#29712-a-SPM
2022 S.D. 58
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
…
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
TRISTIN LARSON, Defendant and Appellant.
…
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
HUGHES COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
…
THE HONORABLE BOBBI J. RANK
Judge
…
BRAD A. SCHREIBER
Pierre, South Dakota Attorney for defendant
and appellant.
MARK VARGO
Attorney General
PAUL S. SWEDLUND
Solicitor General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
…
ARGUED
APRIL 26, 2022
OPINION FILED 10/05/22
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MYREN, Justice
[¶1.] Tristin Larson was indicted for aggravated battery of an infant and
alternative counts of second-degree murder or first-degree manslaughter for the
death of Easton Felix (Easton). The circuit court denied Larson’s motion to
suppress statements he made to law enforcement and his motion for judgment of
acquittal. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder and aggravated battery
of an infant. Larson appeals. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] Larson and Elizabeth Felix (Felix) were in a romantic relationship for
nearly a year. Felix had a two-year-old son, Easton. Larson, Felix, and Easton
lived in a house with Larson’s mother, Melissa Marmo, in Pierre, South Dakota. On
April 16, 2020, Larson watched Easton while Felix was at work. Larson got mad at
Easton because he was not listening to him. Larson pushed Easton on the forehead,
which caused him to fall to the floor and hit his head. 1 Easton began crying and
stood up but fell a second time. After his second fall, Easton began to convulse.
[¶3.] Larson called Felix, told her he pushed Easton and explained that
Easton was not getting up. Felix told Larson to call the police, but he told her he
did not want to do that. Felix and Larson remained on the phone during the 20
minutes it took Felix to walk home. Larson told her he pushed Easton because
1. As the only witness of the incident, Larson’s depiction of what happened
necessarily provides the initial impression of what occurred. The State’s
theory of the case was that Larson’s conduct was significantly more
aggressive than a simple push. The State attempted to prove its theory of the
case through Larson’s own description as well as expert testimony that the
injuries were inconsistent with a mere push.
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Easton was not listening and that she should not call the police because he did not
want to get into trouble. Larson also told her to blame their dog if anyone asked
what happened. When she arrived at the house, Easton was lying on the couch, and
Larson was pacing back and forth. Larson resisted Felix’s requests to call 911 but
agreed to call his mother. Marmo arrived promptly and took Easton to the hospital.
[¶4.] Law enforcement talked with Larson, Felix, and Marmo at the
hospital. Larson and Felix said Easton was knocked off the bed by the dog.
Because of bleeding in his brain, Easton was flown to Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for
further care.
[¶5.] On April 17, 2020, Felix talked with Kirsten Persson, a physician’s
assistant from Child’s Voice in Sioux Falls, and told her that she had previously lied
and that Larson pushed Easton. Felix spoke with law enforcement on the same
day, and she placed a recorded call to Larson. During this call, Larson denied
pushing Easton. During a second recorded call the next day, Larson admitted
pushing Easton.
[¶6.] Easton passed away on April 18, 2020. That same day, Larson went to
the Pierre Police Department for an interview with law enforcement. At the
beginning of the interview, Detective Dusty Pelle read Larson his rights:
Pelle: You have the continuing right to remain silent and
stop questioning at any time. Anything you say
can be used as evidence against you. You have the
continuing right to consult with and have the
presence of an attorney. If you cannot afford an
attorney, an attorney would be appointed for you.
Do you understand these rights?
Larson: Yes.
Pelle: K. Do you wish to waive these rights and talk to
me at this time?
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Larson: Um, yeah.
[¶7.] During his interview with Detective Pelle, Larson admitted that he
lied about the dog knocking Easton off the bed and that he pushed Easton on the
head, causing him to fall to the floor. Larson explained that he told Easton to get
into the shower, but Easton did not follow his directions. Larson described his
response as follows:
He just wouldn’t turn around, so I finally got mad and I said
well get, get the fuck away from me and I pushed him. And I
like, I like shoved his head and he flew back and [hit] his head
on the ground pretty hard and then he started to like get up, he
started crying and started to get up and then his legs like went
out from under him and he fell back and hit his head again[.]
Later in the interview, Larson explained:
I was just getting overwhelmed I fuck—I don’t know why I
pushed him, I didn’t mean to kill him, I didn’t know I was gonna
kill him, just pushing him you know what I—I mean yeah, I
shoved him kind of hard, but people fall all the time.
Ultimately, Larson acknowledged: “Like I knew I did it on, I, I, after I did it, I knew
I did it too hard on accident.” Once the interview concluded, Detective Pelle
arrested Larson for first-degree manslaughter.
[¶8.] A Hughes County grand jury indicted Larson for a count of second-
degree murder, alternative counts of first-degree manslaughter under SDCL 22-16-
15(1) and (2), 2 and a count of aggravated battery of an infant under SDCL 22-18-
1.4. 3
2. SDCL 22-16-15(1)-(2):
Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree if perpetrated:
(continued . . .)
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[¶9.] Larson filed a motion to suppress the statements he made during his
interview with Pierre law enforcement on April 18, 2020. Larson argued that he
was so emotionally distraught that the waiver of his Miranda rights was not legally
valid. The State asserted that Larson was not in custody at the time of the
interrogation but argued that even if there was a custodial interrogation, Larson
voluntarily waived his rights because he understood his rights and agreed to
answer questions.
[¶10.] Detective Pelle was the only witness that testified at the evidentiary
hearing on Larson’s motion to suppress. He testified that the interview lasted
approximately 40 to 45 minutes, with a break where he talked to Larson’s mother.
He noted that he read Larson his Miranda rights, and Larson agreed to waive
them. Detective Pelle testified that Larson was not placed in restraints during the
interview and had no difficulty understanding his questions. Detective Pelle stated
that he did not tell Larson he was free to leave and admitted that he probably
________________________
(. . . continued)
(1) Without any design to effect death, including an
unborn child, while engaged in the commission of any
felony other than as provided in § 22-16-4(2);
(2) Without any design to effect death, including an
unborn child, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and
unusual manner[.]
3. SDCL 22-18-1.4:
Any person who intentionally or recklessly causes serious bodily
injury to an infant, less than three years old, by causing any
intracranial or intraocular bleeding, or swelling of or damage to
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the
infant’s head to impact with an object or surface is guilty of
aggravated battery of an infant.
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would not have been allowed to leave. Detective Pelle arrested Larson at the end of
the interview.
[¶11.] Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that Larson was subjected to a
custodial interrogation 4 but had been advised of all the required Miranda warnings.
The circuit court determined that Larson had voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The circuit court determined that Larson’s
emotional state during the interview “did not affect his ability to understand his
rights, the waiver of his rights, or [Detective Pelle’s] questions.” The circuit court
concluded that Larson “had no problem responding to [Detective Pelle] regarding
the understanding and waiver of his rights and clearly expressed his desire to waive
his rights and speak to [Detective Pelle].”
[¶12.] Next, the circuit court addressed the issue of whether Larson’s
statements were voluntary. The circuit court stated that there was “no undue
pressure or conduct” exerted by Detective Pelle during the interview and that the
interview was conducted “in a calm and respectful manner.” The circuit court
determined that “Larson was emotional at times during the interview and seemed
to sleep when [Detective Pelle] stepped out to talk to his mother, [but] there is no
indication that these matters eradicated his capacity to resist pressure.” The circuit
court specified that Larson was “focused and able to quickly and completely respond
to [Detective Pelle’s] questions throughout the interview.” The circuit court denied
the motion to suppress.
4. The circuit court’s conclusion that Larson was subject to a “custodial
interrogation” was not disputed by the State on appeal.
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[¶13.] On the first day of the jury trial, Felix testified that Larson told her to
blame their dog for what happened to Easton because he did not want to go to jail.
She acknowledged that she did not call 911 immediately when she heard about
Easton’s injuries because she was worried about what Larson would do to her or
Easton. She also admitted lying to law enforcement at the hospital and going along
with the dog story. However, she testified that she later told Kirsten Persson that
Larson pushed Easton.
[¶14.] Dr. Gokhan Olgun, a pediatric intensivist from Sanford Children’s
Hospital in Sioux Falls, testified about Easton’s various injuries. Easton scored the
lowest possible score on the Glasgow Coma Scale, a tool used to understand the
alertness or responsiveness of a patient. Easton had increased intracranial
pressure caused by diffused tissue swelling, brain swelling, and edema. Dr. Olgun
stated that Easton suffered a significant neurological injury and did not respond to
physical stimuli, and an electroencephalogram showed no electrical activity in his
brain. He also noted that Easton was not breathing independently and was on a
ventilator. Dr. Olgun testified that Easton’s heart stopped beating at 2:25 p.m. on
April 18, 2020.
[¶15.] Dr. Jaime Liudahl, an emergency room physician, testified about
Easton’s condition when he first arrived at the Avera St. Mary’s Hospital in Pierre.
He stated that Easton showed decreased responsiveness, and his pupils were
unequal, indicating a brain injury. Dr. Liudahl said Easton was experiencing
decorticate posturing (involuntary flexing of muscles that looks like seizure activity)
caused by a brain injury or brain irritation. Dr. Liudahl testified that Easton
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suffered from bradycardia caused by increased intracranial pressure from bleeding
in his brain. Bradycardia is when the heart slows below the normal range. A
computed tomography (CT) scan of Easton’s head revealed that he had an
intraventricular subdural hemorrhage, a bilateral frontal subdural hemorrhage,
and a likely subarachnoid hemorrhage. Dr. Liudahl explained that acceleration-
deceleration forces cause these types of hemorrhages where the head hits something
with abrupt force.
[¶16.] Dr. Barry Monfore, a diagnostic radiologist from Avera St. Mary’s
Hospital, interpreted Easton’s CT scan. Dr. Monfore testified that Easton’s CT scan
showed he had a bifrontal subdural hemorrhage, interhemispheric hemorrhage, and
subarachnoid hemorrhage. His opinion was that these injuries were consistent with
non-accidental trauma caused by acceleration-deceleration forces such as violent
shaking or blunt force trauma to the head.
[¶17.] Detective Pelle testified about his interview with Larson. The
interview video was admitted into evidence and published to the jury during his
testimony. On cross-examination, Detective Pelle testified that Larson was
emotional during the interview and that Larson told him that he did not mean to
cause Easton’s death. Detective Pelle stated that he believed what Larson told him
was the truth. On redirect, Detective Pelle clarified that Larson said the push to
Easton was intentional.
[¶18.] Dr. Geoffrey Tufty, a pediatric ophthalmologist in Sioux Falls,
conducted an eye examination on Easton. He testified that Easton’s eyes had
intraretinal hemorrhages in all four quadrants of the retina extending to the ora
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serrata (the edge of the retina). He stated injuries related to household falls or
accidental falls are usually located around the optic nerve or into the orbit of the
eye, not in the ora serrata. Dr. Tufty opined that the force that would cause
Easton’s injuries was a rapid acceleration-deceleration mechanism, and the events
that would cause such a force would be a blow to the head or a head blow to a hard
surface. He further asserted that Easton’s injuries were a marker for abusive head
trauma.
[¶19.] In addition to speaking with Felix about the circumstances leading up
to Easton’s injuries, Kirsten Persson also examined Easton due to concerns of
physical abuse. She testified that Easton was in a coma and on mechanical
ventilation during her evaluation. She testified that Easton had pinpoint bruising
on both of his ears, bruising on his right arm, bruising and a lesion on his right leg,
a bruise on his left calf muscle, a bruise on his left jaw near his chin, and a linear
bruise on his left buttock. She also reviewed the results of his CT scan. Her opinion
was that Easton’s injuries were from physical abuse that could be specified as
abusive head trauma. Further, she asserted that an intentional push done in anger
is not accidental.
[¶20.] Dr. Kenneth Snell, the coroner for Minnehaha and Lincoln Counties
and a forensic pathologist, performed Easton’s autopsy on April 20, 2020. He
testified that his examination revealed subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhaging.
His opinion was that the strike upon Easton’s head, and the subsequent fall onto
the floor, represented a rapid acceleration-deceleration injury. This caused
shearing forces between Easton’s brain vessels and skull, resulting in
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hemorrhaging. Dr. Snell also testified about Easton’s multiple retinal hemorrhages
and stated these injuries were associated with a rapid acceleration-deceleration
type of injury. It was his opinion that Easton’s cause of death was traumatic brain
injury due to assault, and the manner of death was homicide.
[¶21.] After the State rested, Larson made a motion for judgment of
acquittal. He requested acquittal on the second-degree murder charge, arguing that
the State failed to present sufficient evidence of an act imminently dangerous to
others or of a depraved mind. He acknowledged that there was evidence that
Larson pushed Easton but argued there was no evidence that the push was
intended to harm Easton. Larson requested acquittal on the first-degree
manslaughter charge and contended that the State did not provide sufficient
evidence that Larson committed a felony, a reckless act, or an act in the heat of
passion. He argued that the evidence showed an accident with unintended
consequences. Lastly, Larson argued that there was insufficient evidence for
aggravated battery because there was no evidence that he committed a reckless act.
The circuit court denied the motion for acquittal.
[¶22.] On the third day of trial, the defense first called Sarah Big Eagle. She
testified that she knew both Larson and Felix her whole life and never saw Larson
discipline or be inappropriate with Easton. Dr. Brad Randall, a forensic
pathologist, testified that he disagreed with Dr. Snell’s determination that the
cause of death was homicide. In his view, where the actor’s intent was unclear, the
cause of death on the death certificate should be listed as undetermined, meaning it
could be an accident or a homicide.
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[¶23.] After both parties rested, Larson renewed his motion for judgment of
acquittal, and the circuit court denied the motion. The jury found Larson guilty of
second-degree murder and aggravated battery of an infant. Larson admitted the
allegations in the part II information. The circuit court sentenced Larson to life
imprisonment for second-degree murder and 55 years for aggravated battery of an
infant. The sentences were concurrent. Larson appeals.
Analysis and Decision
1. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Larson’s
motion to suppress his statements made to law
enforcement at the April 18 interview.
[¶24.] Larson argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress his statements made to law enforcement at the April 18 interview. He
states that he was mentally and emotionally distraught, causing him to be unable
to understand his Miranda rights or to voluntarily, intelligently, or knowingly
waive them. Larson contends that his “Um, yeah” answer is not a clear and
unequivocal waiver of his rights. Further, he argues that his confession was not
voluntary due to his emotional state during the interview. He asserts that the
findings of fact entered by the circuit court are inconsistent with the circuit court’s
conclusions. Instead, he believes that the circuit court’s findings force the
conclusion that Larson did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his
statements to the police were not voluntary.
[¶25.] “We review ‘the denial of a motion to suppress based on the alleged
violation of a constitutionally protected right as a question of law by applying the de
novo standard of review.’” State v. Willingham, 2019 S.D. 55, ¶ 21,
933 N.W.2d 619,
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625 (quoting State v. Rolfe, 2018 S.D. 86, ¶ 10,
921 N.W.2d 706, 709). “[W]e review
de novo a [circuit] court’s ruling on the question whether a defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived Miranda rights.” Id. ¶ 22, 933 N.W.2d at 625
(alterations in original) (quoting State v. Tuttle,
2002 S.D. 94, ¶ 6,
650 N.W.2d 20,
25). “The burden is on the State to prove the defendant’s admissions were
voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Id.
Miranda Waiver
[¶26.] “A waiver [of Miranda rights] need not be explicit, but ‘[t]o prove a
valid waiver, the State must show that (1) the relinquishment of the defendant’s
rights was voluntary and (2) the defendant was fully aware that those rights were
being waived and of the consequences of waiving them.’” State v. Two Hearts,
2019
S.D. 17, ¶ 21,
925 N.W.2d 503, 512 (second alteration in original) (quoting Tuttle,
2002 S.D. 94, ¶ 9,
650 N.W.2d at 26). “The State must prove the validity of the
waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Id.
[¶27.] “A court examines the totality of the circumstances when considering
whether a valid waiver has taken place, such as ‘a defendant’s age, experience,
intelligence, and background, including familiarity with the criminal justice system,
as well as physical and mental condition.’” Id. ¶ 22,
925 N.W.2d at 512 (quoting
State v. Lewandowski,
2019 S.D. 2, ¶ 21,
921 N.W.2d 915, 921). “A waiver may be
inferred from the defendant’s understanding of the rights coupled with ‘a course of
conduct reflecting a desire to give up those rights.’”
Id. (quoting State v. Diaz,
2014
S.D. 27, ¶ 47,
847 N.W.2d 144, 160).
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[¶28.] Larson argues that his emotional state during the interview prevented
him from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights.
This Court has addressed whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived their Miranda rights in the context of psychological pressure,
intoxication, impaired mental state, sleep deprivation, lack of understanding of
English, and being a juvenile. See, e.g., Lewandowski, 2019 S.D. 2, ¶¶ 25–26, 921
N.W.2d at 921–22 (defendant argued he was mentally impaired because he was
intoxicated and had mental health issues); Two Hearts,
2019 S.D. 17, ¶ 25,
925
N.W.2d at 513 (defendant argued he experienced drug withdrawals and
psychological pressures); Diaz,
2014 S.D. 27, ¶ 23,
847 N.W.2d at 154 (defendant
was a juvenile); State v. Ralios,
2010 S.D. 43, ¶ 23,
783 N.W.2d 647, 654 (defendant
argued he was not proficient in English and was sleep deprived). Moreover, this
Court has recognized that the defendant’s mental state is one of the circumstances
considered when determining whether a defendant has waived their Miranda
rights. Two Hearts,
2019 S.D. 17, ¶ 22,
925 N.W.2d at 512.
[¶29.] At the beginning of the interview, Larson’s head was down on the table
in his arms when Detective Pelle read him his rights and asked him whether he
understood his rights. Larson responded by saying, “Yes.” When Detective Pelle
asked Larson if he wished to waive his rights and speak to him, Larson lifted his
head, looked at Detective Pelle, and stated, “Um, yeah.” After this answer, Larson
told the detective in detail what happened on April 16, 2020. Larson’s reactions and
responses during the interview do not support his argument that his emotional
condition prevented him from understanding his rights and waiving them. His
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conduct shows that he was not confused or unable to decide to waive his Miranda
rights. Instead, his response of “Um, yeah,” and raising his head off the table to
look at Detective Pelle show that he understood the questions and knew he was
waiving his Miranda rights. See Massachusetts v. McNulty, 937 N.E.2d 16, 35
(Mass. 2010) (stating that being “emotional[ly] upset alone does not render a waiver
of [Miranda] rights or the voluntariness of the statement itself invalid where there
is no evidence that the defendant was acting irrationally [during the
interrogation].” (third alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Auclair,
828
N.E.2d 471, 478 (Mass. 2005))).
[¶30.] In Ralios, the defendant argued that his “yeah” response was
“meaningless conversation filler.”
2010 S.D. 43, ¶ 31,
783 N.W.2d at 656. This
Court disagreed and determined that the defendant’s “yeah” response “was an
affirmative and unequivocal positive response” to waive his Miranda rights. Id.
¶ 34,
783 N.W.2d at 657. Like the defendant in Ralios, Larson said, “Um, yeah”
when asked whether he wanted to waive his rights and talk to the detective. He
then answered all of the detective’s questions until the detective concluded the
interview. “A Miranda waiver may be inferred from the defendant’s understanding
of the rights coupled with a course of conduct reflecting a desire to give up those
rights.” Lewandowski,
2019 S.D. 2, ¶ 21,
921 N.W.2d at 921 (quoting Tuttle,
2002
S.D. 94, ¶ 16,
650 N.W.2d at 29). Larson was fully engaged during the interview
and provided detailed answers to Detective Pelle’s questions regarding Easton’s
incident. This type of conduct is indicative of a “course of conduct reflecting”
Larson’s desire to waive his Miranda rights. See Diaz,
2014 S.D. 27, ¶ 49, 847
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N.W.2d at 161 (concluding that answering questions reflected the defendant’s desire
to waive Miranda rights); Ralios, 2010 S.D. 43, ¶ 34,
783 N.W.2d at 658
(“Defendant’s willingness to answer questions about the potential charges against
him showed a course of conduct reflecting a desire to give up his Miranda rights
. . . .”); State v. Rhines,
1996 S.D. 55, ¶ 36,
548 N.W.2d 415, 429 (noting that the
defendant’s “articulate and detailed” answers to questions was conduct showing a
valid waiver).
[¶31.] The totality of the circumstances surrounding Larson’s interview
supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Larson’s waiver was intelligent,
knowing, and voluntary.
Voluntariness of Confession
[¶32.] “[T]he validity of a Miranda waiver of rights and the voluntariness of
an admission are separate but parallel inquiries.” State v. Strozier,
2013 S.D. 53,
¶ 21,
834 N.W.2d 857, 864 (citation omitted). Whether a confession was voluntary
is a legal question and reviewed de novo. Tuttle,
2002 S.D. 94, ¶ 20,
650 N.W.2d at
30.
[¶33.] “Once suspects in custody are properly advised of, and agree to waive,
their Miranda rights, they may be freely questioned as long as interrogators do not
obtain a confession through coercion.” Strozier,
2013 S.D. 53, ¶ 21,
834 N.W.2d at
864 (citation omitted). “The voluntariness of a confession depends on the absence of
police overreaching. Confessions are not deemed voluntary if, in light of the totality
of the circumstances, law enforcement officers have overborne the defendant’s will.”
Id. (citation omitted).
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Two factual inquiries are relevant.
The factual inquiry centers on (1) the conduct of law
enforcement officials in creating pressure and (2) the suspect’s
capacity to resist that pressure. On the latter factor, we
examine such concerns as the defendant’s age; level of education
and intelligence; the presence or absence of any advice to the
defendant on constitutional rights; the length of detention; the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the use of
psychological pressure or physical punishment, such as
deprivation of food or sleep; and the defendant’s prior experience
with law enforcement officers and the courts. Finally, deception
or misrepresentation by the officer receiving the statement may
also be factors for the trial court to consider; however, the police
may use some psychological tactics in interrogating a suspect.
Id. (citation omitted).
[¶34.] Larson argues that his admissions to law enforcement were not
voluntary because he was emotionally impaired during questioning. Larson does
not challenge the circuit court’s findings but contends that the findings support his
position that his emotional state impaired his ability to give a voluntary confession.
[¶35.] The circuit court found that Larson was 21 years old at the time of the
interview and had previous “significant exposure” to the criminal justice system.
Detective Pelle told Larson the purpose of the interview, and Larson agreed to
participate. The circuit court found that Larson was placed in an interview room
but was not handcuffed. Detective Pelle wore his service weapon and never
informed Larson that he was free to leave. Detective Pelle read Larson all of his
Miranda rights from a pre-printed card. As the circuit court noted, Larson was
“very emotional and remorseful” at several points during the interview. Still,
Detective Pelle would wait for Larson to compose himself before continuing his
questioning. The circuit court found that Detective Pelle asked questions in a calm
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and sometimes sympathetic manner. In response to these questions, “Larson was
fully engaged with [Detective Pelle] and clearly understood [Detective Pelle’s]
questions.” The circuit court found that “Larson was able to give detailed responses
and demonstrations” about what happened to Easton. The total time of the
interview was one hour but included in that hour was a 30-minute break without
questioning.
[¶36.] Based on these findings, the circuit court concluded: “there was no
undue pressure or conduct by [Detective Pelle].” Also, the circuit court concluded
that Larson’s emotional state at times during the interview did not “eradicate[] his
capacity to resist pressure.”
[¶37.] Our de novo review also reveals that Larson was able to respond and
give detailed answers to Detective Pelle’s questions despite being emotional. There
is no indication that Larson’s periodically heightened emotional state impacted his
“ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess.” See State v.
Morato, 2000 S.D. 149, ¶ 12,
619 N.W.2d 655, 660 (“A defendant’s will is overborne,
making a statement involuntary, when interrogation tactics and statements are so
manipulative or coercive as to deprive a defendant of the ‘ability to make an
unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess.’” (citation omitted)); see also State v.
Jenner,
451 N.W.2d 710, 717 (S.D. 1990) (“Mere emotionalism does not necessarily
invalidate a confession.”). When Larson became emotional, Detective Pelle waited
until Larson collected himself before continuing the interview. There is no evidence
from the record or video that Larson misunderstood the questions he answered.
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[¶38.] Considering the totality of the circumstances, we determine that the
circuit court did not err in concluding that Larson’s interview statements were
voluntary. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of Larson’s motion to suppress.
2. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Larson’s
motion for judgment of acquittal and whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.
[¶39.] This Court reviews the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. State
v. Armstrong, 2020 S.D. 6, ¶ 12,
939 N.W.2d 9, 12. “In measuring the sufficiency of
the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Frias,
2021 S.D. 26, ¶ 21,
959
N.W.2d 62, 68 (quoting State v. Brim,
2010 S.D. 74, ¶ 6,
789 N.W.2d 80, 83). “[T]he
jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence.”
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “In determining the
sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
on the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence.”
Id. (quoting State v. Bausch,
2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 33,
889 N.W.2d 404, 413).
Second-Degree Murder
[¶40.] Larson argues that the State failed to present evidence that his actions
were “imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind.” He asserts
that although he intended to push Easton, he did not intend the push to cause
injury or death. Larson claims on appeal, as he did to the jury, that Easton’s death
resulted from an accidental consequence of the push. Larson contends the evidence
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was insufficient to establish he acted with a depraved mind because the one push
resulted in unforeseen and unintended injuries.
[¶41.] SDCL 22-16-7 defines second-degree murder as “perpetrated by any
act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard
for human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any
particular person, including an unborn child.”
[¶42.] Second-degree murder is a general-intent crime requiring the State to
prove the defendant “had the intent to do the physical act or recklessly committed
‘the physical act which the crime requires[.]’” Kleinsasser v. Weber, 2016 S.D. 16,
¶ 24,
924 N.W.2d 455, 464, as modified (Apr. 18, 2016) (citation omitted). “[T]he
State must prove that the defendant’s conduct established that he was acting with a
depraved mind.” State v. Little Long,
2021 S.D. 38, ¶ 69,
962 N.W.2d 237, 259.
“Depraved mind” is a “mens rea requirement involv[ing] less culpability than the
element of premeditation required for first-degree murder.”
Id. (citation omitted).
“If a person is able to act with a lack of regard for the life of another, then that
person can be convicted of second degree murder.” Frias,
2021 S.D. 26, ¶ 23,
959
N.W.2d at 68 (quoting State v. Laible,
1999 S.D. 58, ¶ 13,
594 N.W.2d 328, 332).
“[W]hether conduct is imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved
mind regardless of human life is to be determined from the conduct itself and the
circumstances of its commission.” Id. ¶ 23,
959 N.W.2d at 69 (citation omitted).
[¶43.] Perhaps the most compelling evidence presented to the jury was
Larson’s explanation during his videotaped interview with Detective Pelle and the
medical testimony documenting the severe injuries Easton sustained as a result of
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Larson’s actions. During that interview, Larson described and demonstrated how
he “pushed” Easton. Larson stated, that after Easton would not go into the shower,
I finally got mad and I said well get, get the fuck away from me
and I pushed him. And I like, I like shoved his head and he flew
back and [hit] his head on the ground pretty hard and then he
started to like get up, he started crying and started to get up
and then his legs like went out from under him and he fell back
and hit his head again[.]
Larson further stated,
I was just gettin[g] overwhelmed I fuck . . . I don’t know why I
pushed him, I didn’t mean to kill him, I didn’t know I was gonna
kill him, just pushing him you know what I . . . I mean yeah, I
shoved him kind of hard, but people fall all the time.
He told Detective Pelle, “Like I knew I did it on, I, I, after I did it, I knew I did it too
hard on accident.”
[¶44.] Dr. Liudahl testified that Easton’s injuries included bradycardia,
decorticate posturing, an intraventricular subdural hemorrhage, bilateral frontal
subdural hemorrhage, and a likely subarachnoid hemorrhage. He explained that
Easton’s hemorrhages were caused by his head abruptly hitting something. Dr.
Monfore also testified that Easton suffered from a bifrontal subdural hemorrhage,
interhemispheric hemorrhage, and subarachnoid hemorrhage. Dr. Monfore opined
that Easton’s injuries resulted from non-accidental trauma caused by either violent
shaking or blunt force trauma to Easton’s head. Dr. Tufty testified that Easton’s
eyes had intraretinal hemorrhages extending to the ora serrata. Dr. Tufty stated
that these injuries are not typically seen with accidental falls and are associated
with shaking or a blow to the head. Kirsten Persson testified about the bruises
found on Easton’s ears, right arm, left leg, left jaw, and buttock. She opined that
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Easton’s injuries were from physical abuse and abusive head trauma. Dr. Snell
testified about the subdural, subarachnoid, and retinal hemorrhaging he found on
Easton during his post-mortem examination. He opined that these injuries
constituted a traumatic brain injury caused by the rapid acceleration-deceleration
event of the strike upon Easton’s head and his subsequent fall to the floor.
[¶45.] The jury rejected Larson’s theory that his push to Easton’s head
resulted in an accidental death and found him guilty of second-degree murder.
Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Larson had a “depraved
mind” when he pushed or shoved Easton to the ground with such force as to cause
the significant head injuries that led to Easton’s death. See State v. Falkenberg,
2021 S.D. 59, ¶ 36,
965 N.W.2d 580, 591 (“[A] blow to [the victim]’s face, with force
sufficient to cause a ‘fighter’s fracture’ on [defendant]’s right hand, evinces an
indifference to human life and the depravity necessary to support a second-degree
murder charge.”); State v. Harruff,
2020 S.D. 4, ¶ 42,
939 N.W.2d 20, 31
(Defendant’s “admission that he struck [the victim] in the chest with the force of a
mule kick evinces a lack of regard for her life” that was sufficient, in combination
with the other facts of the case, to support a second-degree murder conviction);
State v. Miller,
2014 S.D. 49, ¶ 29,
851 N.W.2d 703, 709 (noting that testimony from
physicians that the victim’s “injuries were from shaking, or blows, and were non-
accidental in nature” was sufficient evidence for second-degree murder).
[¶46.] “No guilty verdict will be set aside if the evidence, including
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, sustains a
reasonable theory of guilt.” State v. Shaw,
2005 S.D. 105, ¶ 19,
705 N.W.2d 620,
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626 (quoting State v. Buchholz, 1999 S.D. 110, ¶ 33,
598 N.W.2d 899, 905). When
the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of second-degree murder beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Aggravated Battery of an Infant
[¶47.] Larson also contends there was insufficient evidence to establish the
elements of aggravated battery of an infant. The State asserted that Larson was
“reckless” because he pushed Easton with sufficient force to cause him to fall and
hit his head on the ground with such force that he suffered injuries to his brain that
caused his death. Jury instruction No. 36 defined “recklessly” as “a conscious and
unjustifiable disregard of a substantial risk that one’s conduct may cause a certain
result or may be of a certain nature.” Further, the circuit court instructed the jury
that “[a] person is reckless with respect to circumstances when the person
consciously and unjustifiably disregards a substantial risk that such circumstances
may exist.”
[¶48.] Larson insists that the incident involving Easton was an accident and
that the evidence does not show a substantial risk that Easton would fall, causing
him injury. Larson notes that the room where the incident occurred was carpeted
with no dangerous objects on the floor or in the vicinity.
[¶49.] During his interview with Detective Pelle, however, Larson admitted
that he was mad and pushed Easton hard enough to cause him to fall and strike his
head on the floor with sufficient force to make an audible noise. He said he knew
right away that he had pushed him too hard.
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[¶50.] As previously noted, the State presented testimony about Easton’s
significant injuries, including bifrontal subdural, interhemispheric, subarachnoid,
and intraretinal hemorrhaging. These injuries were fatal for Easton. Furthermore,
several witnesses testified that Easton’s injuries were not accidental and were
associated with child abuse. Dr. Snell opined that the manner of Easton’s death
was homicide due to traumatic brain injury. The jury heard Larson’s theory of the
case that Easton’s death was an accident and rejected it. In determining the
sufficiency of the evidence, it is not this Court’s task to resolve conflicting evidence
or weigh the evidence. Frias, 2021 S.D. 26, ¶ 21,
959 N.W.2d at 68. Here, there is
sufficient evidence that a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of
aggravated battery of an infant. Specifically, that Larson’s actions were at least
reckless.
[¶51.] Based on our review of the record, the evidence is sufficient to support
the conviction of aggravated battery of an infant. The circuit court did not err by
denying Larson’s motions for judgment of acquittal.
Conclusion
[¶52.] The circuit court did not err in denying Larson’s motion to suppress his
statement to law enforcement or his motions for judgment of acquittal. There was
sufficient evidence to support the convictions for second-degree murder and
aggravated battery of an infant. The convictions are affirmed.
[¶53.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN and DEVANEY, Justices, concur.
[¶54.] SALTER, Justice, concurs specially.
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SALTER, Justice (concurring specially).
[¶55.] I join the Court’s opinion, but I write specially to question whether a
separate voluntariness inquiry for Larson’s statements is truly necessary, given the
fact that his arguments challenging the voluntariness of his Miranda waiver and
his confession are identical.
[¶56.] The United States Supreme Court has observed that “one virtue of
Miranda [is] the fact that the giving of the warnings obviates the need for a case-by-
case inquiry into the actual voluntariness of the admissions of the accused.”
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359,
101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809,
69 L. Ed. 2d 696
(1981). But this is not to say “that compliance with Miranda conclusively
establishes the voluntariness of a subsequent confession” in all instances. Berkemer
v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20,
104 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 n.20,
82 L. Ed. 2d 317
(1984). Still, “cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a
self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.” Id.; see also
Dickerson v. U.S.,
530 U.S. 428, 444,
120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336,
147 L. Ed. 2d 405
(2000).
[¶57.] This is not that type of rare case. Larson’s challenge to the
voluntariness of his statements is unaccompanied by a claim that they were
actually compelled and is otherwise indistinguishable from his argument that his
mental state prevented a valid Miranda waiver. Therefore, having determined that
this waiver was “intelligent, knowing, and voluntary[,]” I believe it is not necessary
to undertake the same voluntariness analysis with regard to his confession.
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