Volume 205 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The defendant, who had been convicted of numerous crimes in connection with the shooting of the victim, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the shooting, had been sentenced to a term of eighty-five years of imprisonment that was to run consecutively to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release that he was then serving as a result of a prior criminal incident. The defendant claimed that he was entitled to be resentenced because, inter alia, his original sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the state and federal constitu- tions in that the sentencing court imposed an effective life sentence without having first considered his age and the hallmark characteristics of youth. The trial court determined that it was precluded from granting the defendant's motion to correct because our Supreme Court deter- mined in State v. Delgado (323 Conn. 801) that a juvenile defendant who received a sentence of more than ten years imprisonment and was eligible for parole following the passage of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts, which amended the statute (§ 54-125a) concerning parole eligibil- ity, could no longer allege a violation of Miller v. Alabama (567 U.S. 460) on the basis of a sentencing court's alleged failure to consider the defendant's status as a youth. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that his sentencing proceeding was merely an academic exercise that contravened the intent of the legislature in eliminating the availabil- ity of a capital felony for juvenile defendants and that he is still being harmed because he has never been afforded a sentencing proceeding in which the appropriate factors were considered. Held that the trial court properly dismissed the defendant's motion to correct, as the sen- tence imposed on him could not be considered illegal because any alleged harm that resulted from the court's failure to consider his youth and its attendant circumstances was remedied by his eligibility for parole pursuant to P.A. 15-84: despite the defendant's claim that his two cases were heavily intertwined and that Delgado was inapplicable because it could be presumed that the sentencing court knew he previously had been sentenced to life without the possibility of release, our Supreme Court has made clear that § 54-125a provides an adequate remedy in that the Board of Pardons and Paroles, at the appropriate time, will consider, inter alia, his age and circumstances as of the date of his crimes; moreover, the defendant was not entitled to resentencing, our Supreme Court having determined in State v. Williams-Bey (333 Conn. 468) that parole eligibility is sufficient to cure any state constitutional vio- lation. Argued November 18, 2020—officially released May 25, 2021

The plaintiff G Co. sought to foreclosure a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant J. The defendant A, J's now former husband, had executed a note for a loan that was used to purchase the property that secured the mortgage, and that loan was now in default. Prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action, A quitclaimed his interest in the property to J as part of a separation agreement. G Co. alleged in its complaint that it was the holder of the note and mortgage. G Co. thereafter filed a motion to substitute T Co. as the plaintiff, explaining that, since the commencement of the action, it had assigned the note and mortgage to T Co. Four days prior to commencing the foreclosure action, however, G Co. assigned the mortgage to T Co. J objected to the motion, claiming that G Co. lacked standing to litigate the action because it had not proven that it was the holder of the note at the time it commenced the action. The trial court granted the motion to substitute. Thereafter, J filed two motions to dismiss arguing that G Co. lacked standing to initiate the foreclosure because the note and mortgage had been assigned before the commencement of the action, which the court denied. Subsequently, T Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability only, which the court granted, and, thereafter, the court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. J filed a motion to open the judgment, which the court denied, and J appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court found unavailing J's claim that G Co. lacked standing to initiate the foreclosure action: G Co. was in possession of the note, endorsed in blank, when it commenced the action and, therefore, had standing to do so; the trial court correctly determined that the note was endorsed in blank, and G Co. alleged in its complaint that it was the holder of the note and, although the mortgage was assigned prior to the com- mencement of the action, there is no indication in the record that the note itself changed hands, as the only evidence before the court indicated that G Co. was in possession of the note when the action was com- menced, and it was of no consequence that the mortgage was assigned before the action commenced. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to substitute T Co. as the plaintiff: although the court mischaracterized the nature of the assignment in granting the motion to substitute when it stated that G Co. assigned both the note and mortgage after the commencement of the action, the substitution had no substantive effect on the proceedings because the note, endorsed in blank, remained in possession of G Co., and, thus, the cause of action itself was not assigned to a legally distinct party, the substitution only having served to clarify that G Co. was bringing the foreclosure action in its capacity as trustee for T Co., and in no way prejudiced J's ability to make payments or defend against the claims brought; moreover, the court correctly deter- mined that, contrary to J's claim, the rule of practice (§ 9-20) that allows for the substitution of a plaintiff when an action has been commenced in the name of the wrong plaintiff to cure the lack of standing of the original plaintiff, was inapplicable because G Co. had standing as holder of the note, and it was not the wrong plaintiff. 3. The trial court properly denied J's motions to dismiss; the court made an express factual finding that G Co. held the note endorsed in blank at the time the action commenced and J failed to submit any evidence in support of her motions to dismiss that called into question G Co.'s status as holder of the note. 4. The trial court properly granted T Co.'s motion for summary judgment: a. T Co. established a prima facie case for foreclosure; the supporting documentation submitted by T Co. in support of its motion for summary judgment established that it was the holder of the note and assignee of the mortgage as well as the terms of the note and mortgage, that A and J were in default, and that T Co. or its predecessor were in compliance with the condition precedent to the institution of the action and, J failed to provide an affidavit or exhibit that raised a genuine issue of material fact to counter T Co.'s documentation. b. J's alleged special defenses were without merit and did not rebut T Co.'s prima facie case; contrary to J's claim, this court has rejected arguments that trust documents or pooling and servicing agreements are relevant to the issue of standing, and, although it may not have been entirely accurate for G Co. to state that it had assigned the mortgage since the commencement of the action, the assignment had no substan- tive effect on the litigation, and it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to decline to characterize this statement as wilful misconduct, the court properly concluded that no statute of limitations applied to the action, and the court properly concluded that a divorce decree between A and J, which stated that J was not assuming any liability on the mortgage, had no effect on the mortgage, which J signed, and was a contract between J and G Co. 5. J's claim that the trial court improperly rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure because it never resolved the issue of standing and should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine when G Co. acquired the note was unavailing, this court having previously determined that G Co. was the holder of the note at the time the foreclosure action was commenced and had standing. 6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying J's motion to open the judgment as the grounds put forth in the motion have been resolved in favor of T Co. Argued January 20—officially released June 1, 2021

The plaintiff lessor sought to recover damages from the defendant university students and their parents for alleged damage to its rental property in connection with a lease entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant students, for which the defendant parents were guarantors. The rental rate for the period of the lease was $100,000 with a $10,000 security deposit. After the defendant students vacated the premises at the end of the lease term, the plaintiff claimed that they had caused damage to the premises that exceeded the amount of the $10,000 security deposit. In response, the defendants filed a counterclaim, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff violated the applicable security deposit statute (§ 47a-21), and that the $100,000 prepayment of rent constituted a secu- rity deposit for purposes of § 47a-21. Subsequently, the parties filed a signed, joint stipulation of facts with the trial court, which stated that, pursuant to the lease, the total security deposit was $10,000. Following a trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the appeal was moot on the basis that the defendants did not challenge all independent bases for the trial court's judgment; because this court could provide meaning- ful relief to the defendants by remanding the matter for a consideration of their claim that the $100,000 prepayment of rent constituted a security deposit and, therefore, should have been held in escrow in an interest bearing account, the appeal was not moot. 2. The trial court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of the application of the exemption in the statute (§ 47a-2) for certain lease arrangements incidental to housing for educational services from application of title 47a of the General Statutes when the plaintiff never pleaded the exemption and no evidence was presented at trial in support thereof: the plaintiff simply denied the allegations of the defendants' special defenses and counterclaim, and, in its special defenses, it never claimed an exemption under § 47a-2; moreover, there was no reference or claim by the plaintiff at trial that it was exempt from complying with the provisions of title 47a, nor was there any testimony or evidence relating to whether the lease was incidental to the educational residence of the defendant students, as found by the court; accordingly, the defendants did not have sufficient notice at any time prior to the judgment, of any claim pertaining to the exemption in § 47a-2 concerning housing incidental to educational purposes. 3. Although the trial court improperly considered § 47a-2, judgment correctly was rendered in favor of the plaintiff on the defendants' second amended counterclaim; the parties filed a signed, joint stipulation of facts with the court that stated that the total security deposit was $10,000, and, because during the trial the defendants did not seek to withdraw, explain, or modify the stipulation, they were bound by their judicial admission, such that their claim that the $100,000 prepayment of rent also should have been treated as a security deposit necessarily failed. Argued March 1—officially released June 1, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for breach of contract from the defendant insurer. The plaintiff was awarded damages for personal injuries she sustained when a large fight broke out while she was at a bar owned by C Co., the defendant's insured. C Co. assigned its rights under its general liability insurance policy to the plaintiff. The defendant, however, declined to defend or indemnify C Co. with respect to the plaintiff's injuries because the insurance policy contained an exclusion for any injuries arising out of assault or battery, and the plaintiff com- menced this action. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that it did not owe C Co. a duty to defend because the plaintiff's claim was barred by the insurance policy's assault and battery exclusion. The court, Swienton, J., denied the motion, finding that genu- ine issues of material fact existed, including relating to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The court, J. Moore, J., then granted the plaintiff's motions to quash and for a protective order in which she argued that the defendant should not be allowed to take her deposition because the only evidence that should be considered in determining the case were the complaint and the insurance policy. Following that decision, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for a jury trial on the ground that there were no factual issues for a jury to decide, as the duty to defend was purely a legal question to be resolved by the court. After hearing oral argument on the matter, Judge Moore issued an order to bifurcate the trial, with the issue of the duty to defend to be considered first by the court. He requested that the initial stage of the trial be assigned to another judge because he had been involved in the parties' pretrial settlement discussions, and the matter was assigned to Judge Aurigemma. Both parties filed briefs on the issue and waivers of oral argument, asking the court to decide the matter on the papers. Judge Aurigemma concluded that the defendant did not have a duty to defend C Co. because the insurance policy did not permit recovery for injuries sustained from an assault. After requesting additional briefs on the matter and scheduling oral argument, which the parties waived, Judge Moore found that Judge Aurigemma's decision was dispositive of all of the issues in the case and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in ordering a court trial on the legal issue of the duty to defend following its denial of summary judgment on that issue: in denying summary judgment, the court did not find that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment on the matter but only that genuine issues of material fact existed, which precluded the court from finding that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; moreover, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant owed a duty to defend C Co. because that question was purely a legal issue to be decided by the court; furthermore, the law of the case doctrine did not preclude Judge Moore from concluding that the duty to defend question was a legal matter to be decided before a jury trial could be held to address any remaining factual issues, despite the court's prior denial of summary judgement on the matter, as, under the doctrine, a trial judge may reach a contrary conclusion on an issue of law pre- viously decided if the judge was convinced that the prior ruling was wrong. 2. The trial court did not improperly deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial on the issue of whether the defendant had a duty to defend C Co. because the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial on the matter: both the interpretation of pleadings and the question of whether an insurer owes a duty to defend are issues of law, which must always be decided by the court. 3. There was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that Judge Moore should have recused himself to avoid the appearance of impropriety due to his involvement in the pretrial settlement negotiations: Judge Moore did not play a role in deciding the issues of liability or damages in the case, he only made the determination that Judge Aurigemma's ruling was dispositive of all of the issues, which decision was administrative in nature; moreover, despite the fact that the parties were aware that the matter would appear before Judge Moore following Judge Aurigemma's decision, the plaintiff did not raise the issue of a potential appearance of impropriety until after she received an adverse decision, and such a decision alone is insufficient to form the basis of a claim of judicial bias; furthermore, the plaintiff failed to provide any legal or factual analysis supporting her argument for recusal in her brief and, therefore, failed to set forth a factual basis on which a reasonable person might have questioned Judge Moore's impartiality. Argued February 16—officially released June 1, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, the acting superintendent of schools for the Hartford public school system, in connection with the termination of his at-will employment as a high school football coach for alleged misconduct. When the termination of the plaintiff's employment became public, the defendant issued a statement in response to inquiries from the news media. The plaintiff thereafter brought this action, alleging recklessness, intentional inflic- tion of emotional distress and libel. The trial court granted the defen- dant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendant. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly granted the motion as to all three counts of his com- plaint. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and, as that court properly resolved the issues, this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memoran- dum of decision as a proper statement of the relevant facts, issues and applicable law on those issues. Argued April 8—officially released June 1, 2021

The plaintiffs, a solar development company and its principal, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Com- mission. The plaintiffs requested certain records from the defendant Department of Energy and Environmental Protection relating to its request for proposals issued to solicit offers from developers for large- scale clean energy contracts. The RFP indicated that each bidder was to submit a public version of its proposal, with any confidential business information redacted, as well as an unredacted version of the proposal that identified all confidential and proprietary information. The RFP informed bidders that the department would disclose certain information in its final determination but that it would take reasonable steps to protect confidential information. The department retained independent consultants to evaluate the costs and benefits of the proposals submitted using a market simulation model. The result of the analysis was an answer key that compiled the data submitted by the bidders, including confidential, proprietary information. The department denied the plain- tiffs' request for the release of the answer key, stating that it was a trade secret exempt from disclosure requirements pursuant to the applicable provision (§ 1-210 (b) (5)) of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.). The plaintiffs appealed from the department's denial to the commission, which, following a hearing, denied the appeal. The plaintiffs then appealed to the trial court, which affirmed the decision of the commission, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that the commission's conclusion that the answer key met the trade secret criteria set forth in § 1-210 (b) (5) (A) (i) was supported by substantial evidence: the department engaged in trade by coordinating the RFP and using the answer key to analyze the proposals, as the process required making a significant investment within a highly competitive industry for the benefit of rate- payers across the state; moreover, even though the department did not have any direct competitors in the renewable energy industry, it was a participant with a direct interest in ensuring competitive rates because it had a statutory duty to obtain value for ratepayers; furthermore, there was sufficient evidence to find that the answer key held economic value to the department based on the resources expended to develop it, its value to the market, and the significance of the resulting projects to ratepayers, and that the answer key's value derived from its secrecy, as its confidentiality was required to maintain the integrity of the state's procurement process. 2. The trial court properly determined that the commission's conclusion that the bidders and the department intended for the information submit- ted to be given and maintained as confidential information in accordance with § 1-210 (b) (5) (A) (ii) and (B) was supported by substantial evi- dence: the commission's determination that reasonable efforts were made to maintain the secrecy of the information was supported by testimony given at the commission hearing indicating that nondisclosure agreements were made, that bidders relied on the department's guaran- tees of confidentiality, and that certain bidders pursued protective orders with respect to the information; moreover, based on the testimony at the hearing, there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the information was ''given in confidence'' in accordance with § 1- 210 (b) (5) (B) because, although the RFP stated that the department intended to disclose certain bid information in its final determination, the department gave express assurances of, and the bidders had resulting expectations of, confidentiality with respect to a majority of the informa- tion. Argued November 19, 2020—officially released June 8, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of assault of a peace officer while incarcerated, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate his case, failing to explain to him the strengths and weak- nesses of his case and failing to meaningfully explain the plea offers made to him and the likely range of sentences that he faced. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition, concluding, inter alia, that the petitioner had failed to prove that his trial counsel's representation of him was deficient or that he was prejudiced by this alleged deficiency. Thereafter, the habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. On appeal, the peti- tioner claimed that the habeas court incorrectly concluded that his trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a defense of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect. Held that the judgment of the habeas court denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed; the habeas court having thoroughly addressed the petitioner's argument raised in this appeal, this court adopted the habeas court's well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the relevant facts, issues and the applicable law on those issues. Argued February 9—officially released June 8, 2021

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's dismissal of their action against the defendant, a mortgage servicing company, in which they alleged that the defendant violated the mortgage release statute (§ 49-8) by failing to provide a timely and valid release of their mortgage. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs' alleged failure to demonstrate their compliance with the requirements of § 49-8 (c) regarding the statutory demand notice for release of the mortgage. This ground was not argued by the defendant in its motion to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court deprived them of due process by dismissing their action on a ground that the court raised sua sponte without affording them notice or an opportunity to be heard. Held: 1. The trial court improperly granted the motion to dismiss, as that court improperly addressed, sua sponte, the issue of the plaintiffs' alleged noncompliance with the statutory demand notice requirements in § 49- 8 (c) without first providing the plaintiffs with notice or a reasonable opportunity to submit evidence of their compliance with those require- ments; the plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to contest whether they were required to demonstrate on the notice that was attached to the complaint that the notice had been received by the defendant or its attorney, and the defendant's special defenses that alleged that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy all conditions precedent, including sending the required written demand notice to the defendant, were insufficient to place the plaintiffs on notice that they were required to demonstrate that they complied with the notice requirements of § 49-8 (c); moreover, any alleged failure to satisfy the written demand notice requirements did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the matter, but rather impacted the court's authority to grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs; furthermore, regardless of whether the issue was jurisdictional or simply related to the court's authority, due process required the defendant to have raised in its motion to dismiss the issue of the plaintiffs' compliance with the statutory demand notice requirements of § 49-8 (c) or, failing that, required the court to have provided the parties with notice that the statutory demand notice requirements issue was to be decided before it granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on that ground. 2. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action could be affirmed on the alternative ground that they were not aggrieved pursuant to § 49-8 because they did not suffer any harm and, therefore, did not have standing, as § 49-8 was a penalty statute that did not require the plaintiffs to suffer actual damages; the defendant did not provide evidence that it complied with the statute (§ 49-9a) that would have upheld the defendant's release of mortgage that contained a ''scrivener's error,'' and the plain language of § 49-8 provided damages for aggrieved persons if the mortgagee fails to execute or deliver a timely release of mortgage, and the plaintiffs, who allegedly did not receive a timely release of the mortgage on their property after they undisputedly sold the property in a short sale, were accordingly aggrieved persons within the meaning of § 49-8. Argued November 12, 2020—officially released June 8, 2021

The plaintiff sought to foreclosure a judgment lien on certain real property owned by the defendant in connection with an unsatisfied judgment from a previous case involving the parties. The plaintiff submitted an appraisal before the trial court valuing the property at $960,000, and the defendant submitted an appraisal valuing the property at $390,000. Following a hearing, the court found the fair market value of the property to be $620,000, and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not improperly determine the fair market value of the property: the record contained ample documentary and testimonial evidence regarding the valuation of the property in question; moreover, in light of the significant disagreements between the expert appraisers offered by the parties, the court reasonably could conclude that a com- promise figure best reflected the fair market value of the property. Argued February 9—officially released June 8, 2021

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the defen- dant citation hearing officer for the defendant city of Middletown uphold- ing a citation assessed against him for violating the city's anti-blight ordinance. The court upheld six of the seven blight violations alleged against the plaintiff and calculated a resulting fine, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's request for a jury trial; the plaintiff cited no authority that would support his challenge to the plain language of the rule of practice (§ 23-51) that governs petitions to reopen citation assessments and pro- vides that there is no right to a hearing before a jury in such circum- stances. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the citation hearing officer had a conflict of interest: the plaintiff never raised this issue before the citation hearing officer, which precluded him from raising the issue on appeal; moreover, even if the citation hearing officer had a conflict of interest, the hearing on appeal before the trial court was a de novo proceeding, and any possible prejudice would have been cured because the decision of the trial court, not that of the citation hearing officer, was on appeal. 3. This court declined to address the merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claims as they were not properly before the trial court, which never ruled on them, and could not be reviewed for the first time on appeal: the plaintiff filed a request to amend his complaint that included constitu- tional claims three days prior to the de novo hearing, and his attempted amendment failed to comport with the requirements of the rules of practice (§§ 10-1 and 10-60) regarding the amendment of pleadings, such that the court sustained the defendants' objection to the plaintiff's request to amend; accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the plaintiff to amend his petition or to argue those constitutional issues at the de novo hearing. 4. The trial court's factual findings challenged by the plaintiff on appeal were not clearly erroneous; the findings were supported by evidence in the record, and this court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that any mistake had been committed. Argued February 3—officially released June 8, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the decision of the trial court denying his motion to modify his alimony obligation. Pursuant to a separation agreement entered into by the parties and incorporated in the court's judgment of dissolution, the defendant was obligated to pay alimony to the plaintiff until, inter alia, the plaintiff's cohabitation with another individual. On appeal, the defendant claimed that, pursuant to the plain language of the separation agreement, the court was obligated to termi- nate his alimony obligation in light of evidence of the plaintiff's cohabita- tion. Held that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to modify his alimony obligation: the separation agreement plainly and unambiguously provided, in mandatory language, that the defendant's alimony obligation shall be terminated upon cohabitation by the plaintiff, and the court found that, following the dissolution of the parties' mar- riage, the plaintiff cohabitated with another individual, which was sub- stantiated by evidence adduced at a hearing on the motion; moreover, although the court expressly found that the plaintiff experienced a change in circumstances, it nonetheless failed to apply the relevant provision of the statute (§ 46b-86 (b)) regarding cohabitation, and, instead, sua sponte invoked § 46b-86 (a), which permits modification of an alimony order upon a showing of a substantial change in circum- stances, which was error, as the defendant's postjudgment motion for modification was premised on cohabitation pursuant to § 46b-86 (b). Argued April 20—officially released June 15, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, D and W, had rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner, who had shot the victim during an altercation at a café, testified at trial that the gun he was carrying at the time of the shooting had accidentally discharged. When the state sought to present rebuttal testimony from six witnesses as to prior uncharged conduct by the petitioner related to his use of guns, the trial court, at the request of D, who sought to avoid a conflict of interest, admitted W pro hac vice for the purpose of cross-examining the state's rebuttal witnesses, two of whom were then represented by D in other matters. Neither D nor W thereafter cross- examined the rebuttal witnesses. The court, at D's request, instructed the jury as to certain lesser included offenses within the crime of murder and on the affirmative defenses of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and extreme emotional disturbance. The petitioner alleged that D was ineffective because, inter alia, the affirmative defenses and lesser included offenses were inconsistent with the petitioner's trial testimony, that the only reasonable trial strategy would have been for D to pursue a claim that the gun accidentally discharged and that the petitioner's conduct fit the parameters of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. The petitioner also grounded his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in D's conflict of interest in concurrently representing two of the state's rebuttal witnesses and D's decision to have W handle the cross-examination of those witnesses, which the petitioner asserted was insufficient to ameliorate the possibil- ity that he would be prejudiced by D's conflict of interest. The petitioner further asserted that D was ineffective in having conceded the issue of whether the petitioner had intended to kill the victim by asserting the affirmative defenses and by presenting a theory of the case at trial that was inconsistent with the petitioner's testimony that the gun accidentally discharged. The petitioner also asserted that W was ineffective for having failed to cross-examine the rebuttal witnesses. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that neither D nor W had rendered ineffective assistance, and that the petitioner mischaracterized the defense case D had presented in that D had argued repeatedly before the jury that the gun discharged accidentally. The court further determined that the petitioner had procedurally defaulted on and waived his claim that D's concurrent representation of the two rebuttal wit- nesses constituted an actual conflict of interest. The habeas court there- after granted the petitioner certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court correctly denied the petitioner's claim that D rendered ineffective assistance, as the petitioner failed to establish that there was no tactical justification for D's defense strategy, which was consistent with the petitioner's testimony that the gun accidentally discharged: the evidence supported the court's finding that D's primary strategy was to argue that the gun was fired accidentally, as the first issue D discussed during closing argument to the jury was whether the petitioner intended to kill the victim, D later reminded the jury that it had to make a determination as to that issue, and he spent a significant amount of time arguing that the shooting was accidental; moreover, the petitioner's claim that it was unreasonable for D to present a defense that was inconsistent with the petitioner's testimony was misplaced, as D's strat- egy to show that the petitioner lacked the intent to kill the victim comported with the petitioner's explanation of how the gun discharged, it was not deficient performance to pursue defenses that were inconsis- tent with each other, and it was inconsistent with the principle that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty for the petitioner to suggest that D, by presenting the affirmative defenses, conceded that he intended to kill the victim, the trial court having made it abundantly clear to the jury that it had to first decide whether the petitioner was guilty of murder before it could reach the affirmative defenses; furthermore, D's decision to present the affirmative defenses and the supporting testimony of a psychologist was not unreasonable because of the mere possibility that it could have led to the admission of the state's rebuttal evidence, as the psychologist had been called to testify before D requested jury instructions as to the affirmative defenses, the court, prior to the psychologist's testimony, had ruled against the admission of evidence of prior incidents in which the petitioner displayed guns, and the court instructed the jury that the rebuttal evidence could not be used as evidence of intent. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in concluding that he procedurally defaulted on and waived his conflict of interest claim as to D: a. The habeas court appropriately concluded that the conflict of interest claim was procedurally defaulted, as the petitioner could not establish good cause for not raising that issue on direct appeal; contrary to the petitioner's assertion that his claim could not be procedurally defaulted because the record was inadequate to raise it on direct appeal, the factual and legal basis of the claim was available to counsel at the time of appeal, as the record established that D explained the conflict to the trial court, which then explained to the petitioner that D would have a conflict if he cross-examined the rebuttal witnesses, the trial court acquired the petitioner's assent to proceed with W handling the cross- examination of the state's rebuttal witnesses, and the record revealed the immediate consequences of D's apparent conflict of interest, as W handled the cross-examination but asked no questions. b. The petitioner's claim that the habeas court improperly found that he waived his conflict of interest claim as to D was unavailing: the record indicated that D and the petitioner discussed the conflict during a recess at trial, and that the petitioner subsequently stated to the trial court his approval of having W cross-examine the rebuttal witnesses after the trial court advised him that D could not adequately and fairly cross-examine them as a result of the conflict; moreover, contrary to the petitioner's assertion that his waiver of D's conflict of interest was premised on cross-examination of the state's rebuttal witnesses actually occurring, the defense plan was not to ask any questions of the rebuttal witnesses, and, with the exception of two of the rebuttal witnesses who had heard from the petitioner about one of the prior incidents at issue, none of the state's six rebuttal witnesses was cross-examined; further- more, the petitioner's waiver of his conflict of interest claim did not foreclose him from claiming that W's handling of those cross-examina- tions constituted ineffective assistance. c. The habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner had proce- durally defaulted on his claim pursuant to United States v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648) that prejudice against him should have been presumed because of D's conflict of interest, the Cronic claim having had a factual basis that was identical to the petitioner's unsuccessful conflict of interest claim. 3. The habeas court correctly denied the petitioner's claim that he was entitled to a presumption of prejudice under Cronic, which was based on his assertion that W rendered ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine two of the state's rebuttal witnesses and to subject its case to meaningful adversarial testing: W's actions did not rise to a level that would constitute such a failure, and, even if it were presumed that it was error for W not to have cross-examined the two rebuttal witnesses, his failure was not complete, as the testimony of the rebuttal witnesses was admitted for the limited purpose of credibility, the issue concerned only two of dozens of witnesses who testified during trial, the substan- tially similar testimony of two other witnesses was unchallenged, and D subjected the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing through his objections, voir dire and cross-examinations of the state's witnesses, and presentation of four defense witnesses; moreover, although analysis of W's alleged failures was more appropriate pursuant to the perfor- mance and prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668), no further analysis was neces- sary, the petitioner having explicitly stated that his claim should not be analyzed for prejudice under Strickland. 4. The habeas court did not improperly decline to consider the aggregate effect of the trial court's alleged errors; because the petitioner failed to prove each of his individual underlying claims of error and our Supreme Court has declined to adopt such a cumulative error analysis, it was not within this court's authority to grant the petitioner the relief he sought. Argued April 15—officially released June 15, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following an evidentiary hear- ing, the habeas court denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel had acted deficiently by failing to present certain expert testimony or to impeach a testifying witness, M, regarding M's alleged motivation to testify untruthfully, and that any failure on behalf of the petitioner's trial counsel to impeach M with respect to M's conflicting statements regarding the identification of the shooter did not prejudice the petitioner. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the peti- tioner having failed to demonstrate that the issues raised in his petition were debatable among jurists of reason, that the court could have resolved the issues in a different manner or that the questions were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further; the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance of his trial counsel, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the outcome of his trial would have been different if his trial counsel had presented evidence about the Jamaican etymology of a term that was allegedly used by the shooter when he fired his weapon, as there was no evidence that the term could be used only by a person of Jamaican descent and, in light of the evidence presented at trial that the shooter was wearing a Jamaican hat and fake dreadlocks, the jury could have inferred that the petitioner used the term in an effort to conceal his identity; moreover, the petitioner failed to present any credible evidence in support of his theory that M agreed to cooperate with the police to avoid criminal liability and also failed to demonstrate that any further inquiry into the matter was likely to have affected the jury's assessment of M's testimony; furthermore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's alleged failure to impeach M concerning the fact that M had made inconsistent statements to the police regarding the shooter's identity, as these statements were pre- sented to the jury during the criminal trial and the state presented proof, independent of M's testimony, of the petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Argued February 8—officially released June 15, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes in 2012, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in December, 2017, collaterally attacking his conviction. The respondent Commissioner of Correction filed a request for an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. Following an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court dismissed the petition pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (c) and (e)), concluding that it was untimely and that the petitioner, having declined to present any evidence of the reason for the delay in filing the petition, failed to rebut the presumption that the delay was without good cause. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that this court declined to review the petitioner's unpreserved claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal because his habeas counsel provided ineffec- tive assistance and he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because the habeas court failed to intervene when counsel did not present any evidence in support of his claim that good cause existed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay in the filing of his petition; contrary to the petitioner's contention, the petitioner was not entitled to appellate review of his claims under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) or for plain error, the petitioner having failed to raise them as grounds for appeal in his petition for certification to appeal. Argued March 15—officially released June 22, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of murder and two counts of kidnap- ping in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The judge who presided over the defendant's probable cause hearing offered the defendant a plea deal at a pretrial conference, proposing a thirty year term of imprisonment if the defendant agreed to plead guilty to murder. The defendant rejected the deal and it was withdrawn. A jury found the defendant guilty of all charges and, at his sentencing hearing, the judge who had presided over the trial imposed a sentence of sixty years of imprisonment on the murder count and eighteen years on each of the kidnapping counts, to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of ninety-six years of imprisonment. The defendant filed an application with the sentence review division of the Superior Court, requesting a reduction of his sentence, which he claimed was excessive. His request was denied and the sentence was upheld. The defendant then filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that, by imposing a sen- tence substantially longer than that which was proposed pretrial, the sentencing judge was punishing the defendant for rejecting the plea deal and, in doing so, violated the defendant's constitutional right to due process. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion and the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the record did not contain any indication of vindictiveness on behalf of the sentencing judge: the fact that the length of the sentence imposed greatly exceeded the length of the sentence proposed prior to trial did not give rise to an inference of vindictiveness when the record was considered as a whole, including the defendant's background, his long and violent criminal history, and evidence that the defendant posed such a grave danger to the community that he should spend the remain- der of his life in prison; moreover, there were legitimate bases for the disparity between the sentence proposed pretrial and the sentence imposed posttrial, including that the trial provided the sentencing judge with the opportunity to gain a greater appreciation of the evidence and of the effect of the defendant's actions on his victims and their families, that a guilty plea would have shown evidence of the defendant's willing- ness to accept responsibility for his crimes, which is a mitigating factor for sentencing, whereas his refusal to accept responsibility even after his trial demonstrated a lack of remorse and dim prospects for rehabilita- tion, and that the sentences were considered by two different judges, with different sentencing philosophies and priorities, at different stages of the case; furthermore, the sentencing judge was not required to expressly disavow a vindictive or retaliatory motive for the sentencing because the facts of the case did not give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. Argued October 6, 2020—officially released June 22, 2021

The plaintiff sought a partition by sale, pursuant to statute (§ 52-500 (a)), of certain real property that she and the defendant had purchased as tenants in common. The parties, who never married, shared a principal residence in New York, where they were employed as attorneys. After the parties had a child together, the plaintiff left her employment to be the child's primary caregiver, after which the defendant was the sole source of support for her and the child. The parties thereafter purchased what they intended to be a country home that would accommodate them and their child as well as the defendant's other children when he had visitation with them. Although both parties were obligors on the note and mortgage, the defendant funded the purchase and carrying costs for the home. The parties made improvements and repairs to the property, many of which the plaintiff managed, and the defendant purchased artwork for the home, including an item referred to as ''punch- ing bag art.'' The trial court found that the plaintiff had a relatively minimal interest in the property as compared to that of the defendant and declined to order a partition sale because a lump sum payment by the defendant to the plaintiff in exchange for her quitclaim to him of her interest in the property would better promote the relative interests of the parties. The court rendered judgment, ordering, inter alia, that the plaintiff quitclaim her interest in the property to the defendant, at which time he was to pay her $25,000 and complete a sale or refinance of the home, or other transaction, that would relieve her of liability under the mortgage note and deed. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the parties' respective interests in the property, as it reasonably could have deter- mined, in balancing the equities of the parties, that the plaintiff possessed a relatively minimal interest in the property as compared to that of the defendant: the evidence supported the court's findings that the defendant alone obtained preapproval and a mortgage commitment for the prop- erty, that he was the sole source of the money to purchase the property, as well as furnishings, artwork and other artifacts, and to carry the mortgage debt and other property expenses; moreover, the court found that the parties had not reached an agreement as to the property's disposition in the event that they were to part ways, that it was uncontro- verted that the defendant paid for the punching bag artwork with his personal funds, and that the plaintiff's testimony that she had no recollec- tion of signing the note and mortgage was incredible, as the court was in a superior position to assess the parties' testimony and to credit the defendant's testimony over that of the plaintiff, as was its exclusive prerogative. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding evidence the plaintiff sought to offer regarding her nonmonetary contributions to the defendant and the children, as it permitted her to present a full day of testimony in narrative form with respect to her care of the children, management of the home, and commitment to the defendant and non- monetary contributions to his career; moreover, her proffered evidence about a discounted price on the purchase of the punching bag artwork was irrelevant, as it was cumulative of evidence that already had been admitted, and the plaintiff did not show that the preclusion of the testimony was prejudicial to her. 3. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court exceeded its authority under § 52-500 (a) was unavailing, as the evidence substantiated the court's determination that the plaintiff had a minimal interest in the property and that an order requiring its sale would not promote the parties' relative interests; contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the court's conclusion that a sale was necessary undermined and was inconsistent with its conclusion that a sale would not promote the parties' interests, the court never concluded that a sale was necessary but merely ordered the defendant to complete a sale, refinance or like transaction so as to absolve the plaintiff of any legal obligation with respect to the existing note and mortgage. 4. The trial court did not abuse its equitable discretion in awarding the plaintiff $25,000 as just compensation pursuant to § 52-500 (a); the court reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for the punching bag artwork, as there was uncontro- verted evidence that the defendant paid for it with funds from his per- sonal account, which was not shared with the plaintiff, and, although it was beyond dispute that the defendant was the sole source of money to buy the property, make improvements to it and carry the mortgage debt and other property expenses, the court made its award of compen- sation to the plaintiff in light of her nonmonetary contributions to the property, which included her work with a broker, follow up on matters for mortgage funding, handling of some preclosing inspections and, after the closing, making arrangements for many repairs and purchasing general furnishings. Argued April 12—officially released June 22, 2021

The plaintiff, who suffered injuries when the tractor trailer he was operating was struck by an unavoidable object, sought to recover uninsured motor- ist benefits allegedly due under a policy of insurance issued by the defendant C Co. to the defendant W Co. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was an agent or employee of W Co. and was operating a tractor trailer maintained by W Co. and covered by a fleet insurance policy issued by C Co. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the tractor trailer was not covered by uninsured motorist insurance. Specifically, the court concluded that Tennessee law governed the parties' dispute, that the plaintiff was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under Tennessee law because it did not require the defendants to provide such coverage, and that certain Con- necticut statutes requiring uninsured motorist coverage did not apply because the tractor trailer was not registered or principally garaged in Connecticut. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the court misinter- preted applicable Connecticut law and disregarded public policy in con- cluding as a matter of law that the insurance policy did not provide uninsured motorist coverage and relied solely on Connecticut law in arguing that uninsured motorist coverage was required. Held that the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed as moot, the plaintiff having failed to challenge all of the bases for the trial court's summary judgment ruling; the principal basis for the court's ruling was that Tennessee law applied to the action and that the plaintiff was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under Tennessee law, and, as the plaintiff failed to challenge this independent basis for the court's summary judgment ruling, this court could not afford any practical relief. Argued March 9—officially released June 29, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, sought a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent Commissioner of Correction filed a request for an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. Following an evidentiary hearing, at which the petitioner declined the opportunity to present evidence, the habeas court dismissed the petition as untimely pursuant to the applica- ble statute (§ 52-470 (d) and (e)), concluding that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay in filing the petition nearly three years after the deadline for filing a subsequent petition challenging his conviction. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that this court declined to review the petitioner's unpreserved claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal because his habeas counsel provided ineffec- tive assistance and he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because the habeas court failed to intervene when counsel did not present any evidence in support of his claim that good cause existed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay in the filing of his petition; contrary to the petitioner's contention, the petitioner was not entitled to appellate review of his claims under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) or for plain error, the petitioner having failed to raise them as grounds for appeal in his petition for certification to appeal as required by § 52-470 (g). Argued March 15—officially released June 29, 2021

The plaintiff, a former elementary school principal, appealed to the trial court from the decision by the defendant, pursuant to statute (§ 10- 145b (i) (2)), revoking her initial educator and professional educator certificates after an investigation determined that she was involved in and responsible for cheating that occurred on a schoolwide basis during the administration of the Connecticut Mastery Test. The trial court found that the record contained substantial evidence that the plaintiff directly participated in a portion of the cheating, and knew that cheating was taking place during the administration of the test and did not stop it. The court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, and the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that there was no substantial evidence to support the finding that she was directly involved in or was responsible for the cheating. Held that, upon this court's plenary review of the record, the briefs and the arguments of the parties, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a proper state- ment of the facts and the applicable law on the issues. Argued May 19—officially released June 29, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for having followed a strategy that was based on an inaccurate statement of the law. The petitioner specifically asserted that his right to due process was violated because the statutory (§§ 53a-8 and 53a-55a) scheme underlying his conviction of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory does not require the state to prove, as an essential element of accessorial liability, that he intended the princi- pal's use of a firearm. The habeas court concluded that the petitioner failed to show how §§ 53a-8 and 53a-55a violated due process by shifting to the defense the burden of proving an essential element of accessorial liability, and, thus, that the petitioner had failed to prove that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The court denied the petitioner's habeas petition, and, on the granting of certification, he appealed to this court. On appeal, the respondent Commissioner of Correction contended that the petitioner's claim was procedurally barred pursuant to Teague v. Lane (489 U.S. 288), which precludes a court on collateral review from declaring a new constitutional rule after a conviction has become final. Held that the habeas court properly denied the petitioner's habeas peti- tion, as state and federal precedent at the time his conviction became final made clear that no constitutional rule existed then that required the state to prove, as an essential element of accessorial liability for manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, that the accessory intended the principal's use of the firearm; moreover, the rule the peti- tioner sought to establish was not, as he claimed, an application of existing constitutional principles, as the United States Supreme Court in Patterson v. New York (432 U.S. 197) had held prior to his conviction that it was constitutionally permissible to require criminal defendants to prove affirmative defenses that relate to culpability, which the legisla- ture has required pursuant to statute (§ 53a-16b); furthermore, the rule the petitioner sought to establish was procedural in nature pursuant to Teague because it focused on the manner by which an accessory can be deemed culpable for the use of a firearm by others and, thus, contrary to his assertion, did not place a category of private conduct beyond the power of the state to punish so as to satisfy that exception in Teague to the prohibition against establishing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure in collateral proceedings, as the rule the petitioner sought would invalidate the provisions in §§ 53a-16b and 53a-55a that make a criminal defendant's lack of knowledge of the firearm an affirmative defense, rather than an element of the offense. Argued March 9—officially released June 29, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant attorney for, inter alia, legal malpractice in connection with the defendant's represen- tation of the plaintiff in a federal criminal case involving certain fraudu- lent real estate transactions. The plaintiff entered into a plea agreement in the federal case. The plaintiff's three count complaint alleged legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). As to the legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the plaintiff alleged that he was required to pay an excessive amount in restitution as part of his sentence in the federal case as a result of the defendant's deficient representation of him. As to the CUTPA claim, the plaintiff alleged that he was compelled to retain the defendant as his criminal defense counsel in lieu of another attorney as a result of certain statements that the defendant made to him that were untrue, misleading and deceptive. The trial court granted a motion to strike filed by the defendant as to the plaintiff's CUTPA claim, and a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant as to the legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's CUTPA claim; pursuant to Connecticut case law, representa- tions made by an attorney to a prospective client regarding the attorney's expertise and/or competence do not relate to the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law and therefore are outside of the ambit of CUTPA; moreover, if the defendant breached the governing standard of care and the plaintiff suffered harm as a result, then the plaintiff's remedy would be to bring an action claiming legal malpractice, not a violation of CUTPA. 2. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims because they were not ripe for review pursuant to Taylor v. Wallace (184 Conn. App. 43): to succeed on those claims, the plaintiff would have had to demonstrate that the defendant's alleged conduct led to the imposition of an errone- ous restitution order by the federal sentencing court, which would neces- sarily have undermined the validity of his sentence, and such a collateral attack on the plaintiff's sentence is not permissible because, as long as a plaintiff's conviction or sentence remains valid, it cannot be vitiated indirectly by a tort action commenced against counsel; accordingly, as to the summary judgment rendered in the defendant's favor on these claims, the form of the judgment was improper because a judgment of dismissal must be rendered when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Argued January 12—officially released July 6, 2021

The plaintiff administrator of the estate of the decedent, D, sought to recover damages from the defendants, four police officers who were members of a tactical unit of the state police, for the wrongful death of D following his suicide after a standoff with law enforcement on certain public property in Groton. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that, in response to a Groton police captain's request for the assistance of the tactical unit, the defendants arrived at the scene of the standoff and, after several hours of unsuccessful negotiations with D, who was suicidal and armed with a handgun, they used less than lethal ammunition on him. D then shot himself in the head and died as a result of the gunshot. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In reaching its decision, the court determined that the wrongful death action, as alleged in the complaint, satisfied the four criteria of the test set forth in Spring v. Constantino (168 Conn. 563), and, therefore, it was brought against the defendants in their official, rather than their individual, capacities. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment. This court thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration to address his claim that the panel misapplied the Spring test by giving too little weight to his express assertion in the complaint that he had elected to sue the defendants in their individual capacities. On reconsideration, held that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the ground of sovereign immunity: the plaintiff unequivocally elected to sue the defendants in their individual capacities, as the operative complaint stated that the defendants were sued in their individual capacities and three of the four defendants were served with process at their usual place of abode, which was required to sue the defendants as individuals, rather than through the Office of the Attorney General, which would indicate that the defendants had been sued in their official capacities; moreover, in concluding that the state was the real party in interest, the court failed to give proper deference to the express allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff was suing the defendants in their individual capacities and improperly concluded that, because the challenged con- duct occurred while the defendants were acting in their official capaci- ties, the plaintiff was suing them in their official, rather than their individual, capacities. Argued November 17, 2020—officially released July 6, 2021

Convicted of the crime of burglary in the second degree in connection with a confrontation in the victim's apartment, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that his constitutional rights to confronta- tion and to present a defense were violated when the trial court pre- cluded him from cross-examining the victim about matters pertaining to the victim's bias against him and motive to falsify his claims to the police. The victim, the defendant and M had been at a bar when the defendant asked the victim if he could borrow twenty dollars. The victim gave the defendant the money and stated that he had other money at home for his rent. When the bar closed, the defendant invited the victim to his apartment, where he and M punched the victim and asked him about a watch he allegedly had stolen from M. The men then went to the victim's apartment, where the defendant took $400 and threatened to shoot the victim if he talked to the police. The state charged the defendant with six crimes, including burglary in the second degree by entering or remaining unlawfully in the victim's apartment with the intent to commit any, some or all of the underlying crimes of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, threatening in the second degree in violation of statute (§ 53a-62 (a) (1)) and larceny in the sixth degree. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to impeach the victim's credibility with evidence of his felony conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, which had occurred prior to the incident with the defendant and M, and for which the victim was serving a sentence of probation both at the time of the incident with the defendant and M and at the time of trial. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that there would likely be testi- mony that the victim's conduct during the incident with the defendant and M violated the terms of the victim's probation, and that such evi- dence was relevant to the victim's state of mind during the incident and motive to fabricate claims against the defendant. The defendant also sought to question the victim about a violation of the victim's probation that occurred prior to the pendency of this case, asserting that, because the victim had not been incarcerated as a result of that violation, he had an interest in staying in the state's good graces, which was relevant to his veracity and motive to falsify claims against the defendant. The defendant further contended that, because M claimed that the victim had stolen his watch, the victim would have a motive to fabricate his allegations against the defendant if he knew that a condition of his probation was that he not have any new arrests. The trial court denied the defendant's motion but permitted him to question the victim regard- ing his felony conviction, the name of the crime of which he had been convicted and the fact that he was on probation as a result of that conviction at the time of the incident with the defendant and M and at the time of trial. Held: 1. The trial court did not impermissibly infringe on the defendant's constitu- tional rights to confrontation or to present a defense and did not abuse its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of the victim: although the court did not explicitly find that the defendant's proffered line of questioning was irrelevant, it determined that it was speculative and that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, the issues related to the victim's probationary status, which the court excluded, were marginally related, at best, to the issues in the case, and the defendant failed to provide a sufficient foundation to support his claim that his proffered line of questioning related to the victim's motive to fabricate the allegations against him, as it strained credulity to believe that the victim would initiate contact with the police if he was worried that they would learn he had been drinking alcohol or that the defendant and M would accuse him of larceny as to M's watch; moreover, the defendant's attempt to characterize his proffered line of questioning as relating to the victim's state of mind was tenuous and did not change its speculative nature, this court having previously determined that spec- ulative evidence is irrelevant; furthermore, defense counsel undertook an extensive and robust cross-examination of the victim that addressed many inconsistencies in his testimony, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of five of the six charges against him, which indicated that it did not credit all of the victim's testimony. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court's jury instruction on burglary in the second degree misled the jury because the court did not define the terms ''physical threat'' and ''imminent'' as elements of the underlying crime of threatening in the second degree: a. The defendant was not entitled to review of his claim pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as it was clear from the record that, under State v. Kitchens (299 Conn. 447), he implicitly waived his right to challenge the trial court's instructions on appeal; defense counsel had a meaningful opportunity to review, comment on and suggest modifi- cations to the court's proposed instructions, she affirmatively accepted the instructions as proposed by repeatedly telling the court that she had no other issues to raise concerning the instructions, the proposed instructions were provided to defense counsel six days prior to when the jury was charged, defense counsel had the opportunity, overnight, to review the final jury instructions as modified from the charging confer- ence with the court, and at no time before or after the final charge did defense counsel raise any issue or objection concerning the instructions as they related to the underlying crime of threatening. b. The defendant's assertion that the state failed to provide an adequate record to show that he waived his instructional claim was unavailing: although the record did not contain a copy of the trial court's proposed jury charge, which had not been made an exhibit at trial, and despite the defendant's contention that there was not enough evidence to determine what was in the draft of the court's proposed instructions, the record was adequate for this court to closely examine the particular facts and circumstances and to make a determination as to whether the defendant had implicitly waived his right to challenge the instructions on appeal, as the trial court had held an on-the-record charging conference in which it addressed each jury instruction the parties requested, and gave the parties multiple opportunities to comment on them and on the court's proposed instructions; moreover, the waiver rule in Kitchens did not require that a copy of the proposed instructions be marked as an exhibit but, rather, only evidence that the court gave the parties a copy of the proposed instructions, and that the reviewing court's determination of implied waiver be based on a close examination of the record and the particular facts and circumstances of the case. c. Contrary to the defendant's alternative claim, the trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to include the definitions of ''physical threat'' and ''imminent'' in its jury charge relating to the underlying crime of threatening in the second degree, as this court previously has determined that a ''threat,'' consistent with its dictionary definition, is an expression of intent to cause future harm, and the defendant did not demonstrate that ''imminent,'' as used in § 53a-62, has anything other than its ordinary meaning: because the jury returned a general verdict on the burglary charge, it was unknown whether the verdict was based on the underlying crime of threatening or the underlying crime of larceny in the sixth degree, any error in the court's instructions on threatening was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of burglary on the basis of the underlying crime of larceny, which the defendant conceded in his appel- late brief, the defendant did not raise any challenge to the jury instruc- tions, and he did not show that the verdict was based on a legally inadequate underlying theory of conduct on his part or allege that the court misstated the law, that the state's theory of conviction was time barred or that his actions were constitutionally protected. Argued March 9—officially released July 6, 2021

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant C Co. The defendant Z had executed a note for a loan that was used to purchase the property that was secured by the mortgage, and that loan was now in default. Prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action, Z quitclaimed his interest in the property to C Co. The plaintiff alleged in its complaint that it was the holder of the note and mortgage. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to substitute S Co. as the plaintiff, explaining that, since the commencement of the action, it had assigned the mortgage and note to S Co. The trial court granted the motion to substitute and thereafter the matter was tried to the court. The court concluded that S Co. had been assigned the mortgage and was in possession of the note, endorsed in blank, that C Co. lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of the notice of acceleration and default under the note because it was not a party to the note and mortgage, and rejected C Co.'s special defenses. From the judgment of strict foreclosure, C Co. appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court's finding that S Co. was in possession of the note, endorsed in blank and, therefore, was the rightful owner of the debt entitled to foreclose on the mortgage was not clearly erroneous, as the record contained evidence that supported the court's finding; S Co. produced the original note, endorsed in blank, and mortgage at trial and presented testimony regarding the history of the documents and how they came to be in S Co.'s possession, testimony which the court was free to credit. 2. The trial court properly determined that C Co. lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of the notice of acceleration and default under the note: contrary to its claim, C Co. was not a foreseeable interested party, the transfer of interest in the property by quitclaim deed from Z to C Co. did not transfer any rights or obligations in the underlying note and mortgage to C Co., and C Co.'s contention that it made payments under the note was belied by the record, which established that payments were made on behalf of C Co. by another entity, and that C Co. made only one payment, and the check was not cashed; moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of notice as a full exhibit, as C Co.'s arguments as to the sufficiency of this evidence had no bearing on the admissibility of the evidence. 3. The trial court did not err in determining that S Co. had proven the amount of the outstanding debt; the court was within its right to credit the evidence submitted by S Co., including witness testimony and an affidavit of debt, in determining the amount of the debt, and the court did not improperly reject the defendant's characterization of the evidence as confusing or conflicting; moreover, the court was free to find that C Co.'s claim that it was unaware that checks that it had submitted for payment had not been accepted was not credible. 4. The trial court properly rejected C Co.'s special defenses of payment, equitable estoppel and unclean hands; the court was free to reject the evidence C Co. submitted in support of its special defense of payment, and C Co. failed to prove that the court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous; moreover, C Co. failed to provide the court with any addi- tional factual basis or legal argument in support of its special defenses of equitable estoppel and unclean hands, beyond what was asserted in its special defense of payment. 5. The trial court abused its discretion by ordering a judgment of strict foreclosure, rather than foreclosure by sale, because there was substan- tial equity in the property. Argued November 18, 2020—officially released July 6, 2021

The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant attorney for abuse of process, legal malpractice, malicious prosecution, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, arising out of his conduct during his representation of the plaintiff's former spouse, C, in her marital dissolution action against the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant knowingly notarized a fraudulent interrogatory response by C, counseled C to provide false testimony to a police detective that the plaintiff had assaulted her, and failed at any time to correct C's false testimony under oath regarding the alleged assault. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff did not have an attorney-client relationship with the defendant and that the defendant's conduct was protected by the doctrine of litigation privilege. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's abuse of process claim on the ground of the litigation privilege, as the claim was not within the scope of the privilege. 2. The trial court properly found that, as the plaintiff at no time had an attorney-client relationship with the defendant, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a legal malpractice claim against him. 3. The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim on the ground of the litigation privilege, as the claim was not within the scope of the privilege. 4. The trial court properly found that the plaintiff's claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by the litigation privilege, as the defendant's conduct was privileged pursuant to Simms v. Seamen (308 Conn. 523) and Stone v. Pattis (144 Conn. App. 79). Submitted on briefs May 10—officially released July 6, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, her former employer, for alleged discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment on the basis of her gender in violation of the applicable provision (§ 46a-60) of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. The plaintiff, who had been a finance manager at the defendant's car dealership, claimed that she had been paid less than male employees who performed the same job and that she had been subjected to mistreat- ment by four male managers, which included sporadic incidents of yelling. She further alleged that male employees made remarks in the workplace that were crude and demeaning to women. The plaintiff initially brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in which she alleged that the defendant had violated the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq.). While the federal action was pending, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, in which she alleged violations of § 46a-60. The commission thereafter issued to the plaintiff a release of jurisdiction letter that authorized her to bring this action in the Superior Court. During the pendency of that action, the District Court rendered summary judgment for the defendant. The trial court then granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and that the evidence she presented was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to her hostile work environment claim. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court correctly determined that res judicata barred the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim: contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the statute of limitations for Equal Pay Act claims required her to litigate that claim before her gender discrimination claim, there was no genuine issue of material fact that she was not jurisdictionally barred from bringing the gender discrimination claim in the District Court, as she failed to take advantage of available options that included filing the Equal Pay Act claim in the District Court, then seeking a stay of that action until the proceeding before the commission concluded, amending the Equal Pay Act complaint to add the gender discrimination claim after the commission issued the release of jurisdiction letter, or exhausting her administrative remedies before the commission, then filing both the Equal Pay Act and gender discrimination claims in the District Court; moreover, as the complaint before the trial court and the pleadings in the District Court contained virtually identical allegations, and involved the same parties and conduct that occurred during the same time period, the combined facts of both actions constituted a single transaction that would have formed a convenient trial unit for the District Court, which would not have been unexpected by the parties; furthermore, the plaintiff failed to present any evidence to suggest that the District Court would have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her gender discrimination claim, as federal courts routinely, and properly, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims of that nature when similar federal claims also have been alleged, and, although the plaintiff's Equal Pay Act and state law discrimination claims contained different legal elements, such differences do not affect the application of res judicata when the legal claims arise from the same transaction. 2. The trial court correctly determined that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim: the conduct at issue was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to give rise to a hostile work environment claim, as the plaintiff admitted that the incidents and conduct at issue were sporadic and not pervasive, she was unable to describe with specificity when the events occurred, and she never alleged, and the record did not suggest, that the conduct at issue altered the conditions of her employment; moreover, nothing in the record suggested that yelling, the only conduct clearly directed at the plaintiff, ever had anything to do with her gender, and the plaintiff stated that the yelling was always related to issues in the workplace; furthermore, there was no evidence as to when the comments and conduct directed at other female employees occurred or that the plaintiff ever took steps to report it, and she specifically stated that she was never the target of language or conduct of a sexual nature. Argued April 14—officially released July 13, 2021

Convicted of the crime of the sale of a narcotic substance, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant sold crack cocaine to M, who testified about the drug sale at trial. Prior to trial, M was interviewed and gave a statement to a defense investigator, P, who provided a memorandum containing M's statement to defense counsel. In her state- ment, M indicated that she had possessed narcotics prior to meeting with the defendant and that she provided narcotics to the defendant. The parties agreed prior to trial that the state would not present expert testimony from its witnesses regarding narcotics trafficking. During trial, it was discovered that defense counsel failed to timely disclose P's memorandum. The trial court concluded that P's memorandum was not protected attorney work product and should have been disclosed to the state pursuant to the relevant rule of practice (§ 40-15). The court imposed a sanction on the defense limiting P's testimony and ruled that P's memorandum would not come into evidence. The trial court ordered defense counsel to provide a redacted copy of the memorandum to the prosecutor and to make P available for subsequent questioning. Defense counsel called P as a witness, who testified that M provided narcotics to the defendant on the day of his arrest. Immediately following this testimony, the court provided the jury with a limiting instruction that the testimony was to be used only for the purpose of impeaching M's prior inconsistent statement that she had purchased narcotics from the defendant. During his cross-examination of P, a former law enforcement officer, the prosecutor asked a series of questions regarding the sale and use of drugs. After P had answered these questions, defense counsel objected on the ground that the parties' agreement did not permit opinion testimony regarding the narcotics trade and that P had not been offered as an expert. The court denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial. The trial court also denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial impropriety. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that defense counsel had violated discovery rules and by imposing a sanction limiting P's testimony as a result of that violation as any error relating to the court's discovery ruling and sanction was harmless: although the trial court improperly determined that P's memorandum constituted M's statement pursuant to § 40-15 and imposed a sanction limiting P's testimony regarding his memoran- dum, this court, in reviewing the entirety of the evidence adduced at trial, concluded that the record sufficiently provided a fair assurance that any nonconstitutional error relating to the determination of a discovery violation did not substantially affect the verdict, as the defendant was able to present to the jury the fact that M had made a prior inconsistent statement in which she claimed to have possessed the narcotics prior to her meeting with the defendant, and there was ample evidence pre- sented by the state that M was the buyer and that the defendant was the seller in the narcotics transaction. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to go beyond the scope of direct examination on his cross-examination of P and to convert him into an expert witness regarding the narcotics trade after the parties had agreed not to present expert testimony on that topic: even assuming, arguendo, that the court's evidentiary rulings regarding the state's cross- examination of P constituted an abuse of discretion, any such error was harmless as this court could not conclude that the jury's verdict was substantially swayed by the state's cross-examination of P, as testimony from several witnesses supported the state's case that the defendant sold the narcotics. 3. The defendant failed to establish that his due process right to a fair trial was violated as a result of prosecutorial impropriety: a. The defendant failed to establish that any impropriety occurred during the prosecutor's cross-examination of P when P was asked if he knew the state had been unaware of the statement M purportedly had made to P regarding the possession of narcotics; contrary to the defendant's claim, P did not impugn the integrity of defense counsel as the thrust of the prosecutor's inquiry was on the actions of P, and not defense counsel, specifically, the prosecutor highlighted for the jury the contrast of P's statements on his company's website and P's actions, and this line of inquiry served to challenge P's credibility, rather than to demean the integrity or role of defense counsel; moreover, the prosecutor did not mention the relevant rules of practice regarding the timing of discovery materials to the jury. b. The prosecutor's challenged comment during closing argument that the defendant ''behaved himself well in court'' was not improper; the remark was made in the context of the prosecutor's proper comments that the jurors were required to put aside any sympathy for the defendant, due to his age, and to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented, and the challenged comment focused solely on the defendant's good in-court behavior and did not suggest, in any manner, any sort of illicit or untoward out-of-court conduct, and this court declined to infer the most damaging interpretation of the prosecutor's comment. c. Although this court declined to decide whether the prosecutor's com- ment regarding M's credibility, that she was ''open and honest'' with certain aspects of the narcotics transaction, was improper, this court concluded that the defendant failed to establish a deprivation of his due process right to a fair trial; the comment was not severe, it was isolated, it was corrected by the prosecutor immediately, it was ameliorated by a specific jury charge, and much of the M's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. Argued January 6—officially released July 13, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the decision of the trial court denying his motion to open the judgment of dissolution on the basis of, inter alia, fraud. The defendant claimed that the court erred by, sua sponte, quashing certain subpoenas he issued in connection with his motion to open the judgment and in finding that he failed to establish probable cause that the dissolution judgment was procured through fraud or mutual mistake. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in quashing the subpoenas at issue because the underlying civil action resulting in a final judgment of dissolution had been resolved and there was no active civil matter pending that would have permitted the defendant to subpoena witnesses and to conduct discovery in con- nection with his motion to open the judgment: the court properly inter- preted the applicable legal principle of Oneglia v. Oneglia (14 Conn. App. 267), that once a court has rendered a final judgment, until and unless the court has opened that judgment, there can be no civil action within the meaning of the applicable statute (§ 52-197) or rule of practice (§ 13-2); moreover, because the fraud alleged by the defendant took place prior to the rendering of the judgment of dissolution, the motion to open did not implicate the trial court's continuing jurisdiction over an outstanding order; furthermore, because the plaintiff filed certain motions for contempt to effectuate and enforce orders of the court issued after it had rendered its judgment of dissolution, and the plaintiff did not take issue with the underlying judgment but, rather, the defen- dant's failure to comply with it, there was no active civil matter pending that gave the defendant the authority to issue subpoenas in connection with his unrelated motion to open the judgment, as a party may file a motion for contempt before or after judgment is rendered to effectuate prior judgments or otherwise enforceable orders. 2. The record was inadequate to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to establish probable cause that the dissolution judgment was procured through fraud or mutual mistake; the defendant only submitted a nine page excerpt from a transcript of the relevant hearing, which related solely to the portion of the hearing in which the court addressed certain motions to quash, and did not provide additional portions of the transcript relating to the motion to open the judgment, such that it was not possible to make a determination regarding what the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated about the issue of probable cause. Argued March 2—officially released July 13, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries that she sus- tained when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant B, an employee of the defendant Department of Administrative Services. The plaintiff alleged that her injuries were the result of B's negligence. Following a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration as to her claimed future medical expenses, and attached to that motion a letter from her treating physician, G, which had been admitted as a full exhibit at trial. The letter stated that it was more probable than not that the plaintiff would require future medical treat- ment. The court granted the plaintiff's motion, awarded additional dam- ages, and the defendant Department of Administrative Services appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant Department of Administrative Services could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in declining to apply the unavoidable accident doctrine, which was based on its claim that B was not negligent because she experienced a sudden emergency caused by the blowout of her left front tire: because the court found that B was negligent and caused the collision with the plaintiff's vehicle, the accident could not be considered unavoidable as a matter of law; the court determined that B was negligent in the way in which she operated the vehicle and that her actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and, because these findings were inapposite to a determination that the record could support a finding that the negligence of neither party was involved, the court correctly determined that its finding of negligence necessarily precluded a finding that the accident was unavoidable. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration after it determined that she had presented sufficient evidence to support an award of damages for future medical expenses: G's letter and certain additional evidence presented at trial supported a conclusion that the plaintiff would incur future medical expenses and also provided evidence as to the specific costs of those expenses; this evidence took the plaintiff's claimed future medical expenses out of the realm of speculation, provided a degree of medical certainty that she would need future care, and presented sufficient evidence from which the court could approximate the costs of future medical treatment. Argued March 10—officially released July 13, 2021

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from an assessment by the Board of Assessment Appeals for the defendant town of West Hartford in connection with certain of the plaintiff's personal property. In his appeal, the plaintiff also named as a defendant the state Office of Policy and Management, claiming that it violated a certain statute (§ 12-71d) in recommending the schedule of motor vehicle values the town used to assess his vehicle. The Office of Policy and Management moved to dismiss the action as against it and the trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the alternative ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the action against the Office of Policy and Management because he was not classically aggrieved; the personal and legal interest claimed by the plaintiff, namely, the way in which vehicles are assessed for tax pur- poses, is common to all taxpayers, and not specific and personal to the plaintiff, and apart from the Office of Policy and Management's recommendation that municipalities use a certain guide's schedule to assess vehicles, the plaintiff did not allege that the Office of Policy and Management had any involvement in the assessment of the plaintiff's vehicle or any other vehicle, the plaintiff recognizing that it was the responsibility of each municipality to perform that function. Argued April 19—officially released July 13, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes in connection with a riot at a correctional institution during which he assaulted a correctional officer, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel and his prior habeas counsel. Follow- ing a hearing, the habeas court dismissed, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-29 (3)) governing successive petitions, the petitioner's habeas petition with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and denied the petition with respect to the claims of ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly denied his habeas petition with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel; although, contrary to that court's determination, the petitioner's claim was not barred by the doctrine of successive petitions, the petitioner having sought different relief from that which he had sought in his first habeas petition, this court concluded that the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed, as the petitioner could not demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of appellate counsel's alleged deficient performance in failing to challenge on direct appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on direct appeal had appellate counsel challenged the trial court's denial of that motion. 3. Because this court concluded that the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel failed, his claim of ineffective assis- tance of his prior habeas counsel also failed, as it was dependent on whether appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance on direct appeal. Argued January 13—officially released July 20, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder, kidnapping, capital felony, larceny in the first degree and robbery in the first degree and sentenced to a total effective term of seventy years of imprisonment without the possibility of parole, appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying in part his motion to correct an illegal sentence. At the hearing on his motion, the defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time he committed the crimes, claimed that his capital felony conviction and sentence had to be vacated because, under No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts, individuals who were juveniles at the time of their offense no longer could be sentenced for capital felony and that the remainder of his sentence was illegal because the sentencing court violated the prohibition against double jeopardy by imposing his sen- tence for murder in conjunction with his sentence for capital felony. The trial court vacated the defendant's capital felony conviction and sentence but denied any further relief. Held that the defendant's claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that his right to due process was violated because the sentencing court relied on materially inaccurate information at his sentencing, namely, that it failed to recognize, as required by Miller v. Alabama (567 U.S. 460) and State v. Riley (315 Conn. 637), that juveniles are different from adults for purposes of sentencing, was not reviewable under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), the record having been inadequate for review. Argued May 12—officially released July 20, 2021