MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision:
2017 ME 88
Docket: Pen-16-563
Submitted
On Briefs: April 27, 2017
Decided: May 9, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE MARIAH Y. et al.
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] The mother of Mariah Y. and Jebediah Y. appeals from a judgment
of the District Court (Bangor, Jordan, J.) terminating her parental rights to the
children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (1)(B)(2) (2016).1
Counsel for the mother filed a brief indicating that there were no arguable
issues of merit in this appeal and, in an order dated February 14, 2017, we
afforded the mother the opportunity to file a supplemental brief.
[¶2] Pursuant to that order, the mother filed a supplemental brief
purporting to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the
termination of her parental rights. The mother’s brief recounts how her
history as a victim of abuse has affected her and her capacity to care for her
1 The father of the children is deceased. The mother has an older daughter who is the subject of
a separate child protection matter and who was the victim of a sexual assault that led to the
mother’s felony conviction.
2
children. However, the mother’s brief does not demonstrate any error in the
trial court’s findings regarding her incapacity to care for Mariah and Jebediah
as a result of her past conduct and her present incarceration. That
incarceration will end, at the earliest, in October 2017, a year after the
termination hearing in the trial court.
[¶3] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the mother was unable to protect the
children from jeopardy and that these circumstances were unlikely to change
within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, see id.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i); was unable to take responsibility for the children
within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs, see id.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii); failed to engage in a good faith rehabilitation and
reunification effort, see id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(iv); and that termination of her
parental rights is in the children’s best interests, see 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). See In re Robert S., 2009 ME 18, ¶ 15,
966 A.2d 894. The
court based this decision on the following specific findings of fact.
[¶4] The mother was convicted of one count of gross sexual assault,
17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(B) (2016), and three counts of endangering the welfare
of a child, 17-A M.R.S. § 554(1)(C) (2016). The mother initially admitted to
3
the behaviors that constituted the sexual abuse. The victim of the gross sexual
assault was the mother’s oldest daughter, who was the subject of a separate
child protection proceeding. As a result of the mother’s actions, a jeopardy
order in this proceeding was entered based on the court’s finding that the
children were in jeopardy to their health and welfare in the care and custody
of their mother due to a threat of sexual abuse. The Department was relieved
of its obligation to pursue reunification efforts with the mother because the
court found the existence of a statutory aggravating factor. See 22 M.R.S.
§§ 4002(1-B)(A)(1), 4041(2)(A-2)(1) (2016).
[¶5] On May 1, 2015, the mother was sentenced to fifteen years’
incarceration with all but three years suspended on the conviction for gross
sexual assault. She is currently serving that sentence but has filed a petition
for post-conviction review based on alleged defects in the trial and in trial
counsel’s representation.
[¶6] While incarcerated, the mother has engaged in the educational and
psychological services available to her. She has taken parenting classes and
domestic violence classes, and has attended counseling. She also enrolled in a
sex offenders counseling group, but admitted she did so only to avoid
returning to prison from the re-entry center where she is currently housed.
4
Despite having admitted to the abuse in her criminal trial, the mother now
denies having committed the sexual assault at all and is adamant that she does
not need sex offender counseling.
[¶7] The children have been placed with a foster family and have done
well over the last two years in that placement. The current foster parents may
be willing to be permanent guardians, but they have not yet committed to that
course.
[¶8] The trial court acknowledged that, pursuant to 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1-A)(A) (2016), it could presume that the mother is unwilling or
unable to protect the children from jeopardy upon finding that she “has acted
toward a child in a manner that is heinous or abhorrent to society.” The trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence that the gross sexual assault
committed by the mother against her oldest daughter occurred and that it was
heinous or abhorrent to society.
[¶9] Given these findings, the court adequately explained how the
mother has failed to alleviate jeopardy, failed to engage in rehabilitative
services, and failed to protect the children or be available to take
responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet
their needs. See In re Cameron Z., 2016 ME 162, ¶¶ 17-18,
150 A.3d 805;
5
In re Brandi C., 1999 ME 68, ¶¶ 6-7,
728 A.2d 679. The court did not err or
abuse its discretion in determining that termination of the mother’s parental
rights is in the children’s best interest. See In re M.B.,
2013 ME 46, ¶¶ 40, 43,
65 A.3d 1260. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Wendy D. Hatch, Esq., Waterville, and the Mother, pro se, for appellant Mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2014-102
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
