State v. Cooper

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                  

State of North Dakota,                                    Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Jodi L. Cooper,                                        Defendant and Appellant



                                 No. 20250134

Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Lonnie Olson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.

Meggan J. Crosby, Assistant State’s Attorney, Devils Lake, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee; submitted on brief.

Ulysses S. Jones, Devils Lake, ND, for defendant and appellant; submitted on
brief.
                                 State v. Cooper
                                  No. 20250134

Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Jodi Cooper appeals from a criminal judgment after the district court
denied her motion to suppress and she entered a conditional guilty plea,
preserving her right to appeal. An amended criminal judgment was
subsequently entered to reflect her conditional plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11.
Cooper argues the court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We conclude
Cooper was not subjected to unlawful custodial interrogation when she admitted
to smoking marijuana a few hours earlier, law enforcement did not
impermissibly extend the stop of her vehicle to allow a K-9 unit to arrive, and
probable cause supported the search of her vehicle. We affirm.

                                        I

[¶2] In June 2024, the State charged Cooper with count 1, unlawful possession
of drug paraphernalia—use SI, SII, SIII, a class A misdemeanor; count 2,
endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult, a class C felony; count 3, driving
under suspension, a class B misdemeanor; count 4, possession of drug
paraphernalia—marijuana, an infraction; and count 5, possession of a controlled
substance—marijuana, an infraction. The charges stem from a traffic stop of
Cooper’s vehicle.

[¶3] On June 19, 2024, a North Dakota Highway Patrol trooper was on routine
patrol on Highway 20, south of Devils Lake in Ramsey County. At approximately
4:00 p.m., the trooper observed a 1993 Chevrolet Silverado driving on the center
line, almost coming into the southbound lane. The trooper initiated a traffic stop
of the vehicle and walked up to the vehicle’s passenger side. The trooper asked
the driver, later identified as Cooper, for her identification, registration, and
proof of insurance. Cooper had two children in the vehicle—a 10-year-old female
in the front passenger seat and a 7-year-old male in the back seat. While at the
vehicle, the trooper observed Cooper was shaking and could not seem to sit still.
The trooper went back to his patrol vehicle to run a status check on her license
and to check for warrants. The trooper learned Cooper’s license was suspended.


                                        1
[¶4] The trooper returned to Cooper’s vehicle and asked her to exit the vehicle.
The trooper testified this was his standard practice because the juveniles were
present. At first, Cooper did not want to get out, but she did after the trooper
requested a second time. When they got to the front of his patrol vehicle, the
trooper informed her that her license was suspended. While talking to her, the
trooper observed Cooper could not stand still, she kept pacing, and her eyes were
“really constricted,” watery, and bloodshot. The trooper asked her if she was
under the influence of anything, and Cooper admitted she had smoked a
marijuana joint a few hours earlier. The trooper asked her if there was anything
illegal in her vehicle; she looked back toward her vehicle and said no. The
trooper then asked if he could search the vehicle, and she said no.

[¶5] At that moment, Cooper went back to her vehicle and grabbed her phone.
The trooper testified he thought she was upset at “why [he] was asking her to
search the vehicle.” The trooper testified he told her to put the phone down and
go back to his car, but “[s]he didn’t want to,” so he grabbed the phone and put
it down. The trooper placed her in handcuffs and told her she was being detained
suspecting she was under the influence. This occurred at about 11 minutes into
the stop. The trooper placed her in the back seat of his patrol vehicle and went
back to Cooper’s vehicle and contacted a parent or guardian of the children. The
trooper testified a parent arrived about five minutes later and took custody of
both children, and the trooper explained what was going on. The trooper asked
the parent if he could talk to the children, advising the parent of Miranda rights.
The trooper also spoke with the other parent who had arrived on the scene. The
trooper testified he spoke with the children’s parents for about 10 to 15 minutes.

[¶6] Based on his observations and before conducting field sobriety tests, the
trooper contacted K-9 handlers to conduct an open-air sniff of Cooper’s vehicle.
After contacting two other K-9 officers who were unavailable, the trooper was
able to contact a Ramsey County K-9 deputy who was at home, off-duty, but
could come to the scene. Suspecting she was impaired, the trooper asked Cooper
if she would take field sobriety tests, and she consented.

[¶7] During the period before the K-9 unit arrived, the trooper conducted three
field sobriety tests outside of the patrol vehicle, during which Cooper was not


                                        2
handcuffed. The trooper testified he conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus test,
a lack of convergence test, and a walk-and-turn test. The trooper testified Cooper
did not exhibit clues of alcohol impairment and he was able to eliminate “alcohol
and possibly drugs.” The trooper, however, testified based on his training and
experience that a person could still be impaired despite passing field sobriety
testing. The trooper placed Cooper back into his patrol vehicle’s back seat. The
trooper testified he was writing the citation for driving under suspension when
the deputy arrived on the scene with his dog and performed an open-air sniff of
Cooper’s vehicle.

[¶8] The deputy testified his dog made a “soft indication” on the passenger side
of Cooper’s vehicle. Based on the dog’s alert, the trooper and the deputy
searched Cooper’s vehicle and discovered a glass smoking device with suspected
methamphetamine residue, a green leafy substance suspected to be marijuana,
and a smoking device with suspected marijuana residue. The trooper
subsequently advised Cooper of her Miranda rights and placed her under arrest
at approximately 4:56 p.m. Cooper was transported to the Lake Region Law
Enforcement Center, where she was searched, and a correctional officer located
a smoking device with suspected marijuana residue.

[¶9] In October 2024, Cooper moved to suppress all prearrest statements and
evidence seized from the warrantless search of the vehicle she was driving and
contraband found on her. The State opposed her motion. On November 19, 2024,
the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. At the hearing, the
court received testimony from the trooper, who conducted the vehicle stop, and
the Ramsey County sheriff’s deputy, who arrived at the scene to conduct a dog
sniff of the vehicle. Cooper submitted into evidence video of the stop, consisting
of video from the patrol vehicle’s front camera and from the trooper’s body
camera. In January 2025, the court issued a memorandum decision and order
denying her motion to suppress.

[¶10] In March 2025, Cooper entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her
right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. The district court sentenced
Cooper, and a criminal judgment was entered on counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, and count
3, driving under suspension, was dismissed. An amended criminal judgment


                                        3
was subsequently entered to reflect a conditional guilty plea under
N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 on counts 1 and 2.

                                        II

[¶11] Cooper argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
Our standard for reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress is
well-established:

      We defer to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts
      in testimony in favor of affirmance. We will affirm a district court’s
      decision on a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent
      evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court’s findings, and
      the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
      Our standard of review recognizes the importance of the district
      court’s opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their
      credibility. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and
      whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law.

State v. Grensteiner, 

, 

 (quoting State v. Casatelli,

, 

); see also State v. Genre, 

, 

. While the underlying factual disputes are findings of fact, whether
the district court’s findings meet a legal standard is a question of law. State v.
Rahier, 

, 

.

[¶12] Cooper did not challenge the validity of the trooper’s stop of her vehicle
in the district court, nor does she challenge the stop on appeal. Rather, Cooper
argues she was improperly questioned about criminal activity and her drug
usage without being advised of her right to remain silent, and she challenges the
warrantless search of her vehicle.

                                       III

[¶13] In denying Cooper’s motion, the district court made specific factual
findings about the trooper’s interactions with Cooper after stopping the vehicle:

            At this time, [the trooper] testified that he noticed Cooper was
      shaking and could not sit still. [The trooper] went to the patrol
      vehicle and called in the stop, which included inquiring about

                                        4
Cooper’s driving privileges. Her driving privileges were relayed to
[the trooper] as suspended. [The trooper] returned to the passenger
side of the Cooper vehicle, and asked Cooper to come back to the
patrol vehicle. This occurred about 8 minutes after the stop. After
the first request, Cooper did not leave her vehicle. [The trooper]
asked again, and this time Cooper did get out. They stood in front
of the patrol [vehicle] and talked. [The trooper] testified that he
noted that Cooper would not stand still. He noted that she was
pacing, her eyes were very constricted, and were watering and
bloodshot. [The trooper] testified that he thought there was some
impairment in Cooper.
       Cooper was informed of her driving under suspension.
Cooper then returned to her vehicle, grabbed her phone, contrary to
[the trooper]’s instructions. Cooper [sic] called the parents of the two
children. This occurred about 11 minutes after the stop. In about one
minute, Cooper was placed in the back of the patrol vehicle, and [the
trooper] was outside. Cooper is heard on the video swearing
profusely. About 4 minutes later, the children’s father drove up to
get the kids. Shortly after, [an officer] of the Devils Lake PD
approached and got out of his patrol vehicle. Cooper is continuing
to swear in the back of the patrol vehicle. [The trooper] talks with
[the Devils Lake officer] and at one point tells [the officer] that the
Cooper vehicle came across the center line into his lane. At the 20
minute mark after the stop, [the trooper] talks to the children’s
father, and after a minute, the mother also drives up to the scene.
The children then get in with the parents and leave about the 25
minute mark. [The trooper] then calls for a K-9 officer to come to the
scene of the stop.
       [The trooper] testified that he has been trained in detecting
drug impairment in drivers in 2020 in Bismarck. At some point
previous to the field sobriety tests, [the trooper] did a criminal
history check of some sort, and found Cooper to have a prior drug
usage history. About the 27 minute mark, [the trooper] asked
Cooper about drug usage, which she admitted to smoking a joint
earlier in the day. He asked Cooper to perform the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test, to which Cooper exhibited no clues. About the 27
minute mark, [the trooper] asked Cooper to perform a walk and turn
test, which she passed. In [the trooper]’s opinion, that excluded
alcohol impairment. The [field] sobriety tests were completed by the
35 minute mark, and Cooper was taken back into the patrol vehicle.
[The trooper] commenced to fill out a citation for driving under

                                   5
      suspension. About two minutes later, the K-9 and handler, [a
      deputy] of the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office, drove up. Within 2
      minutes the K-9 search was completed.

                                       IV

[¶14] Cooper argues that the testimony and videos show she was questioned
about criminal activity, she was not advised of her rights before the questioning,
and she did not waive her right to remain silent.

[¶15] An officer must administer the Miranda warning “when a person is subject
to custodial interrogation.” State v. Werner, 

, 

(quoting Genre, 

); see also State v. Martin, 

(N.D. 1996). This Court explained:

      A suspect is in custody when there is a formal arrest or restraint on
      the suspect’s freedom of movement to the degree associated with a
      formal arrest. When determining if a person is subject to custodial
      interrogation the court examines all circumstances surrounding the
      interrogation and considers what a reasonable man in the suspect’s
      position would have understood his situation.

Werner, ¶ 13 (quoting Genre, ¶ 23 (cleaned up)).

[¶16] Ordinary or routine traffic stops are not usually deemed custodial stops
triggering the need for Miranda warnings. Martin, 

; State v.
Fasching, 

 (N.D. 1990). In other words, an individual
detained during a routine traffic stop generally is not “in custody” for Miranda
purposes. Genre, 

. “Likewise, ordering a driver out of the vehicle
for officer safety or to issue a citation is reasonable and does not result in a
custodial interrogation.” Genre, ¶ 24 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 

 (1977); State v. Mertz, 

 (N.D. 1985) (ordering driver into
a squad car was reasonable)). “[A] driver should reasonably expect to answer
common sense investigatory questions; questioning during a traffic stop does
not become a custodial interrogation simply because the officer asks a question
that may establish an element of a crime.” Id. ¶ 26. This Court has further said:




                                        6
             Although we agree that “custodial interrogation” can take
      place in a police car, Miranda protection certainly does not extend to
      all questioning that takes place there. Instead, the determination of
      whether a person questioned in a police car is “in custody” must
      depend on the specific facts of each case. To make this
      determination, the factual situation, atmosphere, and physical
      surroundings during the investigation and questioning must be
      considered to ascertain the degree of police domination and
      restraint or compulsion. Consideration of these factors is essential
      for answering the ultimate inquiry of whether there was a “formal
      arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated
      with a formal arrest. Absent an arrest or a like restraint, a person is
      not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda even if the questioning
      takes place in a police car.

Martin, at 227 (cleaned up). Whether a suspect is in custody and entitled to a
Miranda warning presents a mixed question of law and fact, fully reviewable on
appeal. Werner, 

; Genre, ¶ 23.

[¶17] Cooper contends that upon the trooper initially asking her to go to his
patrol vehicle, “she was not free to leave” and the trooper’s initial “direction” to
her “caused her to be in detention and therefore it was required that she be
advised of her [Miranda] rights before being questioned about criminal activity.”
After she got her phone from the vehicle, the trooper took the phone and advised
her she was being detained for being under the influence. She asserts she was in
custody when the trooper handcuffed her, which occurred about 11 minutes into
the traffic stop. Cooper argues that the trooper’s questions to her about drug
usage were intended to get incriminating evidence without advising on her right
to remain silent and that the trooper was trying to get information against her
because the trooper’s criminal history check of her showed previous cases
involving drug usage. She contends when the questions were posed, the
investigative stop was completed and the trooper had already determined a
criminal offense occurred, so “there was nothing more to investigate” regarding
her driving under suspension.

[¶18] The State, however, responds the district court did not err in finding the
trooper’s questions before the subsequent Miranda warnings were valid. The


                                         7
State argues the trooper was engaged in an investigatory stop—justified by the
trooper’s observation of Cooper’s demeanor and physical attributes, her
previous drug history, and her admission to smoking marijuana and driving
under suspension—and was still involved in an investigative stop when
inquiring about driving under the influence.

[¶19] Cooper argues that she was “in custody” for Miranda purposes when she
was asked to get out of her vehicle and go back to the trooper’s patrol vehicle.
We disagree. This Court has specifically said that “ordering a driver out of the
vehicle for officer safety or to issue a citation is reasonable and does not result in
a custodial interrogation.” Genre, 

.

[¶20] The trooper testified at the hearing about his observations of Cooper and
suspected alcohol or drug impairment that he made while talking with her at her
vehicle and at his patrol car. Neither Cooper nor the State dispute Cooper’s
admission—of having smoked marijuana a few hours earlier—occurred before
she was initially detained and placed in handcuffs, around 11 minutes into the
stop. The trooper further testified: Cooper went back to her vehicle to grab her
phone; he told her to put the phone down, but she did not want to; so he “put
her in handcuffs at that moment, and she was detained” as part of an
investigation “and put in the back seat of [his patrol] car.” He testified it was at
that time that he also contacted a parent for the children. While the district court
found Cooper was asked about her drug usage at the 27-minute mark, this error
is insignificant as it is clear from review of the record that the conversation about
her drug usage occurred before Cooper was placed in handcuffs.

[¶21] Courts have held “that neither handcuffing, United States v. Rodriguez, 

 (8th Cir. 2013), nor questioning in a patrol car, United States v.
Boucher, 

 (8th Cir. 1990), necessarily triggers the Miranda rule.”
United States v. Villanueva, 

 (8th Cir. 2024). However, assuming
without deciding that Cooper was “in custody” for Miranda purposes when the
trooper initially handcuffed her and placed her in the back of his patrol vehicle,
Cooper’s admission to having smoked marijuana a few hours earlier occurred
before this point in the trooper’s investigation for her suspected impairment.



                                          8
Cooper has not identified or cited to the record any other statements that should
have been suppressed.

[¶22] Moreover, if custodial interrogation were present after she was placed in
the patrol vehicle, the evidence elicited must still be testimonial. State v.
Chihanski, 

 (N.D. 1995). For example, in Fasching, this Court
held the district court should not have suppressed a deputy’s observations of the
defendant’s physical condition and her performance during field sobriety tests
and her blood test result. 

. This Court explained that while the
defendant’s answers about what she had drunk and where she had been were
properly suppressed, “gathering of evidence other than communications did not
transgress the constitutional bar against compelling testimony.” 

 “[Field
sobriety tests] only compel the suspect to exhibit his physical characteristics of
coordination as a source of real or physical evidence which may be testified to
by the officer observing the tests.” 

 Here, the trooper’s specific observations of
Cooper’s impairment, and the other evidence gathered, would not need to have
been suppressed.

[¶23] On this record, the district court’s finding that Cooper was not subject to
an unlawful custodial interrogation is supported by substantial evidence, was
not based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, and we are not left with a
firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. We conclude the
finding was not clearly erroneous.

                                         V

[¶24] Cooper argues she did not consent to the search of her vehicle, no
applicable exception applies, and anything found should be suppressed.

[¶25] The “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement “allows law enforcement officers to search a vehicle for illegal
contraband without a warrant upon establishing probable cause the vehicle
contains contraband.” State v. Gefroh, 

, 

.

      Under the automobile exception, law enforcement officers may
      search for illegal contraband without a warrant when probable


                                         9
      cause exists. Probable cause exists to search a vehicle if it is
      established that “certain identifiable objects are probably connected
      with criminal activity and are probably to be found at the present
      time at an identifiable place.” If a warrantless search of an
      automobile is made with probable cause, based on a reasonable
      belief arising out of the circumstances known to the officer that the
      automobile contains articles which are subject to seizure, the search
      is valid.

 (quoting State v. Dudley, 

, 

 (cleaned up)). “Once
probable cause that a vehicle contains contraband is established, officers may
search the vehicle because the ready mobility of the vehicle is an exigent
circumstance justifying the exception to the warrant requirement.” 

 “Allowing
a drug-sniffing dog to sniff a vehicle is not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.” 

 ¶ 9 (citing State v. Ressler, 

, 

). “A drug-sniffing dog indicating the presence of a controlled
substance establishes probable cause.” 

                                        A

[¶26] Cooper argues there was no “probable cause” to continue to detain her to
conduct a K-9 sniff of the vehicle and the trooper unduly prolonged the traffic
stop to allow a K-9 unit to arrive and conduct a search in violation of her rights.

[¶27] “During a lawfully-initiated traffic stop, the officer can conduct activities
‘related to traffic enforcement but not absolutely necessary to issuing a traffic
ticket.’” State v. Sargent, 

, 

 (quoting State v.
Marsolek, 

, 

); see also State v. Anderson, 

, ¶ 8, 

; State v. Vetter, 

, 

. An
officer may conduct the following activities during a traffic stop:

      [R]equesting the driver’s license and registration, requesting that the
      driver step out of the vehicle, requesting that the driver wait in the
      patrol car, conducting computer inquiries to determine the validity
      of the license and registration, conducting computer searches to
      investigate the driver’s criminal history and to determine if the
      driver has outstanding warrants, and making inquiries as to the
      motorist’s destination and purpose.


                                        10
Anderson, ¶ 8 (quoting State v. Phelps, 

, 

). We
have “rejected a de minimis time exception for extending a traffic stop for activity
outside the mission of the stop without reasonable suspicion to support the
expanded scope.” 

 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marsolek, ¶ 12).

[¶28] “The Fourth Amendment tolerates certain unrelated investigations that do
not lengthen the roadside detention.” State v. Stands, 

, 

 (cleaned up) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 

(2015)). However, “after the completion of the traffic stop duties, if the officer
continues the seizure, he violates the Fourth Amendment ‘unless the officer has
a reasonable suspicion for believing that criminal activity is afoot.’” Sargent, 

 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Vetter, 

). This Court
has explained when a traffic stop becomes an unconstitutional seizure:

      Traffic violations justify a stop by police officers. When an officer
      seizes an individual for a traffic violation, it justifies a police
      investigation of that violation. Because a routine traffic stop is
      relatively brief, it is more like a “Terry stop” than an arrest. The time
      it takes to complete the “mission” of the stop, to “address the traffic
      violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety
      concerns,” is a permissible length of time to detain someone.
      However, a stop may not extend longer than the amount of time
      necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop. An officer’s
      seizure of a person is permitted only until the tasks tied to the traffic
      infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed. A
      traffic stop prolonged beyond the “time reasonably required to
      complete the stop’s mission” is unlawful. Unrelated inquiries are
      permitted during a stop as long as they do not prolong the stop and
      extend the time the individual is detained. A stop may be prolonged
      only if the officer has reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the
      individual for inquiries unrelated to the stop.

Sargent, ¶ 14 (emphasis added) (quoting Marsolek, 

).

[¶29] Cooper contends none of the reasons for the basis of the K-9 sniff provided
probable cause for a search of her vehicle. She also asserts she did not exhibit
any clues on the field sobriety tests that the trooper administered to support a
claim of drug impairment sufficient for a search of the vehicle.


                                         11
[¶30] Cooper argues she was “seized” when she was told she was being detained
and placed in handcuffs, and contends the traffic stop was unduly prolonged
without reasonable suspicion to permit law enforcement to conduct a K-9 sniff.
She contends the trooper had a “mere hunch” about unlawful activity; and her
previous drug history was not an indication she was involved, or about to be
involved, in unlawful activity. She argues, if the trooper believed contraband
was in the vehicle, the vehicle could have been impounded and a search warrant
obtained; and the totality of the circumstances reflect the trooper could have
cited or arrested her long before the K-9 sniff occurred, and waiting for the K-9
unit to arrive unduly prolonged the stop.

[¶31] Here, in denying the motion, the district court found the evidence showed
the K-9 sniff occurred “while the purposes of the traffic stop were still being
performed,” or while the trooper was drafting a citation for driving under
suspension. The court found the trooper did not unreasonably extend the stop to
allow time for the K-9 unit to arrive, particularly where a portion of the stop was
to allow the minor children’s parents to arrive and remove the children from
Cooper’s vehicle. The district court found, “[b]ased upon the previous findings
of fact,” the trooper had sufficient probable cause for a search of the vehicle
under the automobile exception.

[¶32] “This Court looks to the totality of the circumstances while applying an
objective standard to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify
prolonging a traffic stop.” Anderson, 

, ¶ 16. “Whether the facts
support a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion is a question of law, and
thus, is fully reviewable by this Court.” 

 (quoting State v. Adan, 

, 

). “The question for this Court is ‘whether a reasonable
person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective
manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in
unlawful activity.’” 

 (quoting State v. Franzen, 

, 

). “Reasonable suspicion is not easily reduced to a methodical set of legal
rules, but it does require more than a ‘mere hunch.’” 

 (quoting State v. Fields,

, 

).




                                        12
[¶33] This Court has said an officer may consider an individual’s nervousness
and criminal history as factors to support a determination of reasonable
suspicion. See Sargent, 

. We have also said “[e]rratic
driving, including veering, weaving, crossing the line of the driving lane, and
nearly striking another vehicle, is a factor indicative of impairment.” State v.
Berger, 

, 

. “Belligerent, aggressive, and abusive
conduct, and use of profanity, are relevant factors indicative of impairment.” Id.
¶ 15. “Unusual nervousness and severe shaking indicate the person’s physical
faculties are not in their normal state and the person does not have normal
control of [oneself].” Id. ¶ 16. “Glossy or watery eyes are indicative of
impairment.” Id. ¶ 17.

[¶34] Here, the trooper’s observations of Cooper supported his suspicion of
alcohol or drug impairment—including her shaking, inability to sit still, pacing,
bloodshot and watery eyes, constricted eyes, previous drug history, and
admission she smoked marijuana and was driving under suspension—
constituted reasonable and articulable suspicion for the trooper continuing to
detain her to investigate driving under the influence. The district court did not
err in finding the stop was not unduly prolonged because the trooper was still
attending to the “duty of the stop” by contacting a parent to pick up the children,
contacting K-9 handlers, conducting field sobriety tests, and issuing citations
while the dog sniff was being conducted.

[¶35] Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude there was
reasonable and articulable suspicion Cooper was engaged in criminal activity,
such that her continued detention until a K-9 unit arrived was lawful. The
trooper did not impermissibly extend the stop of her vehicle to allow a K-9 unit
to arrive. Moreover, the dog sniff of the vehicle established probable cause for
the trooper and deputy’s subsequent vehicle search.

                                        B

[¶36] Cooper argues the K-9 did not alert on the vehicle, but rather the deputy
directed the dog to pay attention to the front passenger door area. Here, the
district court found Cooper presented no testimony—expert or otherwise—to


                                        13
refute the deputy’s testimony on the type of his dog’s alert, i.e., a “soft”
indication or alert; to show the deputy’s dog “search” was contrary to policy; or
to show the deputy directed the dog to give the “soft” alert. Rather, the court
found her counsel’s “conclusory argument” was not supported by any evidence
and specifically found the dog “did alert on the Cooper vehicle.” We conclude
the court made specific findings on this issue and sufficient competent evidence
supports the court’s findings.

                                      VI

[¶37] Cooper also contends that “anything allegedly found on her person at the
jail upon her arrest should be suppressed as this constitutes the fruit of the
poisonous tree.” However, as one noted treatise explains: “It now appears to be
clearly established that when an arrested person has been delivered to the place
of his forthcoming detention, he may be subjected to a rather complete search of
his person.” 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 5.3(a) (6th ed. Nov. 2024
Update) (discussing search upon arrival at place of detention). “This search may
be conducted without a warrant, and requires no justification in the individual
case other than that the person searched was lawfully arrested and is presently
lawfully detained.” Id. “There are two grounds upon which such a search is
commonly upheld: (i) as a search incident to and reasonably contemporaneous
with the preceding arrest; and (ii) as an inventory conducted to protect the
arrestee’s effects and to maintain the security of the detention facility.” Id.

[¶38] Cooper has not argued that the stop of her vehicle was unlawful or that
she was not properly arrested for driving under suspension. We have concluded
she was lawfully arrested. It is also not clear this issue was preserved by her
conditional guilty plea. Nevertheless, her argument is unavailing.

                                      VII

[¶39] We have considered Cooper’s remaining arguments and conclude they are
either unnecessary to our decision or are without merit. We affirm the amended
criminal judgment.




                                       14
[¶40] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J.
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Jon J. Jensen
      Douglas A. Bahr
      Mark A. Friese




                                15