Volume 204 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

Convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intox- icating liquor or drugs, and of previously having been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, and sentenced pursuant to the statute (§ 14-227a (g)) that imposes enhanced penalties on a third time offender, the defendant appealed to this court. Specifically, he claimed that the trial court should not have sentenced him as a third time offender because the essential elements of the crime of driving while under the influence are not substantially the same in Connecticut and Florida, where he was con- victed in 2000 and 2006. Held: 1. The defendant cannot prevail on his claim that prior convictions under Florida's statute for driving while under the influence did not qualify as prior convictions for the same offense under § 14-227a (a) and, there- fore, he was entitled to be resentenced as a first time offender: a. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court's application of the current revision of § 14-227a to the defendant's conduct, rather than the revision that was in existence at the time of his Florida convictions, did not violate the ex post facto clause; the court's application of the current revision did not enhance the defendant's punishment for his prior Florida convictions and did not punish him for conduct that was not criminal in Connecticut at the time he committed the Florida offenses; instead, the court, applying the statute as the legislature intended, merely enhanced his sentence for his current illegal conduct because it was considered more serious in light of his earlier offenses in Florida; more- over, on the basis of the statute's clear and unambiguous language, as well as precedent from this court, our Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court, the legislature intended that the applicable revi- sion of § 14-227a was the one under which the defendant was charged in this case. b. The ''operation'' element in § 14-227a was substantially the same as the ''actual physical control'' element in the Florida statute; the elements of each statute need not be identical to be substantially similar, and, in examining the manner in which Florida courts have applied the actual physical control element and the manner in which Connecticut courts have applied the operation element, it was clear that both statutes crimi- nalize substantially the same conduct. c. Contrary to the defendant's claim, neither § 14-227a (a) nor the Florida statute requires a vehicle to be motorized, and, accordingly, the statutes are substantially the same in their definitions of ''vehicle'' and ''motor vehicle'' for purposes of both statutes. d. Contrary to the defendant's claim that the Florida statute and § 14- 227a are dissimilar because at the time of his wrongful conduct in Florida, § 14-227a (a) required operation in specific proscribed areas, but the Florida statute did not, § 14-227a (g) directs a comparison of a prior conviction with the current revision of § 14a-227 (a) (1) or (2), and, pursuant to the revision of § 14-227a under which the defendant was charged for his 2016 conduct, there was no requirement that he operate his vehicle on a public highway or another similar road, as the public highway element of § 14-227a (a) was eliminated by the legislature in 2006. e. The defendant's claim that the statutes are dissimilar because at the time of his 2000 conviction in Florida, § 14-227a (a) required a blood alcohol content of at least 0.10 percent, but the Florida statute required only a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent, was without merit; as an enhancement penalty for a repeat offender penalizes only the last offense committed by a defendant, and, when the defendant was charged in the present case for his Connecticut conduct, § 14-227a (a) applied to a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher, the 0.10 percent element of § 14-227a (a) having been lowered to 0.08 percent by the legislature in 2002. 2. This court, as an intermediate court of appeal, was unable to overrule, reevaluate, or reexamine controlling precedent of our Supreme Court and, accordingly, declined the defendant's request to overrule State v. Burns (236 Conn. 18) and State v. Mattioli (210 Conn. 573) on the basis that they contravene the plain language of § 14-227 (g). Argued November 18, 2020—officially released April 20, 2021

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and conspiracy to commit witness tampering, filed his third petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that he had received ineffective assistance from D, his first habeas counsel. At the petitioner's criminal trial, the trial court permitted his defense counsel, S, to withdraw on the ground that he could be called as a witness at trial. The petitioner indicated to the court that he waived any conflict, and wanted to proceed to trial and was prepared to represent himself, which the court did not allow. The petitioner thereafter was charged with additional crimes in a sepa- rate docket, and C was appointed to represent him on all of the charges, after which the petitioner entered his plea. In the first habeas action, the petitioner alleged that S and C had rendered ineffective assistance. The habeas court denied the petition, and D failed to file a timely petition for certification to appeal. In the second habeas action, in which the petitioner alleged that S, C and D had provided ineffective assistance, the habeas court rendered judgment restoring the petitioner's appellate rights with respect to the issues raised in the first habeas petition. The petitioner thereafter appealed from the denial of his first habeas petition, but did not raise the merits of his claims in that first petition against S and C. This court affirmed the judgment of the first habeas court. The petitioner then filed his third habeas petition, and the habeas court rendered a judgment of dismissal, concluding that there was no good cause to proceed to trial. This court reversed in part the judgment of the habeas court and remanded the case for a trial on the merits of the petitioner's claim that his right to the effective assistance of habeas counsel had been violated. The petitioner claimed that D failed to pursue a claim that his right to the effective assistance of criminal trial counsel had been violated when C failed to advise him properly that his plea would operate as a waiver of his appellate rights, specifically, his right to challenge the trial court's granting of S's motion to withdraw. After a trial on the merits, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the petitioner's claim on the ground that he had failed to prove prejudice because he failed to establish that he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's alleged deficient performance. Thereafter, the habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly denied the petitioner's ineffective assistance of habeas counsel claim because he failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient perfor- mance of C; the petitioner faced a possible sentence of 140 years of incarceration with no possibility of parole if convicted at trial, and C was able to negotiate a reduction in the charges and a state recommended sentence of thirty years of incarceration with the possibility of parole in exchange for the petitioner's plea, and the record supported the court's finding that the petitioner would not have declined that plea offer on the chance that he could convince a jury on a retrial, after he was convicted once and successfully appealed on the grounds he claimed he would have pursued if he had been counseled properly by C, that he was not guilty, as the state's case against the petitioner was strong, the petitioner's claim of self-defense had significant weaknesses, and the court was free to discredit the petitioner's testimony that he would have gone to trial had he been counseled by C that his issues regarding S's withdrawal and his right to self-representation could have been raised on appeal had he been convicted. Argued February 4—officially released April 20, 2021

The plaintiff banking firm sought to recover damages from the defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff, for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with bonus agreements between the parties. The plaintiff, which had paid annual discretionary bonuses to its employees, was unable to pay the plaintiff his 2014 bonus until 2016 because of financial difficulties. When the defendant shortly thereafter requested his bonus for 2015, U, the plaintiff's chief executive officer, told him that the plaintiff was not paying 2015 bonuses at that time because it had just paid 2014 bonuses. The defendant thereafter told U that, in exchange for the 2015 bonus, he would bring his family to the United States from the Philippines, buy a home in Connecticut and redouble his efforts at the plaintiff's firm. Pursuant to written agreements the parties executed, U agreed to pay the defendant an advance on the 2015 bonus and an additional payment at a later date. Six days after receiving the advance on the 2015 bonus, the defendant informed U that he was resigning and moving to the Philippines. On his last day of employment, the defendant returned to the plaintiff a laptop computer that the plaintiff had provided to him. U thereafter discovered on the laptop e-mails from the defendant to friends and coworkers indicating that he had been preparing to start an information technology business in the Philippines upon receipt of the 2015 bonus. U concluded that the defendant had used the plaintiff's resources to develop that business. The plaintiff thereafter sought repay- ment of the 2014 bonus and the 2015 bonus advance. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on its complaint in part and thereafter granted in part the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. On the defen- dant's appeal and the plaintiff's cross appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly rendered judgment for the plaintiff and granted its motion for attorney's fees, and, because the court's memoranda of decision fully addressed the arguments raised in this appeal, this court adopted the trial court's memoranda of decision as proper statements of the facts and applicable law. Argued September 17, 2020—officially released April 20, 2021

The plaintiffs, G, a high school student, and his mother, sought damages from the defendants, the Board of Education of the Town of Glastonbury and several school administrators and educators as a result of injuries G sustained while playing football at the high school. The plaintiffs had brought a previous action in connection with G's injuries in which the trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike and thereafter rendered judgment for the defendants after the plaintiffs failed to replead. The plaintiffs then appealed to this court but thereafter with- drew the appeal. The defendants in both actions were the same with the exception of a football coach who was named as a defendant in each case. The defendants in the present action filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the doctrine of res judicata barred the present action regardless of any additional facts or different theories of liability that the plaintiffs alleged. The trial court granted the defen- dants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiffs there- after appealed to this court. Held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, as the issues were properly resolved in that court's thor- ough and well reasoned memorandum of decision, which this court adopted as a proper statement of the facts, issues and applicable law. Argued March 10—officially released April 20, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of various crimes in connection with the sexual assault of the victim, appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his challenge to the jury panel, which he claimed did not represent a fair cross section of the community in violation of the sixth amendment and had been summoned under a process that violated his right to equal protection. The defendant further invited this court to exercise its supervisory authority to require the collection and/or maintenance of venire panel demographic data. During jury selection, the court conducted a hearing on the defendant's objec- tion to the jury panel. Relying on census data, information from the prospective jurors' questionnaires and the testimony of an expert witness who used a Baysean probability model to predict the race of the prospec- tive jurors, the defendant claimed that the state failed to engage in substantive changes to remedy the underrepresentation of minorities and overrepresentation of Caucasians in prospective jury pools and that the state failed to adopt measures to increase minority participation in jury pools. The questionnaires stated that prospective jurors had the option of providing information as to their race but that they need not do so if they found it objectionable. The defendant also provided testimony from eight witnesses about how venire pools were selected throughout the state and about the nonenforcement of civil penalties on nonappearing jurors. None of the witnesses testified that they or the state entities where they were employed compiled or maintained data as to the racial or ethnic composition of venire panels in the state. The defendant thus claimed that the Judicial Branch had seemingly demonstrated wilful blindness in regard to the statutory (§ 51-232 (c)) requirement that it assure that venire panels are nondiscriminatory. He also asserted that the state's failure to take action with jurors who did not report for duty led to underrepresentation of certain groups. The court ruled, inter alia, that the defendant had presented no evidence that the purported underrepresentation of African-Americans and Hispanics resulted from their systematic exclusion in the jury selection process, or that the jury selection process was susceptible to abuse or racial bias. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's challenges to the venire panels in violation of his constitutional rights: a. The defendant did not establish a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment right that the venire pool represent a fair cross section of the community, as he failed to demonstrate that any underrepresentation of African-Americans and Hispanics resulted from their systematic exclusion in the jury selection process; although the state was generally aware of a lower response rate to jury summonses from certain minority groups, the uncontroverted evidence established that the process by which the Judicial Branch's jury administration summons jurors is accomplished without regard to race, and there was no evidence to support a finding that enforcement of civil penalties against nonap- pearing jurors would lead to greater responsiveness to juror summonses. b. The court correctly rejected the defendant's equal protection claim, as there was no evidence of a jury selection procedure that is susceptible to abuse or is not racially neutral; the defendant did not establish that the state systematically excluded African-Americans or Hispanics from the jury selection process, and the defendant did not provide any evi- dence of discriminatory intent with respect to excluding African-Ameri- cans or Hispanics, rather, the evidence presented by the defendant reflected that Judicial Branch officials were either unaware of the racial and ethnic characteristics of people summoned for jury duty or that such information was not retained or recorded. 2. This court declined to exercise its supervisory authority over the adminis- tration of justice to require the state to collect demographic data in accord with the directive of § 51-232 (c) to prevent discrimination in jury selection; the defendant's claims about the composition of jury panels at issue were unproven, and, as crafted by the legislature, the language of § 51-232 (c) explicitly makes the provision of racial and ethnic information discretionary rather than mandatory. 3. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from inquiring about certain Probate Court matters that he claimed were relevant to the victim's purported bias against him, the defendant having failed to raise that specific claim before the trial court and expressly abandoned it in his principal appel- late brief. Argued March 9, 2020—officially released April 27, 2021

The plaintiff sought, by way of summary process, to regain possession of certain premises occupied by the defendant. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for default for failure to plead and rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff. The following day, the defendant filed a motion to open the judgment, which the court denied one week later. Notice of the court's decision denying the motion to open issued two days after that, and the defendant appealed that same day. There- after, the plaintiff filed a motion to terminate the appellate stay, which sought, in substance, a determination that there was not, in fact, an appellate stay in effect because the defendant had not filed his appeal within the five day statutory (§ 47a-35) appeal period in summary process actions and that the filing of the motion to open did not extend the appeal period. The defendant filed an objection, arguing that the case was controlled by Young v. Young (249 Conn. 482). Following a hearing, the court determined that no appellate stay was in effect that would prevent the execution of the judgment of possession during the pendency of the appeal. The defendant thereafter filed a timely motion for review with this court. Held that the case was controlled by Young, and, there- fore, the defendant's appeal was timely and, pursuant to § 47a-35 (b), execution of the judgment of possession was stayed until the final determination of the cause: because the defendant filed his motion to open well within the five day appeal period and, pursuant to the applica- ble rule of practice (§ 63-1 (c) (1)), a motion to open is a motion that, if granted, would render the judgment ineffective, a new five day appeal period arose when notice of the court's decision denying the motion to open issued, and the defendant filed his appeal on that same day, well within the new appeal period; accordingly, the defendant's motion for review and the relief requested therein were granted, and the trial court's order on the plaintiff's motion to terminate the appellate stay was vacated. Considered March 17—officially released April 27, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for injuries she sustained when she fell on a public sidewalk that was located in the defendant city of Bridgeport, adjacent to the property owned by the defendant S Co., a housing cooperative association. She alleged that her injuries were the result of the defective condition of the sidewalk, which was raised, uneven, and deteriorated. As part of the discovery process, S Co. hired an engineering firm to lift the sidewalk in the location of the incident and it was determined that its deteriorated condition was the result of a large tree root growing directly beneath the sidewalk. The root emanated from a tree growing on S Co.'s property. S Co. filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it could not be held liable for the plaintiff's alleged injuries, either by statute or under the common law. The trial court granted the motion and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, claim- ing that the trial court improperly granted the motion because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether S Co. was liable for her injuries due to its negligence or for maintaining a nuisance that caused the defect in the sidewalk. Held that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of S Co. because no genuine issue of material fact existed as to its liability for the plaintiff's injuries: the plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that her injuries were the result of S Co.'s negligence because S Co. did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, as the primary responsibility for maintaining public sidewalks in a reason- ably safe condition falls to municipalities, not abutting landowners; moreover, neither of the exceptions to that general rule applied in this case because there was no statute or ordinance that shifted liability from the city to the landowner and the injury was not the result of an affirmative act of the landowner, as the growth of tree roots is not typically considered an affirmative act of the owner of the land on which a tree grows and there was no evidence that S Co., or any of its predecessors, planted the tree; furthermore, S Co. was not liable for maintaining a nuisance that caused the defect in the sidewalk because the sidewalk was not under its ownership or control, the plaintiff pro- duced no evidence of any affirmative act by S Co. that caused the sidewalk to become uneven, and the presence of the tree on its property did not constitute an unreasonable or unlawful use of its land. Argued November 30, 2020—officially released April 27, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of several crimes, including murder, as a result of the stabbing death of N, appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the deposition testimony of B, whom the defendant also stabbed during the same incident, after having improperly determined pursuant to the former testimony exception to the rule against hearsay in the applicable provision (§ 8-6 (1)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence that B, an undocumented immigrant, who had returned to her native Guatemala prior to trial, was unavailable to testify. The defendant also claimed that his conviction of attempt to commit murder and assault in the first degree as to B violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because each crime was predicated on the same act against B. Prior to trial, the court granted the state's motion to issue a subpoena for B to be deposed, as her return to Guatemala would put her beyond the state's subpoena power. At the judicially supervised deposition, which was video-recorded and tran- scribed, the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine B without any restrictions by the court. B, who spoke no English, thereafter left for Guatemala. At trial, P, a director of an immigrant services organization, testified that she had spoken with B at least once a month after B returned to Guatemala and that, at the state's request, she spoke to B by phone three days before the trial and B indicated that she would not voluntarily return to Connecticut to testify. The defendant argued that the state had failed to establish B's unavailability because, inter alia, P spoke with B only by phone and did not testify that she had seen B in Guatemala, there was no evidence that B had been forced to leave the United States and because the state should have advised B not to return to Guatemala. The trial court admitted the videotaped deposition, con- cluding that the state had met its burden of establishing B's unavailability pursuant to § 8-6 (1). Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that B was unavailable to testify and admitted her deposition testimony at trial, the state having acted in good faith and with due diligence to procure her attendance: under the totality of the circumstances presented, the defendant's rights to confrontation and due process were not violated, as the state made sufficient efforts to establish B's unavailability, the defendant provided no legal authority that required the state to take additional steps beyond those it pursued to procure B's attendance at trial, the state was aware of her immigration status and desire to return to Guatemala, it kept in touch with her throughout the pretrial proceedings through P, who maintained contact with B after she left the United States and, at the state's request, contacted B three days before trial to inquire if she would be willing to return, and, as it was highly unlikely that any addi- tional efforts by the state would have succeeded in convincing B to return voluntarily, this court was not convinced that the state was required to expend any and all available resources to eliminate the complex challenges posed by her immigration status or to extend logisti- cal and financial incentives to induce her return to Connecticut; more- over, despite the defendant's unavailing assertion that, even if B had been properly found to be unavailable, the admission of the deposition transcript violated his rights to confrontation and due process, the defen- dant had an unfettered opportunity to confront B at the deposition, which was taken under agreed upon parameters and the direct supervision of a judge who did nothing to restrict the defendant's cross-examination of her, B was under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury, the videotape of the deposition reflected her demeanor, the state made no objections to her testimony, and, to the extent that impeachment evi- dence existed, the defendant declined to present it at trial when given the opportunity to do so; furthermore, any potential that B's examination at trial might have differed from her deposition testimony or that the defendant might later have become privy to additional information to utilize during cross-examination was speculative and not a basis on which to conclude that his confrontation rights were violated. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his convic- tion of attempted murder and assault in the first degree violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, which was based on his assertion that he was punished twice on the same evidence for the same offense against the same victim, B: because attempted murder requires intent to cause the death of the victim, which is not an element of assault in the first degree, and assault in the first degree requires serious injury to the victim with a deadly instrument, which are not elements of attempted murder, those crimes are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy, nor can assault in the first degree be a lesser offense included within attempted murder; moreover, although the operative information charged attempted murder and assault in the first degree in separate and distinct counts, nothing in the language of those counts could be construed as evincing any intent by the state to charge the defendant in the alternative, as the charges were not pursued by the state in an alternative manner, nor was such a theory discussed in closing argument, and the defendant requested no instruction, nor did the court give any instruction to the jury, indicating that it should consider the charges only as standing in a greater-lesser relationship; furthermore, the defendant's failure to raise his double jeopardy claim at trial belied any indication that the double jeopardy claim was obvious on the face of the information or in the manner in which the case was charged, and the defendant advanced nothing from which to discern any legislative intent to preclude the prosecution of a criminal defendant for both attempted murder and assault in the first degree. Argued October 20, 2020—officially released April 27, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of six counts of the crime of wilful failure to pay sales tax, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. There was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of wilful failure to pay sales tax as charged in count four of the operative information, the state having presented no evidence that the defendant failed to pay the sales tax allegedly due on the date specified in that count. 2. There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of wilful failure to pay sales tax as charged in the remaining counts of the operative information: the state presented sufficient evidence by which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, as the person responsible to pay sales tax for her husband's sole proprie- torship, was a person who was required by law to pay sale taxes and that she wilfully failed to do so; moreover, although the information technically charged that the defendant wilfully failed to pay sales tax as the owner of a different business entity, the name of the business entity was not an essential element of the crime, the evidence proved that the defendant wilfully failed to pay sales tax that was owed for the sole proprietorship, and the defendant made no claim of variance at trial, did not object to the admissibility of the evidence regarding the sole proprietorship on the ground of variance and did not claim that she was prejudiced in her defense and that substantial injustice had been done because of the language in the information. 3. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that the trial court misled the jury by giving an improper jury instruction that diluted the state's burden of proof and weakened her presumption of innocence; the defendant conceded that she waived her claim, and, contrary to her contention, her conviction did not warrant reversal under the plain error doctrine, as she failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that the court's instruction misled the jury and affected the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the proceeding. Argued February 8—officially released May 4, 2021

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the trial court's order granting the defendant's postdissolution motion to modify child support, claiming that the court improperly ordered him to pay the defendant a certain percentage of his annual bonus income as supplemental child support. In issuing its order, the trial court deviated from the child support guidelines on the basis of the significant disparity between the parties' incomes. Held that the trial court's reason for deviating from the child support guidelines constituted an abuse of its legal discretion: the court made no specific finding as to why the guidelines were inequitable or inappropriate, save for alluding to the significant disparity between the parties' incomes, and that reason to deviate from the child support guidelines failed as a matter of law because, although our Supreme Court has stated that income disparity may be considered when the custodial parent has the higher income and deviation from the presump- tive support amount would enhance the noncustodial parent's ability to foster a relationship with the child, that was not the situation in the present case, in which the unemployed defendant was the custodial parent who had no income aside from child support, and, accordingly, the court improperly considered the disparity between the parties' incomes in ordering the defendant to pay a certain percentage of his net bonus income as supplemental child support. Submitted on briefs December 3, 2020—officially released May 4, 2021

The plaintiffs, A Co. and E Co., sought damages from the defendants U Co., a utility company, U Co.'s parent company, and several individuals for, inter alia, fraudulent nondisclosure for concealing the true cost of environmental remediation on property the plaintiffs acquired from Q Co. Q Co. had purchased the property from U Co., which contaminated the site with hazardous materials. Prior to selling it to Q Co., U Co. had a study conducted to estimate the cost of remediation and the decommissioning of the site and designated a certain amount of money for that purpose. It was later discovered that U Co. concealed the true cost of remediating the site and that the cost was much higher than was originally estimated. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike several counts of the complaint, pleading fraud and unjust enrichment against the various defendants, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not err in its decision to strike portions of the complaint that pleaded fraud and unjust enrich- ment, as that court properly concluded that the complaint contained broad allegations that were insufficient to satisfy the pleading require- ments for fraud and that the complaint failed to allege, with the requisite specificity, that the defendants' alleged fraud was done to induce the plaintiffs to act, and failed to allege that the defendants had a duty of full and fair disclosure of known facts to the plaintiffs as it pertained to the property: the plaintiffs' claims of fraud did not plead specific acts and merely referenced the defendants' filings and representations as proof of fraudulent conduct, the complaint failed to allege that the defendants' fraudulent conduct was done with the intention or purpose to induce the plaintiffs to act to their detriment, as the complaint did not allege that the defendants had any knowledge that Q Co. would sell the site to future purchasers at the time it acquired the property, the plaintiffs were not parties to the proceedings regarding environmental remediation that preceded the plaintiffs' entering into the leasing agree- ment with Q Co., and, therefore, there was no special relationship that existed between the parties; moreover, the defendants' conduct with regulatory authorities and their filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission did not give rise to a duty of disclosure from the defendants to the plaintiffs; furthermore, this court declined to review the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly struck their claim of unjust enrich- ment and that the claim should be reinstated, as that claim was inade- quately briefed. Argued November 16, 2020—officially released May 4, 2021

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, M. At M's request, the trial court assigned the case to the foreclosure mediation program. The mediation, however, did not take place because of M's failure to attend three out of four of the required premediation meetings. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, which the court granted following M's default for failure to plead. On August 21, 2017, the court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, determined the amount of the debt owed, and set M's law day. M then filed a motion to open the judgment and extend the law day, claiming that her default was due to an increase in her mortgage payments based on a dispute that arose in relation to the payment of her condominium association fees. She also filed a petition for reinclusion into the foreclosure mediation program, asserting that she wanted to modify the mortgage and retain the property. The mediation proved unsuccessful, as the plaintiff did not believe that the property was M's primary residence and M did not have the lump sum required under the modification agreement to reinstate the mortgage. Between January and August, 2018, M filed her second, third and fourth motions to open the judgement and extend the law day, indicating in each that she anticipated being able to pay off the amount required to reinstate the mortgage. The court granted all of these motions. M then filed her fifth motion to open the judgment and extend the law day, claiming for the first time that there were discrepancies regarding the reinstatement figure that needed to be resolved. The court denied the motion but extended the law day. The court also denied M's sixth and seventh motions to open the judgment, in which M reiterated her claim that the amount of the debt was disputed, but the court again set new law days. Thereafter, the court denied M's eighth motion to open the judgment and her second petition for reinclusion in the foreclosure mediation program, and she appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying M's eighth motion to open the judgment because M failed to establish good cause as required under the applicable statute (§ 49-15): M's claim on appeal was based on the premise that the court's finding as to the amount of debt, made at the time of the judgment of strict foreclosure, was erroneous, yet she failed to challenge that finding on appeal or in her first four motions to open; moreover, a showing of good cause cannot rest entirely on a claim that the original foreclosure judgment was erroneous, or the statute would serve merely as a device for extending the time to appeal a judgment; furthermore, M had numerous opportunities to complete a modification of the mortgage note or to reinstate the note and failed to do so, citing only her desire to dispute the amount of the debt. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying M's second petition for reinclusion into the foreclosure mediation program because M failed to demonstrate the requisite good cause pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 49-31l (c) (5)): there was no indication that the parties would benefit from additional mediation when their two prior attempts were unsuccessful and the plaintiff had made it clear that it would not engage in further discussions relating to the amount of the debt, as that amount was finally determined by the court when it rendered judgment on August 21, 2017. Argued December 3, 2020—officially released May 4, 2021

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of several crimes, includ- ing murder and arson in the first degree, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that D, his first habeas appellate counsel, rendered ineffective assistance in the petitioner's appeal to this court from the denial of his first habeas petition. A police investigator, M, had determined that a fire at the petitioner's home, in which the victim died, had been intentionally set with an accelerant, and S, the state medical examiner who performed an autopsy on the victim, testified that, because of the lack of soot in the victim's bodily organs and low level of carbon monoxide in the victim's blood, she concluded that the victim had died prior to the fire. The first habeas court, in denying the first habeas petition, concluded, inter alia, that the petitioner had presented no newly discovered evidence that proved his claim of actual innocence and failed to establish that the scientific evidence admitted at his criminal trial was false or invalid. The court also rejected the petitioner's assertions that his trial counsel, N, was ineffective in chal- lenging the expert testimony of M and S and had a conflict of interest in representing the petitioner in a civil matter against his homeowners insurer. On the petitioner's appeal to this court, D challenged only the first habeas court's rejection of the petitioner's claims that N had a conflict of interest and had inadequately cross-examined M and S as to the cause of the victim's death and the cause of the fire. This court affirmed the judgment of the first habeas court. In his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged that D was ineffective for having failed to challenge the first habeas court's rejection of his claims that he is actually innocent, that his conviction was based on scientifically invalid evidence, and that N was ineffective in challenging certain expert testimony adduced by the state pertaining to fire science evidence and the cause of the victim's death. The second habeas court rejected the petitioner's claims that D had rendered ineffective assis- tance and rendered judgment denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not err in concluding that D's decision not to pursue an actual innocence claim did not constitute ineffective assistance, as the petitioner did not present affirmative proof of his innocence or demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on an appeal from the first habeas court's denial of that claim; the petitioner's assertion that he is actually innocent due to the unreliabil- ity of the scientific evidence at his criminal trial was unpersuasive in that unreliable evidence cannot logically constitute affirmative proof of actual innocence, and, even if the petitioner had proven that the evidence was unreliable, such a determination, although it might undermine the jury's guilty verdict, is not affirmative proof of his innocence. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that D rendered ineffective assistance in having failed to challenge the first habeas court's rejection of the petitioner's assertion that his right to due process was violated because his conviction was based on false and invalid scientific evidence: the evidence the petitioner presented to establish that there were alterna- tive explanations relative to the conclusions reached by M and S as to the cause of the fire and the victim's death fell short of proving that their conclusions were false or scientifically invalid, and the jury had been made aware of, and presumably considered, the existence of alter- native explanations, the existence of which M and S acknowledged on cross-examination at the criminal trial; accordingly, this court was not left with a firm belief that the petitioner most likely would not have been convicted if the jury had been presented with additional competing evidence such as the opinions of expert witnesses he presented at the first habeas trial who disagreed with M and S as to the cause of the fire and the victim's death, and, thus, it was not likely that the petitioner would have prevailed on an appeal from the rejection of his due pro- cess claim. 3. The habeas court properly concluded that D did not render ineffective assistance in deciding not to pursue the petitioner's claim that N was ineffective in challenging the testimony of M and S that pertained to the cause of the fire and the victim's death: the petitioner's contention that N should have presented expert testimony that focused on M's alleged failure to follow the scientific method was unavailing, as N's choice of experts did not give rise to a claim of deficient performance, M followed the essential steps in the scientific method, a finding by the first habeas court that the petitioner did not argue was clearly erroneous, and it was unnecessary for N to present expert testimony to refute M's testimony that an accelerant was the only possible source of a pour pattern found on the floor of the home, M having conceded on cross- examination that there were other reasonable explanations for the pour pattern that did not involve accelerants; moreover, in claiming that N was ineffective in failing to present evidence that undercut S's opinion as to the time of the victim's death, the petitioner ignored the fact that N presented evidence of that nature by way of requiring S to acknowledge having examined the body of another burn victim who did not have soot in her lungs or carbon monoxide in her blood, and the evidence the petitioner presented at the first habeas trial did not undermine S's opinions any more than her own confession did; furthermore, even if N's challenge to the testimony of M and S could be considered deficient, the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced, as N demonstrated through effective cross-examination that the conclusions of M and S were not beyond reproach, and, as the jury, faced with the concessions by M and S, still found the petitioner guilty, it was not reasonably probable that D would have succeeded in demonstrating that N's counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Argued January 4—officially released May 4, 2021

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the decision of the trial court granting the defendant's motion for a domestic relations order relating to distribu- tions from his pension plan. In the trial court's memorandum of decision dissolving the parties' marriage, the court ordered that the defendant's pension benefit held with his employer, D Co., be divided with the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently filed a motion seeking the entry of a domestic relations order with regard to the pension benefit, attached to which was a proposed order and a schedule, the terms of which were agreed to by the parties, setting forth the plaintiff's share of the defendant's pension income as of the date of dissolution. The court subsequently entered a domestic relations order that incorporated the language of the defendant's proposed order, and the plaintiff's appeal followed. Held: 1. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly modified the property distribution set forth in the dissolution judgment by requiring her to assign a portion of the joint survivor annuity to a third party was unavail- ing: the court's order effectuated the dissolution judgment by ensuring that any survivor benefit that the plaintiff received is based on the value of the pension benefit as of the time that the dissolution judgment was rendered, which value was the basis of the parties' calculation of the plaintiff's annual pension benefit; thus, the order did not impermissibly modify the judgment, but merely protected its integrity and ensured that the plaintiff did not receive an unintended windfall. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the court's postjudgment order constituted an impermissible modification of the dissolution judg- ment because the order required the plaintiff to share in the cost of the joint survivor annuity election: in the dissolution judgment, the court ordered the defendant to elect a 50 percent joint and survivor annuity, and the postjudgment order merely stated that the defendant had elected payment in the form of a 50 percent joint and survivor annuity with the plaintiff as the survivor annuitant and that both parties would share, in proportion, the cost of the election of that annuity; the order did nothing more than confirm that the election of the annuity resulted in a cost to both parties in the form of a lesser current pension benefit. 3. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly ordered that both parties would share equally in any future reductions in the defendant's pension benefit that may result from decreased contributions to the pension plan by D Co. was unavailing: the plaintiff could not prevail in her argument that the issue of future reductions in the defendant's pension benefit was not ripe for adjudication by the trial court because the court's order merely clarified and effectuated the dissolution judg- ment and, to the extent that the court rendered a judgment addressing a potential future contingency, it did so when it rendered the dissolution judgment; moreover, the dissolution judgment provides that the parties are to share equally in the pension benefits that were vested and accrued as of the date that the dissolution judgment was rendered, and the court's postjudgment order was consistent with that judgment, which was entered in order to protect the integrity of its original judgment and to clarify any ambiguity that might result from D Co.'s reduction or termination of such benefits, and substantial deference was accorded to the court's clarification of its own order, its interpretation of which was not manifestly unreasonable; furthermore, the court did not improp- erly modify the dissolution judgment by adopting a formula that could result in a reduction of the plaintiff's pension benefit, because the court's order did no more than effectuate the dissolution judgment by clarifying that her share of the benefit was subject to reductions to the same extent that the defendant was affected. Argued November 19, 2020—officially released May 4, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of assault in the second degree and conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree in connection with a fight at a bar, the defendant appealed to this court. One victim of the fight, C, suffered a head wound as a result of being punched, and the other victim, T, was struck by a bat and suffered, inter alia, a fractured ankle. Although there was evidence that the defendant exchanged punches with C, no evidence was presented that the defendant wielded the bat or as to the identity of the person who did. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Held: 1. The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree: there was no evidence presented or any reasonable inference that could have been drawn that a relationship existed between the defendant and the unidentified person who wielded the bat or that they engaged in any coordinated action, and an inference by the jury that the defendant had entered into an agreement with that person would be based on impermissible conjecture; moreover, the brief nature of the incident supported the conclusion that, even if the defendant saw the individual with the bat while he continued to exchange punches with C for a short period of time, there could not have been an inference that his continued participation in the fight supported an inference of an agreement with the bat wielding individual, and, accordingly, a judgment of acquittal of that crime was directed. 2. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to establish that C's injuries were caused by means of a dangerous instrument, as C did not testify and the evidence established only that the defendant had exchanged punches with C and C was later transported to a hospital, and, accordingly, a judgment of acquittal of assault in the second degree was directed. Argued February 4—officially released May 4, 2021

The plaintiff attorney sought damages from the defendant reporter, K, and the defendant publishers for, inter alia, defamation in connection with an article written by K and articles published by the publishers. The articles concerned a Superior Court decision that resulted in the plain- tiff's one year suspension from the practice of law for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment claiming that, as a matter of law, the published matter was not actionable because the plaintiff's claims were barred by the fair report privilege, which applies to the publication of defamatory matter in an accurate report of an official action or proceeding. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants: this court declined to address the plaintiff's unpreserved claim that the evidence supporting the defendants' motions was insufficient because it was improperly authenticated, as that claim was not raised before the trial court; moreover, the plaintiff's claim that the defendants failed to submit proof of their reliance on a government document as the source of the articles was unavailing because the defendants were not required to submit such proof to avail themselves of the fair report privilege and the articles were protected by that privilege because they conveyed substantially fair, true and accurate accounts of an official action or proceeding, as they contained language that was substantially similar to that of the court decision, the defendants were not required to conduct an impartial investigation as to the underlying facts of that decision, and their omission of facts that might have placed the plaintiff under less harsh public scrutiny and the inclusion of a quotation that was not attributed to a government document or proceed- ing did not render the articles substantially inaccurate; furthermore, the plaintiff's claims of malice failed as a matter of law because the defen- dants were not required to submit evidence to rebut his claims of malice because the articles were fair and accurate abridgments of the court decision, and the plaintiff's state constitutional law claims were not considered because they were inadequately briefed, and any rights under the state constitution did not defeat and were not inconsistent with the fair report privilege. Argued January 13—officially released May 4, 2021

F Co. sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants. The substitute plaintiff, K Co., filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and the defendants filed an amended answer with seven special defenses. Thereafter, K Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability, which the court granted. The defendants then filed a motion to reargue and reconsider the granting of the motion for summary judgment, which the court granted but denied the requested relief. The defendants also filed a motion to open the summary judgment, which the court denied. The defendants then filed a motion to reargue and reconsider the court's denial of their motion to open the summary judgment on the ground that the court had failed to consider our Supreme Court's holding in U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Blowers (332 Conn. 656), which the court denied. Subsequently, the court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, from which the defen- dants appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to reargue and reconsider the court's denial of their motion to open the summary judgment as to liability; the record showed that the trial court based its orders on a review of the parties' evidentiary submissions, not on a conclusion that the special defenses as pleaded were legally insufficient and, thus, contrary to the defendants' contention, our Supreme Court's decision in Blowers was inapplicable to the circumstances of the present case, as Blowers involved the trial court's ruling on a motion to strike that the defendant's special defenses and counterclaims, as pleaded, were legally deficient and whether the special defenses related to the enforce- ment of the note and mortgage, whereas in the present case, the court made no reference whatsoever to the relationship of the defendants' special defenses to the making, validity or enforcement of the note or mortgage when it denied the defendants' motion to reargue and reconsider. Argued February 16—officially released May 4, 2021

The defendant, who had been previously convicted, on a plea of guilty, of assault in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying in part and dismissing in part his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied that portion of his motion in which he alleged that the sentencing court had imposed his sentence in an illegal manner by relying on inaccurate information. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim asserted as a matter of law as the motion failed to advance a colorable claim that invoked the jurisdiction of the court; rather than truly attacking the legality of the sentencing proceedings or the sentence itself, the defendant instead challenged the continued validity of his choice to plead to reduced charges under the doctrine enunciated in North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), and, in order for the court to have granted the defendant the relief he requested in his motion, it would have been required to open the judgment of conviction and vacate the plea agreement that was the actual basis of the challenged sentence, and, because the court lacked any authority to do so as part of the limited jurisdiction afforded under a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the motion, correctly construed, was nothing more than a collateral attack on the plea underlying the defendant's conviction; accordingly, this court concluded that the claim was properly rejected by the trial court but that the form of the judgment was improper with respect to this portion of the defendant's motion, and the case was remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing that portion of the defendant's motion. Argued November 10, 2020—officially released May 4, 2021

The plaintiff, who had been charged with the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles suspending his motor vehicle operator's license for forty-five days and requiring the use of an ignition interlock device in his motor vehicle for one year, pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b), for his refusal to submit to a breath test to determine his blood alcohol content. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal was affirmed; the trial court did not err in concluding that the administrative record contained substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's finding that the plaintiff know- ingly refused to submit to the breath test; the totality of the evidence, including a police report, a Form A-44, a breath test strip that read ''test aborted refusal,'' and the testimony of the arresting officer and the plaintiff at the hearing, provided reliable, probative, and substantial evidence that the plaintiff refused to submit to a breath test; moreover, although the officer did not provide a narrative to describe the plaintiff's words or actions that constituted a refusal, as required by Form A-44, the officer's testimony at the hearing about the plaintiff's express verbal refusal cured any defects in the Form A-44. Argued January 11—officially released May 4, 2021

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to vacate an arbitration award that was rendered against it and granting the application filed by the plaintiff, its former employee, to confirm the award. The plaintiff had claimed that the defendant terminated his employment in violation of a written employ- ment agreement between the parties. During the pendency of the arbitra- tion proceeding, the trial court granted the plaintiff's application for an order pendente lite pursuant to statute (§ 52-422) and for a prejudgment remedy. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the case was commenced with the application for a prejudgment remedy, and the plaintiff there- after failed to serve and return the summons and complaint to court as required by statute (§ 52-278j). Held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, as the statutory (§§ 52-417 and 52-418) requirements rele- vant to the parties' applications to vacate and to confirm the arbitration award clearly were satisfied, the requirements of § 52-278j were inappli- cable to proceedings pursuant to § 52-422, and, as the trial court thor- oughly addressed the arguments raised in this appeal as to the claim that it erred in confirming the arbitration award, this court adopted the trial court's well reasoned decision as a correct statement of the facts and applicable law on the issues. Argued March 10—officially released May 4, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for breach of contract, alleging that the defendant had failed to pay when a promissory note the parties had executed matured. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant on its special defense of waiver. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and, as the issues raised in this appeal properly were resolved in the trial court's thorough memorandum of decision, this court adopted the trial court's well rea- soned decision as a proper statement of the facts, issues and applica- ble law. Argued April 15—officially released May 4, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of murder, filed a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court, upon the request of the respondent Commissioner of Correction, issued an order, pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (e)), to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely pursuant to § 52-470 (d) (1) on the ground that it was not filed within two years of the conclusion of appellate review of the judgment on the prior habeas petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, during which the petitioner testified, the habeas court dismissed the petition as untimely, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay in filing his petition. In reaching its decision, the court determined that there was no evidence corroborating the petitioner's testimony that his prior habeas and appellate counsel did not advise him of the statutory time constraints or that he had taken substantial steps to pursue a federal habeas petition. The court also stated that it was not persuaded by that testimony nor the petitioner's testimony that he was unaware of the statutory time constraints. There- after, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in rejecting his claim that his ignorance of the time constraints in § 52-470 (d) constituted good cause for the delay in the filing of his habeas petition, which was based on his argument that his testimony that he was unaware of the statutory deadlines overcomes the rebuttable presumption of unreason- able delay: even if an assertion of ignorance of the statutory deadlines was sufficient to satisfy the burden of showing good cause, the habeas court found that the petitioner's testimony that he was unaware of the deadlines was not credible, and it was not within the purview of this court to second-guess the habeas court's credibility determinations; accordingly, there was no basis for this court to conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal. Argued November 19, 2020—officially released May 11, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant property owners for breach of contract in connection with the defendants' failure to pay for services rendered. The plaintiff is a business that provides tax consultation services and specializes in real estate tax valuation and assisting property owners in contesting property assessments. The par- ties entered into a contract authorizing the plaintiff to represent the defendants at informal hearings, before the Board of Assessment Appeals of the City of Bridgeport and, if necessary, to hire an attorney to represent the defendants on appeal to the Superior Court. After the defendants refused to pay the plaintiff for the services it had rendered, the plaintiff commenced this action. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on its complaint in part and the defendants appealed to this court, claiming that the court erred in not finding that the plaintiff had engaged in, or otherwise induced, the illegal practice of law by hiring an attorney to pursue the tax appeals and in maintaining exclusive control over the tax litigation. Held that the contract was consistent with public policy considerations and did not authorize the illegal or unauthorized practice of law: the trial court correctly observed that Connecticut courts have enforced agreements like the one at issue in the present case, and, according to our Supreme Court, contracts of this nature are consistent with the public policies against the unautho- rized practice of law and in favor of fair and accurate taxation because they facilitate the correction of errors by municipal assessors; moreover, the contract provided the defendants with the right to discontinue the engagement at any time with proper notice, and the tax appeals to the Superior Court were validly brought by an attorney retained by the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants. Argued March 8—officially released May 11, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sus- tained as a result of the defendant's negligence, arising out of an incident in which she became trapped in a restaurant restroom and one of the defendant's employees attempted to force the door open, causing a piece of wood to strike and injure her. The defendant's registered agent for service was served with the summons and complaint, but the defen- dant did not file an appearance until nine months later, after it had been defaulted for failure to appear and the trial court had rendered judgment on the default and awarded damages to the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion to open the judgment, claiming that its failure to appear was the result of mistake in that it had notified its insurance broker of the underlying matter but that the broker did not notify the defendant's insurance company until after the judgment had been rendered. The court denied the defendant's motion to open the judgment, concluding that the defendant failed to meet the provisions of the applicable statute (§ 52-212) and, thereafter, granted the defendant's motion to reargue the motion to open but reaffirmed the denial of the motion to open, and the defendant appealed. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to open the judgment and finding that there was no reasonable cause for the defendant's failure to appear; the defendant did not file an appearance until nine months after it properly received notice of the action, and the court concluded that the defendant's action in sending the summons and complaint to its insurance broker under the assump- tion that the broker would inform its insurance company to hire an attorney constituted negligence on the part of the defendant rather than a mistake or other reasonable cause required by § 52-212. 2. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that it was entitled under the rules of practice (§ 11-12 (c)) to a hearing after the trial court granted its motion to reargue its motion to open; the court's denial of the motion to open was an appealable final judgment and, as such, pursuant to Practice Book § 11-12 (d), § 11-12 (c) was inapplicable, the motion to reargue was instead governed by Practice Book § 11-11, pursuant to which the court was not required to schedule a hearing on granting the defendant's motion to reargue. Argued February 10—officially released May 11, 2021

The plaintiff, J, sought, by way of summary process, to regain possession of certain premises that he owned with B, his wife, that were occupied by the defendant. The defendant filed special defenses, a counterclaim and prayers for relief. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to cite in B as a counterclaim defendant. When J and B moved to strike the defendant's counterclaim and prayers for relief, the trial court, sua sponte, struck all but one of the defendant's special defenses. Following a trial, the court rendered judgment of possession of the premises in favor of J and B, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action, as the record clearly reflected that the joint owners of the premises were unanimous in their desire that the defendant be evicted from the premises: after B was added as a party to the action, she joined with J, a joint owner, in all efforts to secure a judgment of possession for them and against the defendant and there was no evidence that B objected to the summary process action; moreover, there was no language or provision in the applicable statute (§ 47a-23) providing that the trial court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over a summary process action unless all owners of a subject property agreed with the initiation of the action by a statement in the complaint or some sworn statement. 2. The trial court improperly struck, sua sponte, the defendant's special defense of laches; the defendant was not provided with reasonable notice that her special defense could be struck, as J and B filed a motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim and prayers for relief and did not move to strike the defendant's special defenses, yet, in granting the motion to strike, the court struck the special defense of laches. Argued February 10—officially released May 11, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted on a plea of guilty to the crime of felony murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentence was illegal because the Department of Correction improperly failed to calculate certain job credits that amounted to a reduction of sixty-three days in his sentence. The petitioner alleged that he had had a seven day job that allowed him to earn one day off his sentence for every week he worked while he was incarcerated in Connecticut but that the sixty- three days in sentence reduction he claimed to have earned were taken away from him when he was transferred to a correctional facility in Virginia. The habeas court, without prior notice to the petitioner or a hearing, sua sponte rendered judgment dismissing his habeas petition pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-29), concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was no cognizable liberty interest in prison jobs or credits that have not yet been applied to a sentence. The court thereafter denied the petitioner certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner certifica- tion to appeal from the dismissal of his habeas petition, the court having erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner's job credits claim as pleaded. 2. The habeas court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed the habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction: the court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because no cognizable liberty interest existed in prison employment or credits that have not been applied to a sentence, the petitioner's claim having been that his job credits were earned and credited but then removed without due process, and the court misconstrued the job credits claim as having asserted that the petitioner was denied the right to receive those credits while he was incarcerated in Virginia; moreover, contrary to the claim by the respondent Commis- sioner of Correction that dismissal of the habeas petition was proper because a certain timesheet constituted undisputed evidence that the petitioner never earned the job credits, at the time of the dismissal, the only information the court properly could have relied on was that contained in the allegations of the habeas petition, as it was not at all clear that the facts in the timesheet were undisputed; furthermore, Practice Book § 23-29 did not provide that the court may dismiss a habeas petition on its own motion without notice to the petitioner and an opportunity to be heard when a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Argued February 9—officially released May, 11, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, sought a second writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that the state violated his right to due process, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83), when it failed to disclose to him at his criminal trial certain information concerning an alleged bank fraud scheme involving a third party, H, and the victim. H had given the police a sworn statement asserting that an individual he knew as Lenny had asked him to open a bank account and to provide him with an account number. H alleged that Lenny would then deposit money into the account after which H could withdraw a certain amount. H's statement to the police and certain bank records were admitted into evidence in the petitioner's second habeas trial, at which H invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. The petitioner, who had admitted to several individuals that he shot the victim, claimed that H's statement and the bank records constituted exculpatory information and viable evidence that should have been provided to him to support a third-party culpability defense. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that there was no reasonable probability that H's statement or the bank records would have been relevant or admissible third-party culpability evidence at the criminal trial. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the proffered evidence, which did not establish a direct connection to the victim's murder, was not material and, thus, the state's failure to disclose it did not constitute a Brady violation: the possibility that H may have had a motive to kill the victim to withdraw the remaining funds from the bank account was insufficient to establish a direct connection to the crime, as the evidence, at best, created a mere suspicion of a connection between H and the victim, and, even if it were assumed that Lenny and the victim were the same person, the documents established only that H and the victim knew each other for a short time and were engaged in a fraud scheme, which did not rise to the level of a legitimate third-party culpability defense, particularly in light of the petitioner's multiple confessions; moreover, as a Brady claim is resolved by determining whether the suppressed evidence itself is material, the proffered evidence did not create a reason- able probability of a different result at the petitioner's criminal trial on the basis of a mere possibility that it could have led to the discovery of further evidence, and, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the habeas court did not improperly decline to consider the effect of the proffered evidence in conjunction with an adverse inference from H's invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination, as the finder of fact would be prohibited from drawing any adverse inferences from H's decision to invoke the privilege, which could not have affected the petitioner's criminal trial without constituting error; furthermore, because the peti- tioner's claim of ineffective assistance on the part of his prior habeas counsel was premised on that counsel's failure to advance the Brady claim in the first habeas proceeding, the habeas court properly denied the petition as to that claim. Argued March 2—officially released May 11, 2021

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court finding him in violation of his conditional discharge and revoking his conditional discharge. He claimed that the particular condition of his conditional discharge that prohibited him from soliciting on private property violated his rights to free speech, due process, and liberty guaranteed by the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. Held that the defendant's appeal was dismissed as moot, the defendant having failed to challenge all the bases for the trial court's finding that he violated his conditional discharge; the court also found that the defendant violated a second condition of his conditional discharge, the condition that he stay away from the Connecticut Post Mall in Milford, and, as the defendant failed to challenge this independent basis for the court's finding that he violated his conditional discharge, this court could not afford him any practical relief. Argued January 14—officially released May 11, 2021

The plaintiffs, S and F Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant for breach of contract after the defendant allegedly breached its obliga- tion to repair S's motor vehicle. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant improperly drilled a hole in the engine block and damaged the vehicle and that, as a result of the defendant's breach, the plaintiffs incurred expenses for, inter alia, the repair of the vehicle, rental of a replacement vehicle, and lost business time and profits. The court rendered judgment, after a trial to the court, for the plaintiffs, awarding certain damages, and denying the plaintiffs' request for further claimed damages. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that the trial court did not err in awarding certain direct and consequential damages to the plaintiffs: the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to fairly and reasonably estimate their expenses, and the court subsequently awarded direct and consequential damages in amounts that were consistent with the plaintiffs' itemized expenses; with respect to direct damages, the plaintiffs presented invoices for work performed by the defendant, addi- tional repair costs, and the cost of a replacement engine, and, with respect to consequential damages, the plaintiffs presented documenta- tion of towing and rental expenses; accordingly, the damages award was not clearly erroneous, considering the evidentiary record before the court and affording the court the broad discretion that it is entitled to in calculating damages. Argued January 12—officially released May 11, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries that he sus- tained when his vehicle struck an open manhole while he was traveling on a roadway maintained by the defendant city. The plaintiff alleged that his injuries were the result of the city's negligence, as one of its snowplows had knocked off the manhole cover and its operator failed to stop and secure the roadway. The city filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the facts alleged stated a claim of injury arising out of a highway defect for which the defective highway statute (§ 13a- 149) provided the exclusive remedy and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to give notice of his injuries as required by the statute. The court sustained the plaintiff's objection to the motion, noting that the complaint alleged that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the negligence of the snowplow driver rather than by a defect in the road. The matter proceeded to trial and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The city filed a posttrial motion to dismiss, renewing its claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to provide the requisite notice pursuant to § 13a-149. The court denied the motion, again stating that the plaintiff was asserting a negligence claim rather than a defective highway claim, and rendered judgment in favor the plaintiff, from which the city appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly denied the city's posttrial motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because § 13a-149 provided the plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the city and the plaintiff failed to comply with its notice requirements: the plaintiff's injuries were caused by an open manhole, which constituted a highway defect within the meaning of § 13a-149 because it was an object in the traveled path that obstructed or hindered the use of the road for the purpose of traveling, and the city conceded that it was responsible for maintaining the road on which the manhole was located; moreover, although the plaintiff did not plead § 13a-149 as a means for recovery, his sole remedy was under the statute because the evidence invoked it, and the cause of the defect did not alter this analysis because the city's liability was based on the existence of and its failure to remedy the defect; furthermore, the plaintiff failed to provide notice to the city within ninety days of the accident, which was a condition precedent to an action under § 13a-149, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Argued November 16, 2020—officially released May 11, 2021

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant state board of veterinary medicine disciplining him on a finding that he was negligent pursuant to statute (§ 20-202 (2)). The plaintiff had been administering less than the prescribed dose of rabies vaccine to dogs under a certain weight in contravention of the applicable statute (§ 22- 359b) and regulation (§ 22-359-1). The court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, concluding that the board had properly construed § 22-359b and § 22-359-1 of the regulations to mandate the administration of the prescribed amount of rabies vaccines to all dogs regardless of weight and properly determined that the plaintiff had committed professional negligence by failing to comply with the statute and the regulation. The court further concluded that the board's decision was supported by substantial record evidence and that the board did not exceed its author- ity or abuse its discretion in imposing its disciplinary order. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court did not err in concluding that the board properly construed the statute and regulation governing the standard of care for rabies vaccination in Connecticut and properly imposed disciplinary action on the plaintiff on its finding that his vaccination protocol constituted a prima facie violation of the standard of care: § 22-359b and § 22-359-1 of the regulations are plain and unambiguous in requiring that licensed rabies vaccines in Connecticut must be administered as instructed, a plain reading of both does not yield an absurd or unworkable result, and neither the statute nor the regulation conferred discretion on the plaintiff to administer the rabies vaccine in any other manner, which he did not dispute doing; moreover, this court declined to alter the statutory and regulatory scheme governing rabies vaccinations in Con- necticut. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claims that the trial court improperly concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the board's finding that he had failed to receive informed consent from his client and that the board did not exceed its authority or abuse its discretion in imposing its disciplinary order, the plaintiff having failed to brief these claims adequately; the plaintiff's attempt to incorporate by reference his amended verified complaint into his principal appellate brief was not procedurally proper, and the abstract representations contained in the plaintiff's principal appellate brief, unaccompanied by substantive legal analysis or citation to legal authority, failed to satisfy the plaintiff's obligation to adequately brief his claims. Argued June 29, 2020—officially released May 18, 2021

The plaintiff, a concrete supply company, sought to recover payment under certain surety bonds issued by the defendant, claiming that it had not been paid the amount it was owed for supplying concrete and other materials to the bonds' principal, M Co. M Co. entered into a subcontrac- tor agreement with C Co. to deliver and pour concrete for a construction project. C Co. then engaged the plaintiff to supply concrete materials to C Co. to comply with its subcontractor agreement. After receiving a joint credit agreement and lien waiver from M Co., the plaintiff began supplying concrete and sent invoices directly to M Co., which paid the plaintiff in full. C Co. was unhappy with this arrangement and, thereafter, the plaintiff opened an account with C Co., albeit for a different project. Subsequently, the plaintiff continued to provide C Co. with concrete and charged C Co. directly; however, C Co. did not pay the plaintiff. The plaintiff informed M Co. of C Co.'s nonpayment and M Co. provided payment to C Co. to forward to the plaintiff, but C Co. failed to do so. After C Co. defaulted, the plaintiff sent the defendant a notice of claim under the payment bond, and recorded a mechanic's lien against the owner of the construction project. The defendant issued a substitute bond, as a surety, which the plaintiff accepted as a substitute for its mechanic's lien. Thereafter, M Co. issued a response to the defendant in which it denied that the plaintiff's claim had any merit. The defendant refused to pay the plaintiff under the payment bond or the substitute bond, and the plaintiff brought the present action against the defendant. The defendant asserted nine special defenses against the plaintiff, alleg- ing, inter alia, that the plaintiff acted in bad faith and was reckless in its dealings with C Co. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in finding that the defendant failed to sustain its burden of proof in showing that the plaintiff conducted its business with C Co. recklessly, in bad faith, or with a dishonest purpose in providing C Co. with its own account, not demanding payment immedi- ately upon default, or bringing an action on the unpaid balance, as the court's factual findings and the evidence in the record supported the court's conclusions; the plaintiff was not a party to the payment bond agreement, the plaintiff took more protective steps than the defendant, which had failed to include any provisions in its bond agreement to require M Co., who brought C Co. into the construction project, to complete credit checks on subcontractors before bringing them onboard, the plaintiff did not act recklessly where it took reasonable steps to execute a joint check agreement with M Co., M Co. was on notice that C Co. had not been forwarding payment to the plaintiff, yet M Co. continued advancing payment for the materials directly to C Co., and there was sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that the plaintiff's conduct in continuing to supply materials to C Co. for the project did not rise to the level of common-law recklessness. 2. The defendant cannot prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff satisfied the express condition precedent to a valid claim as delineated in the payment bond, namely, that the plaintiff provide the defendant with a copy of the plaintiff's written contract or purchase order with C Co., as the court's finding that the forty-five invoices submitted to the defendant, which set forth the relationship between C Co. and the plaintiff, were sufficient to comply with the provisions of the payment bond; there was no dispute that the plaintiff supplied materials to C Co. for the construction project for which the plaintiff was not paid, and the plaintiff attached the invoices with its proof of claim form, indicating that C Co. and the plaintiff had an ongoing agreement for the materials to be supplied to C Co. for the benefit of the project; moreover, the payment bond failed to exclude any specific type of agreements or to indicate that proof of certain types of agree- ments were disallowed upon making a claim. 3. This court declined to review the merits of the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff to recover damages in excess of the penal sum of the substitute bond; the defendant raised no objec- tions at trial regarding the award of prejudgment or offer of compromise interest as part of the damages award, or the court's calculus of its award. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the plaintiff to present rebuttal evidence after the defendant rested without introducing any evidence or testimony during its case-in-chief when the defendant pleaded special defenses and partly geared its lengthy cross-examination of the plaintiff's sole witness toward addressing those special defenses; because the court had the sound discretion as to the order of its proceed- ings and because the court had barred the plaintiff from addressing the defendant's special defenses in its case-in-chief on the basis that those special defenses had not yet been raised, the court properly allowed rebuttal evidence limited only to the defendant's special defenses; the plaintiff's rebuttal was not presented to bolster its case-in-chief but, rather, to refute or contradict the evidence the defendant put forth during its cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness concerning the defendant's special defenses, and the documents that the defendant admitted during that cross-examination, which as the defendant con- ceded, were evidence. Argued November 9, 2020—officially released May 18, 2021

The plaintiff sought damages from the defendants, the son of her deceased husband, M, and M's attorney, J, for, inter alia, tortious interference with contractual relations relating to an antenuptial agreement executed by the plaintiff and M and tortious interference with her right of inheri- tance from M's estate. The plaintiff and M entered into the antenuptial agreement a few days prior to their marriage. Approximately six months later, M was diagnosed with cancer and told that he had less than one year left to live. Before undergoing palliative surgery in 2013, M signed a will that was prepared by J. The plaintiff alleges that she and M discussed amending the antenuptial agreement to provide that certain of M's assets, including their marital home, would be transferred to the plaintiff at the time of his death and that M memorialized the intended changes in a handwritten note the day after he signed the 2013 will. Although the plaintiff and M both engaged attorneys to represent them in negotiations pertaining to the modification of the antenuptial agree- ment, it was never amended. In early 2014, M signed a second will that was prepared by an estate planning attorney. It did not reflect the discussed modifications to the antenuptial agreement and instead left his residuary estate to a trust benefitting his two adult children from a prior marriage, including his son. Following M's death, J submitted an application to the Probate Court for the admission of the 2014 will. The plaintiff objected, claiming that, at the time of its execution, M lacked testamentary capacity and was under the undue influence of the defen- dants. The Probate Court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that there was insufficient evidence to prove either of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff then commenced the present action, claiming that the defendants manipulated M to prevent him from amending the ante- nuptial agreement and the 2014 will. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because they pre- viously had been adjudicated and decided by the Probate Court. On the basis of the collateral estoppel effect of the Probate Court decree, the trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of the doctrine of collateral estoppel with respect to the plaintiff's tortious interference claims because the claims presented issues identical to those actually litigated and necessarily determined by the Probate Court: following a full eviden- tiary hearing, the Probate Court admitted the 2014 will over the plaintiff's objection because it determined that there was insufficient evidence to show that the disposition of the estate in the 2014 will was the result of undue influence; moreover, the plaintiff's tortious interference claims that were raised in the trial court relied on the same factual predicate offered in support of her undue influence claim in the Probate Court, namely, whether the defendants' alleged conduct rose to a level of impropriety sufficient to support a finding of tortious conduct; further- more, because the plaintiff did not appeal from the Probate Court decree, it was considered a final judgment for the purposes of collateral estoppel. Argued January 7—officially released May 18, 2021

The defendant employer, R Co., and its owner, M, appealed to this court from the decisions of the Compensation Review Board affirming the finding of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner that the Workers' Compensation Commission had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits and that the plaintiff employee had sustained a compensable injury. The plaintiff sustained injuries when a car he was working on at R Co.'s junkyard fell on his shoulders and the back of his head. The plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim within one year of the date of his injury as required by statute (§ 31-294c), and R Co. and M argued that the commission lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. The commissioner bifurcated the issues, deciding the jurisdictional question first before holding a hearing on the issue of compensability. After the first hearing, the commissioner found that the medical care exception in § 31-294c (c) applied. The commissioner further found that an employer-employee relationship existed between R Co. and/or M. Thus, the commissioner found that the commission had jurisdiction over the matter. R Co. and M filed a petition for review with the board, which affirmed the commissioner's finding of jurisdiction in a decision issued in 2017. In 2019, a hearing was held before the commissioner to address the issue of compensability. No additional evidence or testimony was presented and the parties agreed that record from the prior hearing would be incorporated by reference and constitute the record for purposes of the new hearing. The commissioner concluded that the plaintiff's injury was compensable and that R Co. and M, as alter egos, were jointly and severally liable. The board affirmed the decision of the commissioner in part, and R Co. and M appealed both decisions of the board to this court. Held: 1. Although the board erred in affirming the 2019 decision of the commis- sioner on the basis of collateral estoppel, it properly applied, in the alternative, the law of the case doctrine and, thus, properly affirmed the decision of the commissioner that the plaintiff had sustained a compensable injury and was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. 2. The board properly affirmed the commissioner's determination that juris- diction over the plaintiff's claim existed. a. The board's decision affirming the commissioner's finding that the requirements of the medical care exception in § 31-294c (c) had been satisfied resulted from a correct application of the law to the subordinate facts and the inferences reasonably drawn from them: testimony and evidence credited by the commissioner showed that, after the car had fallen on the plaintiff and he could not feel his legs, he was placed on a wet mattress by M, who then directed an agent of R Co. to drive the plaintiff to a hospital, where he received medical treatment; moreover, any claim by R Co. and M that they lacked notice that the plaintiff suffered an injury was belied by the record and the fact that, within one year following the incident, M provided the plaintiff with money to purchase an electric wheelchair, purchased and/or provided a wheel- chair accessible ramp for the plaintiff's home, and paid him $500 per week subsequent to his injury. b. This court declined to consider R Co. and M's claim that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff was an employee of R Co. and not an independent contractor because R Co. and M failed to file a motion to correct that factual finding in the commissioner's 2017 decision; moreover, the board's determination that the commissioner's finding of jurisdiction was proper was based on a correct application of the law to the subordinate facts found by the commissioner relating to the employment relationship of the parties, including that the plaintiff was an employee of R CO. on the date of the incident that caused his injuries and that he was subject to the direction and control of R Co. and M. 3. The board improperly affirmed the commissioner's findings that the plain- tiff was an employee of M, that M was the alter ego of R Co., and that he was jointly and severally liable for the award of benefits to the plaintiff: it was undisputed that the plaintiff never filed a notice of claim alleging that M was his employer, and the commissioner acted beyond the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) by bring- ing M into the action in his personal capacity and deciding the issue of whether M, as the principal of the employer of the injured employee, should be held personally accountable for the plaintiff's injuries, as the commissioner was without jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil of R Co.; moreover, there is a remedy pursuant to statute (§ 31-355 (c)) for the Second Injury Fund to recover amounts paid by the fund, and, in such a civil action, the fund could seek to pierce the corporate veil of R Co. Argued February 9—officially released May 18, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was entitled to certain presentence confinement credit. While serving an aggregate ten year sentence for previous convictions, the petitioner was charged with various crimes after he assaulted a correction officer and was eventually deemed not guilty by reason of insanity. After being transferred to the Whiting Foren- sic Hospital, he assaulted residents and staff, and was charged with various new crimes. During the ensuing criminal proceedings on those new crimes, the petitioner did not post bond, and was transferred to the Northern Correctional Institution. After he was convicted of the charges stemming from the assaults at Whiting, he was sentenced to another term of imprisonment to be served consecutively to the ten year sentence he was already serving. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to a certain number of days of presentence confinement credit on the sentence for the Whiting crimes for the time that he spent as a pretrial detainee at Northern. The habeas court rendered a judgment of dismissal, concluding that the petition failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and denied the petition for certification to appeal. On the petitioner's appeal to this court, held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to present an issue that was debatable among jurists of reason, that could be resolved in a different manner or that deserved encouragement to proceed further, as his claim did not present an issue of first impression in Connecticut appellate courts; the habeas court properly recognized that, as a sentenced prisoner in the custody of the respondent Commissioner of Correction, the petitioner was being held at Northern both pursuant to judgment mittimuses for his aggregate ten year sentence and for his failure to make bond imposed as a result of the assaults at Whiting, and, as a sentenced prisoner, he was not entitled to have the jail credits earned on his aggregate ten year sentence applied to any other sentence; moreover, pursuant to statute (§ 18-98d), presen- tence confinement credit is earned when the failure to make bond is the sole reason the petitioner is held at a correctional facility, and it is settled law in Connecticut that § 18-98d does not allow a petitioner to earn jail time credit and presentence confinement credit simultaneously. Argued March 8—officially released May 18, 2021

The plaintiffs, M and P, sought to recover damages for the defendants' alleged negligence as a result of injuries they sustained when their vehicle was struck from behind by the defendants' vehicle. The defen- dants filed a special defense alleging that P was contributorily negligent. Interrogatories were not submitted to the jury, which returned a general verdict for the defendants, and the trial court rendered judgment in their favor. On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly prevented them from testifying, for the purpose of rehabilitating their credibility after it had been challenged by the defendants, that the reason their attorney referred them to certain medical providers was because they lacked adequate medical insur- ance. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the defendants' counsel to question the plaintiffs about their selection of medical provid- ers from a list curated by their attorneys and about a lawsuit M previously had filed that pertained to injuries she sustained in a prior motor vehicle accident: the examination of the plaintiffs by the defendants' counsel as to those issues was relevant to the defendants' claims that the testi- mony of the plaintiffs' medical providers was biased and that M's asser- tion about her injuries being causally related to the motor vehicle colli- sion at issue lacked credibility; moreover, that evidence was properly admitted to challenge the plaintiffs' credibility as to whether they were actually harmed or merely seeking treatment to establish and to augment their damages claim, as credibility was a particularly important issue at trial given the parties' differing versions of the events. 2. The trial court improperly precluded the plaintiffs from presenting evi- dence that they sought treatment from medical providers referred to them by their attorneys due to their lack of adequate medical insurance; the plaintiffs were entitled to present that evidence to rebut the defen- dants' claim that their treatment may have been motivated not by pain but for purposes of litigation and establishing damages, nothing in the record revealed the authority on which the trial court relied in precluding the plaintiffs' evidence as to why certain medical providers were chosen, the defendants' assertion that the collateral source rule (§ 52-225a) pre- cluded evidence of the absence of insurance was untenable, as that rule, which is premised on third-party payments toward damages sought by a plaintiff, was simply not implicated in this case, and, because the defendants repeatedly emphasized the role of the plaintiffs' attorneys in selecting medical providers, the court's preclusion of evidence the plaintiffs sought to present to rehabilitate their credibility likely affected the jury's verdict and thus constituted harmful error. 3. The defendants' contention that the general verdict rule precluded review of the plaintiffs' claims was unavailing; the defendants' challenge to the plaintiffs' credibility permeated all aspects of the trial, and, this court having determined that the trial court improperly precluded the plaintiffs from offering evidence to rehabilitate their credibility, the prejudicial effect of the trial court's ruling on their credibility could not be limited to the complaint or to the defendants' special defense of contributory negligence and, thus, necessarily tainted the entire case. Argued October 19, 2020—officially released May 25, 2021

The plaintiff attorney sought damages from the defendant reporter, K, and the defendant publisher, C Co., for, inter alia, defamation in connection with articles written by K and published by C Co. The articles related to certain a disciplinary proceeding brought against the plaintiff in the Superior Court that resulted in his suspension from the practice of law for one year. Our Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court on the ground that the proceeding was untimely commenced. The plaintiff alleged in this action that articles published by the defendants in 2015 after his suspension, and an article published in 2017 after our Supreme Court reversed that decision, were defamatory because they stated that he had ''impersonated'' another attorney. The trial court granted the defendants' special motion to dismiss the complaint filed pursuant to statute (§ 52-196a), holding that the publications were about a matter of public concern and that the plaintiff's complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because he had previously raised these claims and issues in prior litigation in federal court and in state court. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which was based on his claim that res judicata does not apply to a special motion to dismiss, was unavailing: the application of the doctrine of res judicata to the present case necessarily would meet or exceed the proof requirements of § 52-196a (e) (3) because it would establish, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff could not establish that there was probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of the complaint; moreover, if the plaintiff unsuccessfully litigated in his prior actions an issue necessary to his success in this action, he would be precluded from relitigating that issue and, therefore, could not establish probable cause that he would prevail in this action; consequently, collateral estop- pel was an appropriate defense to consider in the context of a § 52- 196a motion to dismiss. 2. The doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff's claims: although this court generally agreed with the plaintiff that res judicata did not apply to the allegations of his complaint concerning the article published in 2017, because those allegations related to an article published two years after the articles at issue in previous litigation, collateral estoppel barred his claims because the issues presented in the complaint were substantially identical to issues previously litigated before the federal and state courts that decided his claims; in his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the 2017 publication used the word ''impersonation'' to describe his conduct and that the use of this word evidenced malice, and, in his prior complaints in both federal and state courts, he had also alleged that the use of the word impersonation in the 2015 publica- tions was defamatory, and both of those courts rejected that claim, holding that such a description of the plaintiff's conduct was fair and accurate. 3. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that § 52-196a was unconstitu- tional as applied in this case because its application infringed on his state constitutional rights to redress and a trial by jury; this court, having recently addressed substantially the same claim in Elder v. 21st Century Media Newspaper, LLC (204 Conn. App. 414), adopted the reasoning contained therein. Argued January 13—officially released May 25, 2021

The plaintiffs, R and D Co., sought to recover damages from the defendants, R's former spouse, P, and P's attorneys and their law firms, for, inter alia, vexatious litigation. R and P were married in 2007, and, in 2010, R commenced a dissolution action. P filed a cross complaint, alleging that she suffered personal financial losses as a result of financial misconduct, fraud, and duress committed by R, acting both individually and through D Co., in connection with several financial investments that she made during their marriage. In 2011, P retained the defendant attorneys to assist with the dissolution action and to file a civil action against the plaintiffs, alleging essentially the same claims of financial misconduct that she had made in the dissolution action. Various other individuals and entities who allegedly aided and abetted the plaintiffs were also named as defendants in the civil action. Following a trial in the dissolu- tion action, the court dissolved the marriage between R and P, found that R had not, either individually or through D Co., engaged in the financial misconduct claimed by P, and ordered P to release and hold the plaintiffs indemnified and harmless from any and all claims pending in the civil action. P appealed the dissolution decision and filed a motion to stay the civil action pending a decision on the appeal, which the court granted. The dissolution decision was affirmed and, a few weeks later, the defendants withdrew the civil action. The plaintiffs then filed this vexatious litigation action against P and her attorneys, alleging that the claims made by the defendants in the civil action were identical to those made in the dissolution action and, therefore, were precluded by the prior pending action doctrine and lacked probable cause. The defendants filed for summary judgment, which the court granted with respect to the defendant attorneys, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The prior pending action doctrine was not applicable and, therefore, did not prevent the defendants from being entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law: the fact that the civil action may have been subject to dismissal under the prior pending action doctrine did not make it inherently vexatious, even if it was exactly or virtually alike to the dissolution action; moreover, the policies behind the prior pending action doctrine, namely, to prevent unnecessary litigation that burdens the courts and to avoid a multiplicity of actions and inconsistent judg- ments, did not support expanding the doctrine to adopt a bright-line rule that its applicability could be the foundation for finding a lack of probable cause in a subsequent vexatious litigation action; furthermore, a finding that the applicability of the prior pending action doctrine created a prima facie case of vexatious litigation would conflict with the discretionary nature of the doctrine. 2. There was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had probable cause to continue the civil action following the dissolution decision: the standard to determine the existence of probable cause was whether, on the basis of the facts known, a reasonable attorney familiar with Connecticut law would believe that he had probable cause to bring the action, and whether the trial court applied the correct standard was irrelevant because this court conducted a de novo review of the record; moreover, the court declined to review the claim that the defendants lacked probable cause to commence the civil action because that claim was raised for the first time at oral argument; furthermore, the defendants had probable cause to continue the civil action following the dissolution decision, as it was objectively reasonable for them to move for a stay rather than to withdraw the action because, until the court reviewed the propriety of the dissolution decision and the indemni- fication order, they would not have been able to determine which claims, if any, survived against R, D Co. and the other defendants. Argued January 6—officially released May 25, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes of promoting a minor in an obscene performance, risk of injury to a child, sexual assault in the second degree, possession of child pornogra- phy, and cruelty to persons, appealed to this court, challenging the sentence imposed by the trial court following the court's granting of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant originally received a total effective sentence of nine years of imprisonment, which would run consecutively to a sentence he was then serving, followed by twenty- five years of special parole. He claimed that his sentence on the convic- tion of sexual assault in the second degree, one year of imprisonment followed by twenty-five years of special parole, exceeded the statutory (§ 53a-35a) maximum twenty year term of imprisonment applicable to that offense. The court resentenced the defendant by restructuring his sentence to consist of the same total effective sentence of nine years of imprisonment followed by twenty-five years of special parole that he had agreed to in his plea bargain. On appeal, the defendant claimed that his newly imposed sentence violated the multiple punishment prohibi- tion of the double jeopardy clause as well as his rights to due process and that the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him. The state conceded that the portion of the defendant's new sentence, imposing an eleven year period of special parole on the charge of promoting a minor in an obscene performance, illegally exceeded the statutory (§ 54- 125e (c)) maximum ten year special parole limitation. Held: 1. The defendant's resentencing did not violate double jeopardy, as his overall sentence had not expired, and the trial court was thus free to restructure the entire sentencing package; the defendant provided no authority for his argument that the legal portion of his sentence should have been bifurcated from the illegal term of special parole, the resen- tence did nothing more than place the defendant in the same position he originally occupied when he entered his guilty plea, and, as the defendant was still serving his original sentence at the time of resentenc- ing, he had not obtained an expectation of finality in his sentence. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him; the defendant invoked the jurisdiction of the court by filing a motion to correct his sentence, and the court restructured his sentence before the total effective sentence had expired. 3. The defendant's resentencing did not violate his constitutional rights to due process, as he was resentenced to the same total effective sentence and not to a longer term of imprisonment or a longer combined sentence. 4. The trial court's imposition of an eleven year period of special parole for the charge of promoting a minor in an obscene performance exceeded the ten year maximum limit set forth in § 54-125e (c) and, thus, the defendant was entitled to resentencing. Argued October 21, 2020—officially released May 25, 2021