[Cite as State v. Lacy,
2021-Ohio-1776.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NOS. 2020-A-0041
- vs - : 2020-A-0042
JONAH RASHUAN ERNEST LACY :
a.k.a. JONAH LACY,
:
Defendant-Appellant.
:
Criminal Appeals from the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. 2018
CR 00144 and 2018 CR 00277.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Shelley M. Pratt, Assistant
Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson,
Ohio 44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Jonah Lacy, pro se, A750-690, Lake Erie Correctional Institution, 501 Thompson Road,
P.O. Box 8000, Conneaut, Ohio 44030 (Defendant-Appellant).
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Jonah Lacy, appeals from the judgments denying his motions for
jail-time credit. We affirm.
{¶2} This consolidated appeal stems from two criminal cases against Lacy. In
the first case, Lacy was indicted on one charge of failure to comply with the order or signal
of a police officer. In the second case, Lacy was indicted on several drug trafficking
charges.
{¶3} Lacy entered guilty pleas to the failure to comply charge and to certain drug
charges pursuant to plea agreements, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The
trial court sentenced Lacy to 12 months of incarceration in the first case, with 23 days of
jail-time credit. In the second case, the trial court sentenced him to three years of
imprisonment, with no jail-time credit.
{¶4} On May 8, 2020, Lacy moved for additional jail-time credit of 184 days in
each case. The trial court overruled Lacy’s motions on the basis that Lacy was serving
his sentence in an unrelated case during the time period he cited.
{¶5} Lacy’s sole assigned error states:
{¶6} “The Trial Court erred when it abused Appellant for violating community
control was erroneous because the Trial Court incorrectly calculated jail-time credit.”
(Sic.)
{¶7} Lacy restates his assigned error after his table of contents as follows: “The
trial court erred when it abused its discretion when it denied the appellant’s motion for
additional jail-time credit pursuant to Fugate and Caccamo.”
{¶8} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g) provides, in relevant part:
Subject to division (B)(3) of this section, if the sentencing court
determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is
necessary or required, the court shall …
(g)(i) Determine, notify the offender of, and include in the
sentencing entry the total number of days, including the
sentencing date but excluding conveyance time, that the
offender has been confined for any reason arising out of the
offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by
which the department of rehabilitation and correction must
2
reduce the definite prison term imposed on the offender as the
offender’s stated prison term or, if the offense is an offense
for which a non-life felony indefinite prison term is imposed
under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the
Revised Code, the minimum and maximum prison terms
imposed on the offender as part of that non-life felony
indefinite prison term, under section 2967.191 of the Revised
Code. The court’s calculation shall not include the number of
days, if any, that the offender served in the custody of the
department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of any
prior offense for which the prisoner was convicted and
sentenced.
(ii) In making a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this
section, the court shall consider the arguments of the parties
and conduct a hearing if one is requested.
(iii) The sentencing court retains continuing jurisdiction to
correct any error not previously raised at sentencing in making
a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section. The
offender may, at any time after sentencing, file a motion in the
sentencing court to correct any error made in making a
determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section, and
the court may in its discretion grant or deny that motion. If the
court changes the number of days in its determination or
redetermination, the court shall cause the entry granting that
change to be delivered to the department of rehabilitation and
correction without delay. Sections 2931.15 and 2953.21 of
the Revised Code do not apply to a motion made under this
section.
…
(Emphasis added.); see also State v. Corpening, 11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 2018-A-0094
& 2018-A-0095, 2019-Ohio-4833,
137 N.E.3d 116, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Quarterman, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101064,
2014-Ohio-5796, ¶8 (statute as amended in 2012 “‘mark[ed]
a significant change in the law regarding jail-time credit’”).
{¶9} Here, the court’s sentencing entries note that Lacy was to receive 23 days
jail-time credit in the first case and no jail-time credit in the second case “as agreed to by
counsel.” This language suggests that counsel for the state and for Lacy stipulated to the
3
calculated amount of jail-time credit. Regardless, the records do not contain transcripts
of the sentencing hearings, precluding our review of this issue.
{¶10} Although R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) “allows a defendant to raise an issue
regarding his jail-time credit in a post-conviction motion,” he can do so “only when the
issue was not considered during the sentencing hearing. If an issue was raised and
considered at the time the trial court rendered its original credit ruling, it cannot be
asserted again in a motion for additional credit.” State v. Guiterres, 11th Dist. Trumbull
No. 2015-T-0116, 2016-Ohio-5572, ¶ 15, citing State v. Smith, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos.
15AP-209 & 15AP-214,
2015-Ohio-4465, ¶ 9. “Moreover, in moving for an additional
credit, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that their argument was not
previously considered at sentencing.” Guiterres at ¶ 15, citing Smith at ¶ 10.
{¶11} Because the records do not contain transcripts of the sentencing hearings,
Lacy cannot demonstrate whether the issue of jail-time credit that he now raises was
considered at sentencing. “On this basis alone, the substance of [Lacy]’s argument
cannot be addressed, and his sole assignment is without merit.” Guiterres at ¶ 16.
{¶12} Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.
4
