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2025 ND 70

State v. Lyons

North Dakota Supreme Court

Decided April 10, 2025

North Dakota Supreme Court · decided 2025-04-10

A district court order denying a N.D.R.Crim.P. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(4) and (7).

Relies on State v. Ertelt · Keller v. State

Decided 2025-04-10

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                   
2025 ND 70

State of North Dakota,                                     Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
George Robert Lyons,                                   Defendant and Appellant



                                  No. 20240326

Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central
Judicial District, the Honorable John A. Thelen, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Rachel R. Egstad, Assistant State’s Attorney, Grand Forks, N.D., for plaintiff and
appellee; on brief.

Samuel A. Gereszek, Grand Forks, N.D., for defendant and appellant; on brief.
                                   State v. Lyons
                                   No. 20240326

Per Curiam.

[¶1] George Robert Lyons appeals from a district court order denying his Rule
35, N.D.R.Crim.P., motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, Lyons argues
the district court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion, because his convictions
were barred by the statute of limitations. We have held “N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a)
may only be used to correct an illegal sentence. It cannot be used to attack the
underlying conviction.” Keller v. State, 
2015 ND 228, ¶ 8
, 
869 N.W.2d 424
 (citing
State v. Ertelt, 
1997 ND 15, ¶¶ 5-6
, 
558 N.W.2d 860
 (quoting the N.D.R.Crim.P.
35, Explanatory Note, stating “it is presupposed that the conviction upon which
the sentence has been imposed is valid”)). Lyons argues his sentence was illegal
only because the underlying conviction is void for lack of jurisdiction. A Rule 35
motion is not the proper procedure to collaterally attack the conviction.

[¶2] “The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act is the exclusive remedy for
collaterally challenging a judgment of conviction or sentence.” State v. Eagleman,
2024 ND 231, ¶ 6
, 14 N.W.3d 912 (cleaned up); see also N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(4)
(“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a proceeding under [N.D.C.C. ch.
29-32.1] replaces all other common law, statutory, or other remedies available
before July 1, 1985, for collaterally challenging the validity of the judgment of
conviction or sentence. It is to be used exclusively in place of them.”). We
summarily affirm the district court order under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(4) and (7).
Lyons v. State, 
2024 ND 19, ¶ 11
, 2 N.W.3d 679 (affirming the dismissal of Lyons’
postconviction claim that his convictions were barred by the statute of
limitations because Lyons’ application was untimely under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-
01(2)).

[¶3] Jerod E. Tufte, Acting C.J.
     Daniel J. Crothers
     Lisa Fair McEvers
     Douglas A. Bahr
     William A. Herauf, D.J.

[¶4] The Honorable William A. Herauf, District Judge, sitting in place of Jensen,
C.J., disqualified.

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