Volume 203 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the postjudgment orders of the trial court denying his motion to transfer this matter to the Regional Family Trial Docket and appointing a guardian ad litem for the parties' minor children. Held that the challenged postjudgment orders did not consti- tute a final judgment and, therefore, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: despite the plaintiff's claim that, pursuant to the parties' divorce degree, he may immediately appeal from the trial court's order denying his motion to transfer the case to the Regional Family Trial Docket, the court's order was entered in the course of continuing post- judgment proceedings on motions that remain pending before the trial court, thus, the order did not terminate any proceeding and did not satisfy the first prong of State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27), and, because the right that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate in this appeal is neither statutory nor constitutional, the second prong of Curcio also was not satisfied; moreover, insofar as the plaintiff challenged the court's ruling that the plaintiff had agreed on the appointment of a guardian ad litem, this order also was interlocutory and did not constitute an immediately appealable judgment, as the court appointed a guardian ad litem to investigate facts in order to make recommendations concerning the children's best interests, which was a step toward a final judgment resolving the issues concerning education, visitation, and custody that had arisen postjudgment. Considered December 16, 2020—officially released March 2, 2021

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property in Woodbridge owned by the defendants R and M. Following several antecedent assignments, the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff on the Woodbridge land records, and, subsequently, R defaulted on the note which was secured by the mortgage. The plaintiff provided R and M with written notice of the default, which was not cured, and thereafter commenced this action. The plaintiff appended to its original complaint a copy of the schedule affixed to the mortgage containing a description of the property. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended two count complaint, alleging, in count one, a claim for foreclosure and appending an amended schedule that described an additional parcel of land that abutted the previously identified parcel. The plaintiff asserted in count two a claim for reformation of the mortgage, which alleged that the property description in the schedule appended to the plaintiff's original complaint was inaccurate, and that the amended schedule set forth the correct description of the property. The court thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability on its foreclosure claim. Following a hearing, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and, immediately thereafter, the plaintiff's counsel orally moved for judgment on the reformation claim. The court reserved decision on the plaintiff's oral motion for judgment at the hearing, but subsequently granted the motion. From the judgment ren- dered thereon, R and M appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's oral motion for judgment on its reformation claim: the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence in support of its reformation claim, R and M were not defaulted as to the plaintiff's amended complaint, and the plaintiff never moved for summary judgment on its reformation claim; accordingly, there was no basis on which the court could have properly rendered judgment in the plaintiff's favor; moreover, this court concluded that, as a result of its reversal of the judgment with respect to the reformation of the mortgage, the judgment of strict foreclosure must also be reversed, because a trial court must adjudicate a reformation claim before or in conjunction with the attendant foreclosure claim. 2. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judg- ment as to liability on its foreclosure claim: contrary to R and M's claim that the plaintiff failed to establish that the default notice that it had mailed to R and M complied with the notice requirements of the mort- gage, this court concluded that the notice substantially complied with those requirements, insofar as that notice was required to specify a date, not less than thirty days from the date the notice is given to the borrower, by which the default must be cured, as the language of the notice was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to alert R and M that the plaintiff was demanding that they cure the default within thirty days of February 22, 2016, the notice in the present case was dated February 22, 2016, included several references to that date, and, read as a whole, sufficiently notified R and M that they had to cure their default within thirty days of February 22, 2016. Argued October 21, 2020—officially released March 2, 2021

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants following their default on a promissory note secured by the mortgage. The defendants filed an answer with five special defenses and a counterclaim. After trial, the defendants filed a posttrial brief claiming for the first time that the court was required to deem all of their special defenses as admitted due to the plaintiff's failure to file a reply. In its reply brief, the plaintiff argued that the defendants were not entitled to implied admissions. The plaintiff then filed its reply to the defendants' special defenses, denying each one in turn. The trial court rejected all of the defendants' special defenses and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in determining that the defendants were not entitled to implied admissions on their special defenses because the provisions of Practice Book § 10-19 are not always mandatory: the trial court is not bound by an implied admission pursuant to § 10-19 if the implied admission is not brought to its attention at any stage of the trial proceedings; moreover, the plaintiff's failure to reply did not result in any surprise or prejudice to the defendants, as they were placed on notice of the plaintiff's intent to deny the special defenses by the plain- tiff's pretrial brief, which addressed each defense and the grounds on which they were to be challenged, and the special defenses were litigated during trial; furthermore, once made aware of its nonpleading, the plain- tiff filed a timely reply. 2. The trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff had standing in the action or in rejecting the defendants' special defense that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course because a note holder is pre- sumed to be the rightful owner of a debt, which satisfies the holder's initial burden with respect to standing: the plaintiff was in physical possession of the original note at the time of the commencement of the action and presented credible evidence that an allonge, endorsing the note in blank, was affixed to the note, establishing the presumption that the plaintiff was the rightful owner of the debt; moreover, the defendants' introduction of various other allonges into evidence, without any evi- dence demonstrating that they were ever affixed to the note, was insuffi- cient to rebut this presumption. 3. The trial court did not err in rejecting the defendants' four remaining special defenses: a. The trial court did not err in rejecting the defendants' special defense alleging that any attempt by the plaintiff to seek a deficiency judgment was barred by the statute of limitations, as a court cannot resolve a claimed controversy unless it is justiciable: the plaintiff has not yet filed a motion for a deficiency judgement, so the defendants' statute of limitations defense was premature and not ripe for adjudication. b. The trial court did not err in rejecting the defendants' special defense alleging that the plaintiff lacked standing due to its noncompliance with the securitization requirements of a certain securitization document necessary for the note to be part of a certain trust of which the plaintiff was the trustee because the defendants failed to meet their evidentiary burden of proof: the defendants did not present any evidence with respect to the requirements of securitization or the plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the same; moreover, noncompliance with securiti- zation requirements does not implicate standing. c. The trial court did not err in concluding that the defendants received proper notice of default and acceleration, the delivery of which was controlled by the mortgage documents: pursuant to the mortgage docu- ments, the defendants received notice of default and intent to accelerate the loan if the default was not cured within the relevant time period from the loan servicer, which, contrary to the defendants' claim, was not a stranger to the loan; moreover, the fact that the notice came from the loan servicer instead of the plaintiff did not cause any prejudice to the defendants. d. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the defendants' special defense of unclean hands because the defendants failed to meet their evidentiary burden of proving the facts alleged: the mere presence of additional allonges and assignments of mortgage did not give rise to behavior on behalf of the plaintiff that could be classified as unfair, inequitable, or dishonest. 4. The trial court did not err in admitting the payment history on the note into evidence, as the business records exception to the hearsay rule applies to loan records made by third parties in connection with purchase and sale of debt if it is shown that the records became a part of the business record of the proponent pursuant to a transaction in which the third party had a business duty to transmit accurate information: a witness from the loan servicing company testified that the prior owner of the loan had a duty to provide the servicer with accurate records during the loan transfer process, that the loan servicer reviewed and analyzed the information upon receipt, and that the information provided was used by the loan servicer to create the payment history that was introduced into evidence. Argued October 8, 2020—officially released March 2, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, and three counts of risk of injury to a child, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that counsel failed to present testimony from four witnesses, his mother, his stepfather and two family friends, about his alleged presence or absence from a December, 2007 holiday party at which certain of his alleged criminal conduct occurred. Those same four witnesses testified at his criminal trial that they had not seen him at a 2008 holiday party, and the petitioner was acquitted of sexual assault charges stemming from allegations regarding that date. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish his claim that trial counsel's decision to refrain from questioning wit- nesses regarding his attendance at an event on a certain date in 2007 constituted deficient performance; the petitioner presented no evidence at the habeas trial that anyone except his parents would have attested to his absence from the 2007 party, and trial counsel's strategic decision not to question the petitioner's parents about his whereabouts at the December, 2007 holiday party was not objectively unreasonable, as the jury could have deemed them to be biased witnesses seeking to protect their son, especially in light of contradictory evidence at the criminal trial that the petitioner had told a police officer that he had been present at the December, 2007 holiday party. 2. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to demon- strate that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance of his trial counsel in referring to the complaining witness as the ''victim'' or by failing to object or to request a curative instruction regarding the prose- cutor's use of the same; although both the state and trial counsel inappro- priately referred to the complainant as the victim, neither did so consis- tently, and there was no support for the petitioner's assertion that, but for the use of the word victim, there was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner was acquitted of one of the charges. 3. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to investigate a claim of uncharged misconduct between the petitioner and the victim; trial coun- sel testified that the petitioner admitted to having attended a ski trip where the uncharged misconduct was alleged to have occurred and, thus, trial counsel's decision not to pursue a witness who purportedly would have testified that she did not see the petitioner on the ski trip could not be deemed unreasonable or tactically unsound. Argued October 13, 2020—officially released March 2, 2021

The plaintiffs, the town of South Windsor and its zoning enforcement officer, sought injunctive relief and fines against the defendant, who operated a salvage business out of her residential property in the town. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated the town's blight ordinance and zoning regulations in storing materials on her property that created a junkyard. Prior to the commencement of the action, the enforcement officer had issued several notices to the defendant, beginning in 2014, which alleged that the defendant that was in violation of the town's regulations. In December, 2016, a fire occurred at the property and, thereafter, an arson investigation commenced, which ultimately dis- proved a claim of arson. On February 24, 2017, the defendant was notified again that she was in violation of the blight ordinance, was directed to remove the debris, and was informed that she had the right to appeal. The defendant also received, concurrently, a cease and desist order identifying a zoning violation and she was directed to cease the deposi- tion of discarded material on the property. The notice further stated that she had the right to appeal and that should she fail to address the issues, the defendant would be subject to further statutory (§ 8-12) proceedings and penalties. The defendant did not appeal from either notice. The plaintiffs commenced an action in effort to compel the defendant to comply with the notices. The trial court determined that the defendant was operating a salvage business on her property in violation of the town's zoning regulations and the blight ordinance. The court also found that the defendant had wilfully violated the town's zoning regulations since at least February 24, 2017, the date of the cease and desist order, and imposed a fine pursuant to § 8-12 of $175 per day, running from February 24, 2017, to the date of the court's decision, for a total sum of $125,000, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant's unpreserved claim that the February 24, 2017 cease and desist order premised on her alleged zoning violation was unconstitution- ally vague could not be reviewed pursuant to the bypass doctrine because, even if the defendant had presented her claim to the trial court, that court would have lacked jurisdiction over it on the basis that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; the defendant did not appeal the February 24, 2017 cease and desist order to the zoning board of appeals, she did not argue that she was prevented from doing so, and she did not raise before the trial court any constitutional defect in the regulations whose enforcement was at issue; rather, the defendant's challenge was to the actions of the enforcement officer in issuing the cease and desist order, which challenge would be beyond the narrow purview of the constitutional exception to the exhaustion requirement. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in imposing fines beginning on Febru- ary 24, 2017, the date of the cease and desist order for a zoning violation, for the time period during which the defendant was under orders not to disturb the property: the record contains undisputed evidence, and the plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged, that the defendant was prohibited for some time following February 24, 2017, by her insurer and the police from removing items from the property, as the property was under an arson investigation at the time the February 24, 2017 order was issued; furthermore, the daily fine of $175, imposed on the basis of the trial court's determination that the defendant wilfully had violated the town's zoning regulations, was improper, as the record was devoid of any suggestion, and the plaintiffs did not contend, that the defendant had been convicted of any offense in a criminal proceeding, as a criminal prosecution was a predicate for the imposition of fines for a wilful violation pursuant to § 8-12, and the court was not authorized under § 8-12 to impose the same penalties in a civil proceeding that it could impose in a criminal proceeding. Argued November 10, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis- solved, appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to modify alimony and child support and from the granting of the plaintiff's motion for contempt relating to the defendant's failure to make alimony and child support payments. The trial court ordered the defendant to make payments of the alimony and child support arrearages in granting the motion for contempt. The defendant claimed that his obligation to make the payments was stayed by filing an appeal. Thereafter, the trial court ordered an appellate stay on the defendant's obligation to make the payments, and the plaintiff filed a motion for review to this court, claiming that the court's imposition of a stay was improper. Held that the trial court's orders to the defendant to make payments of periodic alimony and child support arrearages were not subject to an automatic appellate stay both by virtue of the relevant rule of practice (§ 61-11 (c)) and because the orders were issued in connection with a judgment finding the defendant in contempt. Considered December 16, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of manslaughter in the second degree and evading responsibility in connection with an incident in which he struck two pedestrians while operating a stolen vehicle and then fleeing the scene, the defendant appealed to this court. One of the pedestrians died as a result of her injuries. The day after the incident, the police brought the defendant to the Hartford Police Department, placed him in an interview room, and advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). The defendant signed a form waiving these rights. The police then questioned the defendant about an unrelated shooting until he requested a lawyer. The police ceased their questioning and processed the defendant, informing him that he was being booked for murder. After hearing this, the defendant told the police that he was willing to continue speaking to them without the presence of an attorney. The police again advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and he signed another form waiving the same. The police then resumed questioning the defendant regarding the shooting, before switching topics to discuss the motor vehicle incident. The police did not readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights prior to discussing the motor vehicle incident. During the interrogation, the defendant admitted that he was the opera- tor of the vehicle that struck the two pedestrians and he signed a written statement to that effect. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements made during the interrogation, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because his statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his statements: a. The defendant's claim that the police were required to administer a new set of Miranda warnings prior to questioning him about the motor vehicle incident was unavailing because the entirety of the questioning comprised one continuous interview and Miranda rights are not offense specific: the defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights twice, prior to any questioning relating to the motor vehicle incident and prior to making any inculpatory statements; moreover, the questioning regarding the shooting and the questioning regarding the motor vehicle incident were separated by a period of only approximately fifteen minutes and the police told the defendant at the outset of the interview that they wanted to discuss multiple matters with him; furthermore, Miranda warnings are broad and explicit and, as such, the police were not required to readminister the warnings prior to asking the defendant questions about a new incident during the same interview. b. The defendant's claim that the waiver of his Miranda rights was involuntary is unavailing: the defendant was advised of his rights two separate times during the interview and his waivers of those rights were not the result of any pressure applied by the police, as they were made prior to the making of any inculpatory statements; moreover, the defen- dant was aware that the motor vehicle incident was a possible subject of the interrogation and he expressed a willingness to speak with the police regarding the matter. 2. Even if the trial court had erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress and in admitting his statements into evidence, the defendant could not have prevailed on his claim because the error would have been harmless: the state produced ample evidence, independent of his statements, from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, including a video of the incident and the testimony of a coparticipant. Argued November 10, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder, burglary in the first degree and criminal mischief in the first degree, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his prior habeas counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court, upon the request of the respondent Commissioner of Correction, issued an order to show cause why the petition, which was filed in August, 2015, should be permitted to proceed in light of the fact that the petitioner had filed it beyond the October 1, 2014 deadline for successive petitions set forth in the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (d) (2)). The court conducted an evidentiary hearing, during which the petitioner presented a 2005 report of a neuropsychological evaluation of the petitioner, which described in depth his mental deficiencies. The petitioner asserted that those deficiencies established good cause for his delay in filing the second habeas petition because they prevented him from obtaining the legal assistance while he was incarcerated to file it in a timely manner. The habeas court dismissed the petition pursuant to § 52-470 (e) for lack of good cause for the delay in filing the successive petition, conclud- ing that, although the petitioner's mental deficiencies were significant, he failed to prove that they contributed to his delay in filing the petition. Thereafter, the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the second habeas petition and properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay in filing the successive petition; contrary to the petitioner's claim, that court properly determined that the petitioner failed to prove that his mental deficienc- ies, as described in the 2005 report, contributed to his delay in filing the second habeas petition and, thus, failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay set forth in § 52-470 (d), as the record indicated that the petitioner presented no evidence of the nature of his deficiencies during the relevant time frame or how they contributed to the delay in filing the second habeas petition, and the court's determination was supported by the petitioner's having obtained a general equivalency diploma and having completed college classes and his success in filing two habeas petitions as a self-represented party, despite the alleged prevalence of his deficiencies. Argued September 8, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

The plaintiff mortgage company sought declaratory relief related to the defendant's failure to comply with its corporate bylaws, which required the defendant to satisfy state and federal licensing requirements related to the plaintiff's mortgage loan business. The defendant was a founding shareholder and former employee, officer, and director of the plaintiff. The trial court, relying on a stipulation entered into by the parties, ordered the defendant to satisfy the licensing requirements by a certain date, or, in accordance with the plaintiff's bylaws, his stock in the plaintiff would be surrendered. After finding that the defendant had failed to comply with its order, the court rendered judgment ordering the defendant's shares to be surrendered to the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in its interpretation of the parties' stipula- tion. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the defendant's claims were moot. The plaintiff argued that during the pendency of the present appeal, it had taken the defen- dant's stock in satisfaction of a judgment rendered in certain prior litigation between the parties, and, therefore, the defendant was unable to demonstrate that he was entitled to any practical relief. Held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and, therefore, the appeal was dismissed: there did not appear to be any dispute between the parties that this court was unable to afford the defendant any direct, practical relief from the reversal of the judgment from which he appealed as the subject of the judgment in the present action was the defendant's stock in the plaintiff, which, during the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff has taken in satisfaction of the judgment rendered in a prior action; despite the defendant's claim that this court may afford him practical relief because the issue of when the plaintiff took the stock in satisfaction of the judgment rendered in the prior action would affect its value, the defendant did not offer any explanation of how a reversal of the trial court's judgment in the present action would affect the value of the stock, and the court in the present action did not make any findings concerning the valuation of the stock or when the plaintiff acquired it, and, although the defendant argued before this court that the outcome of the present action had collateral estoppel and res judicata effects as to when the plaintiff took his stock, he contradicted these arguments before the trial court in the prior action, claiming that the value of the stock taken by the plaintiff satisfied the entire judgment; moreover, despite the defendant's argument that his ability to bring an action for vexatious litigation in the future against the plaintiff was dependent on this appeal being heard on its merits, because the plaintiff prevailed in the present action, the defendant was unable to demonstrate that probable cause was lacking, and, thus, there was no possibility that this court's resolution of the claims raised in the appeal would have the effect of imposing liability on the plaintiff for commencing the present action; furthermore, the defendant's claim that the present appeal could affect a future action against the plaintiff for fraud was unavailing, the scope of the underlying action was narrow, there were no claims of fraud before the court, and, as a result of the defendant's conclusory analysis of this issue in his objection to the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal, the factual basis of any future cause of action sounding in fraud was unknown to this court; accordingly, the defendant did not demonstrate what was reasonably possible in the future, and, therefore, this court was not persuaded that the collateral consequences on which the defendant relied were reasonably possible. Argued October 5, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

The plaintiff D sought to recover damages from the defendant L Co., her insurer, for underinsured motorist benefits, and from the defendant M, for M's alleged negligence in connection with a motor vehicle accident involving D. D's husband, C, joined the action as a party plaintiff more than two years after D commenced the action. D entered into a voluntary arbitration agreement with L Co., and, after an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator awarded D a certain amount of damages in underinsured motorist benefits. D filed a demand for a trial de novo with the trial court, which was denied. Additionally, M moved for summary judgment on C's claims against him on the ground that they were barred by the two year statute of limitations (§ 52-584) for negligence claims. The trial court granted M's motion for summary judgment. D and C filed a joint appeal to this court challenging the trial court's denial of D's demand for a trial de novo and the judgment for M on C's complaint. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in denying D's demand for a trial de novo following the arbitrator's decision on her claims against L Co., as the parties entered into a voluntary arbitration; the trial court determined that the submission was voluntary and unrestricted, and, because D voluntarily submitted her claims against L Co. to arbitration, any review of the arbitrator's decision was governed by a statute (§ 52-418) under which there was no right to a trial de novo, and the legal authority pursuant to which D argued that she had an absolute right to a trial de novo pertained to compulsory, not voluntary, arbitration. 2. The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment in favor of M on the ground that C's claims were barred by the two year statute of limitations in § 52-584 because C suffered actionable harm on the date of the accident and he did not file his complaint against M within two years from that date; in arguing that his claims were not subject to the two year statute of limitations in § 52-584, but rather the three year statute of repose under § 52-584, C baldly asserted that he did not discover any actionable harm until two years after the accident, which was belied by C's allegation that he arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after it occurred and suffered shock viewing D's condition and the condition of the car, and it could not reasonably be disputed that any alleged injury to C was first sustained on the date of the accident when he first observed D's injuries. Argued November 17, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages caused by an allegedly defective roof installed by the defendant P Co. The defendant town of Bloomfield had hired P Co. to install a new roof on the plaintiff's home pursuant to a residential rehabilitation program, whereby the town offered financial assistance for home improvements to qualified homeowners. Under the program, the town acted on behalf of the homeowner to secure appropriate contractors to do the work and entered into all necessary contracts. P Co. completed work on the plaintiff's roof in July, 2013, and was paid by the town. In October, 2013, the plaintiff noticed water entering her home and an inspection determined that P Co. had installed a defective roof. The plaintiff brought this action alleging in part that P Co. breached its contract to the town when it installed a defective roof and that she was a third-party beneficiary of the contract. The trial court granted P Co.'s motion to dismiss, and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's action for lack of standing, that court having improperly determined that the plaintiff was not a third- party beneficiary of the contract: because the language of the contract was ambiguous as to whether the town and P Co. intended for the plaintiff to be a third-party beneficiary of that contract, it was a question for the ultimate fact finder and, thus, the question of whether the plaintiff had standing as a third-party beneficiary could not be resolved without an evidentiary hearing and, because resolution of the factual issue is intertwined with the merits of the case, resolution of this jurisdictional question should be resolved by the ultimate fact finder as part of the trial on the merits; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded this case for further proceedings. Argued November 12, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

The plaintiffs, the executrix of the estate of R, several former students of a defunct Catholic school located in Madison that was the residual beneficiary of R's estate, the students' parents, and M Co., a corporation operating a private school that is purporting to be the successor to the defunct school, brought this action for relief against the defendant. After R died in 2013, the residuary of his estate was distributed to the defunct school in accordance with his will. In 2018, the defendant announced that, for financial reasons, it would be closing the defunct school and establishing a new school in Branford. Some of the parents of the students attending the defunct school then formed M Co., with the intent of establishing a new Catholic school in Madison. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the residuary clause in R's will created a construc- tive trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs and that the defendant had a duty to convey the funds to M Co., as successor to the defunct school, or to return the funds to R's estate for distribution to his heirs. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that none of the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the charitable gift. The trial court granted the motion and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs lacked standing: the trial court did not err in construing R's bequest as an absolute or outright gift to the defunct school instead of as an endowment that created a charitable trust benefitting the plaintiffs; the residuary clause of the will did not limit the expenditure of principal, restrict the manner in which the funds could be used, name any beneficiaries or a trustee, or include any other language evidencing an intent to form a trust or to exercise any future control over the residue of the estate; moreover, the trial court did not err in concluding that the special interest exception to the rule that the attorney general has exclusive authority to bring an action to enforce charitable gifts was inapplicable to confer standing to the plaintiffs as the exception is limited to actions involving charitable trusts and R's bequest to the defunct school constituted an outright gift, extending the exception to include charitable gifts would undermine their nature as, unlike with charitable trusts, when a donor completes a gift he immediately and irrevocably transfers and relinquishes all control over the gifted property, and the plaintiffs failed to provide any legal authority to support their assertion that the exception should be extended to completed charitable gifts. Argued October 20, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

The plaintiff bank sought, by way of summary process, to regain possession of certain premises from the defendants. Following the judgment of possession rendered for the plaintiff by the trial court, defendants B and F appealed, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process action because a final judgment had not been rendered in the foreclosure action that had resulted in the plaintiff obtaining title to the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff returned the summary process execution of possession to the court and indicated that the defendants were dispossessed of the property. Held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, as B and F were no longer in possession of the property. Submitted on briefs February 9—officially released March 9, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of robbery in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant, wearing baggy clothing, including a sweatshirt, entered a bank and approached a teller station. He passed a withdrawal ticket to the teller, and told the teller to give him all the money and no one would get hurt. On the back of the withdrawal ticket was a handwritten note, which stated: ''Give me . . . all the money and no one gets hurt.'' It also stated: ''It's in my sweatshirt.'' The teller complied and gave the defendant the money. The defendant then left the bank. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he threatened the use of what he represented by his words or conduct to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument as required by statute (§ 53a-135 (a) (1) (B)). Held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury reasonably to have found that the defendant represented that he had a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument in his sweatshirt and that he threatened to use it if the teller did not give him money; the defendant orally and in writing threatened to harm the bank staff if his demand for money was not met, and, immediately following the written threat of harm on the note, was the statement that ''it'' was in his sweatshirt, a statement that the jury reasonably could have inferred made reference to what the defendant would use to carry out the harm he threatened, namely, an object that he had concealed under his sweatshirt, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that his sweatshirt, which surveillance video and photographs showed was baggy, was capa- ble of concealing a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, and, given the fact that his threat was made during a bank robbery, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that he had threatened to inflict serious physical injury or death if his demands were not met. Argued December 8, 2020—officially released March 9, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of two counts of the crime of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree as an accessory and one count each of the crimes of attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, conspiracy to commit aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and burglary in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the trial court abused its authority by denying his right to a hearing when it denied his postconviction motion for DNA testing pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 54-102kk). The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal. On the petitioner's appeal to this court, he claimed that the habeas court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the habeas petition and denied certification to appeal. Held that the appeal was dismissed as moot; because, during the pendency of this appeal, this court issued its decision in the petitioner's direct appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion for DNA testing and affirmed that judgment in all respects, and because, in that proceeding, the petitioner obtained the very relief he requested in this habeas action, namely, a hearing before the sentencing judge on his motion for DNA testing pursuant to § 54-102kk, there was no practical relief that this court could afford the petitioner. Argued November 9, 2020—officially released March 16, 2021

The petitioner, the Disciplinary Counsel, filed a presentment alleging miscon- duct by the respondent attorney, after a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee found that the respondent had violated various provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the rules of practice. The disciplinary proceeding remained inactive while the respondent pursued his appeal to the Superior Court from the decision of the grievance committee directing the petitioner to file a presentment. After the appeal process was completed, the court scheduled a hearing on the presentment. The trial court rendered judgment for the petitioner, and suspended the respondent from the practice of law for one year. The respondent thereafter filed a postjudgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing for the first time that, pursu- ant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-47 (a)), the court lacked jurisdiction because a hearing on the merits of the presentment was not held within sixty days of its filing with the court. The court denied the respondent's motion, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. The respondent could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in denying his postjudgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; contrary to the respondent's claim, our Supreme Court has held that the sixty day hearing requirement of Practice Book § 2-47 (a) is directory, not mandatory, and that failure to meet its time requirements does not deprive the court of jurisdiction, and this court was bound by the decision of our Supreme Court. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in suspending the respondent from the practice of law for one year; when stripped of repeated asser- tions that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the respondent's contentions offered little by way of meaningful analysis, and, therefore, were unavailing. Submitted on briefs February 4—officially released March 16, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of nolo contendere, of various crimes related to his involvement in a marijuana grow operation, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, S, had provided ineffective assistance during the litigation of the petitioner's motion to suppress evidence in the underlying criminal proceeding. The petitioner, who was the owner of the property where the grow operation was conducted, and his brother-in-law, E, were arrested when they arrived at the property while a narcotics task force was present as part of a marijuana eradication operation. The petitioner leased the property to P, who was also arrested. The habeas court rendered judgment deny- ing the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that S rendered deficient performance in litigating the motion to suppress: a. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that S rendered deficient performance when he failed to inform the petitioner of his right to testify at the suppression hearing; the court did not credit the petitioner's claim that S advised him not to testify at the hearing and found, to the contrary, that S's testimony that the petitioner had instructed him not to call the petitioner as a witness at the hearing was credible. b. The habeas court properly concluded that S's decision not to call P to testify at the hearing did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, as S was concerned that evidence connected to P's testimony, although it may have supported the petitioner's claim of standing, could have further implicated the petitioner in criminal activity and S credibly testified that the petitioner had insisted that P not be called as a witness. c. The petitioner's claim that S's asserted justifications for his approach to the suppression hearing were not reasonable was unavailing, as the habeas court concluded and the record demonstrated that S's decision to minimize the petitioner's involvement in the property was reasonably based on the information provided to him by the petitioner, S's decision not to involve P in the suppression hearing was reasonably based on information the petitioner had told S, including that P posed significant safety concerns for the petitioner and his wife, and on S's belief that P's testimony could have further implicated the petitioner in the grow operation and affected the terms of a plea bargain, and S's strategy in seeking to avoid implicating E was reasonable given the petitioner's stated desire to S not to implicate E, who faced possible, ongoing expo- sure under federal drug laws at the time of the suppression hearing. d. S's briefing on the issue of the petitioner's standing regarding the suppression of evidence, which relied on Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186), sufficiently supported the argument in favor of the petitioner's standing and was informed by the facts of the case and the information given to him by the petitioner and, thus, the petitioner's claim that S's failure to cite to Katz v. United States (389 U.S. 347) constituted deficient performance was unavailing. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court deprived him of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law when it characterized in its memorandum of decision a full exhibit admitted at the habeas trial without limitation as one admitted for only a limited purpose, without notice to the petitioner or an opportunity to be heard: although the court erred in stating in its memorandum of decision that the exhibit was admitted for a limited purpose, it had indicated to the petitioner on the first day of a three day trial that spanned three months that it viewed the exhibit as lacking probative value, thereby providing the petitioner with two months to gather and to present additional evidence; moreover, this court declined to review the claim under the plain error doctrine, as the habeas court's limited use of an exhibit it found to have little or no weight did not affect the fairness or integrity of the proceedings or result in manifest injustice to the petitioner. 3. Although the habeas court erred by excluding as an exhibit a letter to the petitioner from the Internal Revenue Service that was addressed to the property searched by law enforcement, the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof that the exclusion of the exhibit harmed him in a way that made it more probable than not that the outcome of the habeas trial would have been different had the exhibit been admitted; in his principal brief, the petitioner failed to analyze whether the court's error in failing to admit the letter affected its conclusion as to either the deficient performance or the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washing- ton (466 U.S. 668), and consequently, failed to identify any cognizable harm from the habeas court's erroneous evidentiary ruling; moreover, this court declined to review the petitioner's argument regarding harm raised for the first time in his reply brief. Argued October 8, 2020—officially released March 16, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder and sexual assault in the second degree, sought a second writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance, and the habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petition. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court declined to review the petitioner's claim that the habeas court improperly determined that he had not established good cause for the untimely filing of his second petition sufficient to rebut the statutory (§ 52-470) presumption of unwarranted delay: the petitioner raised for the first time in his reply brief the threshold issue of whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal, rendering that claim unreviewable; moreover, even if the peti- tioner properly had raised that threshold issue, the petitioner failed to establish that the court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that the court's conclusion that he had not demonstrated good cause for delay was debatable among jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issue differ- ently or the questions raised deserved encouragement to proceed fur- ther; furthermore, the petitioner's argument that his severe mental health issues provided good cause for the delay was unreviewable because the record was inadequate to review such a claim, as the habeas court did not address the issue in its memorandum of decision and the petitioner did not filed a motion for articulation. 2. The petitioner's claims that the habeas court failed to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to investigate and to present evidence as to good cause for the delay in filing his petition was not reviewable on appeal: the petitioner's claim that the court failed to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to present evidence as to a plea offer was unreviewable because the petitioner failed to raise that evidentiary issue in his petition for certification to appeal; moreover, the petitioner's claim that the court failed to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to conduct an investigation regarding newly discovered evidence regarding the plea offer to support good cause for delay was outside the scope of appellate review, as the petitioner did not raise the issue at any time before the court, request additional time from the court in which to conduct an investigation, or include this ground in his petition for certifi- cation to appeal, which also precluded review under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233). Argued January 4—officially released March 16, 2021

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis- solved, appealed from the decision of the trial court denying in part his postjudgment motion for modification of alimony. The plaintiff sought a modification of his obligation to pay alimony, to provide for the defen- dant's health insurance and to maintain life insurance, alleging that his income had decreased substantially since the date of dissolution. At the hearing on the motion, the self-represented defendant made statements regarding certain equity that she had not taken in the plaintiff's business during her cross-examination of the plaintiff and during her closing argument, but did not question the plaintiff regarding the equity that she allegedly gave up or any claims to real estate or business assets that she may have abandoned in exchange for alimony. Held: 1. The trial court improperly found that the defendant had relinquished claims she might have had to certain marital assets in exchange for lifetime alimony, as that finding was not supported by the record: there was no testimony or evidence proffered at the hearing on the motion for modification to demonstrate that the parties had made such an exchange, nor was there any language in the parties' agreement that supported the court's finding, and, although the defendant made state- ments at the hearing while questioning the plaintiff and during her closing argument that she gave up equity for alimony, her statements did not constitute evidence, and the court appropriately cautioned her to that effect, and the defendant did not offer testimony from any other witness, including herself, in support of her claim that she exchanged equity for lifetime alimony. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for modification of alimony on the basis of its erroneous finding that the defendant had given up claims during the dissolution proceedings; although the trial court implicitly found a substantial change in the plaintiff's financial circumstances since the date of the dissolution, there was nothing in the separation agreement, which terms were negotiated with the assistance of counsel, to indicate that the defendant gave up equity or assets in exchange for lifetime alimony, nor was there any evidence proffered at the hearing on the motion demonstrating that the parties had made such an exchange; accordingly, there was a lack of an evidentiary basis in the record for the court's finding of an exchange of assets or equity for lifetime alimony, on which the court's ultimate decision denying the motion in part was based. Argued December 7, 2020—officially released March 16, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of burglary in the third degree, attempt to commit tampering with physical evidence and attempt to commit arson in the second degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the Commissioner of Correction and the Board of Pardons and Paroles violated and misapplied the parole eligibility statute (§ 54- 125a) to increase his punishment, delay his parole eligibility date, and classify him as a violent offender. The habeas court issued an order declining to issue the writ of habeas corpus because, pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 23-24 (a)), the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the petition did not present a claim on which the habeas court could grant relief. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the habeas court denied, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal: the allegations in the petition were insufficient to allege a claim under the stigma plus test because inmates do not have a cognizable liberty interest in parole eligibility; moreover, assuming that a habeas petitioner could state, as a matter of law, a viable stigma plus claim on the basis of his classification as a violent offender, the petitioner failed to allege facts demonstrating that his classification as a violent offender caused him to suffer conse- quences that were qualitatively different from the punishments that are usually suffered by prisoners so that they constituted a major change in conditions of his confinement amounting to a grievous loss; accord- ingly, the petitioner failed to sufficiently allege a cognizable liberty interest invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the habeas court. Argued November 16, 2020—officially released March 16, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of reckless burning and false reporting of an incident in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant, who previously had been living in China for more than a decade, and his wife and two children were temporarily living with his parents. The defendant and his family intended to return to China but were having difficulty obtaining certain travel documenta- tion. As a result, the defendant devised a plan that he hoped would expedite that documentation, whereby he sought to leverage one Chi- nese agency against another by making it appear that the Chinese govern- ment had attempted to intimidate him and his family by entering his parents' house and starting a fire. To effectuate this plan, the defendant spread an accelerant, Sterno, a flammable, fire starting gel, throughout the house while his parents, wife, and children were sleeping. The defendant then lit a candle and used it to burn a sheet for thirty to sixty seconds. After extinguishing the fire, the defendant awakened his parents and told them that he had heard someone in the house and that the person had spread accelerant and started a fire. His father then called 911. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of reckless burning and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict because his conviction of reckless burning was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, the defendant claimed that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he recklessly endangered the building ''of another'' as required by the reckless burning statute (§ 53a-114 (a)) and that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence because his behavior was not reckless. Held: 1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of reckless burning: the jury reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the endangered building where the fire was set was a building ''of another'' as required by § 53a-114; moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim, the state did not have the burden to prove that the house was owned exclusively by someone other than the defen- dant, as the phrase ''of another'' plainly and unambiguously applies to any proprietary or possessory interest in the endangered building by someone other than the defendant, whether exclusive or nonexclusive; furthermore, the jury was presented with evidence from which it reason- ably could have concluded that the defendant's parents owned the house, including evidence that the defendant stated to the police that the house belonged to his parents and that he felt like he was imposing on his parents by staying there with his family, the fact that he had lived in China for nearly twelve years, and the defendant's failure to state affirmatively that he owned the house when questioned by the state at trial about who owned the house. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence: there was a reasonable basis for the jury to find that the defendant's intentional starting of the fire recklessly placed the house in danger of destruction or damage; there was evidence that the defendant spread an accelerant around the house at 2 a.m. while his parents, wife, and children were sleeping, he set a sheet on fire within five feet of the accelerant, he did not fully read the warning labels for the accelerant, he had no experience using the particular accelerant, and he did not have a fire extinguisher or a contingency plan in place should his plan go awry; moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim, the court did not rely exclusively on the jury's verdict in ruling on the motion but independently weighed the evidence in accordance with the standard governing a trial court's consideration of a manifest weight of the evidence claim, the court's statements indicating that it conducted its own assessment of the evidence. Argued January 4—officially released March 16, 2021

The plaintiff home cleaning company, C Co., sought to recover damages from the defendants for breach of contract in connection with the defendants' failure to pay for services rendered. The parties' agreement contained a one year limitation provision that provided that no action relating to the subject matter of the agreement could be brought more than one year after ''the claiming party'' knew or should have known of the cause of action. The trial court found that by September, 2016, C Co. was aware that the defendants were refusing to pay and did not commence the action until March, 2018. The court therefore found in favor of the defendants on their special defense that the action was time barred under the agreement. On C Co.'s appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly rendered judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that C Co.'s claims were contractually time barred; this court concluded that, because C Co. offered a reasonable interpretation of the limitation period, that the term ''claiming party'' referred only to the customer, and the defendants offered a competing reasonable inter- pretation, that the term ''claiming party'' was otherwise not defined in the agreement and the agreement consistently used the terms ''client,'' ''customer,'' and ''provider'' when referring to the parties individually, so that the newly introduced term meant any party bringing a cause of action relating to the agreement, the limitation provision was ambiguous and applied the contra proferentem rule, resolving the ambiguity against C Co. as the undisputed drafter of the agreement and concluding that the one year limitation period applied to any contracting party; accordingly, because there was no dispute that C Co. commenced the action after one year from the time it knew or should have known of it, its claims were contractually time barred. Argued January 6—officially released March 16, 2021

The defendant filed a motion to modify custody of the parties' minor child. After a hearing, the court denied the motion, determining that it was in the best interests of the child for her primary residence to remain with the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motion to modify custody and in failing to examine his alleged overpayment of child support. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to modify custody of the parties' minor child because it determined that it was in the child's best interests for her primary residence to remain with the plaintiff: the court properly responded to allegations of the plaintiff's use of corporal punishment against the child by referring the matter to the Department of Children and Families and appointing a guardian ad litem, who partici- pated in the hearing on the motion, and there was nothing in the record to support the defendant's allegation that the court failed to consider the plaintiff's admission to the use of physical discipline in making its best interests determination; moreover, the defendant's remaining arguments in support of his assertion were unreviewable, as he waived his claim of judicial bias, did not preserve for appeal his claim of failure to appoint proper representation for the child, and this court declined to disturb the trial court's determination of the credibility of one of the plaintiff's witnesses, as such a determination was for the trial court as trier of fact. 2. This court declined to review the defendant's challenge to the accuracy of the child support payment audits: the issue of past child support payments was not before the trial court, which analyzed his allegations of overpayment only in the context of its determination of the best interests of the child, did not issue any orders regarding the audits, and issued an order only concerning the defendant's future child support obligations; accordingly, there was no claim for this court to review on appeal. Argued November 18, 2020—officially released March 23, 2021

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and from the order of that court awarding the plaintiff pendente lite attorney's fees. In the judgment dissolving the marriage, the court, inter alia, ordered the defendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff for a maximum term of six years and modified a relocation provision in the parties' agreed on pendente lite custody and parenting access plan to permit the plaintiff to relocate across state lines but within thirty-five miles of her current residence. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning its support orders; although the support orders account for approximately 90 percent of the defendant's net weekly income, the orders were not excessive in light of an essentially even distribution of the marital property, leaving the defendant valuable assets that he would be able to use to comply with the support orders and sustain his basic welfare, and the six year term for alimony, which was appropriate in light of the facts and circum- stances of the case, and which could not be extended. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or deprive the defendant of due process when it permitted the plaintiff to relocate across state lines to within thirty-five miles of her then current residence: the court determined that it was in the children's best interests to allow the plaintiff to relocate in order to establish residency in the state of New York so that she could afford and attend a doctorate program, which would provide her a necessary opportunity for meaningful employment and income, and the court reasonably tethered the distance for the relocation to the plaintiff's home as she was the party seeking permission to relocate; moreover, the court's order did not deviate from the parties' expressed belief and agreement that it was in the children's best interests that the parties live within thirty-five miles of each other unless otherwise agreed in writing. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of attorney's fees pendente lite that it awarded to the plaintiff: in assessing the reason- ableness of the fee request, the court appropriately considered the ser- vices rendered by the plaintiff's counsel as well as her skill level and experience and corresponding billing rate, which were testified to by the plaintiff's counsel and reflected in fee affidavits with attached billing records; moreover, the court determined that certain billing entries were excessive and identified on the record examples of entries it reduced. Argued December 3, 2020—officially released March 23, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had been dissolved, appealed to this court following the decisions of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motions for contempt and issuing certain other orders. After the trial court granted the plaintiff's motions for postsecondary educa- tional support for the parties' son and for modification of the defendant's child support and alimony obligations, the court denied the defendant's motions for reargument, and he appealed to this court, which dismissed as untimely that portion of the appeal that pertained to the educational support and alimony and child support orders. The defendant then filed an amended appeal challenging the trial court's order that he reimburse the plaintiff for interest on funds she had to borrow as a result of his wilful noncompliance with the educational support order. The trial court then issued a correction to that order, and granted the plaintiff's motions for contempt as a result of the defendant's failure to comply with the educational support order or the child support and alimony orders. The defendant then filed a second amended appeal after which this court issued an order limiting the issues he could raise in this appeal as a result of his having listed the trial court's initial support orders on his amended appeal forms despite the previous dismissal of his appeal as to those orders. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court misinterpreted the parties' separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the dissolution judgment, and, thus, erred in entering the associated support orders. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court committed plain error by imposing its own findings and interpretation of the separa- tion agreement and acting in a manner that gave rise to the appearance of a lack of impartiality: the defendant's assertion as to the separation agreement and the associated support orders was based on a flawed interpretation of the law and was not properly before this court, the defendant having ignored this court's order limiting his appellate brief to the trial court's orders that were issued subsequent to the dismissal of that portion of his appeal that challenged the initial orders modifying his child support and alimony obligations and requiring him to pay educational support; moreover, the defendant did not raise a claim in his motion to reargue as to the trial court's interpretation of the separation agreement, and he failed to argue how that interpretation resulted in a manifest injustice or affected the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the proceedings; furthermore, the defendant's claim of judicial bias arose solely from the adverse rulings against him, which may not form the basis for such a claim. 2. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it issued contradictory findings without changing its modified orders and issued orders that were beyond a statutory time frame that he did not identify in his brief; furthermore, the defendant's claim that the court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt was unavailing, as he did not identify which contempt finding he was challenging and failed to provide legal or factual analysis in support of his claims, and, even if it were assumed that the defendant was challenging the contempt finding relative to the educa- tional support order, his claim was belied by the record, which reflected that he was ordered to pay those expenses on the same day that the court modified his child support and alimony obligations, and the court's finding of wilful noncompliance with those unambiguous orders was amply supported by the record of the numerous hearings he was afforded on that issue. Argued January 5—officially released March 23, 2021

The plaintiff property owner sought a permanent injunction against the defendants, the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection and the Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management, prohibiting them from taking further action in the redevelopment of a state park and for an order precluding them from denying her alleged statutory (§ 22a-16) right to intervene in public hearings related to the redevelop- ment project. The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, seeking to intervene in the public hearings on the project pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 22a-19) and to have the opportunity to present expert witnesses on her behalf in opposition to the conclusions of the environmental impact evaluation, as well as seeking to cross-examine the department's witnesses and provide rebuttal expert testimony. The department denied that there was a proceeding in which the plaintiff could intervene. The plaintiff brought an administrative appeal, in which she claimed, inter alia, that the redevelopment plan would have irreversible environmental impacts on the area and, because her property was close to the park, the redevel- opment would affect her special personal or legal interests. The trial court subsequently dismissed the action on the ground of sovereign immunity. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in determining that she failed to allege facts sufficient to establish her statutory standing under § 22a-16, as her complaint failed to articulate a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruction of the environment; the complaint contained only two causes of action, alleging that each defendant violated § 22a-16, and the complaint's focus was entirely on how the plaintiff's rights were violated when the depart- ment denied her petition for intervention, and alleged a procedural violation without alleging facts that, if proven, would support a finding that this violation would unreasonably pollute, impair, or destroy the environment. 2. The trial court applied the proper rule of law when it construed the factual allegations in the complaint; contrary to the plaintiff's claim, the court did not state that the complaint failed to make out a ''prima facie case,'' as opposed to a colorable claim, instead, the court used ''prima facie'' as a descriptive phrase that captured the type of allegation required to defeat sovereign immunity and to articulate that, at first glance, the complaint did not allege facts that, when viewed in the light most favor- able to the plaintiff, were sufficient to satisfy exceptions to sovereign immunity. 3. The trial court did not err in determining that the allegations of the complaint did not come within the exception to sovereign immunity for state actions alleged in violation of constitutional rights, as the public hearing in which the plaintiff sought to intervene was not a ''proceeding'' under § 22a-19, as that statute did not provide for intervention in the type of hearing at issue in the present case, it was within the department's discretion to reject the plaintiff's petition, and, even if the department wrongfully denied her petition, this action would not constitute a viola- tion of the plaintiff's constitutional rights because § 22a-19 did not create a constitutional right of intervention; moreover, the plaintiff did not specifically allege that her constitutional rights had been violated and the plaintiff's claims in her complaint were not of a constitutional magnitude alleging a violation of a fundamental right. 4. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in holding that the allegations of her complaint did not come within the exception to sovereign immunity for a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of a state officer's statutory authority: although her complaint alleged that the defendants improperly denied her petition for intervention in contravention of § 22a- 19 and that they did so for an illegal purpose, the department had the authority to deny the plaintiff's petition for intervention on the ground that the public hearing was not a ''proceeding'' to which § 22a-19 applied, as § 22a-19 solely covers matters that are adversarial in nature, thus, the facts in the complaint did not support the claim that either of the defendants acted in excess of his statutory authority; moreover, the illegal purpose exception required the plaintiff to plead that the defen- dants' conduct was in excess of their statutory authority, regardless of whether she was required to allege that the defendants' conduct pro- moted an illegal purpose, and the plaintiff's claim still failed because the defendants did not act in excess of their statutory authority. 5. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred when it ruled that the scoping process/review of the environmental impact evaluation was not a proceeding for purposes of intervention under § 22a-19, as the trial court did not address this issue when it dismissed the action, and, instead, based its decision on its determination that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the plain- tiff's claim for relief: this court will not consider a claim that the trial court, in reaching its decision, did not address; moreover, even if this court reached the merits of the this claim, it would fail as this court concluded that the hearing in which the plaintiff sought to intervene was not a proceeding for purposes of § 22a-19. Argued October 13, 2020—officially released March 30, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants C, I Co., and H Co. pursuant to the Connecticut Product Liability Act (§ 52-572m et seq.) in connection with personal injuries he sustained in single car accident that occurred when the left front wheel of his vehicle fractured. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. The plaintiff claimed in his motion, inter alia, that, after the jury had retired to the deliberation room, the defendants' exhibits were timely delivered to the jury room but the plaintiff's exhibits were not, constitut- ing evidentiary impropriety. The jury returned its verdict approximately ten minutes after it had received the plaintiff's exhibits. The trial court denied the motion and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and order a new trial on the ground that court failed to ensure that the plaintiff's exhibits were with the jury when it commenced deliberations: the plaintiff presented no evidence that the jury began deliberations prior to the delivery of the exhibits, the jury was afforded a fair opportunity to deliberate with all the exhibits before it, and it was undisputed that the jury received all the exhibits prior to returning its verdict; moreover, the fact that there was only a short period of time between when the jury received the plaintiff's exhibits and it reached a verdict, did not necessarily indicate a lack of diligence but, rather, may have attested to the weakness of the plain- tiff's case. 2. This court concluded that the plaintiff waived his unpreserved claim that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and order a new trial due to juror misconduct: although the plaintiff claimed that the jury may have begun deliberations prior to the delivery of his exhibits or failed to give adequate consideration to his case, an examination of the record indicated that the plaintiff did not bring the late delivery of his exhibits to the attention of the court on the record prior to the reading of the verdict, which would have given the court an opportunity to investigate and take any remedial measures that may have been required. 3. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict on the basis that the defendants' counsel unfairly prejudiced the jury by reading from docu- ments not in evidence; the court granted the plaintiff's request for a curative instruction to the jury at the time of the alleged improper comments by counsel, an instruction which the court repeated in its charge to the jury, and the plaintiff did not object to the jury instructions as given by the court and, in doing so, waived any claim of error. Argued December 1, 2020—officially released March 30, 2021

Pursuant to statute (§ 1-210 (b) (1)), the Freedom of Information Act does not require the disclosure of preliminary drafts or notes provided the public agency has determined that the public interest in withholding them outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Pursuant further to statute (§ 1-210 (e) (1)), notwithstanding § 1-210 (b) (1), disclosure is required of such documents as advisory opinions and recommendations comprising part of the process by which governmental decisions are formulated. The plaintiff, L, a tenured professor at the defendant health center, C Co., appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission. After the completion of his annual performance review, as required by C Co.'s bylaws, L requested certain documents and com- munications related to the review. C Co. disclosed records within which it made various redactions, including to comments and ratings made by individual committee members about L's evaluation. L appealed to the commission, which found that the redacted portions of the requested records were permissibly exempt pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (1) and (e) (1). L then appealed to the trial court, which concluded that the commission correctly determined that C Co., pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (1), properly had resolved the balance between secrecy and disclosure of the preliminary drafts or notes in good faith and that § 1-210 (e) (1) did not require production of the committee members' final comments and ratings because they were ''preliminary'' to the committee's recommendation to the dean of C Co. regarding L's evaluation, and dismissed L's appeal. On L's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that the redacted records were exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (1), as those records were preliminary drafts or notes within the meaning of that statute: the redacted records at issue consisted of the individual comments and ratings of the committee members made during the deliberative process of the multistep commit- tee process during which the committee members deliberated in the form of stated impressions in order to reach a finalized collective recom- mendation for the dean, and the stated individualized impressions, in and of themselves, preceded the formal and informed collective recom- mendation of the committee; moreover, the commission did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the benefit of withholding the records at issue outweighed the public interest in disclosure, as it found that C Co. determined that public disclosure of the records would have a chilling effect on the willingness of the committee members to provide the candid assessments that were necessary to ensure an objective evaluation process. 2. The trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed L's appeal, and improperly concluded that the commission had correctly applied § 1- 210 (e) (1) to the final comments and ratings that were delivered to the dean because § 1-210 (e) (1) required the requested documents to be produced, even though disclosure would not otherwise be required under § 1-210 (b) (1); the final individual comments and ratings provided by the committee members were used in the dean's deliberative process and were part of a completed, not draft, document, and were precisely the type of documents that our Supreme Court stated in Van Norstrand v. Freedom of Information Commission (211 Conn. 339) should be produced pursuant to § 1-210 (e) (1); moreover, the record did not support the conclusion of the commission that the redacted records did not contain recommendations, as although the individual committee members' comments and ratings were initially submitted as recommen- dations for the purpose of the committee's deliberations, the final version of the comments and ratings served as recommendations for the purpose of the dean's review of the faculty member's rating, and the trial court and the commission misapplied the term ''preliminary'' as it is used in § 1-210 (e) (1). Argued September 15, 2020—officially released March 30, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis- solved, appealed from the decision of the trial court denying his motion to open the judgment of dissolution. Prior to the commencement of the dissolution action, the plaintiff forwarded to the defendant an e-mail, which he did not read, which contained information relating to certain pending litigation involving the estate of the plaintiff's uncle. The dissolu- tion judgment incorporated the parties' separation agreement, in which the defendant expressly waived any right to proceeds to be received by the plaintiff in the future as a result of the estate litigation. More than four months later, the defendant filed a motion to open the judgment, claiming that the judgment was obtained as a result of fraudulent misrep- resentations by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff failed to disclose her receipt of an inheritance related to a settlement of the estate litigation. The court denied the motion, finding that the defendant chose not to read the documents regarding the litigation, which were disclosed by the plaintiff, and that there was no fraud on the part of the plaintiff. On the defendant's appeal, held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it applied an incorrect legal standard in denying his motion to open: contrary to the defendant's claim, the court did not improperly assign him a duty of due diligence; the court simply acknowl- edged that a party to a dissolution action cannot ignore documents that were appropriately delivered to him, only to later claim that the disclosed potential asset was fraudulently withheld from him, which was particu- larly true in the present case, where the defendant had ample time and opportunity to review the disclosures, the plaintiff informed the defendant of the potential asset, the defendant signed a separation agreement wherein he waived any right to the potential asset, and the separation agreement was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution; moreover, the court correctly applied the elements of fraud in addressing the defendant's claim and found that there was no fraud on the part of the plaintiff because the plaintiff clearly disclosed her intangible, potential interest in the estate to the defendant with ample time for him to review the disclosure, and, by focusing on whether the plaintiff disclosed and characterized the asset in the documents provided to the defendant, it was clear that the court applied the appropriate legal standard. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider a pattern of fraudulent conduct on the part of the plaintiff was without merit; the court found that the plaintiff made appropriate disclosures to the defendant, expressly stating that there was no fraud, and this court's review of the record supported that court's conclusion because the plaintiff's potential asset, which was known to the defen- dant, involved a contested estate in Canada, and the final settlement of the litigation related to the estate occurred almost one year after the judgment of dissolution was rendered. Argued December 1, 2020—officially released March 30, 2021

Following the search of a home located at 351 Noble Avenue in Bridgeport, the defendants, who all claimed to be residents of that address, were charged with various drug and weapons offenses. The warrant that supposedly authorized the search described the premises to be searched as ''349 Noble Avenue.'' 349 Noble Avenue and 351 Noble Avenue are separate units within the same duplex. Each unit has its own driveway, front entrance, mailbox, electric meter, and gas meter, and neither unit can be accessed from inside of the other unit. Prior to trial, the defen- dants filed motions to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming that, because the warrant authorized a search of the property identified as ''349 Noble Avenue,'' the search of 351 Noble Avenue was conducted without a warrant and that the seizure of the items could not be justified pursuant to any exception to the warrant requirement. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants' motions and, on the state's motion, rendered judgment dismissing each informa- tion. The state, on the granting of permission, appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the defendant in the first case, L, who was the only defendant who did not testify at the hearing, failed to meet his burden of proving an expectation of privacy in the area searched and, therefore, did not have standing to proceed with his motion. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in determining that L met his burden of proving an expectation of privacy in the area searched by law enforcement officers and had standing to proceed with a motion to suppress: it is well established that owners, tenants, and even overnight guests of a dwelling have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that dwelling and, therefore, have standing to contest the legality of a search of the dwelling; moreover, the state's claims that the court relied on inadmissible hearsay and improperly took judicial notice of facts not testified to at the hearing in determining that L had a reasonable expectation of privacy are unavail- ing because the state failed to include an adequate analysis of how it was harmed by the court's evidentiary rulings in its brief; furthermore, the court's finding that L had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched was not clearly erroneous when the executing officers found personal items, including men's clothing and important documents such as a passport and other identifications containing L's name or photograph, in the room he alleged was his own and when he was wearing a bathrobe and slippers at the time of the search, which com- menced at 6 a.m., evidence that was sufficient to prove that L was, at a minimum, an overnight guest at the premises. 2. The trial court did not err in granting the defendants' motions to suppress: the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant that authorized the search of a different address, the only description of the premises in the warrant was the address, which clearly and unambiguously identified the place to be searched as ''349 Noble Avenue,'' and the warrant did not contain any information indicating that the issuing magistrate instead intended 351 Noble Avenue to be searched or that the officers executing the warrant otherwise had knowledge of that intent; moreover, the mistake in the warrant was not cured by the affidavit filed in support of the warrant application because the warrant did not incorporate the contents of the affidavit, as it did not reference the affidavit, there was no evidence that the affidavit was attached to the warrant, and the affidavit was under seal and was not available to the executing officers, so it could not have been used to inform the officers that the warrant was actually intended to authorize a search of 351 Noble Avenue; further- more, there are no facts in evidence to uphold the search in the face of the claim that the warrant lacked particularity because there was no evidence that the executing officers prepared the warrant or participated in the surveillance of the premises prior to the search and, therefore, understood the intended reach of the warrant and executed it accord- ingly; additionally, none of the factors that may justify a search with a technical error in the warrant was present in this case, as there was nothing on the face of the warrant to eliminate the possibility that another premises might be mistakenly searched, such as a physical description of the property, and there was no evidence that the executing officers conducted the presearch investigation or prepared the warrant application; accordingly, the search was a warrantless search that was presumptively unlawful and the state, relying entirely on the warrant as legal authorization for the search, did not claim any exception to the warrant requirement. Argued October 7, 2020—officially released March 30, 2021

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff. The defendant claimed that the trial court erred in declining to award her alimony. Held that the trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in declining to make an award of alimony to the defendant: the court considered the statutory (§ 46b-82) factors in determining whether alimony should be awarded, assessed the credibility of the parties' trial testimony, finding certain testimony of the defendant to be not credible, and, based on the evidence presented, found that the parties were able to continue the standard of living to which they were accustomed during the marriage, considering the defendant's average gross income, education and employability, as well as the division of marital property, and the defendant did not challenge any of the factual findings that supported the court's decision not to award alimony. Argued January 13—officially released March 30, 2021

The petitioner, a Haitian national who had been convicted of reckless man- slaughter in the first degree in violation of statute (§ 53a-55 (a) (3)), sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the habeas court improp- erly concluded that he had not established that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising him of the immigration consequences of his plea of nolo contendere. The petitioner asserted that his counsel failed to advise him that his plea would result in certain deportation because a conviction pursuant to § 53a-55 (a) (3) constituted a crime of moral turpitude under federal law. The court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner having failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel: contrary to the petitioner's claim that the crime of which he was convicted was one of moral turpitude that would result in definite deportation, there was no federal or Connecticut authority holding that reckless manslaughter in the first degree consti- tuted a crime of moral turpitude, and, although the petitioner's deporta- tion was extremely likely as a result his plea, it was not a certainty, as a practice guide that was available to his counsel at the time of the plea advised that crimes of moral turpitude did not render noncitizens removable in every case and that federal law permitted the waiver of that ground for removal; moreover, the petitioner's testimony that he would not have entered his plea had he known that there was a very real risk of deportation was found to be not credible by the court, which credited trial counsel's testimony that he had advised the petitioner that his plea could very likely result in his deportation and that he should expect the worst. Argued December 7, 2020—officially released April 6, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motion for contempt and awarding her appellate attorney's fees. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in granting the plaintiff's motion for contempt; contrary to the defendant's argument of a good faith misunderstanding, the court did not err in concluding that the defendant wilfully violated a clear and unambiguous court order that provided that he was required to make weekly payments to the plaintiff until a lump sum alimony award was paid in full, which he failed to do, as the court credited evidence from the plaintiff showing that the defendant owed her an outstanding balance, and the court found that the defendant had the ability to pay and did not present credible testimony or evidence that he had a good faith belief that he had paid the lump sum alimony obligation in full. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellate attorney's fees to the plaintiff; the court found that the defendant was not credible with respect to his purported inability to pay and that, pursuant to statute (§ 46b-62), the award of attorney's fees was necessary to avoid undermining the judgment of contempt and the court's orders regarding the defendant's obligation to pay the outstanding balance of the lump sum alimony owed to the plaintiff, regardless of the plaintiff's ability to pay the fees. Argued January 7—officially released April 6, 2021

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the decision of the trial court denying her postdissolution motion for contempt as to a claimed arrearage for unallocated alimony and child support, claiming that the court incor- rectly determined that she was not entitled to receive a percentage of profit distributions received by the defendant from his purchased membership interest in a company, P Co. The trial court found that the defendant received income from two sources: commission income as an employee of C Co., and distributions as a member of P Co. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt, concluding that the distributions that the defendant received from P Co. were not included in the defendant's gross annual earned income from employment, as defined in the parties' separation agreement. Held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt because the distribu- tions received by the defendant as a member of P Co. were not included in the definition of gross annual earned income from employment as defined in the parties' separation agreement: the evidence supported the court's conclusion that the distributions were not derived from the defendant's employment with C Co., including expert testimony that the defendant had paid for an equity interest in P Co., and that the income he received derived from that interest; moreover, there was no provision in the members' agreement, which concerned distributions from P Co., that required members of P Co. to be employed by C Co., the defendant purchased his membership interest in P Co. postdissolu- tion, and he receives distributions on that investment, and the separation agreement provides that all income received by the defendant due to his investment of certain assets shall not be considered in the definition of gross annual earned income from employment. Argued January 19—officially released April 6, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for gender discrimination and retal- iatory discharge in violation of statute (§ 46a-51 et seq.) as a result of the termination of her employment by the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant paid her less than it paid two male employees, whose job responsibilities she recognized were different from her own. After the defendant began to experience financial difficulties, the plain- tiff was laid off, and her duties were absorbed by other employees, including one of the two male employees she claimed had been paid more than her. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and because the court thoroughly analyzed the legal issues in concluding that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this court adopted the trial court's comprehensive and well reasoned decision as a proper statement and analysis of the applicable law on the issues presented. Argued February 8—officially released April 6, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of assault in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel pursuant to statute (§ 51-296 (a)) and State v. Casiano (282 Conn. 614). Held that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence without appointing counsel: the central holding of Casiano is that, pursuant to § 51-296 (a), a self-represented defendant has the right to counsel to determine whether a sound basis exists for a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the defendant's specific reference to Casiano in his motion consti- tuted an affirmative request for counsel; accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sen- tence was reversed and the case was remanded in order for counsel to be appointed in accordance with Casiano. Argued February 4—officially released April 6, 2021

The petitioner, who had been sentenced to ninety-five years of incarceration, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his constitutional rights were violated when he was placed in administrative segregation. Pursu- ant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-29 (4)), the habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petitioner's appeal as moot because the petitioner was no longer in administrative segregation. Thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that because the petitioner failed to address the threshold question of whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal, he was not entitled to appellate review and this court declined to review his claims on appeal. Argued February 16—officially released April 6, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle, misconduct with a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner contended that she was prejudiced by counsel's responses to evidence of her blood alcohol content and consciousness of guilt in connection with a motor vehicle collision that killed the occupants of a vehicle that was struck by the petitioner's vehicle. The petitioner had consumed alcohol at a party prior to the accident. A paramedic at the accident scene drew and labeled five tubes of the petitioner's blood, which were placed in a biohazard bag and taken with the petitioner in an ambulance to a hospital. Each of the tubes had a different colored cap. A computer in the hospital's laboratory scanned the tubes and printed labels that identified the test to be performed on each tube of blood. After a hearing outside the jury's presence, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion to exclude the blood alcohol content evidence. W, a laboratory director at the hospital, then testified that a printout from the laboratory's com- puter had indicated that the type of tube normally used to test blood alcohol content had a cap that was different in color from the caps on the five tubes that were in the biohazard bag. The petitioner's counsel thereafter did not renew his motion to exclude the blood alcohol content evidence on chain of custody grounds. The state also offered conscious- ness of guilt evidence that, shortly after the accident, the petitioner had executed a quitclaim deed transferring her one-half interest in her home to her mother. Defense counsel objected unsuccessfully to the admission of that evidence on the ground that, although evidence of a transfer of property to shield assets from recovery may be admissible in a civil case as probative of liability, it was not admissible to establish conscious- ness of guilt in a criminal case, and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on her claim that trial counsel rendered deficient performance when he did not renew his motion to exclude the blood alcohol content evidence after W's testimony or discuss it during closing argument to the jury: a. There was no reasonable probability that the trial court would have excluded the blood alcohol evidence if counsel had renewed his objec- tion or that a reviewing court would have concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling such an objection: counsel's more than sufficient, reasonable explanation for the discrepancy between the color of the tube cap in the hospital's records and the color of the cap on the tube into which the paramedic drew the petitioner's blood did not undermine the chain of custody evidence so as to require the exclusion of the test results, as the evidence tended to demonstrate that the hospital and the ambulance service used tubes with different colored caps relative to blood alcohol testing, the tubes the ambulance service used were a smaller, acceptable version of the tubes the hospital used, and, as it was unclear whether the hospital's computer system had an option in a drop-down menu to describe the color of the tube that contained the blood sample being tested, it was likely that the technician inputting the data selected the option that showed the type of tube used by the hospital, despite its not having been the precise color of the cap on the actual blood tube from which the sample tested was drawn; moreover, the state elicited substantial testimony tracing the chain of custody of the petitioner's blood samples, no witness from the laboratory testified as to any confusion, problems or mix-ups in processing the laboratory's work at the time the blood test was conducted, and the only other blood sample that was tested that night, which was from another patient, showed no detectable alcohol, a result that made it highly unlikely that it came from the petitioner in light of her admissions and other evidence that she drank a significant amount of alcohol before the accident. b. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that her counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to emphasize during closing argument W's testimony regarding the discrep- ancy in the color of the test tube caps: the petitioner did not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel emphasized W's testimony, as counsel gave a well reasoned, detailed closing argument in which he attempted to undermine the reliability of the blood alcohol test result by focusing on discrepancies in the collection, labeling and testing of the petitioner's blood, he highlighted the testimony of the medical profes- sionals and witnesses who had attended the party that she did not exhibit behavior there that was consistent with intoxication, and, had counsel emphasized W's testimony, the state could have responded by focusing on facts that provided a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy; moreover, as there was strong evidence of the petitioner's guilt, which included her statement to a paramedic at the accident scene that she had been drinking at the party, the petitioner failed to establish that she was prejudiced by her counsel's failure during closing argument to emphasize W's testimony. 2. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner was not preju- diced by her counsel's performance with respect to consciousness of guilt evidence concerning the transfer of her interest in her home to her mother shortly after the accident: a. Testimony from witnesses that counsel decided not to call, who would have corroborated the petitioner's explanation that she was planning to divorce her husband and wanted to protect her mother's finances from him, was not reasonably likely to have resulted in the exclusion of the property transfer evidence or changed the outcome of the trial, as the petitioner did not initiate divorce proceedings until fourteen months after the accident, which placed in issue her motivation for the transfer so soon after the accident, and, as the evidence of the property transfer itself was mundane, it was unlikely that the jury gave significant credence to the state's contention that it evidenced a guilty conscience. b. The petitioner failed to prove that her counsel undermined her inno- cent explanation for the property transfer when he elicited from her testimony that her interest in the property was transferred back to her because the initial transfer to her mother was inappropriate; it was unlikely that the trial was impacted by that single response from the petitioner, given the collateral relationship of the property deed when viewed against the substantial direct evidence against her, as the trial court sustained the state's objection to her testimony and, in its charge to the jury, instructed that the jury was not to consider testimony that had been stricken, which it must be presumed the jury followed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Argued October 21, 2020—officially released April 6, 2021

Convicted, after a trial to the court, of the crimes of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with a shooting, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case and personal jurisdiction over him. Held that the defendant's challenges to the trial court's jurisdiction were without merit, as his assertions lacked an arguable legal basis in that they were sovereign citizen claims that were based on the argument that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate his behavior, a defense that has been uniformly held to have no conceivable validity in American law. Submitted on briefs February 11—officially released April 6, 2021

Convicted of the crime of criminal violation of a protective order, the defen- dant appealed to this court. The trial court had issued a protective order against the defendant, which provided that she must, inter alia, stay away from the home of the victim, her former husband, and wherever the victim shall reside. The protective order listed the victim's address as a certain property, which he had obtained through divorce proceed- ings with the defendant. At the time the court issued the order, the defendant requested further clarification of the order from the court. The court orally advised the defendant to stay away from the residence of the victim, wherever it may be, including the residence listed on the protective order. Thereafter, as the defendant was driving by the property, she noticed a real estate agent's car in the driveway and pulled up to the driveway, telling the agent that she could not list or sell the property because of pending legal proceedings and a court order relating to the property. The agent notified the victim of this interaction. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she had the requisite intent to be convicted of criminal violation of a protective order, as that crime is not a specific intent crime; the state was not required to prove that the defendant specifically intended to violate a condition of the protective order, only that she intended to perform the activities constituting the violation of the protective order, specifically, that she intended to go to the property, and it was undisputed that she went to the property. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the criminal violation of protective order statute (§ 53a-223) was void for vagueness as applied to her because the language of the protective order, as explained to her by the trial court, did not provide adequate notice of what was prohibited; the terms of the protective order provided adequate notice that going to the property would constitute a violation of the order, the court's oral instruction to the defendant specifically warned her to avoid the victim's residence, the address of the property clearly was listed as the victim's address on the protective order, the language contained in the order required the defendant to stay away from the property even if the victim was not residing there, and the court's oral instructions did not alter the restrictions of the protective order in any way. Argued December 8, 2020—officially released April 13, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder and conspir- acy to commit murder, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his prior habeas counsel, V, had provided ineffective assistance, his due process rights had been violated at his criminal trial, and he was actually innocent. Specifically, the petitioner claimed that the state had withheld evidence of a plea agreement between the state and a cooperating witness, and that V rendered ineffec- tive assistance because he, inter alia, failed to investigate and present the testimony of another witness, P. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petitioner's ineffective assistance of habeas counsel claim and dismissing his due process and actual innocence claims, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The judgment of the habeas court dismissing the petitioner's due process claim was affirmed on the alternative ground that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata; the petitioner's claim that the state failed to reveal the existence of a plea agreement between the state and a cooperating witness was fully litigated and adjudicated on the merits during both the petitioner's direct appeal and his first habeas trial, and he failed to make a showing that any new factual allegations were unavailable to him when he filed his direct appeal or first habeas petition. 2. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's actual innocence claim because it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata; the legal ground and relief sought in the petitioner's actual innocence claim were identical to those in his first habeas petition and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the claim was based on evidence not reasonably available at the time of the first petition. 3. The habeas court properly denied the petitioner's ineffective assistance of habeas counsel claim because the petitioner failed to establish that V's performance was deficient; V did not testify at the petitioner's second habeas trial and, with no evidence to show what information was avail- able to him, what decisions he made, and why he made them, the petitioner could not overcome the presumption of V's competence as to his trial strategy. Argued December 1, 2020—officially released April 13, 2021

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and criminal possession of a firearm, sought a fifth writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance and that his right to due process had been violated. The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petition in part on the grounds that, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-29 (3)), the petitioner's claims were successive and barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in concluding that his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which was based on his contention that, as a self-represented litigant in his previous habeas actions, he lacked the skill and expertise to ascertain the facts underlying his present claims, and, therefore, they were not reasonably available to him; because the petitioner chose to represent himself through all of his postconviction proceedings rather than exercising his statutory right to counsel, to countenance his contention would be contrary to our jurisprudence and fundamentally unfair to the respondent Commis- sioner of Correction and to others who have an interest in the finality of the petitioner's conviction. 3. The petitioner's claim that the habeas court erred in concluding that his due process claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel was unavailing; although the petitioner reworded the nature of his claim and the theory on which it was based, it was clear that he had previously litigated the relevant issue of whether a diagram pertaining to the state's ballistics evidence that was admitted into evidence at his criminal trial was the product of fraud, as the integrity of the ballistics evidence had been the subject of extensive postconviction litigation by the petitioner. Argued January 11—officially released April 13, 2021

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of larceny in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss, which alleged that the prosecution had been instituted improperly. Held that, because the defendant failed to challenge all of the court's independent bases for denying his motion to dismiss, the court was unable to provide the defendant with any practical relief and, therefore, the appeal was moot and the court was without subject matter jurisdiction; accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. Argued January 19—officially released April 13, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, his allegedly wrongful discharge from employment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. The plaintiff asserted that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the defendant's termination of his employment violated public policy for the protection of children. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant independent school as a history teacher and he also served as the defendant's Director of Food Studies, a role that required him to establish and maintain a garden on campus and use it to teach a class on food studies. In May, 2015, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's suggestion that telephone poles that had been treated with creosote, a pesticide and wood preservative, be used to make raised beds in the garden because he believed that the chemical posed a health risk to himself and his students. Following the dispute, the plaintiff was relieved of his duties relating to the garden but remained employed as a teacher at the school, entering into at-will employment agreements with the defendant in July, 2015, and April, 2016. In September, 2016, the plaintiff's employment was terminated. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff set forth a valid wrongful discharge claim: the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his dismissal occurred for a reason that violated public policy because it did not violate any explicit statutory or constitutional provision, as there were no state or federal regulations prohibiting the use of creosote- treated wood, and it did not violate any judicially conceived notion of public policy, as, although the courts may have recognized a public policy of protecting children in their prior interpretations of child protection statutes, they have not articulated any judicially conceived notion of public policy relating to the protection of children; moreover, the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is narrow, requiring conduct that violates a clearly articulated public policy, as a broad interpretation would impair the exercise of managerial discretion and render the at-will employment doctrine meaningless; furthermore, even if this court assumed that the defendant's conduct violated public policy, the plaintiff could not have prevailed on his claim because he failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating a causal connection between his allegedly protected activity and the discharge of his employment, as the defendant's decision to enter into employment contracts with the plaintiff in July, 2015, and April, 2016, despite the May, 2015 dispute, broke the causal connection between the dispute and the plaintiff's September, 2016 termination of employment. Argued March 5, 2020—officially released April 20, 2021