Volume 202 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

Convicted of the crime of threatening in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant allegedly was involved in a domes- tic disturbance during which he stabbed his wife in the leg. Over the defendant's objection, the trial court admitted portions of his wife's hearsay statement to a police officer that the defendant ''was gonna continue to hurt her more.'' Neither the defendant nor his wife testified at trial. The defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he made a physical threat to his wife, a necessary element of threatening in the second degree in violation of statute (§ 53a- 62 (a) (1)). Held that the evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of threatening in the second degree in violation of § 53a-62 (a) (1), there having been insufficient evidence to support the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made a physical threat to his wife: the state presented no direct evidence to the jury that the defendant had threatened his wife, either through words or some nonverbal expression, with imminent future harm; moreover, the state's argument that the jury reasonably could have inferred a threat from other evidence was unavailing, as the fact that evidence existed from which the jury could have concluded that the defendant had recently assaulted his wife, without more, was insufficient to support an inference that he necessarily made a threat of future violence, his wife's statement that he ''was gonna continue to hurt her more'' did not connect her subjective fear of future harm to any particular act, expression or communication by the defendant, nor was there evidence that she complained of a threat, that other people heard threatening words or observed threatening behavior, or that the police inquired about a potential threat; furthermore, the jury was not permitted to speculate that a threat had been made solely on the basis of her assertion of fear, and, assuming the jury was permitted to consider the defendant's silence during his wife's statement as an evidentiary admission that he had stabbed her, this could not be viewed as an admission of a threat or have more effect than acknowledging her subjective fear. Argued September 16—officially released December 22, 2020

The defendant O appealed to this court, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to reargue and for reconsideration of the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale. The plaintiff, the town of Newtown, had sought to foreclose a mortgage and filed a motion for default as to O for his failure to plead pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 10-18). The court clerk thereafter granted the motion. O claimed that the foreclosure judgment should be opened and vacated because, inter alia, the default entered by the clerk was invalid and could not serve as the basis for the foreclosure judgment. Held that the trial court properly denied the motion to reargue and for reconsideration; because the claim raised by O in this court essentially reiterated the claim he raised in the trial court, which thoroughly addressed his arguments, this court adopted the trial court's well reasoned memorandum of decision as a statement of the facts and applicable law. Argued November 18—officially released December 22, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes, sought a second writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, ineffective assistance of criminal trial counsel and former habeas counsel. The habeas court, upon the request of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, issued an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed in light of the fact that the petitioner had filed it outside of the two year time limit for successive petitions set forth in the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (d) (1)). The court conducted an evidentiary hearing and, thereafter, dismissed the petition pursuant to § 52-470 for lack of good cause for the delay in filing the successive petition. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the habeas petition and properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay in filing his untimely habeas petition; the petitioner failed to rebut successfully the presumption of unreasonable delay set forth in § 52-470, as he failed to demonstrate that something outside of his control or the control of habeas counsel caused or contributed to the delay, as the only evidence having been presented was the petitioner's testimony that he was allegedly unaware of the statutory deadline imposed by § 52-470 and was never made aware of it by his former habeas counsel, and that he did not always have access to a law library or similar legal resource while he was incarcerated and was in lockdown, evidence that was insufficient to persuade the court that he had rebutted the presumption of unreasonable delay, and the court properly took into consideration the lengthy delay, indicating that the second petition was filed nearly three years beyond the filing deadline, and properly concluded that, even if it accepted the petitioner's proffered excuses at face value, a mere assertion of ignorance of the law, without more, was insufficient, the court having properly noted that ignorance of the law, in and of itself, was not a legally justified excuse, and the record sufficiently demonstrated that the court properly weighed relevant fac- tors in reaching its decision to dismiss the petition, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that, under the circumstances, the court's determi- nation was an abuse of discretion. Argued September 22—officially released December 22, 2020

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, D, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request an alibi instruction. He claimed that his appellate counsel, C, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim on direct appeal that his sixth amendment right to a trial by jury was violated by the trial court's handling of a jury note inquiring about the testimony of a witness, T, that invaded the fact-finding province of the jury. The habeas court rendered judgment denying in part and dismissing in part the habeas petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certifi- cation, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner was not preju- diced by any alleged ineffective assistance of D as the petitioner failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability that, but for D's failure to request an alibi instruction, the outcome of the petitioner's criminal trial would have been different; the petitioner's alibi defense was weak, as the petitioner testified vaguely that he believed he was in New York City on the day of the murder, his only alibi witness did not testify as to his whereabouts on the day of the murder but only testified that he had moved to New York City a couple of months prior to the murder, there was substantial evidence linking the petitioner to the murder of the victim, including the testimony of two eyewitnesses who observed the petitioner shoot the victim, testimony which the jury clearly credited over the testimony of the petitioner, and there was evidence that the victim and the petitioner had engaged in a previous altercation in which the petitioner shot at the victim two years earlier. 2. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner was not preju- diced by C's failure to raise a sixth amendment claim on direct appeal; the trial court did not impermissibly find facts in violation of the petition- er's sixth amendment right to a jury trial, as that court's reference to certain relevant pages of the transcript of T's tape-recorded statement to the police, in response to the jury's question during deliberations, was not improper marshaling of the evidence, as the statement was in evidence, the court did not specifically read portions of the statement to the jury but only highlighted pages it believed were material to the jury's request, it allowed the jury to review the statement itself and reminded the jurors that the weight accorded to the evidence was up to them. 3. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's freestanding claim that the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a jury trial on the ground of procedural default; on direct appeal, the petitioner failed to argue that the court, in its handling of the jury note, impermissibly found facts in violation of his right to a jury trial, and he failed to meet his burden of proving that his procedural default should be excused; the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the trial court's handling of the jury note, and, thus, the petitioner's constitutional right to a trial by jury was not violated. Argued September 16, 2020—officially released January 5, 2021

The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, to recover damages from the defendants, A and W, for their alleged mismanagement of the finances of a company, I Co., of which the parties together owned all of the shares. After the plaintiffs initiated the action, A filed with the trial court a notice of election to purchase the plaintiffs' shares of I Co. The parties then executed a memorandum of understanding resolving the primary issues of their dispute, which required that A make payments over time to the plaintiffs in exchange for receiving the plaintiffs' shares in I Co. The memorandum of understanding provided that the parties would enter into a more detailed settlement agreement that would provide the neces- sary terms to effectuate the plaintiffs' transfer of their shares to A. After the parties appeared to have reached a full settlement, the defendants did not sign a written settlement agreement and A did not make his first payment. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. In objection, A claimed that he never had the funds to buy out the plaintiffs, and W claimed that the settlement was always conditional upon A raising the necessary funds through a loan. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce, and rendered judg- ment in favor of the plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the defendants failed to establish that the trial court improperly enforced the settlement agreement, which consisted of the signed memorandum of understanding as supplemented by the unsigned settlement document with attachments: the defendants pro- vided neither law nor argument that the court was clearly erroneous in its factual findings or incorrect in its legal conclusions, as the court, in its memorandum of decision, discussed the communications submitted to it by both the plaintiffs and the defendants, found that A had filed a notice of election to purchase the plaintiffs' shares of I Co., to which no shareholder had an objection and which A never sought to withdraw, and it acknowledged that the defendants referenced A's pursuit of financ- ing in a number of the communications, but refused to infer an unex- pressed intent on the part of the defendants that obtaining financing was a contingency to any settlement; moreover, the defendants signed the memorandum of understanding, which provided that it contained the essential terms of a settlement agreement between the parties that would form the basis for a written agreement, but contained no contin- gency for financing, and during negotiations of the final settlement agreement, the defendants requested multiple changes, but none con- cerned inserting language regarding the ability of the defendants to obtain financing as a contingency of the settlement agreement. Argued October 15, 2020—officially released January 5, 2021

The self-represented, incarcerated plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages against the defendants, state correc- tional employees, claiming state tort claims and violations of his federal constitutional rights. Following the trial court's termination of a protec- tive order barring the plaintiff's contact with his mother, M, a victim of a crime he had committed, the plaintiff and M submitted various requests to the Department of Correction to approve contact visits between them while the plaintiff is incarcerated, which were denied. The plaintiff then submitted two inmate grievance forms, which were also denied. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff's claims against them in their individual capacities were barred by statutory (§ 4-165) immunity and the claims against them in their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court did not improperly conclude that it lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacities: a. The trial court did not improperly conclude that the defendants were entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a) to the extent that the plaintiff alleged state tort claims; in his complaint, the plaintiff merely alleged that the defendants had denied his requests for contact visitation with M during his incarceration in the discharge of their duties pursuant to a certain Department of Correction administrative directive, and did not allege that the defendants denied his requests in a wanton, reckless, or malicious manner; accordingly, the court lacked subject matter juris- diction. b. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's federal civil rights claims brought pursuant to the applicable federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against the defendants in their individual capacities on the alter- native basis of qualified immunity, as the plaintiff failed to plead facts showing that the defendants violated a statutory or constitutional right: the plaintiff failed to allege any incursion upon a constitutionally pro- tected liberty interest, as an inmate does not have a liberty interest in access to visitors, and, thus, the plaintiff failed to allege a violation of his due process rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; moreover, the plaintiff failed to allege a violation of his right to freedom of association as guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States constitution because preventing or limiting contact visits between inmates and the victims of their crimes, even when such victims are immediate family members, bears a rational relation to legitimate penological interests; accordingly, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. c. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacities on the alternative basis of lack of personal jurisdiction, as the plaintiff only effected service on the defendants in their official capacities; by serving each defendant at the Office of the Attorney General and not at their usual places of abode, as required by statute (§ 52-57 (a)), the defendants were not served properly in their individual capacities. 2. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims brought against the defendants in their official capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity: the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages were barred because the plaintiff failed to allege in his complaint that the state had waived sovereign immunity or that the claims commissioner had authorized the plaintiff's claims; moreover, the plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were barred because the plaintiff failed to plead facts showing that the defendants violated a statutory or constitutional right. Argued October 15, 2020—officially released January 12, 2021

The plaintiff auto repair shop sought to recover damages from the defendant insurance company for breach of a commercial automobile insurance policy in connection with the defendant's failure to pay the full cost of repairs that the plaintiff had made to a vehicle owned by the defendant's insured, which assigned its rights under the insurance policy to the plaintiff. The defendant asserted as a special defense that the plaintiff's claim was barred because the insured failed to comply with the voluntary payment provision of the policy, which required the insured to obtain the defendant's consent before incurring any expense, except at the insured's own cost. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in concluding that recovery of the full cost of the repairs was precluded by the insured's failure to comply with the voluntary payment provision of the policy, as none of the plaintiff's specific claims of error was distinctly raised before the trial court. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the defendant's reliance on the insured's alleged noncompliance with the voluntary payment provision of the policy did not constitute an improper attempt to steer the insured to the defendant's preferred auto repair shop in violation of the applicable statute (§ 38a- 354 (b)); although the defendant refused to pay the full cost of repairs charged by the plaintiff, there was no evidence presented at trial that the defendant required the insured to use a specific person, and, in the absence of such evidence, the court's determination that the plaintiff failed to prove a violation of § 38a-354 (b) was not clearly erroneous. Argued October 29, 2020—officially released January 12, 2021

The plaintiff, a building official for the defendant town of Middlefield, appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administra- tive appeal from the decision of the defendant's Board of Selectmen to terminate his employment. The plaintiff was responsible for processing applications for certificates of occupancy and administering and enforc- ing the state building code. The board alleged, inter alia, that during the plaintiff's employment as the town building official, his performance and conduct regarding several long-standing projects was unreasonable and that he failed to follow instructions and directives. The board alleged that the plaintiff obstructed the issuance of a certificate of occupancy to P Co., a company that owned a commercial ski property. Thereafter, the board unanimously voted to terminate the plaintiff's employment and the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court, pursuant to statute (§ 29-260 (c)), appealing his discharge, which the court dis- missed. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in determining that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the board's decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment as the town's building official: the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff sought to carry out his vow of never granting P Co. a certificate of occupancy by constantly interjecting new or resolved compliance issues whenever P. Co. was on the verge of being issued a certificate of occupancy; moreover, there was substantial evidence of the plaintiff's insubordination when he abandoned his duties by leaving an inspection against instruction, repeatedly acted outside the scope of his role by raising matters outside his jurisdiction to obstruct the issuance of the certificate of occupancy to P Co., and misplaced paperwork submitted to him by P Co. on more than one occasion. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly upheld the board's decision to terminate his employment because the decision violated public policy, constituting a wrongful discharge, this claim having failed for the lack of a factual finding by the board or the trial court that the termination of his employment was pretextual and/ or retaliatory; there was substantial evidence before the board to support the plaintiff's discharge on one or more of the grounds set forth in its notice of charges, as the facts presented to the board supported a conclusion that his dismissal was warranted for failing to perform the duties of his office, conduct which fell within the statutorily authorized basis in § 29-260 (b) to terminate his employment, as the record demon- strated that the plaintiff vowed that he would never issue a certificate of occupancy to P Co. regardless of P Co.'s compliance with the build- ing code. Argued September 15, 2020—officially released January 19, 2021

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review affirming the decision of an appeals referee of the Employment Security Appeals Division that the plaintiff was liable for certain unpaid unemployment compensation contributions under the Unemployment Compensation Act (§ 31-222 et seq.). The plaintiff sold jewelry and provided body piercing and tattoo services in its store at a shopping mall. The plaintiff and S, a tattoo artist, entered into an agreement under which the plaintiff would receive one half of S's fees for tattoo services that S would sell from a room in the plaintiff's store. An audit by the defendant Administrator of the Unemployment Compen- sation Act thereafter determined that S was an employee of the plaintiff, rather than an independent contractor, as the plaintiff had claimed. The appeals referee found, inter alia, that S did not pay rent to the plaintiff for the room, that S performed tattoo services only during store hours, and that the plaintiff advertised on its website and Facebook page that customers could have tattoos done at its store. The board determined that the plaintiff failed to satisfy any of the three requirements of the ABC test, as set forth in § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (I), (II) and (III), which governs the determination of whether services performed by an individual constitute employment under the act. On appeal from the appeals referee's decision that affirmed the defendant's determination, the board reasoned that, under part B of the ABC test in § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (II), S's tattoo services were not performed outside of the plaintiff's usual course of the business or outside of the place of its business, and that S's tattoo services were an integral part of the plain- tiff's business enterprise. After the plaintiff appealed to the trial court, the board denied in part a motion the plaintiff filed to correct certain of the appeals referee's findings of fact. The defendant then filed a motion for judgment in which it asserted that the plaintiff had failed to prove that S was not an employee pursuant to the act. The court agreed with the board that the plaintiff failed to satisfy part B of the ABC test, and granted the defendant's motion and rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the board's findings were improper and concluded that the board properly determined that the plaintiff failed to satisfy part B of the ABC test. Held that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, as the board and the court properly applied part B of the ABC test in § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (II) to the plaintiff's employment relationship with S: the record contained substantial evidence for the court and the board to have determined that S's provision of tattoo services was within the plaintiff's usual course of business and a regular part of its business enterprise, the board's conclusion that S's services were an integral part of the plaintiff's business and that tattoo customers were part of its customer base was strongly supported by the board's findings that the plaintiff, at no cost to S, provided S with a workspace and permitted him to use its credit card machine to collect payments, and the plaintiff's advertisements reflected that the plaintiff portrayed itself to the public as a seller of tattoo services that were offered during the hours in which the plaintiff's store was open for business; moreover, the only income S earned was derived from the tattoo services he provided in the plaintiff's store, the plaintiff required tattoo customers to sign a waiver of liability as to the plaintiff and S, and, contrary to the plaintiff's claim that the board and the court focused solely on the plaintiff's advertisements and not on other findings that did not support the board's determination, the board and the court indicated that their decisions were made after a review of the entire record. Argued September 16, 2020—officially released January 19, 2021

The plaintiff, a building supply company, sought to recover damages from the defendants for breach of contract after they failed to make payments owed for building materials sold to them pursuant to a credit agreement. The credit agreement was signed by the defendant M, who was the sole member of the defendants R Co. and T Co., and by the defendant J, M's husband and a building contractor, in their capacities as both buyers and personal guarantors. The defendants filed a five count counterclaim and the plaintiff moved to strike four of the counts on the ground that they did not arise out of the same transaction that formed the basis for the plaintiff's complaint. The trial court granted the motion to strike and later rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the four stricken counts. Following a trial to the court, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on its complaint and on the remaining count of the counterclaim alleging breach of contract, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion to strike four counts of the defendants' counterclaim because the counts did not arise out of the same transaction that formed the basis for the complaint: the stricken counts involved issues relating to the plaintiff's use of prejudgment remedies, the propriety of the prejudgment remedies, and their legal effect, and the plaintiff's motivation in utilizing such remedies presented factual and legal issues distinct from those necessary to adjudicate whether the defendants breached the credit agreement; accordingly, the court should have rendered judgment dismissing the counts on the ground of improper joinder, and the case was remanded with direction to render a judgment of dismissal with respect to the stricken counts of the counterclaim. 2. The trial court properly rendered judgment on the merits of the complaint and the counterclaim in favor of the plaintiff: a. The trial court's finding that the plaintiff was the seller of the building supplies at issue in the complaint was not clearly erroneous: the defen- dants failed to provide any basis for this court to conclude that the court erred in viewing an uncontested allegation in the defendants' surviving count of its counterclaim as a judicial admission that the plaintiff was the seller; moreover, even if the court should not have treated the defendants' pleadings as constituting a judicial admission, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court's finding that the plaintiff was the seller, including the fact that the credit applica- tion identified the plaintiff as the party extending the credit, invoices provided to the defendants had the plaintiff's name and logo printed on them and indicated that payment should be remitted to the plaintiff, all funds paid by the defendants were deposited into accounts owned by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was the actual owner of the materials provided to the defendants. b. The trial court's finding that J and M acted in dual capacities as buyers and guarantors was not clearly erroneous; the court was entitled to rely on the defendants' allegation in the surviving count of its counter- claim that the defendants collectively, including J and M, purchased goods and materials from the plaintiff as a judicial admission that J and M were buyers under the credit agreement. c. Contrary to the defendants' claim, the trial court applied the proper standard in considering the defendants' defense of revocation; the court found that the defendants had failed to present evidence that established to what extent any defects in the building materials had impaired the value of the goods delivered to the defendants, which was a necessary element to justify revocation of acceptance. d. The defendants' claim that the trial court misapplied a provision (§ 42a-2-714) of the Uniform Commercial Code in rendering judgment for the plaintiff on the breach of contract count of their counterclaim was unavailing; although the court found that the defendants had shown that some of the goods may have been nonconforming, the defendants failed to establish the value of the goods as accepted, which prevented the court from comparing the value of the goods as received to the value of the goods had they been received in proper condition. e. The trial court's award of damages to the plaintiff was not clearly erroneous; there was evidence before the court from which it could make a fair and reasonable calculation of the amount of damages, includ- ing copies of statements that accounted for all charges and payments from the time the defendants opened the credit account through the filing of the action and it was free not to credit the evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their challenges to the damages claimed by the plaintiff. Argued June 15, 2020—officially released January 26, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of the crime of larceny in the first degree, appealed to this court, challenging various evidentiary rulings by the trial court and its denial of her request to secure the attendance at trial of several out-of-state witnesses pursuant to statute (§ 54-82i). The defendant had been a finance director for the state chapter of the American Red Cross and was responsible for reporting payroll informa- tion to P Co., which produced payroll checks and made direct deposits into American Red Cross employees' bank accounts. The defendant was responsible for using SPIN, an online reporting system, to report employee salaries and benefits to the national chapter of the American Red Cross. After the defendant's employment was terminated following a merger of several American Red Cross chapters, her responsibilities were taken over by L, the chief financial officer for the Connecticut American Red Cross. L compared P Co.'s records to the SPIN reports that the defendant had submitted and discovered that the defendant had paid herself $409,647.47 more than she was entitled to while she was employed by the American Red Cross. Thereafter, the defendant gave state police detectives a written, six page statement in which she admitted that she had embezzled money from the American Red Cross. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the SPIN reports into evidence pursuant to the statutory (§ 52-180) business records exception to the rule against hearsay because nothing in L's testimony indicated that the American Red Cross prepared the SPIN reports in the regular course of business; the record plainly indicated that the three statutory requirements for the admissibility of the SPIN reports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule were satisfied, as L testified that the defendant was responsible for submitting individual payroll information to the national chapter of the American Red Cross, that the national chapter of the American Red Cross would create SPIN reports for pension and insur- ance purposes, and that the creation of SPIN reports was in the normal course of business for the national chapter of the American Red Cross. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining various evidentiary objections by the state to certain documents and testimony that the defendant proffered at trial, the defendant having failed to demonstrate that any of the court's rulings were harmful; the state presented over- whelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, most notably her confession, which she read, signed and corrected, and which was sufficiently corrob- orated by her intimate knowledge of the details of the crime and the testimony of one of the detectives that the defendant reviewed and understood the statement before swearing to its accuracy. 3. The defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for certificates to subpoena out-of-state witnesses pursuant to § 54-82i (c) and by considering the timeliness of her request was unavailing: a. The limited nature of the defendant's proffer at trial failed to demon- strate that the witnesses were material and necessary, as she provided generalized allegations in her written applications as to what they could testify to and what documents they could provide, her appellate coun- sel's more specific references to offers of proof at oral argument before this court pertained to collateral issues that were immaterial to whether she embezzled funds, and much of the proffered testimony would have been cumulative because similar issues had already been explored dur- ing cross-examination; moreover, the defendant made no offer of proof that the testimony of the proposed witness who was the source of the SPIN information would have challenged the reliability or authenticity of the SPIN reports. b. The trial court's consideration of timeliness and delay as a factor in determining whether to grant the defendant certificates was not an abuse of discretion: contrary to the defendant's claim that whether she would have had the time to secure the witnesses was not relevant, a delay of the trial for an indeterminate amount of time as a result of the issuance of the certificates was not inconsequential, as the court had confirmed the trial schedule with counsel so that it could advise venire- persons of the time commitment expected of them at trial, and consid- ered that the case had been pending for more than five and one-half years and that the defendant could have taken numerous steps to secure the testimony of the witnesses in the fifteen months since the mistrial in this case; moreover, nothing in § 54-82i (c) impaired the court's obliga- tion to oversee the management of the trial and the impact that delays could have on the availability of jurors, trial dates and the court's docket, and the complicated procedural and logistical consequences that arise from the issuance of certificates pursuant to § 54-82i (c) underscored the defendant's need to make timely and adequately supported applica- tions to the court. Argued September 10, 2020—officially released January 26, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of larceny in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from his alleged reception of stolen property in the form of one Rolex watch, taken from the victims, D and S, during a break-in of their home by the defendant's brother. During the break-in, three Rolex watches were stolen, valued by D at $11,000, $5000 and $16,000. Over the defendant's objection, the trial court admitted a portion of a police detective's testimony regarding a surveillance video that showed the defendant, in a business that provided jewelry appraisals, in possession of one of the Rolex watches. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the value of the watch in his possession was more than $10,000 or that he knew the watch was stolen as required by statute (§ 53a-123). Held: 1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of larceny in the second degree: a. There was sufficient evidence that the value of the property was more than $10,000 as required by § 53a-123 (a) (2): although D testified that one of the stolen watches had been worth only $5000, his description of that watch did not include diamonds, and D testified that the watch seen with the defendant in the surveillance video was his diamond Rolex, recognizable by its dial and condition, which he had valued at $16,000, a clerk on the surveillance video examined the watch and confirmed the authenticity of diamonds on it to be genuine, and the jury was entitled to weigh the credibility of conflicting evidence that S had valued all three watches below $10,000, and, thus, the jury could have found that the defendant possessed the $16,000 watch; moreover, the state established that D owned the watch and D's testimony as to the value of his watch was sufficient to put the question of value before the jury, which was entitled to weigh that evidence in finding the value of the property. b. Sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that the defendant knew the property was stolen; the jury's decision to find the defendant not guilty of various other crimes with which he had been charged by the state did not preclude the inference that the defendant likely knew the property was stolen, as there was testimony that the watch the defendant possessed days after the break-in was stolen, the defendant made inconsistent statements to the police as to how he had obtained the watch, there was evidence that the defendant's brother had been identified by the victims as a suspect in the break-in, had been connected to the stolen watches and had been found in possession of D's stolen documents, and the defendant made an unsolicited reference to the police regarding identifications of the suspects made through Facebook that suggested the defendant was aware of the circumstances of the break-in. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the police detective's testimony regarding the surveillance video over his objection, even if improper, as he failed to show that the admission caused him harm; the challenged testimony was cumulative of D's testimony in which he identified the Rolex as his from the surveillance video, which the defendant did not challenge. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain impeach- ment evidence by prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining S on the topic of her drug related arrest subsequent to the break-in: S testified that she had a criminal history and had sold drugs from her home but that she stopped selling pills after the break-in, and the court denied defense counsel's request to cross-examine S regarding the underlying facts of her arrest months after the break-in during which she had been found with a large quantity of cash and pills on her person, as she was ultimately convicted of illegal storage, not sale, of narcotics, that conviction did not tend to prove that she had lied about ceasing to sell controlled substances, and impeaching S on this issue would be an overly speculative collateral inquiry requiring impermissible extrinsic evidence; moreover, the court gave the defendant wide latitude to impeach S through other means. 4. The defendant's claim that the trial court committed structural error by using a certain phrase in its jury instruction concerning reasonable doubt was unavailing; our Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld the use of instructions employing the very language challenged by the defendant, and this court, as an intermediate appellate court, was bound by that controlling precedent. Argued September 21, 2020—officially released January 26, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs as a third time offender, and, after a court trial, of the infraction of operating a motor vehicle without a license, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly excluded evidence that she had offered to take a blood test in lieu of a Breathalyzer test and gave the jury a limiting instruction that it could not consider her offer to take a blood test as relevant to any issue in the case: a. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding her purported offer to take a blood test, as the state, during its direct examination of D, the state trooper who arrested and processed the defendant, elicited the very testimony that the defendant asserted was improperly excluded and the defendant, thereafter, did not attempt to question D about this or to offer any other evidence of her purported offer to take a blood test. b. Even if this court assumed that the trial court's limiting instruction concerning the relevancy of the defendant's purported offer to take a blood test was improper, there was no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled: although the defendant correctly argued that evidence of an offer to take a blood test instead of a Breathalyzer test may be relevant to rebut the inference of guilt permitted under the applicable statute (§ 14-227a (e)) when a defendant refuses to take the specific chemical test chosen by a police officer, in this case, there was no evidence that the defendant offered to take a blood test, and, therefore, an instruction that the jury could consider the defendant's consent to a blood test would have confused the jury; moreover, the state presented overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, independent of her refusal to take a Breathalyzer test. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied her request to charge the jury on field sobriety acts, which provided that the jurors should use their common experience to evaluate whether she had been impaired and that the words used by the state's witnesses to describe field sobriety tests do not indicate that such tests are scientific, was unavailing; there was no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled by that court's refusal to adopt the defendant's requested instruction, as the court's instruction to the jurors that they must consider all the evidence in light of reason, experience and common sense sufficiently conveyed the defendant's proposed instruction, and, in this context, the terms used by the state's witnesses were simply descriptive and did not automatically imply that the topic was scientific in nature. Argued October 19, 2020—officially released January 26, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court, which dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to statute (§ 52-470). The petitioner, who was represented by counsel, filed a habeas petition in 2012, but withdrew it on the date trial was to commence in December, 2016, so that he could obtain different counsel. The petitioner did not refile the petition until February, 2018. The habeas court, at the request of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, thereafter issued an order to the petitioner to show cause, pursuant to § 52-470, why the petition should be permitted to proceed in light of the fact that he refiled it beyond the presumptive deadlines for doing so set forth in § 52-470 (c). After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that the petitioner's counsel had advised the petitioner in 2016 that he could withdraw the 2012 habeas petition but that he should ''do it now'' and that he would be assigned different counsel. The court further determined that the petitioner's counsel had advised the petitioner in 2016 to refile the habeas petition and that, after the 2016 withdrawal, he could have done so within the time frame permitted by § 52-470 but that he waited more than one year after the withdrawal to do so. The court thus concluded that the petitioner failed to show good cause for the delay in refiling the petition and dismissed it pursuant to § 52-470 (e). On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court, claiming that he had established good cause for the untimely refiling of his habeas petition because his counsel's failure to inform him of the need to refile it following the 2016 withdrawal, coupled with the court's statements at the 2016 proceeding, resulted in his mistaken belief that the 2012 habeas action remained active. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the habeas petition as untimely pursuant to § 52-470 and properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay in refiling the petition; the court's findings were not clearly erroneous as to the advice the petitioner's counsel had provided about the need to refile the petition and the relevant time limits as it related to refiling, and the record fully supported the court's conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish good cause pursuant to § 52-470, as he offered no reason, impediment or excuse for the delay in refiling the petition. Argued November 9, 2020—officially released January 26, 2021

The plaintiff bank O Co. sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant. In its complaint, O Co. alleged, inter alia, that it was the holder of the mortgage by virtue of a series of assignments of mortgage recorded on the town land records, that it was the holder of the promissory note that secured the mortgage and that the defendant had defaulted on the note. The defendant raised as a special defense that O Co. was barred by laches from claiming a default on the note. Thereafter, O Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability. In support of its motion, O Co. submitted the note endorsed in blank and an affidavit from R, an assistant secretary for C Co. into which O Co. had merged, who averred concerning the accuracy of the mortgage assignments, copies of which were attached to his affidavit. The trial court granted O Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability, concluding that O Co. had established its prima facie case and that the defendant had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. The court further concluded that the defendant's special defense of laches was a mere conclusory statement that lacked specificity as to the facts giving rise to laches, and, therefore, the defense was legally insufficient. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that O Co. had initiated and later withdrew a prior foreclosure action against him, which the court denied. Subsequently, C Co. was substituted as the plaintiff, and the trial court granted its motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment. Held: 1. This court declined to reach the merits of the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in rejecting his special defense of laches; because the defendant did not challenge the trial court's legal conclusion that his special defense was not properly pleaded, his claim was irrelevant as to that court's determination that his special defense of laches was legally insufficient; moreover, this court did not address whether O Co.'s motion for summary judgment was properly used to challenge the legal sufficiency of the special defense of laches, as the defendant did not raise such a claim on appeal. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in denying his postappeal motion for judgment in which he asserted that C Co. lacked standing; that court properly determined that C Co. had standing to foreclose on the mortgage, as O Co. proffered evidence that it possessed the note endorsed in blank at the time it commenced the action and the defendant did not produce any evidence to rebut the presumption that O Co. was the owner of the debt. 3. The defendant's claim that the trial court erred in crediting obviously fraudulent and defective assignments of mortgage was unavailing; the defendant failed to proffer evidence that demonstrated fraud or defects in the assignments of mortgage and did not, in the proceedings before that court, proffer admissible evidence that called into question the validity of those documents. 4. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss the action on the ground that O Co. had initiated and later withdrew a prior foreclosure action against him; the defendant did not cite any authority to support his assertion that O Co. should have been prohibited from commencing the present action, and, in the absence of a showing that O Co. abused its right of withdrawal when it withdrew the prior action, O Co. was permitted to commence the present action. 5. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that he was denied due process in connection with his postappeal motion for judgment: that claim was not properly before this court, as the defendant failed to comply with the applicable rule of practice (§ 61-9) because he did not appeal from or amend his appeal to include the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment; moreover, even if the defendant's claim was properly before this court, it was not reviewable, as it was inade- quately briefed. Submitted on briefs September 22, 2020—officially released February 2, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 12-63c (a)), the owner of real property used primarily for the purpose of producing rental income may be required to ''annually submit to the assessor not later than the first day of June'' certain rental income and expense information. Pursuant further to statute (§ 12-63c (d)), an owner who fails to submit the information required by § 12-63c (a), shall be subject to a penalty ''equal to a ten per cent increase in the assessed value of such property for such assessment year.'' The plaintiff, an owner of several rental properties in the defendant town of Hamden, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which upheld the decision of the defendant's Board of Assessment Appeals affirming a 10 percent penalty imposed by the defendant's assessor on the tax assessments of the plaintiff's properties pursuant to § 12-63c (d), as a result of the plaintiff's submission of required tax forms after June 1. The plaintiff sent the tax forms by first class mail to the assessor on May 31. It was undisputed that the assessor failed to receive the required forms by the June 1 deadline set forth in § 12-63c (a). The plaintiff claimed that the word ''submit'' as used in § 12-63c (a) was ambiguous and that the trial court was required, as a matter of law, to rule in its favor on the basis of the statute's ambiguity and also claimed that the imposition of the assessor's penalty violated the excessive fines clauses of both the federal and state constitutions. Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the count of the complaint that alleged that the board improperly upheld the 10 percent penalty: the plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the word ''submit,'' as used in § 12-63c (a), essentially means ''to mail,'' as the word ''submit,'' when viewed in the context of other tax statutes, was unambiguous and meant that the assessor must receive the forms by June 1; the legislature's decision not to include the phrase ''or postmarked'' in § 12-63c (a) was dispositive, meaning that those forms must be delivered to the assessor's office by June 1 in order to comply with the statute.. 2. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's constitutional claims: the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution did not apply to the 10 percent penalty in § 12-63c (d), as that penalty was not punitive within the meaning of the eighth amendment, and, accordingly, the plaintiff's alleged violations of the eighth amendment necessarily failed; moreover, under the state constitution, the 10 percent penalty in § 12-63c (d) was not a fine that subjected it to the excessive fines clause and, even if this court assumed that the clause applied, the court was not persuaded that the 10 penalty was unconstitutionally excessive under the facts of the case and controlling Connecticut precedent. Argued October 15, 2020—officially released February 2, 2021

The plaintiff in error, who had been appointed the receiver of rents in certain foreclosure actions, filed a writ of error, claiming that the court improperly granted a motion for a protective order filed by the defendant in error, S Co., to preclude certain of his discovery requests and held him liable to pay a certain sum to S Co. The plaintiff in error filed the writ of error in the Supreme Court, which transferred it to this court. Held that because the plaintiff in error failed to brief his claims adequately and to comport his brief and appendix with the appellate rules of prac- tice, this court declined to review his claims and dismissed the writ of error; any meaningful comprehension or review of the plaintiff in error's claims was made virtually impossible because of the significant deficien- cies in his appellate brief and sprawling appendix, which was not appro- priately limited in accordance with the rules of practice and appeared to contain materials that were not part of the proceedings at issue. Argued January 7—officially released February 2, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and of tamper- ing with a witness, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to modify the terms and conditions of his probation because the conditions were overbroad and not reasonably related to his crimes, did not satisfy the purposes of probation and violated his free speech rights. Held: 1. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to modify the probationary condition that he not have an authoritative position over females or access to their personal information because no cognizable dispute existed; the court found that the defendant did not demonstrate the deprivation he alleged, and the defendant did not challenge those find- ings on appeal. 2. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to modify the probationary condition barring him from the use of social media of any kind because his objection to the condition was premature and speculative and it lacked a factual basis; the court found that the defendant had not submit- ted any specific requests to the Office of Adult Probation for an exception to use social media for business related purposes and that that office had expressed a willingness to consider exceptions to the condition if the defendant followed the procedures outlined in the conditions of his probation. Submitted on briefs October 6, 2020—officially released February 2, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of larceny in the first degree and larceny in the second degree, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At the request of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correc- tion, the habeas court issued an order, pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (e)), directing the petitioner to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed in light of the fact that he filed it outside of the two year limitation period set forth in § 52-470 (d) for the filing of a successive petition challenging the same conviction. The court con- ducted an evidentiary hearing, during which the petitioner argued that his petition was timely because he filed it within two years of the final judgment that was rendered by a federal District Court denying a habeas petition that he previously had filed in that court. The petitioner claimed that the term ''prior petition'' in § 52-470 (d) was not limited to habeas petitions filed in state court and that, even if his second petition was untimely, he established good cause for the delay in filing it because he was not aware of the limitation period in § 52-470 (d), as his counsel in his first state habeas action terminated representation of the petitioner before § 52-470 (d) took effect and, thus, could not have advised him of the limitation period. The habeas court dismissed the petition under § 52-470 (e), concluding that it was untimely filed and that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay. The court determined that the final judgment on the federal habeas petition did not reset the prescribed time limits in § 52-470 (d) to file a subsequent habeas petition, and that the petitioner failed overcome the presumption of unreasonable delay in § 52-470 (e) because everyone is presumed to know the law and ignorance of it excuses no one. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner's habeas petition was untimely, as the phrase ''prior peti- tion'' in § 52-470 (d) is limited to habeas petitions that are filed in state court, and, thus, contrary to the petitioner's claim, the final judgment on his federal habeas petition did not reset the time limits prescribed in § 52-470 (d) to file a subsequent habeas petition challenging the same conviction: because the phrase ''prior petition'' occurs within a statutory framework that concerns state procedures for state habeas petitions, it must be read in the context of a body of laws that are limited to state habeas proceedings, and the statute's silence as to whether ''prior petition'' includes a federal habeas petition indicates that it does not; moreover, the phrase ''prior petition'' is plain and unambiguous, and, although it is not defined in § 52-470 (d), the only reasonable interpreta- tion of it is that it is limited to a prior state petition, and that construction would not produce an absurd or unworkable result, as it is consistent with the purpose of the legislature's habeas reforms in 2012 to expedite the resolution of habeas cases. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay in filing his second habeas petition and properly dismissed it pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e): the only evidence the petitioner presented to support his contention that he was unaware of the filing deadline in § 52-470 was his testimony that he lacked personal knowledge of the deadline and had never been informed of it by his previous habeas counsel, and, although it was unclear whether the habeas court credited the petitioner's assertion, the court properly concluded that a mere assertion of ignorance of the law, without more, was insufficient to compel a conclusion that the petitioner met his burden to establish good cause. Argued October 20, 2020—officially released February 2, 2021

The plaintiff in error, C, challenged the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants in the underlying action. C is the daughter of R, the plaintiff in the underlying action who sought to quiet title to certain real property in East Haven. Following a trial in the underlying action, the court concluded that the defendants were the owners of the property. R appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and our Supreme Court denied R certification to appeal from that judgment. Subsequently, C, who was not a party to the underlying action, filed the present writ of error in our Supreme Court, which transferred the matter to this court. C challenged the trial court's factual findings underlying its determination that the defendants were the own- ers of the subject property. Held that C lacked standing to challenge the trial court's judgment and, accordingly, the writ of error was dismissed: C relied solely on her claimed status as a holder of a mortgage alleged to include the subject property to establish aggrievement, but C's reli- ance on the mortgage was not sufficient to establish aggrievement, as C offered no proof as to how, or to what extent, her claimed interest as a mortgage holder had been impaired by the trial court's judgment, and, accordingly, C did not establish aggrievement and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge the judgment. Argued November 18, 2020—officially released February 9, 2021

The plaintiff, an abutting property owner, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court sustaining in part its appeal from the decision of the defendant Town Plan and Zoning Commission of the Town of Fairfield granting extensions of the approvals of a special permit and coastal site plan review to the defendant F Co., until April, 2023. The commission had approved the special permit and coastal site plan review in April, 2006. A nonparty appealed the commission's decision to the Superior Court and an appeal from the Superior Court's judgment in that case to our Supreme Court was dismissed on April 8, 2009. In April, 2009, the Fairfield zoning regulations provided that a special permit was valid for two years, subject to any extensions, from the date of such approval and, in the case of an appeal, the two year period would commence from the date of the final judicial determination of such appeal. On February 8, 2011, the commission amended the Fairfield zoning regulations, which deleted the language providing for the two year limitation. On February 15, 2011, F Co. requested confirmation from the town that pursuant to the 2011 amendment to the Fairfield zoning regulations and a certain statute (§ 8-3 (i)), the special permit and coastal site plan review approvals granted in April, 2006, remained in effect until April 8, 2014. The town provided the requested confirma- tion in writing. A few years later, in March, 2018, F Co. submitted a letter to the commission requesting an extension of the special permit and coastal site plan review approvals, which the commission voted to extend until April, 2023. The plaintiff appealed from that decision to the trial court, which sustained the appeal in part, concluding that the commission's decision to extend the special permit approval was improper. The court further concluded, however, that its decision sus- taining the plaintiff's appeal as to the commission's decision to extend the special permit approval did not operate to invalidate the special permit, because special permits attach to the property and run with the land and, therefore, could not be limited as to time, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded that the special permit granted to F Co. could not be limited in duration because a zoning authority is empowered pursuant to statute (§ 8-2 (a)) to impose a temporal condition on a special permit and the court's reliance on the legal principle that special permits ''run with the land'' was misplaced. Held that the trial court incorrectly determined that the special permit granted to F Co. and recorded in the land records pursuant to statute (§ 8-3d) was valid indefinitely and could not be subject to a temporal condition: § 8-2 (a), which provides that special permits may be approved subject to ''conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values,'' authorizes a zoning authority to con- dition, by regulatory fiat, its approval of a special permit on the comple- tion of development related to the permitted use within a set time frame as it prevents the permit holder from unduly delaying the commencement of the permitted use to a time when the surrounding circumstances may no longer support it; moreover, the fact that the legislature has chosen to set forth express time limits in some land use statutes does not prevent the imposition of temporal limits on special permits, especially in light of the explicit language in § 8-2 (a) permitting a zoning authority to subject a special permit approval to certain conditions; furthermore, the trial court misapplied the legal principle that special permits ''run with the land'' in concluding that special permits cannot be temporally restricted, although permits are not personal to the applicant and remain valid notwithstanding a change in the ownership of the land, a zoning authority is not prohibited from placing a temporal condition on a special permit; accordingly, once the special permit became effective in April, 2009, F Co. had two years to complete development on the property in accordance with the Fairfield zoning regulations in effect at that time, and, because it failed to do so or request any extensions within that time frame, the special permit expired in April, 2011, and the case was remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining the plaintiff's appeal as to its claim that the special permit expired on April 8, 2011. Argued September 21, 2020—officially released February 16, 2021

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The ground for dismissal was the plaintiff's failure to file his administrative appeal in the Superior Court within forty-five days of the mailing of the defendant's final decision, as required by statute (§ 4-183 (c)). Held that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; although a court clerk improperly refused to file the plaintiff's appeal because he did not effect service through a marshal, contrary to the express statutory language of § 4-183, this rejection occurred after the time limitation for filing the appeal had already expired and, thus, even if the clerk had accepted and filed the plaintiff's appeal when the papers arrived, the plaintiff's appeal would have still been untimely. Submitted on briefs October 7, 2020—officially released February 16, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, S, and R. Co., an automobile dealership, for injuries he sustained when he was struck by a motor vehicle driven by S and owned by R Co., while he was riding his motorcycle. R Co. provided the vehicle to S to use while her own vehicle was being repaired at R Co. R Co. and S entered into an agreement regarding the vehicle, entitled ''Subaru Rental Agreement,'' that provided that the agreement was for a ''temporary substitute vehicle.'' The section of the agreement used for setting forth rental rates and charges was blank. S provided R Co. with proof of a valid automobile insurance policy at the time she signed the agreement. The plaintiff alleged that R Co. was vicariously liable for damages resulting from the accident pursuant to statute (§ 14-154a), because it had entered into a rental agreement with S. R Co. moved for summary judgment, asserting that the motor vehicle was loaned to S and that it was immune from liability pursuant to statute (§ 14-60), because § 14-60 grants immunity to motor vehicle dealers from liability caused by a loaned automobile, so long as the customer has furnished the dealer with proof of liability insurance. The trial court rendered summary judgment for R Co., concluding that R Co. had loaned the vehicle to S and that S had provided R Co. with proof of insurance. The plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that R Co. was not entitled to the immunity provided by § 14-60 because the motor vehicle did not have a dealer plate and there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the motor vehicle had been ''loaned'' to S. Held that the trial court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether R Co. was entitled to the immunity provided by § 14-60: the plaintiff's construction of § 14-60, that it applies only to the lending of motor vehicles that have dealer plates affixed, was untenable in light of the plain language of the statute encompassing situations in which a dealer lends either a dealer vehicle, a dealer plate, or a dealer vehicle containing a dealer plate and, thus, the fact that the motor vehicle operated by S had a vanity plate rather than a dealer plate did not operate to preclude the application of § 14-60; moreover, regardless of the label on the agreement between R Co. and S, the essence of the transaction was a loan, as the motor vehicle was given to S for temporary use and S was not charged a fee for the use of the motor vehicle. Argued November 30, 2020—officially released February 16, 2021

The petitioner, who had pleaded guilty to murder, appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court, which denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that his guilty plea should be vacated pursuant to the doctrine of frustration of purpose because the subsequent abolishment of the death penalty in Connecticut frustrated his principal purpose in accepting the plea agreement, namely, to avoid the death penalty. The relief he sought was a judgment vacating the original plea agreement and the remand of his case for resentencing in accordance with a plea that would have been negotiated had the death penalty been unavailable. The habeas court, after a trial at which both of the petitioner's trial counsel testified, concluded that the peti- tioner failed to prove that his principal purpose for agreeing to enter a guilty plea was substantially frustrated by the subsequent abolition of the death penalty and that he had assumed the risk that the death penalty subsequently might be abolished. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner cannot prevail on his claim that he was entitled to relief under the frustration of purpose doctrine because, even if this court assumed that the frustration of purpose doctrine applied to plea agreements, by accepting the plea agreement, contract principles dictate that the petitioner assumed the risk that at some point the death penalty could be abolished: the record demonstrated that the terms of the agreement were unambiguous, that the petitioner was fully aware of the consequences of his bargain, and the parties, having been made aware of the potential for future favorable changes to the law, intended for the plea agreement to remain enforce- able notwithstanding any future changes to the law, including the subse- quent abolition of the death penalty in Connecticut, which did not change the petitioner's expectations under the agreement, namely, that he serve a full sixty year sentence and not be permitted to appeal or withdraw his guilty plea after the court imposed the agreed upon sentence; moreover, although the petitioner may have miscalculated the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action, an individual cannot withdraw a guilty plea merely because a subsequent change in the law rendered the maximum penalty for the crime in question less than was reasonably assumed at the time the plea was entered, even when the maximum penalty at issue was death, and any such miscalculation did not provide a basis to grant habeas relief to the petitioner regarding his guilty plea; furthermore, as our Supreme Court unequivocally has rejected the ame- lioration doctrine, which provides that amendments to statutes that lessen their penalties are applied retroactively, it would be improper to vacate the petitioner's guilty plea pursuant to the frustration of purpose doctrine, which in this instance is the functional equivalent of applying the amelioration doctrine and which would work a substantial injustice on the state in new plea negotiations as the petitioner would enjoy a much greater degree of leverage than in the first negotiation because of the numerous difficulties attendant to securing a conviction at trial nearly twenty years after the crime was committed, including evidence that has become stale, memories that have faded, and witnesses that may no longer be available. Argued October 8, 2020—officially released February 23, 2021

The defendant Planning and Zoning Department of the City of Danbury appealed from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal filed by the plaintiff property owner. The plaintiff, which had been issued a permit to construct and operate a solid waste transfer station and volume reduction plant on its property by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, filed a site plan with the defendant, which the defendant denied. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court alleging that the defendant acted arbitrarily, capriciously, unlawfully, and in abuse of its discretion when it determined the site plan was not a use permitted by the city's zoning regulations, and that its site plan denial was in violation of the statute (§ 22-208b (b)) providing that no zoning regulation shall have the effect of prohibiting the construction and opera- tion of a volume reduction plant and transfer station. The court sustained the plaintiff's appeal and remanded the case with direction to grant the site plan, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err by holding that the regulations' limitation of solid waste facilities only to those in a certain zone and in existence as of a certain date violated § 22a-208b (b); this court's examination of the regulations persuaded it that the regulations do not permit a new transfer station or other type of solid waste facility anywhere in the city, in effect, prohibiting the construction, alteration, or operation of solid waste facilities and, as such, they did not conform to the strictures of § 22a-208b (b). 2. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the plaintiff lacked standing to claim a violation of § 22a-208b (b) on the basis of allegations that the regulations failed to allow solid waste facilities other than the specific subtype of facility it sought to construct on its property: the plaintiff did not seek to have the regulations invalidated, it merely sought to have the court order the defendant to approve the site plan that complied with regulations related to industrial uses in the zone as required by § 22a-208b (b); moreover, the plaintiff was aggrieved by the defendant's denial of the site plan and there was an actual controversy at issue; furthermore, the court did not invalidate the regulations, rather, it held that the ground on which the defendant denied the site plan, that a volume reduction plant and transfer station was not a permitted use in the zone, did not withstand judicial scrutiny pursuant to § 22a- 208b (b). Argued October 13, 2020—officially released February 23, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder and robbery in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his right to conflict free counsel was violated and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, the petitioner claimed that his trial counsel had a financial incentive not to retain three expert witnesses and that he failed to investigate a potential eyewitness and present her testimony. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in concluding that his trial counsel did not have a conflict of interest: a. This court concluded, contrary to the determination of the habeas court, that the petitioner's conflict of interest claim was not procedurally defaulted, as it was a type of ineffective assistance of counsel claim that typically must be raised by way of habeas corpus, rather than by direct appeal, due to the need for a full evidentiary record of the claim; neither trial counsel nor the court raised the potential for a conflict of interest at trial and, consequently, the record on direct appeal was not adequate to review the claim; accordingly, the claim was not subject to the procedural default doctrine. b. The habeas court properly determined that no actual conflict of interest existed because trial counsel did not have an obligation to finance the petitioner's litigation costs or to make his private resources available to the petitioner: the fee agreement clearly placed responsibil- ity for the payment of experts on the petitioner and his family, and counsel's decision not to advance funds to engage experts after the family failed to do so did not violate his duty of loyalty or otherwise create a conflict of interest. 2. The habeas court did not err in determining that the petitioner was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial counsel, reasoning that trial counsel's failure to investigate the potential eyewit- ness did not result in any prejudice to the petitioner's defense: the habeas court's conclusion that the witness would not have been willing to assist the defense at trial, even if she had been contacted by counsel, was based on a credibility determination that was not clearly erroneous even though the witness stated at the habeas trial that she would have testified at the trial if she had been approached by counsel because she also testified that she witnessed the shooting, knew that the petitioner had been arrested, and yet made no efforts to contact the police; accord- ingly, the petitioner did not establish that there was a reasonable proba- bility that the trial outcome would have been different if trial counsel had investigated the eyewitness. Argued October 13, 2020—officially released February 23, 2021

The defendant, a dentist licensed by the Department of Public Health, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying in part his motion to vacate a prior contempt judgment stemming from his noncompliance with a subpoena duces tecum seeking the production of certain patient records, issued by the plaintiff, the Commissioner of Public Health, pursuant to statute (§ 19a-14 (a) (10)). The court pre- viously had granted a petition for the enforcement of the subpoena and ordered the defendant to release the records to the department, and this court affirmed that order. The trial court subsequently granted the plaintiff's motion to find the defendant in contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena and ordered the defendant to pay a coercive fine each day until he produced the records to the department. Thereafter, the court affirmed its finding of contempt but vacated the fine, and it issued supplemental orders that the defendant permit the department to search his dental office for the patient records and awarded attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiff pursuant to the statute (§ 52-256b (a)) that permits the award of attorney's fees in contempt proceedings in the discretion of the court. Held: 1. The defendant's claim that the trial court erred in finding that his noncom- pliance with the subpoena was wilful was unavailing; the court found the defendant's testimony as to how the subpoenaed records came to be discarded or destroyed was not credible and concluded that the defendant had failed to prove that he was unable to comply with the subpoena's request for all applicable records, and, as the defendant bore the burden of proving that his noncompliance was not wilful, the plaintiff was not required to present evidence in opposition to the defendant's claim. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to § 52-256b (a), as the court found the defen- dant's noncompliance was wilful and this court affirmed that finding. 3. This court declined to review the defendant's challenge to the constitution- ality of the trial court's order permitting the plaintiff to search his office; the defendant claimed the search violated his fourth amendment rights pursuant to our rules of practice (§ 13-9), however, the plaintiff com- menced the action seeking enforcement of the subpoena pursuant to § 19a-14 (a) (10), and the defendant did not challenge the constitutional- ity of that statute or the court's ability to issue the order under that statute. Argued October 19, 2020—officially released February 23, 2021