, and the plaintiff presented no evidence at trial indicating that the defendant intended to remain in Peru with M; moreover, the court credited the testimony of the guardian ad litem that she supported M's international travel, noting that there were no travel advisories for Peru and that Peru was a signatory to the Hague Convention, which provided the plaintiff with an avenue of redress against the defendant in the event she refused to return to the United States. Argued November 13, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants J and D. Following its motion for judgment of strict foreclosure, the plaintiff filed a demand for disclosure of defense under the applicable rule of practice (§ 13-19). J and D timely responded with a disclosure of defense. The trial court thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion for default for failure to disclose a ''proper defense'' as a means to delay the action and overruled J and D's objection. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon, from which J and D appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for default and, accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed; J and D properly complied with the requirements of § 13-19 by timely disclosing their defense, stating their counsel's belief that the defense was bona fide and setting forth the nature or substance of the defense, and the court made no findings as to the good faith and intentions of the defendants' counsel in filing the defense as required by Jennings v. Parsons (71 Conn. 413). Argued September 24, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment as to a tax sale of real property, and for other relief. Pursuant to the system to collect taxes unique to the defendant city of Torrington, the defendant R, the tax collector for the city, conducted a tax sale in which he sold certain real property of the plaintiff to collect unpaid property taxes. In response, the plaintiff commenced an action against the city, R, and the defendants W and S, the purchasers of the property at the tax sale. The trial court granted the motion to intervene as a party defendant filed by H Co., a lender that held a mortgage on the property. H Co. sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment as to the title to the real property, and for other relief. Subsequently, the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the city, R, and W and S, and rendered judgment thereon, from which H Co. appealed to this court. Held that H. Co.'s appeal was moot because there was an unchallenged, alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the trial court; accordingly, because this court could not grant H Co. any practical relief with respect to its claims, this court was without subject matter jurisdiction over H Co.'s appeal. Argued November 12, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiff, who had purchased certain residential real property in New Haven from the defendant, brought an action seeking damages for, inter alia, breach of contract for the defendant's failure under the contract to deliver a property that contained three legal dwelling units. The defendant purchased the property in 1979, and had used it as a three unit residence during his ownership. In 2011, the city building depart- ment sent a letter to the defendant, informing him that the department's records indicated that the property was a two unit residence, and that it may have been altered without approval from the building department. Thereafter, the defendant spoke with the building department's director, and the defendant believed that the matter was resolved. Subsequently, the defendant represented in a real estate listing that the property was a three unit residence and sold the property to the plaintiff in 2015, without informing the plaintiff of the 2011 letter. Thereafter, the plaintiff became aware of the 2011 letter upon inspecting the records of the building department on an unrelated matter. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding that the city building department had not made a determination that the plaintiff's property contained only two residential units. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in finding that the city building department had not made a determination regarding the use and occupancy status of the property; contrary to the plaintiff's claim that the building depart- ment had determined that the property contained a two unit residence, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding, as the building department official testified that no determina- tion regarding the number of legal units had been made, no code viola- tions regarding the number of legal units had been communicated to the defendant, and no further action had been taken after the issuance of the 2011 letter; moreover, although the plaintiff was correct in asserting that the record contained some contradictory evidence regard- ing the building department's determination, the mere existence of such evidence was insufficient to undermine the finding of the trial court. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in not finding that the plaintiff established the existence of damages, as the defendant cannot be liable for damages if, pursuant to the court's findings, he was not liable for the underlying causes of action. Argued November 19, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiff, M, brought an action against the defendant C, alleging, inter alia, that C had failed to make payments due on a mortgage note held by M. In May, 2009, after a trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of M. In July, 2013, M died and, subsequently, in July, 2017, his wife, P, as executrix of his estate, filed a motion to open the judgment and to substitute herself as the plaintiff, which the court denied. In October, 2017, P again filed a motion to substitute herself as the plaintiff, which the court granted. The court also vacated its prior order denying the July, 2017 motion to open and C appealed to this court. Held that P should not have been substituted as the plaintiff, as the trial court erred in premising its decision to open the judgment and to substitute P as the plaintiff on a statute (§ 52-107) which is inapplicable in instances in which a case has reached final judgment: the statutory language of § 52-107 clearly and unambiguously conveys the meaning that it is applicable only in cases in which an action is presently pending before the court, and not in cases in which a final judgment has been rendered, and, in the present case, there was no action pending before the court at the time it relied on § 52-107 to grant P's motion to substitute herself as the plaintiff, as P's motions were filed approximately four years after the death of M and eight years after final judgment was rendered in the present case; moreover, although P claimed that the right of survival statute (§ 52-599) provided the court with broad discretion to grant her untimely motion to substitute herself as the plaintiff on a showing of good cause, the record failed to support the plaintiff's claim that the court must have considered § 52-599 and conducted a good cause analysis, as it was clear from the language of the court's articulation, which did not cite to § 52-599, that it, instead, considered and relied on the standards provided in § 52-107 and our rule of practice (§ 9-18), both of which govern the intervention of nonparties, and, even if it were true that the court utilized its discretion under § 52-599 to grant P's untimely motion to open the judgment and to substitute herself as the plaintiff, neither P nor the court had pointed to any evidence that would support a finding of a reason amounting in law as a legal excuse for P's four year delay in seeking to participate in the present case. Argued November 14, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory judgment of interpleader to determine the rights of the defendants, certain individuals and companies (Group I defendants, Group H defendants and Group S defendants), to certain shares of the plaintiff's common stock. The Group H defendants had commenced two actions, which were consolidated with the interpleader action, against the Group I defendants and the plaintiff, claiming, inter alia, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages in connection with the investment by the Group H defendants in three limited liability partnerships. Thereafter, the Group H defendants' actions were referred to an arbitrator, who issued an award in favor of the Group H defendants, which the trial court con- firmed. Subsequently, in the interpleader action, the Group H defendants filed a motion for an interlocutory judgment of interpleader, asserting that, pursuant to the arbitration award, they were the rightful owners of the disputed shares of stock. The Group H defendants also filed a motion to remand in which they requested that, if the trial court found that the arbitration award was ambiguous as to the ownership of the shares, the court remand the matter to the arbitrator for clarification regarding that issue. The defendant G Co. thereafter file a motion to dismiss the interpleader action on the ground that it was moot. Following a hearing, the trial court denied G Co.'s motion to dismiss, granted the Group H defendants' motions to remand and for an interlocutory judgment of interpleader, and rendered judgment thereon. On the Group I defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The Group I defendants' claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the interpleader action on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing because its transfer agent, who was not a party to the action, allegedly was holding the subject shares on behalf of the plaintiff was unavailing; there was no appellate authority that supported the proposition that an interpleader action is jurisdictionally defective if the property at issue is held by a nonparty transfer agent of a named party. 2. The Group I defendants' could not prevail on their claims that the trial court improperly denied G Co.'s motion to dismiss and improperly ren- dered the interlocutory judgment of interpleader; although the Group I defendants asserted that the interpleader action was moot because the Group S defendants did not have a viable adverse claim to the subject shares, it was premature, at the current stage of the proceedings, for this court to consider the merits of any of the parties' purportedly adverse claims to the shares. 3. The trial court properly granted the Group H defendants' motion to remand the matter to the arbitrator: contrary to the Group I defendants' claim that by remanding the matter to the arbitrator, that court improperly opened and vacated the arbitration award, the court properly exercised its authority to remand the matter to the arbitrator to clarify the arbitra- tion award as to the ownership of the subject shares; moreover, the court did not violate the doctrine of functus officio, as the varying positions of the Group I defendants and Group S defendants regarding whether the arbitrator had determined the ownership of the shares demonstrated that the arbitration award was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Argued October 18, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiffs, who held a warranty deed to real property in a subdivision and a quitclaim deed to an undivided one-forty-eighth interest in a beach that was subject to certain restrictive covenants, brought an action against the defendants, who also owned real property in the subdivision, seeking a declaration that a 2011 modification to the restrictive cove- nants of the beach deed was null and void. In 2014, a modification that contained an extensive revision of the restrictive covenants governing the use of the beach was filed in the land records, causing the plaintiffs A and B to amend the complaint to seek a declaratory judgment that the 2014 modification was null and void. The case was tried to the court, which rendered judgment in part in favor of the defendants, declaring that the 2011 modification was null and void but that the 2014 modifica- tion was valid and in full force and effect. A and B thereafter filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, which the court denied. A and B appealed to this court, which, inter alia, reversed the trial court's judg- ment in favor of the defendants on the declaratory judgment count with respect to the 2014 modification, concluding that the 2014 modification was not valid and in full force and effect, and affirmed the court's judgment in favor of the defendants on A and B's claim for attorney's fees and costs. The trial court, on remand, rendered judgment declaring the 2014 modification invalid. Subsequently, A and B filed postjudgment motions for equitable relief and for fees and costs and a motion to open the judgment, which the court denied. On A and B's appeal to this court, held: 1. The claim of A and B that the trial court improperly denied their postjudg- ment motion for equitable relief because this court's order of remand in the first appeal required the trial court to address their claims for quiet title and injunctive relief was unavailing, as the relief sought by A and B was beyond the scope of this court's remand: the rescript in the first appeal, as interpreted in conjunction with the entirety of the opinion, conveyed to the trial court that the claims of A and B for quiet title were beyond the scope of the mandate, as this court, having identified all of the claims that A and B advanced in the first appeal and having noted which of those claims would not be addressed in its opinion, communicated to the parties that each claim was given its due consideration before this court and ultimately concluded that it was unnecessary to address the quiet title claims, this court's favorable rulings on the declaratory judgment counts of A and B obviated the need to address their quiet title counts, which sought the same relief as the declaratory judgment counts, and this court made no mention in its rescript of the quiet title claims of A and B, despite acknowledging that they had raised those claims; moreover, A and B could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly declined to provide injunc- tive relief on remand, as this court, having declared the 2011 and 2014 modifications null and void under the declaratory judgment counts, invalidated the modifications' attack on the original beach deed's restric- tive covenants by returning title to the beach to what it was prior to the enactment of those modifications, and, therefore, A and B were not entitled to any further relief. 2. A and B could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly denied their postjudgment motion for fees and costs as to their success- ful challenges to the 2011 modification, as that court was correct that its consideration of the postjudgment motion for fees and costs as to that modification was beyond the scope of the remand in the first appeal because this court affirmed the trial court's denial of attorney's fees and costs with respect to the 2011 modification and did not indicate in its rescript that the issue warranted further consideration; nevertheless, the trial court improperly denied the postjudgment motion for fees and costs without reaching the merits of that motion as to the 2014 modification, as it was appropriate for A and B to seek postjudgment fees and costs with respect to the 2014 modification on remand because their entitlement under that modification to attorney's fees and costs had not been considered before a judgment was rendered in their favor on the 2014 modification by this court's reversal of the trial court, and the postjudgment motion for fees and costs as to that modification was not barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel because it had not been considered by either the trial court or this court in the first appeal. 3. The claim of A and B that, even assuming that this court's mandate in the first appeal did not encompass their claims to quiet title, equitable relief, and fees and costs, the trial court improperly denied their motion to open to provide them with their requested relief, was unavailing; the trial court considered the issues raised by A and B by way of their postjudgment motions to have been litigated and reviewed, and the claim of A and B that the trial court and this court failed to rule on the claims raised in their postjudgment motions was incorrect, as those claims were raised in the first appeal and either rejected or not addressed. 4. A and B could not prevail on their claim that the trial court violated several of their state and federal constitutional rights by failing to hear or grant their postjudgment motions to correct the record and clear the cloud on their title caused by both the 2011 and 2014 modifications, provide them with damages and injunctive relief inherent thereto, and protect their rights and their title against further violations; that court interpreted the scope of the remand correctly when it denied the claims of A and B to quiet title, to injunctive relief, and to attorney's fees and costs as to the 2011 modification, and the court's denial of those claims did not amount to a violation of the constitutional rights of A and B. Argued October 22, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The defendant zoning board of appeals appealed from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal filed by the plaintiff landowners. After a hurricane destroyed their home, the plaintiffs sought to construct a new home on their property. The plaintiffs filed an application for a variance from the building height requirements of certain zoning regula- tions. The board denied the application, and the plaintiffs appealed to the trial court, alleging that the board acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion by ignoring certain legal hardships unique to the property. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs' appeal, concluding that the plaintiffs demonstrated an unusual hardship on the basis of the destruction of their previous home and the need to comply with applica- ble federal and state flood elevation requirements, and that their pro- posal qualified under the narrow exception to the hardship requirement set forth in Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals (205 Conn. 703), because the proposed house would reduce nonconformities in relation to the previous house. Thereafter, this court granted the board's petition for certification to appeal to this court, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiffs demonstrated a legally cognizable hardship: an applicant for a variance must show that, because of some peculiar characteristic of his property, a strict applica- tion of the zoning regulation would produce an undue hardship, and the plaintiffs here failed to carry their burden of demonstrating a legally cognizable harship as the record of the proceedings before the board contained no evidence of hardship originating in the zoning ordinance because the evidence merely established that the plaintiffs could not, in the absence of a variance, build the type of house that they desired while conforming to flood elevation requirements; although the plain- tiffs' proposed home did not increase substantially the square footage when compared to their prior home, the plaintiffs' alleged hardship arose out of their desire to build a certain type of home, which was appropriately characterized as personal disappointment. 2. The trial court erroneously determined that the plaintiffs' proposal quali- fied under the Adolphson exception to the hardship requirement: although the plaintiffs argued that the board should have granted a variance because it would reduce other nonconformities, the plaintiffs' proposed new construction would create a height nonconformity where none previously existed, and the plaintiffs provided this court with no authority suggesting that the board was required to grant the requested variance from the height limitation, which would create a new noncon- formity, on the basis of a proposed reduction or elimination of other nonconformities and compliance with flood regulations. Argued November 18, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

The plaintiffs brought this action claiming that the defendant city of Meriden and the defendant T Co. conspired to secure the defeat of the plaintiffs' effort to obtain approval of a certain leaseback agreement for a fifty- two acre portion of certain real property that the plaintiffs had sold to P Co., which sought to build a power plant on the property. The lease agreement was to be granted subject to its being approved by the Con- necticut Siting Council as part of the power plant project. After P Co. sold the property to another entity, the Connecticut Siting Council approved the power plant project but rejected the leaseback agreement and conditioned approval of the project on the transfer of the fifty-two acres to the city, which thereafter redesignated the fifty-two acres as open space. The plaintiffs previously had brought four unsuccessful actions against, inter alia, T Co. and the city in federal and state court seeking to effectuate the lease. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court determined that the lease was the same one involved in the plaintiffs' prior lawsuits against the city, in which the plaintiffs tried to force the city to recognize the lease, and that the only new claim against T Co. was that it orches- trated the defeat of the plaintiffs' effort to obtain approval from the Connecticut Siting Council. The court rendered judgment for the defen- dants, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly concluded that res judicata barred their claims. Held that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defen- dants, as the plaintiffs' claims stemmed from the same agreement per- taining to the lease and sought redress on the basis of the same underly- ing factual predicate, which was the Connecticut Siting Council's rejection of their efforts to effectuate the lease, and, despite the plaintiffs' assertion that their claims were founded on different types of conduct by different defendants and the different effects of that conduct, they had ample opportunity to bring their claims in any or all of the four prior actions they brought against multiple entities under multiple theories of liability that allegedly resulted in or stemmed from the plaintiffs' failure to acquire the lease of the fifty-two acres. Argued November 18, 2019—officially released February 25, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of six counts of risk of injury to a child, three counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree, two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, and one count of attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of alleged prosecutorial improprieties during the state's rebuttal closing argument which resulted in a denial of his due process right to a fair trial pursuant to the six factor test set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 523). Held: 1. The prosecutor's remarks on her own credibility and the credibility of one of the state's witnesses in rebuttal closing argument did not constitute improper vouching for the state's credibility: the state's response was reasonable in light of the defendant's sharp comments in closing argu- ment, and the prosecutor also stated, on numerous occasions throughout her rebuttal argument, that it was the jury's job to assess credibility; moreover, the prosecutor's comments were directly tied to the defense's interpretation of the evidence adduced at trial and did not improperly extend beyond the record. 2. The prosecutor's comments in rebuttal closing argument that the state's experts were not allowed, as a matter of law, to meet with the victims were improper and constituted an impropriety, as our law does not prohibit expert witnesses from meeting with children who are complain- ants of sexual assault: the prosecutor explicitly stated that the state's experts could not meet with the victims because doing so would usurp the jury's role in assessing credibility and, although the state correctly articulated that the experts could speak about the behavioral characteris- tics of child abuse victims only in general terms, such a principle is rooted in our courts' concern for improper vouching, and is not borne out of a rule precluding experts from meeting with complainants of sexual assault; moreover, the prosecutor's comments explicitly mis- stated the law and, although they may have been intertwined with proper remarks relating to the jury's role in assessing credibility, the jury likely could have misunderstood that the reason for the experts' general testi- mony was because of their purported inability under the law to meet with the victims. 3. The defendant was not deprived of his due process right to a fair trial even though a prosecutorial impropriety occurred; under the six factor test set forth in Williams, the trial, as a whole, was not fundamentally unfair and the impropriety did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the defendant's convictions a denial of due process, as the defense initially argued that one of the state's experts was precluded from meeting with the victims, the severity of the impropriety was lessened by the fact that the defendant did not object to the state's closing argument, the prosecutor's misstatement of the law was not frequent and was confined to rebuttal argument, the impact of the impropriety was minimal as the jury acquitted the defendant of two counts, demonstrating its ability to filter out improper statements and make independent assessments of credibility, any improper effect was reduced by the court's final instructions to the jury following closing arguments, and the state's case was fairly strong, even without physi- cal evidence. Argued November 21, 2019—officially released March 3, 2020

The plaintiff sought a temporary and permanent injunction to, inter alia, prevent the defendant, her former husband, from limiting her access to a shared driveway, and for other relief. Pursuant to a separation agree- ment that was incorporated into the parties' dissolution judgment, the defendant quitclaimed his ownership interest in certain real property to the plaintiff, including an area known as the east branch. He provided an express easement that allowed the plaintiff to reach her quitclaimed property with access over the shared driveway on the property that he retained, known as the west branch, until he installed a similar driveway for her to use on the east branch. The plaintiff's property is landlocked without access to a right-of-way over either the east branch or the west branch. The plaintiff's and the defendant's properties lie northerly of and abut a portion of a discontinued highway known as the Old Connecti- cut Path. The defendant repeatedly obstructed the plaintiff's access to the quitclaimed property by various means, including placing objects, such as boulders and a gate, across the shared driveway. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, granting her a permanent injunction, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motions to open and to disqual- ify. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court wrongly issued a permanent injunction: a. Although, as the defendant claimed, the plaintiff did not allege irrepara- ble harm or lack of an adequate remedy at law, the complaint provided adequate notice of the plaintiff's claim for a permanent injunction: the plaintiff explicitly sought a permanent injunction in her prayer for relief and clearly alleged that the defendant had consistently impeded her ability to use the shared driveway to access her property; moreover, the complaint further explained that the plaintiff asserted her right to use the shared driveway on the basis of the parties' separation agreement, providing the defendant with sufficient notice of the factual basis of the plaintiff's claims, the defendant's claim having been premised on a legal technicality, rather than a claim of prejudice or lack of notice. b. Although the defendant claims that, during the course of the trial, the plaintiff did not establish that, without a permanent injunction, she would suffer irreparable harm and lacked an adequate remedy at law, the trial court correctly determined that a permanent injunction was warranted: the plaintiff sustained her burden of proving that the defen- dant had yet to install a similar driveway on the east branch as required by the separation agreement, and, although the defendant installed a serviceable means of allowing vehicular passage, the plaintiff does not yet and may never possess any marketable title that would allow the installation of a driveway on the east branch; moreover, there is a substantial likelihood that, in the absence of judicial intervention, the plaintiff stands to lose a valuable asset in the form of the quitclaimed property, which the defendant is uniquely poised to reacquire at a fire- sale price. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly allowed the plaintiff to modify the dissolution judgment by granting an injunction: as the defendant has not complied with the terms of the separation agreement because he has not installed a similar driveway as required in that agreement, the trial court effectuated, rather than modified, the terms of the separation agreement by determining that the plaintiff continues to have a right to access her property by crossing the defendant's property until the defendant satisfies his obligations under the separation agreement. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff to present evidence that allegedly contradicted judicial admissions in her pleadings: although the defendant claimed that the plaintiff admitted in her pleadings that she had fee title to the east branch and that the defendant had complied with the separation agreement, the plaintiff's admission of fee simple ownership of the east branch has no bearing on the marketability of her property, and the plaintiff's admission that a driveway was constructed by the defendant was not conclusive of whether that driveway was ''similar'' to the defen- dant's driveway as required by the terms of the separation agreement and, therefore, those admissions were not dispositive of the marketabil- ity of the property or the similar characteristics of the driveway con- structed on the east branch. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge nor did it err in denying the defendant a hearing before another judge: although the defendant alleged that the trial judge that ruled on the injunction should have been disqualified because that judge presided at the defendant's sentencing in his criminal trial on a charge of breaking into the plaintiff's residence and because the plaintiff's trial counsel worked as the deputy chief clerk at the same courthouse that the trial judge was assigned to in 2011, the defendant, claiming to be unaware of either of the alleged disqualifying factors until after judgment was rendered, waived his claim that the trial judge should be disqualified on the basis of his connection to the defendant's criminal trial, as the defendant had cause to know of his own prior interactions with the trial judge and consented to whatever impropriety, if any, existed as a result of those interactions, and, regarding the plain- tiff's trial counsel, the only evidence offered in support of defendant's motion was that, for a very brief window of time, the trial judge and the plaintiff's trial counsel worked in the same building, any interaction between the trial judge and the plaintiff's trial counsel occurred more than six years before the trial court case was decided, the defendant did not offer any further evidence to support his claim that the trial judge's impartiality was compromised by a suspected single interaction between the trial judge and the plaintiff's trial counsel, and the plaintiff's trial counsel worked as the deputy chief clerk for civil matters whereas the trial judge had been assigned to a criminal trial in the same court- house; moreover, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant a hearing before another judge on the motion to disqualify regarding the allegations concerning the plaintiff's counsel because, in the absence of further allegations to substantiate the defendant's claim, there was no fair support to his claim that would have entitled him to a hearing. Argued November 13, 2019—officially released March 3, 2020

Convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the trial court vio- lated his right to present a defense when it excluded certain evidence of an alleged statement made by a bystander and an autopsy toxicology report, violated his right to due process when it declined to give a jury instruction on self-defense, improperly admitted firearm related evidence including, inter alia, reports by a state firearms expert, R, and violated his right to a fair trial when it failed to grant his motions for sanctions, for a new trial or to dismiss the charges after the state's late disclosure of the firearms related evidence. He further claimed that he was denied the right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial impropriety. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate the defendant's right to present a defense by excluding evidence of a statement allegedly made by an unidentified bystander and the toxicology portion of the victim's autopsy report. a. The defendant failed to demonstrate the relevancy to his claim of self-defense or to lay an evidentiary foundation for the unidentified bystander's alleged statement; the defendant failed to lay the foundation necessary to admit the alleged statement as relevant to his state of mind, in that he failed to offer any testimony that the alleged statement influenced his assessment of the need to use deadly physical force against the victim and, as there was no evidence that the defendant heard the alleged statement, it was irrelevant to his motive. b. The trial court properly excluded the toxicology report from evidence: there was no causal relationship between the victim having PCP in his body and the defendant having shot him; moreover, at trial, the defendant failed to explain why the presence of PCP in the victim was relevant to his claim of self-defense or his intent and there was no evidence that the defendant feared the victim or that the victim threatened anyone and there was no evidence that the victim confronted the defendant with the imminent use of deadly force from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant acted in self-defense; furthermore, the state's evidence was sufficient to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. The trial court did not violate the defendant's right to due process by failing to give a self-defense jury instruction; no reasonable juror could have believed that the defendant was in imminent or immediate danger so as to warrant the use of deadly physical force, because there was no evidence that the defendant was afraid of the victim, there was no evidence of a conversation between the defendant and the victim before the victim left the defendant's porch and there was no evidence that, after the defendant followed the victim down the street, the victim moved toward the defendant, made a threatening gesture or made a verbal threat indicative of immediate or imminent harm. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sanction the state for its late disclosure of the murder weapon and, thus, properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial or to dismiss the charges on the basis of the state's late disclosure of the murder weapon and related materials: although the disclosure of the murder weapon was late, it did not constitute bad faith, and the firearms evidence, including R's reports, was disclosed during jury selection and before R testified; more- over, the state disclosed R's report to the defendant as soon as the state was aware of the report and made R available to the defendant before trial but the defendant elected not to examine them, and the defendant was able to address R's reports and changes to them when R testified; furthermore, the court was willing to grant the defendant a continuance and offered the defendant the option to continue plea negotiations before evidence began, but the defendant did not elect to do either; moreover, the defendant failed to explain how a firearms expert could have assisted his theory of self-defense. 4. The defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial impropriety during closing arguments: although the prosecutor's statement that the defendant killed the victim ''in cold blood'' was improper, the defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's use of the phrase, defense counsel used the phrase himself, the prosecutor stated the phrase only once, the use of the phrase was not central to the case and the state's case against the defendant was strong; moreover, the prosecutor's argument that the case was a senseless American tragedy was not improper, as the statements were grounded in evidence and the jury reasonably could have concluded that the unexplained shooting death of the victim was a tragedy. Argued September 10, 2019—officially released March 3, 2020

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant M following her default on a promissory note secured by the mortgage, which was executed by M on behalf of the defendant D in favor of M Co., as nominee for A Co. Thereafter, M Co. assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff, who then commenced this foreclosure action against the defendants. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon, in which it determined the amount of the outstanding debt and the fair market value of the property and set the law days. M then filed notice of her pending chapter 7 bankruptcy petition pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 14-1) pertaining to bankruptcy stays. In the schedule of creditors filed by M in the bankruptcy proceeding, she listed the plaintiff as having a claim secured by the subject property but did not identify the claim as contingent, unliquidated or disputed. She also represented that none of the plaintiff's claim was unsecured. The bankruptcy trustee of M's estate thereafter determined that there was no property available for distribu- tion from the estate and that the estate was fully administered and requested that he be discharged as trustee. The Bankruptcy Court granted the discharge and closed the bankruptcy case. After the law days had passed during the pendency of M's bankruptcy proceedings, the plaintiff filed a motion to reenter the judgment after termination of the bankruptcy stay to, inter alia, make new findings as to the debt and fair market value of the property, reenter the judgment of strict foreclosure and set new law days. M filed an objection to the motion, arguing that she was not authorized to execute the subject note and mortgage to M Co. on behalf of D because D did not validly execute the power of attorney that ostensibly appointed her as his attorney-in- fact, and, therefore, the improperly executed power of attorney rendered the note and mortgage nugatory. The trial court overruled M's objection, concluding that she lacked standing to raise that defense. After granting the plaintiff's motion to reenter the judgment, the trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, and M appealed to this court. Held that M could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred by concluding that she lacked standing to object to the plaintiff's motion to reenter the judgment of strict foreclosure: M lacked standing to pursue her defense to the plaintiff's interest in the property that the mortgage on the property may be invalid due to the alleged improper power of attorney, as her failure to notify the bankruptcy trustee of that defense by not disclosing it as an asset of the bankruptcy estate on the relevant bank- ruptcy form, precluded her from raising the defense after the discharge of the bankruptcy estate; moreover, M's contentions that Beck & Beck, LLC v. Costello (178 Conn. App. 112), which this court applied in reaching its decision, is inapplicable and that the plaintiff's reliance on it conflates a debtor's claim for money damages as an asset of the bankruptcy estate with a debtor's defense to enforcement of an invalid lien were unavailing, as her arguments circumscribed far too narrowly her disclosure obliga- tions to the bankruptcy trustee because the relevant bankruptcy form required M to state whether the plaintiff's claim was contingent or disputed, and, therefore, necessarily, she was required to disclose her purported defense, and her failure to do so deprived her of standing to assert the defense in the trial court; furthermore, M's claim that either the bankruptcy trustee or any creditor could move to reopen the bankruptcy estate if the trial court were to find that the mortgage is invalid ignored the threshold issue that M lacked the legal capacity to raise the defense, and, therefore, the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to hear it, as M's failure to list the defense as an asset of the bankruptcy estate caused the defense to remain the property of the estate and to vest with the trustee, thereby precluding her from pursuing it for her own benefit. Argued October 11, 2019—officially released March 3, 2020

The plaintiff, C Co., sought to foreclose municipal tax liens on certain real property owned by the defendant K. Following K's failure to pay his property taxes for a number of years, the town of Newtown imposed liens on the subject property and recorded them on the town land records. Thereafter, the tax liens were assigned to C Co., which recorded the assignment on the town land records. After C Co. had commenced this action, it assigned the tax liens to A Co., which was substituted as the plaintiff. The assignment to A Co. was not recorded on the town land records. K thereafter moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that A Co. lacked standing to foreclose the property because the assignment of the tax liens to it was not recorded. The trial court denied K's motion to dismiss, concluding that A Co.'s failure to record the assignment did not deprive it of standing. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which K appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly denied K's motion to dismiss, as that court correctly determined that A Co. had standing to pursue the foreclosure action; contrary to K's claim, A Co.'s failure to record the assignment of the tax liens on the town land records did not deprive it of standing, as the more specific statute (§ 12-195h) and rule of practice (§ 10-70) governing the assign- ment and foreclosure of tax liens, which do not require recordation to confer standing, take precedence over the more general land transfer statute (§ 47-10), which does require it, and, furthermore, a tax lien, similar to a mechanic's lien, is more analogous to a transfer of debt than to a transfer of title and, as such, is not considered a conveyance under § 47-10. Argued November 18, 2019—officially released March 3, 2020

The plaintiff, W Co., sought to sell to the defendant E Co. the energy and capacity from twenty-six solar electric generating facilities. E Co. agreed to purchase the energy, but not the capacity, and rejected W Co.'s offer to sell the energy at a rate equal to the anticipated avoided costs over the life of the proposed thirty year contract. W Co. then filed a petition with the defendant Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, pursuant to statute (§ 16-243a), seeking an order to compel E Co. to enter into the contract to purchase the energy and the capacity in accordance with W Co.'s proposed pricing. W Co. claimed that E Co. had failed to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a contract that fairly reflected the requirements of § 16-243a and the anticipated avoided costs over the life of the con- tract. The authority denied W Co.'s petition, concluding that E Co. did not need the capacity offered by W Co. and that the avoided cost of the proffered capacity was zero. The authority further determined that W Co.'s petition sought a declaratory judgment and held that it would open a separate proceeding to consider whether its regulations required modification or amendment. After W Co. appealed to the trial court, that court granted an unopposed request from the authority to remand the matter to the authority to consider the effect of recent rulings by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on the authority's denial of W Co.'s petition. The court retained jurisdiction over W Co.'s appeal. The authority thereafter reversed its initial decision denying W Co.'s petition, concluding that W Co.'s claims should be addressed through the authority's rule-making proceeding. The authority then filed a motion to dismiss W Co.'s appeal on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because W Co. was not aggrieved by the authority's two decisions and that the appeal had become moot as a result of the authority's reversal of its initial decision. The court granted the authority's motion to dismiss, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because W Co. had failed to plead facts sufficient to establish aggrievement and that W Co.'s appeal was moot as a result of the authority's reversal of its initial decision. The court thereafter rendered judgment for the authority, and W Co. appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly concluded that it did not have standing and that its claims were moot. Held that the trial court improperly granted the authority's motion to dismiss W Co.'s petition, as W Co. had standing to appeal, having satisfied the requirements of the test for classical aggrievement, and its claims were not moot because there was practical relief that it could have been afforded by the trial court: W Co. had a specific, personal and legal interest in the issue at hand in that it sought an order from the authority to approve and to compel the execution of the power purchase agreement and alleged that it had been specially and injuriously affected by the authority's refusal to compel E Co. to execute the contract, and, in determining that W Co.'s claims were moot as a result of the authority's second decision, the trial court conflated notions of relief that may be afforded to W Co. with relief to which W Co. was entitled when it improperly addressed the merits of W Co.'s claims and discussed the authority's options to address those claims directly or generically through the authority's regulatory proceed- ing; moreover, the court could have afforded W Co. practical relief by reversing the authority's decision to address the petition through its rule-making proceeding and remanding the matter with direction to consider the issues presented by the petition, or the court could have addressed issues the authority decided in its initial decision that it did not reverse or left unresolved in its subsequent decision. Argued November 19, 2019—officially released March 3, 2020

The plaintiff, an assignee of municipal tax liens for the tax years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, sought to collect the unpaid taxes on the 2006 through 2008 tax liens. The tax liens had been assigned to the plaintiff by the city of Hartford pursuant to statute (§ 12-195h), which grants to the assignee the same powers and rights the municipality would have if the lien had not been assigned. The plaintiff previously brought a separate action to foreclose on the 2005 tax lien, in which it obtained a judgment of strict foreclosure that it later assigned. In the collection action, the defendant property owner asserted various special defenses, including that the plaintiff's claims were extinguished pursuant to statute (§ 12- 195) because the plaintiff had obtained a judgment of strict foreclosure on the 2005 tax lien, and that the defendant's debt had been satisfied. Section 12-195 provides that when a municipality acquires real estate by foreclosure, the acquisition is deemed a cancellation by the municipal- ity as against the tax collector for unpaid taxes. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant on these two special defenses, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly found that, pursuant to § 12-195 and the controlling precedent of Municipal Funding, LLC v. Gallulo (72 Conn. App. 755), the 2006 through 2008 tax liens were extinguished by the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff or its assignee in the foreclosure action on the 2005 tax lien and, thus, barred the plaintiff from recovering in this action; moreover, because the plaintiff or its assignee acquired title to the property by foreclosure, pursuant to § 12- 195, all of its claims, in whatever form those claims might take, were extinguished, a result that coincides with the common-law rule that prohibits double recovery and provides that a plaintiff may be compen- sated only once. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred when it concluded that the defendant's debt had been satisfied as the plaintiff failed to present an adequate record for review. Argued January 15—officially released March 3, 2020

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for an order seeking payment of unallocated support. The plaintiff contended that the defendant failed to pay her the full amount due from a bonus payment the defendant received. The parties' separation agreement set forth three tiers for determining the amount of the defendant's income that would be paid to the plaintiff. The defendant calculated the payment under the second and third tiers solely using his bonus payment. The plaintiff contended the payment must be calculated using the defendant's total gross income, which was his base salary plus the bonus payment. The trial court agreed with the defendant's interpretation of the separation agreement and denied the plaintiff's motion. Held that the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's motion for order because it incorrectly interpreted the applicable provision of the separation agreement; the plain language of the separation agree- ment required that the second and third tiers be applied to the defen- dant's gross income, not solely to his bonus. Argued December 2, 2019—officially released March 3, 2020

The self-represented, incarcerated plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, a former state correctional institution administrative captain, claiming violations of his federal constitutional rights. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant retaliated against him for providing legal advice to his fellow inmates by ordering the search of the plaintiff's cell, the seizure of items from his cell, and the removal of the plaintiff from his job at the prison's gym. Following a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that he was engaged in an activity protected by the first amendment, that he was denied access to the courts in a specific, pending, personal action, and that there was any causal connection between his alleged protected conduct and the defendant's alleged retal- iatory acts. From that judgment, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, as that court's finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove a causal connection between his conduct and the defendant's alleged retaliation was not clearly erroneous: the court concluded that there was no evidence of a retaliatory motive on the basis of the defendant's testimony, which the court expressly found was credible, and the court noted that the only evidence to establish a causal relationship between the discharge of the plaintiff from his gym job and any claimed protected activity was that of temporal proximity, which the court found insuffi- cient to establish a causal connection; ample evidence supported the court's finding that the defendant's actions that the plaintiff alleged were retaliatory were premised solely on legitimate motives, and, although the plaintiff pointed to evidence that he asserted supported his claim of retaliation, the mere existence of evidence to support an alternative conclusion is not sufficient to reverse a trial court's findings of fact. Submitted on briefs December 11, 2019—officially released March 10, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of murder, the defendant appealed. The victim, who had been the defendant's long-term girlfriend, had last been seen in the company of the defendant by the defendant's mother and, shortly thereafter, the victim's cell phone stopped making and receiving any form of communication. One month after the victim's disappearance, two of her limbs, which had been severed from her body using a sharp instrument, were discovered approximately 1.5 miles from the defendant's residence, although her body has never been recovered. Prior to the victim's disappearance, the defendant, a licensed practical nurse, had stated to an acquaintance, J, that, as a nurse, he knew how to get rid of someone. On appeal, the defendant claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support a murder conviction, specifically, that the state failed to prove the manner, means, place, cause, and time of death. He further claimed that the trial court erred in not giving a special credibility instruction with respect to the testimony of J, a cooperating witness, and that his right to due process was violated by his retrial because the state had twice failed to meet its burden of proof. Held: 1. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of murder: the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant intended to cause the victim's death and did in fact cause her death as there was evidence presented that the defendant was controlling and domineering toward the victim, he had choked the victim one month before her disappearance, the victim had expressed a desire to end her relationship with him, the defendant made a statement that, as a nurse he knew how to get rid of someone, the victim had last been seen alive at the defendant's residence, two of the victim's severed limbs were discovered approximately 1.5 miles from the defendant's residence, some of the victim's personal belongings were discovered in a trash bag at the defendant's residence, the bathtub, sink, and other plumbing materials had been removed from the defendant's other residence, and the interior of the defendant's car had been detailed shortly after the victim's disappearance. 2. The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to give a special credibility instruction with respect to J's testimony; although there are three categories of witnesses that require such an instruction, as set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Diaz (302 Conn. 93), J did not fit into any of those categories, and the court gave both a general credibility instruction as well as a credibility instruction with regard to J, who was an individual with a criminal record on probation at the time of his testimony. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state's decision to prosecute him for a third time after his two previous trials had ended in mistrials violated his right to due process; a mistrial that has been declared following a hung jury does not terminate original jeopardy and, therefore, a subsequent trial does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Argued November 19, 2019—officially released March 10, 2020

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from his alleged sexual abuse of the victim, his daughter, who did not report the assault until a few years later. On cross-examination of the victim, the defendant challenged her credibility and her delay in reporting the assault. After the state offered the testimony of A, a constancy of accusation witness, the defendant elicited on cross-examination of A that she believed that the victim had reported the assault contemporaneously, without delay. The defendant then moved to strike A's testimony on the ground that there was no justification for having a constancy of accusation witness testify when the witness testifies that there was no delay in the victim's reporting of the assault. The trial court denied the defendant's motion on the ground that, under the Supreme Court's modification of the constancy of accusation doctrine in State v. Daniel W. E. (322 Conn. 593), the state was permitted to present A's testimony because the defendant had challenged the victim's credibility and her delay in reporting the assault. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly admitted A's testimony to refute any negative infer- ences the jury might have drawn from the victim's delay in reporting the assault. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to strike A's testimony, that court having properly applied the constancy of accusation doctrine as modified in Daniel W. E.; A's testimony was proper because the defendant undisput- edly challenged the victim's credibility on cross-examination when he inquired about her delayed reporting, such delay was for the jury to consider in evaluating the weight to be given to the victim's testimony, it was the fact of the victim's having reported her complaint to A that was relevant, and any inaccuracy in A's belief as to the delay in reporting did not preclude the admission of A's testimony but, rather, went to A's credibility. Argued January 9—officially released March 10, 2020 Proceedings Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, and with one count each of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before D'Addabbo, J.; thereafter, the court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to one count of risk of injury to a child; verdict and judgment of guilty of one count of risk of injury to a child, and sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. John C. Drapp III, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (defendant). Melissa Patterson, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attor- ney, and John F. Fahey, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion DEVLIN, J. The defendant, Prince A., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2), sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted testimony of a constancy of accusation wit- ness to refute any negative inferences the jury might have drawn from the victim's delay in reporting the sexual assault because that witness mistakenly believed that there had been no delay.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following relevant facts. The victim is the defendant's daughter. In 2010 or 2011, when the victim was either ten or eleven years old, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim while they were alone in his apartment. Initially, the victim did not report the assault because she felt uncomfortable and scared. A few years later, in 2013, the victim told a friend at school about the assault. Shortly thereafter, the victim met with Iris Adgers, a behavior technician at the victim's school, and described the assault. Following this meeting, the Hart- ford Police Department was notified of the assault and investigated the defendant. The following procedural history also is relevant to this appeal. On November 13, 2017, the state charged the defendant with sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and two counts of risk of injury to a child, one count under § 53-21 (a) (1) and one count under § 53-21 (a) (2). Trial com- menced on November 27, 2017. During trial, the jury heard testimony from the victim. When the defendant's trial counsel, William Gerace, cross-examined the victim, he challenged her credibility and her delay in reporting the assault. Following the victim's testimony, the state offered Adgers as a con- stancy of accusation witness whose testimony, as the court later explained in a limiting instruction to the jury, was offered solely ''to negate any inference that [the victim] failed to tell anyone about the sexual offense and, therefore, that [the victim's] later assertion could not be believed. . . . Constancy evidence is not evidence that the sexual offense actually occurred or that [the victim] is credible. It merely serves to negate any inference that because of [the victim's] assumed silence the offense did not occur.'' Adgers offered brief testimony confirming that the victim had reported the sexual assault to Adgers. Immediately following the state's direct examination of Adgers, the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury regarding constancy of accusation testimony. On cross-examination, Adgers testified that, as far as she knew, the victim had reported the assault contemporaneously, without delay.2 Follow- ing Adgers' testimony, Gerace moved to strike her testi- mony, arguing that there was no justification for having a constancy of accusation witness testify when that witness testifies that there was no delay in the victim's reporting of the assault. The court denied the motion, noting that because the defendant had challenged the victim's credibility and her delay in reporting the assault, the state was permitted to present constancy testimony. Following three days of evidence, the case was sub- mitted to the jury. During its final charge to the jury, the court again offered a limiting instruction regarding Adgers' testimony. After deliberating, the jury found the defendant guilty of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2).3 The court then sentenced the defendant to serve a total effective term of seventeen years of imprisonment, fol- lowed by three years of special parole. This appeal followed. Before turning to the claim on appeal, we set forth the applicable law governing the constancy of accusation doctrine and our scope and standard of review. The constancy of accusation ''doctrine traces its roots to the fresh complaint rule . . . [t]he narrow purpose of [which] . . . was to negate any inference that because the victim had failed to tell anyone that she had been [sexually assaulted], her later assertion of [sexual assault] could not be believed. . . . [B]ecause juries were allowed—sometimes even instructed—to draw negative inferences from the woman's failure to com- plain after an assault . . . the doctrine of fresh com- plaint evolved as a means of counterbalancing these negative inferences. Used in this way, the fresh com- plaint doctrine allowed the prosecutor to introduce, during the case-in-chief, evidence that the victim had complained soon after the [sexual assault]. Its use thereby forestalled the inference that the victim's silence was inconsistent with her present formal com- plaint of [assault]. . . . In other words, evidence admit- ted under this doctrine effectively served as anticipa- tory rebuttal, in that the doctrine often permitted the prosecutor to bolster the credibility of the victim before her credibility had first been attacked. . . . The fresh complaint doctrine thus constituted a rare exception to the common-law rule that prohibited rehabilitative evidence in the absence of an attack on the [witness'] credibility.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniel W. E., 322 Conn. 593, 618–19, 142 A.3d 265 (2016). Presently, the constancy of accusation doctrine, as modified by our Supreme Court in Daniel W. E., per- mits ''the victim in a sexual assault case . . . to testify on direct examination regarding the facts of the sex- ual assault and the identity of the person or persons to whom the incident was reported. . . . Thereafter, if defense counsel challenges the victim's credibility by inquiring, for example, on cross-examination as to any out-of-court complaints or delayed reporting, the state will be permitted to call constancy of accusation witnesses subject to [certain] limitations . . . . If defense counsel does not challenge the victim's credi- bility in any fashion on these points, the trial court shall not permit the state to introduce constancy testimony but, rather, shall instruct the jury that there are many reasons why sexual assault victims may delay in offi- cially reporting the offense, and, to the extent the vic- tim delayed in reporting the offense, the delay should not be considered by the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility.''4 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 629. A constancy of accusation witness is limited to testifying ''only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge, includ- ing, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 620. ''[W]hether evidence is admissible under the con- stancy of accusation doctrine is an evidentiary question that will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. . . . An appellate court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's evidentiary rulings. . . . To the extent that the evidentiary ruling in question is challenged as an improper interpretation of a rule of evidence, our review is plenary.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gene C., 140 Conn. App. 241, 247–48, 57 A.3d 885, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 928, 64 A.3d 120 (2013). The defendant's claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Adgers' testimony under the constancy of accusation doctrine because she believed that the victim had not delayed in reporting the sexual assault. We disagree. The defendant's claim is premised on an inaccurate reading of Daniel W. E. In Daniel W. E., our Supreme Court established that the only prerequisite for the introduction of constancy testimony is the ''defense counsel challeng[ing] the victim's credibility by inquir- ing, for example, on cross-examination as to any out- of-court complaints or delayed reporting . . . .'' State v. Daniel W. E., supra, 322 Conn. 629. It is undisputed that Gerace, in fact, did challenge the credibility of the victim and her delay in her reporting. Such delay is a matter for the jury to consider in evaluating the weight to be given to the victim's testimony. See id. As to constancy of accusation witnesses, it is the fact of the victim's complaint to them that is relevant. See id., 622. Any inaccuracy in the constancy witness' belief as to the delay in reporting does not preclude the admission of such testimony but, rather, goes to that witness' cred- ibility. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly applied the constancy of accusation doctrine and did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to strike Adgers' testimony. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victim or others through whom victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. 1 On appeal, the defendant additionally claims that the trial court should not have admitted portions of the testimony of the constancy of accusation witness that were irrelevant and cumulative. The state argues, and the defendant conceded at oral argument before this court, that these claims were not presented to the trial court and, thus, were unpreserved for appeal. Accordingly, we decline to review these unpreserved evidentiary claims. See State v. Artiaco, 181 Conn. App. 406, 412, 186 A.3d 789, cert. granted on other grounds, 329 Conn. 906, 185 A.3d 594 (2018); id., 411 (''Appellate review of evidentiary rulings is ordinarily limited to the specific legal [ground] raised by the objection of trial counsel. . . . To permit a party to raise a different ground on appeal than [that] raised during trial would amount to trial by ambuscade, unfair both to the trial court and to the opposing party.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 2 Adgers also testified on cross-examination that she would not have been surprised if she were mistaken and that the assault had occurred years earlier. 3 After the close of evidence, the court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the second count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1). 4 Following Daniel W. E., § 6-11 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence was revised to reflect our Supreme Court's modification of the constancy of accusation doctrine. Section 6-11 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence presently provides in relevant part: ''(1) If the defense impeaches the credibil- ity of a sexual assault complainant regarding any out-of-court complaints or delayed reporting of the alleged sexual assault, the state shall be permitted to call constancy of accusation witnesses. . . . ''(2) if the complainant's credibility is not impeached by the defense regarding any out-of-court complaints or delayed reporting of the alleged sexual assault, constancy of accusation testimony shall not be permitted, but, rather, the trial court shall provide appropriate instructions to the jury regarding delayed reporting.'' The revision to § 6-11 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence did not go into effect until February 1, 2018, whereas the trial concluded in the present case on November 30, 2017. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court released its decision in Daniel W. E. on August 23, 2016, prior to the commencement of the evidentiary portion of the present trial, and, thus, the modified con- stancy of accusation doctrine applied to the present case. See State v. Daniel W. E., supra, 322 Conn. 630.

The defendant, who had been charged with the crimes of violation of a civil protection order and harassment in the second degree, appealed to this court from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the charges. The charges stemmed from interactions the defendant had with a juve- nile member of the softball team for which the defendant served as a volunteer coach. The juvenile and her mother had obtained an ex parte civil protection order against the defendant. At the hearing on the order, however, the court denied the request for a civil protection order. On the basis of the civil protection order hearing, the defendant moved to dismiss the criminal charges on the ground of collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and the defendant appealed to this court. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the facts had been fully and fairly litigated in the civil protection order hearing and that allowing the state to pursue criminal charges based on those same facts implicated the right against double jeopardy. Held that this court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant's interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss; the defendant failed to put forth a colorable claim of double jeopardy because the civil protection order hearing was not a prosecution, which is brought only by only by public officials representing the state, whereas a civil protection order pursuant to statute (§ 46b-16a) may be sought by any person who has been the victim of certain conduct and the language of § 46b-16a (e) provides that a civil protection order proceeding does not preclude a criminal prosecution based on the same facts. Argued October 8, 2019—officially released March 10, 2020

The plaintiff board sought to vacate an arbitration award issued in connec- tion with a grievance filed by the defendant union on behalf of a class of teachers, some of whom were assigned to the T school, alleging that the board had violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement by depriving certain teachers of their bargained for weekly preparation periods. Following arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator found that twenty-two teachers at the T school had been routinely deprived of preparation periods as a result of being required to substitute for absent teachers. In his award, the arbitrator ordered that the affected teachers be awarded compensatory damages and that the board cease and desist from depriving the teachers at the T school of their preparation periods. The trial court granted the board's application to vacate the award, denied the union's application to confirm the award and rendered judg- ment thereon, from which the union appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly vacated the arbitration award, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-418 (a) (4)), on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded or so imperfectly executed his powers that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matter submitted was not made, as the award conformed to the arbitration submission: the unrestricted submission required a determination of whether teachers at the T school were deprived of their preparation periods and, if so, the nature and extent of their remedy, and the award determined that only twenty-two teachers at the T school had been deprived of their preparation periods, awarded the affected teachers compensatory damages and ordered the board to cease and desist from depriving the teachers at the T school of their preparation periods, and, therefore, the award plainly conformed to the submission because it was directly responsive to, and did not exceed the scope of, the submission; moreover, there was no merit to the board's argument that the award was not mutual, final and definite because the award did not offer any guidance that could be used in similar situations arising in the future, and the board's argument that the award failed to provide a basis for why the application of the cease and desist order applied only to the teachers at the T school and not to others misapprehended the award. 2. The trial court improperly determined that the arbitration award violated the public policy set forth in the Teacher Negotiation Act (§ 10-153a et seq.): the relevant public policy of the act, that parties must negotiate salaries and other conditions of employment through the collective bargaining process, was not contravened by the execution of the award because the act applies to arbitrations of collective bargaining agree- ments and does not apply to grievance arbitrations, the parties in fact abided by the act and negotiated various terms of employment in their agreement, including salary and compensation, the award did not consti- tute compensation, salary or remuneration because compensatory dam- ages are not synonymous with compensation, the award did not add to or modify the provisions of the agreement, and, most important, the arbitrator awarded compensatory damages, which was within his author- ity as provided in the terms of the agreement; moreover, the award was not inconsistently limited to a group within a collective bargaining unit, as it was properly limited to the aggrieved teachers at the T school who had presented evidence of their deprivation at the arbitration pro- ceedings. Argued November 12, 2019—officially released March 17, 2020

Convicted of the crimes of murder, assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a firearm, the defendant appealed, claiming that the state violated his right to due process when it suppressed DNA evidence that was material to his defense, in violation of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83), and did not disclose it until after the jury returned its verdict. The defendant allegedly shot the victims, J and M, in the automobile in which the three were riding after they had left an after-hours club. M subsequently died from his injuries but J was able to flee after he was shot. After the three men left the after-hours club, the defendant told J to park the automobile on the street so the defendant could exit the automobile to urinate. The defendant testified that, while he was urinating by a nearby fence, an unknown person put a gun to his head and told him not to move, yell or turn around. The defendant further testified that he then heard two loud pop sounds. When he turned around one minute later and saw no one, he went back to the automobile and saw that the driver's side door was open. The defendant testified that he did not see anyone inside the automobile or on the street and then ran away. A discarded sweatshirt that the police found in the vicinity of the shootings was sent to the state's scientific laboratory for DNA testing. At the time of trial, DNA from the sweatshirt had not been matched to anyone, including the defendant. Two weeks after the ver- dict, the prosecutor notified defense counsel that a DNA profile from the sweatshirt had matched a DNA sample that had been collected from a convicted felon, O, whom defense counsel later learned was not incarcerated at the time of the shootings. The defendant claimed that the state had acquired the DNA evidence at least two months before his trial began or while his trial was proceeding, and that it would have discredited the testimony of J, the state's key witness, and bolstered the defense theory that the unknown individual was the shooter. At the defendant's sentencing proceeding, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. Held that the defendant failed to prove that the DNA match between the sweatshirt and O constituted material evidence within the meaning of Brady, there having been no reasonable basis to conclude that the lack of the DNA evidence of the match at trial undermined its fairness and resulted in a verdict that was not worthy of confidence: it was reasonable to conclude that the sweatshirt could have been left as a result of innocuous activity, rather than by someone involved in the commission of the shootings, as the defendant did not testify that the alleged unknown gunman was wearing a sweatshirt, which was found more than half a block away from the crime scene in an area that was reasonably likely to be traversed by the public, there was no evidence that indicated how long the sweatshirt had been there, that it was present when the police first responded to the crime scene or that it contained gunpowder residue or blood, and, as there was no indication that O was in the vicinity of the crime scene at the time of the shootings or had any connection to the victims, the defendant would not have been able to successfully raise a third party culpability defense; moreover, even though the defendant was aware of the existence of the sweatshirt at the time of trial and that it did not contain his DNA, it was not necessary for defense counsel to know about the DNA match in order to suggest to the jury that the sweatshirt belonged to someone other than the defendant, bolstering his claim that some unknown person committed the shootings; furthermore, the state's case against the defendant was strong, as it included J's identification of the defendant as the shooter, evidence that the defendant had a motive to kill M when he learned at the after-hours club that M had admitted to the killing the brother of a close friend of the defendant, the defendant's testimony about the events was very weak and lacked credibility, and significant consciousness of guilt evidence implicated the defendant, as he had lied to the police when they interviewed him and had sought to have friends dispose of his cell phone and visit an area near the crime scene to see if surveillance cameras were present. Argued October 11, 2019—officially released March 17, 2020

Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of a pistol without a permit, the defen- dant appealed. At trial, during cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor asked a question that referenced the defendant's consultation with his counsel. Defense counsel did not object but the trial court, sua sponte, issued a cautionary instruction to the jury. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the prosecutor's question constituted prosecu- torial impropriety that deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor's question to the defendant, even if it was assumed to be an impropriety, deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial, as any impact of that alleged impropriety was sufficiently cured by the trial court's strong curative instruction; the state presented a strong case, the severity of the alleged impropriety was low, the alleged impropriety was limited to one question that was qualified in nature, and, although the alleged impropriety was not invited by defense counsel, and the alleged impropriety would have been central to the issues before the jury as it involved the defendant's testimony in a criminal trial, any impact the alleged impropriety had on the central issue of credibility was sufficiently cured by the trial court's strong curative instruction to the jury that was specifically directed at the question. Argued December 2, 2019—officially released March 24, 2020

The plaintiff, trustee of the V Trust, sought to recover damages from the defendant asphalt production company for, inter alia, breach of contract for the defendant's failure to remit rental payments in accordance with two lease agreements. In May, 1974, the defendant's predecessor in interest entered into separate, twenty year leases with D for two asphalt production plants. The leases were set to expire on December 31, 1993, but provided for an opportunity to extend the terms of the leases. As trustee, the plaintiff owns a 12.5 percent interest in both plants. Trusts for three other individuals each own 12.5 percent and the estate of D owns 50 percent for a total of 87.5 percent interest in the plants. In 1993, the holders of the 87.5 percent interest agreed to amend the leases with the defendant to reduce the amount of rent. The plaintiff did not agree to the amendments. On April 1, 1993, the holders of the 87.5 percent interest executed amendments to the two leases. The amendments made clear that the plaintiff's 12.5 percent interest was not a part of the agreement. After execution of the amendments, the plaintiff considered the defendant a holdover tenant. The defendant continued to remit rental payments to the plaintiff, calculated pursuant to the lease amendments rather than the original lease agreements. The plaintiff accepted and deposited these payments. The defendant twice exercised its rights to extend the amendments to the leases for an additional ten years but did not do so with respect to the plaintiff's 12.5 percent interest. The plaintiff's breach of contract claims were based on the defendant's failure to remit rental payments for the plants in accordance with the terms of the original leases. The trial court found in favor of the defen- dant, concluding that the original leases expired on December 31, 1993, and, thus, the plaintiff could not prevail on his breach of contract claims. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that the original leases expired on December 31, 1993. Held that the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff could not prevail on his breach of contract claims because the original leases expired on December 31, 1993, and the plaintiff and the defendant did not form an agreement to extend the terms of the original leases beyond the expira- tion of the primary term; the defendant did not exercise the option to extend the original lease terms with respect to the plaintiff's 12.5 percent interest, the defendant's rent payments, after the expiration of the origi- nal leases' primary terms, were formulated commensurate with the provisions of the lease amendments, supporting the conclusion that the original leases were no longer enforceable contracts between the plaintiff and the defendant and the defendant held over, creating a month-to-month tenancy with the plaintiff's 12.5 percent interest in the plants. Argued December 11, 2019—officially released March 24, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, civil theft and unjust enrichment in connection with a $150,000 payment she made on the defendant's line of credit account. The defendant was in the business of collecting rare cars and worked with R, a broker, to find classic cars, purchase them, and, at times, resell them. The plaintiff's former husband, T, was also a broker of classic cars. At one point, the defendant was having cash flow problems and owed $150,000 on his line of credit. R asked T to loan the defendant the money and promised that it would be repaid within seven days. T, who was interested in cultivating a business relationship with the defendant, asked the plaintiff for the funds and the plaintiff, with the understanding that the money would be repaid in seven days, wired the funds directly to the defendant's line of credit account on September 1, 2015. The defendant did not learn until one week after the money had been received that it was from the plaintiff. T contacted the defendant in early January, 2016, seeking repayment of the $150,000, and the defendant refused to repay the money. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was denied by the trial court. After a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages, including treble damages for the civil theft claim pursuant to statute (§ 52-564), and prejudgment interest, from which the defendant appealed to this court. On appeal, the defen- dant claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, in finding that he committed civil theft and awarding treble damages, in awarding prejudgment interest on the trebled punitive portion of the damages and in setting the start date for the prejudgment interest on the unjust enrichment award. Held: 1. This court declined to review the defendant's jurisdictional challenge on the merits as the defendant waived his right to challenge the trial court's personal jurisdiction because he failed to file a supporting memorandum of law with his motion to dismiss as required by a rule of practice (§ 10-30). 2. The trial court erred in finding that the defendant committed civil theft and in awarding treble damages pursuant to § 52-564; the plaintiff's tort claim could not arise from an implied in law contract because she had no right to possess specific identifiable money once the payment on the defendant's debt was made, which is required to establish a valid claim of civil theft for money owed. 3. In light of this court's determination that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant committed civil theft and awarding treble damages pursuant to § 52-564, the award of prejudgment interest on that portion of the judgment also failed. 4. The trial court improperly set the start date for the commencement of prejudgment interest on the unjust enrichment damages award; the court set the start date for the prejudgment interest as September 8, 2015, based on the plaintiff's intent to make a loan to the defendant to be paid within one week, however, there was no evidence that the defendant agreed to borrow money from the plaintiff or to repay it within one week and, therefore, the proper start date for the prejudgment interest was January 14, 2016, the date that T first made a demand for repayment on the defendant. Argued November 20, 2019—officially released March 24, 2020

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the postjudgment order of the trial court ordering him to include income derived from two entities, C Co. and I Co., in the calculation of his unallocated support obligation. Pursuant to a provision in the parties' separation agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, the plaintiff was required to pay the defendant unallocated support, which was to be calculated using a decreasing percentage of the plaintiff's gross base income and quarterly bonuses over a twelve year schedule. That provision also provided that income for purposes of the calculation was the parties' respective total income that had ''historically been listed'' on line 22, or the equivalent, of their joint 1040 federal tax returns, and expressly included all employment, business and partnership income, but specifi- cally excluded any income received by the plaintiff from patents or inventions that he created or obtained. Following the dissolution of the parties' marriage in 2010, the plaintiff acquired ownership interests in C Co. and I Co. Thereafter, the defendant filed an amended motion for contempt, arguing that the plaintiff had underpaid her unallocated support for the years 2010 through 2013. At the hearing on the motion, the central issue before the trial court was whether, pursuant to the unallocated support provision, income that the plaintiff had earned from C Co. and I Co. and similar future income was to be included in the calculation of the unallocated support. The trial court found that the provision was ambiguous and, crediting the defendant's testimony regarding the meaning of the phrase ''historically been listed'' as used in the provision, determined that the parties intended to include the income at issue in the plaintiff's total income for purposes of determining his unallocated support obligation. Held that the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly interpreted the subject provision of the separation agreement in determining that income received from C Co. and I Co. was included in the definition of total income for purposes of calculating the plaintiff's unallocated support obligation: that court's determination that the parties intended to include the income at issue in the plaintiff's total income for purposes of determining his unallocated support obligation was not clearly errone- ous, as the term ''historically,'' as used in the provision's income defini- tion, modified ''total income,'' which referenced income on line 22 of form 1040, total income under the provision expressly included all employment, business and partnership income, the plaintiff character- ized his income from C Co. and I Co. as partnership income on his federal tax returns and the plaintiff recognized that his profits from C Co. were reflected on line 22 of form 1040, and the plaintiff's contention that the phrase ''historically been listed'' should be construed as referring only to how he had historically earned income as a physician was unavailing, as that construction would render the provision's specific exclusion of income derived from the plaintiff's patents and inventions superfluous; moreover, there was no merit to the plaintiff's argument that, because his interests in C Co. and I Co. were purchased with cash assets awarded to him at the time of the dissolution, the income received from his investment of the cash assets should not be redistributed again, as his argument confused an award of assets with a support award based on the income stream derived from an asset, and the cases relied on by the plaintiff were distinguishable from the present case; further- more, this court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that equitable principles required that his income from C Co. and I Co. be excluded from the calculation of unallocated support. Argued November 13, 2019—officially released March 24, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that her prior habeas counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petition because the petitioner failed to appear at a status conference. Thereafter, the court denied the petitioner's motion to open the judgment of dismissal in which she argued that she did not receive notice of the status conference. The petitioner subsequently filed two motions to reargue, seeking an opportunity to present evidence that she did not receive notice of the status conference, which the habeas court denied and, thereafter, on the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. On appeal, the petitioner claimed that the habeas court abused its discretion in dismissing her habeas petition, in denying her motion to open, and in denying her motions to reargue. Held that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to open the judgment of dismissal on the sole ground that notice of the status conference was sent properly without having conducted a proper hearing; although the court had issued a JDNO notice regarding the status conference and the petitioner was listed as a party to the action, creating a rebuttable presumption that the petitioner received notice pursuant to the mailbox rule, the petitioner was entitled to an opportu- nity to rebut this presumption, which she attempted to do by filing the motion to open the judgment, a supporting affidavit and motions to reargue, the petitioner should have been afforded a hearing in which she could present evidence to rebut the presumption that she received notice and, accordingly, the case was remanded for a factual determina- tion as to whether the petitioner knew or should have known of the status conference and, thus, whether the judgment of dismissal should be reopened. Argued December 5, 2019—officially released March 24, 2020

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant H. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to liability only to which H objected, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the statutory (§ 8-265ee (a)) notice requirement of the Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program, which requires a mortgagee to provide certain specific notice to the mortgagor before it can com- mence a foreclosure of a qualifying mortgage. H argued that this failure deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff argued that this requirement was satisfied and relied on the notice sent prior to the commencement of a previous foreclosure action brought by its predecessor in interest, that was later dismissed for failure to prosecute. Although the trial court acknowledged the plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice requirement and its attempts to import the notice from the previous action, it granted the motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon, from which H appealed to this court. Held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice require- ment § 8-265ee (a), a jurisdictional necessity; as a matter of first impres- sion, the notice requirement of § 8-265ee (a), when applicable, is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action and the failure to comply deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdic- tion; moreover, the plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that it was entitled to rely on the notice sent in a separate foreclosure action by its predecessor in interest. Argued January 22—officially released March 24, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of failure to appear in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant had been arrested and charged with a felony offense; a trial was scheduled to commence at 10 a.m. on October 3, 2017. The defendant was not present in court on the scheduled date and time and the court ordered the defendant's bond forfeited and that he be rearrested. The defendant entered the courthouse at 10:34 a.m., then briefly went outside to tele- phone his attorney, W. The defendant and W reentered the courthouse and the court ordered that jury selection proceed; the defendant, how- ever, left the courthouse and, subsequently, he was charged with failure to appear. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Held: 1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of failure to appear in the first degree: the evidence admitted at trial and the reasonable inferences from that evidence that the jury was permitted to draw were sufficient to establish that the defendant wilfully failed to appear, as the defendant knew that he must appear in court to commence jury selection, he admitted that he could have walked to the courthouse from his home and arrived on time but chose not to do so, and the jury reasonably could have inferred from that decision that he did not intend to appear; moreover, the defendant's conduct after arriving at the courthouse provided a basis for the jury reasonably to have inferred that he wilfully failed to appear in court at the place and time to which the charges against him were continued, the court provided an opportunity for the defendant to remedy his failure to appear by stating that, even though it ordered a rearrest, it was willing to commence with jury selection that day and reopened a courtroom to do so, and, despite knowing of this opportunity, the defendant fled the courthouse; furthermore, the defendant did not remedy his failure to appear in the following days and failed to surrender to authorities for more than one month, from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that his failure to appear was not accidental but, instead, demonstrated an intent to avoid any incarceration that might result from his criminal trial and, thus, his conduct after arriving at the courthouse and in the weeks that followed October 3, 2017, arguably demonstrated a consciousness of guilt regarding his intention to appear in court at 10 a.m. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the events that occurred after he arrived at the courthouse, which was based on his claim that the evidence was irrelevant because once the court forfeited his bond and ordered him rearrested, he was no longer obligated to appear; the defen- dant's conduct after entering the courthouse was probative of his state of mind as to whether he intended to appear in a courtroom at all that day, and the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant's failure to appear at the continued proceeding was part of his scheme to avoid the commencement of his trial. 3. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly admitted W's testi- mony because it did not place the burden on the state to demonstrate a compelling need for the testimony, and that the state did not show a compelling need, was unavailing: the court understood that it must apply the compelling need test and was satisfied that the state met that burden, and, even if the court's decision was ambiguous, this court presumes the court applied the correct legal standard; moreover, W was uniquely positioned to testify about what he told the defendant and his impression of the defendant's understanding of the situation, and W's testimony was, thus, relevant to the defendant's state of mind. 4. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the third element of failure to appear in the first degree: despite the defendant's claim that the court instructed the jury in a manner that permitted the jury to convict him on the basis of conduct that occurred after he was no longer required to appear, the court's instructions were consistent with the applicable statute (§ 53a-172 (a)) and case law, the instructions directly quoted the statutory language the defendant contended was necessary, and, thus, the jury understood that it could convict the defendant only if he wilfully failed to appear when legally called according to the terms of his bail bond; moreover, the court's use of the phrase ''as required'' in explicating the third element of the offense was a shorthand reference to § 53a-172 (a), and, read in context, tied the defendant's obligation to appear at the time and place he was legally called according to the terms of his bail bond; furthermore, when the court forfeited the defendant's bond, it stated that it was willing to proceed with jury selection if W could get the defendant to the courthouse, and the practical effect of that statement was to condition the forfeiture of the bond until later in the day to give the defendant an opportunity to cure his failure to appear and, accordingly, the defendant's bond continued to obligate him to appear in a courtroom after he arrived at the courthouse. Argued October 18, 2019—officially released March 31, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for defamation in connection with statements made by the defendant about the plaintiff at a public hearing before the Greenwich Planning and Zoning Commission on the plaintiff's application for a special permit to construct a new residence and new sewer line on his property. At the hearing, the defendant addressed the commission to share her concerns regarding the plaintiff's application. In addition to her concern that the proposed sewer line would have an impact on the health of trees, she stated that the plaintiff had not been trustworthy, had a serious criminal past, and had paid more than $40,000,000 in fines to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The press was in attendance and published parts of the defendant's state- ment. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action claiming, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because her statements were entitled to absolute litigation immunity, which the court granted. The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, claiming that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the hearing was quasi- judicial in nature, improperly considered whether the defendant's state- ments were pertinent rather than relevant to the subject matter of the hearing, applied the wrong standard to a motion to dismiss, and failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts. The court denied the motion and the plaintiff appealed to this court claiming, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly granted the motion to dismiss and denied his motion to reargue. Held: 1. The trial court properly decided the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint, the transcript of the hearing, and the defendant's affidavit, and did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing or in denying the plaintiff's motion to reargue; the plaintiff failed to present evidence to establish a dispute as to a material jurisdictional fact and did not request an evidentiary hearing until after the court decided the defendant's motion to dismiss. 2. The trial court correctly determined that the defendant's statements were entitled to absolute litigation immunity: the planning and zoning commis- sion hearing was quasi-judicial in nature because the commission exer- cised discretion in deciding whether to approve the plaintiff's special permit application, it engaged in fact-finding, it had the ability to approve, deny, or table the plaintiff's application for further proceedings, its decision whether to grant or deny the plaintiff's application had the power to affect the property rights of private persons, and it heard the testimony of several witnesses; moreover, public policy interests in encouraging citizen participation in the deliberations and decisions of their local governments supported a finding that the hearing was quasi- judicial in nature; furthermore, the defendant's statements concerned the credibility of the plaintiff, which the plaintiff put into issue by submitting a special permit application that contained representations on which the zoning and planning commission would rely in reviewing that application and, therefore, the defendant's statements were perti- nent to the subject matter of the proceeding. Argued October 22, 2019—officially released March 31, 2020

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and conspiracy to commit risk of injury to a child in connection with his abuse of the minor victim, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly sanctioned a nonunanimous jury verdict against him when it denied his motion for a bill of particulars and his request that the court give the jury a specific unanimity instruc- tion as to the sexual assault charge. The defendant and the victim were first cousins. The defendant and T, who also were first cousins, had had an ongoing sexual relationship since childhood. After T and the victim's father moved to a new residence when the victim was seven years old, the defendant began to sexually abuse the victim there when the victim stayed overnight during visits with his father. The defendant's sexual abuse of the victim lasted until the victim was ten years old and involved the victim's performing oral sex on the defendant and the defendant's anal penetration of the victim. During that period of time, the defendant and T often sexually abused the victim together. The victim testified that the first incident of sexual abuse occurred after he saw the defendant and T exchange a ''look.'' The state's information alleged that the defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim through fellatio and anal intercourse in violation of subdivision (2) of the statutory (§ 53a-70 (a)) subsection proscribing sexual assault in the first degree. The information also alleged that the defendant violated subdivision (2) of the statutory (§ 53-21 (a)) subsection proscrib- ing risk of injury to a child, in that he had contact with the victim's intimate parts and subjected the victim to contact with his intimate parts. The conspiracy count alleged that the defendant and T had conspired to commit risk of injury to a child in the manner alleged in the risk of injury count. The defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars prior to trial, claiming that the information was duplicitous in that it contained allegations that could have been stated as separate offenses and gave rise to a risk that he would not be afforded a unanimous verdict because different jurors could reach a guilty verdict on the same count on the basis of findings as to different incidents of abuse. The trial court con- cluded, inter alia, that the information was not duplicitous and that the jury was not required to unanimously agree that the defendant had engaged in a specific act among different acts that would give rise to criminal liability. The court thereafter denied the defendant's request for a specific unanimity instruction as to the crime of sexual assault in the first degree, reasoning that the jury did not have to agree unanimously as to whether the sexual intercourse consisted of fellatio or anal inter- course. The court instructed the jury that, to find the defendant guilty of each offense, it must unanimously agree that the state proved each essential element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that, if it were unable to do so, it must find him not guilty. The court also denied the defendant's motion to preclude evidence that he had had an ongoing sexual relationship with T from childhood through the time of the sexual assaults of the victim. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court sanctioned a nonunanimous verdict when it denied his motion for a bill of particulars and his request for a specific unanimity instruction as to the charge of sexual assault in the first degree: the court properly instructed the jury with respect to the charge of sexual assault in the first degree, as § 53a- 70 (a) (2) proscribed a single type of conduct, sexual intercourse, which can be proven by different types of specific acts, including fellatio and anal intercourse, and, although the risk of injury and conspiracy counts potentially were premised on the violation of alternative statutory subdi- visions and, thus, gave rise to a risk that the jurors were not unanimous with respect to the alternative bases of criminal liability, it was of no consequence that the defendant was charged with having engaged in those acts at different times and in distinct scenarios, as the state presented evidence of both types of violations of § 53-21 (a) in that the defendant had contact with the victim's intimate parts and subjected the victim to contact with the defendant's intimate parts; moreover, although the information was duplicitous as to the risk of injury and conspiracy counts, a specific unanimity instruction was not required with respect to those counts, as the court's instructions did not expressly sanction a nonunanimous verdict, and the court provided general una- nimity instructions to the jury as well as unanimity instructions in the context of the instructions pertaining to those counts. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence that the defendant and T had had a sexual relationship since childhood: the long-term sexual relationship between the defendant and T was relevant to the jury's assessment of T's credibility, it was probative, circumstantial evidence that the defendant and T had intended to con- spire to engage in conduct constituting the crime of risk of injury to a child and that their sexual activities with the victim were overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, the evidence was relevant to whether the defendant and T could have discussed matters of a sexual nature, whether they were likely to trust one another to conspire to commit a crime of a sexual nature against a child, and the evidence made it more likely that the ''look'' the defendant and T shared before they sexually abused the victim together for the first time was evidence that they had agreed to sexually abuse the victim and engaged in conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy; moreover, the court minimized the risk of prejudice by limiting T's testimony about his sexual relationship with the defendant and expressed its readiness to provide the jury with a limiting instruction, which the defendant requested not be delivered, and the graphic evidence of the sexual activities the defendant and T engaged in with the victim undermined the possibility that the limited evidence of the sexual relationship between the defendant and T unduly aroused the jurors' emotions; furthermore, the evidence, which was not of a violent or sexually graphic nature, was not introduced as or characterized as prior misconduct by the defendant or evidence of his propensity to sexually abuse the victim, and, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the trial court never suggested that the sexual relationship between the defendant and T was a basis from which to infer that they were motivated to engage in sexual conduct with children, as the jury reasonably may have inferred that the relationship between the defen- dant and T began as sexual exploration between young children, and the potential that the fact that the defendant and T were first cousins could arouse negative emotions in the jurors was not so significant that it outweighed the probative value of the evidence of their sexual rela- tionship. Argued October 9, 2019—officially released March 31, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages, including treble damages pursuant to statute (§ 52-568), for vexatious litigation, alleging that the defendant had brought an action against him in 2009 without probable cause and with malicious intent. In a prior action brought in 2013 concerning the 2009 action, the plaintiff had sought to recover damages for vexatious litigation from the defendant as well as her attorney, C. In May, 2015, the trial court dismissed the action as to the defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction. Thereafter, the court granted C's motion to bifur- cate the trial and have the issue of probable cause decided first by the trial court. Following a hearing, the court concluded that C had probable cause to bring the 2009 action and rendered judgment for C in October, 2015, which was affirmed by this court. In May, 2016, the plaintiff com- menced the present action against the defendant pursuant to the acciden- tal failure of suit statute (§ 52-592). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment in which she argued that the present action was time barred and not saved by § 52-592. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, and the defendant filed an answer and special defenses asserting, inter alia, that the present action was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel because the trial court in 2013 found that there was probable cause for the 2009 action and she was in privity with her attorney, C. The defendant then moved for summary judgment on the special defense of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, which the court denied, concluding that those doctrines were inapplicable because the 2013 action involved what infor- mation C possessed when he filed the action and the present action involved what information the defendant possessed when she pursued the 2009 action. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied her motions. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment predicated on the special defense of res judicata and/or collat- eral estoppel; the 2013 action involved whether C had probable cause to commence the 2009 action on the basis of his knowledge at the time whereas the present case concerned whether the defendant had probable cause to pursue the 2009 action on the basis of her knowledge at the time, and genuine issues of material fact existed as to this issue. 2. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied her motion to dismiss predicated on her claim that the present action was time barred and not saved by § 52-592; the denial of a statute of limitations defense is not a final judgment and, therefore, was not reviewable on appeal; moreover, although in some situations a statute of limitations claim may be inextricably linked with a res judicata and/or collateral estoppel claim and, thus, reviewable, the defen- dant's statute of limitations claim in her motion to dismiss was not inextricably intertwined with her claims of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel in her summary judgment motion. Argued February 6—officially released March 31, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant attorney E, and the defendant insurance company, N Co., claiming that E had committed fraud against the plaintiff and that N Co. was vicariously liable for E's actions. The plaintiff had previously brought an action for, inter alia, negligence against A, who was insured by N Co., and another individual, R. A was represented by E on behalf of N. Co. in the negligence action, in which the jury awarded the plaintiff damages against both A and R. Pursuant to a settlement agreement in that action, the plaintiff signed a general release and withdrawal form in exchange for settling the case against A. The plaintiff later discovered that she would be unable to recover damages from R, and moved to open the judgment in the negli- gence action, claiming that E had engaged in unfair and deceptive behav- ior by instructing her to sign the release without explaining what it was and how it could affect the judgment in that action. After the trial court in the negligence action denied her motion to open and concluded that there was no evidence that E had coerced the plaintiff into signing the release, the plaintiff commenced the present action alleging fraud against E and N Co. Thereafter, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from asserting her fraud action because the issue had been addressed in the negligence action, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. This court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, conclud- ing that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim for intentional misrepresen- tation because there were genuine issues of material fact whether that claim had been fully and fairly litigated at the hearing on the motion to open the negligence action, and remanded the case for further proceed- ings. Following the remand, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff's claim. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the action, conclud- ing that the defendants had satisfied the requirements for absolute immu- nity under the litigation privilege, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the litigation privilege implicated the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and that the defendants timely filed their motion to dismiss; the doctrine of absolute immunity concerns a court's subject matter jurisdiction and challenges to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and cannot be waived. 2. The trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss and concluded that E's statements were protected by the litigation privilege; E's statements made during a postverdict settlement conference were made during a judicial proceeding, there is no requirement that statements be made in a courtroom, under oath, or in a pleading in order to be considered part of a judicial proceeding and the postverdict settlement conference was part of the ongoing litigation between the parties and was judicial in nature, and the statements were relevant to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding, as the purpose of the conference was for the defendants to reach an agreement with the plaintiff and, thus, E's state- ments about signing the withdrawal were relevant to the conference. Argued November 19, 2019—officially released March 31, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and carrying a pistol without a permit, the defendant appealed. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he shot and killed the victim following a heated discussion and a brief physical altercation. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to pre- clude the admission of evidence of certain incidents of prior misconduct, which the state sought to offer to prove the identity of the defendant as the shooter. At the hearing on the motion to preclude, the state conceded that evidence regarding an incident in which the defendant had shot his girlfriend, F, in the eye with a flare gun would not be admissible, and the trial court advised the state that, if it sought to introduce evidence of that incident, it should raise the issue outside the presence of the jury so that the court could assess its admissibility. In addition, the defendant offered an unsigned stipulation that he had shot and killed the victim, but the state refused the defendant's offer to stipulate, and the trial court did not consider it in ruling on the motion. Thereafter, the trial court denied in part the motion to preclude and allowed the state to present to the jury evidence of certain instances of misconduct related to the defendant's prior use of the firearm that was used to shoot and kill the victim. During trial, M, a state's witness, inadvertently testified regarding the flare gun incident. The defendant immediately objected to M's testimony, and the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard it. At the conclusion of M's testimony, the defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that M's testimony was prejudicial because, inter alia, F was expected to testify for the state and she had a visible injury to her eye that she sustained during the flare gun incident. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly allowed the state to introduce evidence of several instances of miscon- duct involving his prior use of the firearm that was used to shoot and kill the victim: contrary to the defendant's contention that the misconduct evidence lacked probative value and was unduly prejudicial to him because his offer to stipulate that he had shot the victim with the firearm obviated the state's need to prove identity, the misconduct evidence was indisputably probative to establishing the identity of the defendant as the shooter of the victim, which was an issue that the defendant contested from the inception of the investigation of the victim's death until the hearing on his motion to preclude the admission of that evi- dence; moreover, the defendant's reliance on Old Chief v. United States (519 U.S. 172) for the proposition that the trial court erred in not balanc- ing his offer to stipulate with the prejudicial effect of the misconduct evidence was unavailing, as that case was distinguishable from the present case, and the defendant's offer was not a forthright concession that he killed the victim and, therefore, there was no alternative evidence of identity for the trial court to consider in weighing the probative value of the misconduct evidence and its potential prejudice to the defendant. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial after M inadvertently testified regarding the flare gun incident; although M's testimony was improper, the trial court found, and the record supported, that it was not invited by the state and that it was isolated, and, immediately following M's improper reference to the flare gun incident, the court instructed the jury to disregard it, and, therefore, even if M's isolated statement could be view as being unduly prejudicial to the defendant, any danger inherent in its admission would have been cured by the court's instruction, and this court deferred to the trial court's advantageous ability to observe the impact of M's state- ment on the jury. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his constitu- tional right to confrontation was violated when the trial court allowed T, a state trooper, to testify that the first selectman of the town of Andover told her that the defendant did not have a temporary town permit to carry the firearm that he used to shoot and kill the victim; the defendant's claim failed under the fourth prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because the admission of T's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant did not challenge the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit at trial, he did not object to T's testimony or cross-examine her and he testified that he was illegally carrying the subject firearm at the time of the shooting, which admission alone supported the jury's verdict on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit. Argued January 7—officially released April 7, 2020

Pursuant to statute (§ 49-1), ''[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure . . . .'' The plaintiff sought to foreclose, inter alia, a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant S Co. and to collect on a personal guarantee by the defendant L. S Co. had executed a promissory note in the amount of $800,000 in favor of the plaintiff, which was secured by a mortgage on the subject property, and L executed a guarantee agreement in which he personally guaranteed all sums due under the note, including attorney's fees and costs. Following S Co.'s default on the note, the plaintiff commenced this action by way of a three count complaint, and the trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure as to the first two counts. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a deficiency judgment against S Co., and the parties stipulated that there was a deficiency of $449,441.88, including attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability on count three of the complaint, which was directed against L and sought to collect on his personal guarantee of the note. The defendants filed an objection to the motion, contending that the plaintiff was barred from recovering from L pursuant to § 49-1 and the statute (§ 49-14) that provides a limited exception to § 49-1. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, concluding, inter alia, that § 49-1 had no effect on the plaintiff's ability to recover monetary damages from L following the judgment of strict foreclosure. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment as to count three of the complaint and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $531,938.98. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial count improperly rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on count three of its complaint, which was based on their contention that, pursuant to §§ 49-1 and 49-14, the plaintiff was barred from recovering on L's per- sonal guarantee; in light of binding precedent, this court concluded that the trial court properly enforced L's personal guarantee, as the bar pursuant to § 49-1 applies only to those individuals or entities who are made or could have been made parties to the foreclosure, and, because L was a guarantor, he was not a party to the foreclosure and could not properly have been made a party to it, and, therefore, § 49-1 did not have an effect on the plaintiff's ability to recover money damages from L under count three of the complaint. 2. Contrary to the defendants' claim that the trial court improperly held them jointly and severally liable for the judgment on L's personal guaran- tee, the reference to joint and several liability in the written order prepared by the court clerk was a scrivener's error, as the court's judg- ment pertained only to L's personal guarantee under count three of the complaint. Argued October 15, 2019—officially released April 14, 2020

The substitute plaintiff, M Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants. After commencing the action, the original plaintiff, H Co., moved for summary judgment as to liability, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, the court granted H Co.'s motion to substitute M Co. as the plaintiff. In support of its motion to substitute, H Co. provided certain evidence that showed it had merged into M Co. approximately twenty-one months before H Co. had filed its motion for summary judgment. The court then rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of M Co., and the defendants appealed to this court, claiming that the court improperly granted the motion to substitute M Co. for H Co. and granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of H Co. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted H Co.'s motion to substitute M Co. as the plaintiff as the substitution had no substantive effect: when H Co. merged into M Co., no assignment of the underlying cause of action occurred, as H Co.'s assets, including the cause of action against the defendants, vested in M Co. by operation of law, and M Co. was the real party of interest upon its merger with H Co.; moreover, the substitution of M Co. did not prejudice the defendants, as the defen- dants did not articulate how being misled by the failure to substitute M Co. as the plaintiff for more than two years after the merger occurred caused actual prejudice to their ability to defend against the claims brought against them, and M Co.'s obligation to establish its prima facie case was not circumvented because it carried the same burden in obtaining summary judgment as H Co. once the merger became effective; furthermore, under established law, the substitution of M Co. as the plaintiff was not necessary after its merger with H Co., and the failure of M Co. to substitute itself prior to H Co.'s motion for summary judgment did not preclude the defendants from obtaining discovery on any of the issues that were pertinent to opposing that motion. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improp- erly granted summary judgment as to liability in H Co.'s favor because H Co. failed to establish that it had standing, in that it possessed the mortgage note at the time the action was commenced: the record clearly demonstrated that H Co. satisfied its prima facie case that it had standing, as its production of the note, endorsed in blank, established a rebuttable presumption that it possessed the note at the time it commenced the foreclosure action, and the defendants failed to offer evidence to rebut that presumption; moreover, although H Co. was not obligated to provide anything further to show that it had standing to enforce the note, its additional evidentiary submissions established that it possessed the note at the time it commenced the underlying action. 3. The trial court improperly determined that M Co. satisfied its burden of proof to establish that H Co. complied with the notification requirements pursuant to the mortgage, and, thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether H Co. satisfied a condition precedent to foreclosure; H Co. did not submit any evidence to prove that the notice of default was actually delivered to the defendants, and no admissible evidence existed to support the claim that the notice of default was sent by first class mail, and, accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Argued September 23, 2019—officially released April 14, 2020