Volume 21 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Abstract Question — Controversy—Complaint.—'When an action is brought only to obtain a judicial decision on an abstract question of law and an actual controversy between the parties is not alleged in the complaint, it should he dismissed.</p> <p>Id. — Regulation oe Insular Racing Commission — Action eor Nullity — Controversy. — When, as in this case, the object of the action is to annul a regulation of the Insular Racing Commission authorizing said commission to appoint the officers of the hippodromes of the Island and the only allegation of the complaint relative to a controversy between the parties is that said commission appointed the officers, there being no showing that the officers accepted the appointments and were disposed to take possession of the offices, or that the plaintiff was in any way hound thereby, or that there existed any real controversy between the parties, it must be concluded that the question raised is an abstract one.</p>

<p>.The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>New Trial — Evidence—Influencing Jury — Presumption.—Although it is better that impertinent evidence erroneously admitted by the court be not heard by the jury, nevertheless, when it is and the court afterwards orders it to be stricken out, it is to be presumed' that the jury complied with its duty of disregarding such evidence in finding a verdict of guilty, and unless the evidence be very important and is presented in order to influence the jury this is not sufficient cause for ordering a new trial.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Transcript of Record. — When the transcript of the record does not show that a new trial was asked for or that an appeal was taken from the ruling refusing the same, the appellate court need not consider the question of a new trial.</p> <p>SEDUCTION — EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF VICTIM-CORROBORATION.-Tile testimony of a physician that the victim ivas deflowered and the conduct of the accused in not denying the commission of the act when one of the relatives of the victim demanded that he marry her, he promising to do so some days later, is a sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the victim.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Mayhem.</p> <p>'The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Abstract Question — Lack op Controversy — Declaration op Bights — Jurisdiction. — When, as in the case at bar, it is alleged that the plaintiffs are in possession as lessees of a property belonging to the defendants and the complaint alleges only that the defendants refuse to recognize them as lessees, without alleging any specific or concrete fact showing that the rights of the plaintiffs have been disturbed by the defendants, and the prayer of the complaint is that the court order the recognition of the right of the plaintiffs to hold as lessees the same property which they say they are in possession of, such complaint involves an abstract question which cannot be considered and decided by the court to which it was submitted.</p> <p>Action por Execution op Deed — Ambiguity op Prayer — Becord op Lease.— When, as in the case at bar, the plaintiffs pray in general terms in the complaint that the defendants be ordered to execute, jointly or severally, the documents necessary for recording the contract of lease in favor of the plaintiff company -without specifying the documents necessary, the court has no ground upon which to render a clear and specific judgment which could be executed.</p> <p>Cross-Complaint — Answer—Pleading.—A cross-complaint must allege a cause of action against the plaintiff and not a defense to Ms cause of action, therefore when an answer to a complaint prays for judgment as a cross-complaint without complying with the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,' such judgment cannot be rendered.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for , Libel.'</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Curable Defect — Conjugal Partnership Property — Private Property of Spouse — Origin of Purchase Prioe. — Failure to state the origin of the purchase price of a property in a deed affecting real property is not a curable defect when it is not sought by means of said deed to record the property acquired as the private property of one of the grantee spouses.</p> <p>Id. — Private Property op Spouse — Conjugal Partnership Property- — Origin op Purchase Price. — Only when the husband or the wife seeks to record property belonging exclusively to one or the other is it necessary to state in the deed that the purchase price of the property belonged exclusively to the spouse in whose name it is desired to record the property.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Intervention in Ownership of Beal Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — New Trial — Judgment Eoll. — In accordance with sections 301 and 225 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment roll is an indispensable part of the transcript of the record in an appeal- from an order granting or refusing a new trial and when the judgment roll is omitted the appeal will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Appeal—Transcript op Record.- — The fact that the appellant in habeas corpus proceedings failed to file a transcript of the record in the Supreme Court is no ground for the dismissal of the appeal at the instance of the respondent, for, in accordance with the Sabeas Corpus Act of March 12, 1903, the judge or court a quo¡ and not the appellant, should send up the transcript of the record to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for the Sale of Lottery Tickets.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for the Sale of Lottery Tickets.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Seduction.</p> <p>The facts are' stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judicial Administration — Motion to Amend — Appeal.—A decision overruling a motion to annul the appointment of a judicial administrator is appealable.</p> <p>Id. — Verification of Petition — Amended Petition — Public Instruments Accompanying Petition. — When a petition for judicial administration containing all the requirements of section 23 of the Law of Special Legal Proceedings of March 9, 1905, is presented and denied and no appeal is taken from the decision of denial, but later another unsworn petition is presented re-pleading the same facts and adding some averments of the petitioner not required by law, the second petition may be considered as an amendment to the first and, although not verified, in the interests of justice in this case, it may be understood that the oath to the first extended to the second, especially when both petitions were accompanied by public instruments which prove the allegations made in said petitions and have as much force as the verification of the petition.</p>

<p>Construction of Law. — Statutes of American origin should be construed according to the jurisprudence of the United States.</p> <p>Id.- — Meaning of Words. — The words "father,” "mother” and "child,” used in section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, refer to a lawful father and mother and a legitimate child and do not include a natural father and mother and illegitimate children.</p> <p>Action for Damages — Illegitimate Child. — Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives no right of action to the father or mother for the death of an illegitimate child.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Arecibo Finding Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Internal Revenue Law — Judgment—New Trial. — Considered alone and with-out reference to the transcript of the record, the judgment rendered in this case is defective and - technically insufficient because it fails to state what section of the Internal Revenue Law was violated, but this of itself is not sufficient ground for the reversal of the judgment and the granting of a new trial.</p> <p>Errors Not Prejudicial — Construction of Law — Judgment.—The provisions of sections 362 and 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to-section 1 of the Act of May 30, 1904, should be construed liberally in the sense that judgments appealed from should not be reversed for defects which do not qjrejudice the accused and to the end of procuring a speedy, practical- ' and free administration of justice.</p> <p>Judgment — Modification of Judgment. — In accordance with sections 362 and; 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the Act of May 30,, 1904, the Supreme Court is empowered to modify a judgment appealed from and affirm the same in its modified form when said judgment is defective in failing to state the section of the Internal Revenue Law violated by, the accused, and for this purpose it may consider the record as a whole. Internal Revenue Law — Sale by Agent Without License — License of Principal. — When, as in the present case, a person makes a sale of liquors without the license required by the Internal Revenue Law, but acted in good faith as the agent or partner of the seller, the license which the principal has to sell liquors is sufficient to exempt the agent from liability under the Internal Revenue Law.</p>

<p>The judgment appealed from is reversed on the grounds set out in the opinion delivered in the ease of The People v. Alvarez, decided June 27, 1914.</p>

<p>Record op Title — Property Situated in Two Districts. — When a property is recorded in one district and later is found to lie in two different municipal districts, it is not necessary to make a previous record in favor of the vendor in the second municipal district.</p> <p>Id. — Statement op Purchaser. — The bare statement of the xmrehaser as to the portions lying in the different municipal districts is not sufficient for the admission of the title to record.</p> <p>Id. — Curable Defect — Description op Property. — The boundaries and area of a property are requisites which should be shown in the registry of property, and the lack thereof constitutes a curable defect.</p>

<p>Evidence — Contradictory Evidence — Finding of Trial Court. — When the evidence is contradictory the weight of preponderance given thereto by the trial court will not be reversed on appeal unless there exist special reasons therefor.</p> <p>Id. — Promissory Note — Genuineness of Signature — Transcript of Record— Finding of Trial Court. — When the evidence is contradictory as to the genuineness of the signatures to various promissory notes the weight given thereto by the trial court after making a comparison of the signatures attacked with other original documents containing the genuine signatures of the party cannot be reviewed by this court when the original documents which served as a basis for the comparison are not included in the transcript of the record, it not being sufficient to include typewritten copies of said documents in the statement of the ease.</p> <p>Brief of Respondent — Appearance.—It is bad practice on the part of the attorney for the respondent not to file a brief and only to appear at the hearing to argue orally.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Arecibo Denying Admission to Record of a Usufructuary Estate.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section 2, Denying Admission to Record of a Contract of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion. .</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in Proceedings for the Liquidation of a Commercial Partnership and the Partition of an Hereditary Estate.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action, for Damages for Conspiracy.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>ADMINISTRATIVE Appeal — Brief of Begistrar. — In eases like the present, registrars of property should brief in detail the reasons for their decisions «and cite the authorities on which they rely so as to insure greater exactitude in the decisions rendered by the court.</p> <p>Record of Title — Bargain and Sale — Voluntary Mortgage. — A 'deed of bargain and sale and voluntary mortgage Raving been presented for record in tlie registry of property, by which deed the owner of a property sold the same to another person for a fixed sum of which the vendor admitted she had received a part from the vendee, who agreed to pay the balance to certain persons within fifteen days after the death of the vendor and created a mortgage on the property so acquired for the purpose of guaranteeing the deferred payment, it was held that the said deed was recordable.</p> <p>Referred Obligations — Conditional Obligations. — There are similarities and differences between the maturity and the conditions of obligations which must be distinguished in order not to confuse a deferred obligation with a conditional one. The condition is an uncertain event, whereas the term is an event which is bound to take place, although it is not known when. The condition may be such that the obligatory relation may or may not have effect, whereas the term merely places a limitation upon the time when the contractual relation shall take effect.</p> <p>Id. — Day Certain. — When, as in the case at bar, it is covenanted in a deed of bargain and sale and voluntary mortgage that the deferred payment shall be made to certain persons fifteen days after the death of the vendor, the setting of that date should be understood as a day certain on which the obligation is demandable, pursuant to the provisions of section 1092 of the Revised Civil Code.</p> <p>.Id. — Mortgage.—In accordance with law, jurisprudence, and custom, the purchaser of a property may create a mortgage thereon in the same deed by which he makes the purchase in order to guarantee the deferred instalment ■of the purchase price.</p>

<p>Appeal — Certifying Transcript of Record — Construction.—The word "attorneys,” as used in section 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure, includes the attorneys of all the parties to the action or proceeding from -which the appeal was taken and, therefore, the certifying of the transcript of the record by the attorney for the appellant and the respondent in person is insufficient and the appeal should be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Intervention in Ownership of Real Property and for an Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Community Property — Bedemption—Deposit—Complaint.—The Law of Civil Procedure in force in this Island since 1886 has not been repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure of 1904 in so far as the former requires that in order to bring an action for legal redemption of community property the redeemer must deposit the purchase price in the court having jurisdiction of the case, and this fact must be alleged in the complaint, otherwise it? does not state a cause of action.</p> <p>Deposit. — In making such deposit it is not necessary to follow the measures prescribed by the Civil Code in cases where the deposit of the amount owing may produce the effect of payment.</p>

<p>Pleading — Judgment on the Pleadings. — When the complaint is sufficient of itself and has been verified in the proper manner, it is indispensable that the material allegations thereof have not been specifically denied in the' answer and that no new matter has been set up amounting to a contradiction or a legal defense in order that judgment may be rendered on the pleadings on motion of the plaintiff.</p> <p>Unlawful Detainer — Judgment on the Pleadings — Evidence.—When the defendant in an action of unlawful detainer in tenancy at sufferance denies all the material allegations of the complaint and at the first hearing admits, having received a letter from the plaintiff notifying him that from a certain] date the permission granted him to occupy a certain lot on which he had built a house would be rescinded and revoked, the admission that he had received such letter is not sufficient upon which to sustain the plaintiff’s motion made at the second hearing for the introduction of oral testimony and before the same had been heard for a judgment on the pleadings and evidence.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action for Eescission of Contract and Indemnity for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Tke facts are stated in tb-e opinion.</p>

<p>Contempt — Jurisdiction oe Municipal Judges. — Pursuant to section 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which alone empowers municipal judges to punish for contempt, said judges may punish for the said offense only when, committed before thorn and not when committed beyond their presence,.</p> <p>Construction op Law — Discrepancies Between English and Spanish Text:— When a statute is of American origin, as in the case of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the English text governs in preference to the Spanish in ease of discrepancy.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action for the Legal Redemption of Community Property.</p> <p>■ The' facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 300 of the Penal Code.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for G-aming.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Slander.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>INJUNCTION — Recovery oe Possession — Forcible or Fraudulent Acts. — In enacting that dispossession must be accomplished by forcible or fraudulent acts, Act No. 43 of March 13, 1913, does not make it a necessary requisite tthat dispossession shall be effected by physical force or fraud, it being sufficient that it be done against the will of the possessor or without his consent.</p> <p>Id. — Forcible or Fraudulent Acts. — When a person is deprived of the possession of his property against his will, this constitutes a forcible act which may be carried into effect by force, intimidation, threats or any other act affecting the liberty of the possessor. When a person is deprived of his possession without his consent, there exists a fraudulent act which can be carried into effect by means of fraud or deceit, properly speaking, or by any other act' equivalent to deceit, for example, surprise or acts performed unknown to or behind the back of the holder.</p> <p>Id. — Forcible or Fraudulent Acts — Threats—Fencing in Land. — A person is deprived of possession by forcible or fraudulent acts when, as- in the case at bar, it is proved that the defendant threatened anyone entering the land with imprisonment, which involves an element of force, and, in addition, placed a fence around tlie land and put up a sign forbidding entrance, to the surprise and behind the back of the lawful owner, thereby showing a fraudulent attempt to dispossess the owner, which may be classified as a fraudulent act.</p>

<p>Employers’ Liability — Defect in Machinery — Cause of Accident. — When, as in the ease at 'bar, it is proved that the plaintiff worked as machinist in the factory of the defendant for several years and that one of his duties was to repair the defects in the clutch of the machine and that the aeeident which caused the injury to the plaintiff did not occur while the machine was in operation, thus causing the jumping out or breaking of the clutch, but occurred while the plaintiff was repairing the defects of same, it cannot be concluded that the accident was the necessary and exclusive consequence of . any defect in defendant’s machinery, within; the meaning of the act in force-relating to the liability of employers.</p> <p>Id. — Assumption of Risk — Defect in Machinery. — When, as in the case at bar, the defect in the clutch of the defendant’s machinery existed from the-time of its installation in the year 1895, since whieh time the plaintiff had’ been in charge of the same, knew of the said defect and voluntarily assumed the obligation to repair the same, and there is nothing to show that he-specifically called the attention of the defendant to the fact that the adjustment of the clutch in the manner which he had followed for many years placed his life in danger or exposed him to bodily injury and that the defendant promised to repair the defect permanently or that the accident occurred during a period which would reasonably warrant the deduction that the plaintiff had continued to work under the impression that the defendant would repair the defect, it must be concluded that he voluntarily assumed the risk of his employment and must take the consequence of his own acts*</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>Motion of the Despondent for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Mayagiiez in a Proceeding to Secure the Effectiveness of Judgment in an Action for Damages for Libel.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Surety — Contract.—The defendant wrote the plaintiff a letter reading as fol- - lows: “I hávé thé pléas'hré of recommending to you my friend Marcelino Barreto, who will purchase some lumber from you with which to build a house iu Santurce and it seems to me that you will be able to give Mm the lowest prices because he is entirely reliable personally and, besides, in recommending him to you I may be responsible to you for everything he may purchase.” It was held that the said letter did not constitute a surety contract per se and that the defendant was not liable for the value of the lumber purchased by the said Barreto, especially when it is taken into account that 1he letter referred only to one house, whereas, according to the evidence, Barreto built several houses with the lumber which he purchased. Besides, Barreto made various payments on account of the lumber purchased and it may be that the value of the lumber which he obtained for the eon-struetion of the first house was paid for in full.</p>

<p>DIVORCE — Counterclaim:—Cross-Complaint.—A counterclaim or cross-complaint may be filed in a suit for divorce.</p> <p>Id. — Counterclaim—Abandonment.-—The time elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the counterclaim cannot be included in computing the period of one year required by subdivision 5 of section 164 of the Civil Code as the term of abandonment necessary to constitute a cause of action for divorce.</p>

<p>Intervention — Judgment bt Default — Trial.—Pursuant to section 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure, leave to intervene must be applied for previous to the trial. After judgment by default has been entered against the defendant no intervention can be solicited because the rendition of judgment is equivalent to the holding of a trial within the meaning of the said section.</p>

<p>Sale op Property by Federal Court — Purchase by Attorney — Title Conveyed by Special Master — 'Jurisdiction.—An insular district court has jurisdiction of an action to annul a judicial deed of sale executed "by a special master in proceedings before the Federal Court of Porto Pico when the complaint does not assail the judgment of that court hut the deed of sale on the ground that it conveyed title to the attorney for the plaintiff, thus violating the provisions of section 1362 of the Civil Code, and when, according to (he complaint, the case was terminated in the Federal Court . several years before and the property is beyond the custody of the Federal Court and it does not appear that the nullity of said title was raised before that court or decided thereby, or that it affirmed the sale.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — -Presumption.'—The jurisdiction of a court of record is presumed until the contrary is shown.</p>

<p>Demurrer — Cause of Action — Ground of Demurrer. — A demurrer under section 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the complaint does uot state tacts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is sufficiently explicit in that form and need not allege the grounds on which it is based.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Fundamental Error — Cause of Action. — When an appeal is taken from a judgment holding that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in accordance with Eule 43 of this court, the court should examine the allegations of the complaint even when the only error assigned by the appellant cannot be sustained, in order to ascertain whether there is any fundamental error. 1</p> <p>Fraud — Insufficiency of Complaint — Curable Defects. — In order that a complaint alleging fraud may be sufficient, the facts alleged therein must be of such a character that, admitting them to be true, they would support a judgment against the defendant, which does not occur in the present ease where the allegation of fraud is limited to deductions and suppositions. A defeet of this nature’in the complaint may be corrected by amendment.</p>

<p>^Evidence — Error.-—The admission of evidence tending tp show, that a witness had an old and vexatious claim against the defendant which the latter had refused to acknowledge and offered in order that the court might take such fact into consideration in weighing the testimony of the witness against the interests of the defendant, does not constitute a fundamental error although such evidence was not actually introduced at the proper time.</p> <p>Id. — Error.—The court does not commit a fundamental error in an action of this kind by admitting in evidence certificates of the civil registry showing that the plaintiff’s mother had other children while single and a deed of gift in which the defendant’s predecessor in interest solemnly declared that he had no legitimate, acknowledged or natural children, especially when, as in the ease at bar, these facts are alleged in the answer as matters of defence.</p> <p>Id. — Error—Adjournment.—The adjournment of the case from one day to another, especially after a long session, judging from the number of witnesses and the length of their testimony, is not error.</p> <p>Id. — Contradictory Evidence — Finding of Trial Court. — When the evidence is contradictory and the trial court finds in favor of one of the parties, this court will accept such finding as juat and proper unless it is shown that the trial court was influenced by passion, prejudice or partiality, or committed a manifest error.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence tending to show that the plaintiff’s mother had carnal intercourse with ether men during the period in which the plaintiff could have been begotten, is admissible- in eases of this kind.</p>

<p>Habeas Cokbus — Patela Potestas — Custody or Minor. — Unless some just cause exists for depriving a father of Ms right of patria potestas, the custody of a motherless child vests in said father-.</p>

<p>Adulterated Milk — Evidence.—When, as in the present case, it is shown only that the milk alleged to he adulterated was brought to the defendant’s place of business at the same moment when the sanitary inspector arrived there, and that the milk had just been emptied into the receptacle and the cartman was leaving with the can whieh he had just emptied, it is manifest that the evidence is insufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.</p> <p>Id. — Possession—Evidence.—The mere fact that the accused are in possession of adulterated milk does not constitute an offence in the absence of evidence that they had offered it for sale.</p> <p>Id. — Intention—Evidence.—In criminal actions like the present in which it is not necessary to show criminal intent, the existence of the elements constituting the statutory offence must he shown beyond all reasonable doubt.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe District Court óf Mayagüez in an Action to Annul Deeds.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Ponce Refusing to Record a Judgment Rendered in Dominion Title Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement of Case — Amendment—Consent op Parties. — When a statement of the case has been approved by the trial court and included in the transcript of. the record it cannot be modified or amended in the Supreme Court unknown to or without the consent of the trial judge, even though both parties agree thereto.</p>

<p>Prescription — Action to Annul Contract. — According to section 1267 of tlie Civil Code the prescription of four years of an action of nullity of contracts as provided for in section 1268 of the said code is applicable only to contracts having the requisites mentioned in section 1228 whenever they contain any of the defects which invalidate them according -to law, which requisites are the consent of the contracting parties, a definite object which is the subject-matter of the contract and a valuable consideration stated.</p> <p>Demurrer. — In ruling on any kind of demurrer the facts must be accepted as set lip in the complaint and deduced from the allegations, without deviating from their literal meaning.</p> <p>Patria Potestas. — Pursuant to the Partida Laws in force, in Porto Bieo in the year 1869 the mother had no patria potestas over her minor children, the same being vested in the father only according to Laws II and III, Title XVII, Partida 4.</p> <p>Prescription — Action to Annul Contract — Patria Potestas. — An action to annul a deed of acknowledgment and mortgage executed in Porto Kico on November 29, 1879, wherein one of the contracting parties acts as mother with patria potestas over her minor children, does not prescribe within the period of four years provided for by section 1268 of the Revised Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Action to Annul Foreclosure Proceedings. — Nor does an action to annul foreclosure proceedings on the ground that the plaintiffs were not summoned prescribe within four years notwithstanding the fact that the said action does not come within the provisions of section 1477 of the old Law of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Ejectment.—The defendants having entered into possession of the properties in litigation in the years 1887 and 1888 and Shis being an astion to recover a part ownership therein, the period of SO years prescribed by section 1864 of the Bevised Civil Code for the prescription of real actions has not yet elapsed.</p> <p>Id. — Fraud—Possession by Prescription.' — -When fraud and bad faith of the defendants in acquiring possession are alleged in the complaint the necessary term for acquiring ownership by prescription is 30 years, which time has not yet elapsed.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Action on? Filiation. — The registration of the births of the minor plaintiffs as the natural children of their mother does not prevent their bringing an action of filiation as the natural children of the defendant’s ancestor.</p> <p>Id. — Action of Filiation. — Both section 199 of the Revised Civil Code, which was repealed by Act No. 73 of March 9, 1911, and section 194, as amended in section 1 of said act, authorize ah action of filiation under certain restrictions after the death of the putative father; and this being the case, it is obvious that the action lies against the succession or successor in interest of the deceased father.</p> <p>Id. — Action of Filiation — Evidence—Complaint.—The law does not require it, nor is it necessary to allege in detail in the complaint the facts upon which the action is based, because such details, if they are necessary, may be brought out in the evidence at the trial.</p> <p>Id. — Action of Filiation. — The right of a natural child to acknowledgment is governed by the law in force at the time of his birth.</p> <p>Id.- — Action of Filiation — Evidence.—Proof of acknowledgment must be strong and convincing.</p> <p>Id. — Action of Filiation- — Support of Mother and Children. — The relations . between the putative father and the mother of the plaintiffs, the furnishing of funds by the former to the latter for the support of herself and her children and the fact that he called the plaintiffs his. children at times, are not alone sufficient to prove their acknowledgment as natural children when said facts can be explained without admitting the paternity and may be the result of benevolent sentiments and affection entertained for the mother and her children.</p> <p>Id. — Action of Filiation. — In the case at bar it was held that no authentic instrument executed by the father expressly recognizing the plaintiffs as his children had been introduced at the trial, and that it was not proven that the mother lived in concubinage with the father during her pregnancy and at the time of the birth of the children, or that the children had been in possession of the status of natural children, for which there’ must be a continuation of facts showing the plaintiffs to have had an undisturbed relation with the putative father as his natural children.</p> <p>3d. — Action of Filiation — Evidence.—When the case is of children born on different dates whose right to acknowledgment is governed by different laws, it is necessary to show specifically by the evidence the acts of acknowledgment relating to each one of them and the dates on which such acts were performed.</p> <p>Id. — Action op Filiation — Evidence.—One of the witnesses for the plaintiffs having testified that the handwriting of the letters offered in evidence appeared to be that of the putative father although the signatures did not, while another witness testified that the handwriting and the signatures of the letters were those of the putative father, who in signing public documents made another rubric and in signing letters made a flourish, this cannot be held sufficient to establish the genuineness of the said letters.</p> <p>.Id. — Action op Filiation — Proof op Paternity. — Taking into account the spirit of Act No. 73 of March 9, 1911, tending to require more convincing proof of the filiation than what was formerly required by section 189 of the Civil Code, it must be deduced that the proof of paternity required by said act must be such as to be equivalent to that shown by a genuine document of express acknowledgment, by the continuous possession of the status of natural child and by the concubinage of the mother with the father during her pregnancy and at the time of the birth of the child.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, ’ Section 1, in an Action to Becover Attorney’s Pees.</p> <p>Motion of Bespondent for Dismissal pf the Appeal. ‘'</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Injunction — Discretion of Court. — The ratification or dissolution of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the court, governed by wise and just rules, and unless it is shown that the trial judge abused his dis-cretional power, his discretion should not be controlled by the appellate court.</p> <p>Id. — Stay of Execution. — «An injunction may stay temporarily the execution of a judgment in order to prevent waste and litigation.</p> <p>Id.- — -Affidavit to Petition — Perjury.—Although the affidavit to the petition in this case, to the effect that the facts alleged therein are known to the affiant of his own knowledge, is not in strict accord with section 118 of the. Code of Civil Procedure, nevertheless it eannot be concluded that it is void inasmuch as it may be considered sufficient to make the affiant liable for perjury if it is proved that the allegations are not true.</p> <p>Surety Bond. — Surety bonds must be drawn up as plainly as possible so that they may be enforced without difficulty in a proper ease.</p> <p>Id. — Oath of Sureties. — The bond for an injunction in this case is defective because .of its ambiguity, and the affidavit of the two sureties is likewise defective because it does not state plainly that each of them is the owner of unencumbered property to the value of more than $1,000, which was the amount fixed by the court.</p> <p>Id. — Notary Public — Illiterate Surety. — When the surety bond exceeds $2,000 and is executed by more than two sureties, the provisions of section 365 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1905, must be complied with; if the notary does not know the sureties personally, the provisions of section 3 of the Act of 1908, relating to affidavits, must be followed, and in case a surety should not know how to sign, the rule laid down in the case of Vendrell v. PeTlot, decided July 11, 1914, must be followed.</p> <p>Id. — Sufficiency of Sureties. — In accordance with section 7 of the Act to Define Injunctions of 1906, when the sufficiency of the sureties is objected to within five days after the service of the injunction, such sureties are required to justify, but if the said objection is made subsequently, then the objecting party must allege and prove the insufficiency of the sureties to the satisfaction of the court.</p> <p>Id. — Defective Bond. — Even when the injunction has been granted properly, if the bond required as a sine qua non for its issuance does not contain the requirements prescribed by law, the court should dissolve the writ.</p>

<p>Aggravated Assault and Battery — Motion to Quash — Evidence.'—After considering the evidence admitted in this case it was held that it was sufficient to show the commission of the crime charged in the information, and that therefore the court did not err in overruling the motion to quash made by the accused.</p> <p>Evidence — Finding op Trial Court — Passion, Prejudice, or Partiality.— When the evidence is contradictory the weight given thereto by the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is shown that the said court was influenced by passion, prejudice, or partiality, or committed manifest error.</p>

<p>■Sanitary Begulations — Destruction of Property — Bubonic Plague. — After considering the evidence introduced and the circumstances surrounding this case, it was held: That the houses described in the complaint, which were torn down by the Sanitary Service on account of the bubonie plague then , existing in Porto Bieo, were old, worthless and unfit to be repaired,, a part of them being level with the ground, the roofs full of leaks, the walls decayed, and the floors rotten and infested with rats and other vermin, and that the order of the director of Sanitation to tear down the said houses was just, legal, and necessary in view of the situation by reason of the epidemic of bubonic plague.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Murder in the First Degree.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Murder in the First Degree.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>View — Finding cot Trial Court — Objection in Lower Court. — When it is alleged for the first time on appeal that the findings of the court as to facts which i have been considered by it by virtue of a view are inconsistent with the evidence, this court should accept the findings because the result of the view was not objected to in the lower court.</p> <p>Negligence — Onus Probandi. — When, as in the ease at bar, it is not shown clearly that the building was under the sole charge of the defendant and that the opening in the floor through which the plaintiff fell was sometimes covered and sometimes not, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the negligence in allowing the said opening to be uncovered when the accident occurred was directly attributable to the defendant. ></p> <p>Contributory Negligence. — The plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence when in walking over the floor of a building undergoing repairs he looks up to see what other work has to be done instead of watching where he is going.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section. 1, Refusing Admission to Record of a Deed of Bargain and Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the' District Court of Arecibo 'in an Action to Annul Possessory Title Proceddings, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in Contempt Proceedings in an Action to Restore the Material Possession of Real Property.</p> <p>Motion of the Plaintiff for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ApplicatioN for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the decision.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainer — Ownership—Parties—Estoppel.—In an action of unlawful detainer questions relative to the ownership of the property in litigation cannot be considered, nor whether the defendant is barred by the doctrine of estoppel from alleging his title to the property, nor whether the plaintiff or the defendant was really an • interested party to an instrument executed previously and on which the estoppel alleged against the defendant is based.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Jurisdiction—License Taxes. — A writ of mandamus lies to compel a person wlio lias refused to do so to file with the Treasurer of Porto Pico a certificate for the assessment of license taxes, pursuant to Act No. 134 of August 12, 1913, and the Supreme Court, in its discretion, has original jurisdiction of such proceeding.</p> <p>People op Porto Pico — Sovereign Powers. — Since the Supreme Court of the .United States decided the ease of The People v. Sosaly, 227 U. S., 270, there is no doubt that Porto Pico enjoys substantially all the sovereign powers possessed by any state of the Union, subject to revision and annulment by the Congress of the United States.</p> <p>License Taxes. — The Legislative Assembly of Porto Pico may impose industrial and commercial license taxes, and the Poraker Aet contains no provision prohibiting the exercise of such faculty.</p> <p>Id. — Constitutional Law — Delegation op Legislative Power. — Aet No. 134 of August 12, 1913, is not unconstitutional, and the fact that it authorizes the Treasurer of Porto Pico to classify commercial establishments and divide some of them into five classes for the purpose of imposing upon each class the amount of taxes prescribed by the said aet, is not a delegation of legislative power to the Treasurer, but is an administrative power and does not render the said act unconstitutional.</p> <p>Id. — Classification op Establishments — Arbitrary and Unjust Powers.— Aet No. 134 of August 12, 1913, relative to industrial and commercial licenses, does hot contain the defect of conferring arbitrary and unjust powers upon the Treasurer of Porto Rico to classify commercial and industrial „establishments, and the fact that the act in one instance divides such establishments ■ into five classes and in others less, does not affect the validity of the said act.</p> <p>Id. — Classification op Establishments — Rate op Taxation — The fact that Aet No. 134 of August 12, 1913, delegated to the Treasurer of Porto Rico the administrative faculty of imposing upon each class of business or industry classified by him by virtue of said faculties the rate formerly prescribed by the act for each class, does not render the said aet null and unconstitutional ■ because of its failure to fix a more definite rate of taxation, inasmuch as the manner in which the rate is fixed is sufficient.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Construction op Law. — It is the duty of a court to follow the intention of, the legislative power and not hold an act to be . unconstitutional unless it is clearly shown to be so.</p> <p>License Taxes — Collection op Back Tax — Promulgation op Regulations— Constitutional Law. — Tlie fact that a tax law has a retroactive effect does not imply necessarily that it is unconstitutional, and the fact that the Treasurer of Porto Eico promulgated the regulations for the collection of license taxes subsequently to January 1, 1914, when the first quarterly payment of said taxes became due, does not prevent his demanding the payment of said back taxes, nor does it make the act of presenting the certificate for the amount of said taxes by the Miramar Shop Company impossible to execute.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administrative Appeal.- — In deciding an administrative appeal, this court will not consider documents which have not been presented to the registrar.</p> <p>Id. — Record op Judicial Orders — Extension op Notice — Effectiveness of Judgment. — When in a proper proceeding a court of competent jurisdiction orders the extension of a notice in the registry refusing to record a deed, in order to secure the effectiveness of the judgment to he rendered in an action pending before said court, the registrar has no authority to refuse to record the said -judicial order on the ground that the period of 120 days prescribed by the Act of March 1, 1902, relative to appeals from decisions of registrars of property in eases of refusal to admit documents to record, is not subject to extension, nor has a court the discretional power to extend the same.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Proceeding for Judicial Authorization to Compromise an Action to Recover Hereditary Interests of Natural Children.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Embezzlement — Agent—Owner.—It was shown in the present ease that the accused; a seller of bread, was not a salaried agent of the owner of the article, and the evidence further tended to show that when the bread was delivered to the seller.he immediately acquired the ownership thereof although he did not pay for it at the time, and that the amount which he finally owed was the balance resulting against him in a long account current whieh he had with the said owner. Held,: That under such circumstances and as there is nothing in the record to show that the accused had acted with criminal intent, he could not be considered guilty of the crime of embezzlement charged by the fiscal.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Special Judge of the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt and Appointment of Receiver.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Rescissory Action.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San Germán Denying Admission to Record of the Cancellation in Part of a Mortgage Securing Promissory Notes Payable to Order.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opiuion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of G-ua-yama Denying Admission to Record of a Deed of Partition of Inheritance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from, the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in a Mandamus Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Prohibition to the Judge of the District Court of Guayama Forbidding Him to Order the Execution of the Judgment Rendered in an Injunction Proceeding Against the Executive Council in an Election Matter.</p>

<p> Petition sihstained. </p>

<p>Appeal — -Dismissal op Appeal prom Municipal Court1 — Transcript of Record.— Tire fact that the secretary of the municipal court did not send up the transcript of the record until after the expiration of the period of twenty days-prescribed by the Act to regulate appeals from judgments of municipal courts in civil eases, approved March 11, 1908, is not of itself sufficient ground to warrant the dismissal of an appeal in a district court when the motion to dismiss is filed after the transcript of the record had been received.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Ejectment and for Damages.</p> <p>Motion to Strike the Statement of the Case and Bill of Exceptions from the Transcript of the Record.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Possessory Title Proceeding — Evidence—Registrar op Property — Review.— A registrar of property in Porto Rico has no authority to review the weighing of the evidence by a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of approving a possessory title proceeding.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Registrar of Property — Review.—The authority of the registrar to ascertain by examining a possessory title proceeding before recording it whether the formalities and other legal requisites essential to the validity of the proceeding have been complied with, according to the doctrine laid down in the case of Fernandes v. Registrar of Property, 17 P. R. R., 1021,'cannot serve as the basis for a refusal to record a possessory title proceeding on the ground that one of the witnesses testified' in such proceeding that he could not state positively that the petitioner was in possession of the property, for this would amount to a review of the weighing of the evidence by the judge who approved the possessory title proceeding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Jnan, Section 1, in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>Motion for Dismissal of Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the decision.</p>

<p>Appeal — Notice of Appeal — Service on Adverse Party. — As a general rule motions of this kind require a careful inquiry into the merits of the ease in order to determine whether the party who has not been served with the notice of appeal is really an adverse party whose rights would be affected by the ruling on the motion, and this inquiry can be made to better advantage after the transcript of the record has been filed and both parties have been heard at the hearing on the appeal on its merits, therefore the motion is overruled without prejudice to the consideration of this question at the hearing on the appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal oe Appeal. — Rule 59, which is relied on in this case as authority for the motion for dismissal of the appeal, contains three fundamental grounds for the dismissal of an appeal; namely, that it has not been prosecuted by the appellant with duo diligence, or in good faith, or that the appeal is frivolous. Held: That not one of these grounds has been shown clearly to exist in this case.</p> <p>Id. — Diligence—Extension oe Time — Statement oe Case. — Although the fact that the appellant did not ask for the stenographic notes until June 8, while the appeal was taken on May 24, 1914, and did not insist upon having them but waited until the month of September, when they were delivered, and did not file the statement of the caise within the ample time allowed, but applied for a new extension of time in which to do so, reveals very little or no activity on the part of the appellant in the preparation of the appeal, these facts do not of themselves constitute absolute proof of the want of diligence required by rule 59 of this court in order to warrant the dismissal of an appeal on that ground alone.</p> <p>Id.' — Indefinite Extension of Time. — ■When a motion for dismissal of an appeal is based on rule 59 of this court the question raised by the respondent that an extension of thirty days, counting from the delivery of the stenographic notes, is void because the time fixed is not specific, cannot be decided upon said motion.</p>

Motion of the Respondents for Dismissal of the Appeal for Failure tor Bring the Same Within the Time Fixed by Law. The facts are stated in the decision.

<p>Fees — Order oe District Court Granting Leave to Sue in Forma Pauperis— Eeeect on Secretary oe Supreme Court — Orders of district courts granting leave to sue in forma pauperis only relieve the party interested from the payment of fees accruing in. said courts, pursuant to the Act of March 10, 1904, but do not extend to obliging the secretary of this court to abstain from the collection of the fees prescribed by the Act of March 12, 1908.</p>

Motion of Respondent for Dismissal of the Appeal and Motion of the. Appellant for Leave to File the Transcript of the Record. The facts are stated in the decision.

<p>Appeal — Death op Accused. — A criminal action is extinguished by the death of the accused and, therefore, as no practical result could be attained by considering and deciding the appeal taken by him, it should be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in a Prosecution for Violation of the Internal Revenue Law.</p> <p>Motion by respondent to join'and dismiss two appeals, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Common Property — División op Property op Minors. — Section 229 of the Civil Code, as amended by Act No. 33 of March 9, 1911, does not apply to a division of common property in which minors are interested, such division being governed by section 413 in connection with section 1027 of the said code.</p> <p>Id. — Division of Pboperty of Minors Represented by Father or Mother— Judicial Authorization.- — According to section 1027 of the Civil Code, which is made applicable -to the division of common property by section 413 of the same code, judicial authorization is not necessary to effect a partition of property owned in common by minors when they are represented by their father or mother.</p> <p>•Repeat. — Section 1027 of the Civil Code was not repealed by section 3 of the Act of March 9, 1911.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Hu-maeao Denying Admission to Record of a Supplementary Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administrative Appeal — Brief of Registrar. — Tlie court insists that in appeals of this hind the registrars should brief in proper detail the reasons on which they base their decisions and cite authorities therefor so that the court may be in a position to decide the questions raised with confidence that it has heard the arguments for and against each contention and, consequently,, with greater certainty of accuracy.</p> <p>Partnership — Record of .Contract — Articles of Partnership. — When the documents presented for record in the registry set out in an authentic, accurate and unequivocal manner the necessary data relative to the organization of the partnership, the powers, of the partner or partners who executed the contract sought to be recorded, etc., it is. not necessary that the articles of partnership of the firm should accompany the same.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section 1, Denying Admission to Record of a Cancellation of Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Motion by the Respondent for Dismissal of Appeal for Failure to File the Transcript of the Record and because of Insufficiency of Bond. The facts are stated in the decision.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Censure op Documents — ’Powers op Registrars — Judicial Orders — Jurisdiction. — According to article 18 of the Mortgage Law, registrars of property are authorized to determine whether judicial decisions presented to them for record in the registry have been rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Lis Pendens. — Pursuant to section 4 of the Act reorganizing the judiciary, approved March 10, 1904, municipal courts only have jurisdiction in civil matters of cases where the subject-matter is capable of being assessed in money and the amount does not exceed $500, including interest; therefore a municipal court has no jurisdiction of an action whose object is not to recover money but to obtain a judgment directing the defendant to apply for a declaration of heirs and in a ease of this kind an order issued by a municipal court for recording a lis pendens in the registry of property is not recordable.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in Certiorari Proceedings begun in the said Court against the Judge of the Municipal Court of Guayama to set aside an Order Refusing a Change of Yenue.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Breach op Peace — Information—Quarreling.—An information charging the defendant with wilfully and maliciously disturbing the peace and quiet of the neighborhood by quarreling and causing a tumult is sufficient and need allege nothing more, as quarreling is one of the ways of disturbing the peace.</p> <p>Contradictory Evidence — Finding oe Trial Court. — When the evidence-is contradictory the finding of the trial court will not be disturbed by this court when it is not shown that it was influenced by passion, prejudice, or partiality, or that it committed manifest error.</p>

<p>Appeal — Administrative Appeal. — The period of twenty days fixed by section 3 of the Act to provide for appeals from the decisions of registrars of property of March 1, 1902 (section 801 of the Revised Statutes of Porto Rico), begins to run from the date of notice of the registrar’s decision, and the appeal is understood to be taken when the appellant files in this court the documents presented in the registry accompanied by a notice of appeal and not when he files his brief in support of the appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Acquiescence in Registrar’s -Decision — Curable Defects. — When, as in the case at bar, a document is presented in the registry of property for record and admission thereof is denied and the interested party fails to . appeal therefrom within the legal period, his acquiescence therein is taken for granted and if said party presents the deed anew accompanied by' other documents which, in his judgment, cure the defects assigned by the registrar, then, and in ease the registrar insists in his denial, the interested party may appeal to this court; but in such appeal the court can only determine whether the defects assigned in the first decision acquiesced in were or were not properly cured.</p> <p>Curable Defects. — After considering the additional documents presented in this case to the registrar, it was held that the curable defects assigned under letters A, B, C, D, and E of the decision of June 15, 1914, which was acquiesced in, were cured.</p>

<p>Statement op Case — Legal Period — Extension of Time. — Section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer powers upon a district court to admit and approve a statement of tire case filed within an extension of time granted after the expiration of the legal period.</p> <p>Extension op Teme — Legal Period. — An extension of time granted after the legal period has expired is void.</p> <p>Id. — Transcript op Record. — An extension of time granted after the expiration of 'the legal period fixed for filing d statement of the ease being void, the period of thirty days for filing a transcript - of the record begins to run from the date of the filing of notice of appeal, and if the said transcript of the record is not filed within said time, the appeal will be dismissed.</p>

Motion by Bespondent for Dismissal of the Appeal on the G-round that the Decision Appealed from is not Appeal-able. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Attorney — Withdrawal oe Attorney — Notice to Clients and Adverse Party. — The withdrawal of an attorney from a ease before this court without showing that he has served notice of such withdrawal on his’ clients and on the adverse party is irregular.</p> <p>Id.- — Dismissal oe Appeal — Notice oe Motion.' — When, as in the case at bar, the attorney for the appellant withdraws from the ease and there is nothing in the record to show that he has served notice of such withdrawal on his client or the respondent, the attorney for the latter is justified under such circumstances in serving the said attorney with a notice of motion for dismissal of the appeal.</p> <p>Notice oe Motion — Death oe One oe Appellants. — In moving for a dismissal of the appeal against all the appellants when one of them has died, it is necessary to ascertain who are the real heirs or successors of the deceased party and serve notice of said motion on them. To this end an affidavit presented by any person to the effect that he had served notice of the motion on two persons as successors of the deceased will not suffice.</p>

MotioN by Respondent for Dismissal of the Appeal for Failure to File a Transcript of the Record and Because the Appeal would Serve no Practical Purpose. Tlie facts are stated in the decision.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a Prosecution for a Violation of the Election Law.</p> <p>Motion by Appellant for an Order to the Secretary of the Lower Court to send up the Original Record Introduced In Evidence by the Appellant. .</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the decision.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, to Annul an Order Granting an Indefinite Extension of Time for the Filing of a Statement of the Case in a Mandamus Proceeding.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judicial Sale — Judicial Notice — Deputy Marshal — Curable Defect. — A registrar of property in Porto Rico cannot take judicial notice of deputy marshals, of district courts and failure to prove the official capacity of such, oficial in a judicial deed of sale executed by a deputy marshal is a curable defect, a certificate by a notary to the effect that the party appearing is discharging the duties of deputy marshal not being sufficient.</p> <p>Id. — Writ op Execution — Certificate' op Sale — Curable Defect.' — Failure to copy the writ of execution and the certificate of sale into a deed of judicial sale, or failure 'to present a certified copy of the said documents or their equivalent together with said dee'd.to the registrar, is a curable defect and the fact that the notary makes reference thereto' in the deed will not suffice.</p> <p>Id. — Power op Registrar. — Registrars have authority to determine when a deed of judicial sale in foreclosure proceedings is presented for record whether the law governing said proceedings has been complied with and whether demand for payment has been made upon the person specified by 'law.</p> <p>Id.- — Presumption.—In judicial sales there is no presumption that the marshal has performed everything in due form, but the purchaser must show to the registrar by authentic documents that the provisions of law have been complied with.</p> <p>Id. — Foreclosure Proceedings — Succession—Curable Defect. — In a deed of judicial sale in foreclosure proceedings failure to specify-the persons composing a succession is a curable defect.</p> <p>Title op Acquisition — Succession.—In accordance with the jurisprudence laid down in the cases of Pasalaequa Mérmanos 4' Co. v. The Registrar, 6 P. R. R., 41, and Zayas v. The Registrar, 14 P. R. R., 589, in order to record a deed of judicial sale in foreclosure proceedings brought against the succession of the debtor it is not necessary to state in the said deed the manner in which the said succession acquired the property foreclosed or to make a prior record of the said property in the registry in the name of the heirs composing said succession.</p>