Volume 203 — United States Reports

Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court limiting the power of Congress to make laws under the Thirteenth Amendment. Three white men had been convicted in the Eastern Arkansas District Court for conspiring against black sawmill workers. The statute that was used to convict the men prohibits conspiracy to deprive American citizens of their constitutional liberties, including the right to make contracts. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that Congress did not have the right to intervene against racially motivated interference with labor contracts.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Appellants agree with the Supreme Court of New Mexico that all legislation upon the subject of hid'e inspection in New Mexico, and the organization and existence of the Cattle Sanitary Board, should be looked into and construed together with this enactment, so far as the same may appear to be in ;pari materia. The statutes touching hide inspection directly or indirectly, are: Act of 1889, Comp.

<p>Testator created a trust''for his children including therein all of his property except one parcel, the income whereof was to go to a niece for life, the trustees to make such income up to a specified .yin from the property in the general trust. The general trust was declared void as creating a perpetuity but not the trust for the niece. The children appealed claiming that the trust for the niece was also void. Held that</p> <p>One not appealing cannot, in this court, go beyond supporting the judgment and opposing every assignment of error, and therefore the niece could not endeavor to sustain the validity of the trust as a whole.</p> <p>The trust for the niece was not illegal, and was not so intimately connected with the failing trust as to fail with it;' but the decree was modified so that the income could only be made up to the specified sum from income from property in the jurisdiction.</p> <p>An objection that a person should have been made a party to a bill 'of review comes too late when the existence of that person does not appear of record.</p>

Held: as to the defendants other than the beneficiary, that as the action was prosecuted in good faith, whatever notice they may have had by virtue of the company’s defense was purged by the verdict, and although they had received their respective shares from the proceeds paid into court it was the same in law as though they had been paid in money directly by the judgment creditor and it could not be recovered. ' Whether…

The subject matter of .this suit consists of 4,420,406 acres of land in' the Cherokee country about to be allotted among the Cherokee people entitled to participateyin the distribution of the common property of the Cherokee Nation. The case was transmitted to' the Court of Claims by the Secretary of the.

<p>Where the order of the court having authority to designate the place of trial for a newly organized county in Oklahoma is as precise as circumstances permit, the fact that it merely names the town, there being no county or court buildings at the time of trial, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, where it dbes not appear that the party complaining lost any opportunities by reason of no building being named.</p> <p>Acts of the legislature of Oklahoma are not laws of the United States within the meaning of § 753, Rev. Slat..</p> <p>The Fifth Amendment requiring the presentment or indictment of a grand jury does not take up unto itself the local law as to how the grand jury shall be made up, and raise the latter to a constitutional requirement.</p> <p>Under § 10 of the Organic Act of Oklahoma of May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 85, the place of trial of a crime committed in territory not embraced in any organized county is in the county to which such territory shall be attached at the time of trial, although it might have been attached to another county when the crime was committed.</p> <p>Courts of Oklahoma Territory have jurisdiction to try a person for crime although committed in a part of the Territory not then opened for settlement, it appearing from the acts of Congress that title had passed to the Territory, and Congress was only exercising control so far as settlement was concerned.</p> <p>Whether a person on trial is compelled to be a witness against himself contrary to the Fifth Amendment because compelled to stand lip and walk before the jury, or because the jury was stationed during a recess so as to observe his size and walk, not decided, but held that it did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court, and render the judgment void.</p>

<p>An adjudication in ah action at law on a policy of insurance that the insured cannot recover on the policy as it then stood is not an'adjudication that the contract cannot be reformed; and a court of another State does not fail tp give full faith and credit, to such a judgment because in an equity action it reforms the policy and gives judgment to the insured thereon as reformed.</p> <p>Whether the obligation of the contract was impaired by a. statute as con- : strued is not open in this court if that objection was not taken below.</p>

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP KENTUCKY.’ The facts are stated in the opinion. As to power of the Circuit Court to issue the writ: There was no way in which the lower court could enforce its jurisdiction except by a writ of mandamus because jurisdiction could hot be entertained in a direct suit to recover the money, and so no judgment could have been recovered. Amendment XI to Const.; Coulter v. Weir, 127 Fed. Rep. 897.

Held: and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, that sections. 187 and .188 of the Maryland Code extending immunities' to the new company, had the effect to exempt from taxation certain property of the reorganized company and that the exemption constituted a contract between the State and the company entitled to protection under the con *117 tract clause of the Federal Constitution, against the subsequent…

On March 26, 1901, Thomas Burns, the owner of three, mining claims, as party of the first part, and Charles M. Taylor, as party of the second part, made the following agreement: “The said party of the first part, in consideration of the sum of one dollar, lawful money of the United States of America in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and for the further consideration of money and labor heretofore expended and of labor to be hereafter expended in and…

<p>Although the record of a case here on writ of error may fail to show how the facts on which the highest court of a State sét aside^ the findings of the trial court were brought to its attention, this court cannot ignore the recitals of .what it considered, if it appears that testimony was in fact taken.</p> <p>When the conclusions of the; highest court of a State reversing the. trial court are in harmony with the general rule as to the effect to be given to a patent of the United States,- this court is hot justified in setting the judgment aside upon a presumption of what might have been the testimony upon which the trial court made its findings.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. Neither the order nor the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing the temporary injunction, nor the judgment upon the merits in- the injunction suit in favor of these plaintiffs, have any tendency to support the decision stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. That decision is directly contrary to both.

<p>Under par. 313, as construed in connection with pars. 306, 307 of the Tariff Act of July 24,1897, figured cotton cloth is subject not'only to the specific duties imposed by par. 313, but also to the ad valorem duty imposed ' by pars. 306, 307.</p> <p>The evident purpose of these paragraphs precludes the application of the rule that any doubt as to the construction of a tariff statute should be resolved in favor of the importer.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The appeal was properly taken; the petition for rehearing was addressed to the discretion of the court and extended the time, as all judgments are under the control of the court during- the term at which they are rendered. Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 238; Aspen Mining and Smelling Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 31; Voorhees v. Noye Mfg.

This case is before us on error to the Supreme Court of Washington. 38 Washington, 126: It was submitted to the state courts oh an agreed statement of facts and involves the question of.the liability of the land of the plaintiff, now plaintiff in error, to taxation for the year 1904. He is a Puyallup Indian, and claims exemption under and by virtue of the treaty of December 26, 1854. 10 Stat. 1132.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The legislature of Virginia had no power to lake away the right of the National Council to continue to control and to use, through its subordinate body, the Virginia voluntary association,. the title or name “State Council of Virginia, Junior Order United American Mechanics.” This is true, whether the Virginia corporation is within or without the jurisdiction of Virginia.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The Circuit Court was wholly without jurisdiction to proceed in said cause either against the person or property of plaintiff in error, and the judgment against him was void. The attachment of his property in the State of Montana did not give the state court jurisdiction to proceed to render a judgment against the plaintiff in error without personal service of process upon him-within the State of Montana.

This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus,' -commanding the St. Mary’s Franco-American Petroleum.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Idaho refusing; upon habeas corpus, to discharge appellant who alleged that he was held in custody by the Sheriff of Canyon County, in that State, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>The appellant was indicted in' the Supreme Court of New York, county of Erie, for the crime of grand larceny, first degree, .alleged to have been committed in that county on the eighteenth day of May, 1904.</p> <p>Upon that indictment. a warrant of arrest was issued, but the accused was not arrested, for the reason that he was not found within the State.</p> <p>Then the District Attorney of Erie County applied to the Governor of New York for a requisition upon the Governor of Massachusetts for Appleyard as a fugitive from justice. The application was based upon the above indictment and numerous accompanying affidavits, stating, among other things, that the accused was then in Massachusetts. A requisition was accordingly made upon the Governor of that Commonwealth for the apprehension of Appleyard and his delivery to a named agent of New York, who was authorized to receive and convey him to the latter State, to be there dealt with according to law. With that requisition went properly authenticated copies of all the papers which had been submitted to the Governor of New York by the District Attorney of Erie County.</p> <p>The Governor of Massachusetts received the requisition and pursuant to the statutes of that Commonwealth referred it to the Attorney ’ General for examination and report. Giving the accused full opportunity to be heard and to introduce evidence, of which he availed himself, that officer examined the cáse and reported that the requisition was in regular and proper form and that there was no sufficient reason why it should not be honored. The Governor thereupon issued a warrant for the arrest of Appleyard and his delivery to the agent of New York to be taken tb that State, the officer who should execute the warrant being required to give the accused such opportunity to sue out a writ of habeas corpus as was' prescribed by the laws of Massachusetts in such cases. Apple-yard having been arrested applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. This fact is stated in the return of the officer holding the accused and is not denied. That court, after’hearing an argument, denied the application and remanded the petitioner to the custody of the agent of New York to be held in accordance with the warrant issued by the Governor of Massachusetts.</p> <p>The accused then applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the warrant of the Governor of Massachusetts’ and the order for his delivery to the agent of New York were issued without authority of law and contrary to the Constitution and laws as well of the United States as of Massachusetts7 and “especially contrary to sec. 2, art. 4, of the Constitution of the United States and of sec. 5278 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in that your petitioner is not a fugitivé from justice.” The writ was issued and a return was made of the above facts.</p> <p>At the hearing in the Circuit Court the accused requested a ruling that on the evidence it did not appear that, within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States, he was a fugitive from justice, and, also, that he should be discharged from custody unless it appeared positively, by a preponderance of proof, that he “consciously fled from justice when he left the State of New York.” Those requests were denied. But the court granted a request that the finding by the Governor of Massachusetts as a fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice was not conclusive. The court' refused to find, as facts, that the .acts of Appleyard did not', constitute a crime under the laws of New York; that no crime was committed by him in that State; and that Appleyard was not in New York on May 18, 1904, the date of the alleged crime. It consequently discharged the writ of habeas corpus. From-that order the present appeal was prosecuted.-</p>

Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906), was an important United States Supreme Court case dealing with corporations conducting business and the power of individual states to regulate how corporations may conduct business.

<p>In the absence of Congressional legislation goods moving in interstate commerce cease to be such commerce only after delivery and sale in the original package.</p> <p>The word “ arrival ” as used in the Wilson law means delivery of the goods to the consignee, and not merely reaching their destination and expressions to that effect in Rhodes v. iowa, 170 U. S. 412 are not obiter.</p> <p>The power of the State over intoxicating liquors from other States in original packages after delivery and before sale given by the Wilson law does not attach before notice and expiration of a reasonable time for the consignee to receive the goods from the carrier; and this rule is not affected by the fact that under the state law the carrier's liability as such may have ceased and become that of a warehouseman.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The allegation of plaintiff’s being a citizen of Sweden was not a sufficient allegation for the purposes of jurisdiction in the Circuit-Court in a suit between plaintiff and a corporation existing under the laws of Wisconsin. Stuart v. Easton, 156 U. S. 46; Hennessy v. Richardson Drug Co., 189 U. S. 25, 34.

<p>The proper .way to review judgments in actions at law of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma where the case was tried without a jury is by writ of error, not by appeal.</p> <p>The objection that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found no facts upon which a review can be had by this court is untenable, where it appears that the case was before that court a second time and that in its opinion it . referred to and adopted its former opinion in which it had made a full statement and findings of fact.</p> <p>The endorsement and delivery before maturity of a note secured by a chattel mortgage by the payee transfers not only the note but by operation of law the ownership of the mortgage which'has no separate existence; and such a chattel mortgage if recorded, although the assignment thereof was not recorded, remains a lien on the property, superior to that of subsequent mortgages even though the original payee may, without authority, and after the transfer, have released the same, if the law of the State in which the mortgage was given does not require the assignment of chattel mortgages to be recorded.</p> <p>Under the law of Kansas there is no statute making it necessary to record or file the assignment of a chattel mortgage in order to protect the rights of the assignee thereof.</p> <p>An assignee does not lose his rights under a mortgage by not recording or filing it, unless there is a law which either in express terms or by implication provides therefor; where there is no such statute it is not necessary, nor is it the duty of the assignee to record or file a mortgage.</p> <p>The rights of the holder of a chattel mortgage over the property after the same has been removed to another State are determined by the law of the State where the property was when the mortgage was given.</p>

The appellant filed its bill in this case in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Georgia to obtain an injunction restraining the city of Columbus, in thp State of Georgia (one of above defendants) from the construction of waterworks for the supplying of water to the defendant city and its inhabitants, Judgment was entered by the Circuit Court dismissing the bill for the want of jurisdiction, and the question of jurisdiction alone was certified to…

Held: contrary to the contention of the plaintiff in this case, did not displace the regular assessor, or affect his right to make an assessment for back taxes.

Held: although' it did say that the commission and the Circuit Court had made an order that indicated that the trains which already stopped at Magnolia were not sufficient and that the town should have five daily trains going south, and, therefore, the court said it thought it well to examine other questions, which it did.

Frances J. Riley, the • defendant in error, who was plaintiff below, recovered a judgment against plaintiffs in error, defendants below, for $1,250, in the District Court of Brown County, in the State of Kansas, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, and the defendants below have brought the case here by writ of error.

<p>Allen v. Riley, ante p. 347 followed as to power of a State to require one selling patent rights to record the letters patent and applied to a law of Arkansas, which also makes a note void if given for a patent right, if the note does not show on its face for what it was given.</p>

<p>In California, pueblo lands, which were simply ancillary to the execution of the public trust and in which the pueblo never had an indefeasible proprietary interest, and which were subject to the supreme political dominion of the former Mexican government, became, on the change of government, equally subject to the sovéreignty of the State of California through its legislature, and the title to such lands did not pass to the United States.</p> <p>The title of one holding under a deed to pueblo lands from a city in California, ratified by the legislature, sustained as against the city claiming to hold under a' subsequent patent from the United States.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are' stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The statute is based upon the principle of eminent domain, and the real, and indeed the 'only, reason which the state'court had to justify its decision was that every railroad is a public trust, and that the State can exercise the power of eminent domain so far as may be necessary to secure the property taken being put to the best use in fulfilment of the trust for a public use.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The act of 1895 so far as affects the plaintiff cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power. It is not in fact an exercise of the police power, but an attempt to exercise the' revenue power. Cooley’s Const. Lim., 6th ed., 704; 4th ed., 719; Freund, Police Power, §3; Rochester Turnpike Co. v. Joel, 41 App. Div. (N. Y.) 43; Potter’s Dwarris, 458.</p> <p>The taxing power is a separate and distinct power from the police power.</p> <p>Whether the railroad paid these assessments or not did not affect in an}' way the object sought by the police power. The act is plainly an example of that class of acts by which it has been attempted to exercise the power of special assessment by fixed rules in order to avoid inquiry in reference to the benefits in each case; the same class of acts which have repeatedly come before this court, and particularly in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269. Dillon on Mun. Corp., §752.</p> <p>The act of 1899 repealed the act of 1895.</p> <p>Neither the act of 1895'nor that of 1899 can be upheld under the reserved power of amendment. The legislature cannot take property under guise of the power of repeal and amendment. Inland Fisheries Co. v. Holyoke Water Co., 104 Massachusetts, 446; Holyoke v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500; Railway Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, do not support the opinion below. See Railway Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684; New Yorkv. O’Brien, 111 N. Y. 1; State v. Haun, 61 Kansas, 146.</p> <p>An obligation to keep in repair does not include an obligation to repave.</p> <p>The assessment directed by the act of 1895, treated as an assessment of benefits, is not a taking of property without compensation or without due process of law. French v. The Barber Asphalt Co., 181 U. S. 324; Brovm v. Drain, 112 Fed. Rep. 582; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Scott v. Pitt, 169 N. Y. 521.</p> <p>The Special Law of 189.5 was an amendment of the plaintiff’s charter.</p> <p>This has been held by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in this case, interpreting Connecticut legislation and it should not now be questioned in this court. Bulkley v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 27 Connecticut, 479; N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Waterbury, 60 Connecticut, 1; N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co.’s Appeal, 62 Connecticut, 527, 538; English v. N\ Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., '32 Connecticut, 243.</p> <p>The power of amendment cannot be restricted to such measures as might be justified also as an exercise of the police power. The police power may be exercised in derogation of rights claimed by contract. The power of amendment covers acts which are not an exercise of the police power; otherwise the power of amendment is ineffective.</p> <p>While the power of amendment is not without some restriction, and may not be exercised to impair the obligation of a contract made by the company pursuant to its charter rights that it was designed to enable the State to change the .obligation of its contract, that is the terms of the corporate charter. This certainly may be done by a legislative measure, passed in good faith, consistent with the scope and object of the act of incorporation and respecting vested rights of property. Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin Canal Co., 192 U. S. 201; Sioux City By. Co. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S. 98; N. Y. & N. E. B. B. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 567; Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347; Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; 1 Morawetz, Corporations, §§ 1093 et seq.</p> <p>That the act of 1895 was a valid exercise of the police power is shown by the authorities cited in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in this case.</p> <p>It is not necessary to determine whether the act of 1895 should be regarded as an act authorizing an assessment of benefits, that is of taxation, or one imposing a new condition on the original grant. Lincoln St. By. Co. v. Lincoln, 84 N. W. Rep. 802.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The city of Atlanta has no cause of action under the Antitrust Act.</p> <p>While the declaration alleges that the defendant in error was injured in its business of supplying water to its inhabitants, the averment can only mean that it was injured by the payment of an excessive price for the pipe bought to extend its water mains. There is no allegation showing an injury of any other character either to the business or property of the defendant in error. The action can only be maintained, if at all, on the ground that the defendant in error, as a consumer, has been compelled to pay more for the goods it purchased by reason of the fact that the seller'was a party to an illegal combination. Brown & Allen v. Jacob’s Pharmacy, 115 Georgia, 429; Bouttoell v. Marr, 71 Vermont, 1; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Illinois, 608; Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 476; S. C., 21 Q. B. Div. 544; S. C., 23 Q. B. Div. 598.</p> <p>From the nature and purpose of a combination to, restrain and monopolize, it was expected that every contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade or to monopolize the same would include among its purposes that of an assault upon the business of independent rival traders. For such action is necessaiy to complete the illegal scheme.</p> <p>So by §§ 1 and 2 of the, act Congfess struck at the initial step towards" the creation óf these injurious combinations by imposing-heavy penalties for joining in them, and by § 7 penalties, in the nature of treble damages and attorneys’ fees,, were provided to protect the independent trader by giving him a right of action if injured in his business or property by the combination of those endeavoring to create the monopoly.</p> <p>, There is not only no language in the act from which it could be inferred that Congress meant to protect the business of those engaged in trade wholly within the States, but Addyston Pipe cfc Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 247, held that Congress has no jurisdiction over that part of a combination or agreement which relates to commerce wholly within the State and which is subject alone to the jurisdiction of the State. Whenever, therefore, the business of a waterworks company, or the like, is injured by a combination or monopoly, redress therefor must be sought under the laws of the State under which the business is carried on.</p> <p>To extend the operation of the act so as to give a right of action, under the seventh section thereof, to every consumer seeking to recover back, as excessive, a part of the price paid for goods bought and-shipped from another State, would include a class of actions not contemplated by Congress, and not necessary to insure competition in interstate trade. Such damages could only arise from fraud or deceit in making the sale, and would be governed by the laws of the State under which the contract was made and to be performed. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38; Gibbs v. McNeeley, 118 Fed. Rep. 127; Whitwell v. Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. Rep. 545.</p> <p>Defendant in error contracted for the purchase of pipe at an agreed price fixed in the contract. This agreement was legal and binding under the laws of Georgia, where it was made and to be performed, notwithstanding the fact that the selling company was a party to a contract in restraint of trade, which was illegal under the laws of the United States. National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co., 86 Wisconsin, 352; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540.</p> <p>The Anti-trust Act is not a legal method of regulating prices. While denying to interstate traders the right to form combinations that would have the power to prescribe prices, Congress did not undertake itself to do, either directly or indirectly, what it prohibited to others. An action for threefold damages will only lie where there has been an actual, direct injury inflicted by something done in violation of the act (.Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48, 70), and this injury must have been done to the person suing in his business of interstate commerce, or in his property while the subject of interstate commerce.</p> <p>Under the statute of limitations of Tennessee applicable to this case the suit is barred either in one year as a statute penalty or in three years as an injury to- property for tort. State v. House, 2 Shannon’s Cases, 610; State v. Shaw, 113 Tennessee, 536; Hogan v. Chattanooga, 2 Tennessee, 339; Greenwood v. State, 6 Baxt. 567, 576; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 667; Merchants’ Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412; Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y: 326.</p> <p>A statute may not be penal in the international sense of that term, but penal within the meaning of the statutes of limitations applicable to private actions only. The following' cases, brought to enforce statutory liability, were held to be penal actions within the meaning of the statutes of limitations barring civil suits for statute penalties. Beadle v. Railroad Company, 48 Kansas, 379; 51 Kansas, 252; Savings Bank v. Bailey, 66 N. H. 334; Gridley v. Barnes., 103 Illinois, 211; Baker Wire.Co. v. Chicago á N. W. Ry. Co., 106Towa, 239; A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Tánner, 19 Colorado, 559; State Savings Bank v. Johnson, 18 Montana, 440; Raticon v. Terminal Assn., 114 Fed. Rep. 666; Davis v. Mills, 113 Fed. Rep. 678; S. C., 121 Fed. Rep. 703; Patterson v. TFade, 115 Fed. Rep. 770; Goodridge v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 35; Barry v. Edmonds, 116 U. S. 550, 565; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 522; Minneapolis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 35.</p> <p>If the penalty, or recovery in excess of compensatory.damages,- is imposed for a failure to pay a debt, and not in the exercise of the police power which concerns the interest of the public, then the statute is unconstitutional. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96; Railroads v. Crider, 91 Tennessee, 490.</p> <p>The suit was brought not only to recover treble damages for the injury sustained, but attorneys’ fees besides. The actual damages as found by the jury were $1,500; but the judgment rendered was for $7,000, or nearly five times the damages actually suffered. This judgment can be sustained upon no other principle than that declared in the cases cited— that is, vindictive or punitive damages, and imposed under the police power of the'government for the purpose of deterring others from the commission of similar offenses.</p> <p>If not barred, however, as a statute penalty in one year,, ■the action is within § 2747, providing that all wrongs and injuries to the property and person, in which money only is demanded as damages, shall be commenced within three years and redressed by an action on the case.</p> <p>As to what will support an action on the case and fall within this provision see Love v. Hogan, 5 Yer. 290; Allison v. Tyson, 5 Hum. 449; Rosson v. Hancock, 3 Sneed, 434; Gwinther v. Gerding,' 3 Head, 198; Bank v. Doughty, 2 Tennessee, 584; Railroad v. Guthrie, 10 Lea, 432; Ramsey v. Temple, 3 Lea, 252; Rhea v. Hooper, 5 Lea, 390; James & Co. v. Bank, 105 Tennessee, 1. The cases cited by Court of Appeals of Tennessee can be distinguished and that court erred in holding that. this action fell under the ten year statute.</p> <p>An action may be in the form of debt where the' statutory liability is certain, or may be made so from the face of the statute. But while such actions are in form debt, they are criminal in their nature and within the statute of limitations relating to criminal proceedings. Civil liabilities founded on statutes may be in the nature of debt, or contract, but an action to enforce, such liability, whatever its form, ‘would be barred by the statute applicable to contracts; and limitations applicable would always depend on the nature of the liability declared or imposed. Bagley v. Shoffach, 43 Arkansas, 377; Chaffee v. United States, 18 Wall. 516; Stockwell v. United States, 18 Wall. 531. Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason, 243, is inapplicable. See Householder v. City of- Kansas, 83 Missouri, 488, 495; Topley v. Forbes, 2 Allen, 24; Addison on Torts, 49;. Knowlton v. Ackley, 8 Cush. 97; Steams V. A. & St. L. Ry. Co., 46 Missouri, 114; Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520, 527; High-tower v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Alabama, 600. And see also as to action on the case being the proper remedy Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 199, 213; Sandford v. Haskell, 50 Maine, 86; Reed v. North field, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 99; Morrison v. Bedell, 22 N. H. 238; Russell v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 93 Virginia, 325; M-ount v. Hooter, 58 Illinois, 246; Boyn v. Smith, 17 Wend. 88; Beatly v. Barnes, 8 Or.. 98, 108.</p> <p>Actions for liabilities arising 'out of duties imposed or acts prohibited by statutes are within the limitation imposed on all similar actions. Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1, 13; Carroll v. Green, 92 U. S. 509; Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610.</p> <p>The liabilities created by the statutes authorizing the organization of national banks, or for the infringement of patent rights, or rights founded on other acts of Congress, have never been treated as specialties, even though sometimes clearly in the nature of debt. McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S.- 72; Cockrill v. Butler, 78 Fed. Rep. 680; Stephens v. Overstolz, 43 Fed. Rep. 465.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. While for a long time participation in common loss and profits of a common business was one of the most conclusive tests of copartnership relations, yet the later and best opinion now is that this is not necessarily so. The rule now is that the question of partnership or no partnership is not to be settled by arbitrary tests; that to attempt to do so is mischievous, resulting in error.

The facts are stated in the opinion. This court • has jurisdiction. The appeal by the United States to this court is special and mandatory under § 11 of the act of 1860; therefore the Circuit Court of Appeals Act does not apply. This principle is recognized respecting original jurisdiction under the act of August 13, .1888. Re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, .661.. Gwin v. United States, 184 U. S. 669, distinguished.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The order is appealable. By § 1909, Rev. Stat., writs of error and appeal ■ are allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, upon writs of habeas corpus involving the question of personal freedom. Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U, S. 612; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82. This right was not taken away by the Circuit- Court of Appeals act, 26 Stat. 830, § 15; Shute v. Keyser, 149 U. S. V549; Folsom v.' Unfted States, 160 U. S. 121.

The facts are stated in the opinion. ' The bond under consideration is given under § 1000, Rev. Stat., and is a formal instrument required by the law, and governed by the law, and has, by nearly a. century’s use become a formula in legal proceedings, with a fixed and definite meaning. Hotel Co. v. Kountze, 107 U. S. 378. The affirmance of the judgment by the upper court conclusively establishes the liability of the appellant on the bond. Davis v. Patrick, 57 Fed.

Relator was, on May 12, 1902, a clerk in the classified civil service of the-United States, and employed in the War Department. On that day an article purporting to be signed by her and making very serious reflections on the President of the United States appeared in a newspaper published at Washington.

The defendant in error, who was plaintiff below, recovered a judgment against the railroad company, plaintiff in error, in a trial'court in Arizona Territory,' for the negligent killing of her son, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory, and the company brings the case here, The deceased was a brakeman and had been employed by the defendant ■ company as such for^a few weeks before the accident occurred in which he lost his life.

<p>The requirement of' § 64a of the bankruptcy law of 1898 in regard to preference of taxes is a wide departure from the act of 1867 and prefers taxes due to any State and not only those due to the State in which proceedings are instituted.</p> <p>It is the province of the courts to enforce, not to make, laws; and if. a law works inequality the redress, if any, must be had from Congress, and arguments directed, not to the construction of the act, but as to the justice of a method of distribution of assets under the bankruptcy law, and the hardship resulting therefrom, cannot influence judicial determination.</p> <p>Generally speaking, a tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon- individuals or property to support the Government, and § 64a of the bankruptcy law is very broad and covers all taxes, including yearly license fees imposed by the State on corporations organized under its laws for the privilege of doing business, whether such business is carried on in that or in other States.</p> <p>A State . creating a corporation may fix the terms of its existence and provide that for the continued existence of its franchise it must yearly pay the State certain sums fixed by the amount of its outstanding stock.</p> <p>While the state court may construe a statute and define its meaning it cannot conclusively determine that which is not a tax to be a tax within the meaning of a Federal statute; that is a Federal question of ultimate decision in this court.</p> <p>In this case this court reaches independently the same conclusion as that reached by the state court.</p> <p>Under the bankruptcy act taxes assessed on returns made prior to the adjudication are legally due and owing and entitled to the preference ■ givén by § 64a although not collectible until after the adjudication.</p>

On November 16, 1903, the Railroad Commission of Mississippi, by written order, directed the Alabama and Vicksburg Railway Company, hereinafter called the Vicksburg company, to put into effect, over its line of road from Vicksburg to Meridian, a flat rate of 3| cents per 100 pounds on grain and grain products.

In July, 1903, the W. M. Laircl Company of Pittsburg; Pennsylvania, commenced proceedings in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Now York to cause the Frederic L. Grant Shoe Company, a corporation doing business in 'Rochester, New York, to be adjudicated involuntary bankrupts.

<p>Where the highest court of the State dismisses the writ, of error to the trial court solely and expressly because of lack of jurisdiction, the result of the ruling is to determine that the trial court is the final court where the question could be decided, and the writ of error from this court should be directed to the trial court,- and not to the highest fiourt, although that court may be clothed with jurisdiction of questions of state and Federal constitutionality of state laws, and may have discussed, and found without merit, the constitutional question.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. submitted: It is a principle established beyond -controversy that the negotiation of sales of goods that are in another State for the purpose of introducing them into the State in which the negotiation is made is interstate commerce, and is protected from local interference, burdens, or tax, by clause 3, § 8, Art. I, Constitution of the United States, which provides that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations…

Held: within the meaning of section 709, to assert a right and immunity under such statutes, although the statutes may not give the party himself a personal or affirmative right that could be enforced by direct suit against his ad *526 versary. Such has been the view taken in many cases where the authority of this court t.o review the final judgment of the state courts was involved. Logan County Nat.

<p>In determining the constitutionality of a state statute this court must follow 'the construction given thereto by the highest court of the State; and a ruling by that court that the provisions of a statute prohibiting the purchasing of a commodity on margin, and the carrying on of “bucket shops”-for dealing in such commodity are separable is conclusive on this court, and refutes the contention of one.convicted of carrying on a “bucket shop” that the law is void as to him because certain presumptions created by the statute in regard to the prohibitions of purchasing on margins may be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment; nor will this court determine that the creation of certain presumptions of guilt by a state statute is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the record does not show that the conviction sought to be reviewed was b,ased on these presumptions and could not have been based on independent evidence.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. That an inheritance tax is not á tax on property, but on the privilege or right of inheriting, is no longer open to question. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283; Knowlton y. Moore, 178 U. S. 41; Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115; 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 338. That the rights of these heirs and legatees, vested at the moment of the death of the ancestor is also beyond dispute.

The facts are stated in' the opinion. Appellant, by probating the will through which its succession is derived, appearing before the state appraiser in the inheritance tax proceeding, appealing from the action of such appraiser to the County Court of Cook County, and from its action to ■ the Supreme Court of. Illinois, brought itself, within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Black v. Caldwell, 83 Fed.

United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906) (along with decisions at 214 U.S. 386 (1909), and 215 U.S. 580 (1909)), were rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States with regard to Sheriff Joseph F. Shipp and five others of Chattanooga, Tennessee, having "in effect aided and abetted" the lynching of Ed Johnson. They were held in contempt of court and sentenced to imprisonment. It remains the only criminal trial in the history of the Supreme Court.