Volume 206 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

Convicted of the crime of assault in the first degree in connection with an incident in which he struck the victim in the head with a chair during a confrontation, the defendant appealed to this court. Before the start of trial, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to disqualify the judicial authority on the basis that the trial judge, while serving as a prosecutor, might have been involved with pretrial proceedings in one of his prior criminal cases and, thus, appeared to lack impartiality. The court also denied in part the defendant's motion to exclude from evi- dence certain photographs of the victim's injuries on the basis that they were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge: the defendant made no claim of actual bias, and his claim that a reasonable person would question the impartiality of the judge because she had served as a supervising prosecutor in the Office of the State's Attorney in the judicial district of Waterbury at the time of pretrial criminal proceedings that were conducted there against him was unavailing, as the judge had a limited role, if any, in the previous criminal proceedings and was not working in her supervisory prosecutorial role when the defendant was convicted in the previous case, twelve years had elapsed between the previous proceedings and the current criminal case, and knowledge of the defen- dant's conviction in the previous case was available to any trial judge; moreover, this court declined to establish a bright-line rule requiring recusal of a judicial authority when there is an appearance of partiality but an absence of actual partiality, as our Supreme Court already estab- lished a rule in State v. Milner (325 Conn. 1) requiring recusal in cases in which a reasonable person would question a judge's impartiality on the basis of all of the circumstances. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to exclude from evidence certain challenged photographs, which showed sutured wounds to the victim's face and head: the photographs indicated the severity of the injuries and, thus, were relevant to the state's burden of proof of establishing that the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury, and they corroborated testimony from witnesses regarding the underlying confrontation and the victim's injur- ies; moreover, although the photographs depicted graphic injuries, the surgical site shown was clean rather than unnecessarily gory, and the court properly determined that the probative value of the depiction of serious injuries outweighed the prejudicial impact caused by the number of stitches shown. Argued May 17—officially released July 20, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted on a plea of guilty to the crime of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his counsel pro- vided ineffective assistance. At the time of his plea, the trial court found that it was made voluntarily and informed the petitioner that, pursuant to his agreement with the state, he would be sentenced to a period of twenty-five to forty-two years of incarceration. Prior to his sentencing hearing, the petitioner filed a letter with the trial court seeking to with- draw his guilty plea, indicating that his attorney, G, had coerced him into pleading guilty and that he thought he was doing so to a charge of manslaughter rather than to murder. The trial court then appointed a new attorney, P, to represent the petitioner and P filed a motion to withdraw the petitioner's guilty plea. The petitioner withdrew that motion at his sentencing hearing and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-eight years of incarceration. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that, during plea negotia- tions, G misadvised him as to the negotiated plea agreement and his sentence exposure, failed to make a thorough investigation of the facts, failed to consult with him adequately before his guilty plea, and failed to present favorable information to the trial court. Additionally, the petitioner claimed that, during his sentencing hearing, P failed to present mitigating evidence and failed to advocate zealously to secure the lowest sentence contemplated by the plea agreement. Following an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas peti- tion, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not err in concluding that the petitioner had failed to prove that he was prejudiced by G's allegedly inadequate representation during plea negotiations because the petitioner did not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty and, instead, would have gone to trial but for G's allegedly deficient performance: the petitioner's ability to prove prejudice was undermined by the fact that he was appointed alternate counsel, P, who, after reviewing his entire file with him, advised the petitioner to accept the plea bargain and forgo trial, and, as a result, the petitioner decided to withdraw his motion to withdraw his plea and proceeded with his guilty plea; moreover, the probability of the petitioner's conviction at trial was high, as the state's case against him was unusually strong and included video surveillance of the incident, the statements of multiple eyewit- nesses, and evidence of the petitioner's DNA on the murder weapon; furthermore, no evidence was presented that indicated that a lesser sentence would have been available, but for G's allegedly deficient performance. 2. The habeas court did not err in concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his claim of ineffective assistance with respect to P's representa- tion during the sentencing proceedings: the petitioner was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice pursuant to United States v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648) and Davis v. Commissioner of Correction (319 Conn. 548) because P advocated on his behalf at the sentencing hearing by present- ing mitigation evidence, including the petitioner's remorse, his difficult upbringing, his positive work history, and his lack of prior involvement with the criminal justice system, and by requesting a sentence that was less than the petitioner's maximum exposure, even though he did not request the minimum sentence for strategic purposes; moreover, the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by P's allegedly inade- quate representation because he failed to present any evidence indicating that the trial court would have given him a lesser sentence if mitigation evidence relating to the petitioner's mental health or other additional evidence was presented at the sentencing hearing and, given the strength of the state's case, the seriousness of the crime, and the trial court's awareness of the pertinent mitigation evidence, there was not a reason- able probability that, but for any deficient performance by P, the peti- tioner would have received a lesser sentence. Argued April 8—officially released July 20, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, his brother, for breach of an implied in fact contract. The plaintiff started a landscaping company and, although the defendant started working for the plaintiff as an employee, they eventually became de facto equal partners, sharing the profits and management of the business. No written partnership agreement was ever entered into by the parties. At one point, the defen- dant formed a limited liability company with himself as the sole member because the plaintiff lacked a tax identification number, but the business of the LLC was a continuation of the landscape company started by the plaintiff and the parties remained partners. The defendant later locked the plaintiff out of the landscaping business, taking all the customers, crew, tools, vehicles, and equipment along with all the cash in two bank accounts, leaving behind certain masonry/tree equipment and vehicles. At that time, landscaping represented 90 percent of the business income and the portion left to the plaintiff represented only 10 percent of the revenue. The trial court found that an implied partnership existed between the parties and that the defendant breached the terms of the partnership agreement, and it rejected the defendant's special defenses. From the judgment rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court's finding that there was an implied partnership agreement between the parties was not clearly erroneous; the court's finding was supported by ample evidence in the record that the parties regarded each other as partners, including evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were compensated by withdrawals from the business account for personal expenses, they jointly managed the business and shared its profits, and they jointly purchased real estate using corpo- rate funds. 2. The trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff provided credible evidence of his damages; the court had broad discretion in determining its award of damages and, although the plaintiff's testimony was less than certain at times, the court was entitled to weigh that testimony, assess its reliability and credibility, and afford it whatever weight it deemed appropriate in concluding that the testimony, including testi- mony that when the defendant locked the plaintiff out of the business he took control of eighty-five customer accounts, including two condo- minium accounts worth $20,000, and took possession of several trucks and large pieces of landscaping equipment, provided sufficient evidence to enable the court to make a fair and reasonable determination as to the amount of damages. 3. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff's action was governed by the six year statute of limitations (§ 52-576 (a)); the plaintiff's one count complaint sounded in breach of an implied contract and did not assert a claim sounding in tort. Argued April 22—officially released July 20, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court challenging an order issued by the trial court in connection with its denial of the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for contempt. Under the parties' separation agreement, which was incor- porated into the judgment of dissolution, the defendant was required to pay to the plaintiff, as child support, alimony, and/or property distribu- tion, certain percentages of the net income that he received from his employer in the form of cash bonuses and stock awards. In 2015, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion for contempt, claiming that the defendant had failed to pay certain amounts required under the separa- tion agreement. The trial court issued an order in connection therewith, requiring that the annual amounts paid with respect to the defendant's bonus and stock funds be based on his effective tax rate from the prior year. The plaintiff filed another motion for contempt alleging, inter alia, that the defendant violated the dissolution judgment by deducting extra amounts from his bonus and stock payments for taxes that he did not actually pay. The defendant asserted that these amounts were properly deducted because his net proceeds were to be calculated using his marginal tax rate rather than his effective tax rate. After a four day hearing, during which neither of the parties ever mentioned the 2015 order, the trial court found that the defendant's noncompliance was not wilful, but it issued a remedial order that required that he reimburse the plaintiff for certain funds based on its conclusion that the term ''net,'' as used in the separation agreement, clearly and unambiguously did not contemplate the consideration of his net income to calculate the amount of his bonus and stock income that was subject to distribution to the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the trial court's analysis underlying its conclusion that the meaning of the term ''net,'' as used in the separation agreement, was clear and unambigu- ous was erroneous because it failed to take into consideration the stipula- tion of the parties set forth in the 2015 order, which provided specific directions as to how the net amounts of the defendant's bonus and stock income were to be calculated; accordingly, the remedial order was vacated. Argued March 8—officially released July 20, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, alleging that the defendants had failed to make all payments required under a promissory note. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on his breach of contract claim and rejected the defendants' special defenses, including their defense that the plaintiff failed to allege or establish that he had fulfilled every condition precedent prior to bringing an action on the promissory note. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to the breach of contract claim on the ground that the plaintiff substantially complied with the notice of default provision in the promissory note under the circumstances of this case; although the plaintiff did not send the letter declaring default by certified mail, as required by the notice provision in the promissory note, there was no contractual requirement of proof of actual delivery, the defendants did not contest that they had actual notice of the declaration of default, and any noncompliance by the plaintiff with the requisite method of delivery as provided in the promis- sory note did not result in any prejudice to the defendants. 2. The trial court's award of damages was not clearly erroneous, as there was ample evidence in the record to support its finding that the defen- dants were not entitled to a $120,000 credit for the purported value of certain stock provided to the plaintiff as security; the share value for the stock claimed by the defendants was based on market transactions in December, 2015, but the plaintiff did not have an obligation under the note to sell the shares until after he declared a default in September, 2016, the defendants provided no evidence as to the value of the shares at the time of the declaration of default, the evidence actually revealed substantial fluctuations in the stock price over the years, and there was evidence that the shares were not accessible in the plaintiff's account and, therefore, not transferable, until January, 2017, contradicting the defendants' claim that the plaintiff could freely sell the shares in Decem- ber, 2015. Argued May 24—officially released July 20, 2021

Convicted of the crime of larceny of an elderly person by embezzlement in the second degree in connection with certain credit card transactions, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant was a health care aide who lived part-time with the alleged victim, R, and his wife. Eventu- ally, the defendant and R became romantic and intimate. R gave the defendant large sums of money, and, according to the defendant, author- ized the use of his credit card to make purchases for the defendant's own personal needs. After R's health declined, his son, B, hired a book- keeper to help R manage his finances. When the bookkeeper found certain credit card charges and checks written to the defendant, the defendant's employment was terminated. B filed a complaint with the police, who conducted a larceny investigation, during which a detective, S, interviewed R. Prior to trial, R died, and the court granted a motion in limine filed by the defendant to preclude the admission of statements made by R to any law enforcement agent. At trial, S testified that he met with R and that R consented to the investigation. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a testimonial hearsay statement of R in violation of her constitutional right to confrontation and that she was deprived of her due process rights when the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial impropriety by making substantive use of the testimonial hearsay statement in her closing rebuttal argument. Held: 1. The trial court violated the defendant's right to confrontation under the federal constitution by admitting into evidence, without limitation, S's testimony that R consented to the larceny investigation, which consti- tuted hearsay: R's consent to the larceny investigation was an out-of- court statement, and, although S did not repeat any of the specific words that R spoke during his interview with S, S's testimony presented to the jury, by implication, the substance of R's statements during the interview, that, after being informed of the nature of the investigation into the defendant's conduct, R communicated to S that the police had his permission to continue to pursue the larceny investigation because the transactions were unauthorized; moreover, R's statement of consent was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, as the court indicated to the parties that it would admit the statement even if it were hearsay in that it was akin to a dying declaration, the court admitted the statement at issue without limitation, which meant it could be used for any purpose, and the prosecutor's closing rebuttal argument that the jury should infer that the defendant made unauthorized purchases with R's credit card because otherwise R would not have consented to the police investiga- tion was a powerful indicia that the parties and the court understood that R's statement of consent was admitted for substantive purposes; furthermore, R's statement was testimonial in nature because the state conceded it would be if it came in for substantive purposes and it was provided amidst an interrogation to establish or to prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, and the defendant did not previously have the opportunity to cross-examine R, who was unavailable due to his death; additionally, the defendant was harmed by the error, because the circumstances of the trial suggested that the admission of S's testimony influenced the judgment of the jury in that R effectively testified against the defendant on this critical issue from the grave without ever having been subjected to cross-examination, the jury had been presented with evidence that R had often gifted the defendant money and that the state did not charge the defendant for the theft of those funds, and, less than ten minutes after the jury reheard S's testimony, it returned a guilty verdict. 2. Because this court concluded that the trial court improperly admitted R's testimonial statement for substantive purposes, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, it did not need to reach the merits of the defendant's prosecutorial impropriety claim. Argued January 6—officially released July 20, 2021

The plaintiff, as trustee, sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant L Co. In the first count of his complaint, the plaintiff sought foreclosure of the mortgage, alleging, inter alia, that there were encumbrances on the subject property that were subsequent and subordinate to his mortgage, including the mortgage of the defen- dants K and D. In the second count, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the mortgage of K and D, which was purportedly recorded before the plaintiff's mortgage, was subordinate to the plaintiff's mort- gage on the ground that the plaintiff had no notice of K and D's mortgage because it had been incorrectly indexed by the town clerk's office. K and D denied the allegation in each count that their mortgage was subordinate to the plaintiff's mortgage and asserted a special defense that L Co. had mortgaged the subject property to them and that their mortgage was prior in right and title to the plaintiff's mortgage. Due to a mistake on the mortgage, the town clerk's office initially indexed the deed under S, the sole member of L Co., as an individual, rather than as a representative of L Co. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on both counts and ordered a foreclosure by sale. Prior to the sale date set by the court, K and D appealed from the judgment of foreclosure to this court, which dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. K and D, on the granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme Court, which reversed this court's order and remanded this case to this court for further proceedings. Held that the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's mortgage had priority over K and D's mortgage was not clearly erroneous; K and D's mortgage did not put the plaintiff on actual or constructive notice when it was lodged with the town clerk, as, due to an error in the language of the mortgage, the chain of title for L Co. was silent as to the existence of K and D's mortgage, which was indexed with S as the grantor according to accepted practice, and there were no documents, information or other matters that appeared in the chain of title of L Co. to put the plaintiff's title searcher on any notice as to K and D's mortgage. Argued January 12—officially released July 20, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, disability discrimination pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.) and for interference with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.) following the termination of her employment. The plaintiff was first hired by the defendant in 1995 but her position was eliminated and she was termi- nated in June, 2015. The plaintiff was rehired for a new position in August, 2015, and was subject to a probationary period for her first 120 days at work. In September, 2015, the plaintiff injured her left knee and lower back while at work. The plaintiff was placed on modified work duty but was eventually placed on an indefinite leave of absence and remained on leave until October, 2015. She missed additional work in November, 2015, after she experienced a flare-up of her knee injury. All of the time that she missed from work was considered workers' compensation leave by the defendant. The plaintiff received two negative performance evaluations in January and February, 2016, based solely on her performance while she was at work. The plaintiff was terminated for her poor job performance in March, 2016. During the trial on the plaintiff's complaint, the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the plaintiff's FMLA interference claim, concluding that there was no evidence to support the claim that the plaintiff made an FMLA request to the defendant. On the plaintiff's remaining claims, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly declined to charge the jury with regard to the plaintiff's claim of interference with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: the plaintiff failed to satisfy the preliminary requirement for the court to consider her interference claim, namely, that she made an initial showing that she was denied a right under FMLA, as there was no evidence that the plaintiff made an FMLA request to the defendant and, thus, the defendant had no notice that she was interested in utilizing FMLA leave; moreover, the court's determination that the defendant's policy with regard to nonconcurrent applications of workers' compensa- tion leave under the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) and FMLA leave worked to the benefit of the plaintiff, was supported both by federal regulation and by common sense, as allowing or requiring the plaintiff to use both forms of leave at the same time would have diminished the total legally available amount of her paid and unpaid leave; furthermore, the plaintiff offered no evidence to demonstrate to the jury that she was prejudiced by the defendant's long-standing policy not to run workers' compensation leave and FMLA leave concurrently, and, even if such evidence had been offered, it would not have been relevant to the defendant's evaluations of the plaintiff's work during her probationary period. 2. The trial court did not err in admitting into evidence a letter written by the plaintiff's coworker, containing observations about the plaintiff's workplace behavior and performance, under the business records excep- tion to the hearsay rule: the letter was made in the regular course of the defendant's business, as the record made clear that it was standard procedure for the defendant to subject new employees to a probationary period, based on their actual days at work, and to evaluate the perfor- mance of these employees during that period; moreover, even if the letter was inadmissible hearsay, any error in its admission into evidence was harmless because the author of the letter also testified at trial, and the opinions expressed in the letter were made directly to the jury and the plaintiff did not object to the testimony. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence certain medical records of the plaintiff; the records the plaintiff sought to admit into evidence were created after the date of her termina- tion of employment and described her condition as it existed approxi- mately six months after she was terminated and the court concluded that the evidence lacked probative value as to whether the plaintiff had a chronic condition at the time she was employed by the defendant, the records containing no information as the plaintiff's condition at the time she was discharged. Argued May 20—officially released July 20, 2021

The plaintiffs, B and J Co., operated a liquor store in the town of Vernon. The town's zoning regulations required establishments that sell alcoholic liquors to be separated by a distance of no less than 3000 feet. T filed an application with the town's zoning board of appeals for a variance that would allow him to establish a liquor store in a location that was 2935 feet from the plaintiffs' store. The board scheduled a public hearing on the application and provided notice of the hearing to the abutting landowners by letter and to the general public in a local newspaper. At the conclusion of the hearing, which the plaintiffs did not attend, the board voted to approve the variance. T then submitted an application to the town's planning and zoning commission for a special permit to allow the sale of alcohol at the property. After a public hearing, at which B spoke on the record and claimed that the underlying variance was void, the commission approved the special permit application. The plaintiffs appealed the commission's decision to the Superior Court, claiming, inter alia, that the variance was void, that the commission should not have relied on the variance in determining whether to grant the special permit, and that the board lacked the authority to grant the variance. The trial court denied the appeal, and the plaintiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the plaintiffs' failure to appeal from the decision of the board that granted the application for the variance rendered their opposition to the commission's decision to grant the special permit an impermissible collateral attack on the validity of the variance: once the statutory period to appeal the board's decision to grant the variance had expired, the decision became final; moreover, collateral attacks on the decisions of zoning authorities are generally impermissible in light of the need for stability in land use planning and the need for justified reliance by the interested parties; furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that either of the conditions that may permit a collateral attack on a previously unchallenged zoning decision were satisfied, as, because the board acted within its statutorily authorized power to vary zoning regulations, its decision was not so far outside of what could have been regarded as a valid exercise of zoning power that there could not have been any justified reliance on it, and the plaintiffs' argument that the continued maintenance of the variance would violate a strong public policy because it varied the town's zoning regulations was unavailing because it merely described the purpose of a variance. Argued March 3—officially released July 20, 2021

The plaintiff, who was incarcerated following his conviction of various criminal charges, including murder, sought damages for, inter alia, alleged legal malpractice and fraud by the defendants, an attorney and his law firm, who had previously represented the plaintiff in a habeas action concerning his criminal conviction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants provided deficient representation in the habeas action by failing to prosecute fully and properly his action and by engaging in fraudulent billing practices. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment of dismissal, concluding that the plaintiff's claims against the defendants were not ripe for adjudi- cation because his underlying criminal conviction had not been invali- dated. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not ripe for adjudi- cation; this court, in Taylor v. Wallace (184 Conn. App. 43), held that a tort action is not ripe for adjudication when success in that action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction and that the action must be dismissed unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated, and, because the plaintiff had been convicted and that conviction had not been invalidated on direct appeal or through a habeas action, his claim was a collateral attack on his underlying conviction, his claim for legal malpractice was not ripe, and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 2. The trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's claim of fraud as not ripe to the extent the allegations of fraud did not implicate the validity of his conviction; the plaintiff's allegations in support of his fraud claim, that the retainer contract was misrepresented, he was billed for work the defendants did not do, and the defendants inflated or padded the hours they worked, simply alleged a fee dispute, and a judgment for the plaintiff in the fee dispute would not imply the invalidity of his conviction, and, therefore, Taylor v. Wallace (184 Conn. App. 43) was inapplicable and dismissal of the plaintiff's fraud claim was unwarranted. Argued March 11—officially released July 27, 2021

The plaintiff, N, sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant F Co. F. Co. previously had executed and delivered a note to the defendant D together with a mortgage deed on the property. As security for a loan from N, D then assigned to N certain rights in the mortgage note on the property. D defaulted on the loan, and N commenced foreclosure. The trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, which was affirmed on appeal. J, the executor of D's estate, was thereafter substituted as the defendant, and C, the execu- tor of the plaintiff's estate, was substituted as the plaintiff. The substitute plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a deficiency judgment, and the defendants objected, arguing that the doctrine of res judicata barred the trial court from the litigating the amount of the deficiency, because the Probate Court had already determined that amount in proceedings to settle D's estate. The court granted the motion for a deficiency judgment, determining the deficiency after the foreclosure sale to be an amount higher than that determined by the Probate Court, and the defendants F Co. and J appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court incor- rectly concluded that it was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from determining the amount of the deficiency judgment, which was based on their claim that certain findings from the Probate Court as to the amount of the deficiency barred further litigation on the issue: the Probate Court issued its decree while the foreclosure action was pending in the Superior Court, which had competent jurisdiction, and, therefore, the Probate Court lacked competent jurisdiction to determine the amount of the deficiency judgment. 2. The trial court properly included certain tax liens paid by N to the mortgage debt when calculating the amount of the deficiency: not permitting the real estate tax liens on the property to be added to the calculation of the debt, when N paid the real estate taxes that the defaulting mortgagor failed to pay, would penalize the substitute plaintiff by reducing the amount of the deficiency solely because the defaulting mortgagor permit- ted the property to become encumbered by a real estate tax lien. Submitted on briefs March 4—officially released July 27, 2021

The plaintiff, K, a homeowner, was insured under a homeowners insurance policy issued by the defendant insurance company. K was named as a defendant in a separate action, in which it was alleged that K had stalked and harassed a family, and the claims against K included, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress. K made a claim for coverage relating to the separate action under the insurance policy, which the defendant denied. Thereafter, K brought the present action against the defendant claiming that the defendant had a duty to provide K with a legal defense in the separate action and to indemnify. The trial court determined that the count alleging negligent infliction of emotional dis- tress against K in the separate action did not allege that a bodily injury had occurred and that, pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, bodily injury did not include claims for purely mental injury. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, K claimed that, in the separate action, the plaintiff's allegation that her emotional distress was so severe that it could cause physical illness was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that a bodily injury was alleged to have been sustained and, therefore, K was entitled to coverage pursuant to the terms of his policy. Held that the trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment for the defendant: the complaint against K did not allege actual physical illness or injury but was required to allege that K's actions could have resulted in such in order to comply with the pleading requirements for a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and, as the insurance policy explicitly excluded purely mental injuries, this court was bound by that plain language and could not read the policy differently to account for public policy considerations, thus, pursuant to the terms of his insurance policy, K was not entitled to coverage, and, accordingly, the defendant had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify K. Argued May 11—officially released July 27, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, P, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him concerning a plea offer. The habeas court denied the petition, concluding that P had provided the petitioner with effective assistance and, thereafter, the court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and properly concluded that the petitioner was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel: there was ample evidence in the record to support the court's findings that P advised the petitioner regarding the plea offer, the state's case against him, and the pros and cons of going to trial through exten- sive discussions, P requested several continuances to provide the peti- tioner with time to consider the plea offer, and there was evidence in the record that P did in fact recommend that the petitioner plead guilty; moreover, P's representation was not deficient, as the advice given by P was adequate for the petitioner to make an informed decision about whether to accept the plea offer, P having made the petitioner aware of the mandatory minimum sentence, discussed the state's evidence against him, including witness statements and warrant affidavits, and estimated that the petitioner had a 50/50 chance of success at trial; furthermore, there was no requirement that counsel specifically recom- mend that a client accept a plea offer, only that counsel provide an informed opinion regarding the plea offer under the circumstances of the case. Argued January 12—officially released July 27, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of assault in the first degree and multiple counts of burglary and who had his probation revoked following a trial to the court in 2009, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant also had pleaded guilty at his 2009 trial to being a persistent serious felony offender pursuant to statute (§ 53a-40 (c)) and the trial court, in 2010, enhanced the defendant's sentence pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2007) § 53a-40 (j)) after determining that his extended incarcer- ation would best serve the public interest. In 2008, the legislature had amended § 53a-40 to remove the requirement of a public interest determi- nation. The defendant claimed that because he was sentenced in 2010, the sentencing judge improperly applied the 2007 revision of § 53a-40 (j) when it enhanced his sentence. The defendant also claimed in his motion to correct an illegal sentence that he was improperly denied a probable cause hearing and challenged the revocation of his parole. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence and concluding that he was properly sentenced pursu- ant to the 2007 revision of § 53a-40 (j); the 2008 amendment to § 53a- 40 (j) contained no language stating that it applied retroactively and the absence of any such language indicated that the legislature intended for the amendment to apply prospectively only and, therefore, the sen- tencing judge was required to apply the statutory revision that was in existence in July, 2007, when the defendant committed the crimes. 2. The trial court properly concluded that the defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the public interest determination pursuant to (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-40 (j), and that the defendant was not required to admit that extended incarceration would best serve the public interest; the defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial under (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-40 (j) by pleading guilty to being a persistent serious felony offender and was properly canvassed by the court, and, because that court made an explicit finding that extended incarceration would best serve the public interest, it was not necessary for the defendant to make that admission. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claims that he was entitled to a probable cause hearing and that his probation was revoked improperly, as those claims challenged pretrial proceedings rather than the defen- dant's sentence; accordingly, this court concluded that the claims were properly rejected by the trial court but that the form of the judgment was improper with respect to this portion of the defendant's motion, and the case was remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing that portion of the defendant's motion. Argued April 20—officially released July 27, 2021

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the trial court's orders issued follow- ing a hearing on the defendant's motion for contempt. Pursuant to a separation agreement entered into by the parties and incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, the plaintiff was obligated to name the defendant as the beneficiary of a $900,000 life insurance policy; however, the plaintiff was not required to pay more than $3500 for the annual premium for the insurance. In 2008, the court issued an order increasing the life insurance coverage the plaintiff was required to maintain from $900,000 to $1.8 million. The order made no mention of the $3500 cost limitation. In 2019, the plaintiff communicated to the defendant that he would be discontinuing any further life insurance coverage because the costs had become excessive. Coverage under the original policy lapsed in March, 2019. The plaintiff then obtained a life insurance policy through L Co., effective May, 2019, but it contained an exclusion for any and all claims arising out of the insured person piloting any type of aircraft. The plaintiff owned a private aircraft and flew it ten to thirty times per month. In June, 2019, the court issued certain orders relating to the defendant's motion for contempt regarding the insurance coverage that the plaintiff had obtained: the plaintiff was required to apply to five separate insurance companies to obtain adequate insurance without a piloting exclusion, and, in the event that an application was rejected, or it was accepted with a piloting exclusion, the plaintiff was to transfer to the defendant as security for the life insurance obligation a mortgage in the face amount of $1.8 million on property owned by the plaintiff, and, until there was life insurance without a piloting exclusion or the mortgage deed had been recorded, the plaintiff was prohibited from piloting any aircraft or being a passenger in any airplane piloted by anyone else other than by a commercial airline pilot on a commercial airline flight. The court also found the plaintiff's claim that he let the original life insurance policy lapse because the cost to renew would have been $65,850 and that he was only required to pay $3500, was not credible, concluding that the 2008 order increasing the life insurance obligation eliminated this limitation. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in concluding that the insurance premium cost limitation of $3500 per year had been eliminated when the court amended the amount of required insurance coverage in 2008; this court would not second-guess the trial court's determination that the plaintiff's claim that he believed he was required to maintain insurance only up to an annual premium of $3500 was not credible, and it was reasonable for the trial court to interpret the 2008 order as eliminating the $3500 limita- tion, given the fact that the amount of insurance required was doubled in that order and in light of the plaintiff's own conduct in maintaining insurance with annual premiums in excess of the $3500 limitation. 2. The plaintiff's claims challenging the trial court's orders prohibiting him from private piloting until he obtained life insurance without a piloting exclusion or, in the alternative, requiring him to transfer a mortgage to the defendant on property he owned to secure his life insurance obliga- tion were moot: because the plaintiff secured three accidental death policies, in addition to the life insurance obtained from L Co., that meet the requirements of the amended separation agreement, the plaintiff was no longer subject to the alternative conditions imposed by the court's June, 2019 orders. Argued March 8—officially released July 27, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted in 2009 on a plea of guilty to three counts of the crime of assault in the first degree, appealed from the trial court's dismissal of his 2018 motion to withdraw his plea, in which he claimed that the plea was obtained in violation of his due process rights because the trial court failed to inquire as to whether the plea was the result of force, threats or promises apart from a plea agreement, as required by the applicable rule of practice (§ 39-20). The trial court dismissed the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the defendant conceded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to con- sider his motion but requested that this court exercise its supervisory authority pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 60-2) to treat the appeal as an authorized late appeal from his 2009 conviction. Held: 1. This court had the authority to review the merits of the trial court's dismissal of the postsentencing motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea: reviewing courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a trial court had subject matter jurisdiction; moreover, even though the defendant conceded that the court properly dismissed his motion, the appeal was justiciable because there was an actual controversy as to whether this court should exercise its supervisory authority to treat the defendant's appeal of the dismissal of his motion as an authorized late appeal of his judgment of conviction, the parties' positions on the issue were adverse, this court had the power to resolve the controversy pursu- ant to Practice Book § 60-2, and it could have granted practical relief to the defendant. 2. The defendant failed to demonstrate that it was appropriate for this court to invoke its supervisory authority pursuant to Practice Book § 60-2 to treat his appeal from what he conceded was the correct judgment of the trial court as an untimely appeal from the judgment of conviction that was rendered more than ten years ago: this court's supervisory powers should be invoked only in rare and unique circumstances in which traditional procedural limitations would be inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts; moreover, the circum- stances of the defendant's case were not rare or unique because he had ample opportunities to challenge his judgment of conviction prior to this appeal, yet he failed to do so. Argued March 1—officially released July 27, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's postjudgment motion for modification of the custody of the parties' children. Pursuant to the separation agreement, which was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, the parties shared joint legal custody of the children and the plaintiff had primary physical custody. The parties entered into a postjudgment agreement that permitted the plaintiff to relocate to North Carolina with the children, provided that, inter alia, the defendant retained rights to visitation and the plaintiff was required to pay to the defendant a monthly travel allowance for visitation related expenses. After the plaintiff and the children relocated, the parties entered into another postjudgment agreement, which, inter alia, stipulated that the courts in either Connecticut or North Carolina would have jurisdiction to decide any issues relating to custody and/or visitation. The plaintiff filed a petition for registration of a foreign child custody order in a court in North Carolina, which that court confirmed. The defendant then filed a motion for modification in Connecticut, claiming that the plaintiff had failed to pay alimony and the travel allowance in accordance with their agreement, which impacted her ability to visit the children. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's motion for modifi- cation, asserting that North Carolina was the children's home state and, as such, the Connecticut court should decline to exercise jurisdiction. Following a hearing on the motions, the trial court determined that it no longer had jurisdiction to enter orders relating to the custody and visitation of the children pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46b-115l (a) (2)), and, accordingly, it granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Held that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's motion for modification: a trial court's determination that it lacked continuing jurisdiction to modify custody pursuant to § 46b-115l (a) (2) required the satisfaction of three factors, namely, that Connecticut was no longer the children's home state, that the children lacked a significant relationship with the defendant, who continued to reside in Connecticut, and that substantial evidence concerning the children's care, protection, training and personal relationships was no longer available in Connecticut, and, although the trial court based its determination that it no longer had jurisdiction to enter custody orders on the defendant's concession that North Carolina was the children's home state, it failed to address the remaining two factors. Argued April 12—officially released July 27, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder as an accessory and conspiracy to commit murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentence of sixty years of incarceration without the possibility of parole was illegal because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state constitutions in light of his age, eighteen years old, at the time of the crimes and the emerging science concerning juvenile brain development. Pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 23-29 (2)) governing the dismissal of habeas petitions, the habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that the petition failed to state a claim on which habeas corpus relief could be granted. Thereafter, on the granting of certification, the peti- tioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court improperly dismissed the habeas petition: that court, by dismissing the habeas petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2) during its preliminary consideration of the petition and prior to issuing the writ of habeas corpus, failed to follow the proper procedure as outlined in Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction (334 Conn. 548); moreover, this court concluded that it was not appropriate to remand the case to the habeas court with direction to decline to issue the writ because the petition was not amenable to declination under the relevant rule of practice (§ 23-24 (a)), as there was no claim that the habeas court lacked jurisdiction over the petition, the petition advanced a claim that was not frivolous on its face and, because the petitioner is still incarcerated and advanced a colorable claim under our state constitu- tion, the relief sought may be available; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 2. The respondent Commissioner of Correction could not prevail on his claim that the petitioner's state constitutional claim was procedurally defaulted because the habeas petition was not the proper procedural mechanism to pursue that claim; contrary to the respondent's assertion that this court should affirm the habeas court's judgment of dismissal even though the procedural default issue was not litigated in the habeas court, this court could not rely on the mere possibility of a successful procedural default defense as an ex post facto justification of the habeas court's dismissal, without a hearing, of the habeas petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2). Argued March 3—officially released July 27, 2021

The plaintiff, an off duty East Granby police officer, sought to recover damages for personal injuries that he sustained after being hit by a car while he was on the premises of a shopping mall owned by the defendant B Co. in Manchester. While in the parking lot of the shopping mall, he heard a radio broadcast indicating a pursuit of a suspected participant in a crime and was injured after he joined that pursuit and was struck by the car that the suspect entered, which was driven by C. The plaintiff alleged that his injuries were a result of the negligence of B Co., and A Co., which provided security services for B Co., for, inter alia, chasing the suspect into the mall parking lot. Following a jury verdict and judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on superseding cause, improperly instructed the jury on the statutory (§ 54-1f) duties of off duty police officers, and failed to instruct the jury on the duties owed by a possessor of land to invitees. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court's charge to the jury on the doctrine of superseding cause was improper and harmful, as it was not reasonably probable that the jury was misled by the trial court's instruction on the doctrine; the court's charge, read as a whole, was correct in law, adapted to the issues, and was sufficient for the guidance of the jury, as the court charged the jury that, in order for the defendants to prevail on their special defense that C's conduct was a superseding cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the defendants had to demonstrate that C had intentionally or criminally struck the plaintiff with his car, and, the jury, on the interrogatories, found that C's conduct was both intentional or criminal and not foreseeable, and there was ample evidence presented to show that C's conduct was intentional or criminal, including the plaintiff's testimony and his statement to the police that the driver of the vehicle had looked at him then reversed the car into him. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claims that the court improperly instructed the jury as to the reasonableness of his actions as an off duty police officer pursuant to § 54-1f and his status as an invitee on B Co.'s property, as he did not satisfy his burden that the purported errors were harmful; once the jury concluded that C's conduct was both intentional or criminal and not foreseeable, it did not have occasion to consider the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct or his status as an invitee, but, instead, pursuant to the instructions on the interrogatory form, it completed the defendants' verdict form as to B Co. and A Co. Argued April 7—officially released July 27, 2021

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property, a condominium unit, owned by the defendant P. The defendant J Co. was the condominium association for the complex, which included the condominium unit at issue. The previous owner of the unit, T, had executed a note and mortgage in favor of M, which was recorded in the land records. J Co. thereafter recorded a lis pendens on the unit in the land records and commenced a foreclosure action against T and M in which it sought a judgment of strict foreclosure as to its condominium common charge lien on the property. The trial court in that prior foreclo- sure action rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. M assigned to the plaintiff his rights, title and interest in the mortgage note and deed encumbering the property, and the plaintiff recorded in the land records the assignment of that interest five days before the law days were set to run. No party redeemed and no party appealed the judgment of strict foreclosure. J Co. then sold the unit to P. Several years later, the plaintiff brought this action against, inter alia, J Co. and P, in which she sought the foreclosure of the mortgage that M had assigned to her and damages for unjust enrichment. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by J Co. on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly granted J Co.'s motion to dismiss count one of her complaint on the ground that she lacked standing, which was based on her claim that the mortgage that she sought to foreclose had not been extinguished in the prior foreclosure action: when the law day passed for the mortgage that M had assigned to the plaintiff, her right to redeem the property ended and, although the plaintiff had constructive notice of the prior action, she did not litigate the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in that prior action or file any motion or appearance, and she did not attempt to appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure; moreover, there were no exceptional circumstances that existed to permit the plaintiff to collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the trial court in the prior foreclosure action, when the plaintiff commenced this action approximately three years after the conclusion of the prior action and after title to the property had absolutely vested in J Co., and the plaintiff's claim that the jurisdictional prerequisites to maintaining a foreclosure action on a common charge lien pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 47-258 (m) (1)) were not satisfied overlooked established law that a collateral attack on a final judgment is disfavored, and the question of whether the jurisdictional requirements in § 47-258 (m) (1) were satisfied in the prior action were not obvious from the record. 2. The trial court properly granted J Co.'s motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment count of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that she lacked standing: notwithstanding the plaintiff's claim that her interest in the mortgage was not extinguished in the prior foreclosure action because the trial court in that action lacked jurisdiction, the plaintiff could not prevail on this claim, as that mortgage was extinguished in the prior action when title to the property became absolute in J Co. Argued May 12—officially released August 3, 2021

The defendant, a mortgage servicing company, appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, a property owner, finding that the defendant violated the mortgage release statute (§ 49-8) by failing to provide a timely release of the plaintiff's mortgage. The defendant received a payoff of the mortgage from the plaintiff, along with a demand that specifically cited and quoted the statutory damages provisions of § 49-8 (c). Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not have standing because the plaintiff did not incur actual damages, and, therefore, was not aggrieved; the defendant acknowledged that it had received a proper demand under § 49-8 and failed to provide the required release to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was entitled to a release after satisfying the mortgage, it made the proper demand for the release, the defendant received that demand, and the defendant failed to provide the release within the statutory sixty days, and, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the plaintiff was a statutorily aggrieved party. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the plaintiff's objection to certain questions the defendant asked of its corporate witness concerning whether there existed a common practice whereby borrowers recontact the defendant if they have not timely received a requested § 49-8 (c) release, as the trial court correctly determined that this evidence was not relevant; the defendant's attempt to shift the responsibility to the plaintiff for the defendants' own failure to comply with § 49-8 was unmoving, the fact that the defendant admitted that it customarily fails to comply with § 49-8 did not mean that its responsibil- ity to comply then shifted to the mortgagor to repeatedly remind the defendant that it had a statutory obligation, and, whether others provided the defendant with such a reminder, was of no relevance to whether the defendant, in fact, had failed to meet its statutory obligation to fulfill its legal duty within sixty days of the plaintiff's proper request. 3. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly rejected its special defense in which it alleged that the plaintiff had a duty to mitigate, but failed to mitigate its statutory damages, as the statutory damages provision of § 49-8 was enacted as a means to curb what the legislature considered to be a long-standing problem in the mortgage industry; § 49-8 is coercive and provided the mortgagee with an incentive to fully comply in a timely manner, and to require the plaintiff to ''remind'' the mortgagee that it had a legal obligation to comply with § 49-8 (c) by providing the plaintiff with a release, after already properly requesting that it provide such a release, would run counter to the intent of the statute and would encourage the abuses the legislature sought to curb through its enactment. 4. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that § 49-8 (c) was unconstitu- tional as applied to this case on the ground that it permitted the court to levy an excessive and punitive fine that is grossly in excess of the plaintiff's actual damages, which were none: the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution did not apply to this civil case between private parties, and any income tax the plaintiff might owe on the statutory damages it received did not constitute a fine directly imposed on the defendant by the government; moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim, § 49-8 did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in that it permitted a statutory award of ''punitive'' damages that was greatly in excess of the plaintiff's actual damages, as the legislative history of § 49-8 revealed that the purpose of the statute was to curb one of the abuses in the mortgage industry, namely, delays in providing timely releases of mortgages, the defendant had full control of its statutory liability because the statutory damages were assessed on a weekly basis for each week of noncompli- ance and the defendant knew exactly what its exposure was and the simple step it needed to take to limit its liability. Argued April 12—officially released August 3, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, H. He claimed that H failed to investigate the viability of self-defense as a defense strategy and that he was ineffective for failing to assert a claim of self-defense at trial. The habeas court denied each of the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance, and the petitioner appealed to this court claiming that the habeas court improperly concluded that he failed to prove his claims. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the habeas court properly having determined that he failed to demonstrate that it was objectively unreasonable for his trial counsel to pursue a defense of third-party culpability instead of self-defense: after examining all of the evidence, H determined that a theory of third- party culpability was the strongest defense, concluded that the facts in the petitioner's signed statement were not consistent with self-defense, and testified at the habeas trial that he could not recall whether or not the petitioner had informed him that he had possessed a gun during the altercation with the victim, and the habeas court had the sole ability to determine the credibility of the petitioner's testimony that he did in fact inform H of that information; moreover, the petitioner failed to produce evidence at the habeas trial that would have overcome the presumption that H's decision to pursue a defense of third-party culpability, rather than self-defense, was sound trial strategy in that neither his signed statement to the police nor his testimony at his criminal trial included facts that his counsel considered essential to a claim of self-defense, in that he did not admit to having a gun nor did he indicate that he feared for his life. 2. The habeas court's findings that H was unaware that the petitioner had a gun and had fired it in self-defense and that the petitioner admitted that he never informed H that he had a gun and shot it in self-defense were clearly erroneous, but amounted to harmless error, as there was ample evidence in the record to support the court's conclusion that H was not deficient in his investigation or in failing to raise a self-defense claim at trial: despite those erroneous findings, it did not undermine appellate confidence in the court's fact-finding process, as the petitioner failed to prove that he had informed H that he had a gun at the time of the shooting; moreover, even if the petitioner had informed H that he possessed a gun during the altercation, it would still have been reasonable for H to forgo further investigation into self-defense when examining all of the evidence, as the petitioner's signed statement did not include essential components of a self-defense claim, and the petitioner's counsel believed he could effectively undermine the state's case by attacking the credibility of its key witnesses at trial. Argued April 20—officially released August 3, 2021

W Co., a law firm that had previously represented the claimant in proceedings before the Workers' Compensation Commission, appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which vacated the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner that divided equally the attorney's fees between W Co. and V, an attorney who had also successfully represented the claimant in the matter before the commission. W Co. claimed on appeal to this court that the board improperly vacated the commissioner's ruling and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing on the ground that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the commissioner's distribution of attorney's fees. Held that there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the commissioner reasonably could have based her ruling on attorney's fees and, accordingly, the board improperly vacated the commissioner's decision: the board incorrectly applied the appropriate legal standard to its review of the commissioner's decision by vacating her ruling on the basis of its speculation that her ruling could have rested on a more solid evidentiary foundation, thereby substituting its judgment for the conclusion of the commissioner; moreover, the board's decision was devoid of any analysis of the facts found by the commis- sioner, and the board improperly encroached on the commissioner's discretion without making any findings as to whether her conclusions were based on an incorrect application of the law or unreasonable inferences drawn from the facts found; furthermore, the commissioner's decision to divide the attorney's fees equally was made on the basis of the record and evidence presented at the hearing, the scheduling of which both parties were properly notified, and V failed to appear before the commissioner and presented no evidence in his favor. Argued March 9—officially released August 3, 2021

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decree of the Probate Court admitting the decedent's will to probate. The decedent, the plaintiff's grandfather, had two children, L and the defendant. The decedent's wife had died. L died in 2010 and expressly disinherited the plaintiff, her daughter. After the death of L, the decedent and the defendant met with an attorney, B, to discuss what would happen to the decedent's estate if the defendant also predeceased him. B advised the decedent that the plaintiff, as the only child of L, would inherit one half of the decedent's assets upon his death. He responded that he did not want the plaintiff to inherit any of his assets. B then drafted a new will for the decedent that reflected his express wish to disinherit the plaintiff. The will left all of the decedent's assets to the defendant and stated that the decedent intentionally made no provision for the plaintiff. After the decedent's death, the Probate Court admitted the decedent's will. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the will should not have been admitted to probate because the decedent was not of sound mind and was under the defendant's improper and undue influence. Following a trial, the trial court concluded that the Probate Court properly admitted the will to probate because the decedent had testamentary capacity to execute the will and was not under the undue influence of the defendant. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the decedent had testamentary capacity to execute the will; the defendant presented more than sufficient evidence that the decedent was of sound mind when he executed the will, and the court based its ruling on its well supported findings that, at the time the decedent executed the will, he was able to live independently with the assistance of family members, lacked serious brain injury that would deprive him of the ability to understand what he was doing when he executed the will, and he was well aware of what he was doing when he executed the will and had rational reasons for doing so, which was to change his previous will in order to disinherit the plaintiff because he wanted to ensure that she would not waste the assets she would otherwise inherit from him. 2. The trial court properly rejected the plaintiff's claim of undue influence: the burden of proof on the issue of undue influence generally rests with the person alleging it and, although it can be shifted in rare circum- stances, the burden of disproving undue influence will not shift to a child of the testator, even where a confidential relationship appears to exist; moreover, the court's conclusion that there was no undue influence would not have changed even if the court had shifted the burden onto the defendant because the court's decision that there had been no undue influence was made under the clear and convincing standard, which is the same standard of proof that would have applied had the burden of proof formally been shifted to the defendant. Argued March 16—officially released August 3, 2021

Convicted of various crimes in connection with his actions toward two police officers when they attempted a stop of his motor vehicle, the defendant appealed to this court. The police officers, L and M, separately responded to an early morning call regarding a suspicious individual in a silver car who appeared to be attempting to break into vehicles in a residential neighborhood. On their arrival, the officers encountered the defendant driving a vehicle matching that description and followed him, each in their own marked cruiser, down a dead end road. Near the end of the road, the defendant turned his car around. After an unsuccessful attempt to make a vehicle stop, L angled his cruiser across the road to try to prevent the defendant from leaving the area. The defendant drove over the curb and around L's vehicle. M then engaged his lights and siren and similarly angled his cruiser across the road to try and block the defendant. The defendant hit M's cruiser while attempting to drive around it. Assuming that the crash had disabled the defendant's vehicle, both L and M exited their cruisers and ordered the defendant to shut off his vehicle. Instead, the defendant reversed quickly toward L, who had to kick off the side of the defendant's car to avoid being hit by it. The defendant again advanced his car toward M, who was then standing near the back of his vehicle. The defendant briefly stopped his car between the two officers. After unsuccessfully trying to open the defen- dant's car door, L used the butt of his gun to break open the driver's side window of the defendant's vehicle, in an attempt to grab him. The defendant again quickly reversed and L stumbled out of the car's path. M, believing that L had been hit, fired a single shot at the defendant's vehicle in an attempt to disable it. The defendant then drove around M's cruiser and continued approximately one quarter of a mile down the road before his vehicle broke down. The defendant exited the vehicle and ran into the woods. He was apprehended shortly thereafter. Various items, which had been reported as missing from the vehicles of area residents, were recovered from the defendant's car. Although the jury found the defendant not guilty of attempt to commit assault in the first degree with respect to his actions against L, he was convicted of one count of attempt to commit assault in the first degree with respect to his actions against M, two counts of attempt to commit assault of a peace officer with respect to his actions against L and M, respectively, and one count of engaging an officer in pursuit. On appeal, the defendant claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first degree and that the trial court erred in accepting the jury's verdict of guilty of attempt to commit assault of a peace officer because that crime was not legally cognizable or, in the alternative, because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of both counts. Held: 1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first degree: there was ample evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found, by the cumulative impact of the evidence and the rational inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, that the defendant's intent was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant was aware of M's presence and location, that he intended to hit M with his car, that he had a motive to assault M, as the defendant's car had several stolen items in it that evening, many plainly visible, and that he did not mistakenly accelerate toward M. 2. The trial court did not err in accepting the jury's verdict of guilty of two counts of attempt to commit assault of a peace officer: the defendant's claim that the crime was not legally cognizable was unpreserved because he failed to raise it at trial; moreover, the claim failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), because the defendant failed to establish that there was a constitutional violation, as this court had previously determined in State v. Jones (96 Conn. App. 634), that attempt to commit assault of a peace officer was a legally cognizable crime; furthermore, the defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence of the requisite intent to support his conviction pertaining to his actions against M failed because the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to M, which would be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant acted with an intent to prevent M from performing his duties; additionally, the defendant abandoned his claim that there was insufficient evidence of the requisite intent to support his conviction pertaining to his actions against L because his briefing was devoid of any analysis to support his claim, merely incorporating his arguments set forth with respect to his chal- lenge to his conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, which related only to his actions against M, and, accordingly, this court declined to review the claim. Argued February 17—officially released August 3, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of two counts of the crime of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, appealed to this court, claim- ing that the trial court improperly denied his motions for a mistrial and his motion to suppress evidence, including, inter alia, 121 bags of individually packaged crack cocaine, that was seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant. At trial, the state offered the expert testimony of a police detective, P, who testified about the quantities of drugs usually found in the possession of people who sell drugs as opposed to people who only use drugs. Answering a hypothetical posed by the prosecutor, P testified that the possession of 121 bags of crack cocaine was consistent with someone who sold drugs. Following argu- ment that this testimony went to the ultimate issue of the defendant's intent, the court denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial. The state also offered the testimony of Y, a police sergeant, who testified that he knew where the defendant lived ''from other situations'' that involved the defendant. Defense counsel argued that Y's testimony improperly informed the jury that the defendant had prior involvement with the police but did not request a limiting or curative instruction following the court's denial of a motion for a mistrial. The defendant also argued that the search warrant for his apartment, the application for which had been based on the affidavit of P and another police detective, L, referencing in part two sales of narcotics by the defendant to a confidential informant, had been issued without probable cause. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motions for a mistrial. a. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial after P's testimony, as P's response to the state's hypothetical questions did not amount to an opinion as to the ultimate issue of the defendant's intent to sell narcotics; pursuant to the opinion of our Supreme Court in State v. Nash (278 Conn. 620), the significance of the quantity of narcotics found on a suspect is a proper subject of expert testimony, and P's testimony concerned a hypothetical individual and not this defendant. b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial based on Y's testimony; Y's statement mentioning ''other situations'' was vague and did not mention prior misconduct, police investigations or anything nefarious, and defense counsel, who specifically told the court that he did not want a curative instruction, could not opt for a mistrial instead. 2. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evi- dence, as probable cause existed to support the issuance of the search warrant for the defendant's apartment; P and L attested that they had heard multiple reports that the defendant had been selling narcotics out of his apartment, a confidential informant made two controlled purchases of narcotics from the defendant under police observation, and a reasonable inference could be made that the defendant brought narcotics from his apartment when he met with the confidential infor- mant. Argued April 5—officially released August 3, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, the town of Newtown and various school employees, for personal injuries he sustained when he fell from a referee stand while officiating a public high school volleyball match. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they had shown that their allegedly negligent actions were discretionary, and thus they enjoyed governmental immu- nity, and that the plaintiff did not fall within the identifiable person- imminent harm exception to the governmental immunity doctrine. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff, a volleyball referee, was not legally compelled to be on school premises at the time of his injury, and, accordingly, he was not an identifiable person to whom the identifiable person-imminent harm exception applied. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was an identifiable victim who fell within the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to the gov- ernmental immunity doctrine: the only identifiable class of foreseeable victims that our Supreme Court has recognized is that of schoolchildren attending public schools during school hours, and an assignment to officiate a volleyball game after school hours is nothing like the legal compulsion imposed by our statutes that require a child's attendance at school; moreover, the plaintiff conceded that he had the option to accept or to deny the refereeing assignment, which made his presence on the premises voluntary; furthermore, it would have been improper to extend the identifiable victim classification, particularly because the student athletes participating in the volleyball game over which the plaintiff officiated would not themselves enjoy such a designation under existing law, and there was no doctrinal justification for treating the plaintiff differently than the schoolchildren. Argued March 4—officially released August 3, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted in 2009 of the crimes of murder and risk of injury to a child, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 6, 2017. Thereafter, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52- 470 (c) and (e)), the respondent Commissioner of Correction filed a request for an order to show cause why the untimely petition should be permitted to proceed. The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the petitioner testified that he was not aware of any deadlines for filing habeas petitions and that, in late 2016, he became concerned about the adequacy of the legal assistance furnished by his defense counsel due to his son's representation that counsel had not contacted him prior to the petitioner's 2009 guilty plea. The habeas court dismissed the habeas petition as untimely, concluding that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that the delay in filing the petition was without good cause. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal because he established good cause for the untimely filing of his habeas petition, as neither of the petitioner's reasons was sufficient to satisfy his burden of demonstrating good cause for the delay: despite his testimony that he was unaware of the statutory deadlines for filing habeas petitions, the petitioner was presumed to know the law, and the habeas court did not find his claimed ignorance to be credible but, instead, found that he was aware that his habeas petition could have been filed in the eight years following his conviction; moreover, although the petitioner testified that, in late 2016, his son provided information as to the purported lack of communication between his son and defense counsel, he presented no explanation or evidence regarding his failure to act on that information by filing his habeas petition before the October 1, 2017 deadline; furthermore, because the petitioner failed to raise any claim of good cause based on mental health issues or medications at the show cause hearing or in his petition for certification to appeal, this court could not conclude that the habeas court abused its ample discretion on that ground. Argued May 10—officially released August 3, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant Commissioner of Transportation pursuant to the state defective highway statute (§ 13a- 144), for injuries that he sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on a bridge over a public highway. The plaintiff alleged that the accident was caused by black ice on the bridge, which he claimed constituted a highway defect. Before the plaintiff's accident, the state police had informed the Department of Transportation of another ice related accident on the bridge. The plaintiff's accident occurred before the arrival of the department's crew. The case was tried to a jury and, after three days of deliberations, the jury attempted to return a plaintiff's verdict while also answering ''no'' to an interrogatory that asked the jury whether it found that the defendant had a reasonable amount of time to remedy the defect before the plaintiff's accident. After the trial court returned the jury to continue its deliberations, the jury returned with a defendant's verdict, maintaining its ''no'' answer to the interrogatory. The trial court accepted the verdict, denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to accept the jury's initial verdict and by returning the jury to continue its deliberations to rectify an inconsistency in its verdict: the jury found, in its answer to the interrogatory, that the defen- dant did not have a reasonable amount of time to remedy the defect, and, accordingly, the defendant could not be liable to the plaintiff and the trial court correctly concluded that the initial verdict in favor of the plaintiff was inconsistent with its response to the interrogatory; moreover, this court did not consider the plaintiff's claims that the interrogatory was confusing and suffered from inartful wording because he did not timely object to the inclusion of or to the text of the interroga- tory before it was submitted to the jury. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to the instruction that it gave to the jury before returning the jury to continue its deliberations because that claim was not properly preserved: although the plaintiff's counsel argued that the particular language of the supplemental charge, namely, its lack of a specific reference to the challenged interrogatory, constituted an abuse of discre- tion, the plaintiff's counsel did not object to the court's instruction prior to the jury's return with a defendant's verdict, and the general comments of the plaintiff's counsel were neither timely nor sufficient to preserve the issue for review by this court; moreover, even if counsel's statements could have been perceived as an objection to the court's supplemental instruction, they were not timely when they were made for the first time after the jury returned from its deliberations and the court accepted its verdict. Argued May 18—officially released August 3, 2021

The plaintiff, as trustee, sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant F. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability only and rendered a judg- ment of foreclosure by sale, from which F appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to that court to set a new sale date. The trial court ordered a new sale date and waived newspaper advertisements. The committee filed a motion to approve the sale and the trial court rendered judgment approving the sale and deed, from which F appealed to this court. Thereafter, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to terminate the appellate stay and, although F objected to the motion, he did not file a motion for review of the trial court's order granting that motion. Held that F's appeal was moot and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed; because F failed to seek review of the court's order terminating the appellate stay, the judicial sale became final, and title vested in the plaintiff and F's right of redemption was extinguished. Argued May 11—officially released August 3, 2021

The defendant attorney appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court reprimanding him for violations of the rules of practice and the Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with misconduct involv- ing his IOLTA account. The plaintiff, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, filed a presentment alleging the misconduct after a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee found that there was probable cause that the defendant had violated various provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the rules of practice. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the presentment complaint on the grounds that it was untimely because the reviewing committee took more than ninety days to render its final written decision, in contravention of the applicable statute (§ 51-90g (c)) and rule of practice (§ 2-35 (i)), and because the reviewing committee had considered allegations of misconduct beyond the scope of its probable cause determination. Held: 1. The trial court did not err when it refused to dismiss the presentment complaint due to the reviewing committee's failure to issue a final written decision within ninety days of its determination of probable cause; the failure of the reviewing committee to abide by the time frames established in § 51-90g (c) and Practice Book § 2-35 (i) did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the disciplinary action, as § 51-90g (c) and Practice Book § 2-35 (m) provide that the reviewing committee's untimeliness did not require dismissal of the presentment complaint. 2. The trial court did nor err when it refused to dismiss the presentment complaint because the reviewing committee considered allegations out- side the scope of its probable cause determination; the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-35 (d) (1)) expressly provides that the disciplinary coun- sel may add additional allegations of misconduct before the reviewing committee holds a hearing on the alleged misconduct. Argued May 25—officially released August 3, 2021

The plaintiff school district sought to recover damages from the defendant for breach of contract relating to the defendant's allegedly defective work in repairing a set of concrete stairs on the plaintiff's campus. Following the defendant's completion of its contract, the concrete of the stairs experienced significant cracking, and the plaintiff was required to hire a separate contractor, R Co., to replace the stairs. The stairs replaced by R Co. also complied with applicable building code regula- tions, which the stairs repaired by the defendant had not. The trial court found that the plaintiff could not prevail on its breach of contract claim on the basis of the building code violations, as the contract did not call for compliance with the code, but that the defendant did breach the contract on the basis of its unworkmanlike performance in the construc- tion of the stairs. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded damages, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in concluding that the defendant breached the contract by virtue of its unworkmanlike performance: this case fell within the recognized exception to the general rule requiring expert testimony in cases alleging a breach of the implied duty to perform in a workmanlike manner, as the court did not require expert testimony to conclude that the cracks in the concrete were caused by the defendant's defective work, there was evidence presented showing that there were plain and obvious defects in the concrete, the defendant was the only party responsible for replacing the stairs, including the choice and instal- lation of the concrete, cracks began to appear less than six months after the work was completed, the cracks were significant in degree, and the defendant presented no evidence that the cracks were caused by some significant impact; moreover, the defendant's claim that the cracking could have been caused by a snowplow or other significant impact was speculative, unsupported by admissible evidence, and inconsistent with the evidence of cracking that continued to occur throughout the winter and after the defendant had performed repair work. 2. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly calculated damages because the plaintiff failed to prove that the defen- dant's breach of contract required the stairs to be replaced instead of repaired; the trial court's conclusion that the cracking in the concrete required the stairs to be replaced was not clearly erroneous, as the court's finding that both the cracking concrete and the code violations independently required the stairs to be replaced was supported by evi- dence in the record, which showed that there was substantial cracking in the concrete, which was not resolved by the defendant's subsequent repair work, and the defendant conceded that it was liable for any damages stemming specifically from defects in the concrete. Argued April 15—officially released August 3, 2021

Convicted of the crime of sexual assault in the second degree after a trial to the court, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel by allowing him to represent himself and thereafter abused its discretion by failing to order a competency hearing or to appoint counsel for him. The defendant had been represented by three public defenders during pretrial proceedings before two different trial judges in the several months prior to trial, when he sought to dismiss the public defenders and to represent himself. After the defendant rejected the state's offer of a plea agreement, the court canvassed him regarding his request to represent himself, and found that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and was qualified to represent himself. None of the public defenders at any time during those proceed- ings expressed concerns to the court about the defendant's competence to stand trial or indicated that he suffered from a mental illness or incapacitation. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defen- dant was competent to represent himself and that he made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel: a. The record supported the court's finding that the defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself, as he had expressed his desire to represent himself on two occasions before different judges prior to being allowed to represent himself, he was consistently able to articulate logical reasons for that desire, his responses to the court during its canvass of him showed that he compre- hended the disadvantages and dangers of representing himself, and he indicated that he understood the elements of the crime with which he was charged and the range of penalties associated with a conviction. b. Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the court's canvass of him provided sufficient information to determine whether he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, as the record was devoid of facts that should have given rise to any specific concerns in the court's mind: the court determined that the defendant had the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of his decision to represent himself, it made him aware of the penalties to which he was exposed and the great dangers in self-representation, such as making self-incriminating statements at trial, and its questions demonstrated that he understood that he would be responsible for filing motions, legal research, selecting a jury, and complying with the rules of evidence and criminal procedure; moreover, although the court did not explicitly advise the defendant of the statutory maximum and mandatory minimum sentences he faced, his statements to the court and discussions with the state regarding the plea offer sufficiently demonstrated that he was aware of the prison time to which he was exposed if convicted, and, contrary to his unsupported assertion, the court was not required to advise him that he would need to register as a sex offender if he were convicted or to ask him or his counsel if he had any mental health issues; furthermore, the defendant's education level and lack of experience as a self-represented litigant did not necessarily mean that his election to represent himself was not intelligently made, as his responses to the court about his educational background, whether he had a history of representing himself and his awareness of the requirements of self- representation suggested that he understood those obligations. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that, because his postcanvass conduct constituted substantial evidence of mental impairment, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order a competency hearing or to appoint counsel for him after it granted his request to represent himself: the record reflected that the defendant interacted intelligently with the court, as he advanced arguments in support of his defense and actively participated in the trial, at no point after its canvass of him did the court express concerns about his compe- tence, his actions after the state rested its case demonstrated a basic understanding of the judicial process and a trial strategy for creating reasonable doubt about the veracity of the allegations against him, and, even if some of his arguments at trial were not well grounded in the law and his representation lacked the hallmarks of an attorney skilled in the practice of law, the defendant showed that he had a rational understanding of the proceedings by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that was before the court. Argued January 7—officially released August 3, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the alleged medical malpractice of the defendants, a radiology practice and a physician, claiming that they were negligent in failing to timely diagnose a malignancy in her left breast, resulting in a delay in the diagnosis and treatment of her cancer. At trial, the plaintiff sought to offer the testimony of G, a radiolo- gist, regarding the proper standard of care, and the testimony of L, a radiology oncologist who treated the plaintiff. The defendants' counsel objected to the form of certain questions posed to G by the plaintiff's counsel, many of which the trial court sustained, and the trial court imposed a time limitation on the length of the plaintiff's direct examina- tion of L. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and the court rendered judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the objections of the defendants' counsel to the form of certain questions that were posed by her counsel to G because the court's evidentiary rulings were harmless; although the court did sustain objections to certain questions asked by the plaintiff's counsel concerning the standard of care and whether the defendants had breached that standard, the trial transcripts reflected that G testified to those matters later in the proceedings. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by placing a time limit on the presentation of L's testimony, the plaintiff having failed to preserve her claim; the plaintiff raised no objection to the court over the time limit imposed and did not identify any evidence that she was unable to elicit from L due to the time limit. 3. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the time limit constituted a denial of her right of access to the courts and violated article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution, the plaintiff having failed to adequately brief her unpreserved claim; the plaintiff's brief contained no analysis as to why her unpreserved claim should be reviewed pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) or any substantive analysis as to why the time limit constituted a constitutional violation. Argued April 14—officially released August 10, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant T, who had agreed to indemnify the plaintiff from certain liability, following T's alleged default on that indemnification agreement. After T's death, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to substitute R, the trustee of a trust to which T had transferred certain real property, as a defendant. The plaintiff then filed an amended two count complaint, alleging in one count that T had breached the indemnification contract with the plaintiff and, in the second count, that R, as trustee, had fraudulently accepted the conveyance of the real property to the trust, knowing that T was indebted to the plaintiff. The court defaulted R for failure to appear and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him damages. The court thereafter denied R's motion to dismiss the action on the basis that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and R appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly denied R's motion to dismiss, as it had personal jurisdiction over R; although the court cited R into the case pursuant to the plaintiff's motion to substitute the defendant, that motion was effectively a motion to add R as a new and separate party under the theory of liability that R was a fraudulent transferee of T's assets, as the motion identified R by name and in his capacity as trustee and alleged that the trust received assets from T in order to place those assets beyond the plaintiff's reach, and the operative complaint, with which R was served, did not seek to recover from R for breach of the underlying indemnification agreement but alleged only that R was liable as a fraudulent transferee. Argued April 7—officially released August 10, 2021

The plaintiff sought equitable distribution of certain real property containing residential and equestrian buildings that she and the defendant owned as tenants in common and payment of just compensation for her undi- vided 25 percent minimal interest in the property. The parties entered into an oral stipulation before the trial court but were unable to agree on the fair market value of the property. Both parties presented expert testimony to the court from real estate appraisers. The court agreed with the defendant's expert appraiser, determined the fair market value to be $1,110,000 and issued certain orders regarding payment to the plaintiff for her undivided minimal interest. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court committed plain error and made clearly erroneous findings of fact in regard to the highest and best use of the property. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court committed plain error when it determined the highest and best use of the property without reviewing applicable zoning regulations because she did not meet either prong of the plain error doctrine: the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the trial court made a plain and obvious error that affected the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings, as the parties stipulated that the plaintiff had only a minimal interest in the property and that a partition in kind or by sale would not better serve their interests, the hearing before the court was for the sole purpose of having it determine the fair market value of the property, no evidence was submitted to the court regarding the possibility of obtaining any zoning variance and the court did not conclude that the current use of the property would not be permitted to continue, such that the court's determination of the highest and best use and fair market value of the property did not require the review of applicable zoning regulations; moreover, the plaintiff did not establish that the failure to grant relief would have resulted in a manifest injustice. 2. The trial court's determination that the highest and best use of the prop- erty, a residential use augmented by a supporting equestrian facility that had limited commercial viability, was not clearly erroneous: the court considered the testimony and written reports of both the plaintiff's and the defendant's appraisers, and concluded that the comparable sales offered by the defendant's appraiser were more similar to the subject property in size and location than those offered by the plaintiff's appraiser; moreover, the value determined by the plaintiff's appraiser was based in part on a price per horse stall method that included twenty- three stalls, but the evidence at trial supported the court's finding that only thirteen or fourteen stalls on the property were potentially func- tional; furthermore, the only evidence of income generated from the property was from residential rent and rent for two horse stalls, and the court considered the testimony from a witness offered by the defen- dant that the marketing of the property as a commercial equestrian facility was not successful. Argued April 13—officially released August 10, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and unlawful restraint in the first degree in connection with the beating of the victim, who was the mother of his four minor children, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant had dragged the victim by her hair down stairs into the basement of their home, where he kicked, punched and choked her on three consecutive nights while the children, who ranged in age from fifteen months to thirteen years, were alone on the upper floors of the home. After the defendant left the house on the third day, the victim was brought to a medical center, where staff members observed bruising on her scalp, face, chest, back, legs, arms and left side. The victim also was determined to have had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, a broken rib and fluid in her pelvic region. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state failed to prove that he caused the victim serious physical injury and, thus, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the first degree: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant caused the victim to suffer either serious disfigurement or a serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ and, thus, a serious physical injury, as the victim and C, a medical center staff member, testified consistently with one another as to the extensive bruising that covered much of the victim's body, the noticeable injuries to her head and face, and that the victim had lost consciousness during one of the defendant's beatings of her, which the jury was free to credit or to disregard; moreover, C testified that the bruising was literally every- where on the body of the victim, who had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, and a police officer who took the victim's statement at the medical center saw that she was missing hair and had a swollen face and a bloodshot eye. 2. The defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of risk of injury to a child was unavailing; the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant put the children at risk of impair- ment of their health or morals, as the children had no access to parental care during the three nights when he beat the victim in the basement and did not permit her to leave the basement until the morning, the jury was free to credit a psychologist's testimony that the children may have been traumatized as a result of having observed the extensive physical injuries to the victim, and the state did not have to prove actual harm to the children, as the defendant was charged under the portion of the risk of injury statute (§ 53-21 (a) (1)) that required that he have the general intent to perform an act that created a situation that put the children's health and morals at risk of impairment. 3. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree, as the defendant's intent to unlaw- fully restrain the victim was independent from his intent to assault her: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant evinced an intent to restrict the victim's liberty to move freely within the house when he seized her by her hair and dragged her into the basement and separately could have reasonably found that he evinced an extreme indifference to human life on the basis of his independent acts of kicking, punching and choking the victim in the basement for three consecutive nights; moreover, the jury reasonably could have found that the defen- dant's act of dragging the victim down a full flight of stairs by her hair subjected her to a substantial risk of injury, as it presented a real or considerable opportunity for her to have suffered an impairment to her physical condition or to have suffered pain. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior misconduct evidence pertaining to two other incidents in which the defendant was alleged to have assaulted the victim, as that evidence was relevant to the charges of unlawful restraint and tampering with a witness, and its probative value was not outweighed by its prejudicial impact: the prior misconduct evidence was relevant to and probative of the defendant's intent to restrain the victim and to tamper with a statement she had given to the police, as both unlawful restraint in the first degree and tampering with a witness are specific intent crimes, and the prior miscon- duct evidence was not likely to arouse the jurors' emotions and sympathy toward the victim, and was not distracting in terms of its severity and the amount of time and focus that it involved; moreover, the two incidents of prior misconduct did not involve gruesome details, facts or photographs, whereas the crimes of which the defendant was convicted involved conduct and injuries that were substantially more gruesome in nature, and the court provided a limiting instruction to the jury on the first day of evidence, coincident with the admission of the prior misconduct evidence, which restricted the parameters of the state's use of the evi- dence to limit its prejudicial effect. Considered April 1—officially released August 10, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of felony murder and burglary in the first degree, sought a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent Commissioner of Correction filed a request for an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. Following a hearing, at which the petitioner raised for the first time a claim of actual innocence based on purported newly discovered DNA evidence, the habeas court dismissed the third habeas petition as untimely pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (d) and (e)), con- cluding that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay in filing the petition three years after the October 1, 2014 deadline. Thereafter, the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's third habeas petition pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e), the petitioner having failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption that he lacked good cause for filing his petition beyond the statutory deadline; contrary to the petitioner's contention, the petitioner's assertion of a claim of actual innocence and reference to new evidence for the first time at the show cause hearing were not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the delay in filing the petition was without good cause, as they were irrelevant to the habeas court's determination of good cause, the petition having contained only a claim of ineffective assistance of coun- sel. Argued May 25—officially released August 10, 2021

The defendant employer G Co. appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner concluding that G Co.'s workers' compensation insurance policy, issued by the defendant L Co., was still in effect on March 1, 2016, the date on which the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury while at work. In September, 2015, L Co. issued G Co. a workers' compensation insurance policy. In October, 2015, L Co. issued a cancellation notice with an effective cancellation date of Novem- ber 3, 2015, and filed the cancellation notice with the National Council on Compensation Insurance. In February, 2016, L Co. sent G Co. an endorsement to the insurance policy. In April, 2016, G Co. was sent a prorated portion of its previously paid premium. The plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim against G Co. in May, 2016, and L Co. denied coverage. After a hearing, the commissioner found that coverage was in place on the date of the plaintiff's injury and that the cancellation notice did not comply with certain statutory (§ 31-321) requirements. L Co. appealed to the board, which reversed the commissioner's decision. Held that the board properly determined that the insurance policy was cancelled effectively on November 3, 2015, and that there was no insur- ance coverage on the date of the plaintiff's injury: L Co.'s electronic notice of the cancellation to NCCI was sufficient to comply with the requirements that insurance companies notify the chairman of the Work- ers' Compensation Commission of cancellations pursuant to statute (§ 31-248), as § 31-248 authorized the commission to utilize NCCI to collect notices electronically of policy cancellations and was what the legislature intended when it amended § 31-248; moreover, the fact that G Co. may have believed that it still had insurance because L Co. did not refund the premium until after the date of the plaintiff's injury and sent inconsistent letters stating that the policy may be cancelled if it did not receive certain information, did not support a conclusion that the coverage under the policy continued notwithstanding the cancellation notice, as an employer's belief or understanding as to when coverage is terminated is irrelevant, and the fact that an endorsement was issued in February, 2016, was not inherently inconsistent with the termination of coverage as of November 3, 2015, because coverage remained in effect for any claims that may arise for injuries occurring prior to November 3, 2015. Argued April 19—officially released August 10, 2021

Convicted of the crime of criminal mischief in the first degree in connection with a property dispute with his neighbor, C, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he had no reasonable ground to believe that he had a right to remove certain trees C had planted on C's land. The defendant claimed to enjoy deeded easement rights to the land in question. C planted a number of trees, some of which were located along the border of the land subject to the easement, and the defendant, following advice from attorneys, subsequently dug up the trees along the border. The state charged the defendant with criminal mischief in the first degree for intentionally causing damage in excess of $1500 to C's tangible property without a reasonable ground to believe he had the right to do so. Held: 1. The trial court's finding that the trees were beyond the easement area was clearly erroneous; there was insufficient evidence in the record to establish the precise location of the easement area or the location of the trees in relation thereto, as none of the maps admitted into evidence established where the deeded easement actually ended or depicted the location of the trees, the witness testimony was imprecise and inade- quate to support the court's finding, and there was no expert testimony presented on the topic of the location of the easement area or the trees. 2. The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of criminal mischief in the first degree: the trial court failed to recognized the defendant's right under Connecticut easement law to remove the obstructing trees from his right-of-way without first seeking judicial intervention; moreover, because the court failed to recognize the defendant's right, it erred in finding that it was not credible that an attorney would advise his client that the client was entitled to remove property that was blocking access to a right-of-way granted in an ease- ment, and, as a result, improperly concluded that, as a matter of law, the defendant could not have had a reasonable ground to believe that he had the right to remove the trees from the easement area; accordingly, a judgment of acquittal was directed. Argued February 18—officially released August 17, 2021

Convicted, following a plea of guilty, of the crimes of sexual assault in the second degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The fourteen year old victim of the sexual assault indicated in a forensic interview that she and the defendant had engaged in two sexual encounters and, subsequently, she became pregnant. The victim delivered the child and arrangements were made for her sister to adopt the child. Under the plea agreement, the defendant's sentence included a condition of probation that he would not contest or interfere with the adoption of the child conceived by the sexual assault. The defendant claimed that the condition of probation at issue violated his constitutional rights and that the condition exceeded the court's authority. The court denied the defendant's motion, finding that the provisions of the applicable statute (§ 53a-30) were not exhaustive and that, given the severity of the offense, the condition was bargained for and was reasonable. Following oral argument before this court, this court ordered the trial court to resolve certain factual issues that were not clear from the record, and, after a hearing, the trial court found that the defendant's parental rights had been terminated by the Probate Court, the defendant's appeal of that decision had been dismissed, and the child had been adopted by order of the Probate Court. Held that because the defendant's parental rights had been terminated and the child had been adopted, the appeal was moot: the provisions of the applicable statute (§ 45a-719) concerning a motion to open or set aside a judgment terminating parental rights make clear that the court may not grant such a motion, if, prior to the filing of such a motion, a final decree of adoption has been issued; moreover, with respect to the adoption of the child, even if an avenue to challenge the adoption existed, the defendant would lack standing to pursue it, and, accordingly, this court could not grant the defendant any practical relief. Argued April 12—officially released August 17, 2021

The plaintiffs, N and the trust of which N was the sole trustee, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Energy and Environ- mental Protection denying N's application for a permit to maintain fences on certain real property owned by the trust adjacent to Long Island Sound and ordering that the fences be removed. N had installed the fences, without the required permit from the defendant, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, in part to deter public access to the area waterward of the mean high waterline in front of the property. The property on the waterward side is public land held in trust by the state. The department thereafter issued to N a notice of violation, informing him that the fences were unauthorized and ordered him to remove them. After a hearing, a department hearing officer issued a decision recommending that N's permit application be denied. The com- missioner adopted the hearing officer's decision and issued a final deci- sion affirming the denial of the permit application and directing the hearing officer to finalize the removal order. The trial court concluded, inter alia, that the record contained substantial evidence to support the commissioner's determination that the fences were constructed on public land to deter public access to that land, and that the commission- er's decision and removal order were not unreasonable, arbitrary, capri- cious, illegal or an abuse of discretion. Held that upon this court's review of the record, and the briefs and arguments of the parties, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a proper state- ment of the facts and the applicable law on the issues. Argued May 18—officially released August 17, 2021

Convicted of various crimes in connection with her actions while attempting to pick up her child from day care while allegedly under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant testified on her own behalf at trial. During cross-examina- tion, the prosecutor asked the defendant whether she had an interest in the outcome of the trial and implied that the defendant had the opportunity to tailor her testimony by taking the stand after observing the testimony of all of the other witnesses. Additionally, during the rebuttal portion of her closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the defendant was the only witness who had the opportunity to hear the testimony of the other witnesses prior to giving her own testimony, that she had a vested interest in the outcome of the case, and that the jurors could consider that interest in their decision-making process. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the prosecutor's questioning and argument constituted generic tailoring, which violated her right to con- frontation and her right to testify on her own behalf under both the state and federal constitutions. Held: 1. The defendant failed to prove her unpreserved claim that the prosecutor violated her state constitutional rights to confront witnesses against her and to testify on her own behalf: although the state's tailoring questions and argument were generic because they were not tied to evidence that specifically gave rise to an inference of tailoring and instead focused on the defendant's presence in the courtroom, her ability to observe the proceedings, and her interest in the outcome of the trial, the defen- dant failed to prove that the state constitution offered greater protection than the federal constitution and, accordingly, failed to establish a consti- tutional violation under State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672), as the language of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution was virtually identical to that of the sixth amendment to the federal constitution, Connecticut's early recognition of a defendant's right to testify provided no insight as to whether the state historically viewed generic tailoring as improper, most of the cases that the defendant claimed were persuasive precedent from other states relied on the supervisory authority of the courts and on public policy to prohibit generic tailoring arguments or questions rather than on their state constitutions, the United States Supreme Court in Portuondo v. Agard (529 U.S. 61) held that generic tailoring arguments did not violate the federal constitution, Connecticut precedent after Portuondo did not demonstrate that the state courts considered generic tailoring arguments to raise state constitutional issues, and the defen- dant's argument that public policy considerations required a conclusion that generic tailoring arguments violated the state constitution was not compelling. 2. The prosecutor did not deny the defendant her due process of law under either the federal or state constitutions: the defendant's claim was unpre- served and it failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233); moreover, our Supreme Court in State v. Medrano (308 Conn. 604) held that a trial court's instruction that a jury could consider the defendant's interest in the outcome of the case did not implicate the defendant's right to due process, and the defendant in this case failed to demonstrate that a prosecutor's similar argument could have more of an impact on her due process rights than a court's jury instruction. 3. The prosecutor did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial when she argued that the defendant had tailored her testimony and that she had a motive to lie: the defendant failed to establish a claim of prosecutorial impropriety because she failed to prove that the prosecutor's argument and questions infringed on her constitutional rights. 4. This court declined to employ its supervisory authority over the adminis- tration of justice to expand the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Medrano (308 Conn. 604) to prohibit a prosecutor from making argu- ments about the defendant's interest in the outcome of his or her criminal trial, the defendant having failed to persuade this court that such argu- ment merits the exercise of that authority. 5. Although the defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the prosecu- tor's generic tailoring questions and comments did not affect the fairness of her trial, this court exercised its supervisory authority over the admin- istration of justice to prohibit prosecutors from employing generic tai- loring arguments in future criminal cases: this court determined that generic tailoring arguments should be prohibited because they were likely to implicate the perceived fairness of the judicial system and could give rise to a danger of juror misunderstanding; accordingly, this court held that, prior to asking tailoring questions or before making such comments in closing arguments in the future, a prosecutor must inform the trial court and the defendant of her intention to do so and, if the defendant objects, the trial court must determine that the prosecu- tor's questions or argument are specific before allowing the state to pro- ceed. 6. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that her conviction of attempt to commit risk of injury to a child should be vacated because the crime was cognizable: our Supreme Court determined in State v. Sorabella (277 Conn. 155) that attempt to commit risk of injury to a child was a cognizable offense and this court was bound by that decision. Argued January 5—officially released August 24, 2021

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property that was jointly owned by the defendants, C and D, who were domestic partners. The plaintiff purchased a line of credit that had been extended to C's business, W Co., and guaranteed by C. After the plaintiff brought a collections action against W Co. and C for nonpayment, the plaintiff, W Co., C and D entered into a settlement agreement in which, inter alia, the plaintiff agreed to forbear litigation and reduce the total amount of the indebtedness owed in exchange for W Co.'s and C's agreement to waive all defenses they had with respect to the agreement and to make regular payments on the debt. D guaranteed payment of the sums due under the settlement agreement on a nonrecourse basis, and C and D granted the plaintiff a mortgage against their respective interests in their residence to secure their obligations under the settlement agreement. After W Co. and C defaulted on their payment obligations, the plaintiff declared the entire outstanding balance immediately due and payable and brought a foreclosure action against the real property. C and D each pleaded separate special defenses. D claimed that she did not read the settlement agreement prior to executing the document and that she was not represented by counsel in connection with the same. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike C's special defenses but denied the plaintiff's motion with respect to D's special defenses. Follow- ing a bench trial, the trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff against C but determined that, with respect to D, the settlement agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The trial court explained that the settlement agreement was both proce- durally and substantively unconscionable as to D due to, inter alia, the rushed nature of the closing, her lack of business acumen, her unawareness of the terms of the agreement, a lack of consideration, and the overly harsh terms of the agreement. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court improperly concluded that the settlement agreement was procedurally and substantively unconsciona- ble as to D; the court's findings with respect to the contract formation process failed to support a legal conclusion of procedural unconsciona- bility because there was no language barrier between the parties, D had entered into a prior mortgage and, as a result, had some familiarity with mortgage documents, D's education level and business sophistication were immaterial, as she did not argue that the settlement agreement was ambiguous or exceedingly complicated and her surprise regarding the contract terms derived solely from her failure to read the agreement, and the court did not find that the plaintiff was responsible for any misconduct during the contract formation process, as it did not mislead or take advantage of D; moreover, the trial court's conclusion that the settlement agreement was substantively unconscionable because D did not receive any direct consideration in exchange for her agreement to mortgage her interest in her residence was clearly erroneous, as, even though D was not previously obligated to pay the debts of C or W Co., she received consideration for her guarantee because, if the settlement agreement had been honored, she would have avoided having to share title to her home with the plaintiff and she incurred the liability so that C could receive the direct benefit of forbearing litigation and reducing his total indebtedness; accordingly, the judgment with respect to D was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to render a judgment of strict foreclosure against D. Argued May 17—officially released August 24, 2021

Convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, the defendant appealed from the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant was charged with, inter alia, murder, and, at trial, the state presented evidence that the defendant and his accomplices each fired a gun at the victim. At the state's request, the judge charged the jury on all of the elements of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. At the hearing on the motion to correct, the defendant acknowledged that he was challenging his sentence solely on the basis of what he contended was an unconstitutional conviction of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant was attacking his conviction, not the sentence he received or the manner in which the sentence was imposed. On appeal, the defendant claimed that there was a colorable claim that his sentence on the underlying conviction of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm was illegally enhanced on the basis of a fact not found by the jury. Held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the defendant's motion to correct for lack of jurisdiction, as the defendant challenged what transpired at trial, not at sentencing, and his claim presupposed an invalid conviction; the jury was instructed on all of the elements of the offense for which the defendant was convicted and sentenced, including the element of using a firearm, and the jury, not the judge, found the defendant guilty of that offense; moreover, to the extent that the defendant argued that the court misled the jury or incorrectly accepted its verdict, his arguments attacked his underlying conviction, not his sentence, and despite the defendant's claim that the firearm element that enhanced his manslaughter conviction was never proven to the jury, the record sufficiently demonstrated that the state presented evidence that the defendant used a gun to shoot at the victim. Argued April 19—officially released August 24, 2021

The substitute plaintiffs, D and A, sought a declaratory judgment to deter- mine the rights and obligations of the parties under a certain insurance policy that had been issued to the plaintiff L Co., a wheelchair accessible van seller and van modifying company, by the defendant C Co. In an underlying personal injury action, D, a paraplegic confined to a motor- ized wheelchair, sought damages for injuries he sustained in connection with a confrontation with K, an employee of L Co. During an argument D had with K about modifications L Co. made to D and A's van, the confrontation turned physical when K slapped a baseball cap off D's head. When K saw that A, D's wife, had recorded the incident on her cell phone, he grabbed the phone from her and threatened in crude terms to break it. As D moved his wheelchair toward K in order to retrieve the cell phone, K grabbed D's arm and the wheelchair and altered its path, which caused D to fall from his wheelchair and sustain serious injuries. D and A settled an underlying personal injury action against L Co. and K by means of a stipulation for judgment. L Co. and K commenced an action against C Co. seeking a legal declaration that, under their insurance policy, C Co. had a duty to defend and indemnify them for the claims alleged in the personal injury action. As part of the stipulated settlement of the personal injury action, L Co. assigned its rights under the policy to D and A, and D and A were substituted as party plaintiffs. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by C Co. as to D and A's complaint and its counterclaim, from which D and A appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in holding that the exclusion provisions under the insurance policy pertaining to an assault or battery applied to D's and A's claims and that there was no coverage under the policy because D's injuries were not caused by an accident that resulted from garage operations, and properly determined that C Co. had no duty to provide a defense to L Co. pursuant to the exclusion provisions: the policy excluded claims for injuries that arose out of an assault or battery or both, and K's slapping D's baseball cap and grabbing A's cell phone and threatening to break it constituted actual harmful or offensive contact and verbal abuse from which D's injuries arose because if K had not escalated the verbal argument into verbal abuse and engaged in offensive contact with both D and A, D would not have moved his wheelchair in K's direction and K would not have had the opportunity to grab D or his wheelchair to divert D's path; accordingly, D's injuries grew out of, flowed from, had their origins in, and were connected with K's intentional acts, which by themselves, constituted an assault, battery, or assault and battery within the meaning of the policy. 2. The trial court did not improperly confine its analysis to the operative complaint and refuse to consider certain pieces of extrinsic evidence that allegedly supported C Co.'s duty to defend: at the time the court heard oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment, it stated that it had reviewed ''everything,'' and the documents at issue were attached to D and A's objection to the motion for summary judgment, and, without evidence to the contrary, this court concluded that the trial court reviewed those documents; moreover, even if the court had not reviewed the documents, they were insufficient to support D and A's claim that C Co. had a duty to defend, as there were no meaningful factual differences between the documents and the operative complaint. Argued April 5—officially released August 24, 2021