State v. Eagleman

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                  

State of North Dakota,                                    Plaintiff and Appellee
     v.
Matthew Alan Eagleman,                                 Defendant and Appellant

                                 No. 20240176

Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central
Judicial District, the Honorable Kristi P. Venhuizen, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Justine S. Hesselbart, Assistant State’s Attorney, Grand Forks, ND, for plaintiff
and appellee.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                                State v. Eagleman
                                  No. 20240176

Jensen, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Matthew Eagleman appeals from a district court’s order denying his
amended motion for correction of an illegal sentence. Eagleman argues the court
erred by not treating his amended motion as an application for postconviction
relief, by not addressing all of his claims, and in summarily denying the motion.
We conclude the court did not err in treating the amended motion as a request
for relief under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a) and we affirm the order denying the
amended motion.

                                         I

[¶2] In April 2024, Eagleman was charged with the following: (1) reckless
endangerment, a class C felony, in violation of N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-17-03, 12.1-32-
01(4); (2) fleeing a peace officer, a class C felony, in violation of N.D.C.C. §§ 39-
10-71(1)(b), 39-10-71(2), 12.1-32-01(4); (3) unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class C felony, in violation of N.D.C.C. §§ 19-03.4-03(2), 12.1-32-
01(4); and (4) driving under suspension, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
N.D.C.C. §§ 39-06-42(1), 12.1-32-01(6). In May 2024, Eagleman pleaded guilty to
all charges, was sentenced, and had a judgment entered against him.

[¶3] In June 2024, Eagleman filed a motion and an amended motion under
N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a) to correct a sentence he claims was illegally imposed on him.
The amended motion was titled: “Motion for Amended Supplemental Correction
of Illegal Sentence, Rule 35(a).” The amended motion included claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, an improper factual basis leading to an illegal
sentence, a coerced plea, and a violation of his due process rights. The State
opposed the motion, addressed the illegal sentence argument, and asserted the
other claims do not fall under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a). The district court issued an
order denying Eagleman’s motion. Eagleman appealed the order.




                                         1
                                        II

[¶4] Eagleman argues that despite the title of “Motion for Amended
Supplemental Correction of Illegal Sentence, Rule 35(a),” the district court erred
in not considering all of his claims, asserting his motion should have been treated
as an application for postconviction relief. On appeal, Eagleman failed to raise
or brief any issues with regard to his assertion he was entitled to relief from an
illegal sentence under Rule 35(a).

[¶5] Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature, as such, they are
governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Wacht v. State, 

, 

. “A party . . . bears the burden to correctly label its
motion so as to inform the adversary of the nature of the motion and the relief
sought.” In re N.C.C., 

, 

; see N.D.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(2).
Although this Court is “not bound by the district court’s label, and may look to
the substance of a motion to determine its proper classification,” we are not
required to look beyond a party’s labels. State v. Moore, 

, 

; In re N.C.C., at ¶ 11.

[¶6] We have also previously recognized that “[t]he Uniform Postconviction
Procedure Act is the exclusive remedy for collaterally challenging a judgment of
conviction or sentence . . . .” State v. Kovalevich, 

, 

.

             While these post-conviction remedies co-exist for similar
      purposes and may be used interchangeably to attack an illegal
      sentence, this Court has also held a defendant may not avoid the
      procedures of the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act by
      designating his motion under a rule of criminal procedure or by
      filing his motion in his criminal file, rather than filing as a new
      [application] for post-conviction relief.




                                        2
Id. at ¶ 11 (cleaned up). “A plain reading of this provision is that the Uniform
Postconviction Procedure Act is to be used exclusively in place of other remedies
collaterally challenging the judgment of conviction.” State v. Atkins, 

, 

.

[¶7] Eagleman’s amended motion sought relief under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a).
Eagleman did not seek relief under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act,
or previously seek relief under the Act. While we have previously treated
motions filed under the rules of criminal procedure as applications under the
Act, we have done so in the limited circumstance where the defendant has filed
a previous application for postconviction relief and the filing in the criminal case
hints at an attempt to “avoid the procedures of the Uniform Postconviction
Procedure Act[.]” Kovalevich, 

; see, e.g., Glaum v. State,

, ¶¶ 9-10, 6 N.W.3d 603; State v. Vogt, 

, 

; Van Chase v. State, 

, 

; Atkins, 

; State v. Gress, 

, 

. Under the
circumstances of this case, we conclude the district court did not err in treating
Eagleman’s amended motion as a request for relief under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a).

                                        III

[¶8] On appeal, Eagleman failed to raise or brief any issues with regard to his
assertion he was entitled to relief from an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a),
N.D.R.Crim.P. The claims asserted by Eagleman were outside the scope of Rule
35(a) and the correction of an illegal sentence, and were collateral attacks on the
judgment subject to the exclusive remedy within the Uniform Postconviction
Procedure Act. We conclude the district court did not err in declining to address
the claims asserted by Eagleman and in summarily dismissing his amended
motion.




                                         3
                                    IV

[¶9] We affirm the order of the district court denying the amended motion.

[¶10] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr




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