State v. Sargent

                          IN THE SUPREME COURT
                          STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA


                                     

State of North Dakota,                                             Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Richard Jon Michael Sargent,                                    Defendant and Appellant

                               Nos. 20230351 & 20230353

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, the
Honorable Joshua B. Rustad, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and Justices McEvers
and Tufte joined. Justice Crothers filed an opinion dissenting.

Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State’s Attorney, Williston, ND, for plaintiff and appellee;
submitted on brief.

Samuel A. Gereszek, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                                    State v. Sargent
                               Nos. 20230351 & 20230353

Bahr, Justice.

[¶1] Richard Sargent appeals from two criminal judgments entered following his
conditional pleas of guilty to 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 17
counts of theft of a firearm, and one count of theft of $500-$1000. Sargent’s conditional
plea reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. We conclude the traffic stop was valid, the officers had reasonable suspicion to
extend the traffic stop, and the automobile exception allowed the officers to search the
Nissan Armada on the trailer attached to the Chevrolet Tahoe driven by Sargent. We affirm.

                                             I

[¶2] Law enforcement received an anonymous tip “indicating that a ‘Richie’ would be
towing another vehicle to Williston, ND and operating a Yukon SUV. The anonymous
tipster indicated that ‘Richie’ was accompanied by a bearded heavier set male and had ‘a
lot of guns with them.’” “Based on the information received, law enforcement believed the
suspect individual was [Sargent].” At 3:15 a.m. the next day, an officer observed a
Chevrolet Tahoe SUV pulling a trailer carrying a Nissan Armada SUV. The Tahoe stopped
past a stop sign, drove down a dirt road, and stopped past a second stop sign. The officer
conducted a traffic stop of the Tahoe.

[¶3] Sargent was the driver of the Tahoe. There was also a passenger in the Tahoe; an
officer described the Tahoe’s passenger as “a bearded heavier set male.” When the officer
attempted to contact the passenger by knocking on the window, the passenger would not
look at the officer or acknowledge his presence. The officer went to the driver’s side of the
Tahoe and made contact with the driver, Sargent. The officer observed “that the front seat
passenger appeared to be attempting to conceal his face with a low hat covering his eyes.”
The officer observed the passenger was not wearing a seatbelt and requested his
identification. The passenger initially refused to give the officer his identification, but
eventually complied.



[¶4] The officer observed a handgun in the back seat of the Tahoe. The handgun was
later determined to be fake. After initial contact with Sargent, officers placed Sargent in a


                                             1
police car. The officers determined Sargent was on probation, had a narcotics history, and
did not have any active warrants. The officers also determined the passenger was on
probation and had a narcotics history. Sargent told the officer they were headed to a shop
in town. However, the Tahoe had already passed the shop, the route to the shop Sargent
was taking was out of the way, and the route Sargent took was on a poorly maintained road.

[¶5] The officers observed Sargent showed signs of “extreme nervousness.” His hands
were shaking, he could not be still, and his voice appeared to be in distress.

[¶6] With Sargent still in the police car, officers requested a K-9 unit, which arrived
“roughly 30 minutes after the stop.” When the K-9 arrived, the K-9 sniffed both vehicles
and alerted positively on the Tahoe, but not the towed Armada. Officers searched both
vehicles. They found syringes in the Tahoe and firearms in the towed Armada. The officers
arrested Sargent for felon in possession of firearms.

[¶7] The State charged Sargent with 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a
felon, 17 counts of theft of a firearm, and one count of theft of $500-$1000. Sargent moved
to suppress the evidence gathered in the stop. The district court denied Sargent’s motion to
suppress evidence. Sargent entered conditional pleas of guilty to all the charges.

                                            II

[¶8]   When reviewing a motion to suppress, this Court:

       [D]efer[s] to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts in
       testimony in favor of affirmance. We will affirm a district court’s decision
       on a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly
       capable of supporting the trial court’s findings, and the decision is not
       contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

State v. Casatelli, 

, 

 (quoting City of Bismarck v. Vagts,

, ¶ 4, 

). “Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal,
and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law.” 

 (quoting
Vagts, at ¶ 4).

                                            III

[¶9] Sargent argues “[t]he anonymous tip was not reliable, nor was it sufficient to
establish reasonable articulable suspicion” to stop the Tahoe.


                                             2
[¶10] “A law enforcement officer may initiate a traffic stop for an investigation if the
officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver has violated or is violating a
law.” State v. Boger, 

, 

. “Reasonable suspicion for a stop
exists when a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some
objective manifestation to believe the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in
unlawful activity.” 

 (quoting State v. Corum, 

, 

). “The
severity of an observed traffic violation is of no consequence: ‘It is well settled, traffic
violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct which
provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops.’” State v.
Ostby, 

, 

 (quoting Pesanti v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 

, 

). Moreover, the reasonableness of a stop does not depend
on the officer’s motivations. 

 “[T]raffic violations, even if pretextual, provide a lawful
basis to conduct an investigatory vehicle stop, and evidence discovered during those stops
is admissible.” Ostby, at ¶ 8.

[¶11] After reviewing the video of the stop, the district court found the footage established
Sargent “failed to stop at the point nearest the intersection roadway before entering it,” in
violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-10-24. Thus, the court concluded “the traffic violation provided
a lawful basis to conduct an investigatory stop.” The court’s finding Sargent violated
N.D.C.C. § 39-10-24 is supported by competent evidence. The court’s conclusion the
traffic violation provided a lawful basis for the officer to stop the vehicle is in accordance
with the law. Because the officer observed Sargent commit a traffic violation, the stop was
valid and the reliability of the anonymous tip is not relevant to whether the officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop the Tahoe.

                                             IV

[¶12] Sargent argues the officers unreasonably extended the traffic stop when they called
in a K-9 unit.

[¶13] “During a lawfully-initiated traffic stop, the officer can conduct activities ‘related
to traffic enforcement but not absolutely necessary to issuing a traffic ticket.’” State v.
Marsolek, 

, 

 (quoting State v. Vetter, 

, 

). “The Fourth Amendment tolerates certain unrelated investigations
that do not lengthen the roadside detention.” State v. Stands, 

, 

 (cleaned up) (quoting Rodriguez v. U.S., 

 (2015)). However, “after
the completion of the traffic stop duties, if the officer continues the seizure, he violates the


                                               3
Fourth Amendment ‘unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion for believing that
criminal activity is afoot.’” 

 (quoting State v. Fields, 

, 

).

[¶14] In Marsolek, this Court explained when a traffic stop becomes an unconstitutional
seizure:

       Traffic violations justify a stop by police officers. When an officer seizes an
       individual for a traffic violation, it justifies a police investigation of that
       violation. Because a routine traffic stop is relatively brief, it is more like a
       “Terry stop” than an arrest. The time it takes to complete the “mission” of
       the stop, to “address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend
       to related safety concerns,” is a permissible length of time to detain someone.
       However, a stop may not extend longer than the amount of time necessary to
       effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop. An officer’s seizure of a person is
       permitted only until the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably
       should have been—completed. A traffic stop prolonged beyond the “time
       reasonably required to complete the stop’s mission” is unlawful. Unrelated
       inquiries are permitted during a stop as long as they do not prolong the stop
       and extend the time the individual is detained. A stop may be prolonged only
       if the officer has reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the individual for
       inquiries unrelated to the stop.

 (quoting Vetter, 

).

[¶15] The district court found multiple factors gave the officers reasonable suspicion to
extend the stop. The factors identified by the court include Sargent “appearing nervous, his
criminal history, the fact that [Sargent] was on probation, and conflicting information
provided in the interactions with the [vehicle] occupants.” “In addition,” the court found,
“law enforcement was able to corroborate certain aspects of the anonymous informant’s
tip from the night before including a vehicle towing another vehicle, and a name and
information law enforcement was able to discern was [Sargent].” It then concluded “the
continued detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as the seizure was not justified
solely by the stop sign issue, but by that additional reasonable suspicion, and the continued
detention was to address that suspicion.”

[¶16] This Court applies “an objective standard to determine whether an officer has
reasonable suspicion.” Stands, 

.




                                              4
       [T]his Court looks at the totality of the circumstances, applies an objective
       standard, and takes into account the inferences and deductions that an
       investigating officer would make that may elude a layperson. The question
       is whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by
       some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to
       be, engaged in unlawful activity.

 (quoting Vetter, 

). Reasonable suspicion is not easily reduced to a
methodical set of legal rules, but it does require more than a “mere hunch.” Fields, 

.

[¶17] One factor considered by the officers is Sargent appeared extremely nervous. “An
individual’s nervousness during a traffic stop ‘is a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion.’” State v. Adan, 

, 

 (quoting State
v. Heitzmann, 

, 

). “However, nervousness alone is
insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion.” 

 Moreover, the passenger was evasive.
He refused to respond to the officer, appeared to be attempting to conceal his face, and
initially refused to give his identification to the officer. “Nervous, evasive behavior is a
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Fields, 

 (quoting
Heitzmann, at ¶ 15).

[¶18] The officers also considered that Sargent and the passenger had criminal histories
and were on probation. An officer’s knowledge of an individual’s criminal history “is a
legitimate factor to be taken into account in determining whether there is a sufficient
quantum of suspicion. . . .” Fields, 

 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 9.4(f), 192 (3d ed. 1996)). “Although insufficient alone, a person’s criminal
history can support a finding of reasonable suspicion.” State v. Wills, 

,

. Here, both Sargent and the passenger had criminal histories and were on
probation. The officers appropriately considered Sargent’s nervousness, the passenger’s
evasive behavior, and their criminal histories and probationary statuses in combination
with other factors when deciding to investigate further whether Sargent was involved in
unlawful activity.

[¶19] One of the other factors the officers considered was Sargent’s explanation of where
he was going. “When there are inconsistencies about the details of a trip, these
inconsistencies may be used in forming a reasonable suspicion.” Adan, 

;
see also Fields, 

 (stating “unusual or suspicious travel plans may give
rise to reasonable suspicion”). Sargent’s travel plan was inconsistent because he claimed


                                             5
he was traveling to a shop he already passed. His route was also suspicious, it being out of
the way and on a poorly maintained road. Moreover, the time of day is relevant, particularly
when considering Sargent’s explanation for their trip. “The lateness of the hour is [a] fact
that may raise the level of suspicion.” Fields, at ¶ 20 (quoting U.S. v. Lender, 

 (4th Cir. 1993)).

[¶20] The anonymous tip was another factor the officers considered. State v. Miller, 

 (N.D. 1994) (explaining corroborated anonymous tips may raise a
reasonable suspicion). The officers corroborated many aspects of the anonymous
informant’s tip, including a vehicle was towing a trailer with another vehicle, the general
location, there was a driver and a passenger, the driver’s name, and the description of the
passenger. See State v. Neis, 

 (N.D. 1991) (“We have held before that
an anonymous tip, together with the officer’s own observations, is sufficient for a
reasonable suspicion.”); cf. State v. Thordarson, 

 (N.D. 1989)
(concluding a reasonable suspicion stop is appropriate where an anonymous tip is bolstered
by an officer’s own senses).

[¶21] To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer need not rule out all potential innocent
reasons for the behavior in question. State v. Bolme, 

, 

.
Moreover, an officer does not have to observe illegal conduct to have reasonable suspicion.
In analyzing whether reasonable suspicion existed, courts may consider “innocent
conduct,” i.e., conduct that “is not inherently suspicious.” Adan, 

. That
is because courts do “not view each fact in isolation; rather, [they] look at the totality of
the circumstances to determine if reasonable, articulable suspicion exists.” 

 “Although
no one fact before the court may by itself support reasonable suspicion, several taken
together can acquire as a whole a significance they lack when taken individually.” State v.
$127,930 United States Currency, 

, 

.

[¶22] Here, the officers articulated many factors that gave them reasonable suspicion
Sargent was engaged in unlawful activity. Considering the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude there was reasonable and articulable suspicion that Sargent was engaged in
criminal activity and that his continued detention until a K-9 unit arrived was lawful.

                                             V

[¶23] Sargent argues the officers only had probable cause to search the Tahoe because the
officers’ probable cause did not extend to the towed Armada.


                                             6
[¶24] This Court has explained:

             The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
      I, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution protect individuals from
      unreasonable searches and seizures. Where an individual has a reasonable
      expectation of privacy in an area, the government must obtain a search
      warrant unless the search falls within a recognized exception to the warrant
      requirement. If an exception does not apply to the search, evidence
      discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed under
      the exclusionary rule. The burden is on the State to prove a warrantless search
      falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.

State v. Lelm, 

, 

 (cleaned up).

[¶25] One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. “Under the
automobile exception, law enforcement may search for illegal contraband without a
warrant when probable cause exists.” State v. Lark, 

, 

.
The district court found “there was clearly probable cause to search the [Tahoe], as the K-
9 alert gave probable cause to search the [Tahoe.]” Sargent does not challenge this
conclusion. Thus, the issue is whether the automobile exception extends to the Armada on
the trailer towed by the Tahoe. We conclude the automobile exception permitted the
officers to search the towed Armada.

[¶26] In State v. Otto, 

, 

, this Court held the automobile
exception applied to a camper. In Otto, the “camper had the landing gear down, power
cords were plugged in, and no vehicle was hooked up to it.” Id. at ¶ 16. In reaching our
decision, we noted there are “two different ‘automobile exception’ theories—mobility and
a lesser expectation of privacy.” Id. (quoting State v. Garrett, 

, 

). Although the “camper was not mobile while the officers were present, it was
capable of being mobilized within a very short time.” 

 Furthermore, the “camper was in
a commercial parking lot” making the case “more akin to an automobile search than to the
search of a permanent residence.” Id. at ¶ 17. Both automobile exception theories support
application of the exception here. The Armada was on a trailer being towed by the Tahoe.
Thus, it was mobile and could quickly be moved. The Armada was also on a public road,
meaning there was a lesser expectation of privacy.

[¶27] Case law in other jurisdictions support our conclusion the automobile exception
extends to the towed vehicle. For example, in State v. Finlay, 

 (Or. App.
2013), the Oregon Court of Appeals held the automobile exception extended to the

                                            7
warrantless search of a trailer attached to the defendant’s pickup. In reaching its conclusion,
the court wrote:

       [T]he exigency that permits the police to conduct a warrantless search of a
       mobile vehicle arises from the fact that the vehicle can be quickly moved out
       of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. That
       justification applies equally in the case of a trailer, or any container, that is
       attached to a vehicle. That is so because, if the vehicle quickly moves out of
       the locality or jurisdiction, so too will the container attached to it.

 (cleaned up).

[¶28] The Kansas Supreme Court held probable cause to search a truck was sufficient to
establish probable cause to search the entire traveling unit, including the fifth-wheel
camper being towed by the truck. State v. Crudo, 

 (Kan. 2024). In Crudo,
“officers noticed the smell of raw marijuana coming from the cab of the truck.” 

.
“Officers did not observe any smell of marijuana coming from the fifth-wheel trailer[.]”

 “Nonetheless, the officers did search the trailer.” 

 The court explained, “The trailer
was being towed down the highway and was sufficiently mobile to satisfy the exigency
requirement.” 

 The court then concluded “that probable cause to search a stopped vehicle
does not have to be ‘localized’ and thus limited to one particular area or part of the
travelling unit. That is, under the automobile exception, once probable cause to search is
established, it extends ‘bumper-to-bumper’ to the entire travelling unit.” 

.

[¶29] In State v. Overbey, 

, 

, the South Dakota Supreme Court
held a drug-dog’s alert to the cab of the pickup truck justified the police searching the
camper towed by the pickup truck. The court wrote, “The fifth-wheel camper was being
towed by the pickup in the same fashion in which a semi-tractor tows a trailer.” Id. at ¶ 23.
The court went on to say, “The camper was a part of the pickup and subject to search as
long as the motor vehicle exception was satisfied as to any part of the pickup or camper.”
Id.

[¶30] We hold the officers had probable cause to search the Armada on the trailer towed
by the Tahoe driven by Sargent.

                                             VI

[¶31] We hold the district court did not err in denying Sargent’s motion to suppress
evidence. We affirm.


                                              8
[¶32] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

Crothers, J., dissenting.

[¶33] I agree with much of what the majority has written but ultimately dissent because
of inadequate findings by the district court. I also write separately because some of the
suspicion factors here raise concerns like they did in State v. Anderson, 

(Crothers, J., dissenting).

[¶34] The Fourth Amendment is not violated if law enforcement promptly completes the
mission of the stop and does not, without new reasonable articulable suspicion of unrelated
illegal conduct, prolong the stop to engage in new investigations unrelated to the reason
for the stop. Majority opinion, ¶ 13; Anderson, 

, ¶ 8. “Authority for the seizure
thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 

 (2015). Reasonable suspicion
to extend a stop requires “a particularized and objective” basis to believe another crime is
afoot. United States v. Glenn, 

 (5th Cir. 2019). The Fourth Amendment
requires “‘more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’” 

 (quoting
United States v. Chavez, 

 (5th Cir. 2002)). Courts must consider “the
sum of the circumstances as a ‘laminated total’ and not by separately assessing the
individual facts.” State v. $127,930 United States Currency, 

, 

 (quoting State v. Lark, 

, 

); see also United
States v. Maltais, 

 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Whether the particular facts known
to the officer amount to an objective and particularized basis for a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances.”).

[¶35] This case has similar unparticularized and inchoate suspicion like that in Anderson,
where the initial stop was predicated on a lawful traffic stop and officers observed
questionable behavior, discovered criminal history, and thought the time of night was
significant. Anderson, 

, ¶¶ 2-3. In Anderson, viewed together or individually,
that conduct fell short of reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the traffic stop. Id. at ¶
54, (Crothers, J., dissenting). Here, shortly after the traffic stop law enforcement had much
more than the information present in Anderson. They verified parts of a tip they received
that two individuals would be traveling through Williston with “a lot of guns.” Majority


                                               9
opinion, ¶ 2. They observed Sargent driving a vehicle consistent with the tip. Majority
opinion, ¶ 2. During the stop the officers observed Sargent and the passenger displaying
extreme nervousness and a gun in the backseat (later determined to be fake). Majority
opinion, ¶¶ 4-5. The passenger initially attempted to conceal his appearance and refused to
identify himself or provide evidence of identification. Majority opinion, ¶ 3. Upon learning
the driver’s and passenger’s identity, officers discovered they both were on probation.
Majority opinion, ¶ 4.

[¶36] To extend a traffic stop, the Fourth Amendment requires officers to have objective
particularized suspicion that another crime is afoot. Glenn, 

. Even the
extension of a traffic stop based on fresh reasonable articulable suspicion of different
criminal activity has limits. See 

 (stating a stop may only be extended when there is
particularized suspicion of another crime and the extension may only last so long as it takes
to dispel that newly-formed suspicion). Thus, the newly-formed reasonable articulable
suspicion allows timely investigation into the new suspected criminal activity for the
duration necessary for that investigation. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
explained: “During an investigative stop, officers should ‘employ the least intrusive means
of detention and investigation, in terms of scope and duration, that are reasonably necessary
to achieve the purpose’ of the temporary seizure.” Maltais, 

 (quoting United
States v. Navarrete-Barron, 

 (8th Cir. 1999)). Newly-formed suspicion
does not give officers a day-pass to hold a suspect.

[¶37] Here, the justification for the traffic stop was to issue a traffic citation for a violation
related to an improper stop at an intersection. As the majority acknowledges, after officers’
initial contact with Sargent, they detained him and placed him in their patrol car. Majority
opinion, ¶ 4. Nobody here argues, and the district court did not find, that Sargent was
arrested or that probable cause to arrest existed during the period officers seized Sargent.
Thirty minutes after the stop, while Sargent was detained in the patrol car, a K-9 unit
arrived on scene and positively alerted for drugs, which provided the justification for the
search giving rise to these charges.

[¶38] Our standard on appeal of a motion to suppress is to give deference to the district
court’s findings of fact and review de novo the court’s legal application. Majority opinion,
¶ 8. The district court in this case failed to make findings establishing what the officers did
during that full 30 minutes to “complete the mission” of the extended stop, or whether they
simply held Sargent (and his passenger) until arrival of the K-9 unit due to the suspicion
accumulated during the stop. Without those findings we have no factual determination to

                                               10
consider, and we cannot fulfill our duty to make the legal determination, whether Sargent
was lawfully seized after the traffic stop. See Anderson, 

, ¶ 8 (“[T]his Court
has ‘rejected a de minimis time exception for extending a traffic stop’ for activity outside
the mission of the stop without reasonable suspicion to support the expanded scope.
Marsolek, 

, [

]; see also State v. Karst, 

 (Idaho 2022) (concluding under Rodriguez that a nineteen-second detour to request a
drug-dog unit violated the Fourth Amendment).”).

[¶39] I would retain jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B) and remand for the
district court’s further analysis of the legality of the extended stop. See State v. Juntunen,

, 

 (“We cannot properly review a decision, however, if
the district court fails to make adequate findings explaining the basis for its ultimate
conclusion.”).

[¶40] Daniel J. Crothers




                                             11