Volume 209 — Federal Reporter

Petition for Review from the District Court of the United -States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; J. Whitaker Thompson, Judge. In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of John E. Doyle & Son. Petition to review an order (205 Fed. 543)' denying an application of the trustee to compel the bankrupts to join in an application by a purchaser for a renewal of the bankrupts' liquor license.

Day, Judge. Action by August Mehnke against the McMyler Manufacturing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Melmke, a citizen of Russia, brought this action, in the District Court, against an Ohio corporation, to recover damages caused by injury received while he was working as a machinist in defendant’s shop.

McCall, Judge. Action at law by Mrs. P. E. Judge against the Pullman Company and the Illinois Central Railroad Company. From an order sustaining demurrers by each defendant, plaintiff brings error.

In Frror to and on Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the First Division of the Northern District of California; M. T. Dooling, Judge. Writs of error by David C. Norcross and the Western Fuel Company to review a judgment adjudging said Norcross guilty of contempt, for disobedience of a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to produce books of the fuel company before the grand jury.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; James M. Morton, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by Frederick McNeight against the New England Newspaper Publishing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Joseph Cross, District Judge.</p> <p>Action by Sarah Ann Strough, as administratrix of the estate of Edwin William Strough, deceased, against the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>Master and Servant (§ 13*)—Eisht-Hour Law—“Public Work oe United States.”</p> <p>A lock and dam across a navigable stream, constructed under a contract with the United States authorized by act of Congress, and .the title to which is in the United States, although the contractor receives in payment the privilege of using the surplus water for the generating of electric power for the term of 99 years, subject to the condition that such use shall not interfere with navigation, is “a public work of the United States,” within the meaning of Eight-Hour Law Aug. 1, 1892, c. 352, § 1, 27 Stat. 340 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2521), prohibiting a contractor for such work from requiring or permitting any laborer or mechanic employed thereon to work more than eight hours in 'any calendar day, except in ease of extraordinary emergency.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. § 13.*]</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p> <p>Action at law by T. W. Nunnemaker against the Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Teade-Marks and Trade-Names (§ 44*)—Registration—Prior Use.</p> <p>Id a suit to restrain infringement of a trade-mark consisting of tbe word “Ideal,” as applied to brushes, evidence held to warrant a finding that the word was used and understood in the United States as indicating brushes sold by complainant H. and bis predecessors, and not brushes made exclusively by P. in England, and that an application for registration of the word as a trade-mark, accompanied by a declaration that it had been used by H. for ten years in his business, was properly granted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other eases, see .Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. §§ 50-52; Dec. Dig. § 44.*]</p> <p>2. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names (§ 3*)—Prior Use—Descriptive Word.</p> <p>Where the word “Ideal,” as applied to brushes, had been uked by H. in his business for ten years prior to the passage of Trade-Mark Act (Act Feb. 20, 1905, c. 592, 33 Stat. 724 [U. S. Comp. 'St. Supp. 1911, p. 1459]), he was entitled to have the same registered as a trade-mark without reference to whether it was descriptive.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. §§ 4r-7; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]</p> <p>3. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names (§ 45*)—Registration—Certificate.</p> <p>Certificate of registration of a trade-mark is sufficient prima facie evidence of compliance with all the regulations enacted therefor, and the burden of showing noneompliance is on bim wbo asserts it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.-—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. §§ 53, 59; Dec. Dig. § 45.*]</p> <p>4. Teade-Marks and Trade-Names (§ 21*)—Words Subject to Appropriation-—Specific or Generic Name.</p> <p>Where the word “Ideal,” as applied to brushes, was registered as a trade-mark in the Untied States by complainants, and such word had been applied by complainants only to a hairbrush of a particular shape. and grade sold by complainant H. and his predecessors, the fact that such word had been applied to a patented brush in England, and that the brush sold by H. and his predecessors under such name had the features of the patented brush, was insufficient to show that the name had acquired a generic meaning to represent the patented article so as to deprive complainants of the right to register the same as a trade-mark.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Gent. Dig. § 24; Dec. Dig. § 21.*]</p>

<p>Criminal Law (§ 1192*)—Appeal—Reversal—New Trial—Consent.</p> <p>Where a judgment against accused, was reversed on writ of error for invalidity of the sentence imposed, and a mandate issued directing the court to impose a proper sentence, but pending this the Department of Justice, believing that the conviction was based on perjured testimony, instructed the district attorney not to oppose efforts to obtain a new trial, which was thereupon granted, the government thereby waived its right to a sentence pursuant to the mandate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3231-3240, 3243; Dec. Dig. § 1192.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Northern District of Ohio; John M. Killits, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of Richard G. Kerlin, alleged bankrupt. From orders adjudging Kerlin bankrupt, appeal is taken.</p>

Pollock, Judge. Claims by the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company and by Robert A. Stanley and another, doing business as the Stanley Coal Company, against the City Trust Company, as receiver of the Sedalia Light & Traction Company, and others, to obtain an equitable preference over the lien of prior mortgage bondholders. From orders denying such relief, claimants appeal.

D. Day, Judge. Suits in admiralty by the Rutland Transit Company, by the President and Directors of the Insurance Company of North America, and by C. M. Holmes against the U. P. & J. A. Smith Company. Decree for respondents, and libelants appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Action by Jules Ami Cristin and another against Charles R. Leonard. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee; Edward T. Sanford, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by J. B. Craig, administrator of Eva and May Craig, against the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Patents (§ 328*)—Invention—Gem Setting.</p> <p>The Lawson patent, No. 983,295, for an improved gem setting, held void for lack of patentable invention in view of the prior art. Consolidated Electric Company v. Holtzer, 67 Fed. 907, 15 C. C. A. 63, applied.</p>

In Equity, Suit by Acton Davies against Edward J. Bowes for infringement of a copyright. On final hearing. For purposes of argument, the following assumptions of fact are made: They are in accord with the contentions of complainant and are therefore most favorable to him. If, however, decision were put upon other points, some further investigation of the facts would be necessary. In June, 1908, Davies was in the employment of a newspaper, the Evening Sun.

Petition of Harry K. Thaw for writ of habeas corpus. Statement of reasons for delay in hearing. Held: sir. Court: One moment. I do not think the history of the case is material except so far as it bears upon the question of process, if at all—upon the question whether the process under which he is now held here in New Hampshire is due process within the meaning of the federal Constitution.

In Equity. Suit by the Central of Georgia Railroad Company and by the Western Railway of Alabama against the Railroad Commission of Alabama to restrain the enforcement of a 2%-cent passenger rate for intrastate traffic. Application for temporary injunction.

<p>Bankruptcy (§ 345*)—Provable Claims—Fraudulent Acts of Creditors.</p> <p>Claimants, who organized and were the only stockholders and officers of bankrupt corporation, also held its notes to themselves. After it had become indebted to others, they fraudulently caused substantially all of its property to be transferred to a second corporation, making it appear by means of false recitals in the minutes of stockholders’ and trustees’ meetings that the transfer was in payment of their own notes, when in fact it was without consideration and they had not parted with the notes. Other creditors having brought suit against the bankrupt, claimants, and the second corporation and obtained a receivership, as the result of a settlement the property was transferred back. After the bankruptcy claimants sought to prove their notes against the estate. Held that, while there was not such evidence of their being fraudulent in their origin as to warrant their disallowance entirely in view of the fraudulent action of claimants in so transferring the property that neither they nor the bankrupt could have recovered it, their claims would be postponed to those of all other creditors, in so far as the property transferred and its proceeds are concerned.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 531, 532, 534, 539, 540; Dec. Dig. § 345.*]</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against F. M. Smith. Application by the bankrupt for liquidation of the claims of petitioning creditors before answer.

<p>Master and Servant (§ 250% New, vol. 16 Key-No. Series)—Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act—Construction.</p> <p>Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act, Laws Wash. 1911, c. 74, § 4, requires employers to pay to the state, to create an accident fund, a percentage of wages paid, such payments to be made in advance, based on past pay rolls, and to be adjusted at the end of each year on the basis of tbe actual pay roll for that year. It further provides that any shortage on such an adjustment shall be made good before February 1st following, and, by section 8, that if any workman shall be injured while the employer is in default for any payment and after demand for the same, the employer shall not be entitled to the benefits of the act, but the 'workman shall have a right of action. The commission created is empowered to make regulations for the administration of the act. An employer was notified on February 2Sth of a shortage due on its adjustment, with a demand for payment within 30 days. A workman was injured during that time, and before the payment had been made, but it was afterward made during the time. Held, that the demand was presumably in accordance with the regulations of the commission, and did not become effective until the expiration of the 30 days, and that on payment within that time the employer was entitled to the benefit of tbe act, and the injured workman could not maintain an action in the courts.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by R. J. Darnell against George R. Edwards and others, composing the Railroad Commission of Mississippi. On motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by P. B. Moss against Richard W. Goodhart. On motion to dismiss for want of facts.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by George L. Justice against the Empire State Surety Company. On motion for new trial.</p>

At Daw. Action by the H. F. Pogue Distillery Company against the Paxton Brothers Company and another. On special and general demurrers of the Paxton Brothers Company to plaintiff’s amended petition.

<p>Shipping (§ 122*)—Loss of Cargo—Liability of Vessel-^Negligent Loading.</p> <p>A steamship held liable for the loss of a piece of machinery weighing 4,200 pounds which fell into the sea while being taken on board from a lighter by employés of the vessel by reason of the cutting of the ropes forming the sling by which it was being hoisted, on the sharp edge of a plate on the vessel; no adequate precautions having been taken to prevent such an occurrence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 452, 453, 456, 457; Dee. Dig. § 122.*]</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit for salvage by Oskar Johansen and others against the steamer Roanoke and others.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In'the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of Jacob Yungbluth and August W. Schafer, copartners doing business as Bank of Hamilton, Jacob Yungbluth & Co., Proprietors, etc. _ On petition to review a referee’s order denying the preference to William Tiede, as claimant.

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Mitchell Kennerley. On demurrer to indictment.</p> <p>Demurrer to an indictment found under section 211 of the Criminal Code against the publisher of a book, entitled “Hagar Revelly,” alleged to be obscene. The book is a novel of manners presenting the life of a young woman in New York compelled to earn her living. She is represented as impulsive, sensuous, fond of pleasure, and restive under the monotony and squalor of her surroundings. Her virtue is unsuccessfully assailed by a man she does not love and later successfully by one whom she does. After her seduction she has several amorous misadventures and ends with a loveless marriage and the prospect of a dreary future. In order to give complete portrayal to the girl’s emotional character, some of the scenes are depicted with a frankness and detail which have given rise to this prosecution.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by M. Savage and W. H. Warden against George S. Nixon and George AYingfield, copartners as Nixon & Wingfield. Judgment for plaintiffs.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of Charles E. Cotton and others, doing business as Cotton Bros. & Co. On petition to review a referee’s order directing that municijial corporations holding proceeds of certain contracts performed by the bankrupts pay over the same to the bankrupts’ trustee.

<p>Limitation of Actions (§ 127*)—Action fob Wrongful Death—Amendment of Statement of Claim.</p> <p>Under Act Pa. April 25, 1855 (P. L. 309), as amended by Act June 7, 1911 (P. L. 678), which gives a right of action for wrongful death to the husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased, successively and in the order named, but not jointly, but limits the time for bringing action to one year after‘the death, the causes of action of the three classes named are separate and distinct and require different proof as to damages, and under the law of the state as settled by decision a statement of claim in such an action, in which plaintiff is described as widow, cannot be amended after the expiration of the period of limitation to allege that plaintiff is the mother of deceased.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other ca'ses, see Limitation of Actions, Cent'. Dig. §§ 543-547; l)ec. Dig. § 127.*]</p>

<p>At Law. Action by Giovanna Alessandrelli against the Stroudsburg Hospital and Joseph P. Miller. On motion by plaintiff for leave to amend pleadings.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Carl Eaemmle Music Company and others against Joseph W. Stern and another doing business as Joseph W. Stern & Company. On motion to dismiss.bill.</p> <p>This is a motion to dismiss a bill in equity, and is therefore to be determined solely by the bill itself. The complainants are an Illinois corporation and four residents of New York, and both defendants are residents likewise of New York. The bill alleges that the individual complainants composed a song to which the corporation afterwards acquired title and upon which it secured a copyright; and afterwards the defendants brought an action against the individual complainant in the Supreme Court of the state of New York, to enjoin their use of this copyright. The defendants’ complaint in the state court alleged that the.complainant Solman was the author of the song; that he was under contract to convey it to the defendants, in whom the title was therefore vested; and that the complainant corporation, with knowledge of the defendants’ rights, had published and sold large numbers of copies. In the answer in the action in the state court the complainant corporation set up its copyright as a defense, to which the defendants successfully demurred. Afterwards the case was tried, and the complainant was again unsuccessful; the corporation being enjoined from publishing the work in question, and on appeal to the Appellate Division this decree was affirmed. Afterwards the defendants sued all the complainants at law for damages in publishing the said song, which action is still pending. The bill concludes with a prayer'of injunction against the prosecution of these suits in the state court.</p>

In Admiralty. Label by the United States Steel Products Company against the American steamer Windber, in which the Pacific American Fisheries, a corporation, filed claim. On exceptions to a portion of claimant’s answer demanding discovery of the amount of insurance carried by libelant on the goods in question and whether any portion thereof had been collected.

<p>Bankruptcy (§ 410*) — Discharge — Application — Time — "Next Twelve , Months.”</p> <p>Bankr. Act July 1,1898, c. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 550 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427), provides that any person, after tbe expiration of one month and within “the next twelve months” subsequent to being adjudged a bankrupt, may file an application for a discharge, which application may also be filed within, but not after the expiration of, the next six months. Seld, that the section creates three limitations of time, all subsequent to adjudication, the first one month thereafter, the second “the next twelve months” after the first, and the third the next six months after the second, so that the “next twelve months” begin to run, not from the date of the adjudication, but from the expiration of one month thereafter.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 694; Dec. Dig. § 410.*]</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of Chas. Griesheimer and another, as copartners doing business under the narhe and style of the Variety Store, and such persons individually. On petition for review of referee’s order allowing receiver’s fees.

<p>1. United States (§ 70*)—Contracts—Performance—-Available Funds— Duty of Contractor. '</p> <p>Where plaintiff, having a contract with the government for harbor excavation at a specified rate per cubic yard, was notified by government officers that there were only funds enough available to pay for 60,000 cubic yards, plaintiff was bound to heed the "fact, and could not bind the government by a larger excavation, but was equally entitled to excavate to the full extent specified under the directions of the government inspector and to pay for such amount.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see United States, Cent. Dig. § 53; Dec. Dig. § 70.*]</p> <p>2. United States (§ 74*)—Harbor Excavation—Nature and Character— Government’s Liability.</p> <p>Where plaintiff was directed by government inspectors to make harbor excavations at specified places under contract with the government to make excavations in the harbor at a specified rate per cubic yard, it was no defense to the government’s liability that an excavation made at a certain point was not within the contract, because the fill which rendered the work necessary was not a natural one, but was occasioned through the negligence of the city.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see United States, Cent. Dig. §'57; Dee. Dig. § 74.*]</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus. Suit by the United States, on relation of Dorothy Tremaine, against the Comissioner of Immigration at New York and the Secretary of Labor.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy (§ 269*)—Setting Aside Sale of Property by Trustee.</p> <p>A sale of property by a trustee set aside and a new sale ordered on conditions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 370; Dec. Dig. § 269.*]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Ben Bevy Company against Clara Tetlow, trading under the name of the Tetlow Manufacturing Company. On motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by the Christie Machine Works against the tug Elizabeth.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by the Crane Company against the ship Erskine M. Phelps. On exceptions to answer.</p>

<p>Shipping (§ 141*)—Damage to Cabgo—Liability oe Vessel.</p> <p>Under a bill of lading which exempts the vessel from liability for internal or other breakage or rust of metals, she cannot be held liable for damages to articles of hardware from breakage or rust, without proof that it resulted from negligence of the carrier.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 493, 497-499;. Dec. Dig. § 141.*]</p>

<p>In the matter of the petition for naturalization of George McPhee.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy (§ 413*)—Discharge—Sufficiency of Objections.</p> <p>Amended specifications of objection to tbe discharge of a bankrupt held insufficient, and a demurrer thereto .sustained without leave to amend.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 712-718, 725, 727; Dee. Dig. § 413.*]</p>

<p>Carriers (§ 320*)—Action for Injury to Passenger — Street Railroad — Questions for Jury.</p> <p>Plaintiff was a passenger on a street car of defendant, sitting next a window, and when a meeting car passed on the adjoining track his arm was struck and broken. There were three horizontal rods running across the front of the window. Several passengers in the car testified that plaintiff was resting his arm on the window sill, with his head on his hand, and that when the meeting car passed they heard a scraping sound along the side of their car. Held, that such evidence tended to show negligence on the part of defendant, and might raise a presumption of such negligence, which would shift the burden of proof, and should have gone to the jury, and that it was error to grant a compulsory nonsuit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1118, 1126, 1149, 1153, 1160, 1167, 1179, 1190, 1217, 1233, 1244, 1248, 1315-1325; Dee. Dig. § 320.*]</p>

In the matter of Augustus K. Stiger, trading as the Stiger Manufacturing Company, bankrupt. From an order denying their claim to the proceeds of bankrupt’s accounts receivable, D. C. Andrews &' Co. appeal.

McCall, Judge. Action by Viola Strait, for the use and benefit of herself and the other next of kin of Curtis Strait, deceased, against the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; J. Whitaker Thompson, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by Ernest C. Hunt against John S. Bush and Harry Terry, copartners trading as Bush & Terry. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>1. Trusts (§ 358*)—Following Trust Funds—Identification.</p> <p>A trust fund can be followed and recovered in equity only when it can be clearly traced and identified as some specific fund or property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. §§ 523, 553; Dec. Dig. § 358.*]</p> <p>Following trust property converted by trustee as dependent on its identification, see note to In re T. A. M’Intyre & Co., 108 C. C. A. 545.]</p> <p>2. Trusts (§ 358*)—Following Trust Funds—Assets—Preferred Lien.</p> <p>Claimant and a bankrupt agreed that the former should purchase and sell goods in the bankrupt’s name, he to receive 5 per cent, on the gross sales and all money collected by claimant and pay all bills for goods purchased. To protect the bankrupt from loss, claimant deposited $800 with him to be returned on termination of the agreement. This money was deposited by the bankrupt in a bank, and, about a week prior to the bankrupt’s failure, the balance of his deposit account amounting to $1,500 was paid to the bank to take up a note owing to it. Held that, since claimant’s deposit could not be traced into funds of the bankrupt that came into the possession of his trustee, claimant was not entitled to a lien on the bankrupt’s assets therefor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. §§ 523, 553; Dec. Dig. § 358.*]</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District bf Pennsylvania; J. Whitaker Thompson, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by George Hudson against the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Lewis, Wm. Tí. Pope, and John A. Riner, Judges. Suit in equity by Thomas R. Liddle against Clyde C. Cook and A. L. Cook. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals.

<p>CORPORATIONS (§ 121*)-SALE OS' STOCK—ACTION EOB BREACH—EVIDENCE CONSIDERED.</p> <p>A plaintiff held, on the evidence, entitled to recover on a contract by which defendant in part consideration for certain corporate stock purchased from plaintiff, agreed to pay one-half of any sum plaintiff might pay in settlement, in good faith, of a claimed lien on the stock, not exceeding a stated amount.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Cent Dig. §§ 504, 505; Dec. Dig. § 121.*]</p>

Pollock, Judge. Action at law by the Carson Lumber Company against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of Newbury & Dunham. From an order affirming the report of a Special Master sustaining exceptions to an application for the bankrupts’ discharge and denying the same, they appeal.

<p>1. Master and Servant (§ 286*)—Action for Injury to Servant—Questions for Jury.</p> <p>Where plaintiff, a miner employed in defendant’s coal mine, in obeying an order of the foreman, who under the state statute represented defendant, was obliged to stoop to pass under the roof timbers of a tunnel in which the foreman had bored a hole and placed therein a stick of dynamite with a fuse attached, had a lighted lamp in his cap, but was not warned of the presence of the dynamite until immediately before the explosion by which he was injured, it was a question for the jury whether, if the foreman had performed his duty by giving plaintiff timely warning of the danger, the injury would not have been prevented, although there was no direct evidence as to the cause of the explosion.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1001, 1006, 1008, 1010-1015, 1017-1033, 1036-1042, 1044, 1046-1050; Dee. Dig. § 286.*]</p> <p>2. Courts (§ 23*)—Federal Courts—Jurisdiction on Removal—Consent off Parties.</p> <p>Where a federal court has jurisdiction of a cause on removal by consent of> the parties, the act of the defendant in removing the cause and of the plaintiff in proceeding to trial without objection amounts to such consent and confers jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 75, 75%, 81; Dec. Dig. § 23.*]</p>

This cause comes here upon appeal fíom a decree of the District Court, Western District of New York, which held the respondent solely in fault for a collision between its steamer Princeton and libel-ant’s steamer Glidden. The collision took place in that part of the Detroit river, known as “Ballard’s Reef Channel.” The Princeton was overtaking, and passing the Glidden. The opinion of the District Judge will be found in 196 Fed. 65,

Proceeding by the United States to condemn certain premises at Ward’s Island for a light and fog signal station. From so much of an order granting complainant’s application for a .discontinuance of the proceeding as dismissed an order of condemnation on the United States making compensation for the property taken, the Lawrence Ward’s Island Realty Company brings error.

<p>Collision (§ 105*)—Steamer and Tow Meeting—Evidence oe Fault.</p> <p>A finding by a trial court, which heard the witnesses, that a libelant had failed to sustain allegations of fault against a steamship passing up New York Harbor to her dock, in the evening, for a collision with the tow of a tug passing down, affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Collision, Dec. Dig. § 105.*</p> <p>Collision with or between towing vessel and vessels in tow, see note to The John Englis, 100 C. C. A. 581.]</p>

<p>1. Trial (§ 67*)—Reception op Evidence—Order op Introduction.</p> <p>The admission of evidence on behalf of a plaintiff after he has rested and evidence has been introduced by the defendant is within the discretion of the trial court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 157; Dee. Dig. § 67.*]</p> <p>2. Trial (§ 62*)—Action por Causing Fire—Evidence.</p> <p>Where the evidence of defendant in an action against a railroad company to recover damages caused by a fire tended to show that its engines were all equipped with standard spark arresters, kept in order and well handled, further evidence tending to show that the fire was caused by one of three certain engines did not render inadmissible evidence in rebuttal to show the action and handling of another and different engine of defendant two days after the fire.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 148-150; Dec. Dig. § 62.*]</p>

<p>On motion for'reargument.</p>

<p>Appeal and Error (§ 99*)—Orders Reviewable—Discretion—Security for Attachment!—Increase.</p> <p>An order vacating an attachment, unless plaintiff increased, the existing security from $1,000 to $2,500, was in no sense -final, but purely discretionary, and not reviewable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 661-669; Dec. Dig. § 99.*]</p>

Suit in equity by Charles D. Barry, Frederick W. Lincoln, and John R. Bradlee; copartners trading under the name of Henry W. Peabody & Co., against the Harpoon Castor Manufacturing Company. Decree for defendant, and complainants appeal.

<p>1. Patents (§ 165*)—Infringement—Anticipation.</p> <p>Where the broader view of a claim is necessary to make out infringement, the proof of anticipation must be considered from the same point of view.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 241; Dec. Dig. § 165.*]</p> <p>.2. Patents (§ 165*)—Construction—Beading Limitation Into Claim.</p> <p>Where a patentee has made an iniprovement entitled to protection, and in the claim directed to that feature it is- described in terms which are capable of a broad construction, rendering the claim invalid in view of tlie prior art, or of a narrower construction which will preserve to it the validity which it should have had, the courts will give it that narrow construction and so sustain the patent; but where from the specification or history of the application or the language of the claim it is clear that the patentee intended to claim, and the Patent Office to grant, the broader monopoly, which turns out to he invalid, the courts will not, for the arbitrary purpose of saving the claim, read into it a limitation which it does not have.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Gent. Dig. § 241; Dee. Dig. § 165.*]</p> <p>3. Patents (§ 165*)—Construction—Differentiation of Claims.</p> <p>The propriety of the rule that proper construction and effect can be-given to each claim of a patent only by differentiating it from the other claims, in a normal ease where it can be clearly applied, is not affected by the fact that in many cases it is difficult to make such differentiation because of repetition and confusion.</p> <p>[Kd. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 241; Dec. Dig. § 165.*]</p> <p>4. Patents (§ 165*)—Construction—Differentiation of Claims.</p> <p>When satisfied that a particular claim had for its dominant purpose-to secure one particular feature, we should not construe it as specific also in its calls for other elements.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 241; Dec. Dig. § 165.*]</p> <p>5. Patents (§ 165*)—Claims—Construction.</p> <p>In construing a claim in that respect ambiguous, a given element should be implied, if its presence was necessary to distinguish from the prior art or from the other claims; otherwise, it should not operate as a limitation.</p> <p>LEd. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 241; Dec. Dig. §. 165.*]</p> <p>6. Patents (§ 165*)—Effect of Patent Office Proceedings.</p> <p>A statement by the solicitor that the claim was to be confined to the-“exact form” held not an estoppel because imitation was not required, and not a persuasive admission because of the context.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 241; Dec. Dig. §: 165.*]</p> <p>7. Patents (§ 328*)—Validity and Infringement—Water Purifying Apparatus.</p> <p>The Gretli patent, No. 775,901, for a water purifying apparatus, claim 11, as differentiated from most of the other claims, is not limited to a combination calling for separate compartments in which the lime treatment and the soda treatment are carried on, but has for its principal element the specific battery of independent unit filters described, each of which can he cut off for cleaning without affecting the others, used in combination with a settling compartment and a chemical treating compartment, broadly specified, which may or may not be subdivided. As so construed, the claim was not anticipated and discloses patentable invention; also, held infringed.</p>

This cause comes here upon appeal from a decree of the District Court, Southern District of New York, holding that defendant has infringed two United States letters patent and granting the relief usual in such cases.

<p>1. Patents (§ 328*)—Validity and Infringement—Design for Spoons and-Forks.</p> <p>The Crowell design patents, Nos. 40,124, 40,832, and 40,833, for designs for spoons, forks, or similar articles, held valid and infringed.</p> <p>2. Patents (§ 252*)—Infringement of Design Patent—Use of Cheaper Material.</p> <p>That the owner of a patent for a design for spoons and forks makes them only in sterling silver does not relieve one who copies the design in plated ware from infringement.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 394-396; Dec. Dig. § 252.*]</p>

<p>Patents (§ 328*)—Invention—Flexible Shaft.</p> <p>The Schmidt & Grundmann patent, No. 969,660, for a flexible shaft, held void for lack of patentable invention, in view of the Almond patent, No. 434,748, for a flexible tube: '</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Parsons Non-Skid Company, Limited, the Weed Chain Tire Grip Company, and Harry D. Weed against the E. j. Willis Company. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.</p> <p>On appeal from a final decree in equity, bolding valid and infringed letters patent to Harry Parsons, No. 723,299, dated March. 24, 1903, for armor for pneumatic tires.</p> <p>The patent has been in general and continuous litigation for the last three years and has been sustained and infringement found in twenty-four instances. Appeals have been taken in at least five of these cases, resulting in each case in an affirmance of the decree of the lower court finding validity and infringement of the patent. These decisions are by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth, Seventh and Second Circuits and will be found in 192 Fed. 35, 113 C. C. A. 1; 192 Fed. 41, 113 C. C. A. 14; 196 Fed. 951, 118 C. C. A. 105; 203 Fed. 862, 122 C. C. A. 173.</p> <p>The decision of this court holding the patent valid and infringed is reported in 198 Fed. 399.</p>

<p>3L Judgment (§ 956*)—Record in Prior Action—Evidence.</p> <p>In a suit in equity for infringement of patents, the record in a prior action at law between the same parties for infi-ingement of the same pat-, ents is admissible, to determine exactly what questions were rendered res judicata by the judgment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1822-1825; Dec. Dig. § 956.*]</p> <p>2. Judgment (§ 739*)—Suit for Infringement—Res Judicata.</p> <p>Where defendants in an action at law for infringement after commencement of the action installed and used other devices of the same kind as those subsequently held to infringe, which for that reason could not be recovered fdr therein, plaintiff may recover in a suit in equity for such infringement.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1105, 1267; Dec. Dig. § 739.*]</p>

Suit in equity by Howard P. Denison and the Metal Stamping Company against John A. Gifford and Harry H. Gifford, doing business as John A. Gifford & Son. From an order denying a motion for a preliminary injunction, complainants appeal. This cause comes here upon appeal,, from an order denying complainants’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

Suit in equity by the Wollensak Optical Company against the Ilex Optical Company. Decree for defendant;* and complainant appeals. This cause comes here upon appeal from a decree of the District Court, Western District of New York, which dismissed a bill for alleged infringement of two U. S. patents. The patents are Nos. 679,-134 and 700,878, both granted to Andrew Wollensak and both relating to photographic shutters.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Bush & Lane Piano Company against Becker Bros. On final hearing.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Ford Motor Company against the International Automobile League and others. On motion to vacate order for preliminary injunction and dismiss bill.

<p>1. Patents (§ 310*)—Suit for Infringement—Pleading.</p> <p>Under the practice in the Second Circuit, complainant in a suit for infringement may declare on the patent generally and postpone the statement of the particular claims relied on until the taking of the testimony-begins.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 507-540; Dec. Dig. § 310.*]</p> <p>2. Patents (§ 328*)—Validity—Infringement.</p> <p>The Sargent patent, No. 665,582, for a lamp socket, held valid and infringed on motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Crane Iron Works, petitioner, against the United States, respondent, and the Interstate Commerce Commission and others, interveners. On motions to dismiss petition. For opinions of Interstate Commerce Commission, see 15 Interst. Com. Com’n R. 248, and 17 Interst. Com. Com’n R. 514.

Petitions by the Louisiana & Pacific Railway Company and others against the United States and others, the Woodworth & Louisiana Central Railway Company, Limited, and others, against the same, the Mansfield Railway & Transportation Company and others against the same, and the Victoria, Fisher & Western Railroad Company and others against the same, to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission; the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Railroad Commission 'of…

<p>Carriers (§ 26*)—Regulation of Rates—Interstate Commerce Commission— Division of Joint Rates—Tap Line.</p> <p>An order of tbe Interstate Commerce Commission permitting tbe re-establishment of a joint rate, including rates on both logs and lumber, between trunk lines and a tap line reaching lumber mills, but limiting the amount which might be allowed to the tap line with respect to services rendered to a proprietary mill to a switching charge on the lumber transported to the trunk lines, held invalid as based on arbitrary distinctions.</p> <p>[lid. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 67-82; Dec. Dig. §26.*]</p>

In Equity. Bill by Rensselaer R. Curtis, as receiver of‘the First National Bank of New Berlin, against Aimer H. Phelps and others. On motion by defendant Herbert R. Wheeler for a further and better statement of complainant’s claim and further and better particulars of the various matters alleged in the complaint.

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Ed. Schmidt against the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. On exceptions to answer, and final hearing on the merits.</p>

<p>Seamen (§§ 11, 29*)—Suit foe Injuries—Pleading.</p> <p>Exceptions sustained to a count of a libel by a seaman to recover damages for a personal injury but overruled to a count for failure to provide libelant with proper medical care and attention.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Seamen, Cent Dig. §§ 39-44, 186, 187, 188-194; Dec. Dig. §§ 11, 29.*]</p>

<p>1. Clerks of Courts (§ 70*)—Clerk of Federal Court—Liability for Interest on Deposits.</p> <p>A fund constituted from deposits made with the clerk of a federal court by litigants, pursuant to a rule of court, to be drawn against by the clerk for the payment of the fees of himself and other officers of the court as they accrue, so long as such fund remains as a security deposit is not public money of the United States, but the property of the litigant, and the United States has no claim to interest paid thereon.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Clerks of Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 109-118; Dee. Dig. § 70.*]</p> <p>2. Clerks of Courts (§ 70*)—Clerks of Federal Courts—Liability foe Interest on Deposits.</p> <p>Money collected by the clerk of a federal court for official services rendered is not so collected as revenue of the United States, but as fees and emoluments of his office, and belongs to him, subject .only to his duty to render an account of the same semiannually and to pay into the treasury any excess above the amount he is allowed by statute to retain; and the United States has no right or title to any interest he may receive on the fund pending his semiannual return, either as an increment of the fund or as an emolument of the office, and as such to be accounted for.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Clerks of Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 109-118; Dec. Dig. § 70.*]</p> <p>3. Words and Phrases—“Emolument” of Office.</p> <p>An “emolument” of an office is a sum received by the officer for the performance of some act or service pursuant to the obligation or sanction of his office and for which he has the right by virtue of his office to exact the payment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2367, 2368.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the United States against the Union Gap Irrigation Company.</p>

<p>1. Specific Performance (§ 75*)—Contracts Enforceable—Contracts fob Continuous Acts During Long Period.</p> <p>A court of equity will not decree specific performance of contracts by which owners of oyster beds agree to sell to the other party their entire production for a term of 20 years at a stated price per sack in the shell, with provisos that they shall sell to no one else, and respecting the quality of the oysters and the quantity which each sack shall contain when shelled, for the reason that the character of the obligations are such that continuous supervision of the court would be required during the term of ' ihe contracts, and for the further reason that complainant has a complete and adequate remedy at law; oysters of the quality named having an ascertainable market value.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Specific Performance, Cent. Dig. § 210; Dec. Dig. § 75.*]</p> <p>2. Equity (§ 41*)—Jurisdiction—Granting Legal Relief.</p> <p>Where a court of equity is without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for in a suit, it will not grant relie’f which may properly be obtained in an action at law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 116-118; Dec. Dig. § 41.*]</p>

<p>1. Carriers (§ 100*)—Tariff Schedules—Demurrage—Notice of Arrival of Cars. .</p> <p>Under a tariff schedule of a railroad company requiring the payment of demurrage • after 24 hours on the arrival of ears at their destination and notice to the consignee, where ears were to be delivered at the yards of the company for reeonsignment, a notice of their arrival at such yards, without more particular designation, is sufficient, and demurrage is assessable after 24 hours from the giving of the notice.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ '427-433; Dec. Dig. § 100.*]</p> <p>2. Caebiebs (§ 38*)—Interstate Commerce Act—Indictment eob Violation— Sufficiency.</p> <p>An indictment charging a railroad company with violation of Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, § 6, 24 Stat. 380 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3156), as amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 2, 34 Stat. 5S6 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1289), by failing to observe its tariff schedule as to demurrage, held, sufficient where it charged that for a period of two years defendant delivered coal to a particular consignee without assessing demurrage accrued or keeping records of demurrage charges, while as to other shippers and consignees it made and collected such charges and kept such records.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 84-87; Dec. Dig. § 38.*]</p> <p>3. Caebiebs (§ 32*)—Interstate Commerce Act—Construction.</p> <p>The provision of Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, § 6, 24 Stat. 380 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3156), as amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 2, 34 Stat. 586 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1289), prohibiting an interstate carrier from extending to any shipper or person any privileges or facilities “in the transportation of passengers or property” except such as are specified in its tariffs, relates solely to transportation privileges and facilities, and does not apply to such as may be extended to a consignee after the shipment has reached its destination.</p> <p>[E'd. Note.—For other eases, see Carriers, Dec. Dig. § 32.*]</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by M. A. Taylor against the gasoline launch Sinaloa. On exceptions to libel.</p>

<p>1. Criminal Law (§ 805*)—Trial-Instructions—Requested Charge—Definiteness.</p> <p>In a prosecution for using the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, a requested charge that an honest belief by the defendant of the truth of the “statements” was a defense was properly refused for indefiniteness as to what “statements” were referred to.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § § 1958, 1989; Dec. Dig. § 805.*]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law (§ 829*)—Trial—Requested Charge—Instructions Given.</p> <p>Where, in a prosecution for using the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, the court in various ways charged that in order to convict the jury must find not only that the scheme was false, but that it was known to be false by accused, that he knew his representations made through the mails in order to further the scheme were untrue, etc., such instructions sufficiently covered a requested charge that an honest belief by defendant of the truth of the statements made by him was a defense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011: Dee. Dig. § 829.*]</p>

Cotteral, Judge. Action at law by ,the Thomas J. Baird Investment Company against D. W. Harris. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Pollock and Ralph E. Campbell, Judges. Suits in equity by John E. McKinney and by the Fidelity Title & Trust Company against John M. Landon and others. From orders directing the receivers to surrender certain property to receivers appointed by a state court, complainants appeal.

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri; Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by the Old Colony Life Insurance Company against Frank Blake. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to thé District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York; Thomas I. Chatfield, Judge.</p> <p>Actions by Annie Thierer and by Joseph Thierer against the New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff in each case, and defendant brings error.</p>

E. McCall, Judge. Action by Ike Lankford, as administrator of the estate of Robert McClure, deceased, against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Hollister, Judge. In the matter of Silas U. Snodgrass and_, Clinton W. Snodgrass, doing business as S. U. Snodgrass & Son, bankrupts. Petition by William J. Pugh, trustee, against Blanche W. Snodgrass, Silas L. Snodgrass, and others. From a decree dismissing the petition, the trustee appeals.

Appeal and Error from the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio; Howard C. Hollister, Judge. Suit by E. Reeder Donohue, trustee in bankruptcy of John E. Humphreys, against Walter J. Carey. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals and brings error.

Cushman, Judge. In the matter of Edwin E. Graves and George E. Ea Belle, copartners as Graves & Ea Belle and the Federal Paint & Wall Paper Company, and Edwin E. Graves and George E. Ea Belle, individually, bankrupts. Appeal from order affirming disallowance by R. S. Snowdon, trustee of Berry Bros., a corporation. Reversed.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado; Robert E. .Lewis, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by Ogden D. McClurg against Thomas B. Crawford. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>

Young, Judge. Action by Louis Solomon and others, as administrators of Max Solomon, deceased, for use, etc., agáinst the American Temperance Life Insurance Association of the City of New York. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings- error.

This cause comes here upon appeal from a decree of the District Court, Western District of New York, which held that no fault was proved on the part of either the Empire City or Magna, both owned by respondent, contributing to a collision of the last named vessel with the Glidden. The collision occurred in the St. Clair Flats Ship Canal on the morning of October 9, 1903; the Glidden was bound down, the Empire City with the Magna in tow was bound up.

<p>Banks and Banking (§ 138*)—Unauthorized Payment of Checks—Liability to Depositor.</p> <p>A bank held, liable to a corporation depositor for the amount of checks paid which were drawn without the authority of the corporation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 398-405; Dec. Dig. § 138.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit by the American Malting Company against Adolph Keitel. From an order granting an injunction pendente lite, defendant appeals.</p>

Brown, Judge. Suit in equity by John N. MlcClintock against the City of Pawtucket. From an order denying his'petition for leave to file a bill of review, complainant appeals.

District of' New York. This cause comes here upon appeal from a decree of the District Court, Southern District of New York, which dismissed bill of complaint, in an equity suit brought for infringement of patent. The patent is No. 612,701, issued October 18, 1898 (on application dated August 5, 1897), to Frank W. Canfield for an “igniter or sparker for gas, oil, or vapor engines.” The opinion of the District Court will be found in 200 Fed. 433.

<p>In the matter of Julius Bros., bankrupts. On application for discharge, Lewis Frank & Sons and others filed objections.</p> <p>This is an application for a discharge in bankruptcy. The referee has reported against the discharge upon the ground that the bankrupts conveyed their property within four months of the bankruptcy, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud their creditors. The bankrupts made an assignment of all their assets to a corporation in exchange for $1,550, which was to be páid to their attorney, who also represented the creditors’ committee appointed at a meeting of all creditors, with directions to distribute it as a dividend to all creditors who should agree to compromise their claims for that amount. The two objecting creditors refused to compromise, and the attorney, with the bankrupts’ assent, and that of the creditors’ committee, thereupon appropriated their dividends in paj-ment of his services. Bankruptcy afterwards followed.</p>

<p>Maritime Liens (§ 25*)—Lien for Supplies—Federal Statute.</p> <p>Under Act June 23, 1910, c. 373, 36 Stat. 604 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1191), wMcb. gives a lien for repairs or supplies furnished to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by him, but provides that it shall not be construed to confer a lien when the furnisher of the repairs or supplies knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained, that the person ordering the same was without authority to bind the vessel, one furnishing supplies on the order of the president of a company in possession of a vessel under an option to purchase, which expressly provided that no liens should be incurred thereon, is not entitled to a lien where he was tol<J that the vessel had not been paid for, and knew the owner, whose place of business was in the same city, and for which he had furnished supplies to the vessel for many years, and made no inquiry as to the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For, other cases, see Maritime Liens, Cent. Dig. §§ 20, 31-36; Dee. Dig. § 25.*]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Aaron Hoffman against Sam Le Traunik, sued as Francis Murphy and Jean Bedini, for-alleged infringement of copyright in the use of monologues. On motion for preliminary injunction pendente lite.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company against H. M. Bosworth, Thomas S- Rhea, and C. F. Crecilius, individually and as constituting the Board of Valuation and Assessment of the State of Kentucky, H. M. Bosworth, Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Kentucky, G. B. Likens, Assistant Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Kentucky, James Garnett, Attorney General of the State of Kentucky, C. H. Morris, First Assistant Attorney General of the State of Kentucky, M. M. Logan, Second Assistant Attorney General of the State of Kentucky, O. S. Hogan, Third Assistant Attorney General of the State of Kentucky, Robert B. Franklin, Commonwealth’s Attorney for the Franklin Circuit Court of- the State of Kentucky, and W. C. Marshall, County Attorney of Franklin County, State of Kentucky. On motion for preliminary injunction and demurrer to bill.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Illinois Central Railroad Company against Henry M. Bosworth and others, individually and as constituting the Board of' Valuation and Assessment of the State of Kentucky, and others. On motion for preliminary injunction and demurrer to the bill.

In Equity. Suit by the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company against H. M. Bosworth and others, individually and as constituting the Board of Valuation and Assessment of the State of Kentucky, and others. On motion for preliminary injunction and demurrer to the bill.

In Equity. Suit by the Chesapeake "& Ohio Railway Company against H. M. Bosworth and others, individually and as constituting the Board of Valuation and Assessment of the Státe of Kentucky, and others. On motion for preliminary injunction and demurrer to the bill.

<p>In Equity. Suit by Charles R. Irving and Robert Casson, copartners doing business as Irving & Casson, against Edward H. Neal, individually and as secretary of the Joint District Council of New York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and others. On final hearing.</p>

At Taw. Action by Frederick F. Slater, administrator, etc., against the Illinois Cenrtal Railroad' Company. On demurrer to declaration. This suit was brought by the plaintiff, as administrator, to recover damages for the death of his intestate.

In the matter of the Grand Rapids Furniture Agency, bankrupt. On report of special master in the matter of the alleged stock liability of John C. Smith, W. M. Lucas, and F. E. Dickinson.

<p>Salvage (§ 17*)—Salvage Services—Right to Recover.</p> <p>A steamer lying in New York harbor, on finding fire in a cargo space filled with lumber, blew alarm signals to call the fire boat, which caused libelant to swing his own tug alongside. The captain of the steamer did not wish libelant’s services, but permitted libelant to pump water into a cargo port in the side of the vessel from which dense smoke appeared. This water, because of the peculiar construction of the ship, did little or no good. The tug, however, was not compelled to leave and supplied water at what appeared to be a point of danger for nearly an hour before the fire boat appeared. Held, that the tug rendered a salvage service for which libelant was entitled to recover $250.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Salvage, Cent. Dig. § 30; Dec. Dig. § 17.*]</p>

In the matter of Gordon Phillips, bankrupt. On claim of the bankrupt and the community composed of the bankrupt and Lulu Phillips, his wife, for exemptions.

<p>1. Salvage (§ 28*)—Salvage Service—Rescue of Drifting Barge.</p> <p>A salvage award of $100 made to a tug and crew for the rescue of a loaded barge, whicli had gone adrift and was picked up in Buttermilk Channel, where drifting was dangerous to herself and other'^hipping.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Salvage, Cent. Dig. §§ 67, 69; Dee. Dig. § 28.*]</p> <p>2. Salvage (§ 16*)—Right to Compensation—Salvage or Towing Service.</p> <p>The action of the mate in charge .of a drifting barge in first offering a tug $3 for a towing contract and then attempting to prevent it from making fast by threatening to cut the hawser with an as did not deprive the tug of the right to a fair salvage award for the rescue of the barge, without making it so large as to encourage litigation, where no contract was in fact made, and the service was meritorious.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Salvage, Cent. Dig. § 29; Dee. Dig. § 16.*]</p>

In Equity. Action by the Nótaseme Hosiery Company against Isidor Straus and another to restrain alleged infringement of a trademark and to recover damages for unlawful competition. Decree for defendants was reversed and the cause remanded. 201 Fed. 99, 119 C. C. A. 134. On report of Special Master as to allowance of profits and damages to complainants, Master’s finding modified and report confirmed.

<p>Petition by Peter Czeslicki for writ of habeas corpus to procure his discharge from custody on deportation warrant.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. Proceedings against the Killian Manufacturing Company. On certificate of referee allowing a claim of Smith & Schipper, agents for William Brandt’s Sons & Co., bankers, to recover certain silk purchased and delivered to the bankrupts.</p>

<p>Aliens (§ OS*)—Naturalization—Sufficiency of Petition.</p> <p>Where an applicant for naturalization has not resided within the state for five years, he may, under Naturalization Act June 29, 190G, c. 3592, § 10, 34 Stat. 599 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 533), “establish by two witnesses, both in his petition and at the hearing, the time of his residence within the state,” and the remaining portion of his residence within the United States by deposition, but the affidavit of the witnesses, in his petition, must cover the full period of his residence in the state, and it is not sufficient to show merely that such residence was for more than a year.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 138-145; Dec. Dig. § GS.*]</p>

<p>X. Shipping (§ 203*)—Limitation of Liability—Construction of Statute.</p> <p>Rev. St. § 4282 et sea. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2943), providing for limitation of liability of shipowners, do not pertain to the remedy like ordinary statutes of limitation, but confer absolute legal rights.</p> <p>[Ed. Note—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 637; Dee. Dig. i 203.*]</p> <p>2. Shipping (§ 203*)—Limitation of Liability—Grounds of Relief.</p> <p>The right of a shipowner to a limitation of liability in the courts of the' United States is entirely dependent upon statute, and not upon the general maritime law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 637; Dec. Dig. § 203.*]</p> <p>8. Shipping (§ 205*)—Limitation of Liability—Persons Entitled to Benefit of Statute.</p> <p>The British owner of a British vessel, which foundered In mid-ocean from collision with an iceberg, never having been within the jurisdiction of the United States, cannot maintain a proceeding for limitation of liability against claims arising out of her loss, under Rev. St. § 4282 et sea- (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2943).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 641, 642; Dec. Dig. § 205.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>This cause comes here upon appeal from a decree of the District Court, Southern District of New York, dismissing a petition filed by the owner of the steamship Titanic to obtain a limitation of petitioner’s liability, unde.r the statutes of the United States. Upon the argument there arose certain questions or propositions of law, concerning which this court desires the instruction of the Supreme Court for its proper decision.</p>

Hollister, Judge. Action at law by Jean D. McKell, administratrix, -against the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and der fendant brings 'error.

Elliott, Judge. Logan Fain and another were convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, and bring error.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Mexico; William H. Pope, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Central Electric Company against the Socorro Electric Company and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals.</p>

Safer, Judge. In the matter of Jamison Bros. & Co., bankrupts, in which George McCurdy is trustee. Frank H. MacMorris appeals from, and petitions to review, an order of the District Court. The following is the opinion of the District Court by Safer, District Judge (sitting by designation): The case will be simplified if it be borne in mind that the only order made by the referee which is on review is that of July 6, 1912. The preceding orders stand unimpeaclied.

Elliott, Judge. John E. Fall and David A. Fall were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the State of South Dakota and of using the mails in connection therewith, and they bring error.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Utah; John A. Marshall, Judge;</p> <p>Suit in equity by the United States against the Utah Power & Light Company. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>

Marshall, Judge. Action by the United States against the Southern Pacific Company to recover penalties for alleged violation of the Hours of Service Law. Judgment for defendant, and the United States brings error.

<p>1. Trial (§ 420*)—Directed Verdict—Motion—Waiver.</p> <p>Error, if any, in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict a# the close of plaintiff’s testimony, is waived by the introduction of evidence by defendant</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 983; Dec. Dig. § 420.*]</p> <p>2. Courts (§ 356*)—Rulings Review able—Denial of New Trial.</p> <p>An order of a federal court, denying a motion for a new trial, is not reviewable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Cent Dig. § 937; Dec.‘Dig. § 356.*]</p> <p>3. Trial (§§ 349, 359*)—Special ' Interrogatories—Submission—Effect of Answers—General Verdict.</p> <p>A trial court has common-law power, in its discretion, to submit special interrogatories for a jury’s finding along with a general verdict, and the answers to such interrogatories will control when they clearly compel a different judgment from that which would follow the general verdict.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent Dig. §§ 823-827, 857-860, 875, 877, 878; Dec. Dig. §§ 349, 359.*]</p> <p>1. Master and Servant (§ 297*) —< Injuries to Servant — Coal Mine Operative—Fall of Roof—General Verdict—Special Interrogatories.</p> <p>In an action for injuries to plaintiff while at work in a coal mine, constructing a wall separating certain entries, by the fall of a part of the roof, due to the alleged negligent shooting, of coal pillars, the jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff together with special findings that the superintendent and his subordinate officers were guilty of the negligence specified, that the firing of the shots would have a tendency to loosen the roof, and that the defect in the roof was not of such a character as to be readily discoverable by ordinary inspection. Held, that the latter finding should be construed.to mean that the defect in the roof was not so plainly obvious as to charge plaintiff with contributory negligence in going under it, and hence such findings were not in irreconcilable conflict with the general verdict.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent Dig. §§ 1195-1198; Dec. Dig. § 297.*]</p> <p>5. Master and Servant (§ 203*)—Injuries to Servant—Miners—Assumed Risk.</p> <p>Where plaintiff was injured by the fall of a portion of the roof of a coal mine while he was employed therein, due to shots fired in certain pillars in the vicinity of his working place, the fact that plaintiff had received no assurance from defendant that no shots would be so fired while he was working there was applicable only to the question of assumed risk and would not defeat his right of action.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 538-543; Dec. Dig. § 203.*</p> <p>Assumption of risk incident to employment, see note to Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Hennessey, 38 C. C. A. 314.]</p> <p>6. Master and Servant (§ 258*)—Injuries to Servant—Miners—Fall of Roof—Complaint.</p> <p>In- an action for injuries to an employs in a coal mine by the fall of a portion of the -roof, due to the alleged negligent shooting of pillars in the vicinity, complaint construed and held to state a cause of action.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 816-836; Dec. Dig. § 258.*]</p> <p>7. Master and Servant (§ 286*)—Injuries to Servant—Mines—Questions for Jury.</p> <p>In an action for injuries to an employe in a coal mine by the fall of a portion of the roof, evidence held to require submission to the jury of the question whether the firing of shots in certain pillars near where plaintiff was employed caused the roof to become unsafe and fall.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1001, 1006, 1008, 1010-1015, 1017-1033, 1036-1042, 1044, 1046-1050; Dec. Dig. § 286.*] .</p> <p>8. Master and Servant (§ 276*)—Injuries to Servant—Nature of Duty.</p> <p>Where plaintiff, an employé in a coal mine, was directed to wall up an entry to guard against black damp, and a canvas curtain had been erected to turn currents of fresh air into the place where plaintiff was employed, the fact that he was engaged in replacing the curtain, which for some reason had fallen, when he was injured by the fall of a part of the roof, was insufficient to show that he was not engaged in the line of his duty at the time of the accident.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.-—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 950-952, 954, 959, 970, 976; Dec. Dig. § 276.*]</p>

Court of the United States for the Eastern District 'of Kentucky. Suit in equity hy the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company against George W. Uykins, Orville P. Pollitt, and the Vanceburg & Stouts Lane Turnpike Road Company. From an order granting a preliminary injunction, defendants appeal.

<p>1. Carriers (§ 202*)—Interstate Commerce Act—Action by Shipper tor Damages—Pleading.</p> <p>In an action by a shipper against a railroad company under Interstate Commerce Act Peb. 4, 1887, e. 104, § 16, 24 Stat. 384 (ü. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3165), as amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 590 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1301), to recover for overcharges on interstate shipments for which an award of damages was made by the Interstate Commerce Commission, an allegation in the petition that such charges were unjust, unreasonable, and in violation of law is one largely of fact and is sufficiently specific as against a general demurrer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 906-915; Dec. Dig. § 202.*]</p> <p>2. Commerce (§ 85*)—Interstate Commerce Commission—Award of Damages—Interest.</p> <p>In making an award of damages to a shipper for excessive charges collected by a railroad company, under section 16 of Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, e. 104, 24 Stat. 384 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3165), 'as amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 590 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1301), the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to allow interest on the excess payments where they were made under protest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 138; Dec. Dig. § 85.*]</p> <p>3. Commerce (§ 85*)—Interstate Commerce Commission—Power to Reduce Rates.</p> <p>When a local rate between points within the same state is found by the Interstate Commerce Commission to be excessive when charged as a part of a joint through rate, the commission has power to order its reduction When so used without establishing a new joint through rate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 138; Dec. Dig. § 85.*]</p> <p>4. Commerce (§ 85*)—Interstate Commerce Commission—Orders Awarding Damages to Shipper.</p> <p>Where the Interstate Commerce Commission on complaint of a shipper has made an order fixing a reduced rate to be charged by a railroad company in the future on certain shipments, it is not required to repeat such order in subsequent orders awarding reparation to the shipper on' shipments made under the rate condemned in the first order.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 138; Dec. Dig. § 85.*]</p> <p>5. Carriers (§ 202*) — Action by Shipper for Damages for Excessive Charges—Allowance of Attorney’s Fees—Constitutionality of Statute.</p> <p>The provision of section 16 of Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, e. 104, 24 Stat. 384 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3165), as amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 590 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1301), authorizing the court to allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing petitioner in an action for damages brought thereunder, is constitutional.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 906-915; Dec. Dig. § 202.*]</p>

Sanborn, Judge. Action by Louis E. Wilkins against Albert Miller & Co. and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants Albert Miller & Co. brinj* error.

Landis, Judge. Albert Charles Jones was convicted of 'contempt of court in committing alleged perjury on his examination to qualify himself as surety on the bail bond of one Johnson, and he brings error.

Anderson, Judge. Suit by the Curtice Bros. Company against Harry E. Barnard and others. Judgment for defendants, and complainant appeals.

Dandis, Judge. In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of the Hamilton Automobile Company. From an order dismissing an aménded petition of C. P. KimbaJl & Co. to amend and prove its claim against the bankrupt’s estate, to which E. H. Johnson, trustee, objected, the claimant appeals. On March 12, 1908, appellant filed its claim before the referee in Ee Hamilton Automobile Company, a bankrupt, for $1,782.58.

Wright, Judge. Action at law by the United States against the St. Louis Merchants’ Bridge Terminal Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Pollock, Judge. In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of Grant Bros. Petition by the Baker Ice Machine Company to recover possession of certain ice machinery sold to the bankrupt under a conditional sale contract. From an order of the District Court, affirming an order of the referee-in bankruptcy denying the petition, claimant appeals.

Wright, Judge. Action by the United States against the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company for alleged violation of the 28-hour law. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Whitaker Thompson, Judge. Habeas corpus proceeding by the United States, on the relation o'. Frederick Brown, against Frederick A. Cooke, Superintendent of the Philadelphia County Prison. Judgment for respondent, and relator brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>Action by Charles Weil and others, trading as Weil, Farrell & Co., against Leopold Loeb, trading as Leopold Loeb & Co- Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings erior.</p>

<p>Courts (§ 312*)—Jurisdiction oe Federal Courts—Suit by Assignee.</p> <p>In an action in a federal court by an assignee on a promissory note, the record must affirmatively show that the assignor might have prosecuted an action thereon in the same court, to give the court jurisdiction under Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, e. 231) § 24, par. 1, 36 Stat. 1091 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 135).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.'—For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 865-875; Dee. Dig. § 312.*</p> <p>Diverse citizenship as a ground of federal jurisdiction, see notes to Shipp v. Williams, 10 C. C. A. 249; Mason v. Dullagham, 27 C. C. A. 29.8.]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas; Gordon Russell, Judge.</p> <p>From an order disallowing its claim in bankruptcy proceedings, the First National Bank of Atlanta, Tex., appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas; Gordon Russell, Judge.</p> <p>Action- at law by G. C. Maynor and another against the Kansas City Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Execution (§ 275*)—Validity—Notice.</p> <p>Under Rev. Civ. St. Tex. 1911, art. 3757, which requires a sale of land, under execution order of sale or other process to be advertised for 20 days in a newspaper published in the county where the land is situated, the failure to so advertise the land renders the sale void.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 16, 148, 345, 791-796; Dec. Dig. § 275.*]</p>

Suit in equity by M. C. H. Park, trustee in bankruptcy of the Slay-den-Kirksey Woolen Mill, against the Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank of Waco, Tex. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

<p>Railroads (§ 345*)—Action for Injury at Crossing—Evidence—Rate of Speed.</p> <p>Under an allegation, in the complaint in an action against a railroad company to recover for the death of a person killed at a crossing, that the train was being run wantonly and recklessly at a high rate of speed, a municipal ordinance regulating the speed of trains is admissible.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113-1110; Dec. Dig. § 345.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Cóffield Motor Washer Company against the Wayne Manufacturing Company and the American Washer Company. From an order granting a preliminary injunction, defendants appeal.</p>

Sanborn, Judge. Suit in equity by Percy C. Avery and the American Brass Foundry Company against the Milwaukee Bronze Casting Company. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals. This cause is here on appeal from the order of the District Court adjudging Avery patent No. 986,668, dated March 14, 1911, for a reflector for automobile lamps to be valid and infringed.

<p>Patents (§ 32S*)—Invention—Cabajiel I-Ioldek.</p> <p>The Latean patent, No. 945,7S8, held invalid; it being merely such an economic mechanical step as naturally followed the growth of an industry, and not such an innovating disclosure as makes an inventive act differ from a mechanical improvement.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Grinnell Washing Machine Company against O. B. Woodrow, John Nelson, Harry L. Ogg, and others, partners doing business under the name of the Automatic Electric Washer Company. On final hearing.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the" Rajah Auto Supply Company against the Rex Ignition Manufacturing Company. On motion for preliminary injunction. Motion granted.</p>

<p>Patents (§ 323*)—Suits for Infringement—Decree.</p> <p>Where a bill alleges infringement of claims of a patent as to which little or no evidence was taken, and which were not relied on, discussed by either party, or considered on the final hearing, the court is not required to pronounce any decree whatever as to such claims.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ -596-599; Dec. Dig. § 323.*]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Macallen Company against Charles Wirt & Co. and others. On final hearing.</p>

<p>Action by Marcus' Loland against the Northwest Stevedore Company, a corporation. Motion to remand allowed.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In .the matter of bankruptcy proceedings against Harry Kramer and another, individually and trading as Kramer & Muchnick. On certificate of a referee to review an order requiring the bankrupts to pay money or delivér merchandise to the trustee.

In the matter of the Cotton Manufacturers’ Sales Company, bankrupt. Gn certificate for review of order of Referee.

At Law. Action by James B. Bowers, trustee, against Charles N. Post. On pleas of general issue and set-off. Binding for defendant on plea of set-off. Lyon & Healy is a corporation organized some years ago under the laws of the state of Illinois. Its business has prospered. In January, 1904, it had a capital stock, fully paid, of $500,000, a large surplus, and a large amount of undivided profits.

<p>In Equity. Suit by George C. Vaughan against the Massachusetts Hide Corporation. On exceptions to master’s report on petition of Jeremiah Smith, Jr., receiver, against Brown Bros. & Company. Affirmed in part, and disaffirmed in part.</p> <p>Warner, Warner & Stackpole, of Boston, Mass., for complainant and for defendants Waldron P. Brown and others in petition of Smith, receiver, against Brown.</p>

<p>Petition by George Hanges, Demetrios Dampere, Steve Pantza, and Peter Francas against S. D. Whitfield, as Immigration Inspector, and E. Fitzgerald, as Sheriff of Cerro Gordo County, Iowa, for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

Petition by Richard J. Bolles and others for an order directing the grand jury to allow petitioners and certain witnesses named to testify before that body, and directing it to consider certain documents.

<p>In Equity. Suit by Jacob Van Reen against the /Etna Life Insurance Company.</p>

<p>Street Railroads (§ 12*)—State Regulation—Order Requiring Double Track—Reasonableness.</p> <p>An order of a state corporation commission requiring a street railroad company to double-track a portion of its line in a city of 25,000 population extending ten blocks and to connect with another portion in 'the business section already having a double track held not shown to be unreasonable, and a preliminary injunction to restrain its enforcement denied; but the company held entitled to the continuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the extreme penalties imposed by statute for failure to obey the order until it should have a reasonable time to comply therewith.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 14, 19; Dec. Dig. § 12.*]</p>

<p>1. Aliens (§ 54*)—Exclusion—Hearing—Fair Trial.</p> <p>Where, after petitioners in alien exclusion proceedings had been informed that the cases were closed, new evidence was introduced in opposition to petitioners’ right to enter the United States, of which their attorneys had been informed, and also advised that they would be permitted to inspect the new evidence, and offer further evidence if they desired, the admission of such additional proof on behalf of the government did not deprive petitioners of a fair hearing.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. § 112; Dee. Dig. § 54.*]</p> <p>2. Habeas Corpus (§ 23*)—Exclusion—Persons Likely to Become Public Charge—Findings—Review.</p> <p>A finding by immigration' officers that certain alien Hindoo laborers applying to enter the United States would be likely to become public charges because of there being a deep-seated prejudice in the United States against them, and, theré being no demand for their labor on this account, it would be difficult for them to maintain themselves, was not reviewable on habeas corpus.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. § 17; Dec. Dig. § 23.*]</p> <p>3. Aliens (§ 49*)—Immigration Rules—Entry oe Insular Possessions— Right to Land on Mainland.</p> <p>Immigration rule 14 as amended June 16, 1913, providing that aliens applying at continental ports and surrendering the certificate received on entering the Philippines shall on identification be permitted to land, provided it appears that at the time they were admitted to the Philippines they were not members of the excluded classes, or likely to become public charges if they proceeded thence to the mainland and were given certificates, did not entitle aliens to land in the United States, notwithstanding the finding of the immigration officers that they were liable to become public charges, on the ground that the interior departments had no power to adopt a rule which would preclude an alien once landed in any .territory of the United States from thereafter freely going thence to the mainland.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. § 107.; Dec. Dig. § 49.*]</p>

<p>In Equity. Action by Charles W. Cullen, as trustee in bankruptcy, against Daniel C. Armstrong and another. On application to set aside a preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>Aliens (§ 68*)—Naturalization—Time eor Filing Petition.</p> <p>Tbe provision of Naturalization Act June 29, 1906, c.' 3592, § 4 (2), 34 Stat 596 (ü. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 529), limiting tbe time for filing a petition for naturalization to seven years after tbe making of tbe declaration of intention, applies to tbe declaration prescribed by tbe preceding paragraph, and does not in any way affect tbe rights of an alien, who made bis declaration prior to tbe date when the act became effective in accordance with tbe law then in force, to file a petition at any time.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 138-145; Dec. Dig. g 68.*]</p>

<p>At Law. Action by Blakslee, Perrin & Darling against the Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation, Limited. On motion to remand to state court.</p>

<p>Shipping (§ 84*)—Injuries to Stevedore—Liability of Vessel.</p> <p>While a vessel chartered to a fuel company was being unloaded by its employes, libelant was directed with others to climb the cargo battens in order to dislodge coal that had settled behind them, and when he was 12 or 15 feet from the bottom of the hold, one of the battens supporting him gave way because of a broken cleat, and he fell to the' bottom, sustaining serious injuries. The battens were not intended to be used as a ladder, but were to prevent the cargo from touching the sides of the vessel, and there was no evidence that the owner or master of the vessel knew that they were customarily used by stevedores in cleaning out the so-called pigeon holes. There was proof that this duty was generally performed by the crew while standing on the coal as it was being taken out. Reid that the ship was not liable for the negligence of the fuel company, if any, in directing its men to use the battens as ladders without first ascertaining that it was safe to do so.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 342, 349-351; Dec. Dig. § 84.*]</p>

<p>In Equity. Action by Edwin Ginn and others against the Apollo Publishing Company. On motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>Corporations (§ 560*)—Administration of Estate—Compromise of Judgment.</p> <p>Receivers for an insolvent corporation appointed in a creditors’ suit instructed not to compromise and settle a judgment recovered against the corporation by an employé, where the question whether the receivers could recover the amount paid in such settlement from an insurance company on an indemnity policy, or only the amount the judgment creditor would receive on a distribution of assets, was doubtful under the state decisions. '</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2253-2260, 2262; Dec. Dig. § 560.*]</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy (§ 399*)—Exemptions—Waiver op Bight.</p> <p>Tiie claim of a bankrupt to exemption, being a personal right, is waived unless asserted in due time.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 657, 669; Dec. Dig. § 399.*]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy (§ 399*)—Exemptions—Claim op Exemption.</p> <p>Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 7a (8), 30 Stat. 548 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3424), requires a bankrupt to file a schedule of his property, which shall also contain a claim for such exemptions as he may be entitled to, and, where the exemption under the law of the state is in specific property, it must be fully described; if not, he cannot claim an exemption subsequently out of the proceeds of property sold by the trustee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 657, 669; Dec. Dig. § 399.*]</p>

In. Bankruptcy. In the matter of Mary Jones, alleged bankrupt. On demurrer to petition to adjudicate her a bankrupt, and on motion of petitioning creditors for leave to amend.

<p>Prostitution (§ 3*)—Interstate Commerce—White Slave Traffic Act— Sufficiency of Complaint.</p> <p>The complaint on which a defendant was arrested and held for removal to another federal district for trial held to charge an offense under White Slave Traffic Act June 25, 1910, c. 395, § 2, 36 Staff 825 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1343).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]</p>

<p>Habías Corpus (§ 23*) — Deportation of Immigrant — Conclusiveness of Findings of Secretary of Labor.</p> <p>Tlie decision of the Secretary of Labor, based on substantial evidence, that an alien immigrant, at tbe time of entering the United States, 'was a person likely to become a public charge is not reviewable by the courts in habeas corpus proceedings;</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. § 17; Dec. Dig. § 23.*]</p>

Action by D. E. Loewe and others against Martin Lawlor and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. On writ of error to the District Court for -the District of Connecticut to review a- judgment entered November 15, 1912, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for $252,130, being the amount of a trebled verdict, interest, costs and counsel fees. This controversy has been before the courts for nearly a decade.

Lewis, Judge. John Gould and others were convicted of misuse of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, and they bring error.

Landis, Judge. . . Criminal prosecution by the United States against Samuel Baskin. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error. The plaintiff in error was convicted under an indictment for perjury in violation of section 29b of the Bankruptcy Act, and this writ of error is brought for reversal of the sentence and judgment thereupon.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois; Kenesaw M. Landis, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by. the United States against Morris H. Offner. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

Application by the American National Bank and others, petitioning creditors, for bankruptcy adjudication against H. D. Still’s Sons, alleged bankrupt. From an order granting such adjudication, the alleged bankrupt appeals, and also files a petition to revise.

<p>Petition to. Superintend and Revise, in Matter of Law, Proceedings of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina; Henry A. /Middleton Smith, Judge.</p> <p>Application of the American National Bank of Macon against H. D. Still’s Sons, alleged bankrupts. On petition of the latter to superintend and revise in matter of law, an adjudication against them as bankrupts.</p>

Petition to Superintend and Revise, in Matter of Law, Proceedings of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina ; Henry A. Middleton Smith, Judge. In the matter of the bankruptcy proceedings against H. D. Still’s Sons, alleged bankrupts.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Contracts (§ 147*)—Construction—Intention of Parties—Entire Contract Evidences.</p> <p>The intention of the parties at the time the contract is made determines its interpretation, and that intention must be deduced not from any part of it, or from the agreement without any part, but from every part so construed as to be consistent with every other pqrt and with the entire contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 730, 743; Dee. Dig. § 147.*]</p> <p>2. Sales (§ 218%*)—Contract—Title to Property—Bill oe Ladino.</p> <p>A bill of' lading wherein the vendor is named as consignee, accompanied with a draft in his favor for the purchase price of the property, is almost conclusive evidence that the parties intended that the title and ownership of the property should remain in the vendor until the purchase price was paid. And when the bill of lading contains or is accompanied with an order that the property described therein shall not be delivered without a surrender of the bill of lading, compelling evidence is required to establish a counter intention.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent Dig. §§ 586, 587; Dec. Dig. § 218%.*]</p> <p>3. Sales (§ 202*)—Contract—Title oe Property.</p> <p>A contract of sale of personal property, which declares that the vendor hereby sells and conveys property in consideration of $39,000 to be paid from time to time on the surrender of order bills of lading in the name of the vendor of shipments of parts of the property accompanied by drafts for the agreed payments for such parts, respectively, and which contains a final stipulation that when the entire $39,000 has been paid the remaining property shall thereupon and thereafter become the property of the vendee, is a contract of sale for cash, and the title and ownership of each part of the property remains in the vendor until the purchase price thereof is paid in cash.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see' Sales, Cent Dig. §§ 542-551; Dec. Dig. § 202.*]</p> <p>4. Estoppel (§ 52*)—“Equitable Estoppel.”</p> <p>One who by his acts or representations, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and the latter rightfully acts on such belief so that he would be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts, is thereby conclusively estopped from making such denial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 121-125, 127; Dee. Dig. § 52.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2497-2508;' vol. 8, p. 7655.] ,</p> <p>O. Estoppel (§ 97*)—Equitable Estoppel—Sales—Purchase erom Buyer.</p> <p>A vendor who made a contract of sale of personal property for cash to be paid on or before the delivery of each shipment thereof, which provided that its vendee should remove the property from the ground, load and ship it in the vendor’s name, wrote a letter to its agent to the effect that it had sold the property to its vendee, and in that letter directed its agent to deliver the property to the vendee. A purchaser from the vendee saw this letter in the hands of the agent.</p> <p>Meld, the letter was insufficient to evidence an estoppel of the vendor from proving and enforcing against the purchaser from its vendee the terms of its contract of sale because the letter disclosed no intention to deceive and no culpable negligence toward that purchaser.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. § 289; Dec. Dig. § 97.*]</p> <p>6. Estoppel (§§ 71, 75*)—Equitable Estoppel—Statement—Silence—Sales.</p> <p>A statement by the vendor to the purchaser from such vendee that the vendor had no claim or interest in the property sold, when the fact was that the purchase price had not been paid and the vendor held the title to the property, was sufficient to estop the vendor from proving any title or interest in the property to the damage of the purchaser who acted upon that statement.</p> <p>But the silence of the vendor, or its mere statement that it had sold the property, was insufficient foundation for such an estoppel, because neither evidenced any intention to deceive or any culpable negligence toward such purchaser.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 173-182,192-195; Dec. Dig. •§§ 71, 75.*]</p>

Petition to Review and Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin; Ferdinand A. Geiger, Judge. Bankruptcy proceedings of Charles Churchill. On petition by the bankrupt and his wife to review and revise in matters of law an order (198 Fed. 711) adjudging rights in favor of R. J. Bestul, the bankrupt’s trustee, under an insurance policy on the life of the bankrupt.

In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of Oscar M. Hartzell. An order entered on issues joined between the Century Savings Bank, Robt. Moody & Son, and R. A. Crawford, administrator of the estate of Emma G. Johnson, deceased, having been reversed on the appeal of the bank (204 Fed. 963), and a decree having been vacated, a motion was made to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the remedy was by petition to revise.

Action by Walter E. Beer and another, as executors of Julius Beer, deceased, against Isaac Moffatt, Collector of Internal Revenue, to recover certain legacy taxes paid under War Revenue Act June 13, 1898, c. 448, §§ 29, 30, 30 Stat. 464, 465 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 2307, 2308). From a judgment in favor of defendant (192 Fed. 984), plaintiffs bring error.

Petition to Superintend and Revise Order, and Appeal from, the District Court of the United States f.or the Southern District of Mississippi; Henry C. Niles, Judge. In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of the Louisell Lumber Company. From an order dissolving the lien of attachment levied on certain of the bankrupt’s property, Armour & Co. bring the case here by petition to superintend and revise and appeal.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, at Uynchburg. Suit by Óllie H. Browning and James S. Browning, Jr., an infant, suing by his next friend, James S. Browning, against Thomas T. Boswell and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. On motion by appellants for a citation against additional parties.

Action by the New York Assets Realization Company against John W. McKinnon, individually and as agent for the shareholders, etc., of the Bank of North America. From ,a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling; Alston G. Dayton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Samuel J. T. Russell against the Wheeling Terminal Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

This cause comes here upon appeal from an adjudication of bankruptcy against Martin J. Condon. The appeal is not taken by Condon, who in his answer to the original petition stated that he could not “truthfully deny that he was insolvent,” and that “his assets are far below the amount of his stated liabilities,” and prayed that, “for the protection of all his creditors and that all may be treated alike,” he be adjudged a bankrupt.

the Southern District of New York. This cause comes here upon appeal from a judgment of the District Court, Southern District of New York, entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of defendant in error against James J. Farmer, individually and as trustee for Clara G. Farmer (his wife), Clara G. Farmer, and the Anglo-American Authors’ Association, Incorporated. The verdict was for $42,977.66.

<p>Corporations (§-210*)—Stockholders’ Suit—Parties.</p> <p>Where a Maine corporation owned a very large majority of the stock of a New Jersey corporation, a minority stockholder of the latter cannot ordinarily maintain a bill to restrain the Maine company from voting its stock at an election of directors to manage a New Jersey company’s affairs without making the New Jersey company a party defendant. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 22 Sup. Ct. 308, 46 L. Ed. 499, applied.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 808-813; Dec. Dig. § 210.*</p> <p>Eights of minority stockholders as to management of corporate affairs, see note to Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., 89 C. C. A. 482.]</p>

In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of M. H. Keefe & Son. From an order directing S. P. Riddle, trustee, to sell a certain steam shovel alleged to have been rented by James H. Corbett to the bankrupt, and which the trustee contended was in their possession under contract of sale, claimant appeals.

<p>1. Criminal Law (§ 1218*)—Legality oe Sentence—Imprisonment in Leavenworth Penitentiary.</p> <p>The provision of Act March 3, 1891, c. 529, 26 Stat. 839 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3725), authorizing the establishment of three government prisons “for the confinement of all persons convicted of any. crime whose term of imprisonment is one year or more at hard labor,” so far as it limited the use of such prisons to eases where the sentence included hard labor was repealed as to the prison at Leavenworth by Act March 2, 1895, c. 189, 28 Stat. 957 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3728), directing the transfer of the military prison at Ft. Leavenworth to the Department of Justice to be used for the confinement of prisoners convicted in the United States courts and sentenced to imprisonment in a penitentiary. ;</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3320-3328: Dec. Dig. § 1218.*]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law (§ 1216*)—Continuous Offense—Burglary and Larceny.</p> <p>A defendant cannot he convicted of breaking and entering a post office with intent to commit larceny* in violation of Cr. Code, § 190 (Act March 4,1909, c. 321, 35 Stat: 1124 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1644]), and also of committing the larceny therein, where both acts were committed at the same time and as a part of a continuous transaction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.'—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3310-3319 ; Dee. Dig. § 1216.*]</p> <p>8. Criminal Law (§ 1216*) — Punishment — Excessive Sentence — Right to Discharge.</p> <p>A prisoner confined in a federal penitentiary under a sentence imposing two terms on different counts of the indictment tó be served successively, the second of which terms is illegal, is entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus from such part of the sentence, although his first term has not expired, because of the effect which the illegal part of the sentence has on his right to petition for parole after he has “served one-third of the total of the term or terms for which he was sentenced,” under Act June 25, 1910, e. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1702).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3310-3319; Dee. Dig. § 1216.*]</p>

Pollock, Judge. Habeas corpus, on petition of Julius W. Hopkins, against Robert W. McClaughry, Warden of the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kan.. -From an order denying the writ, and remanding the petitioner to custody, he appeals.

This cause comes here upon writ of error to review a judgment of the District Court, Southern District of New York, in favor of plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below. The action was to recover damages alleged to have been sustained while plaintiff was riding on a train on defendant’s road; such train coming into what is called a “side-wipe” collision with a freight car. The jury rendered-a verdict in favor of plaintiff for six cents damages.

<p>1. Bankruptcy (§ 191*)—Liens—Personal Property—Adjudication—Displacement.</p> <p>Code Miss. 1906, § 3079, provides tbat tbe vendor of personal property shall have a lien thereon for the purchase money while the subject of the sale remains in the hands of the first purchaser or of one deriving title or possession through him with notice that the purchase money is unpaid. Held that, where a suit was brought to enforce such lien within four months prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition against the purchaser, such lien was one created by statute and not one obtained by judicial proceedings, and was not affected by Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 67d, 30 Stat. 564 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3449), providing, that liens given or accepted in good faith and .not in contemplation of or in fraud of the act, and for a present consideration, to the extent of such consideration only shall not be displaced.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 286, 287, 290, 351; Dec. Dig. § 191.*].</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy (§ 191*)-—Seller’s Lien—Enforcement in Bankruptcy by Assignee.</p> <p>Since the seller’s lien for the price conferred by Code Miss. 1906, § 3079, is but a security for the price, the benefit of which follows the debt and is enforceable at least in equity by an assignee, it is enforceable by an assignee in bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 286, 287, 290, 351; Dec. Dig. § 191.*]</p>

In the matter of the bankruptcy proceedings of Ferdinando Savarese, individually and as surviving partner of the firm of V. Savarese & Bro. An order having been entered overruling the specifications of objection to the discharge of the bankrupt filed by the State Bank, it appeals.

Killits, Judge, Suits in admiralty, by Lafayette S. Sullivan and George H. Breyman, and by Lafayette S. Sullivan and another, as owners of the steamer Rust and the schooner Barnes, respectively, against the steamer Alva; M. A. Bradley and others, claimants. Decree for libelants, and claimants appeal.'

<p>Appeal and Error (§ 1195*)—Prior Appeal—Reversal—Determination— Effect—Law of Case.</p> <p>A. & Son, having purchased cotton known as “linters” from defendants, procured them to ship the same as “cotton” on the pretense that they could insure the same during transportation at a higher valuation. Defendants with such knowledge procured bills of lading describing the material as “cotton.” and A. & Son on presentation of drafts attached to the bills of lading paid the drafts, detached them, and pledged the bills to plaintiff bank for a loan on the theory that the material was “cotton” instead of “linters.” Hélü, that the Court of Appeals, on a pridr appeal, having held that since defendants might by reasonable care have discovered that the reason for A. & Son’s request that the property be misdescribed was mere pretense and would enable them to perpetrate the fraud committed, they were liable to plaintiff, such determination was the law of the case on retrial, and, in the absence of different evidence, the trial court properly held that defendants were liable and that the only issue for trial was the question of damages.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4661-4665; Dec. Dig. § 1195.*]</p>

Landis, Judge. In the matter of John B. Dandridge and Spencer B. Pugh, alleged bankrupts. From a decree dismissing the petition, Hattie O. Cooney and the Illinois Fuel & Mining Company appeal. Appellants are two of the three petitioning creditors who sought an adjudication of bankruptcy against appellees. The appeal is from a decree denying adjudication and dismissing the petition.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama; Thomas G. Jones, Judge. Actions by Mabel Clare Bishop and by Lulu G. Thompson and others against the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. In the matter of the bankruptcy proceedings of James Pedio w. Petition of Amedeo A. Bertini to revise an order directing the receiver in bankruptcy to sell at private sále the bankrupt’s stock, consisting of'handkerchiefs, linens, and merchandise, and a further order denying a petition to vacate the original order.

Niles, Judge. Action between M. E. Robertson, trustee, etc., and N. L. Cockrell. Judgment in favor of the latter, and the former brings error.

United States for the District of Kansas; John C. Pollock, Judge. In the matter of Grant Bros., bankrupts. The Baker Ice Machine Company appealed from an order denying its petition to recover property. On reversal of the” order, J. F. Bailey, trustee, requests findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Willard, Judge. Suit in equity by the American Bank Protection Company against the Electric Protection Company and others. From portions of the decree in favor of defendants, complainant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Bill by Herman F. Stempel, Jr., against the O’Brien-Worthen Company, a corporation. From an interlocutory decree for an injunction against infringement and for an accounting, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by John L. Drum against Claude A. P. Turner. On final hearing.</p>

In. Equity. Suit by the National Electric Signaling (Company and others against the Telefunken Wireless Telegraph Company of the United States for infringement of letters patent No. 706,736 for apparatus for wireless telegraphy granted to R. A. Fessenden, August 12, 1902. On final hearing.

<p>Patents (§ 328*)—Validity and Infringement—Ball-Bearing.</p> <p>The Conrad patent, No. 822,723. for a hall-hearing, in view of the prior art, must he limited to a device in which the concentric rings forming the raceway are solid and unbroken throughout, which was the central thought of the invention. So construed, held not infringed.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Clip Bar Manufacturing Company against the Steel Protected Concrete Company. On motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by James H. McGill against Peter Sorensen. On motion to strike out counterclaim in answer.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy proceedings of the M. F. Rourke Company. On referee’s certificate to determine his right to compensation as commissions on funds disbursed by the trustee, on debts incurred by him in the operation of the bankrupt business under his orders.

<p>At Law. Action by M. C. Reich against the Tennessee Copper Company. On demurrer to defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Olaf Hanson and Anna Hanson, husband and wife, against the steamship Starr; the San Juan Fishing & Packing Company, claimant. On exceptions to libel.</p>

In Equity. Suit by Benjamin W. Huebsch against the Arthur H. Crist Company. Decree for complainant.

<p>1. Removal of Causes (§ 25*)—Federal Question—How Shown.</p> <p>Tbe provisions of section 28 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1094 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 140]) for the removal of suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States authorizes such removal only when such facts appear from plaintiff’s own statement of his claim, and, if they do not so appear, their omission cannot be supplied by the petition for removal or by any subsequent pleading.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. §§ 58, 59; Dec. Dig. § 25.*]</p> <p>2. Removal of Causes (§ 19*)—Amount in Controversy—Suits Arising under Law Regulating Commerce—Carmack Amendment.</p> <p>An action against a railroad company to recover for loss of or damage to an interstate shipment of goods through the negligence of defendant is one to enforce the common-law liability of the defendant, and is only removable from a state court on the ground of diversity of citizenship and when the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000. Such action is not a suit arising under “any law regulating commerce,’’ within the meaning of Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1092 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, _p. 136]) § 24, par. 8, of which the district court by paragraph 1 is given jurisdiction, regardless of the citizenship of the parties or the amount involved, as based- on Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, e. 104, § 9, 24 Stat. 382 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3159), which is limited to actions for damages because of the violation of some provision of the act, nor as based on the so-called Carmack amendment to section 20 of the act, embodied in Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1307), requiring the issuance of bills of lading for interstate shipments, the purpose of which is to make the carrier issuing such bill liable thereon by statute for anj' loss or damage occurring on connecting lines.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. §§ 37-46, 48, 52, 53; Dec. Dig. § 19.*]</p>

<p>Albert Steinfeld & Co. and others were indicted for violating Neutrality Resolution March 14, 1912, No. 10, 37 Stat. 630. On demurrer to the indictment.</p>

The Phelps-Dodge Mercantile Company, a corporation,- and the Douglas Hardware Company, a corporation, and certain others, were indicted for violating Neutrality Resolution March 14, 1912, No. 10, 37 Stat. 630, in that they participated in a shipment of munitions of war intended for use in the Mexican revolution. On demurrer to the indictment.

<p>Tbade-Marks .and Trade-Names (§ 72*)—Unlawful Competition—Injunction.</p> <p>Complainant manufactured, sold, and exchanged “Prest-O-Lite” . auto gas in tanks bearing complainant’s trade-mark, which tanks were sold to automobile owners, and when empty could be'exchanged for full tanks at a nominal charge at complainant’s exchange stations. Defendants purchased these tanks, when empty, from automobile owners, refilled them with other gas, and sold and furnished them to customers, after having pasted a paper label on them indicating that they had been refilled; but such label did not entirely cover plaintiff’s trade-mark, nor was it sufficient to successfully advise the purchaser that he was not obtaining Prest-O-Lite gas. Held that, though defendants were entitled to purchase such tanks and refill the same, their resale under such conditions constituted unfair competition, which complainant was entitled to enjoin.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 83; Dec. Dig. § 72*</p> <p>Unfair competition, see notes to Scheuer v. Muller, 20 C. C. A. 165; Lare v. Harper & Bros., 30 C. C. A. 376.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit for unlawful competition in trade by the Prest-OLite Company against Arthur C. Davis and another, doing business as Coughlin & Davis.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Taylor House Association, alleged bankrupt. On motion to confirm the report of the referee adjudicating the association a -bankrupt.

<p>1. Shipping (§ 132*)—Damage to Cargo—Exemption from Liability Under Harter Act—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>To entitle a vessel and owners to exemption from liability for damages to cargo from sea water during a voyage, under Harter Act Feb. 13, 1893, c. 105, § 3, 27 Stat. 445 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2946), the burden rests on the carrier to show that she was seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage and that the damage was caused by dangers of thé sea or from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of the vessel.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 471-487; Dec. Dig. § 132.*]</p> <p>2. Shipping (§ 132*) — Damage to Cargo — Seaworthiness — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>If a vessel proves to be unseaworthy during a voyagé, the burden rests on the owner to prove affirmatively that she was seaworthy at the time the voyage began.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 471-487; Dec. Dig. § 132.*]</p> <p>3. Shipping (§ 132*)—Liability for Damage to Cargo—Evidence Considered.</p> <p>Evidence considered, and held insufficient to show that a vessel was seaworthy at the commencement of a voyage, or that damage to her cargo from sea water resulted from dangers of the sea, or from faults or errors in her navigation or management, but rather to show that it resulted from her unseaworthy condition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 471-487; Dec. Dig. § 132.*]</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by the Triumph Electric Company against Touis H, Thullen. On motion for a preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Utah Implement-Vehicle Company against Frank C. Bowman, as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of N. C. Mickelson, bankrupt, and certain others.</p>

At Law. Action by Polly May Richardson, widow of Walter W. Richardson, deceased, and another, against the Southern Idaho Water Power Company and others. On petition of defendant James A. Green & Co. for removal, the cause was removed to the federal courts, and plaintiffs moved to remand.

Petition of Harry Kendall Thaw for writ of habeas corpus. Commission appointed to determine whether petitioner’s enlargement would be likely to menace the public.

In Bankruptcy. Proceeding against Thorson Bros. On a petition by E. C. Eeean, attacking certain chattel mortgages as fraudulent and void, the referee held such mortgages void, and the Bank of Scandinavia petitions for a review. The bankrupts, merchants, on different dates, executed to the respondent bank three several mortgages covering their stock of general merchandise contained in a store conducted by them to secure indebtedness aggregating $4,875.

<p>1. Collision (§ 8*)—Navigation Rules—East River.</p> <p>Tbe East River is a narrow channel, but boats navigating therein are not bound by tbe so-called narrow channel rule, but are required to observe the New York statute by keeping as nearly as possible in the center of the river, a't the same time observing the general rules as to passing port to port when meeting and that in crossing the burden is on the one having the other on her starboard hand.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Collision, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]</p> <p>2. Collision (§ 95*)—Tugs and Tows Navigating East River—Fault. '</p> <p>The tug Volunteer, with a sand scow on each side, was passing down and diagonally across East River on an ebb tide to the entrance to Wall-about Channel, when on nearing the Brooklyn shore a car float alongside the tug Ashley came into collision with and injured one of the scows. The Ashley was coming up near the Manhattan shore, but turned across in time to intercept the Volunteer, so that at the time of the collision they were on crossing courses. The Volunteer gave a two-whistle signal indicating her intention to cross ahead, which was apparently misunderstood. BeM that, as the Ashley had previously been on no certain course, the Volunteer was not the burdened vessel under the starboard hand rule, but was within her rights in keeping her course, and that the Ashley was in fault for so changing her course as to bring about the collision.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Collision, Cent Dig. §§ 200-202; Dec. Dig. § 95.*]</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Gust Fondahn against the schooner C. S. Holmes. On exceptions to libel.</p>

At Law. Action by Bridget McGovern, as administratrix of the Estate of Peter McGovern, against the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company. On motion for- a new trial and for judgment non obstante veredicto.

<p>1. Pleading (§ 41*)—Declaration—Contents.</p> <p>While it is not necessary and is improper for plaintiff in his declaration to anticipate and deny or avoid matter of defense, he must nevertheless allege all the facts essential to establish a prima facie case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. § 96; Dec. Dig. § 41.*]</p> <p>2. Innkeepers (§ 9*)—Duty to Furnish Lodging—Defenses—Exhausted Accommodations.</p> <p>An innkeeper is absolutely bound to furnish lodging to a traveler in proper condition as to health and conduct and who is ready to pay the proper charge, only provided the innkeeper’s accommodations are not exhausted when the application is made.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Innkeepers, Cent. Dig. §§ 10, 11; Dec. Dig. § 9.*]</p> <p>3. Innkeepers (§ 9*)—Accommodations—Refusal to Furnisd:—Action fob Damages—Declaration—Contents.</p> <p>In an action against an innkeeper for refusal to furnish plaintiff accommodations, a declaration failing to allege that the innkeeper’s accommodations at the time plaintiff applied for entertainment were not exhausted was demurrable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.-—For other cases, see Innkeepers, Cent. Dig. §§ 10, 11; Dec. Dig. § 9.*]</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of J. M. Fiske & Co. On application to the court to fix compensation of trustees’ attorneys. Fees allowed at $51,000.

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Patrick McNiel against the barge St. David, the Coastwise Steamship & Barge Company, Incorporated, and the Griffiths & Sprague Stevedoring Company. On exceptions to amended libel.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the United States to set aside a patent issued by the government to defendant for a town lot in the City of Pocatello, Idaho.

<p>1. Internal Revenue (§ 9*)—Corporation Tax Act—Construction—“Net Income”—Interest on Bonded Indebtedness.</p> <p>Corporation Tax Act Aug. 5, 1909, c. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 946), imposes a tax on tbe net income of corporations, and paragraph 2 declares that such net income shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross income all necessary expenses actually paid within the year out of the income in the business, including all charges, such as rentals or franchise payments required as a condition to the continued use of the property, and (3) interest actually paid within the year on bonded or other indebtedness not exceeding the paid-up capital stock of the corporation outstanding at the close of the year. Complainant was p realty corporation organized to build and rent a building in the city of New York. It had a paid-up capital of $600 and a bonded indebtedness of $4,750,000 secured by mortgage, and during the year for which it was sought to be taxed it had no net income after deducting the interest on its bonded indebtedness from its gross income. Held, that subdivisions 2 and 3 should be construed together, and that the corporation was entitled to deduct interest paid on its bonded indebtedness in determining its taxability.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. §§ 13-28; Dec. Dig. § 9.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4779, 4780.]</p> <p>2. Taxation (§ 58*)—Statutes—Construction.</p> <p>Statutes imposing taxes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 134, 135; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]</p>

_ Evan E. Gwynne was convicted of bringing Anna Ward from one city to another for immoral purposes, and moves to arrest of judgment and for a new trial.

In Admiralty. Suit by Charles Stoffregen against the Prince Line. Limited, as owner of the steamship Portuguese Prince. The steamship Portuguese Prince arrived at New York with a cargo of coffee in bags from various ports in Brazil on October 12, 1912, and on Monday, October 14th, at 10 o’clock a. m., commenced the discharge of her cargo at pier No. 7, East river, belonging to the New York Dock Company, one of the piers customarily used for coffee ships.

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of the Manhattan Brush Manufacturing Company. On motion for the allowance of claims of indorsers of certain notes made to the bankrupt for money paid to the holders for release of the indorsers’ liability.

<p>In the matter of the application of Joseph Pick to be admitted a citizen of the United States.</p>

<p>On application for interpretation of opinion.'</p>

<p>Towage (§ 11*)—Steanding of Tow—Liability of Tug—Uncharted Rock.</p> <p>A tug held not in fault for the stranding of her tow by striking a small submerged rock while following the usual and customary course through the channel of a river, where the rock was uncharted and not generally known to pilots in the neighborhood.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Towage, Cent. Dig. §§ 11-23; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]</p>

<p>Bankruptcy (§ 138*)—Rights of Bankrupt—Assignments of Future Salary.</p> <p>Attempted assignment by a bankrupt of salary held ineffective as to salary earned after tbe bankruptcy, and a stay restraining payment to the bankrupt vacated.</p> <p>¡Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 193-204, 206-209; Dec. Dig. § 138.*]</p>

Action by Charles O’Connor, an infant, by Belle C. O’Connor, his mother and next friend, against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company. Judgment (197 Fed. 224) for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judge. In the matter of the Selman Heating & Plumbing Company, bankrupt; John S. Coxe, trustee. From an order permitting F. S. Hardy & Co. to reclaim property, the trustee appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court- of the United States for the Middle District of Pennsylvania;, Chas. B. Witmer, Judge. Action by G. F. Lazarus, as trustee in bankruptcy against James Eagen. Judgment for plaintiff (206 Fed. 518), and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas; Gordon Russell, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by Charles Herndon against the City of Henderson. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States fordhe Northern District of Mississippi; Henry C. Niles, Judge. Action at law by A. G. Comfort against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the..United States for the Eastern District of Texas; Gordon Russell, Judge!' .Action at law by J. N. and Ortelle McCasland against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring err ror.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas; Gordon Russell, Judge. Suit in equity by the Mackay Telegraph-Cable Com-against the City of Paris. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>

<p>Petition to Superintend and Revise in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia; Emory Speer, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Northern District of Washington.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia; Wm. T. Newman, Judge. Suit in equity by the Stromberg-Carlson Telephone Manufacturing Company against C. Jerome Simmons. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.</p>

Criminal prosecution by the United States against Frank Sullivan for violation of the internal revenue laws. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Action at law by the United States against the New York & Porto Rico Steamship Company. Judgment for defendant, and the United States bring error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Suit in equity by the Waltham Watch Company against Charles A. Keene. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>