IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2025 ND 75
State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Christopher Walter James Allman, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20240250
Appeal from the District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District,
the Honorable Robin A. Schmidt, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
Nathan K. Madden, Special Assistant State’s Attorney, Williston, ND, for
plaintiff and appellee.
Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
State v. Allman
No. 20240250
Crothers, Justice.
[¶1] Christopher Allman appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury
trial. He argues the district court erred by ordering him to undergo a criminal
responsibility evaluation; by failing to order an evaluation of his fitness to stand
trial; by violating his right to a speedy trial; and by sentencing him without
giving proper credit for time served. We affirm.
I
[¶2] In March 2023, the State alleged Allman repeatedly assaulted his wife and
their live-in girlfriend, locked them in a room, and refused to allow them to leave
the residence. The State charged Allman with three counts of domestic violence,
two counts of felonious restraint, and two counts of terrorizing. Allman also
faced charges in another criminal case. See 27-2023-CR-0267. The parties
stipulated Allman undergo a mental health examination and submitted a
proposed order. The judge presiding over the other criminal case signed the
proposed order and it was filed in this case. The order directs a mental health
professional at the North Dakota State Hospital to conduct an examination to
determine:
“1) whether the Defendant is not criminally responsible for his
conduct by reason of mental disease or defect at the time of the
alleged offense; and 2) whether a mental disease or defect or any
other mental condition has a bearing on the issue of whether the
Defendant had the mental state required for the offense charged.”
[¶3] The district court held multiple status conferences. The parties agree
significant delay was caused by the Veterans Administration not releasing
Allman’s records to the State Hospital. The State alleges Allman delayed signing
a required release. Allman asserts the delay should not have occurred because,
unlike his trial counsel, he did not want to raise a lack of criminal responsibility
defense. The State Hospital ultimately performed a mental health examination
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on June 20, 2023, and the evaluation report was completed on August 15, 2024.
The report concludes Allman did not suffer from a mental condition that would
preclude criminal liability.
[¶4] The case proceeded to a jury trial on August 19, 2024, roughly a year and
a half after Allman was charged. A jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.
The district court sentenced Allman to consecutive five-year terms of
imprisonment on the first six counts. On the last count, the court sentenced
Allman to a five-year term, with three years and 94 days suspended, giving him
credit for 636 days of time served. Allman filed a timely notice of appeal. He
raises four categories of error related to the criminal responsibility evaluation,
his fitness to stand trial, his right to a speedy trial, and the legality of his sentence.
II
[¶5] Allman claims the district court erred by ordering a criminal responsibility
evaluation. He argues his attorney, the State, and the district court usurped his
constitutional rights by agreeing he should undergo a criminal responsibility
evaluation against his will. He asserts his right against self-incrimination was
violated because he was forced to participate in the evaluation. He also claims
his “fundamental constitutional right to maintain his innocence” was violated
because assertion of the defense “effectively constitutes an admission of guilt.”
[¶6] When a crime requires an individual to have acted willfully, the individual
cannot be held criminally responsible if he or she “lacks substantial capacity to
comprehend the harmful nature or consequences of the conduct, or the conduct
is the result of a loss or serious distortion of the individual’s capacity to recognize
reality.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04.1-01(a). A defendant intending to introduce a defense
of lack of criminal responsibility must provide notice to the prosecution and file
the notice with the court. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04.1-03(1). The prosecuting attorney
may request the court order the defendant undergo a mental health examination,
or the parties may stipulate to an examination without a court order. N.D.C.C. §
12.1-04.1-05.
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[¶7] We review an appeal claiming a constitutional violation under the de novo
standard of review. City of Fargo v. Rockwell, 1999 ND 125, ¶ 7,
597 N.W.2d 406.
Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance that does
not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” “The harmless error doctrine
recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide
the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence and promotes respect
for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial.” State
v. Bertram,
2006 ND 10, ¶ 31,
708 N.W.2d 913 (cleaned up) (quoting Neder v.
United States,
527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).
[¶8] The district court did not err in entering the order because the parties
stipulated to an examination. Allman has not provided us with authority, and
we have found none, supporting the proposition that, by itself, obtaining an
examination for lack of criminal responsibility equates to an admission of guilt.
Further, Allman did not admit guilt in this case. The case went to trial, the
contents of Allman’s mental evaluation were not introduced into evidence, and
a jury convicted him. If he was improperly forced to incriminate himself, the
remedy would be suppression of that evidence. State v. Stewart,
1999 ND 154, ¶
9,
598 N.W.2d 773 (stating “the remedy for violations of the privilege against
self-incrimination . . . is suppression of a defendant’s statements made after
violation of [that] provision[]”). Therefore, Allman has not established the
evaluation order affected his substantial rights.
III
[¶9] Allman argues the district court erred by not ordering an evaluation of his
fitness to stand trial.
[¶10] Criminal defendants are presumed fit to stand trial. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-
04.1(1). A defendant that lacks fitness to proceed cannot be tried, convicted, or
sentenced. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-04.1(2); see also State v. Rolland, 2024 ND 175, ¶ 8,
11 N.W.3d 761 (“It is well-established that due process prohibits the criminal
prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.”). “Whenever
there is reason to doubt the defendant’s fitness to proceed, the court shall order
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the defendant be examined by a tier 1a mental health professional.” N.D.C.C. §
12.1-04-07(1).
[¶11] Allman asserts his rights were violated because he was allowed to stand
trial “while potentially incompetent.” Allman argues the circumstances relating
to his potential lack of criminal responsibility raised a question about his
competency. The parties’ stipulation states, “counsel for the Defendant has come
to realize that he may have some sort of mental health issue which may impact
his fitness to stand trial, as well as questions about his competency at the time of
the incidents.” However, the proposed order Allman served on the State, which
the district court signed, specifically sought a criminal responsibility evaluation
and not an evaluation of his fitness to stand trial. Allman did not move or
otherwise request a fitness evaluation. See N.D.R.Crim.P. 47(a) (requiring parties
seeking a court order to make a motion).
[¶12] Aside from a single conclusory sentence in the stipulation, Allman has not
identified any grounds to support his assertion that there was reason to doubt
his fitness to stand trial or that he was actually unfit. The criminal responsibility
evaluation report, completed shortly before trial, notes that during the interview
Allman’s speech was “rational, logical, and coherent,” and he “was able to
understand the questions asked of him and respond appropriately.” The report
also states Allman “claimed to not have a mental disorder” and there “were no
indications from the records that he has a serious mental illness or defect.”
Allman does not claim the report is inaccurate or otherwise contest its findings.
Throughout the course of these proceedings, Allman maintained he was fit to
proceed. Based on this record, the district court did not err by not ordering a
fitness evaluation.
IV
[¶13] Allman claims his right to a speedy trial was violated.
[¶14] The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, N.D. Const. art. I, § 12, and N.D.C.C. § 29-01-06(5).
This Court has adopted the balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
4
(1972) to evaluate the validity of a speedy trial claim. State v. Mohamud,
2019 ND
101, ¶ 8,
925 N.W.2d 396. “The test requires consideration of four factors: (1)
length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) proper assertion of the right, and
(4) actual prejudice to the accused.”
Id. No single factor is controlling, and each
factor must be weighed.
Id. This Court conducts a de novo review of the district
court’s “overall assessment, but review[s] the court’s factual findings for clear
error.” State v. Peters,
2022 ND 196, ¶ 5,
981 N.W.2d 874.
[¶15] Allman’s trial began roughly a year and a half after Allman was charged.
“Traditionally, a delay of one year or more is considered presumptively
prejudicial, triggering the analysis. A presumptively prejudicial delay alone does
not create a speedy-trial violation, and the other factors must still be weighed.”
State v. Moran,
2006 ND 62, ¶ 9,
711 N.W.2d 915. The first factor of the balancing
test weighs in favor of Allman’s claim because the delay was more than a year.
[¶16] “The second factor, the reason for the delay, is closely related to the first
factor.” Moran,
2006 ND 62, ¶ 10. The parties agree significant delay was caused
by the Veterans Administration not releasing Allman’s records to the State
Hospital. The State also argues Allman delayed signing the requisite release.
Allman asserts the delay should not have occurred in any event because, unlike
his trial counsel, he had no desire to raise a lack of criminal responsibility
defense. The State Hospital ultimately performed a mental health examination
on June 20, 2023, and the evaluation report was completed on August 15, 2024.
This factor weighs against Allman’s claim because the delay was not due to the
State’s conduct or inaction.
[¶17] The third factor considers whether Allman timely asserted a speedy trial
demand. Allman acknowledges he did not make a speedy trial demand but
nonetheless claims the issue was before the court. In his words, “While Mr.
Allman’s defense counsel did not make an objection based on speedy trial, and
agreed to continuances to obtain the criminal responsibility evaluation, Mr.
Allman repeatedly objected to the delay . . . and made two motions on the record
to dismiss because of the delay.” Allman quotes transcripts where he personally
5
stated: “I motion to dismiss because they are dragging this out,” and “Now I’m
asking for either my case to be dismissed due to lack of progress.”
[¶18] The speedy trial issue was not properly raised in the district court.
Allman’s personal requests made while he was represented by counsel are not
sufficient. A defendant in a criminal proceeding has no right to “hybrid”
representation where the defendant personally acts as co-counsel. State v. Ochoa,
2004 ND 43, ¶ 29,
675 N.W.2d 161. To represent himself, a defendant must
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently relinquish the benefits of counsel.”
State v. Schneeweiss,
2001 ND 120, ¶ 26,
630 N.W.2d 482. “[W]hen a defendant is
represented by counsel, the defendant generally has no authority to file pro se
motions, and the court should not consider them.” People v. James,
841 N.E.2d
1109, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (emphasis in original); see also Robinson v. State,
240
S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (stating “a trial court is free to disregard
any pro se motions presented by a defendant who is represented by counsel”)
(emphasis in original). Therefore, the right to a speedy trial was not properly
asserted in the district court and this factor weighs against Allman’s claim.
[¶19] The fourth factor attempts to quantify prejudice to the accused that was
caused by the delay. “The United States Supreme Court has instructed this factor
be assessed in light of the interest the right to a speedy trial was meant to protect:
‘(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.’” City of Grand Forks v. Gale,
2016 ND 58, ¶ 18,
876 N.W.2d 701 (citing
Barker,
407 U.S. at 532).
[¶20] Allman was subject to prolonged pretrial incarceration and no doubt
experienced anxiety and concern about his detention. However, he has not
provided evidence of actual prejudice or asserted with particularity how the
delay impaired his defense. Absent a specific evidence of prejudice, Allman has
failed to meet his burden to show this fourth factor supports his claim.
[¶21] After reviewing the record, we are not convinced Allman’s right to a
speedy trial was violated.
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V
[¶22] Allman claims the district court imposed an illegal sentence. He claims the
district court erred because it allocated his credit for time served to only one of
his consecutive terms of imprisonment. This Court has rejected the same
argument in other cases. See State v. Neva, 2009 ND 127, ¶ 8,
767 N.W.2d 879 (“A
district court need give credit toward only one of the consecutive terms of
imprisonment it imposes.”); see also State v. Arcand,
403 N.W.2d 23, 24 (N.D. 1987)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that he was entitled to credit “against each
sentence imposed” and stating “[w]hen [a] balance is consumed, nothing
remains”). Allman also asserts, without explanation, the district court improperly
“removed the good time” from his other terms of imprisonment. However, for
each count, the judgment clearly states Allman “is entitled to sentence reduction
as authorized by state law.” We summarily affirm the legality of Allman’s
sentence under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7) and (8).
VI
[¶23] Allman has not shown the district court erred by ordering him to undergo
a criminal responsibility evaluation, by failing to order an evaluation of his
fitness to stand trial, or that it denied his right to a speedy trial. Allman’s
assertion regarding the legality of his sentence is foreclosed by precedent. The
district court’s criminal judgment is affirmed.
[¶24] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
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