Volume 22 — Federal Cases

<p>Case No. 12,806.</p> <p>Seamen — Illegal Punishment — Right to Pbo-teotion — Listening to Complaints.</p> <p>1. Any officer of a vessel may use force, when necessary, to coerce the performance of duty by a seaman, when an exigency requires instant obedience.</p> <p>2. But no one but the highest officer on board, can inflict punishment for a past offence, for the purpose of reformation or example.</p> <p>3. Knocking a man down with a belaying pin, is an illegal mode of punishment.</p> <p>4. The crew of a vessel have a right to the protection of the roaster against illegal violence from his officers. He ought to listen to their complaints, and prevent a repetition of their wrongs.</p> <p>5. Where the crew, having been maltreated by the mate, without reason, and one of them knocked down with a belaying pin, and having good reason to apprehend future violence, appealed to the master in a respectful manner, stating their grievances, and requesting to see the consul, and declaring that they would do no more duty under the mate, the vessel then being safely in port: Held, that the master had no right to require their further services, without listening to their complaints, and taking measures, or giving assurance, that they should be protected from future wrong and outrage from the mate.</p> <p>6. Where the master of a vessel causes any of his crew to be confined in a foreign jail, be ought to see that their condition and treatment there, is such as humanity requires.</p> <p>7. Where seamen have been confined in jail on shore, the master ought not, on their 'return to the ship, to inflict punishment for threats supposed to have been uttered by them while in jail, without seeing the men and hearing their statements.</p> <p>8. It does not necessarily follow, because a wrong is attempted upon a seaman, that he may use every kind and degree of resistance. If the wrong be such as will admit of complete indemnity, such resistance cannot be resorted to.</p> <p>9. The master is civilly responsible for his ill treatment of the crew on board of his ship notwithstanding the advice or direction of the consul.</p>

<p>lln admiralty. For a libel by certain seamen against the master of the ship Anna Kimball, for personal wrongs, see Case No. 12.80(1.]</p>

In tbe case of Shorner it was agreed that the following case should be submitted to tbe district judge for decision as upon a writ of habeas corpus: J. Shorner is a minor, between nineteen and twenty years of age.

The complainant, 'William Short, a citizen of the state of New York, tiled his bill in this court, in 1803, against the defendant, setting forth that Skipwith. as agent of the plaintiff, had abused the confidence reposed in him by. his principal, had failed to account for several sums of money received by him in his character of agent, and had neglected to apply other funds of Short, which had come to his hands, according to the positive instructions of Short; whereby he had…

[This was an application by John Gill Shorter and others, attorneys, for leave to practice in the federal courts without taking the test oath prescribed by the act of January 24, 1865, entitled “An act supplementary to an act to prescribe an oath of office and for other purposes.”]

Assumpsit, in which the plaintiffs declared upon a. note executed by the defendant in 1860. The plaintiffs were citizens of Pennsylvania at the time the note was given, and continued to be such until the bringing of the suit; and during that time the defendant continued to be a citizen of North Carolina.

<p>Case No. 12,813.</p> <p>Nox-Ixtbkcourse — Special Defence — Bübden of Proof — Statutes—Return Cargo — Evidence.</p> <p>1. Where the claimants set up a special de-fence against a forfeiture, the onus probandi lies on them; and if such defence be not satisfactorily made out, condemnation will go. A registered vessel is within the prohibitions of the 3d section of the act of 9 January, 1808, c. 8 [2 Stat. 453]. That section was not repealed by the 19th section of the act of 1st March, 1809, <:. 91 [9 Laws (Weightman’s Ed.l 255: 2 Stat. 033J, or 2d section of the act of 28th June. 1809, c. 9 [10 Laws (Weightman's Ed.) 14; 2 Stat. 550].</p> <p>[Cited in The Ocean Bride. Case No. 10,404; U. S. v. 129 Packages. Id. 15,941;' Boxes of Ojjium v. U. S., 23 Fed. 392.]</p> <p>2. Under the 3d section of the act of 9th January. 1808. c. 8, the return cargo is not affected with forfeiture.</p> <p>3. Strong presumptive circumstances of fraud will outweigh positive testimony against it.</p> <p>[Cited in The Ocean Bride, Case No. 10,404.]</p> <p>[NOTE. This cause was carried by writ of error to the suoreme court, where the sentence of this court condemning the Short Staple was reversed and annulled, and the cause remanded, with directions to decree a restoration of the vessel to the claimants, and to dismiss the bill, 9 Oranch (13 U. S.) 55.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by William Shoup and others against .lacob Henrici and others to enjoin the infringement of letters patent No. 45,647, granted to Shoup December 27.. 1864.]

This was a petition by certain creditors of the firm of J. A. and H. W. Shouse to have that firm declared bankrupt. Held: that where money was lent on a mortgage payable after six months’ notice, such notice not to expire before the 30th January, 1S80, a commission was properly sued out on the debt, in March, 1S20.

<p>Case No. 12,816.</p> <p>Bankruptct — Discharge—Bankrupt Acts — Proportion op Assets.</p> <p>In proceedings in bankruptcy commenced after January first, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, where it does not appear either that the bankrupt's assets are equal to fifty per cent, of the claims proved against him on which he is liable as principal ■ debtor, or that the requisite number of his creditors have assented to his discharge, a discharge from debts contracted prior to January first, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, only, will be granted although the bankrupt shows that his assets equal fifty per cent, of the claims proved against his estate that were contracted subsequent to January first, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Hershman, Case No. 6,430; Re Pierson, Id. 11,154.]</p>

<p>Assumpsit [by Thomas Shreve against Benjamin Dulany] for goods sold and delivered to the defendant’s wife.</p> <p>The defendant, after the jury was sworn, gave a written notice to the plaintiff to produce his book of original entries, in which the items of the account were charged; and tlie next day moved the court to compel the production of it.</p> <p>But THE COUET thought it was reasonable notice; the plaintiff’s counting-house being within a very short distance from the court-house.</p> <p>Upon the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence to prove that the goods were furnished and delivered to the defendant’s wife at her request; and that the defendant afterwards verbally promised to pay for them. That when the goods were furnished to the defendant’s wife, the plaintiff had an account opened in his books against her; and she stated that a considerable part of the goods were for the use of the defendant’s sons, who were under age, (except William,) and were applied to their use and were made into clothes for them, foi the making of which the defendant had paid.</p> <p>Whereupon the defendant offered evidence that his wife left his house in the year 1804, and had lived separate and apart from him ever since; that this was known to the plaintiff at the time he delivered to her the goods, and that in 1805 the defendant, by deed, allowed his wife a separate maintenance.</p> <p>Whereupon the defendant, by his counsel, Mr. C. Simms, prayed the court to instruct the jury, that if they should be satisfied by the evidence that the defendant’s wife left his house, and lived separate and apart from him, and that this was known to the plaintiff at the time he furnished her with goods, and that the defendant had made a competent separate maintenance for his wife before the goods were so furnished, then they ought to find for the defendant. In support of this prayer he cited the following authorities: 1 Esp. N. P. 122, 125; 1 Pow. Cont. IS; Bull. N. P. 135.</p> <p>E. J. Lee, contra, cited Stedman v. Gooch, 1 Esp. 6; Esp. N. P. 124, 126.</p>

<p>[This was an action of ejectment by Shrew and Winston against I. D. Jones to recover possession of a certain lot.]</p>

In admiralty. In this cause of Shrewsbury v. The Sloop Two Friends, the following appears to be a short state of the case: That the vessel, with an American register, is owned partly by a foreign merchant, but now resident here; and partly by a citizen of the state of Georgia, who resides there.

This action was commenced October 27, 1871, to recover the possession of lot one, in block one hundred and eighteen, in the city of Portland, and was tried before a jury, upon the defense that neither the plaintiff [H. A. Shuffleton], his ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seised or possessed of the premises in question, within twenty years before the commencement of this action. Code Or. 141.

A creditor of the bankrupt obtained a judgment against him in the state district court before bankruptcy proceedings were commenced, and the sheriff has made a levy, by virtue of an execution, upon sufficient property to satisfy it.

<p>Case No. 12,823.</p> <p>Courts — Proceedings in Law and Equity — Jurisdiction — Vacating Judgment.</p> <p>1. The commingling of law and equity in the same proceeding, whicb is allowed in the state courts of Georgia, is unknown in the national courts held within that state. ' These sit distinctly as courts of law, or as courts of equity.</p> <p>2. In modern practice the courts incline to allow a question of regularity in the proceedings in a cause to be raised and determined up-en a motion in the cause, instead of requiring the party aggrieved to sue out a writ.</p> <p>3. A circuit or district court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action brought by an in-dorsee of a promissory note where both the maker and the payee and indorser are citizens of the same state. As the payee could not have sued the maker, his assignee or indorsee cannot do so, under section 11 of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789 [1 Stat. 78]. So held, notwithstanding the note was not negotiable in terms.</p> <p>[Cited in Re College Street, 11 R. I. 475.]</p> <p>4. A judgment and subsequent proceedings, had in a circuit or district court, which are void for want of jurisdiction, may be vacated upon motion in the same court, notwithstanding the ■expiration of the term at which the judgment was rendered.</p> <p>[Cited in Woffenden v. Woffenden (Ariz.) 25 Pac. 668. Cited in brief in Jackson v. Hulse, 6 Mackey, 553.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,824.</p> <p>1)ebds— Acknowledgment — 'Who mat Take— Certificate — Recording—Notice.</p> <p>1. Under a late decision of the supreme court of Ohio, a deed acknowledged before the mayor of Cincinnati, is good.</p> <p>2. Independently of this decision, the court incline against the power of the mayor to take the acknowledgment.</p> <p>3. He is given the same powers as a justice of' the peace, “in civil and criminal cases,’’ that is, judicial powers.</p> <p>4. The taking of an acknowledgment is not the exercise of a judicial power — it would seem therefore that the mayor, under the former law, could not take acknowledgments.</p> <p>5. Recording a deed, duly acknowledged, is constructive notice.</p> <p>6. If the acknowledgment be substantially defective, though the deed be recorded, it is not notice.</p> <p>[Cited in Bishop v. Schneider, 46 Mo. 473. Cited in brief in Owen v. Baker, 101 Mo. 410. 14 ¡3. W. 175. Cited in Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 451. Distinguished in Shove v. Larsen, 22 Wis. 146. Cited in Stevens v. Hampton, 46 Mo. 408.]</p> <p>7. By the decision of the supreme court of the United States, parol proof that a justice acted as such, is admissible, when not stated in certificate.</p> <p>[Cited in Hudson v. Fishel, 17 R. I. 70, 20 Atl. 100.]</p> <p>8. Notice in fact may be proved, of a prior deed.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,826.</p> <p>Bankruptcy —Illegal Transfer or Property— Action by Assignee to Recover — Damages.</p> <p>1.A transfer of property by an insolvent debtor, contrary to section 5128 of the Revised Statutes, is contingently valid, and the receipt of the same by the creditor is not tortious, and does not of itself amount to a conversion of the property.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Crampton v. Valido Marble Co., 60 Vt. 297, 15 Atl. 153.]</p> <p>2. An action by an assignee in bankruptcy to recover the value of goods transferred by the bankrupt contrary to section 5128 of the Revised Statutes, is in substance and effect an action of trover, and the complaint must either allege an actual conversion of the property to the use of the defendant, or a demand and refusal to deliver the same to the assignee.</p> <p>[Cited in Crampton v. Valido Marble Co., 60 Vt. 302, 15 Atl. 153.]</p> <p>3. In such action the assignee may recover damages for the detention of the' prooerty, including profits made out of it, or injuries received by it while in the possession of the creditor.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,825.</p> <p>Continuance — Sickness op Counsel.</p> <p>A motion was made for a continuance of this cause, founded on the affidavit of one of the defendant's counsel, who was sick and unable to attend the court. The affidavit stated that the affiant was the first counsel engaged by the defendant, had appeared as his counsel in the same case in the state court, and was intimately acquainted with the grounds of defence. That he had possession of the papers, &c., and that he did not believe justice could be done in the cause, under present circumstances, in his absence.</p> <p>[Cited in Markson v. Ide, 29 Kan. 703; Myers v. Trice, 11 Haus. (86 Va.) 841.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 12.824.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,827.</p> <p>Partnership — Dissolution — Notice — Publication in Newspaper.</p> <p>1. There are two modes of giving notice of the dissolution of a copartnership, which will discharge an outgoing partner. One is express notice, by circular or otherwise, to those with whom the firm has had dealings. The other by publication in some newspaper of general circulation.</p> <p>2. This latter notice is conclusive on those who had not had dealings with the firm. And as to those who have had dealings with the firm, such a publication would be received as evidence to the jury, who must determine, from all the circumstances of the case, whether the party had notice.</p> <p>3. A person who deals with an individual, and exercises a power to bind another, should make some inquiry into his right to do so.</p>

Heard on motion for peremptory mandamus. The case was as follows: On February 23, 1876, the plaintiff recovered in this court against the city of Mobile a judgment for $23,560. The judgment was based on five hundred semi-annual interest coupons for $40 each, which had been originally attached to one hundred bonds for $1,000 each, issued by the city- of Mobile in aid of the Mobile & Alabama' Grand Trunk Railway Company.

<p>Case No. 12,830.</p> <p>Insurance — Fraudulent Proof of Loss — Accuracy is Proof — Arson — Over-valuation — Preponderance of Evidence.</p> <p>1. If an insured party who has suffered a loss, knowingly and with the intention to defraud the insurance company, which had insured his stock of goods, makes up in his proof of loss a false and exaggerated statement of the amount and value of the stock of goods in store at the time of the fire and destroyed or damaged thereby, he thereby forfeits all claim against the insurance company.</p> <p>2. The insured is not obliged to state his loss in dollars and cents with arithmetical accuracy, but lie must disclose the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as nearly as he can arrive at it by a reasonable and honest effort on his part.</p> <p>3. The fact that the insured had been tried and acquitted on a criminal charge of arson in connection with the burning of his store, is entitled to no weight in a civil suit on the policy, in which arson is alleged as a defense.</p> <p>4. Where an insurance company, in defense of an action on an insurance policy, alleges arson or a fraudulent over-valuation of the property destroyed, it sustains the burden of proof and must make out its defense by a satisfactory preponderance of evidence.</p> <p>5. Mere number of witnesses does not constitute oreponderance of evidence, and the jurors may believe one in opposition to several, if satisfied that the truth is with him.</p> <p>Verdict for plaintiff, for $567.50.</p> <p>The verdict in this ease was subsequently set aside and a new trial granted; and the suit was afterwards dismissed by plaintiff.</p> <p>NOTE. The fraud and false swearing, in order to defeat a recovery, must have been intentional. with respect to a material matter and with the purpose to defraud and deceive the insurer. Marion v. Great Republic Ins. .Co., 85 Mo. 148: Moadinger v. Mechanics’ Fire Ins. Go., 2 Hall (N. Y. Super. Ct.) 490; Commercial Ins. Co. v. Huekberger. 52 Ill. 464; MeMaster v. President, etc., of Insurance Co. of North America, 55 N. Y. 222; Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 288; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Updegrnff, 43 Pa. St. 330; Insurance Companies v. Weides. 14 Wall. [81 U. S.] 375; Doggo v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 501. 5 N. W. 889.</p> <p>A discrepancy between the value of the goods destroyed by the fire as sworn to by the insured, and the value as proven on the trial in a suit against the company, is not necessarily evidence of fraud. Beck v. Germania Ins. Co.. 23 La. Ann. 510: Clark v. Phoenix Ins. Co.. 36 Cal. 168; Franklin Ins. Co. v. Culver, 6 Ind. 137; Moore v. Protection Ins. Co., 29 Me. 97; Rockford Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 75 Ill. 548.</p> <p>If payment of the loss be obtained by means of fraudulent proofs, the money may be recovered back. Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 102 Mass. 221; Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Elliott [5 Fed. 223]; McConnel v. Delaware Mut. Safety Ins. Co., 18 Ill. 228.</p>

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.</p> <p>[This was an action by George .T. Sicard, as-signee in bankruptcy of Clarence D. Simpson and Joseph W. Dennis, against the Buffalo, New York & Philadelphia Railway Company, to recover damages for the detention of coal.]</p>

This was an action on the case [by William B. Sickels against William Borden,] tried before Mr. Justice Nelson, for the infringement of letters patent [No. 4,199] granted to Frederick E. Sickels, September 19th, 1845, for a “method of tripping the-dx-op cut-off valves of steam-engines, and regulating and adjusting the same.” The material parts of the specification, and the-claims, were as follows: “By the method now practised of operating the drop cut-off valve, the motion…

This was a motion [by William B. Siekels] for an attachment for the violation of an injunction restraining the defendants [William Borden and others] from using “a certain improvement in the cut-off, patented to Frederick E. Siekels by letters patent [No. 4,199] dated September 19th, 1845,” “by themselves, their agents, servants, workmen or employees” “on the steamer Metropolis, running on the Sound between New York and Fall River.” The injunction was issued under an order…

<p>Case No. 12,835.</p> <p>Patents — Injunction—Defences to — When mat be Issued.</p> <p>1. In order to successfully resist a motion for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a patent, where no question is made as to the use by the defendant of the thing patented, facts must be shown, on the part of the defendant, tending to prove that the plaintiff was not the inventor of the thing patented within two years before his application for the patent.</p> <p>2. It is not a sufficient answer to such a motion, that the infringement has been discontinued and is not intended to be resumed, no compensation for the unlawful use having been made.</p> <p>[Cited in Potter v. Crowell, Case No. 11,323.]</p> <p>3. There is no necessity that the validity of a patent should be established on a trial at law, before an injunction can be granted, where the case is-a clear one for the plaintiff, even though it be shown that the defendant is able to respond in damages.</p> <p>[Cited in Hodge v. Hudson River R. Co., Case No. 6,560; Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Whitney, Id. 3,132.]</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Sickels v. Falls Co. Case No. 12,834; Same v. Evans, Id. 12,839; Case v. Borden, Cases Nos. 12,832, 12,833; Same v. Tileston, Case No. l2,-837; Steam-Packet Co. v. Sickles, 10 How. (51 U. S.) 419.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,834.</p> <p>Patents — Effect — Function — Priok Patent— Reissue — Steam Cut-Off.</p> <p>1. The claim in the patent granted to Frederick E. Siekels, September 19th, 1845, extended September 19th, 1859, and reissued February 21st, 1860, for an “improvement in steam engines,” to “imparting a co-existing movement to two reciprocating catch-pieces, in the operation of the trip cut-off valves,” is a claim for an effect or function, and is, therefore, not patentable.</p> <p>[Cited in Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68, 15 Sup. Ct. 749.]</p> <p>2. The claim is also void on the ground that the imorovement is substantially described and claimed in a patent granted to the patentee October 19th, 1844.</p> <p>[Cited in Jones v. Sewall, Case No. 7,495; Consolidated Roller-Mill Co. v. Coombs, 39 Fed. 38.]</p> <p>3. It is also void because, the improvement having been invented in 1844, it was not embodied in the original patent of 1845, or noticed therein until the reissue of 1860.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see note to Sickels v. Mitchell, Case No. 12,835.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,836.</p> <p>Patents — Steam Cut-Off — Novelty.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by William B. Siekels against Thomas Tileston.] Application for a provisional injunction.

[This was a bill in equity by William B. Sickels and others against David L. Youngs and Stephen Cutter.] Motion for a provisional injunction to restrain the infringement of letters patent [No. 2,631], granted to Frederick E. Sickels, May 20th, 1842, for “a new and useful improvement in the manner of constructing the apparatus for lifting, tripping, and regulating the closing of valves of steam-engines.” The plaintiffs were assignees of the patent.

This was a bill in equity [by Frederick E. Sickles against Bailey W. Evans and Caleb Seagrave] filed to restrain defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 3,802], for an “improvement in the method of opening and closing the valves of steam engines,” granted to complainant October 19, 1844; extended for seven years from October 19, 1838; reissued January 1, 1801, in two divisions, numbered 1112 and 1113, one of which, reissue 1113, was again reissued January 28, 1S62.

This was a question as to the mode of taking evidence in equity suits in the federal courts; and arose upon a bill in equity for the infringement of a patent.

This was a bill in equity [by William B. Sickles and others against the Gloucester Manufacturing Company] to restrain the infringement of letters patent [No. 2,031] for an improvement in steam engines, granted May 20, 1842, to Frederick E. Sickles, and assigned to plaintiff. The patent expired May 20, 1856, previous to which time, the bill had been filed praying for an injunction, discovery, and account of profits.

<p>[This was a proceeding by Joseph D. Side-ner, assignee, against Bernhard Klier. Submitted for final hearing and decree.] •</p>

<p>Case No. 12,842.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,844.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Provable Debt — Concealment— Fraurulent Debts.</p> <p>1. A judgment obtained on breach of promise to marry, is a debt provable in bankruptcy, and is barred by discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Sheehan, Case No. 12,737.]</p> <p>[Cited in Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. SO.]</p> <p>2. Concealment to oppose discharge of bankrupt must be wilful.</p> <p>3. A fraudulent debt must be one made with a view to give a preference. Payment of attorney’s fees is not such a preference as will prevent discharge of bankrupt.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Seeley, Case No. 12,628; Re Boynton, 10 Fed. 279.]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Nicholas Sie-bert against William T. Garratt, for the infringement of certain letters patent.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,847.</p>

<p>[This was a libel in rem by Richard Roberts and others against the ship Sierra Nevada and cargo for salvage.).</p>

<p>Case No. 12,848.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Return—Custodt of Marshal —Conflict of Authority</p> <p>1. A return to a writ of habeas corpus, issued by a judge of the United States, under the judiciary act of 1789 [1 Stat. 73). showing an imprisonment undei process, legal and valid on its face, is conclusive, and precludes further inquiry into the cause of imprisonment.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Farrand, Case No. 4,678.]</p> <p>2. But the seventh section of the act of congress of the 2d of Siarch, 1833 [4 Stat. 634), expressly confers on a judge of the United States the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, in all eases of imprisonment by any authority of law, for any act done or omitted in obedience to a law of the United States;- and where such imprisonment is for an alleged violation of a state law, and by state authority, the judge or court issuing the habeas corpus may inquire into the circumstances ”nder which the alleged crime was committed, with a view to the question whether the act complained of was done or omitted in the proper discharge of official duty, and under the authority of the United States; and, if it appears the act was so done or omitted, the judge or court is authorized to discharge the party from such imprisonment.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Neill, Case No. 10,089.]</p> <p>3. A marshal having a person in custody under lawful process, is bound to retain such custody, and in so doing may use such force as is necessary; and in the proper use of such force, is not guilty of a crime against the law of the state in which the transaction occurred.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Fullhart, 47 Fed. 804.]</p> <p>4. A state judge has no jurisdiction to issue a habeas eoipus for a prisoner in the lawful, custody of an officer of the United States, with a knowledge that he is so held; and if. on the return of the writ, it appears the imprisoned party is held by an officer of the .United States under legal process, the jurisdiction of the state judge ceases, and all further proceedings by him will be coram non judice.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Farrand. Case No. 4,678; Be Reynolds, Id. 11,722.]</p> <p>5. A sheriff, or other state officer, having a so-called writ of habeas corpus, under the Ohio statute of 1856, and having knowledge that the prisoner named in the writ is in the custody of ■an officer of the United States, under legal process, is under no obligation to serve, or attempt to serve, such writ; and his return of the facts is a sufficient justification for not serving it.</p> <p>6. A marshal, having custody of a prisoner under the authority of the United States, is not hound to surrender such prisoner upon the demand of a state officer, having a writ issued under the said Ohio statute, requiring him to take the prisoner from such custody.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa, 94.]</p> <p>7. But if the habeas corpus in the hands of the state officer is issued in good faith, and is the well known writ of that name,-requiring the officer of the United States having the custody to bring the prisoner before the judge or court issuing the writ, with the cause of the caption and detention it is the duty of such officer to obey such writ, as thereby he does not part with the custody of the prisoner; and such obedience will not be in conflict with his duty..</p> <p>8. It is well settled by the adjudications, both of the courts of the Union and the states, that, in case of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal or court to which jurisdiction first attaches shall retain it; and neither has a right to interfere with the other.</p> <p>[Cited in Bruce v. Manchester & Iv. B. Co., 19 Fed. 344.]</p>

<p>[This was a proceeding by William P. Sigs-by against Alexander E. Willis.]</p>

The plaintiffs [Henry W. Sill and Mason Thomson] brought this action against [Cornelius W. Lawrence] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties.

<p>Case No. 12,851.</p> <p>Bridges — Obstruction’ to Navigation — Draws— Preliminarr Injunction.</p> <p>1.The purpose and object of the bridge across the Hudson river at Albany, authorized by the act of the legislature of New York, passed April 9, 1856, entitled, “An act authorizing the construction of a bridge across the Hudson river at Albany’ (Sess. Laws 1856 c. 146), were not simply the transportation of railroad trains, but, in addition, the accommodation of the public in general, in travel and business, by the use of it as a common highway.</p> <p>2. On a bill filed, alleging that a bridge constructed according to the directions in that act, for the conveyance over the same of trains of railroad cars, and for the accommodation of the travelling and business public in general, would constitute an obstruction of the free navigation of the river, within the meaning of the constitution and of the acts of congress securing a right to the enjoyment of the same, the question presented, on a motion for a provisional injunction, before the erection of the bridge is actually commenced, is, whether a case is presented which calls upon the court to interfere and arrest the erection of the bridge, until an opportunity is afforded for a more full examination of witnesses, and a more mature consideration of the alleged obstruction.</p> <p>[Cited in Miller v. New York, Case No. 9,585.)</p> <p>3. In a case of that kind, the work contemplated ought to be promptly enjoined, if there be any reasonable ground for believing that the bridge may finally be held an obstruction, and hence subject to be abated, as the expense and loss to the defendants may otherwise be heavy and ruinous.</p> <p>4. In the present case, the legal right of the plaintiff to a free and unobstructed navigation of the Hudson river being clear, and the defence being that the bridge contemolated would not substantially obstruct or impede such right, and the court being in doubt whether the erection of the bridge in the mode provided by the act, in connection with the powers conferred in the use of it, would not be a serious or material obstruction to the free navigation of the river, the court enjoined the proceedings in the erection of the bridge, until the final hearing of the case.</p> <p>[See Baird v. Shore Line Ry. Co., Case No. 758.)</p> <p>5. The real question in the case stated to be, whether or not, regarding the probable travel and transportation across the bridge by railroad cars and as a common highway, and also the business depending upon the free navigation of the river, up and down, at the place where the bridge is to be erected, the draw or draws provided for will furnish reasonable means to prevent the navigation from being seriously or materially impaired.</p> <p>6. Another question involved stated to be, how far the personal duties and obligations imposed by the charter of a bridge upon its grantees, to remove obstructions to navigation occasioned by its erection, should be taken into account in determining the question of its lawfulness.</p> <p>7. Another question stated to be, how far the business of commerce upon the rivers of the country is to yield to the convenience and accommodation of the conveyance of passengers upon railroads.</p> <p>8. The navigation between different ports upon a public river within the same state, comes within the power to regulate commerce “among the states.</p> <p>9. The power conferred by the constitution upon congress, to regulate commerce, is paramount to the power in a state to authorize the building of a bridge across a public river navigable from the aea.</p> <p>[NOTE. This cause was again before the court on final hearing on pleadings and proof. The judges being opposed in opinion (Case No. 12.852). a division of opinion was certified to the supreme court, where the judges of that court were also equally divided. 1 Black (66 U. S.) 582. This court then made decrees dismissing the bills. Case No. 2.983. From those decrees the plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court where the decrees of this court were affirmed. 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 403.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,852.</p> <p>Bridges— Obstructions to Navigation — Commerce AMONG THE STATES — CONFLICTING INTERESTS — STATE Legislation — Injunction.</p> <p>1.The granting of injunctions by the courts of the United States, considered. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>2. Injunctions, in cases of public nuisance or purpresture, are only to be granted in order to prevent irreparable mischief, or. to prevent or suppress continual, oppressive, or vexatious litigation. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>3. The right of the plaintiff, and the serious character of the injury, ought to be clearly established by a trial at law. or otherwise, before a court of the United States should grant an injunction to restrain the construction of a bridge authorized by an act of the legislature of the state in which it is proposed to be erected. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>4. The question, whether the bridge proposed to be constructed in this case, one over the Hudson river at Albany, would materially obstruct navigation, discussed. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>5. In the present case, the extent of the threatened injury, and of the public benefit to be secured by the erection of a bridge, may be proper subjects of inquiry, and a remedy by injunction should not be afforded unless the impending injury is irreparable, and the right of the plaintiff free from serious doubt. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>[Cited in Blanchard v. Western Union Tel. Co., 60 N. Y. 514.]</p> <p>6. The mere grant of power by the constitution to congress, to regulate commerce among the several states, is not, per se. and without any exercise of the power by congress, an absolute inhibition of all state legislation which may interfere with or affect the inter-state commerce of the United States. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>7. The states ietain the power to legislate in regard to turnpike roads, railroads, bridges, ferries. and the public health, and generally in regard to the internal commerce and police of the state. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>8. The construction of the bridge in this case, it being authorized by an act of the legislature of New York, cannot be restrained by this court, by injunction, unless the provisions of the act aré repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States, or, unless the bridge, if erected, would practically conflict with and abridge the rights to which the plaintiff is entitled under the laws of the United States. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>[Cited in Miller v. New York. Case No. 9.585; Ormerod v. New York, W. S. & B. R. Co.. 13 Fed. 372.]</p> <p>9. The extent of the plaintiff’s rights, as the holder of a coasting license, granted under the act of February 18th. 1793 (1 Stat. 306, § 4), discussed. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>10. The cases of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. [22 U. S.] 1, Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. [27 U. S.] 245, and Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. [54 U. S.] 518, and 18 How. [59 U. S.] 421, considered. Per Hall, J.</p> <p>11. The power of deciding between the conflicting interests of river navigation and of transportation across navigable rivers by permanent structures, is a legislative and not a judicial power. Per Hall, j.</p> <p>12. The legislature of a state may, in the absence of any restraint by congressional legislation, authorize the erection of a bridge over its navigable waters. Pei Hall, J.</p> <p>13. Congress can prohibit the erection of the bridge in this case, or prescribe what facilities it shall afford for the navigation of the river; but, in the absence of congressional legislation, the law of the state must govern, and, unless the legislation of the state conflicts with that of congress, or with the constitution of the United States, this court has no authority to annul the legislation of the state by the restraining process of injunction. Per Hall, J. See the opinion of Nelson, J., in Silliman t. Hudson River Bridge Co. [Case No. 12.851],</p> <p>[Cited in Miller v. New York, Case No. 9,-585.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Charles A. Silliman against the Troy and West Troy Bridge Company and others.] Motion for a preliminary injunction, to restrain the defendants from proceeding in building a bridge across the Hudson river, between the city of Troy and the village of West Troy, and was founded upon the pleadings and affidavits.

<p>Case No. 12,854.</p> <p>Notes — Demand—Assignment—Pleading.</p> <p>1. Where a note is made payable at a par-ticular place, a demand at such place, when the note becomes due, is not necessary, to main-Ttain an action against the maker.</p> <p>.2. An averment that the note was assigned -on the day, or at the time of its execution, is sufficient.</p> <p>3. Where an action is brought against two, as the survivors of one, who executed a joint note, it is not essential to allege in the breach, that ■the note had not been paid by the deceased.</p> <p>¡[Cited in Ripka v. Pope, 5 La. Ann. 61.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,855.</p> <p>Constitutional Law —Acts op Bankruptcy— Pleading.</p> <p>1. The constitutional grant of power to congress, to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, is not limited to passing enactments similar in scope and operation to those in force in England, when the constitution was adopted. It gives congress plenary power over the subject of bankruptcy; under one limitation only, that the laws passed upon that subject shall be uniform throughout the United States.</p> <p>2. The reasons why this power should be vested in the national government, — explained.</p> <p>3. Under the constitution an# and all uniform legislation, tending to promote the distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets among his creditors, and his discharge from their demands, is within the power of congress.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Reiman. Case No. 11,673; Re California Pac. R. Co., Id. 2,315.]</p> <p>4. The wisdom and soundness of the policy of allowing insolvent debtors to dictate preferences in the distribution of their assets, — questioned.</p> <p>5. In the district court, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, pleadings must be special. Hence, a mere general denial of the intent with which an act relied upon as an act of bankruptcy is alleged to have been done, is not a good defense to the charge; but the respondent must also allege and prove with what intent he did such act.</p> <p>6. When the unlawful intent is the necessary consequence of the act charged, as in the ease of a payment of one creditor by an insolvent debtor, a mere denial of such intent is no answer to the petition, and judgment may be given against the respondent as upon a failure to answer.</p> <p>7. Inasmuch as every man is presumed to intend the necessary consequences of his acts, a debtor who has paid one creditor to the exclusion of others, cannot be heard to say that he did not intend to give such creditor a preference. The necessary effect of such payment is, to give a preference. Judgment may be given against a respondent whose answer sets up no other matter of defense than the denial of the intent, as upon failure to answer.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Seeley, Case No. 12,628; National Security Bank v. Price, 22 Fed. 699.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem by the United States, claiming a forfeiture of the schooner, Silver Moon, for importing liquors in packages smaller than allowed by law. William Decker made claim to the vessel and answered denying the allegations of the libel.

On the libel of David Beard and Robert McArthur, for salvage.

A libel was filed on the 1st of April, 1854, by the district attorney, on behalf of the United States, to enforce the forfeiture of the Silver Spring, of Harwich, a fishing schooner of 67 tons burden, alleged to have obtained the fishing bounty for the summer of 1853, by fraud and deceit, and to have become forfeited thereby. The claimants pleaded that there was no forfeiture.

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the district of California.] A petition having been filed, under the second section of the bankruptcy act, asking the circuit court to review an order of the district court in a proceeding in bankruptcy, the petitioner’s counsel objected to the sitting of the circuit judge, on the ground that, at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, the judge was a creditor of the bankrupt [John Sime & Co.], and…

Petition of Sol. A. Sharp for an order restraining the trustee, P. J. White, from paying certain moneys in his hands to one Wm, T. Garratt, and directing the payment of said moneys to the petitioner. The material facts are as follows: John Sime & Co. were bankers, and on the first day of November, 1S71, filed a petition and were adjudged bankrupts. At the time of the failure, Wm.

<p>This was an application made to WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice, in Philadelphia, out of court, by Mr. Simmons, under the third section of the act of congress respecting fugitives from justice, &c. (see 1 Story’s Laws, 274), for a certificate as provided by that section. The evidence was, that Mr. Simmons came to Philadelphia from Charleston, South Carolina, where he resided, and has plantations, in February 1822, and rented a house for one quarter, which he furnished, and in which he continued to reside with his family for three quarters and six weeks. That he brought with him his slave, as his property, who remained during that period, or the greatest part of it, in his service as a domestic, and who has remained in Philadelphia until the present time, without any attempt being made by his master to remove him back to South Carolina, until the present application.</p>

On the motion of respondent [Solomon Simmons] to vacate the order to show cause and dismiss the petition for want of a sufficient verification to the petition, and the cross motion of the petitioning creditors to amend by supplying a sufficient verification.

Information for smuggling. From the defendant’s admission to the collector, it appeared that being a resident of Washtenaw county, Michigan, on the 17th of November, A. D. 1865, he went from there to Windsor, Canada West, for the purpose of buying an overcoat for his son, a lad of eighteen, who accompanied him.

[This was a bill in equity by Robert F. Simmons and others against William Blaek-inton and others to enjoin the infringement of letters patent No. 193,543, granted July 24, 1877.]

[These were actions at law by Thomas Simms and by Samuel Delgado against the Pullman Southern Oar Company for damages for failure of a sleeping car, in which they had engaged berths from New Orleans to Philadelphia, to proceed beyond Washington. Verdicts for defendants. Plaintiffs move for new trials.]

[This was an action of ejectment by Simms’ lessee against James Bead.] The land in controversy was granted in 1790 by the state of North Carolina to Stock-ley Donelson, and by him conveyed to David Allison. The plaintiff claimed under a deed executed by Joshua B. Bond, attorney in fact for Allison. The power of attorney under which Bond conveyed was acknowledged in 1797 before Hilary Baker, mayor of the city of Philadelphia.

<p>[This was an action at law on a dishonored check by Jehiel H. Simonds against Black River Insurance Company. Verdict was given for plaintiff.]</p>

1st, that the plaintiff could not abandon, from the terms stipulated in the order for effecting the insurance; which stated, that the plaintiff was not to abandon, if the vessel should be prevented from entering the port of Cape Francois, from blockade or other cause, but with liberty to proceed to some other port. Secondly. That on general principles, the plaintiff could not abandon. If he could not enter at the cape, he was at liberty to go to some other port. He did so.

[This was an action by Simonds against the Union Insurance Company on two policies of insurance. There was a verdict for plaintiff for the whole sum. Case No. 12,875.) Rule for new trial.

Upon the formation of a partnership between Simonton & Boucher, in 1801, Simon-ton agreed that the separate debts of Boucher, then due by him, should be assumed and paid by the house of Simonton & Boucher; and for securing Simonton for such payments, a bond was executed by the defendants, in which Boucher was bound for the whole of such payments, and Smith and Wood, as his sureties, for one-half.

[Appeal by George B. Simpson from the decision of the commissioner of patents refusing his application for a patent for insulating telegraph wire with gutta percha.]

This was a libel in personam, by Thomas Simpson against Daniel Caulkins, master of the ship Sabrina, to recover damages for breach of a shipping contract. Twelve other causes were instituted on the same facts and for the same cause of action, by Simpson’s fellow sailors in the voyage on the Sabrina, and were consolidated with the present. The cause now came before the court on appeals taken by both parties, from the taxation of costs by the clerk.

<p>Case No. 12,879.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge — Release from Imprisonment.</p> <p>Where a judgment in trespass for malicious imprisonment and whipping was recovered against A., who afterwards was adjudged a bankrupt, held, that upon receiving his discharge he must be released from imprisonment.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,881.</p> <p>Admiiultt— Jurisdiction — 'Toets—Locality.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of admiralty of a collision between a steam tug and a floating dry dock lying in the river, moored to a wharf. As respects torts, the jurisdiction depends entirely on locality; the character of the object injured, or of the thing by which the injury is inflicted, is unimportant.</p> <p>[Cited in Milwaukee v. The Curtis, 37 Fed. 706.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,882.</p> <p>Limitations — Judgment—How Pleaded.</p> <p>Where the statute of limitations has run against a judgment, it may be pleaded to a sci. fa. to revive the judgment.</p>

Action at law upon a policy of insurance [by William H. Simpson against the Pacific Mutual Insurance Company). The case was submitted to the court on an agreed statement of facts, the material parts of-which are stated in the opinion.

<p>Case No. 12,885.</p> <p>Patents — Utility—Damages.</p> <p>1. A person who approves of an improvement of a patented right, but refuses to pay the price charged for it, is inexcusable for using it.</p> <p>2. The fact of use is evidence of its utility, and should subject the defendant to damages.</p>

This was a bill in equity upon the following allegations: One R. O. Otis, of South-port, Wisconsin, having a large amount of real estate, so situated that his title to it would be lost, and some $15,000 or $20,000 sacrificed, if he did not raise about $9,000 before the 5th of November, 1845, proceeded to Boston with a view, if possible, to borrow that amount in money.

Tills cause came before the court upon the petition of the assignee for direction as to the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of certain property belonging to the estate .and claimed to be covered by a chattel mort.gage held by James Monaghan. It was referred to the register in charge to take proofs to be certified into court with his opinion thereon.

<p>Case No. 12,888.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Mortgage Given Apter Commencement of Proceedings — Motion to Set Aside.</p> <p>An assignee may petition summarily to set aside a mortgage given after the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy. Resort to a bill in equity is unnecessary.</p> <p>[See Case No. 12,889.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.] This was an appeal from the district court; where, upon a libel by the appellee, the executrix of her husband, for the wages, as mate on board a vessel, belonging to the appellant, for his full wages from Philadelphia to Ba-tavia, and back, although he died at Batavia; the court decree accordingly. [He was hired for the whole voyage, at the rate of 830 per month.

<p>This case came on upon bill and plea. The former states that Nicklin and Griffith, being indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of. $21,-7G2, Griffith, the surviving partner, for the purpose of securing the said debt, did, by two instruments executed the 20th of April, 1807, covenant to convey to the plaintiff Certain lands, to be disposed of at the end of five years if the debt should not then be paid, and also the interest of Nicklin and Griffith in the cargo of the Triton; in consideration whereof, the plaintiff covenanted that he had not, and would not, employ any legal process to affect the joint or separate interest of said Nicklin and Griffith, or the person of Griffith, and on breach of this covenant on the part of the plaintiff, the agreement to be void; and further, that the said agreement should not affect the claims of the plaintiff against the joint or separate property of Nicklin and Griffith, should the said lands, at the end of the five years, be found unequal to satisfy the debt then due to the plaintiff. The bill further states, that the plaintiff had fully complied with his part of the agreement, and that he had always considered himself restrained by his said covenant from bringing any suit to affect the joint or separate estate of Nicklin and Griffith, on account of the debt due him. That conveyances for the said lands were executed in July, 1807, by Griffith to the plaintiff; but that the same, for defect of title, and other causes, were of no value, and, as well as the cargo of the Triton, have been totally unproductive. That on the 7th of December, 1807, Griffith executed a general assignment of all the partnership effects of Nicklin and Griffith, and of his individual estate, to the defendants, in trust for such of the creditors of Nicklin and Griffith as should, within one year from the date of the deed, execute a covenant not to proceed against the person of the said Griffith or his estate for any debt contracted before the death of said Nicklin, or since, with the said Griffith, as his surviving partner, or in his own right; that the trustees accepted the trust, and possessed themselves of the effects so assigned to them, and after turning them into money, have made a dividend thereof among many of the creditors, excluding the plaintiff altogether, and refuse to pay any part of his claim; that although the plaintiff has considered, and still considers himself bound by his agreement of April, ISO", not to prosecute any suit against Griffith, or the effects of Nicklin and'Griffith, or of Griffith for his debt; still, to remove all objections, he did. in the year 1S13, execute and deliver to the agent of the defendant a covenant not to proceed against the person or estate of the said Griffith, in the. same terms as the other creditors had done; of which the defendants had notice. The prayer is for an account of the moneys received by the defendants under the assignment, and that the dividend to which the plaintiff is entitled, may be ascertained and paid to him.</p> <p>Sims having died since filing the bill, it has been revived in the name of his executors, and the plea is put into both bills. It states that the bill seeks a discovery and relief from the defendants, as assignees of the said Griffith, of all the effects which have come to their hands under the assignment in the bill mentioned, claiming, as one of the creditors of Nicklin and Griffith, a dividend of the said effects; that in the said bill it is further stated, that, on the 7th of December, 1807, the said Griffith made an assignment of all the estate and effects of Nicklin and Griffith. and of Griffith, to the defendants, in trust for their creditors, with a proviso that no creditor, joint or separate, should be entitled to any part of the trust estate who should not, within one year from the date of the assignment, execute a covenant not to proceed against the person of the said Griffith, or his estate, for any claim contracted before the death of Nicklin. or since his death contracted with said Griffith, as his surviving partner, or on his own account. The plea then avers, that the said Sims, although he lived many years after the date of the said assignment, did not, within one year from the said 7th of December, 1807, execute a covenant not to proceed, &c. (following the proviso in the assignment), nor did he, within the said year, in any other manner release the said Griffith or his estate from any claim or demand contracted before the death of Nicklin. or afterwards with the said Griffith, according to the true intent and meaning of the said proviso; and further, that the said Sims had due notice of the said assignment and proviso, at or immediately after the execution of the said assignment, and within twelve months from the date thereof, viz. on the 1st of January, 180S; all which the defendants plead in bar of the said bill, and demand judgment if they shall further answer, &c.</p> <p>The question, in this stage of the cause, arose upon a motion to overrule the plea, because it does not admit or deny all the facts stated in the bill, nor is it accompanied by an answer denying those facts. Cases cited, Coop. Ch. Prac. 225; 1 Har. Ch. Prac. 227, 305; 14 Ves. 65; 1 Atk. 52; 3 Atk. 538; 2 Brown, Ch. 142; Ferguson v. O’Harra [Case No. 4,740].</p> <p>On the other side it was insisted, that an answer is not necessary, unless where it is required to support the plea. Mitf. Eq. PI. 222.</p>

This cause was now argued on the validity of the bar relied on in the plea. See [Case No. 12.891]. It was contended for the plaintiff: (1) That the covenant contained in the agreement of the 20th of April, 1807, was substantially a performance of the condition in the deed of assignment, not to sue the said Griffith, or to proceed against -the joint or separate property of Nicklin and ■Griffith; and if so, equity will dispense with :a literal compliance.

<p>Case No. 12,893.</p> <p>Seamen— Desertion — Confinement at Instance of Master — Voyage Broken Up.'</p> <p>1. The mariners had deserted from a ship on shore and in a perilous situation, and were confined at the instance of the master. The judge considered the voyage broken up by the misfortunes of the ship, and discharged the mariners from imprisonment.</p> <p>[Cited in The Dawn, Case No. 3,666.]</p> <p>2. Seamen deserting a vessel under circumstances of distress or danger [are] answerable for the damages which may be sustained in consequence of their dereliction of duty, and lose their wages.</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by Thomas Sims against Elias Sims to recover damages for breach of contract.]</p>

In admiralty. Christobal Bravo, and others, consignees of merchandise shipped on board of the schooner Ella, filed their libel in rem and in personam, to recover damages sustained by them in consequence of the vessel, immediately after her departure, springing a leak. The water gained upon her so rapidly, that she was run ashore. The goods on board of her were greatly damaged.

<p>Error to the Pulaski circuit court.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,896.</p> <p>Insurance — Answers to Questions in Application — Burden of Proof — Misrepresentation.</p> <p>1. The application contained the following question: “Have the parents or brothers or sisters of the party been affected with insanity, or with pulmonary, scrofulous, or any other constitutional disease, hereditary in its character?” The answer was, “No.” Applicant also answered he did not know cause of death of certain members of the family. The application stipulated that the answers were fair and true, and that it should be the basis of the contract, and any untrue or fraudulent answers should render the policy void, and the policy contained a like stipulation. Held, that the answers were declarations and representations, and the burden of proof was on the company to show them untrue.</p> <p>2. The cause of death must have been hereditary to render the answer “No” untrue.</p> <p>3.- The fact that insured was 14 years of age, and was at home at the time of death of certain members, does not prove that he knew the cause.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Isaac M. Singer and Edward Clark against Julius E. Braunsdorf and Henry Weil for the infringement of letters patent No. 16,030, granted to plaintiff Isaac M. Singer November 4, 1856.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] On the 21st day of January, 1874, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against Towle by some of his creditors, and .the following 3d of February he was adjudged a bankrupt. The plaintiff [B. Singer], appellant herein, is his assignee.

[This was a proceeding by B. Singer, as-signee of Towle, against O. C. Sloan and others, fo have a certain deed set aside. Heard on demurrer to the bill.]

This was an action on the case tried by Judge Giles and a’jury, to recover damages [from William H. Walmsley] for alleged infringements of certain patents owned by the plaintiffs for improvements in sewing machines. The declaration contained six counts, and alleged infringement of six different patents.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Singer & Clark against G. H. Wooster and others to enjoin the infringement of letters patent No. 10,974, granted to Isaac M. Singer May 30, 1854.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,902.</p> <p>Trade Name — Designating Mechanism — Intent to Deceive.</p> <p>1. If a sewing-machine has acquired a name -which designates a mechanism or a peculiar -construction, parts of which are protected by patents, other persons, after the expiration of ! the patents, have the right to construct the ma- ¡ chine and call it by that name, because that j only expresses the kind and quality of the machine.</p> <p>[Cited in Singer Manuf’g Co. v. June Manuf’g Co., 41 Fed. 212.]</p> <p>2. There can be no trade-mark for the name "“Singer Sewing-Machine.”</p> <p>[Cited in Brill v. Singer Manuf’g Co., 41 Ohio St. 131.]</p> <p>3. Although a person not connected with the Singer Manufacturing Company would have the right, after the patents have expired, to make .a Singer sewing-machine and call it by that name, still, he would not be permitted to do any act, the necessary effect of which would be to intimate, or make any one believe, that the machine which he constructs and sells is manufactured by that company.</p> <p>[Cited in Waterman v. Shipman, 130 N. Y. 311, 29 N. E. 111.]</p>

The bill alleged that the defendant company was, in 1866, the owner of certain patented inventions embodied in a machine for making button-holes, and owned a factory, &c., for making the macliines; and tliat, being desirous to bring tbe same into notice and to secure a market, they made a contract with tbe complainant, then a corporation of established reputation and large business in this country and in foreign countries, by which tbe complainant was to be tbe sole and…

<p>Case No. 12,903.</p> <p>Attachment — Bond-I- Resident Sureties — Revised Statutes, Section 915 — Amendment — New Bond.</p> <p>A plaintiff in an attachment suit in the federal court must furnish security in the same manner as to amount and the qualification and residence of the sureties that the laws of the state require to be furnished if he were proceeding in the courts of the state. Rev. St. § 915.</p>

“The libel of Erick Singstrom, Francis Summers, Cato Lewis and James Dyer humbly showeth, that your libellants shipped on board the schooner Hazard, N. D. Gardner, master, on the thirteenth day of April, in the year one thousand eight hundred and six, to perform a voyage from the port of Philadelphia to the island of St. Jago de Cuba in the West Indies, at the monthly wages of twenty-two dollars.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was an action by the United States against Samuel Sinn and others. From a verdict in the district court in favor of the United States (case unreported), error was brought.]

<p>[In the matter of Matthew Sinnett, a bankrupt.]</p>

[JThis was a libel by J. C. Sinnott, owner of the steamboat Georgia, against the steam- • boat Dresden, for damages sustained by collision.]

In execution of the legislation of congress, whereby the complainant and defendant were granted public lands in aid of the construction of their respective roads, a joint patent was granted on the 25th of March, 1873, of thirty thousand seven hundred and ninety and forty one-hundredths acres of land lying between the ten and twenty-mile limit of the land grant of the defendant, to complainant and defendant.

On the 18th of February, 1865. at noon after Charleston had surrendered to the United States forces, the Gladiolus, a steam-tug commissioned as part of our fleet, discovered the Siren, which was a blockade-runner, on fire in the Ashley river, about ' one hundred yards below the first bridge, i She was unarmed, had been abandoned, and set on fire, and her pipes cut.

This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs, on a bill [by William Sisson and others against David Gilbert and others] to restrain the alleged infringement of letters patent granted September 24th, 18G1. to the complainant Sisson, for an “improvement in machine for making staves from bolts,” for which application > 'as made in November, 1859, and of whicl patent the complainants were owners. The bill sought, also, an account and damages.

Ejectment [by Philip Sisson and others against Cornelius Seabury] for land in Ti-verton, Rhode Island. Plea, general issue.

<p>Case No. 12,914.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Undervaluation — Market Value — Evi pence.</p> <p>1. Under the act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 737), where goods imported from abroad are owned by their manufacturer, he must swear that his invoice contains the actual market value of the goods at the time and place when and where they were manufactured.</p> <p>2. "Actual market value,” is the price at which the manufacturer holds his goods for sale in the ordinary course of trade.</p> <p>3. The time when an article is manufactured is when its manufacture is completed.</p> <p>4. The law presumes that there was, at such time and place, an actual market value, and no evidence can be received, in an action to' forfeit the goods for fraudulent undervaluation, to show that there was no such value.</p> <p>5. The law requires the best evidence to be given of any fact.</p> <p>6. A series of sales or a single sale in the ordinary course of trade, is one of the best evidences of market value.</p> <p>7. Offers by merchants or manufacturers to sell their goods in the usual course of trade are among the best evidences of their market value.</p> <p>8. In an action to forfeit goods for fraudulent undervaluation, the jury have the right, in the absence of proof of such sales or offers, to resort to the cost of manufacture, with the manufacturer's profit added, as a means of determining what was their actual market value. But. in that case, the cost of the. raw material is to be taken as of the time and place of manufacture.</p> <p>9. Any intentional undervaluation is cause for the forfeiture of the goods: and the intentional undervaluation of any item in an invoice authorizes the forfeiture of the whole invoice.</p> <p>10. Where the court decides that probable cause has been shown for the seizure of the goods as so forfeited, the burden is upon the claimant to show that the invoice contains the actual market value of the goods.</p>

These articles of merchandise were ferried across the Chowan river in North Carolina, at Reddick’s ferry, and landed on a wharf, preparatory to their being taken to Weldon. They were not contraband of war. but were the property of an inhabitant of the country under the rebel government, who. the evidence showed, was himself actually a rebel. The Chowan river was at the time occupied by a naval force of the United States for blockading and all other purposes of war.

This was an information, under the 43d section of the collection law, against 651 chests hyson skin tea. for being found unaccompanied with the marks and certificates required by law. At the trial in the court below, the .iury found a special verdict, upon which judgment of condemnation was entered [case unreported], and a writ of error brought for its reversal.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>This was an appeal by the claimants from a decree of the district court in favor of the libellants (Vaughan v. Six Hundred and Thirty Casks of Sherry [Case No. 16,900]), in a suit in rem, in admiralty.</p>

Tin review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] The district court made an order disallowing the claim of the Sixpenny Savings Bank and the claim of the New York Savings Bank to be paid out of the assets of the estate of the Stuyvesant Bank, a bankrupt, the amounts of their debts, as proved, in full, as debts entitled to a priority in payment.

Assumpsit. Prom the agreed facts it appeared that the defendant [Paul Curtis], a ship-builder, contracted for the sale of an unfinished vessel to the plaintiffs [Edward P. Size and others], and the parties exchanged notes of the contract, which were substantial counterparts of each other, and of which one part was as follows: “East Boston, May 9, 1864.

In bankruptcy. On the fifth day of .Tuly, 1870. John V. Parwell & Co. filed their petition in this court, alleging that they were creditors of William H. Skelley in a sum exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars, to-wit: in the sum of nine hundred and eleven dollars and ninety-two cents; that said indebtedness w as upon a promissory note for nine hundred and eleven dollars and ninety-two cents, given by said Skel-ley to the petitioners, bearing date on the third day of June,…

<p>Case No. 12,922.</p> <p>Railroad Comi-anies— Receivers— Wages due Employes — Bondholders—Trustees—Consolidation op Roads — Parties.</p> <p>1. Wages to employés past due for eight months before the order of court sequestrating the property of a railroad company and appointing receivers, were ordered to be paid to such employes as were retained in the employment of the road by the receivers.</p> <p>[Cited in Mellhenny v. Binz (Tex. Sup.) 13 S. W. 663.]</p> <p>2. The court refused to pay similar past due wages of employes, which had been assigned to third persons who petitioned for payment. It also refused to pay for steel rails and supplies furnished before the appointment of receivers on the credit of the company.</p> <p>3. On petition of complainants that the receivers should be ordered to issue ten-year extension certificates to such holders of matured bonds and past due coupons as were willing to accept them, the court made the order prayed for.</p> <p>4. The complainants are trustees in a mortgage of $!5.."00.000. owned almost wholly in England and Holland. These bondholders are respectively represented by a London committee and an Amsterdam committee, with whom bonds are deposited, with powers of attorney, The London committee claim to have given all bondholders notice of their intention to bring this suit, and to represent all; but the Amsterdam committee deny this, and claim to represent $2,000,000 of bonds, and aver that the London committee represent only about $2.000.000. It is certain that the Amsterdam committee represent a very large number of bonds, approximating the amount which they claim to represent. This agency, showing powers of attorney, file a petition ■ setting out grounds for disapproving the trustees’ management of the suit, denying that the trustees represent their interests satisfactorily, and praying to be admitted as parties defendant to the suit. Their prayer was denied by the court, the opinion of the circuit judge prevailing; the district judge dissenting from this ruling of the court.</p> <p>[See Lyon v. Virginia & S. It. Co., Case No. 14.321.]</p> <p>5. The defendant in this case (the Atlantic, Mississippi and Ohio Railroad Company] was consolidated, under an act of the Virginia legislature. of three other companies, one of which is the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad Company. The process of consolidation authorized was. that shareholders in the divisional companies were allowed to subscribe their stock to the stock of the consolidated company. So nearly all of the stock held in two of the divisional companies was stocked into that of the consolidated company, that those two companies practically went out of existence. But the case was different with the Virginia and Tennessee Company, 3,389 shares in which remain outstanding. The charter of consolidation. in terms, keeps alive the company so long as this stock remains in its present status. Several mortgages executed before consolidation by this Virginia and Tennessee Company remain unsatisfied. The amount and priorities of the debts they secure were part of the subject of reference to a commissioner in this suit, and of the decrees of the court. Parties in interest prayed that this company should be "made a party defendant to the suit. The court |was| composed of Chief Justice Waite and Circuit Judge Bond (District Judge Hughes dissenting). Held, that this company was not a necessary party defendant, and denied the prayer of the petitioner.</p> <p>[Cited in Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 55 Fed. 448.]</p>

This was a libel on a bottomry bond, executed to the. libellant by one of the part owners of the sloop Polly.

This was a libel in personam against the owners of the schooner Arrowsic, for seamen’s wages. The libellant shipped at the port of Bath, as mate, on the 22d of September, 1848, on a general trading voyage, and continued on board, and did duty as mate of the vessel, in several voyages, two of which were to foreign ports, until the return of the vessel to Bath, on the second of May following.

Certain creditors of [Jacob] Skoll, a clothier at Minneapolis, claiming to represent one-fourth iot number of his creditors, and one-third of the amount of his indebtedness provable under the bankrupt law. have commenced proceedings to have him adjudged bankrupt. On July 7th. Skoll made an assignment to one Clementson of his stock of goods for the benefit of his creditors equally.

<p>Case No. 12,927.</p> <p>Shipping — Master—Hypothecation—Sale—Con-demnation and Sale.</p> <p>Owners of ships would be exposed to great and unjust loss, if much circumspection were not used previously to the condemnation and sale of their property. The master of a ship may hypothecate under certain circumstances; but cannot sell the ship.</p> <p>[Cited in Tunno v. The Betsina, Cáse No. 14,236; The Annie H. Smith, Id. 420; Coyne v. Caplis, 8 Fed. 640.]</p>

In admiralty. The Skylark belonged to the Lake Michigan Transportation Company In 1S68, during which season various claims against the vessel were created. On the ICth of October, John Barker sued out an attachment against her ift the state court at Chicago, obtained judgment, and at the sale under execution, bought her in for about $300.

In admiralty. 'In October, 1868, the propeller Skylark was owned by the Lake Michigan Transportation Company. She was attached in the state court, under the foreign attachment law of Illinois, the company being a corporation of Michigan.

Libel for breach of contract of affreightment. The libel alleged the shipping by libellant of a quantity of building and limestone on board the schooner at Marblehead, in the state of Ohio, on the 23d day of July, 1867, ■consigned to William Becker, of New Baltimore, in the state of Michigan, and that the libellant received “from the master of said schooner a bill • of lading, a receipt and a contract whereby the said master charged the said vessel with the performance of…

<p>Case No. 12,932.</p> <p>Equity — Bill op Revivor — Devisee —Wills — Devise — Probate—Laud in Another State — Pleading.</p> <p>1. A devisee cannot maintain a bill of revivor, but he may maintain an original bill in the nature of a bill of revivor, and thus obtain the benefit of the original proceedings, as well before as after there has been a decree in the original suit.</p> <p>[Cited in Chester v. Life Ass’n of America. 4 Fed. 489; Sharon v. Terry, 36 Fed. 353.]</p> <p>2. The fact, that by the lex loci, where land lies, a probate of a will is conclusive, does not enable a devisee to maintain a mere bill of re-vivor; for none can maintain it but a privy in representation, as an heir, or executor.</p> <p>3. Where a suit in one state brings incidentally in question the title to land held under a devise in another state, it is not necessary that there should be a probate of the will in the state where the suit is brought, before it can be used as evidence of a title.</p> <p>[Cited in The Boston, Case No. 1,669.]</p> <p>[Cited in Mannville .Co. v. Worcester, 138 Mass. 89. Cited in brief in Wooster v. Great Falls Manuf’g Co., 39 Me. 247.]</p> <p>4. Quere. whether a devisee of land, in a state where the probate is conclusive, is bound to make the heirs at law parties to an original bill in the nature of a bill of revivor to revive a suit against third persons respecting the land.</p> <p>5. Semble, that the exception, that a devisee' cannot sue out a bill of revivor may be taken by answer as well as by plea or demurrer.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,933.</p> <p>Notes — Fraud — Bona Fide Assignee Without Notice.</p> <p>1. Fraud may be set up as a defence by the maker against the payee of a note.</p> <p>2. The same defence may be made against an assignee who had notice of the fraud before the assignment. Or it may be set up by an assignee after the note was due, or if assigned without consideration.</p> <p>3. But against a bona fide assignee, for a'valuable consideration, before the note was due, such a defence cannot be made.</p>

Debt [by Slacum] against [Jesse Simms and. Peter Wise, Jr.] the principal and surety on a prison-bounds bond; plea, covenants performed; replication, did not keep in the bounds, but departed without being discharged in due course of law; rejoinder, discharged in due course of law; and issue thereon. contended that a warrant of discharge by the magistrates is conclusive evidence that Simms was discharged in due course of law, and is as much a discharge of the bond, as it…

Indebitatus assumpsit [by Jane H. Slacum against Amos Smith] for the hire of a slave. At the trial, it was contended on the part of the defendant, that the slave had forfeited his wages by his misconduct at Lisbon, and by absenting himself. The jury found a special verdict, which was submitted to the court without argument.

<p>Case No. 12,940.</p> <p>Shipping — Charter —Demurrage — Dispatch — Expense of Discharge — Commission on Advances.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel is to have “dispatch for discharging,” the time to be allowed is measured by the capacity of the vessel to deliver the cargo.</p> <p>2. Under a charter containing such a clause a vessel arrived at Havana with a cargo of paving stones, which, by the rules of the port, were to be discharged at the mole. Her master reported to the consignees on April 4. but. by reason of its being Passion Week and the crowded state of the mole, she was not brought up to the mole till April 14. when she was moored Ikjws on, and the stones discharged on a staging. The master could have discharged the cargo over the side of his vessel in five days, but, in consequence of discharging over the bow and of custom house regulations as to discharging, the vessel was not discharged till April 24th. The master of the vessel claimed demurrage and that some errors in the vessel's account should be corrected, which was refused by the consignees, and the vessel remained in port pending this dispute till May 3d: Held, that the vessel was not entitled to demurrage after the discharge was completed.</p> <p>[Cited in O’Rourke v. Tons of Coal, 1 Fed. 021; Gronstadt v. WitthofE, 15 Fed. 268.]</p> <p>3. The vessel was entitled to demurrage for all the time after she was reported till she was discharged, less five days.</p> <p>4. The vessel was not chargeable with the expense of the staging or extra expenses caused by discharging over the bow. because the charter agreed that the cargo should be received within reach of the vessel’s tackles.</p> <p>5. The consignees, having made an advance to the master which by the charter was to be free of commission, could not claim a commission on it by reason of their having made the advance before they were required to do so.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this court was affirmed, with costs. Case No. 12,941.)</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district •court, against the schooner S. L. Davis and a •cargo of cotton, on transportation by her from Savannah, Georgia, to the city of New York, to recover for salvage services.

[Appeal from the district court of ■ 1 e United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel by Henry J. Sleeper and others against Emilio Puig and Santiago j Puig to recover demurrage aud a balance ; due under a charter part. From a decree in favor of libelants (Case No. 12.940), respondents appealed.)

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] Tlie district court allowed Mr. Player, the assignee in bankruptcy of Mr. Slevin, $169.-09 commissions on a sale of real estate, and ordered that the same be paid by Mr. Seud-der, a mortgage creditor of the bankrupt. [Case unreported.] It is to reverse this order that the present petition for review was brought by Seudder.

The testimony showed that David P. Slichter and Catharine H. Slichter, his mother, a feme covert, were trading under the name of Slichter & Son.

The prisoners [Jerry Sloan and others] having been committed to answer indictments charging them with the murder of two men, were brought up on a writ of habeas corpus, and asked to be discharged from custody, upon the ground that the indictments showed upon their face that the circuit court of the United States had no jurisdiction to try them.

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.] Upon the return day of an order to show cause why the baukrupt should not be… Held: is not permissive only, but imperative, if he desires to apply at all. The objections of the opposing creditors are, therefore, well taken, and the discharge must be denied. An order to that effect is, accordingly, directed.” The bankrupt applied to this court for a review of the order.

This was a bill in equity [by George B. Sloat against James M. Patton] filed to restrain the defendant from infringing the letters patent for “a new and useful improvement in the method of planing, tongue-ing, grooving, and cutting into moldings, or either, plank, boards, or any other material, and for reducing the same to an equal width I and thickness, and also for facing and dressing brick, and cutting moldings on or facing metallic, mineral or other substances,” granted…

<p>Case No. 12,946.</p> <p>Bottomry — Foreign Port — Necessity.</p> <p>Hypothecation can only be in a foreign port, and under circumstances of absolute necessity, where relief cannot be had but by pledging the ship.</p> <p>■ [Cited in The Hunter, Case No. 6,904; Joy v. Allen, Id. 7.552.]</p>

[This. was a bill in equity by George H. Sloat against Charles A. Spring, Peter Boon, and David R. Garrison for infringement of a patent. The cause was tried before a jury upon issues prepared and sent out of the chancery court.]

<p>Case No. 12,948.</p> <p>Patents — Preliminary Injunction — Acquiescence — Presumption.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,949.</p> <p>Payment — By Draft — Principal and Agent — Assumpsit — New Trial — Costs.</p> <p>1. A draft of a third person does not discharge the original consideration, unless it is received unconditionally as payment.</p> <p>2. Consent may be implied from circumstances and from silence.</p> <p>3. Where H. drew a draft as agent for L. and B., to cover the purchase-money for goods, and the latter persons received the goods, and refused to pay the draft, on the ground that H. was not authorized to draw it. held, that the plaintiffs may abandon the counts in the declaration on the draft, and recover the value of the goods on the common count, for goods sold and delivered.</p> <p>4. A verdict against evidence will be set aside and a new trial granted, the costs to abide the event of the suit.</p>

<p>[In the matter of A. M. Slocum, a bankrupt.].</p>

<p>[In the matter of A. M. Slocum & Co., bankrupts. See Case No. 12,951. Heard on petition of review.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,952.</p> <p>Principal and Surety — Pbison Bounds Bond-Escape — Assent op Plaintiff.</p> <p>The obligors on a bond for the jail limits are not discharged from their liability for an escape by the subsequent assent of the plaintiff. Such assent to have any effect must have been given prior to the escape.</p>

The bill states, that the female plaintiff was the only child of Christopher Marshall by his first wife Elizabeth, who died in 1781 shortly after the birth of this daughter, entitled to a considerable real estate; of which, a tract of land in Bucks county, about twelve or thirteen acres of meadow land near Philadelphia, and a house and lot in Southwark, were parts. In 1781, a day or two before her death.

The libellant [G. W. Slocum] was master of the bark Louisa, which, by the articles, was “bound from the port of New Bedford, on a voyage not exceeding five years in duration.” By the first article it was agreed “that the term of service of any of the undersigned shall not end. nor shall any one be entitled to a discharge, until the expiration of said term’ unless said ship shall sooner return to said port of New Bedford, and the voyage be terminated.” The libel propounded…

<p>Case No. 12,955.</p> <p>Shipping — Damage to Cargo — Burden op Proof —Stowage and Dunnage.</p> <p>1. A brig having taken on board at Pernam-buco a quantity of mats of sugar to be brought to New York, under a charter and bills of lading which excepted perils of the seas, the sugar on her arrival at New York was found to have been washed entirely out of some mats and partly out of others. The consignees filed - a libel against the brig to x recover the loss as being occasioned by bad stowage and lack of sufficient dunnage. The sugar was green sugar and liable on that account to excessive drainage, but it appeared that twelve per cent was the limit of draemge usual in such sugars on such a voyage, which was much less than this had lost. It appeared that the brig met with severe weather on the voyage, but the log showed that she was kept pumped during the voyage and that the pumps were able to keep her free all the time, and she made no more water after the heaviest gale than at first. Held, that the burden was on the brig to show that the loss was. occasioned by a peril of the sea. the consequences of which could not have been guarded against by the master and crew with the means available to them.</p> <p>[Cited in The Chasca, 23 Fed. 160; The Queen. 28 Fed. 757; F. O. Hatthiessen & Wiechers Sugar Refining Co. v. Gusi, 29 Fed. 795.)</p> <p>[See Bearse v. Ropes, Case No. 1,192.)</p> <p>2. The comparatively good condition of the top of the cargo showed that the loss was not occasioned by the vessel’s having taken in water through the seams of the deck.</p> <p>3. As appeared from her log. the crew had been at all times able to control the leak, and the water did not appear at any time to have been as deep m her as the platform on which the sugar was stowed, and the injury to the sugar was caused by the water reaching it in the bilges when the vessel rolled.</p> <p>4. On the evidence, the vessel did not have sufficient dunnage under the cargo in the bilges to protect the cargo front such injury. Such lack of dunnage was bad stowage and the vessel was liable for the damage to the cargo therefrom.</p> <p>[Cited in The Charles ./. Willard, US Fed. 762; The Centurion, 57 Fed. 415.]</p>

In equity. This was a motion for a receiver and an injunction.

<p>Case No. 12,955a.</p> <p>Practice in Admiralty — Rehearing—Term.</p> <p>[A rehearing or review cannot be had after the term at which the decree was rendered.]</p>

<p>[Bill in equity b.v Albert G. Sloo and Elwood Fisher against George Law and others.] This was a motion for a provisional injunction.</p>

This was a suit in equity [by Albert 6. Sloo and others against George Law and others], in which George D. Sargeant, Esq., was the solicitor for the plaintiffs. A motion had heretofore been made to the court, by the plaintiffs, for an order to substitute another solicitor in the cause, in the place of Mr. Sargeant, and to compel him to deliver to the plaintiffs the papers in the cause.

The libellant [William Small], master of the brig Catherine of Norfolk, on the 5th of September last, in lat. 37 deg. N. and long. 68 deg. W. fell in with the wreck of the schooner Messenger of Baltimore, White, master, having lost both her masts, sails and rigging; the captain, mate, and eight hands remaining alive, seven of her crew having perished.

<p>[This was an action on a promissory note by William Small against Thomas W. King.]</p>

This was an action upon a judgment of J. Franklin, a justice of the peace of Charles county, in Maryland. ottered in evidence a paper purporting to be an execution issued by J. Franklin, against the defendant, and in favor of the plaintiff, upon which there was a certificate of the clerk of Charles county, that J. Franklin was a justice of the peace. objected that the commission of the justice should be produced.

This action [by Oscar Smedberg against James V. Bentley, collector of internal revenue] was brought to recover the amount of tax paid by the plaintiff upon his income for the year 1871, under the act of congress of July 14, 1870 [1G Stat. 23G]. The tax was paid under protest. The question raised by the jjleadings in the case, was whether the tax on incomes imposed by said act was not unconstitutional.

[Appeal by Barzellai C. Smith from a decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant him a patent for improvements in iron pavements.]

<p>Case No. 12,967a.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations — Criminal Jurisdiction and Cognizance — Powers op Mator.</p> <p>1. The act incorporating the city of Little-Rock delegates no power to punish for offences provided for by the general laws of the country.</p> <p>2. An ordinance, imposing a fine for an assault, committed in the limits of the city, is void.</p> <p>3. The mayor may exercise the same powers as to criminal matters as a justice of the peace.</p>

This case came before the court upon a return to a writ of habeas corpus, which was issued by this court on the 31st of December, 1842, upon a petition for a habeas corpus on the relation of Joseph Smith, setting forth that he was arrested and in custody of William F. Elkin, sheriff of Sangamon county, upon a warrant issued by the governor of the state of Illinois, upon a requisition of the governor of the state of Missouri, demanding him to be delivered up to the governor…

We have heretofore given the decision of the probate court (see [In re Downs] 2 Wkly. Law Gaz. 278), and subsequently the decision of the district court of Ohio, for Hamilton county, on the question as to the right of the probate court to issue naturalization papers; the district court, Judge Swan presiding, having decided that the probate court had no power to act in such case. See Id. 318.

[In the matter of John Ogden Smith, a bankrupt.] 2 [Mr. G. De Forest Lord moved to show cause why this case should not be removed from the hands of Mr. John Fitch, qpe of the registers in bankruptcy, at present having charge of the matter, and sent to some other register.

<p>[In the matter of John I*. Smith and James Smith, involuntary bankrupts. See Case No. i 12,972.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of John P. Smith and James Smith, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,974.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — General Assignment without Preferences — Intention—Presumption.</p> <p>1.The execution by an insolvent of a general assignment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors, without preferences, is an act of bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Silverman. Case No. 12,855; Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co.. Id. 5.4S6; Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 385, 2 Sup. Ct. 770.]</p> <p>[Disapproved in Haas v. O’Brien, 66 N. Y. 602.]</p> <p>2. Where the execution of such an assignment is admitted, an adjudication of bankruptcy will be made, even though the respondent denies any intention to defeat or delay the operation of the bankruptcy act [14 Stat. 517], or to hinder his creditors, or to prevent his property from being distributed according to the provisions of the act.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Silverman, Case No. 12,855; Curran v. Munger, Id. 3,487; Re Marter. Id. 9,143.]</p> <p>3. Every person of a sound mind is presumed to intend the necessary, natural, or legal consequences of his deliberate act. This legal presumption may be either conclusive or disputable, depending upon the nature of the act and the character of the intent; and when, by law, the consequences must necessarily follow, the presumption is ordinarily conclusive, and cannot be rebutted by any evidence of a want of such intention.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Silverman, Case No. 12,855; Re Bininger, Id. 1.420: Re Rainsford, Id. 11,-537; Re Jacobs, Id. 7,159.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Stearns v. Gosselin, 58 Vt. 39, 3 Atl. 193.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12,976.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Arrest—Factor’s Liability— Discharge.</p> <p>1. S. & Co. were adjudicated bankrupts in June, 1877. On February 5, 1878, an order was granted for the arrest of the bankrupts in an action in the supreme court of the state of New York. S. having been arrested under that order, petitioned this court for a discharge from the arrest. The debt, to recover which the action in the supreme court was brought, accrued prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings and was for the proceeds of goods consigned to them for sale as factors: Held, that the cases which held that a factor’s liability is not discharged by a discharge in bankruptcy (In re Seymour [Case No. 12,684]; In re Kimball [Cases Nos. 7,768, 7,769]) have been over ruled by the case of Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, which case, though not directly involving the question, adopted a principle of construction as to the 33d section of the bankruptcy act of 1867 [14 Stat. 533] which is clearly applicable to the case of a factor.</p> <p>2. Under the principle laid down in that case, it must be held that the debt, to recover which the action in the supreme court was brought, would be discharged by the discharge in .bankruptcy, and that the petitioner was therefore entitled to be discharged from arrest.</p> <p>[Cited in Gibson v. Gorman. 44 N. J. Law, 328; -Hennequin v. Clews, 77 N. Y. 431; Herrlich v. McDonald, 80 Cal. 479. 22 Pae. 299; Woodward v. Towne, 127 Mass. 42.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York. [In the matter of Ananias F. Smith and Sidney Bickford, bankrupts.]

The bankrupt [G. W. F. Smith], many years before the war, had purchased the “Meadowville” farm, in Fauquier, in part with some §10,000 borrowed for the purpose, of Anderson, giving a deed of trust on the property. Other unquestionable liens had accrued upon the same property, all to an amount in excess of its value. The widow of Anderson, to whom the original purchase-money is now due to the amount of $15,000, is in need of it for her support.

The assignee in bankruptcy [B. T. August] petitioned for a restitution of property improperly taken by the bankrupts [Smith & McCurdy] in lieu of homestead exemptions, and sold by them to a purchaser who was cognizant of the facts affecting the title to the property at the time of his purchase. The bankrupts were partners, and dealers in house-furnishing articles, chinaware, and the like goods, on Broad street, Richmond, Virginia.

A creditor’s petition represented that the •defendants were joint traders, who had fraudulently suspended payment of their commercial paper. It was proved that they were contractors to' build the Ware River Railroad, and were to grade the road, put down the ties and rails, and build the stations; receiving money, bonds, and shares •of the company, in certain proportions, as the work proceeded. Whether they bought rany materials on credit did not appear.

<p>Case No. 12,980.</p> <p>Forfeiture — Brewery—Fraudulent Manufacture.</p>

[This was an appeal by Hamilton L. Smith from the refusal of the commissioner of patents to grant him a patent for an alleged invention relating to letter-files.] The application under consideration in this case afterwards issued as patent No. 9,776, June 7th, 1853.

<p>Case No. 12,988.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Partnership—Removal op Case.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,984.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Petition—Relief—Appearance.</p> <p>1. A creditor may petition the court for relief, to be paid a judgment against the bankrupt, out of moneys in the hands of the assignee in bankruptcy, but the proper way to bring the credit- or into the case is by petition, setting forth the facts on which he relies for relief, and praying for the specific relief he seeks.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Frizelle, Case No. 5,133.]</p> <p>2. In the first instance, seeking affirmative relief, he must come in person and not by attorney.</p>

<p>Case No. 12,985.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharob — Opposition — Specification's —Pi.eadi N'G.</p> <p>1. A creditor who does not appear upon the return day of the order to show cause why discharge should not be granted, has no standing in court and cannot subsequently file specifications against bankrupt’s discharge.</p> <p>2. It is not necessary to state in specifications that the persons named to whom fraudulent payments are stated to have been made, were creditors of the bankrupt.</p> <p>3. False swearing, if alleged, must be charged to have been wilful.</p> <p>4. The strictness of common law pleading is. not required in creditors’ specifications, but the bankrupt is entitled to such particularity of statement as will give him reasonable notice of what is expected to be proven against him.</p>

<p>[In the matter of John W. Smith.]</p>

The bankrupts [Elijah E. Smith and George Smith] were co-partners under the firm name of E. E. Smith & Son, and were declared bankrupts under a petition in involuntary bankruptcy filed against the firm. The as-signee filed a petition in court, inquiring whether the firm-creditors could share pari passu with the individual creditors of E. É. Smith, and alleging that there was no firm es- I tate, and no solvent partner.

On the 6th day of March, 1876, Robertson’» & Herndon filed a petition addressed to the-register, representing that on the 4th day o£ November, 1872, they were employed by the bankrupt, B. K.- Smith, to institute suit in, the United States circuit court, in chancery,, at Tyler, against J. M. H. Parsons, agent, etc., to recover damages for the wrongful use of a patent right, owned by said Smith, to-the Rhodern M. Brooks cotton press, and to secure a perpetual injunction…

<p>[In the matter of Elmer C. Smith, a hank-rapt.]</p>

In bankruptcy. On certificate of register allowing the claim of Jacob Witteman as a preferred debt. 'The facts found by the register were as follows: Charles A. Smith, the bankrupt, was a private banker in Lebanon, Warren county, Ohio, receiving deposits, loaning money and selling exchange: being styled “the Warren County Bank.” On the 20th day of December, 1872, he drew and sold to Witteman a ■draft or check, numbered seven thousand two hundred and forty-three, on the First…

On exceptions of P. W. Harwood, late partner, to the report of liens and their priorities, made by Special Commissioner Howard. G. W. Smith and P. W. Harwood were partners under the name of Smith & Harwood.

The decision of this case was submitted to the court upon a written statement of facts in accordance with Rev. St. § 5011. [E. M.] Smith, the bankrupt, nearly a year before the petition was filed, left for collection with Mr. Field, his attorney, a note signed by a third person, for eight hundred and fifty dollars, and an action was brought upon it, which ripened into a judgment at about the time the bankruptcy took place, which ■was August 25, 1875.

This was a petition upon the footing of an order to show cause in case of involuntary bankruptcy, and that the bankrupt [John Harper Smith] had secretly and fraudulently transferred his goods, etc., by covenous Ingenuity with Smith and Miller, and praying an injunction against%lL

This was a petition of review, filed under the second section of the bankrupt act, for the reversal of an order of the district court.

This was a petition filed to reverse a decree of the district court in bankruptcy. The facts of the case appeared from the pleadings and evidence to be as follows: John W. A. Smith, was adjudicated a bankrupt by the district court on June 3, 1873. At the date of the adjudication, the petitioner, Mathew Whitfield’s administrator, was the judgment creditor of the bankrupt in the sum of $8,397.

The case [of Charles Smith, Jr.] was argued by Mr. Duer for complainants in the creditor’s bill. Mr. Myers, for assignee, on a former day.

<p>Case No. 12,998a.</p> <p>Shipping — Maritime Tort — Obstructing Passage —Damages—Loss.</p>

This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain the defendant [Ethan Allen] from infringing letters patent [No. 30.000], for “improvement in revolvers,” granted to complainants [Horace Smith and Daniel Wesson] December 18, 1860.

<p>Case No. 13,002.</p> <p>Patents — Dies—Chokd-Bak Heads — Novelty.</p> <p>1. It being old to cut dies in the face of a trip-hammer, or in the anvil upon which a trip-hammer works, oo as to forge iron into different shapes, there was no invention in making dies in such hammers or anvils of the proper shape to form chord-bar heads for iron bridges.</p> <p>2. Letters patent No. 101,529, issued to Frederick J. Smith, April 5th, 1870, for an improvement in dies for making chord-bar heads, held void for want of novelty.</p>

Assumpsit [by Dutee Smith, administrator of Russell Aldridge, against John Arnold]. The declaration was for the price of a certain farm sold by the plaintiff, as administrator of Russeil Aldridge, to the defendant, the defendant refusing to complete the purchase. Plea, non-assumpsit.

This was assumpsit on a policy of insurance made by the defendants to Dana & Carpenter, of Attleborough, Mass., on certain paintworks, etc. The amount insured was fifteen hundred dollars, and in case of loss it was to be paid to Joseph Smith, of Pawtucket, who brings this action. The deféndants were averred in the writ to be a corporation under a special act of the legislature of New Hampshire, and to be doing business at Exeter, in that state.

This was an action [by Jarvis R. Smith] to recover the value of property seized by the defendant [Osear J. Averill], as a collector of Internal revenue, for an alleged violation of the internal revenue act.

<p>Case No. 13,006.</p> <p>Conflict of Laws — Rights—Remedy.</p> <p>1. A contract made in Pennsylvania and sued on in Indiana, in regard to tlie remedy cannot be governed by the law of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>[Cited in Mathuson v. Crawford, Case No. 9,279.]</p> <p>2. Such a rule is impracticable, and cannot be enforced.</p> <p>.3. The law of the contract accompanies it, and must govern it; but that relates to the rights and obligations of the parties, and not to the remedy.</p>

Bill in equity [by William Sydney Smith against Samuel H. Babcock, Joseph Noble, and others).

This was a bill in equity, entered as long ago as January, 1839. [At that time an application was made by Joseph Noble for leave to file an amended answer upon certain circumstances. The motion was allowed. Case No. 13,00S.] The defendants were fourteen in number, viz: Samuel H. Bab-cock, John B. Glover, Josiah Daniels, Increase S. Withington, Joseph Leeds,. Benjamin Leeds, Paul Whitney, Levi B. Haskell, Jos.

<p>Case No. 13,010.</p> <p>Executors — Revivor — Patents — English and American Rule — Courts—Federal Equitv Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. Where the defendant, in a suit for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a patent and for an account, dies before the decree, his equitable liability as an infringer is not determined by his death, and a bill of revivor against his personal representatives will lie, to prevent the abatement of the suit.</p> <p>2. The English rule, that, as, upon the death of the defendant, there can be no decree for an injunction, therefore there can be no decree for an accounting, because the equity for an account is incident to the injunction, is inapplicable to the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts of the United States, conferred upon those courts by the patent laws, and especially since this jurisdiction has been amplified by the act of 1870 [10 Stat. 198], to embrace the allowance of damages in an equitable proceeding for infringement, which were before recoverable only at low. .</p> <p>[Cited in Gordon v. Anthony, Case No. 5,-605; Atwood v. Portland Co., 10 Fed. 284.]</p>

The declaration was as follows: “That before the 8th day of February, 1800, the plaintiff had entered into a certain contract with the defendant to build him a ship, which, on said 8th day of February, was building, the same not being finished; and the defendant, on said 8th day of February, in consideration of the plaintiff’s building said ship, and the sums which would become due to the plaintiff for building said ship pursuant to said contract, and in part payment thereof…

In equity. This was a bill filed by [Gabriel L. Smith] an assignee in bankruptcy [of the Cascade Manufacturing Company of Penn Yann against Coe S. Buchanan and others] to set aside the apparent lien of certain judgment creditors upon the estate of the bankrupt.

Buie obtained by the defendant on the plaintiff, to show cause why the writ of summons should not be set aside for irregularity, the service not being ten days before the couid: to which it was returnable. contended. that under the act of assembly of the •20th of March, 1724 (1 Smith’s Laws), 105, the practice in the state courts has been to set aside the writ of summons, where it appears not to have been served ten days before the return day.

Trespass and ejectment [by Mary Smith against Stephen Burlingame]. Plea, general issue.

Bill in equity, wherein the plaintiff [Frederick Smith] asserted an agreement between himself and the defendant [Daniel Burnham] to become copartners in the business of purchasing and selling lands and lumber in the state of Maine, and the purchase, by the said defendant, of lands and lumber, in pursuance of this agreement, for which he has never accounted to the plaintiff, and praying an account thereof, and a conveyance to the plaintiff of his share of the property, which…

Bill in equity [by Frederick Smith against Daniel Burnham], This case bad already been before the court on an interlocutory matter. [Case No. 13,01S.] The bill stated, that “about the first of June, 1S34, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement, to become copartners in the business of purchasing and selling lands and lumber in the state of Maine,” upon a joint capital, to be furnished by both, and the profits and losses to be equally shared between them.

In admiralty. Libel in personam [by John Smith against Charles H. Chase] for one month’s wages as mate. The answer admitted that the libellant signed articles for a voyage from Portland, Maine, to ! the West Indies, and back to the United States, but denied that he seasonably reported on board ship for duty, and averred his discharge before the commencement of the voyage for that reason.

In equity. Plaintiff [Thomas G. Smith] sued as assignee in bankruptcy of M. W\ Stone, alleging that said Stone had been lessee of the grain elevator adjacent to the defendant's railroad depot in Cincinnati; that the eleva - tor company and the railroad company had entered into a contract on the 11th day of June. 1862. whereby the railroad company agreed to deliver all grain in bulk arriving here over its railroad to the elevator company; that the railroad company violated…

<p>Case No. 13,026.</p> <p>Bankreptct — Illegal Sale — Conspiracy to De-prauo — Bill por Account.</p> <p>F nder a provisional warrant in a bankrupt proceeding the marshal seized certain goods which were in the possession of the firm of D. & A. under a claim of title derived by purchase from persons in the employ of the bankrupt. 'Phe goods were delivered to the assignee by thi> marshal, and have been sold for the benefit of the estate. D. & A. sued the marshal for conversion, and have recovered a judgment on the ground that the warrant did not authorize the seizure of goods in the actual possession of a third party under claim of right, though the title thereto -might be in the bankrupt. That suit is still pending, in the state court on appeal. The price paid by the parties who held the goods came to C. & Co., to whom the bankrupt was indebted under circumstances strong-)y tending to show that C. & Co. and one L., who was guarantor to C. <fc Co. for the bankrupt's indebtedness to them, had conspired with the purchasers to effect a fraudulent sale of the goods for the purpose of using the proceeds to pay the debt of the bankrupts to G. & Co.; Held, that although the transaction might be fraudulent as against the creditors and the assignee of the bankrupt, a bill in equity for an accounting and payment of .the proceeds or value of the goods would not lie against C. & Co., L. and D. & A., because the assignee showed no legal injury to him by the fraud, his possession of the goods for the benefit of the estate being undisputed.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Francis O. .T. Smith and others, against Joseph WT. Clark and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 4.453. granted to S.F. B. Morse, April 11, 1840, reissued June 13, 1848 (No. 118).]

[This was an action by Albert Smith, as-signee of Merrick G. Reade and Charles D. Chase, bankrupts, against David Crawford. Jr., to recover a debt alleged to be due by the defendant to said bankrupts.]

<p>[This was a libel in rem against the ship Creole to recover damages alleged to have resulted from a collision.]</p>

[Appeal from tlio district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] An act of assembly of Pennsylvania, passed in 1S03, provides tor tbe selection of pilots by tiie wardens of tbe port, and for licensing the pilots so selecteu, after they shall have given bond with surety in a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, nor less than three hundred, for tbe faithful performance of their duties.

In equity. This was a motion for a provisional injunction. Complainant [Francis O. J. Smith] was an assignee of S. F. B. Morse, under his patent for electric telegraphs. Defendants [A. B. Cummings. J. K. Moorehead, Joshua Hanna, and others] were operating under a license from parties also claiming under Morse. The bill charged the defendants with such a violation of the terms of their license, as rendered them in-fringers.

Action on a policy, dated 22d of August, 1807, on goods on board the Julius Henry, at and from Baltimore to Hamburgh, with leave to touch at Tonningen; valued at 10,-000 dollars; warranted free from any charge, damage, or loss, which may arise in consequence of seizure or detention for, or on account of, illicit or prohibited trade.

This was a bill in equity filed by the complainant [Francis O. J. Smith], as assignee of S. F. B. Morse, to restrain the defendants [BÍugli Downing and others] from infringing upon letters patent, granted to said Morse, June 20, 1S40, reissued January 25, 1846, and again June 13,1848, and letters patent granted to him April 11. 1846, and reissued June 13, 1848, both for “electro-magnetic telegraphs.” The defendants were assignees of R. E. House, under letters patent granted…

This was an action [by William H. Smith and others] against [Simeon Draper] the collector of the port of New York, to recover the sum of $9,000, as an alleged excess of duties exacted by him from the plaintiffs, on a quantity of teas imported by them into that port. The teas arrived in port at about 9 o’clock p. m. of the 29th of April, 1804.

<p>Case No. 13,038.</p> <p>Charter Party — Tonnage Dues — Port Charges —Account Stated — Presumption.</p> <p>1. S., the master of a schooner, chartered her in Jacksonville, Florida, to D. and B., to carry a cargo of lumber to Cape Haytien, “charterers to pay all the vessel’s port charges at Cape Haytien, including pilotage, consul’s fees,” etc. The vessel took the cargo and delivered it at Cape Haytien to L., the consignee named in the bill of lading, who was a contractor for the building of a dock for which the lumber was destined, and who had an agreement with the Haytian government that vessels coming to the i ports of Hayti, laden exclusively with materials ¡ for the dock and clearing in ballast for a foreign port, were exempted from tonnage dues. This agreement was not known to either of the parties to the charter before the arrival of the. vessel at Cape Haytien. and before her arrival the master had executed another charter to take a cargo from Miragoane. another Haytian port. By the laws of Hayti the schooner, before clearing from Cape Haytien for Miragoane. was bound to pay $381 of tonnage dues. The master claimed that under the charter the charterers were bound to pay the tonnage dues, as being “port charges.’’ The consignee refused to pay them except by deducting them from the freight. This, therefore, he did, and took a receipt for the rest of the freight money, which read that it was “in full for freight. * * * less advances, tonnage dues, etc., paid for my account,” which the master signed and he also made a protest against the deduction. The master then filed a libel against the charterers to recover the $381: Held, that the tonnage dues payable at Cape Haytien for the cargo to be taken on board at Miragoane were port charges payable by the charterers.</p> <p>2. The parties being ignorant of the consignee’s agreement when the charter was made, their rights, under the charter, were not affected by it.</p> <p>3. The presumption would be. not that the vessel was going to leave Cape Haytie.n in ballast, but that she would take an outward cargo.</p> <p>4. The giving the receipt did not. under the circumstances, constitute an account stated between the parties, and the libellant was entitled to recover.</p>

<p>This was an appeal from a decree of the district court. The cause was heard on an agreed statement of facts, which w7as as follows: “The libel in this cause was filed in the district court of Massachusetts, on the 19th of August, 1851. by the libellants [Oliver Smith and others], copartners, and dealers in lumber, to enforce a lien claimed by them upon the steamboat owned by the respondents. Judgment was entered against the respondents by consent, and thereupon they entered an appeal to this court. The case is submitted on the following facts: On or about the 18th of February, 1831, said boat being in need of divers repairs, the respondents made a written contract with one Nathaniel P. Roberts, by which he agreed to •do a portion of the work, and make a portion of the necessary repairs and improvements on said boat. By the terms of the •contract of which the libellants had knowledge, said Roberts was to furnish all the nec.essary materials, as well as perform all the labor for the repairs, for a certain sum stated in the contract. And he performed and completed his work about the 20th of July, 1831, having furnished all the materials, pursuant to his agreement, and the respondents paid him therefor in full, before notice of any claim made by libellants. The lumber used for said repairs, was furnished and delivered to Roberts by the libellants at divers times, partly at their shop, and partly at planing-mills, on his orders, to the amount of 81,075.13. And there was an understanding, before they began, that the libellants should furnish the materials for this job. At the times these materials were delivered, they were entered and charged in the libellants1 books, and a transcript of such entries in the journal and ledger is annexed, marked ‘A,’ which, it is agreed, may be used instead ot said books and entries, and be entitled to the same weight as the books and entries, if, in the opinion of the court, such books and entries are admissible and competent evidence for the libellants, which the respondents deny. About the time of the completion of said work, Roberts failed in business. Previous to February 18, 1851, Roberts had been a customer of the libellants, and had had a running account with them to the extent of several thousand dollars annually, for several years, on a credit usually of six months; bills therefor being rendered usually, on the 1st of January and July, in each year. At the time Roberts purchased the materials in question, nothing was said or done by him or by the libellants, indicating that the materials were not sold on the individual and sole responsibility of Roberts, nor was any thing said or done by either indicating that he purchased or they sold, in any other manner than previously. During the time of the purchases in question. Roberts bought other lumber of libellants, to the amount of about $100, and there was an unsettled account for lumber, on which Roberts owed them $600 or $700. Prior to 1st August, 1851. and after the work was completed, the libellants demanded payment of said Roberts of the bill of materials in question; and on the 13th day of August. 1831, the libellants caused a writ to be sued out against said Roberts, a copy of which and the papers in that suit may be referred to as a part of this statement. Before the filing of said libel, but after the respondents had paid Roberts in full, the libellants made a demand on the respondents for the- amount of said bill. The deposition of Roberts, ana the contract, may be referred to as a part of this' statement by either party. The steamboat in question is of the burden of 242 2S/u-, tons, and without masts. She was enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States, 19th August, 1842. The license expired 19th August, 1S43, and no other has been taken out, and she has been employed only as a ferry-boat to carry passengers to and from the railroad in the harbor of Boston, between Boston and East Boston. If upon the foregoing facts the court shall be of opinion that the libellants had a lien on said boat, which they could legally enforce at the time of the filing of said libel, judgment shall be entered for the libellants for a sum to be agreed uixm, and for costs; otherwise judgment shall be entered for respondents for costs.”</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by William Smith against Henry Elliott, administrator of Joseph T. Whitehouse.]</p> <p>[Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought on letters patent [No. 9,653] for an “improvement in corded elastic fabrics.” granted to William Smith, April 5. 1853; reissued, in three divisions, June 30, 1S6S [Nos. 2.S43, 2,844 and 3.014], and extended for seven years from April 5. 1867. The nature of the invention in controversy is fully set forth in the opinion.] 2</p>

[Action on the case by Francis O. J. Smith against Hernán B. Ely and others. Demurrer to defendants’ pleas.' Suit brought on letters patent [No. 1,647] for the electro magnetic telegraph, granted to Samuel F. B. Morse, June 20,1840, reissued January 13,1848 [No. 117]; also on letters patent for new and useful improvement in electro magnetic telegraph, granted to said Morse, April 11, 1846.

In April, 1S69, Jenkins. Newton. Pierce & Co. commenced business in the city of Rochester. as retail dealers in dry goods. Held: in Re Dalby [Id. 8,-540], that an unrecorded mortgage was good against the assignee, though void against execution creditors. The reasoning covers this case. But this question has been finally settled by the late decision of the supreme court of the United States. Gibson v. Warden, 14 Wall. [81 U. S.] 244.

In equity. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit [hy Hezekiah B. Smith against J. A. Fay & Co. and others,] brought upon letters patent [No. 10,422] for “improvement in mortising-machines,” granted to complainant January 10, 1854, and extended seven years from the expiration of the original term. In the above engravings, Fig. 1 represents a back elevation, and Fig. 2 a side elevation, of the complainant’s machine, as shown in his patent.

This was a real action, to recover an undivided seventh part of certain parcels of land, described in the declaration. The title of the plaintiff [Freelove Smith] was derived from Arthur Fenner, senior, who was her father, and grandfather of the defendant, and who died on the 28th Jan., 1788.

[This was a bill in equity by John R. Smith and others against William E. Frazer and others.] Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 682,481] for an “improved machine for crushing and washing sand.” granted to John R. Smith and William H. Denniston, assignees of John R. Smith, August 27, 1867. The invention will be readily understood by reference to the accompanying engraving, in connection with the claims, which were as follows: 1.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by William Smith against the Glendale Elastic Fabrics Company for the infringement of certain letters patent.]</p>

In bankruptcy. This case was heard on a motion to dissolve an injunction issued on the petition of Smith, the assignee of [A. D.] Lowell, to restrain the defendant from carrying into execution a decree in equity of the state court in his favor, against Lowell and his trustee, Tukey.

[This was an action at law by Smith against Hammond, collector of the port, to recover damages for his refusal to grant a certificate of registry to a certain vessel.]

<p>[This was an action by Smith, Murphy & Co. against John Hartwell to recover the amount of a bond.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,056.</p> <p>Fixtures — Stoves—Vendor and Purchaser.</p> <p>Franklin stoves fixed, in the usual manner with bricks and mortar, pass to the vendee of the house.</p> <p>[Cited in Rahway Sav. Inst. v. Irving St. Bap-~ tist Church, 36 N. J. Eq. 62.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,057.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement—Damages—'Theory op</p>

This was an action on the case [by Alexander Smith and Jonathan Smith against Alvin Higgins and others] tried by Mr. Justice NELSON and a jury, and brought to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 7,446] granted to Alexander Smith, June 18, 1850, and reissued May 11, 1852 [No. 217], for a new and useful “apparatus for parti-coloring yam,” an undivided half of which was assigned to Jonathan Smith.

This was an action on the case [by Alexander Smith and others against Alvin Higgins and others] tried, by consent of parties, by Mr. Justice Nelson, without a jury, to recover •damages for infringement of letters patent [No. 7.44G], granted to Alexander Smith June IS, 1850, and reissued May 11, 1852 [No. 217], for an “improvement in apparatus for parti-coloring yarn.” A report of a former trial, in which the jury disagreed, will be found in [Case No. 13,059].

This is an action of ejectment for two tracts of land in Clearfield county. What gives it consequence is, that the decision affects titles to farms and timber lands of great value, and covering an area of many miles around the lands in controversy. To the old land lawyers of Pennsylvania, the legal principles decided, will seem familiar. By the juniors of the profession this report will be appreciated.

<p>[This was an action at law by Smith against Jackson. Heard on motion for a mandamus.).</p>

<p>Case No. 13,065.</p> <p>Appeal — Am ex dments — Form—Substance— Writs — Service.</p> <p>1. The circuit courts, on appeal from the district courts, have power by the 32d section of the judiciary act, to allow any amendments of defects in form occurring in the court below’, which could have been amended there, or to disregard them in giving judgment.</p> <p>[Cited in Buchanan v. Trotter. Case No. 2,-075; Heye v. Lieman, Id. 6,445a; Tyson v. Belmont, Id. 14,315a; Elting v. Campbell, Id. 4,422.]</p> <p>2. But this power does not extend to defects in substance. Such defects may however bo amended in the district court, on terms. This pov'er is more extensive than any given to the English courts. But the amendments must be made before final judgment. And this is agreeable to the state practice in such cases.</p> <p>[Cited in Buchanan v. Trotter, Case No. 2,-075.]</p> <p>3. An omission of the averment of citizenship is a defect in substance, not cured by verdict, and which cannot be amended after judgment.</p> <p>4. So of the averment of the value of the property in dispute when necessary to give jurisdiction.</p> <p>5. Amendments at common law were for trivial errors, and where there was something to amend by. Anciently they could be made only during the term when the error occurred in the record; afterwards they were allowed at any time pending the suit; but never after final judgment.</p> <p>6. Coniusion and contradiction in the English cases arising upon the various statutes of amendments and jeofails.</p> <p>7. A judgment was entered in the district court of the Northern district of New-York. sitting with circuit court powers, in January, 1824, the record filed and execution issued. In September of the same year it was removed by error into the circuit court, and in January following, the district court allowed the record to be amended by inserting in the declaration the averments of citizenship, and of the value of the property in dispute, which were essential to jurisdiction: Held, that the amendments were irregular, and that this court would not receive them after the original record had been sent up.</p> <p>8. There is no practice in this court of service of papers upon the agent of an attorney, as in the supreme court of the'state.</p>

In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction, to restrain the defendant [D. Griffing Johnson] from publishing and selling a map, in violation of a copyright granted to the plaintiff [Robert P. Smith].

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [These were libels by Edward Jordan’ against James L. Smith and Charles Hitch and others for marine torts, and subtraction, of wages. From a decree in favor of libelant in the district court (case unreported), respondents appealed.]

[These were two libels against the schooner Joseph Stewart, Crandell, master, — the first for salvage, by George Smith and others, mariners, and Richards & Bispham, for the schooner Caspian, and the other for wages, by Charles Hoy and others, mariners.] The Joseph Stewart having been libelled for salvage by the parties in the first of the above suits, the claimants in the second suit, who had abandoned the schooner at sea, filed their libel for wages up to the date of the…

[This was a libel for salvage by Joseph Smith and others, crew of the sloop of war Plymouth, against the brig Josephine, her tackle, apparel, and cargo.]

This is an appeal in bankruptcy from a decree of the district court for the Eastern district of Missouri. The appeal is taken by the assignee [John Ford Smith), by Mrs. Meyer, the wife of the bankrupt [Martin Meyer], and by Vogler. a creditor.

This was a bill in .chancery filed by Joseph H. Smith, assignee of Jacob and Ezrom Mayer, against Charles H. Little and others, to set aside certain mortgages made by said bankrupts to the defendants.

<p>Case No. 13,074.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Chattel Mortgage — Proceeds op Sale — Bights op Purchaser — Partnership — Preference.</p> <p>1. M. and C. were partners in trade, and on the dissolution of the firm, M. purchased of C. his interest in the business, giving his notes in payment, and executing a mortgage to secure the notes on the stock of merchandise and accounts of the firm. M. continued in business some time thereafter, and finally sold and transferred to C. the entire stock of goods then in his (M.’s) store. C. took possession of the stock and made sales on his own account. At the time of the sale M. was hopelessly insolvent. Held, that as the mortgage contained no provision by which the collections and proceeds of sales should be either applied to the purposes of the conveyance, to the payment of the debts to be secured, or indemnity to be provided, or by its reinvestment so as to augment the trust fund, the want of which is inconsistent with the alleged purpose of the conveyance, and therefore it is void upon its face.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Poster, Case No. 4,964.]</p> <p>2, The sale gave C. a preference over the other creditors and was therefore invalid: and C. knew of the insolvency of M. at the time of the transfer, therefore he must pay into court the value of the property, with interest from the time of the sale and transfer.</p>

[This was a libel by Jonas Smith and others against the bark Mansanito and cargo, to recover for salvage services. Heard on application for payment of surplus proceeds of cargo to the cargo owners.] This ease came up on an application to the court for payment of the remnants and proceeds out of the registry.

[This was a bill in equity by William Smith and others against James Marshall and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 142.661, granted to J. B. Aston, September 9, 1873; letters patent No. 53,-883, granted to G. Ross, April 10, 1866; and letters patent No. 37,037. granted to Firth & Ingham, December 2, 1862.]

<p>Case No. 13,078.</p> <p>Patents — Reissue to Administkatok — Effect on Grantees of Territorial Rights — Foreign Administrators — State Laws —Planing Machines.</p> <p>[1. The administrator of a deceased patentee is the only one who, under the act of 1836, has a right to surrender the patent for the purpose of receiving an amended patent, and his right to do so is not affected by the fact that he had previously made grants of exclusive rights, under the patent, for certain parts of the United States.]</p> <p>[2. The amendments in a reissued patent inure to the benefit of grantees of exclusive rights, under the original patent, for particular localities.]</p> <p>[3. A patent signed by the secretary of state, and countersigned under the seal of the patent office, by the chief clerk of that office as “acting commissioner,” during the absence of the commissioner, must be recognized as valid, irrespective of the question whether the chief clerk has authority to act as commissioner of patents during the mere absence of the commissioner, and while he yet retains his official character.]</p> <p>LCited in Woodworth v. Hall, Case No. 18,-017.]</p> <p>[4. A grantee of a patent right may sue upon the patent in the Pennsylvania courts, notwithstanding that he derived his right from a foreign administrator, although such administrator has never taken out letters of administration in Pennsylvania, for the local laws have no application in respect to patent suits.]</p> <p>.LCited in Goodyear v. Hullihen, Case No. 5,-573.]</p> <p>[5. The Woodworth reissue patent of 1842, for an improvement in the method of planing, tongueing. grooving, and cutting into moldings, planks, boards, etc., is not invalid as covering a different invention from that of the original. Woodworth v. Stone, Case No. 18,021, followed.]</p> <p>T6. The original Woodworth patent of 1828 held valid, and declared to be so well supported by judicial decisions as to give a right to a preliminary injunction against an infringer.]</p> <p>7. The Woodworth patents analyzed and construed, and held infringed.]</p>

<p>[This was an action by Benjamin L. Miles against Henry L. Smith to recover moneys illegally collected.]</p>

<p>This was a motion, made on behalf of a party against whom, as garnishee, proceedings in a suit were being prosecuted, to set aside the proceedings in relation to him, for irregularity,</p>

<p>Case No. 13,082.</p> <p>Railroad Companies — Municipal Aid — Liens— Mortgage.</p> <p>1. An act of a state legislature, authorizing a city to issue its bonds in aid of railroad companies incorporated and organized, does not extend to companies afterwards incorporated.</p> <p>2. Where a city issues its bonds in aid of a railroad company without authority of law, and receives therefor the bonds of the company, secured with other bonds by a mortgage upon its road, the city is not such a lien creditor for a valuable consideration as to entitle 'it to claim a share of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged premises made in satisfaction of the mortgage. But the city having received securities collateral to the company’s bonds, a judgment creditor of the company cannot, by bill in equity, require the city to surrender these securities until its rights are determined by judicial proceeding, or it be released.</p>

The court finds, from the evidence, the facts to be as follows: 1.

[Pinal hearing on pleading and proofs. Suit brought [by William Smith against Nathan Nichols] upon letters patent [No. 9,653] for “improvement in corded elastic fabrics,” granted to William Smith, April 5, 1853, and reissued June 30, 1868 [No. 3,014]. A suit upon the same patent is reported in the case of Smith v. Elliott [Case No. 13,041]. The patent was subsequently modified by a disclaimer filed May, 1872.] 3

<p>Case No. 13,085.</p> <p>Towns — Bonds — Commissioners — Consent of Tax Patees.</p> <p>Section 2 of the act of the legislature of New York, passed April 19, 1869 (Laws N. Y. 1869, c. 241, § 2), provided, that commissioners to be appointed might borrow money on the faith and credit of a town, and issue bonds therefor, but that no debt should be contracted, or bonds issued, until consent in writing should be obtained of a majority of the tax payers owning more than half the taxable property of the town, which faet should be proved by the affidavit of the assessors, which should be filed in the county and town clerks’ offices, and should be evidence of the facts therein contained and certified, in the courts and before the judges of the state. In a suit against the town, on coupons attached to negotiable bonds, issued by commissioners professing to act in behalf of the town, the plaintiff being a bona fide holder of the coupons, before maturity, the only evidence of such consent was an affidavit of the assessors, stating that the consent of the requisite majority had 'been obtained, according to the provisions of the statute, that the commissioners of' the town, appointed to carry into effect the purposes of the act, “are now authorized by the terms of” the act, to borrow on the faith and credit of the town, a specified sum of money, without anything more about bonds or issuing bonds, and without stating to what. the consent had been obtained: Held, that the plaintiff could not recover.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Irwin v. Ontario, 3 Fed. 60.)</p> <p>[A motion was subsequently made for leave to reargue the above motion for a new trial. The motion was denied. Case No. 13,080.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,086.</p> <p>New Trial — Reargument.</p> <p>1. After the court has heard and denied a motion for a new trial, in a suit at law, and a judgment has been rendered and paid and satisfied. it has no power to grant leave to re-argue the motion for a new trial.</p> <p>2. The decision in Smith v. Ontario [Case No. 13,085] commented on.</p>

[This was an application for attachment by Smith and Sloat against James M. Patton for an alleged violation of an injunction issued against the defendant.]

<p>[This was an action by Jesse C. Smith against John Pearce and H. Pearce for the infringement of, letters patent granted to plaintiff January 29, 1830.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,090a.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Advance Security — Liability of Owner — Voluntary Discharge of Seamen.</p> <p>[1. A draft for advance wages, drawn by the master on the owner, and discounted by a third person, all according to the provisions of Rev. St. S§ 4533, 4534, creates an obligation enforci-ble in admiralty against the owner, without any acceptance by him.]</p> <p>[2. An advance security, made and discounted according +o the statute, requested the owner to pay certain sums of money to the seamen three days after the sailing of the vessel from St. Mary’s, provided the seamen should go to sea in the vessel from St. Mary’s according to the shipping articles. Held, that the owner was bound to pay the security, although the seamen never went to sea in the vessel from St. Mary’s, for the reason that they were voluntarily discharged by the master before reaching that port.]</p>

In equity. This was a bill filed by the complainant (Janet Smith, administratrix, against Norman C. Perkins and others]' to enforce an alleged lien upon lots 15 and 16 in block 111, of the school section addition to Chicago, arising under a mortgage or deed of trust, executed by George N. Williams, to Obadiah Jackson, on the 1st of October, 1868, to secure a note of $30,000, given by Williams to Charles C. Waite.

. This was an action of ejectment tried to a jury. It was one of numerous cases brought to test the title to the property in “Lambert & Co.’s addition” to St. Paul. .

This is a suit by [P. O. J. Smith] a stockholder of the York & Cumberland Railroad Company against the defendants [J. A. Poor and others], ten in number, seeking to charge them personally for certain alleged misdoings in the management of the business of the corporation as directors.

[Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. [Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 100,-089] for “improvement in -water-closet receivers,” issued to William Smith, August 2, 1870. The claim and material parts of the specification are recited in the opinion. s [In the above engravings, Fig. 1 represents a front view of complainant’s device, as shown in his patent. Fig. 2 represents a vertical section of the same.

Debt [by Smitn, for the use of Higden, against Nicholas L. Queen], on a note under seal. There were payments proved which reduced the amount due to seventeen dollars and thirty cents. The verdict is, “We find .for the plaintiff and find the sum due on the note to be seventeen dollars and thirty cents.” moved for judgment of non pros., under Act Md. 1796, c. 68, § 9. The courts in Maryland are expressly limited. The jurisdiction of this court is general. See Act Cong.

<p>Case No. 13,097.</p> <p>Trade-Mark — Declaration under Oath — Certificate by Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>Section 77 of the act of July 8th, 1870 (16 Stat. 210), provides, as a requirement for obtaining a trade-mark, the filing, in the patent office, of a declaration, under oath, as to the right to the trade-mark. A certificate by the commissioner of patents, of the deposit, for registration, of a trade-mark, of which a copy is given, and of the filing of a statement, of which a copy is annexed to the certificate, (but which statement does not contain any such declaration.) and that the party depositing the trademark has otherwise complied with the act, and that the trade-mark has been registered and recorded, and will remain in force for a period named in the certificate, is not evidence of the filing of such declaration.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by J. Lee Smith ■and others against Robert Reynolds and Samuel Jacobs to restrain the infringement ■of a trade-mark. A motion for an injunction was denied. Case No. 13,097. Proofs were taken for final hearing, and a motion again made for an injunction restraining the use ■by defendant of plaintiffs’ trade-mark.]

<p>Case No. 13,099.</p> <p>Trade-Mark — Particular Use — Registration.</p> <p>The registration of a trade-mark for “paints” by A., who had previously acquired the exclusive use of such trade-mark for particular kinds of paints only, does not enable A. to restrain B. from using such trade-mark upon another kind of paint, to which B. had been in the habit of affixing such trade-mark prior to such registration.</p>

This was an action of trespass on the case, in the nature of a conspiracy to defraud, and for actually defrauding the plaintiff, James Smith, in the purchase of certain lands, situate in Maine. The damages were laid at $63.000.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

This was an action of trover for a quantity of print rolls, tried before PITMAN, District Judge, at the last November term.

This was an application for a provisional injunction. The bill was filed to- restrain the defendants [Henry R. Selden and others,] from the use of Morse’s electro-magnetic telegraph, as secured by two patents granted to Samuel F. B. Morse, and to compel an account of profits derived from the use of the same, in violation, as was alleged, of the patents, on a line of telegraph constructed and operated by the defendants, extending from Buffalo, N. X., to Erie, Pa.

<p>Case Ho. 13,105.</p> <p>Public Lands — Militakt Bounties — Coxtkact op Sale — Notice—Pleading in Equity —Weight of Answer.</p> <p>1. Notice reaches the conscience of the party,, and he acquires no better title than the person of whom he purchased.'</p> <p>2. If denied by the answer, the notice must be-proved by two witnesses, or by one witness and. strong circumstances.</p> <p>3. The 7th section of the act of congress-respecting military bounties, passed March 1, 1890 [2 Stat. 15], which provides that no location shall be made or patents issued for lands, except to persons who performed the service,, or their heirs; and that the patentee shall hold the same, free from any contract of sale, is limited to the patentee named in the section.</p> <p>4. The policy was to protect a meritorious class of persons from contracts entered into under the influence of necessity or fraud. But where the patentee has conveyed, the grantee-cannot shelter himself from his contracts under the above act.</p> <p>5. As in this ease, Buford, the patentee, was-not made a party, nor any reason assigned in the bill why he tvas not, and as he stands in the-same relation to the complainant, as Garrison stood to Hinde v. Findlay [1 Pet. (26 U. S.) 241], and as in that case, the decree was reversed, because Garrison ivas not made a party, that decision is considered conclusive in this-case.</p> <p>[Cited in Pratt v. Vattier, Case No. 11,117 Chester v. Chester, 7 Fed. 4.]</p>

<p>This was an application for a provisional injunction, founded on letters patent granted to Edward Maynard, September 22, 1845, for an “improvement in percussion locks and primers.” The plaintiffs [Thomas L. Smith and others] were assignees of the patent. The bilt averred, among other things, that the defendants were making for the British government, under a contract, 6,000 of Sharp’s rifles, with the Maynard lock and primer, and had delivered some of them. It prayed, among other things, for an injunction restraining the defendants from executing the contract with the British government, without first paying the plaintiffs for the right to apply the Maynard lock and primer to the 6,000 rifles. The defendants did not deny the validity of the patent, or the plaintiffs’ title to it, or their use of the patented invention; nor did they set up any strictly legal right to use it. They averred that they had been attaching the Maynard lock to their rifles, with the understanding that some arrangement would be made with the plaintiffs for the price to be paid for the use; that the plaintiffs had, for at least five years, had knowledge of such use; that the defendants had a contract with the British government to make for it 6,000 rifles, which contract was now nearly completed; that, after it was made, the officers of the British government ordered the defendants to apply the Maynard lock to said rifles; that, under such order, the defendants, without any additional compensation therefor, had constructed the greater part of the locks for said rifles; that the defendants were now ready to pay the plaintiffs at the rate of twenty-five cents for each lock made by them, (excepting those made for the government of the United States, which had a right to the use of the lock), or to render an account of the profits made by them in the manufacture of the locks, and to pay the same to the plaintiffs whenever they could be ascertained by a master of this court, or otherwise.</p>

Meyer made his will in these words: “As to such worldly estate wherewith it has pleased God to bless me in this life, I give and dispose of the same in the following manner, to wit: I give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife Elizabeth, eighty-five aeres and allowance of land of my dwelling plantation whereon I now live, she to have the choice of the same wherever she thinks proper; and further, I do give and bequeath unto my said wife all my movable property or…

This action was brought by an English merchant, upon an account of goods shipped to the testator; and the only question was, as to the proper mode of calculating the interest. insisted that the interest should be calculated whenever a payment is made, to which the payment should, in the first instance, be applied; and if it exceed the interest then due, the balance to be applied to diminish the principal; if it fall short of the interest, the balance of interest should not…

moved to set aside the office judgment by pleading the statute of limitations. Refused; the court saying that it had always been refused. See Hooff v. Herbert (November, 1803 [Case No. 6,670]).

<p>Case No. 13,112.</p> <p>Religious Societies — Church Division — Book Concern — Beneficiaries—Lapsed Charity.</p> <p>1. The general conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church is a delegated or representative body, with limited constitutional powers; and possesses no authority, directly or indirectly, to divide the Church.</p> <p>[See Bascom v. Lane, Case No. 1,089.]</p> <p>2. In the adoption of the “Plan of Separation” in 1844, there was no claim to, or exercise of, such a power.</p> <p>3. As the general conference is prohibited from any application of the produce of the Book Concern, except for a specified purpose, and in a specified manner; and as the annual conferences have refused to remove this prohibition, by changing or modifying the sixth restrictive rule, the general conference has no power to apportion or divide the concern, or its produce, except as provided for by said rule.</p> <p>4. Said Book Concern is a charity, devoted expressly to the use and benefit of the traveling, supernumerary, and superannuated preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, their wives, widows, and children, continuing in it as an organized Church; and any individual, or any number of individuals, withdrawing from, and ceasing to be members of the Church, as an organized body, cease to be beneficiaries of the charity.</p> <p>5. It is the undoubted right of any individual preacher or member of said Church, or any number of preachers, or members; or any sectional portions or divisions thereof, to withdraw from it, at pleasure; but in withdrawing, they take with them none of the rights of property pertaining to them while in the Church; and, the withdrawal of the Southern and SouthWestern conferences in 1845, being voluntary, and not induced by any positive necessity, is within the principle here stated.</p> <p>[Cited in Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 370.]</p> <p>6. The defendants, as trustees or agents of the Book Concern at Cincinnati, being corpora-tors under a law of Ohio, and required, by such law, “to conduct the business of the Book Concern in conformity with the rules and regulations of the general conference.” in withholding from the Church South, any part of the property or proceeds of said Book Concern, have been guilty of no breach of trust, or any improper use or application of the property or funds in their keeping.</p> <p>7. This is not a case of a lapsed charity, justifying a court of eauity in constructing a new scheme for its application and administration; and the complainants, and those they represent, have no such personal claim to, or interest in. the property and funds in controversy, as will authorize a decree in their favor, on the basis of individual right.</p>

[This was a libel by Jonas Smith and others, owners of the Yankee, against Russell Sturgis and others, owners of the Colonel Satterly, to recover damages for injury to the Yankee, resulting from a collision between the two vessels:]

<p>Case No. 13,113.</p> <p>Counties — Coupons—Pi.ace of Payment — Railroad Companies — County Aid— Legislative Act.</p> <p>1. Where a coupon is payable at a particular place, presentation for payment at that place is not a condition precedent to a recovery of judgment thereon by suit.</p> <p>2. Authority given by a public act of the general assembly to a county to subscribe stock to a railroad company and issue bonds to pay for the same, need not be pleaded. The courts of the United States will take judicial notice of the public acts of the states within which they sit.</p> <p>3. When a county issues bonds payable to-bearer, and pledges for their payment the faith, credit and property of the county under authority of an act of the legislature referred to on the face of the bonds by title and date, and these bonds pass bona fide into the hands of the holders for value, the county is bound to-pay them.</p> <p>4. A county, under authority of an act of the-legislature, issued its bonds, payable to bearer at a future day, and after their issue, and long before their maturity, the supreme court of the -state declared the law authorizing the issue to be constitutional. Held, that all persons to whose hands the bonds might come-might consider that question as conclusively settled; it could not he reopened to their damage.</p> <p>[See Case No. 13,114.]</p>

This was an application for the peremptory writ of mandamus. On the 16th of November, 1874, the plaintiffs [Smith & Co.] recovered a judgment for $3,570, against the •county of Tallapoosa, Alabama.2 The judgment was based on certain coupons which had been detached from bonds issued by the -county by authority of an act of the legislature of December 31, 1868, which authorized the court of county commissioners to levy -and collect a tax to pay said coupons.

<p>[This was an action by A. W. Smith and others against the Teutonia Insurance Company of Cleveland. Heard on a petition for an adjudication of bankruptcy.]</p>

<p>[This was an action of ejectment by the lessee of Samuel Smith against Trabue’s heirs.]</p>

This was a libel for wages [by William Smith against. Hiram Treat]. The libellant .shipped as a seaman, April 25, 1845, on board the brig Benjamin, at Frankfort, for a voyage to some port in the West Indies and back, for 'wages at the rate of $15 per month. The brig returned August 17th, and the libellant claimed wages for the whole time; the balance due being $42.50, one month’s wages having been advanced to him at the time of shipping.

<p>Case No. 18,118.</p> <p>Libel — Justification — Nkwspapeh Privilege— Pleading — Separate Pleas — Demurrer — Not Guilty.</p> <p>1. A plea of justification must be as broad as the libel, and answer every material part of the declaration.</p> <p>2. An allegation that the plaintiff, in order to-avoid arrest for participation in an offense, feigned insanity, and took refuge in a lunatic asylum, is a material part of the libel.</p> <p>3. It is not necessary that one particular plea answer the whole libel, if the whole is answered by the different pleas. The defendant may justify separately and distinctly, but in such case the pleas should purport to answer only the particular charges.</p> <p>4. It is not a good plea that the plaintiff was a public man, a lecturer and speaker, and professed to be an educator of the public, and that the defendant, a public journal, made the publication complained of with good intent, having reason to believe it to be true; a journal has no right to make specific charges against a man, unless they were actually true, and honesty of motive is not a sufficient defense.</p> <p>[Cited in Upton v. Hume (Or.) 33 Pac. 813.]</p> <p>6. A demurrer to a count must take the innu-endoes as alleged.</p> <p>6. Plea of not guilty puts in issue the question whether the proof supports the innuen-does.</p> <p>For the rules as to construction of libel and justification, consult Whitney v. Janesville Gazette (June, 1873) [Case No. 17,590].</p>

At a United States government’s tax sale, made on the first day of March, 1864, at Alexandria, Virginia, David Turner became the purchaser and entered into possession of a lot of land and dwelling-house, -on' Royall street in that city. The land was at the time charged on the land-book for 1860, kept under the laws of Virginia, to R. M. & J. M. Smith. Turner still holds possession of the property.

Demurrer to a plea to the jurisdiction. The plea sets up that'the defendant, at the time of being served with process in this case, was a citizen and resident of the state of Iowa, and was temporarily in this district, and that the plaintiff is a citizen of New York.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This also was an action of debt for the penalty of the double value, under the embargo law, and was in many respects similar to the preceding case.

The plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Ohio, and brings suit to recover damages for injuries received while coupling cars on defendant’s road, and while in the employ of defendant as a brakeman. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or of the subject-matter of the action. The demurrer was submitted to Mr. Justice MILDER, at the May term, 1872, and taken .by him under advisement.

[This was a libel by Charles Smith against ■the ship Utica for wages, and to recover the value of property alleged to have been lost or stolen while in custody of the ship.]

<p>Case No. 13,123a.</p> <p>Appeal — Bond—Form—Certainty.</p> <p>1. Appeal bond which does not set out the nature of the action, nor the court to which the appeal is prayed, is informal, but not void, and should not be adjudged invalid.</p> <p>2. It is sufficiently certain to prevent a second recovery against either principal or security.</p>

At law. This action was brought by the plaintiff [Ann C. Cushing, for the use of Caleb Cushing] for injury sustained by the grading of K street in front of her premises in Franklin Row, in doing which they cut down that street some five or six feet, injuring, as she alleged, the value and use of her house.

Motion by Mr. Caldwell, for defendant [John F. Watson], to appear without bail. The cause of action was an account and affidavit by one of the plaintiffs, that the above account, as stated, is “true and correct. according to the best of his knowledge and belief.” 1 Sell. Prac. 112.

This was an action for freight, instituted by the master of the schooner R. S. Graham, against S.‘& W. Welsh, on 529 hhds. and 200 boxes sugar from Havana to Philadelphia, amounting to $2,130. The vessel, while prosecuting her voyage, was east ashore on the coast of Maryland.

<p>Case No. 13,128.</p> <p>Maritime Tort — Master—Allowing Minor Son to be Cheated by Gambler. ;</p> <p>1. Where the wrong complained of was committed on the high seas, or within the ebb and flow of the tide, and is of such a description that an action of trespass on the case might be maintained for it in court of common law jurisdiction, the admiralty court has also jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. The powers, duties, and responsibilities of ship masters considered, with reference to passengers.</p> <p>3. Towards women and minors, the master of a ship is bound, at all times, to exercise the care and tenderness of a pater familias, and this is especially his duty when they are unaccompanied by a natural guardian. The fact is that, in the eye of the law, he stands to all his passengers in loco parentis.</p> <p>4. The odious character of gamblers commented on.</p> <p>5. When a common gambler cheated a minor passenger out of a sum of money on board a vessel. and the captain, when informed of the facts, took no measures to compel the gambler to make restitution, he is himself liable for the loss to the minor’s parent.</p>

<p>[This was a libel for breach of charter-party, by Daniel Smith against John G. Williams and Edward F. Northam.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Eldridge .T. Smith and others against E. W. Woodruff.] Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 76,834] for ■“improvement in paper-files,” granted to Eldridge J. Smith, April 14,1868, and reissued April 19, 1872 [No. 4,864].

The plaintiff [Sarah A. Smith] claims to be the widow of W. K. Smith, who died in Iowa, without issue, in 1872, leaving real and personal property, which he devised and bequeathed to others. This is an action originally brought, in 1873, in the circuit court of the state, claiming, under the statutes of Iowa, her share, as such widow, in the property of the said Smith.

<p>Case No. 13,131.</p> <p>Counties — Bonds in Aid op Railroad — Act op New York Legislature.</p> <p>Tlie act of the legislature of New York, passed April 19, 1869 (Laws N. Y. 1869, p. 447, c. 241), authorized any town in the county of Orleans, “situate along the route of the Lake Ontario Shore Railroad,” after certain proceedings, to issue its bonds in aid of the building of the road. Such bonds were issued by the town of Y., in said county, although, at the time, the route of the road was not located through or along that town, in the manner prescribed by the general railroad act of April 2, 1850- (Laws N. Y. 1850, p. 211, c. 140), under which the railroad corporation was organized: Helé, that the want of such location was no objection to the validity of the bonds.</p> <p>[Cited in Mellen v. Lansing, 11 Fed. 828.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,133a.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations — Grading Streets.</p> <p>The power of grading and regrading the public streets of Washington must be considered as a continuing power in the corporation, to be exercised whenever and as often as the health, improvement and prosperity of the city makes it necessary.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,135.</p> <p>Railroad Company — Lien of Contractor— Mortgagee’s Rights — Priorities.</p> <p>[1. The C. Ry. Co., having the right to construct a railroad about 20 miles in length, made a deed of trust, under which certain bonds were issued, and, after grading about 12 miles of road, abandoned operations for want of funds. The S. Ry. Co. acquired a right to build a road over substantially the same route, and completed such road, using the grading done by the C. Ry. Co. It also acquired a licehse for the road to enter the city of C., which greatly enhanced its value The C. Ry. Co. made a mortgage on the whole road, and issued bonds thereunder. One B., who had built the road, was adjudged to have a first lien on the whole line. Held, that the lien 'of the bonds issued by the C. Ry. Co. attached only upon the grading actually done by that company, and, as the greater part of the value of the 12 miles of road so graded had been added to it by the work subsequently done, the holders of the C. Ry. Co. bonds were not entitled to require B. to satisfy his lien out of the remaining part of the road, on the ground that he had recourse to two securities, only one of which was liable to such bondholders.</p> <p>[2. Held, further, that the holders of the bonds issued by the C. Ry. Co. were not entitled to share in the enhanced value of the road given by the license procured by the S. Co., but that, in distributing the proceeds of sale of the road, the value of such license should be credited entirely to the part of the road constructed by the S. Co.]</p>

Assumpsit for money collected by the defendant [Thomas B. Hanly] as an attorney at law, •’nd which he failed to pay over to the plaintiff Alexander Sneed] on demand. The defendant plead the general issue and the statute of limitations.

This was an open policy on the brig Hound, from Kingston in Jamaica to New-York, on which 2500 dollars were underwritten by this office. Proof of property, that she sailed on the voyage insured, and was lost as stated, was given.

Trover for a quantity of coffee. The case-stated by the plaintiff, was; that the Charlotte, being his property, took in at Cape Francois, in 17S3, a quantity of coffee for the plaintiff, and some for other shippers; and! whilst on her return to New-York, was captured by a British frigate; part of her hands taken out; a prize-master put on board, and ordered for Jamaica.

<p>Case No. 13,139.</p> <p>Seamen' — Wages—Forfeiture for Absence— Deductions — Demurrage.</p> <p>1. To subject a seaman to the forfeiture of his wages, for absence, according to the provisions of the act of 20th July. Í790 [1 Stat. 131), an entry of the fact must have been made in the log book, by the mate, stating the name of the seaman, the date of the absence, and that it was without leave of the master.</p> <p>[Cited in The John Martin, Case No. 7,357.);</p> <p>2. A seaman who returns to a vessel, after a week’s absence without leave, and continues during the rest of the voyage, is to receive his wages at the rate originally contracted for, in the shipping articles, unless a new contract is explicitly made.</p> <p>[See The Almatia, Case No. 254.)</p> <p>3. The charge for a person necessarily employed in the place of a seaman, absent without leave, is to be deducted from his wages.</p> <p>4. The police costs and charges incurred by a seaman, for improper conduct while on shore, are to be deducted from his wages.</p> <p>5. Where a vessel is detained by the refusal of the seamen to work, they are to be charged with the demurrage, and the proportion of each seaman Who refused is to be deducted from his wages.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

Peter Viekman had a decree at a former day, against Loring Snow, for damages and costs.

<p>[In the matter of the petition of George W. Snow and Emeline, his wife.]</p>

This was a petition by Nathaniel Snow, filed the 18th instant, for a habeas corpus, and setting out in substance the following facts: Two suits had been instituted against him by John B. Myers & Co. in this court, on which property was attached as belonging to Snow. But the title to it was contested, and after judgments only one execution was levied on it, and the question as to the property still remains unsettled.

By this libel, the owners of the ship John W. White, sought to recover of the respondents 8653.63. for freight of 200 barrels of oil and 92 tierces of lard, brought from New Orleans to Boston, in the summer of 1854. There were two bills of lading, in -one of which the respondents were the consignees, and the other had been assigned to them; and. on the whole consignment, they had advanced to nearly the value of the goods.

Review in admiralty. A libel for wages of the libellant’s minor son on two fishing voyages was filed in December, 1871. The marshal returned personal service on the defendant [Joseph Edwards], and he was defaulted; and, after an ex parte hearing, a decree was rendered for the libellant, [Ephraim Snow] Jan. 18, 1872, and execution was issued after the lapse of ten days thereafter.

<p>[This was a libel by Nathaniel Snow against the bark Inca to recover damages for injury to goods.)</p>

This was an action of assumpsit [by J. L. Snow and D. B. Lewis against Dawson Miles], and the case came before the court upon an agreed statement of facts.

<p>Case No. 13,147.</p> <p>Patents —Novelty.</p> <p>The invention claimed in letters patent issued to George K. Snow, December 17. 1872, numbered 134,105, for machine for uniting paper and cloth: Held, not invalid for want of novelty.</p>

<p>[This was a' bill in equity by George K. Snow against Yarnun N. Taylor for the infringement of letters patent No. 132,547, granted to complainant October 29, 1872.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,149.</p> <p>Seamen — Shipping Articles — Act op Congkess —Power of Master to Imprison— Tort.</p> <p>1. If the shipping articles do not sufficiently describe the voyage, the seaman may leave the vessel at any time: and if the master imprison him because he refuses to remain and do duty on board, this is a tort.</p> <p>LCited in The Gem, Case No. 5,304.]</p> <p>2. A description of a voyage in the articles, as being, “from the port of Boston to Yalpa-faiso, and other ports in the Pacific Ocean, at and from thence home, direct, or via ports in the East Indies, or Europe,” is not a compliance with the requirement of the 1st section of the act of July 20, 1790 (1 Stat. 131), and the contract is void by the 10th article of the 1st section of the act of July 20, 1840 (5 Stat. 395).</p> <p>[Cited in The Ilermine, Case No. 6,409.]</p> <p>3. The power of the master to imprison the seamen on shore, held not to exist in this case.</p> <p>[Cited in The Elwin Ivreplin, Case No. 4.427.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 13.141.]</p>

In April, 1800, Thomas Snowden, United States inspector at the port of Pittsburg, obtained a patent on a valuable improvement in heating the feed water of steam boilers, by the direct agem y of the live steam in the boiler. Subsequently Ephraim Pierce and Win. McClurg made separate application for patents for the same invention. The commissioner of patents, according to the law of patents, declared an interference between the patent of Snowden and the said application.

<p>Case No. 13,153.</p> <p>Judgment — Release—Revivok.</p> <p>A release of a judgment, which has been subsequently revived by scire facias, cannot be pleaded in an action brought on the revived judgment.</p> <p>See, also, Cardesa v. Humes, 5 Serg. & R. 65; Share v. Becker, 8 Serg. & R. 239; Wilson v. Hurst [Case No. 17,809].</p>

<p>Case No. 13,164.</p> <p>I.vsurance — Life — Conditions —^Suicide—How Determined — Representations—Answers to Questions.</p> <p>1. The policy contained the condition that if the insured died by his own act or hand, whether sane or insane, then the policy should be null and void. Eeld. that the plaintiff was bound by the condition of the policy, and if the jury believed that the insured died by his own hand, whether sane or insane, the plaintiff cannot recover.</p> <p>2. It was a question for the jury to consider and decide, whether the insured died by murder or suicide, and the burden of proving, to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, that deceased died by suicide, lay with the defendant; otherwise, it was liable.</p> <p>3. The fact that the insured was induced by the earnest solicitations of agents to take large amounts of insurance, and make semiannual or quarterly payments, is no evidence that he meditated suicide at the time of insurance. The insured left a written memorandum, in which he referred to a policy of accident insurance as a part of an available fund for the payment of his debts. Eeld, that it was for the jury to consider whether this reference was evidence of a contemplated violent death.</p> <p>4. It was for the jury to consider the facts that the insured expected an early settlement of his policies of insurance, that they would be difficult to collect, that the policy against death by accidents was included in the rest, in determining the question whether the insured meditated suicide.</p> <p>5. The only answer to the questions in the applications, “Have you ever had a disease or other attack?” “Have you ever had any serious illness, disease, or personal injury?” was, “Smallpox thirty years since.” Eeld that if the insured had a fall on the head, and the injury was a severe one, or if he had a severe concussion on the brain, resulting from the fall, the answer is untrue, and the plaintiff cannot recover. The answer to the question in the application. “How long since you were attended by any physician, and for what disease? Give the name and residence of such physician”— was “Not for twenty years.” Eeld, that if the insured, about five years previous, had a severe fall on the head, and was attended several times by a physician, though employed by a railroad company, which is the same in law as being employed by the insured, then the answer is untrue, the policies are void, and the plaintiff cannot recover.</p> <p>[On writ of error, the judgment of this court was affirmed by the supreme court. 93 U. S. 393.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,155.</p> <p>Statute of Uses — Res Judicata — Parties — Third Persons — Equitt—Effect of Decree.</p> <p>1. The statute of uses (27 Hen. VIII.) has been adopted by Vermont, and generally by the New England states.</p> <p>2. A matter whieh has been directly tried and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be again contested between the same parties or privies in the same or any other court: and in this there is no difference between a verdict and judgment in a court of common law and a decree in a court of equity; but no rights will be affected by a recovery except those of the actual defendants, and those claiming through them and purchasers pendente lite.</p> <p>3. But this rule does not apply to matters which come only collaterally or incidentally under consideration, or can only be inferred by arguing from the decree.</p> <p>4. All persons materially interested in the subject of a suit in equity, ought to be made parties, either as plaintiffs or defendants; but as this is a rule established for the convenient administration of justice, it is subject to many exceptions, and is more or less a matter of discretion in the court, and ought to be restricted to parties whose interest is involved in the issue, and to be affected by the decree. And where one was clearly interested in the subject-matter of the suit, but nothing was asked from him by the bill, and his rights were not put in issue, and nothing was required by the decree to be done by him. it was held not necessary to make him a party.</p> <p>5. The ground of the rule as to dispensing with parties, is especially applicable to the courts of the United States on account of their peculiar jurisdiction ov.er parties. And although they will require the plaintiff to do all in his power to bring every person concerned in interest before the court, yet, if the case may be completely decided as between the litigant parties, the circumstance that an interest exists in some other person whom the process of the court cannot reach ex. gr., a non-resident ought not to prevent a decree upon the merits. If. however, such a decree cannot be fitly made without substantial injustice to third persons, the court will withhold its interposition.</p>

Entry sur disseisin. — In the writ, the de-mandants, describing themselves as “the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, a corporation duly constituted and established in England, in the dominions of the king of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, the members of which society are aliens and subjects of said king.” demand of the tenants, who are all citizens of the state of New Hampshire, seisin of a tract of land in Westmore-land in said…

<p>Case No. 13,157.</p> <p>Shipping — Vessel Bokned at Pier — Watchman —Explosion op Gas.</p> <p>Where the fumes of crude petroleum, carried in a tank on a lighter used in the oil trade, escaped into a locker, which locker — there being no watchman on board when the lighter lay one night with other vessels at a pier in Jersey City —was forced open during the night by a thief, who exploring the locker with a lighted match, set fire to the gas and caused an explosion and a fire, whereby the lighter and the libellant's lighter that lay alongside were destroyed: Held. that the escape of gas into the locker was an accident, and the presence of a lighted match in the locker not the natural result, oft the absence of a watchman. Between the act'of-omission charged upon the defendant, and the explosion. there intervened an independent human agency, the presence of whicli had no natural relation to any act of the defendant, and which therefore entailed no responsibility upon the defendant for the explosion.</p>

This was a bill in chancery asking an injunction against the respondent in the following case. It was filed September 8th, 1847, at an adjourned session of the May term. In March. 1847, an action had been instituted by .Tolm Merril in this court, as a citizen of the state of Maine, against Andrew Horn. Richard Horn, and Sinclair, citizens of Massachusetts, on a promissory note made by them to him, dated May 1st, 1841, for $10.000, in one year, with interest.

Bill for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land in the city of Newport.

This court having, at a former term, made a decree for specific performance of a contract of purchase (see [Case No. 13,159]), the case now came on for further directions upon the question whether the purchaser should be compelled to pay interest on the purchase-money. The parties agreed on the following statement of facts.

This action is brought in this court by the plaintiff, a citizen of Ohio, upon a judgment which he recovered against the defendant, in the court of common pleas of Butler county, in the state of Ohio, on the 17th day of October, 1854. It is alleged in the petition that the defendant is now a citizen of the state of Kansas, and has been a citizen and ’resident of said state ever since the year 1854.

A petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed by creditors, alleging that the debtor, “being a merchant, had fraudulently suspended payment of liis commercial paper, and had not resumed within fourteen days.” The debtor appeared and confessed the charge, and a decree was passed adjudging him a bankrupt, upon which he filed his schedules and surrendered his property, and complied with all the provisions of the statute.

This was a question as to the payment by an assignee in bankruptcy of the amount of a mortgage upon certain personal property of the bankrupts. The validity of the mortgage was contested by the creditors.

<p>Case No. 13,164.</p> <p>Prize — Enemy Property — Violation of Blockade.</p> <p>Cargo condemned as enemy property, and also for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

2 [I, Isaac Dayton, one of the registers of said eoui't in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that in the course of the proceedings in said cause before me, the following question arose pertinent to the said proceedings, and was ■stated and agreed to by the counsel for the ■opposing parties, to wit: Mr. Lord, of counsel for Andrew J. Solis, the bankrupt above named, and Mr. Robert Sewell, of counsel for Manning and DeForest, creditors of the said bankrupt.

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Virginia. [In the matter of Joseph Solomon, a bankrupt.]

In bankruptcy. The bankrupt was a furrier, whose purchases were few and of small amount. They had mostly been made in bulk. After working up the'materials purchased, he had sold a portion of the produce of his manufacture at auction, and had sold a greater portion by retail, in a store of his own.

<p>Case No. 13,169.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Assignment of.</p> <p>A pilot purchased a share iu the boat on which ho was serving, and, having paid part of the purchase money, stipulated with the other •owners that they should retain yearly, out of Ids wages, such sum as he was able to spare until the residue of the purchase money should be paid. Held, that this was not an assignment of unaccrued wages, within the meaning of section 4530, Rev. St., and that this agreement gave no authority to the owners to apply any part of the wages to the purchase money without further directions from the pilot.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,171.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Agreement to Renounce.</p> <p>An agreement made between the master and the cook of a fishing vessel by which the latter agreed to renounce his wages, earned and to be earned, and to accept in lieu thereof the catch of one of the seamen, pronounced unequal and unjust and to be disregarded by a court of admiralty.</p>

This is a bill brought by the complainant [Rebecca Somerville, executrix of Henry V. Somerville] to enjoin the defendant [C. C. Lee] from advertising and selling under a deed of trust in which the defendant is trustee, and praying a release from said trust. The facts, as stated in the bill, and not denied by the defendant in his answer, are as follows: Henry Lee owed Henry V. Somer-ville $12,000.

W. W. Berry having been summoned by the marshal of the District of Columbia, to-attend as a witness for the plaintiff in this cause, and failing to attend when called,—

[In the matter of Nathan A. Son, a bankrupt.] In this case, a creditor filed five specifications of the grounds of his opposition to the discharge of the bankrupt. They were as follows: (1) That the bankrupt has concealed part of his effects and his books relating thereto, and has not delivered to the assignee all the property belonging to him at -the time of presenting his petition, with intent to defraud liis «•editors.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] • In January, 1875, the ship Princeton, laden with 4,000 bales of cotton, was set on fire by lightning, near the Southwest Pass of the Mississippi river, and saved by libelants, composing the crews of the steam tugs Rio Grande and Ocean, belonging to the Ocean Tow Boat Company, and the steam tug Rochester, associated with the Ocean Tow Boat Company, and in their associated capacity engaged…

<p>Case No. 13,176.</p> <p>Malicious Prosecution — Bankruptcy — Probable Cause — Exemplary Damages— Actual Malice.</p> <p>1. An action for the malicious prosecution of a proceeding, to have plaintiff declared a bankrupt, is based on the supposed malice of the defendant, and want of probable cause for the prosecution of the bankruptcy proceeding.</p> <p>2. A want of probable cause is evidence of malice sufficient to sustain the action, and will ■entitle the plaintiff to recover the actual damage sustained by him.</p> <p>[Cited in Jerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. 271.]</p> <p>S. In order to a recovery of exemplary damages the plaintiff must show actual malice, that is, that the defendants willfully instituted and carried cn the bankruptcy proceedings when they knew there was no ground therefor.</p> <p>4. In order to justify a party in instituting proceedings in bankruptcy, he must be a credit- or of the alleged bankrupt. He cannot justify himself by saying he had probable cause to believe himself a creditor, and also probable cause to believe his debtor had committed an act of bankruptcy.</p> <p>5. Proceedings to put a debtor in bankruptcy should not be resorted to as proceedings in ter-rorem to collect a debt.</p> <p>fi. 'Where it had been adjudicated by the highest court of law in the state, that, the petitioner had no claim against the party whom he sought to put in bankruptcy, and the bankrupt court had refused to make a decree adjudicating the alleged debtor a bankrupt, in an action for malicious prosecution, the latter was, beyond question, entitled to recover the damages he had sustained by the unlawful attempt to put him in bankruptcy.</p> <p>7. In such a case, the measure of damages stated.</p> <p>8. If the defendants had reason to believe that the plaintiff was indebted to them, and had probable cause to believe that he had committed an act of bankruptcy, they cannot be charged with actual malice, and cannot be made Hi i>ay exemplary damages. .</p> <p>9. Where a decision of the supremo court of the United States declared a certain act to be an act of bankruptcy, a party reposing on such decision is protected from the charge of actual malice in a proceeding to put his debtor in bankruptcy, based on the ground that he had committed such act, even though such decision were afterwards modified, provided the creditor had probable cause to believe his debtor had committed the act charged.</p>

This is an action for goods sold and delivered [by Daniel R. Sortwell and others against Peter Hughes]. An auditor, appointed by consent of parties, having made a report, it was agreed that his report should be taken to be a statement of facts.

In admiralty. The first libel [by Cornelius Soule, master of the bark Oregon, against Rodoeanachi & Franghiadi] is for freight. The second libel [by Rodoeanachi & Frangh-iadi against the bark Oregon] is for damages to cargo.

In admiralty. This -suit is instituted on behalf of the French republic, by their agent of commercial relations [John Francis Soult], to pray restitution of the corvette L’Africaine, her tackle, furniture and apparel; and also compensation for' damages sustained by her detention.

This was a motion to attach the officers of the Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company, for disobedience of the order of the court in respect of the delivery of certain property therein mentioned.

<p>Case No. 13,180a.</p> <p>Collision — Damages—Demurrage during Repairs.</p> <p>[Demurrage for detention of vessel injured in collision cannot be calculated on the basis of what she was earning per day at the time, not being under hire or charter. The proper basis is the market value of the hire of the vessel for the time of detention. Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. (54 U. S.) 101, followed.]</p>

[In the matter of Edward O. Holmes and John W. Blanchard, bankrupts, the South Boston Iron Company, petitioners for review.] Proceedings in conformity to the conditions prescribed in the bankrupt act, relative to a composition proposed by a debtor, and accepted by the creditors as satisfaction of the debts due from the debtor to them, took place in the court.

This was a question upon evidence certified by the register, concerning the debt offered for proof by Frederic Talcott, and called for a decision whether the amount paid by an indorser of a note, after the bankruptcy of the maker, and after an affidavit in due form had been made by Talcott for proving the debt, but before the first meeting of the creditors, and therefore before the debt could be admitted to proof, should be deducted from the debt as a payment pro tanto.

<p>Case No. 13,185.</p> <p>Corporations — Foreign—Legislative Act — “Inhabitant op District” — Federal, Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. An act of the legislature respecting a corporation originally created by another state, will be construed to be a license, or an act of incorporation, according to what appears to be the true legislative intent, without regard to the particular language employed.</p> <p>2. The defendant corporation not being a corporation created by the state of Mississippi, is for that reason not an inhabitant of, nor is it found in the district.</p> <p>3. The circuit court of the United States cannot acquire jurisdiction of the person of a defendant corporation of a state, other than that in which the corporation'was created, by a resort to a state statute licensing the corporation on the condition of its submission'be sued in such state.</p> <p>[Cited in Stillwell v. Empire Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 13.449. Cited in brief in Schol-lenberger v. Phoenix Ins. Co., Case No. 12,-476.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,186.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Loans to Master for “Disbursements” — Waiver of Liens.</p> <p>[1. Where money was loaned to the master in a foreign port after investigation which showed the need of it to pay expenses necessary to enable the vessel to leave port, and upon the master’s representation that he needed the money for “disbursements,” held, that the lender was entitled to a lien, though he did not ask the master what particular payments he intended to make, and though the master in fact applied part of the money to satisfy claims which constituted no lien.]</p> <p>[2. A loan of money to the master in a foreign port to pay overdue seamen’s wages results in a maritime lien, whether seamen’s wages may or may not be included within the terms “repairs” or “supplies.”]</p> <p>[3. A maritime lien is not lost by suing out an attachment in a state court, and causing the same to be levied on the vessel, where the sheriff does not maintain possession, and the action in the state court is voluntarily discontinued before filing the libel in admiralty.]</p> <p>[4. A maritime lien is not waived by taking drafts on the owner, where the credit of the vessel was expressly relied on, and libellant offers to surrender the drafts at the trial.]</p>

This was an appeal from a decree of the district court, dismissing the libel, in a suit in rem, in admiralty. This court found the following facts: “About four o’clock in the morning of the 22d of September, 1875, a collision occurred between the German bark Bremen, owned by the libellants, and the British schooner Southern Home, three or four miles to the eastward of the light ship, off Sandy Hook.

The petition of Danforth W. Blanchard and Samuel D. Arnold, as partners, was filed, praying that the Southern Minnesota Railroad Company be adjudicated a bankrupt.' The corporation made a motion to dismiss the petition on exceptions filed to the petition.

This suit was in the nature of a bill in equity by George Gordon against the South Fork Canal Company, and others, to enforce a lien, claimed… Held: on the motion to confirm this report, that no lien could be claimed for these, but it must be limited to work and materials which actually entered into the thing constructed; and it would therefore be allowed only for the amount of seventy-six thousand five hundred and ninety-eight dollars and eighty-nine cents, with interest,…

<p>Case No. 13,190.</p> <p>Contempt — Violation of Injunction — Attorney.</p> <p>1. On November 12th, 1873, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against a railroad company. On February 13th. 1874, C., a member of the law firm of H. & C.. commenced an action in the supreme court of the state of New York against the company. C. had knowledge of the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. H. & C. appeared as attorneys for the plaintiff in the suit, and having obtained judgment against the company, they, on the 11th of April, 1874, gave notice of an application to the supreme court of the state, returnable on April 20th, for the appointment of a receiver of the property of the company. On April 18th, on motion of the attorney for the petitioning creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings, a tern-porary injunction was issued by the bankruptcy court, restraining C. and his attorney from proceeding with his application to the supreme court for a receiver, with an order to show cause why the injunction should not be made perpetual. The preliminary injunction was served on both H. and C. on the morning of April 20th. It was served on C. when he was already on his feet before the justice of the supreme court, engaged in making the application. He did not withdraw the application, but stated to the justice that he was enjoined from further proceedings, and handed up to the justice his motion papers, with a draft of an order for the appointment of the receiver, and the justice subsequently made the order appointing the receiver. H. having been served with the preliminary injunction, did nothing himself in the suit of C., and took steps to inform C. of the issuing of the injunction. On the return of the order to show cause before the bankruptcy court, the injunction was. on consent of C.. made permanent. An application was then made to this court to punish H. & 0. for a violation of the injunction: Held, that the excuse presented by H. was sufficient to exonerate him from punishment.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Cary, 10 Fed. 627.]</p> <p>2. C. was guilty of contempt in violating the injunction, and a reference must be had to ascertain the amount of the loss and expense caused by it, to enable the court to determine the proper punishment.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,191.</p> <p>Collision — Towing—Liability is Case or Collision.</p> <p>If a vessel employ a tug in general terms to tow in and land her at a particular place, the undertaking of the tug necessarily is that it will use the proper skill and ability to perform the service: and it has the right, and it becomes its duty as well, to direct the vessel that is towed, and to manage the helm, to the end that such vessel may aid in accomplishing the task entered upon, viz., making the landing.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,192.</p> <p>Convicts — Hiking out — Contract —Deductions —Bankhuptct—Preference.</p> <p>1. Under the laws in Indiana, convicts may be hired in any number not exceeding one hundred in any one contract. The bankrupt entered into four separate contracts with the state for +he employment of one • hundred convicts under each contract. The contracts were all executed at tlie same time but were signed by different sureties: Held, that the execution of these contracts was not a violation of the letter or spirit of the statute, and that the contracts were valid and binding.</p> <p>2. By the terms of the contracts the state was to keep the convicts under good discipline and to keep them at diligent and faithful labor for the bankrupt. This was not done: Held, that the loss and damage sustained by reason of the failure of the state to perform these stipulations should be deducted from the contract price in estimating the amount due to the state upon the contracts.</p> <p>3. A claim of the state upon a contract for the employment of convicts is entitled to preference under section 5101, Rev. St. U. S.</p>

In equity. Bill to establish a lost will by Sarah Southworth against Jane N. Adams and others. Decree for complainant. For former report, see 4 Fed. 1. This was a suit in equity, brought originally in the state court, and duly removed to this court, to establish an alleged lost will of Richard De Forest, deceased.

<p>[This was a libel by Southworth, Miller & Co. against the schooner A. E. Douglass and others.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,198.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition Meeting — Calculating Majority— Secured Creditors— Partnership.</p> <p>1. Instructions given to Indiana registers as to manner of calling and conducting composition meetings.</p> <p>2. The proper construction of the clause as to calculating a majority is that creditors whose' debts do not exceed $50, shall be counted in determining the value, but not in determining the number.</p> <p>3. Secured creditors, are those who hold a lien upon property which otherwise would go into the general fund, not those who have personal security. This latter class may prove and vote as unsecured creditors.</p> <p>[Cited in The Home, Case No. 6,657.]</p> <p>4. A composition should not be allowed to work inequality or injustice, as between individual and partnership creditors. If there is no objection, the creditors may direct a general composition, which is the most simple; but if any creditor objects, he has the right to a vote by the separate classes of creditors.</p> <p>5. The court, before confirming the composition, should see that it works no injustice to any class of creditors, and if it does, should give redress accordingly.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,197.</p> <p>Escape— Process — Deputt— Feuerai, Process— Measure op Damages.</p> <p>X. In an action for an escape, the sheriff cannot take advantage of an irregularity in the process, which does not render it void.</p> <p>2. The deputy of the marshal is a sworn officer, known to the law, and he may return, as deputy, tlie process served by him. Such has heen the uniform practice.</p> <p>3. A sheriff who receives as jailor, a person arrested by the marshal, is bound to keep the prisoner under all the responsibilities, as if he had been arrested under state process.</p> <p>4. An escape on final process, subjects the sheriff to damages to the amount of the injury received by the plaintiff.</p> <p>B. This injury is measured by the amount of property possessed by the defendant, not exceeding the sum named in the execution.</p> <p>[Cited in Sheldon v. Upham, 14 R. X. 493.]</p> <p>6. Where the defendant is wholly without property, nominal damages, only, can be recovered against the sheriff.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,198.</p> <p>Pleading at Law — Puis Darrein Continuance —How Met — Motion to Set Aside.</p> <p>1. A plea puis darrein continuance, properly verified and filed, within the rules of the court, will not be set aside on motion.</p> <p>2. The facts alleged in the plea, show that it has been filed in good faith; and the allegations must be denied by a replication, or admitted by a demurrer.</p> <p>3. The filing of this plea waives all prior issues.</p> <p>[Cited in Harding v. Minear, 54 Cal. 505. Cited in brief in Lincoln v. Thrali, 26 Vt. 305.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,300.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Power to Regulate Commerce — Police Regulations — Licenses on Theatrical Exhibitions.</p> <p>A license, issued under the authority of the laws of the United States, to a vessel to carry on a coasting trade, will not exempt the owners of it from the municipal regulations of towns, within Whose corporate limits they moor their-vessels for the purpose of giving theatrical exhibitions on board. If they there give such exhibitions as are by the town-regulations liable to taxation, their license does not protect them from it.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,201.</p> <p>Notes — Notice to Indorsers — How Gives.</p> <p>1. Where an indorser lives at the same place at which the note is payable and dishonored, notice of protest deposited in the local post office will bind the indorser, if actually received by him on the same day or the next.</p> <p>2. Where an indorser lives outside of the limits of the city at which the note is payable and dishonored, notice through the post' office to such indorser is ordinarily sufficient; but if, in such a case, the indorser has a known place of business in the city, notice of protest should be there given, although if given through the post office it will be sufficient if received in time by the indorser, or if received at his place of business on the day of the dishonor or the next day.</p> <p>8. Notice of protest given by a notary public to indorsers resident in the same place, partly in writing and partly in print, and which correctly describes the note, and contains all the essentials of such a notice, if actually received in time, is sufficient, although the signature of the notary be printed.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,202.</p> <p>Witness — Foreign Commission — Power of the Court to Summon.</p> <p>1. Where a commission was issued by a judge in Cuba to the Spanish consul in New York to take testimony to be used in a criminal prosecution for swindling, and the consul thereupon applied to the district court for a summons to compel the witness to appear and testify: Held, that the only provisions made by congress on the subject of enforcing the giving of testimony in judicial proceedings pending in a foreign country, are found in the acts of March 2, 1855 (10 Stat. 630), and of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 769).</p> <p>2. Neither of those acts applied to this ease, and the court had no power to issue the summons asked for.</p>

Charles T. Yerkes, Jr., traded as C. T. Yerkes, Jr., & Co. While thus engaged in business, he obtained a loan from S. & W. Welsh, and deposited with them certain stocks and other property as collateral security. On October 17th, 1871, Drexel & Co. purchased the claim of S. & W. Welsh, and received the securities. Drexel & Co.- sold the securities and realized enough to pay the debt and leave a balance of eight hundred and seventeen dollars and ninety-eight cents.

<p>Motion to dismiss appeal from a decree of the consular court of Canton, in the empire of China, in a case of collision.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,207.</p> <p>Admiralty — Sale—Setting Aside — Inadequacy of Price — Collision—Jurisdiction—Practice.</p> <p>1. A libel was filed in August, 1874, by P. against the steamer S., to recover for supplies. On the return of the process, R. appeared as claimant, but did not answer, and a decree was rendered by default, under which the vessel was sold to T. for $1,000, on the 24th of September, and the proceeds were paid to the libel-lant P., on September 26th. On September 30th, a petition was filed by M., setting up, that he held a mortgage on the S. made by R. to secure certain claims in Virginia and North Carolina; that the vessel had been removed thence, and brought to this state, in order to escape her being taken under the mortgage, and that the proceedings in this suit, and the sale-of the vessel, were collusive, and carried on ■for the same purpose; and that M. had had no-knowledge of such proceedings. And the petition prayed that the sale might be set aside, and the decree opened, in order that M. might be allowed to defend, on such terms as might be just. On this petition process issued against the vessel and against P. and R. and T. T. excepted to the jurisdiction of the court to grant the relief prayed for, and answers were also put in on behalf of P., R. and T., denying the charge of collusiveness in the sale and the merits of M.’s claim. On the hearing, evidence was given by M. tending to show the truth of his allegations. The vessel was shown to have been worth from $8.000 to $10,000, at the time of the sale. None of the respondents offered any evidence: Held, that a court of admiralty is a court of equity; and that purchasers of property sold in pursuance of its decrees, submit themselves to its jurisdiction in respect to the property purchased, and take it subject to the power of the court to vacate the sale, where such action is necessary to promote the ends of justice.</p> <p>[Cited in The Union, 20 Fed. 542.]</p> <p>2. This power may be called into exercise by petition.</p> <p>3. A sale .will be set aside, where there has been fraud or misconduct in the purchaser, fraudulent negligence or misconduct in any other person connected with the sale, surprise or misapprehension created by the conduct of the purchaser, or by some other person interested in the sale, or by the officer who conducted it</p> <p>[Cited in Blackburn v. Selma R. Co.. 3 Fed. 699.]</p> <p>4. On the facts in this case, there was gross inadequacy of price in the sale, and surprise-on the petitioner, and also circumstances tending to show that the persons in possession of the vessel combined with the libellant to secure the sale, and tending to raise suspicion as to -the action of the purchaser in the premises.</p> <p>5. The sale therefore must be set aside, on the reimbursement to T. of his purchase money and his outlay in this proceeding; the libellant P. must repay into the registry of the court the money drawn by him under his decree, and the decree must be set aside, and M. allowed to intervene and defend.</p> <p>[Cited in Blackburn v. Selma R. Co., 3. Fed. 700.]</p>

In equity. This was a motion before Judge BETTS, sitting in the circuit court, to dissolve an injunction.

[This was a hill in equity by Sparkman and Kelsey against Elias S. Higgins and others.] Motion for an attachment for an alleged violation of an injunction restraining the defendants from infringing the plaintiffs’ patent for a design for floor oil-cloth: See Sparkman v. Higgins [Case No. 13,208].

<p>In admiralty. This was a libel in behalf of the owner of a vessel against the owner of her cargo, for a general average contribution. The vessel was bound to Boston, and was accidentally stranded near Edgartown; the cargo was taken out and put in safety, and subsequently the vessel was got off. repaired, and the cargo taken on board and delivered in Boston. The libellant claimed the right to charge in general average the expenses incurred in getting the vessel off, after the cargo was landed. The respondent denied his right so to do, and this was the only question submitted to the court.</p> <p>. For the libellant it was contended. (1) that by usage and custom in Boston, the expenses were to be contributed for; and he introduced evidence to prove such usage; (2) that independently of any usage, the same were proper subjects for contribution.</p>

The hill is filed in this case [by Sparks and Kelsey] to foreclose a mortgage.

<p>[This was a libel for breach of contract by Harvey Sparks against the steamship Sonora.]</p>

This was an action brought by the plaintiff, owner of the ship Hope, against the defendant, for putting on board of the ship, at Havana, a quantity of dollars, without the knowledge, and against the orders of the captain given to his officers; whereby she was detained, for a long time, by the Spanish officers, in order to be searched. ’ the protest of the captain of the Hope;, and to prove that this was always admitted as evidence in the courts of this state, he cited [Hyan…

The schooner was sold, pendente lite, on the original libel of Ballentine and McAlpine. and the proceeds brought into court, and now remain in the registry. Five intervening libels were filed against the vessel. The one first filed was by the Security Insurance Company of New York, and the Buffalo Insurance Co. of Buffalo, for general average on account of the jettison of a quantity of corn.

<p>Case No. 13,814.</p> <p>Insurance — Life —Interrogatories—Truth of Answers — Misrepresentations—Acts of Agent — Estoppel.</p>

<p>' [This was an action on a note by Dunham Spaulding against John Evans.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,217.</p> <p>Courts — Federal Jurisdiction — Pleading— J oinder — Multifariousness— Bankruptcy.</p> <p>1. The plaintiff filed a bill in equity for the recovery of certain property against the bankrupt, his wife, and a third party. The bankrupt and his wife demurred to the bill on the grounds,- First. That the matters stated in the bill are not within the jurisdiction of this court. Second. That the bill is multifarious: As to parties. As to the objects of the bill. Held, that the matter in dbsputfe exceeding five hundred dollars, and the suit being between the citizens of two different states, the bill has all the conditions necessary to give this court jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in Cady v. Whaling, Case No. 2.285.]</p> <p>2. The objection as to a misjoinder of parties does not lie in the mouths of these defendants, as only those who are improperly joined can take advantage of this objection. •</p> <p>3. The bill is not multifarious in its objects.</p> <p>[At the final hearing of this case a decree in favor ' of the complainant, setting aside the deed as fraudulent, was entered. Case No. 13,218.]</p>

Bill to set aside a conveyance by a bankrupt to his wife, alleged to be in fraud of creditors. [Demurrers to the bill were formerly overruled. Case No. 13,217.]

These were bills in equity, filed to restrain the defendants [Nathaniel Page and others and J. It. Duff and others] from infringing letters patent [No. 33,270] for an “Improvement in saws” granted to complainant [Sept. 10, 1861, reissued April 21, 1863, No. 1,456].

This action was commenced in August, 1868, to recover damages for the infringement of a patent granted to the plaintiff for the discovery or invention of an improved mode of inserting detachable teeth in circular saw plates. In the course of the trial, many of the important questions made by the defendant [William Tucker] were disposed of by the court on objections to the evidence offered by him, to prove that the invention of the plaintiff was not novel or patentable.

[This was an action by Nathan W. Spauld-ing against William Tucker and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 33,-270, granted to complainant September 10, 1861, reissued April 21, 1863, No. 1,450, for an improved mode of inserting detachable teeth in circular saw plates. There was a judgment for the complainant. Case No. 13,220. It is now heard upon motion to re-tax the complainant’s bill of costs.]

[Appeal by James Spear from decision of the commissioner of patents on an interference declared, awarding to J. G. Abbott and A. Lawrence a patent as prior inventors of a certain combination, of features to produce gas-burning stoves.)

[This was an appeal by James Spear from a decision of the commissioner of patents in interference proceedings between the appellant and Belson, assignor to Stuart and Peterson.]

<p>Case No. 13,224.</p> <p>Account — Partneus—Grounds op Action— Pleading.</p> <p>1. At common law. joint partners may sustain an action of account against each other when the proceeds of the partnership business have been received by one of the partners, and he refuses to account for the same. But this action has almost totally falien into disuse; a bill in equity being a more convenient and suitable proceeding for the settlement of partnership accounts.</p> <p>2. This action could be sustained against a bailiff, a receiver, a guardian in soeage, as well as against a partner who had received moneys belonging to the partnership, and refused to account. But as it lay only on the ground that money, or its equivalent, had come to the hands of the defendant to be accounted for, it could not be maintained against a dormant partner who receives nothing, and has therefore no account to render.</p> <p>3. Where, therefore, A., B. & C. entered into partnership in paper-making, under an agreement reciting the purchase and transfer of a lease for a term of years to them as tenants in common, the one-half of all the interest in said lease, together with one-half the benefit of twenty-five hundred dollars rents, already advanced on the same, to be owned and held for the use and benefit of A., and the other half to be the property of B. & C.; and the agreement further provided that B. & C. should furnish all the stock and materials of every description on their own private account and responsibility — pay all the expenses, and take charge of and conduct the business, the business +o be done for the mutual profit and loss of the parties according to their respective interest:- it was held, that an action of account brought by B. & C. to have a settlement of the partnership concerns, and to compel A. to contribute his proportion, could not be sustained.</p> <p>[Cited in Carlin v. Donegan, 15 Kan. 498.]</p> <p>4. And where B., one of the partners, (A. being present and consenting thereto,) sold the stock and materials of the partnership to a new company consisting of A. and some third persons, and charged the same on the books of A., B. & C. to the new company, and credited the old company with the same amount, it was held, that as an absolute sale had been made to the new company, and that company charged with the amount, the transaction was closed, and no longer open to be accounted for by A. Nor, even if A. were accountable for that specific property, would it authorize the going into the partnership accounts generally.</p> <p>5. It is a settled rule of the action of account, that nothing can be pleaded before the auditors, contrary to what has been previously pleaded and found by the verdict.</p> <p>[Cited in Quayle v. Guild, 91 Ill. 390.]</p> <p>NOTE. Authorities cited on the argument: Co. Inst. 172, cited in Selw. N. P., now said to be the foundation of the action of account. Com. Dig. tit. ‘Action,” E; Willes. 208; Vin. Abr. tit. “Action of Account”; 1 Vt. 97; s. c. 1 Aikin, 145. To show what partners .can maintain such action: Selw. N. P. 5; Crol Eliz. 830; Cro. Car. 116; 3 Wils. 113; Gow. Partn. 83; 3 Bin. 319; 2 Cow. 425; 1 . Bin. 193; [James v. Browne] 1 Dali. [1 U. S.] 339; Gow. S3; 2 Chip. 95.- 91; Co. Eitt. 172a: [Ozeas v. Johnson] 4 Dali. [4 U. S.] 435; 6 Vt. 27. The foundation of this rule, where the action of account will lie, is laid down in Coke. Defendant not concluded by the judgment to account. This is mere matter of form, and the cause goes to auditors, and their report is considered in the nature of a special verdict. 1 Chit. PI. 243.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,226.</p> <p>War — Commercial Relations — Proclamation Off President — International Law — Probate COURT8 — J URISDICTION.</p> <p>■ 1. The proclamation of the president of April 19, 1861 [12 Stat. 1259], did not interdict commercial intercourse between the citizens of the states in rebellion and those of the other states.</p> <p>2. Contracts made prior to July 13, 1861, were not invalidated by the operation of the principles of international , law.</p> <p>3. Construction of the statute of Mississippi touching jurisdiction of probate courts, guardian ad litem, &c.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,227.</p> <p>Pleading ix Equity — Jurisdictional Facts — Trusts — Quieting Title.</p> <p>1. A naked power or trust must be strictly construed.</p> <p>2. A conveyance of land in consideration of coupon bonds is a sale of the land. Such a sale by a trustee empowered to sell the land may be valid, though it is not a sale for money.</p> <p>3. Where a bill charged that the complainants are the legal owners of lands of which the defendants have forcibly taken possession under a false and fictitious claim of title, but giving no intimation of the nature of the fictitious title, the bill is had for want of equity on its face. The remedy in such a case is an action at law.</p> <p>4. A bill in equity in this court must distinctly state the citizenship of every necessary party to it, and show that the complainants and defendants are citizens of different states. And if it fails to do this, it will be bad on demurrer; and any decree on it in favor of the complainants would be liable to reversal in the supreme court. No appearance, demurrer, or answer to such a bill will waive this omission in it.</p> <p>[Cited in Tug River Coal & Salt Co. y. Brigel, 14 C. C. A. 577, 67 Fed. 628.]</p> <p>NOTE. The general rule is that the power must be strictly executed. Perry, Trusts, § 254. A party out of possession has no right to resort to equity to remove cloud on title. Her-rington v. Williams. 31 Tex. 448; Polk v. Pen-dleton, 31 Md. 118: Barron v. Bobbins, 22 Mich. 35: Lake Bigler Boad Co. v. Bedford. 3 Nev. 399; Branch v. Mitchell. 24 Ark. 431. Contra that he has: Almony v. Hicks, 3 Head, 39. One in possession may maintain a bill against one out of possession to remove cloud of deed valid on its face, where extrinsic facts must be shown to establish its invalidity. Crooke v. Andrews. 40 N. Y. (1 Hand) 547; Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 486; Beed v. Tyler, 56 Ill. 288: Gage v. Bohbrach, 57 III. 262; Gage v. Billings. 56 Ill. 268. But there is no cloud where defect, is apparent on face, or must appear upon attempt to prove title under it. Overing v. Foote. 43 N. Y. (4 Hand) 290; and Meloy v. Dougherty, 16 Wis. 269.</p>

[Appeal by George S. G. Spence from a decision of the commissioner of patents refusing him a patent for an improvement in culinary boiling apparatus.)

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,231.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Supplies—Filing Claim.</p> <p>[This was a libel for supplies by Louis C. Spencer against the steamboat Alida.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,232.</p> <p>Salvage — Nature op Service — Danger to Life</p> <p>—By Request — Receiving Pat. for Service— Measure of Compensation.</p> <p>1. Where a steamboat, on the Ohio river, laden with flour, was sunk by floating ice within a few feet of the shore, and her cargo was saved, at the request of the master of the boat, by fifty of sixty persons on the bank of the river, such service entitles the parties to a decree for salvage.</p> <p>2. It is a well-settled principle of the maritime law, that risk or danger of life is not a necessary element of a salvage service. Where such risk or danger is incurred in saving property from destruction, it will place the sal-vors in a high position of merit, and entitle them to a more liberal compensation for the service than would otherwise be accorded to them.</p> <p>3. The controlling inquiry in salvage cases is, was the property in peril of being lost, and was it saved by the efforts of those claiming to be salvors.</p> <p>4. The measure of compensation, in salvage cases, depends wholly on the circumstances attending the service. Where there has been great personal exposure and risk, and property has been rescued from inevitable destruction by the intrepidity of the salvors, a liberal allowance will be made. One-half the value of the property saved has - been allowed in such oases. There may be eases where the service is attended with so little difficulty and peril that it would entitle the parties to little more than a quantum meruit for work and labor.</p> <p>5. It is not material whether the salvage service was rendered spontaneously or by request, or whether with or without a previous contract between the owner or his agent and the salvors.</p> <p>6. Persons who aid in a salvage service, and receive pay therefor from the owners of the property saved, abandon their right as salvors.</p>

This was a real action brought by the plaintiffs [Reynolds Spencer and wife], in right of the wife, to recover h?r purparty by descent in her father's estate. The defendant [Ephraim Spencer], who is her brother, claimed the estate in question under a will of the father.

<p>Case No. 13,234.</p> <p>Aliens — Naturalization—Moral Character— Pardon.</p> <p>1. An alien, to be entitled to admission to citizenship, must first prove that he has behaved as a man of good moral character during all the period of his residence in the United' States.</p> <p>2. What constitutes good moral character may vary in some respects in different times and places, but a person who commits perjury does not behave as a man of good moral character and is not, therefore, entitled to admission to citizenship.</p> <p>3. A pardon is prospective and not retrospective in its operation; and while it absolves the •offender from the guilt of his offense and relieves him from the legal disabilities consequent thereon, it does not obliterate or wipe out the fact of the commission of the crime, so that it cannot be made to appear on an application to be admitted to citizenship.</p>

The policy in question, was effected on the 27th of June, 1807, on goods, the property of the plaintiff [F. W. Sperry], an American citizen, on board the Little William, belonging to Jacob Sperry, also an American citizen, at and from Philadelphia to Tonningen, or Hamburg, if not blockaded; warranted American property, proof whereof to be made here. She sailed on the voyage insured, on the 3d of July 1807.

<p>Case No. 13,235.</p> <p>Pleading at Law— Declaration — Breach op Condition.</p> <p>1. In a declaration on a marshal’s bond, it is not necessary to aver that the penalty has not been paid.</p> <p>[Cited in Welmore v. Rice, Case No. 17,-468.]</p> <p>2. The usual averment of the breach of the condition is sufficient.</p>

[These were bills in. equity by John Sperry against Robert C. Ribbans and others and Theodore N. Logan and others, to enjoin the infringement of letters patent No. 40,507, granted to complainant November 3, 1863.]

[This was a bill in equity by Elihu Sperry and Anna Sperry against the Erie Railway Company.] Motion by the defendants to take the bill of complaint in this suit from the files of the court, and to set aside the service of the subpoena therein, on the ground that the bill and the subpoena were an abuse of the process of the court, and a fraud thereon, and that the suit partook of the nature of maintenance.

<p>Case No. 13,239.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Power op Register Over Funds op Bankrupt — Contempt.</p> <p>A register may order bankrupts to hand over to his custodian funds in their hands. Disobedience to such an order adjudged a contempt, for which an attachment was issued from the-court.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Allen. Case No. 208; Re Mc-Kenna. 9 Fed. 29; U. S. v. Anonymous, 21 Fed. 770.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,240.</p> <p>Shipping — Damage to Goods — Carrier's Fault —Perils of Sea.</p> <p>Where goods arrived in a damaged condition, and it appeared that the- damage was in great part caused by the carrier’s fault, but that damage, to some extent, would probably have been caused by perils of the sea encountered by the vessel, but to what extent the carrier was unable to show; held, that he was liable for the whole.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Fleishman v. The John P. Best. Case No. 4,861. Cited in The Shand, 16 Fed. 572; The Tommy, Id. 608.]</p>

<p>[This was a proceeding in bankruptcy by Spicer & Peckham against Ward & Trow.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,242.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition’—Register’s Pees.</p> <p>1. In composition cases the register is entitled to five dollars for incidental expenses; three dollars for the meeting; five dollars when acting under a special order; ten cents for filing each paper; twenty cents for each folio of the examination; twenty-five cents for each affidavit; one dollar for ordering an adjournment of a meeting, and ten cents 'for each folio of the report.</p> <p>2. When the resolution has been definitely passed upon, the business of the meeting is over and no adjournment is needed.</p> <p>3. The confirmation need not be presented at the meeting of creditors.</p> <p>4. If the confirmation is presented to the register. the time spent in examining it may be considered as spent under a special order.</p> <p>5. No memoranda are necessary in composition eases.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,244.</p> <p>Pleading at Law — Amendment—Service of Copt.</p> <p>1. A very slight amendment of the declaration. which in no respect can affect the merits of the case, does not require a copy of the declaration to be served under the rule.</p> <p>2. The plea filed by the defendant, required the amendment.</p> <p>3. There is no irregularity in the judgment, which can authorize the court to set it aside.</p>

[This was an action at law for libel, brought by Shearjashub Spooner against John W. Daniels. The article complained of purported to be a criticism upon a work of art produced by plaintiff, namely, a restoration or reproduction of Boydell’s illustrations of Shakespeare.]

<p>[This was a bill in equity- by Lysander Spooner against Alexander McConnell and •others. Heard on motion for an injunction.]</p>

Appeal by Joseph W. Sprague from the decision of the commissioner of patents, rejecting his application for a patent for an improvement in bridges.

<p>Case No. 13,248.</p> <p>Patents — Abandonment — Assignment — Scope op Patent — Harvesters.</p> <p>1. Abandonment is a fact and not a conclusion of law.</p> <p>2. Where the evidence showed that the inventor, although allowing more than four years to elapse from the date of his invention before applying for a patent, nevertheless kept the invention from the public, and it appearing also that he was in straitened circumstances: Held, that, under the circumstances of the case, an abandonment was not proved.</p> <p>[See Babcock v. Degener, Case No. 698.]</p> <p>' 3. The rule, that in cases of delay in applying for patents, the intervening rights of other inventors who in the meantime have devised and patented the same thing, should be protected against the delaying inventor, does not apply to the case of the complainants, who did not know of or acquiesce in the acts of the intervening inventors.</p> <p>■4: The case of Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright,-94 U. S. 92, distinguished.</p> <p>5. Whether, if the first inventor is estopped by conduct of his own, his assignees would be, unless shown to have been cognizant of it, quaere;</p> <p>6. The scope of the patent is fixed by what was known at the date of the completed invention. and not by what was known at the time when the application was filed.</p> <p>7. The first and second claims of reissued letters patent, Number 3,372. granted to Frederick Nishwitz. April 13th. 1869 (original patent dated February 30th, 1858), for improvement in harvesters, held valid.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,249.</p> <p>Corporations — Transfer of Shares — Trustee— Breach of Trust — Holder without Notice.</p> <p>B., as trustee under a will, held five shares in the stock of a Massachusetts corporation, represented by a certificate issued to -him, as “B.. trustee,” in 1857. In 1863, a court of Massachusetts, in a suit against B., in which he appeared. removed him from his trusteeship, and appointed another trustee in his place, and ordered the certificates of stock of the. trust estate to he delivered and assigned by B. to the new trustee, and, in default thereof, the assignment of the shares to be made by a master. The master assigned the five shares to the new trustee, who exhibited the assignment to the corporation, and demanded a transfer of the shares on its books and a certificate therefor to him. The corporation had notice of the suit, and of the proceedings and decree in it. and paid dividends on the shares to the new trustee. Afterwards, and in 1866, H. obtained from S. a loan of money on a delivery and pledge of the certificate issued to B. it had annexed to it a form of assignment, with no name of an assignee, and a power of attorney to transfer the shares, dated in 1858, and signed, “B.. trustee,” and witnessed, but with no name of an attorney in it. S. made the loan without notice of the proceedings in Massachusetts. or of any breach of trust by B. After-wards, S., with the assent of H., inserted his own name, as assignee and attorney, in the power, and presented it to the corporation, and asked for a transfer of the shares to himself, and a certificate therefor.' It was refused. S. then sued the corporation to recover the value! of the shares: Held, that the suit could not be maintained.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Hnrbison v. James. 90 Mo. 414, 2 S. AY. 292.]</p>

<p>[This was an action of ejectment by Sprague and others against John Litherber-ry.)</p>

<p>Case No. 13,250.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Fokfeitcbe fob Stkjking Mastek.</p> <p>[Cited in The Mentor, Case No. 9.427; Smith v. Treat. Id. 13,117; The Cornelia Amsden, Id. 3,234.]</p> <p>[See The Almatia, Case No. 254.]</p>

This was a libel for salvage of certain goods, and was certified to this court, from the district court, under the act of 3d of March, 1821 (chapter 189), on account of the district judge being related to the libellants.

<p>Case No. 13,254.</p> <p>Sale for Taxes — Tax Deed — Limitations.</p> <p>1. A tax deed duly executed by a county clerk, in pursuance of a valid sale of land for taxes by the county treasurer, witnessed and acknowledged, is prima facie evidence of title.</p> <p>2.A tax deed so executed, witnessed, and acknowledged, and recorded, is a bar to an action for the recovery of the land, after two years from the time of recording such deed.</p>

This was a libel in personam by James. Sprague and others, owners of the schooner John R. Watson, against J. Selby West, to recover damages for the detention of a vessel.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Samuel Sprigg against the Bank of Mount Pleasant.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,256.</p> <p>Pahtj ks —Assignment—Insurance—Pike—Proof of Loss — Construction, of Policy.</p> <p>1. An oi;der on an insurance company, given by the assured, after the loss, to a creditor, directing the company to pay such creditor the whole amount due under the policy, makes the person receiving such order the assignee of the cause of action and the real party in interest.</p> <p>[Cited in Board of Com’rs of Bartholomew Co. v. Jameson, 80 Xnd. 165.]</p> <p>2. On a plea that the proofs were not furnished as required by an insurance policy, plaintiff may show that partially defective proofs were accepted by the company, such acceptance being inferred from failure of the company to object to the same.</p> <p>3. A policy describing “blacksmith and carriage makers' stock, manufactured and in process of manufacture,” embraces unmanufac-tured or raw stock of the kind mentioned.</p>

[This was a hill in equity by Charles Spring and others against the Domestic Sewing Machine Company for the infringement of letters patent No. 23,007, granted to complainants May 10, 1800. Heard on motion for a provisional injunction.)

This was an action of assumpsit [by Seth Spring and others against William R. Gray and others, executors of William Gray). Held: that though the dealing between the parties concerned merchandise, and was between merchants, yet that was no reason, why it should be excepted out of .the statute; for if it should, by the same reason every contract between merchants would also be excepted, which was not the intention of the statute.

[These were bills in -equity by Charles Spring and others against James A. Packard and Charles Howard to enjoin the infringement of letters patent No. 23,957, granted to complainants May 10, 1859.)

The plaintiff [Charles Spring] bought 1,000 barrels of flour at Toronto, Canada, in March, 1867, and in April sold the same to J. G. Hall & Co. for exportation, both parties residing in Boston. In May, 1867, 237 barrels of this flour were shipped from Toronto for Boston, and entered at the port of Ogdensburg by a clerk of the railroad company in behalf of the plaintiff, who was not in fact aware of their arrival, and were forwarded to Boston in bond.

<p>Case No. 13,262.</p> <p>Prize —Practice—Order to Examine Cargo— Belay — Ship’s Papers — Belligerent Right of Search.</p> <p>1. A11 order was made by the court in this. case that the marshal open the packages of cnr-go found on board of this vessel, covered by two of the bills of lading found on board, and take an inventory of their contents, their contents not being specified in any papers found on the vessel.</p> <p>2. A claimant in a prize suit can, under the rules of the court, cause the suit to be disposed of. if the libellants are guilty of any wrongful delay in its prosecution.</p> <p>■ 3. The right of a belligerent to visit and search a neutral vessel in time of war implies a power in the prize court of the belligerent to which a captured neutral vessel is sent for adjudication, to order, under reasonable precautions and forbearance, an examination of the cargo sufficient to ascertain its character, and then to employ evidence, so acquired, as further proof to establish the culpability of the vcyage.</p> <p>[Cited in The Peterhoff, Case No. U,024.]</p> <p>4. The belligerent right of search may be made efficient by an examination of the lading, as well as the papers of a vessel.</p>

<p>In - admiralty.</p>

<p>[In admiralty. See Case No. 13,263.]</p>

Assumpsit [by Benjamin H. Springer against Benjamin Foster and trustees]. The principal was defaulted; and the questions arising in the cause respected .the liability of the trustees.

The only' questions in this case arose on the answers of the trustee. Charles Carter. Held: and the last of which writs was that in the present suit. That all, or a major part of the said writs, had been entered in the proper courts, and were then pending, or judgment had been rendered thereon against the said B'oster.

Habeas Corpus. It appeared by the return that they were committed by virtue of the following warrant: “Alexandria County — ss. You are required to receive into your jail and custody, Robert Sprout and Thomas Bailey, two sailors belonging to the ship Alexandria, Captain William Weston, they being charged for neglect of duty on board, rioting and threatening to take the life of their captain and mate contrary to law. Given under my hand this 14th day of July, 1807. A. Faw.

This was an allegation for mariners’ wages [by Elijah Spurr and others against Charles Pearson]. The libellants in February, 1816, shipped for a voyage in the ship Augustá, • commanded by the respondent, from New Orleans to Havre de Grace, and from thence to Boston; and afterwards served on board the ship during the voyage.

John J. Squire and one McDonough were in interference in the patent office upon their several applications for patents. The decision of the commissioner was adverse to Squire, who thereupon brought a bill under section 4915 Rev. St., and gave the proper notice to McDonough, who appeared and answered.

<p>Case No. 13,270.</p> <p>Salvase — Agbeement—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. Where the libellant, who owned some blocks, let them to parties who were endeavoring to get off a wrecked vessel which they had bought, at Nassau, N. P., to be used in getting the vessel off. at so much a day, the vessel to be responsible for the hire and for the safe return of the blocks: Sold, that he had no claim to recover, as a salvor, the price agreed upon, or for the loss of the blocks, either in personam against the parties who owned the wreck, or against property saved from her.</p> <p>[Cited in The Marquette, Case No. 9.101; The Williams, Id. 17,710; The Louisa'Jane, Id. 8,532.]</p> <p>2. The clause making the vessel responsible for the blocks and for their hire, did not create any hypothecation of her which a court of admiralty can enforce.</p> <p>[Cited in The Marquette, Case No. 9,101.]</p>

[This was a libel by Richard Squires against the Charlotte Vanderbilt to enforce a claim for wharfage.] The libel was filed in this cause to recover $195.49 for wharfage, alleging that the steamboat belonging to the port of New York for some time past has been and now is lying in the port of New York, and the said libelant has during that time furnished a berth for said steamboat to lie at one of the wharves of the said city, the wharfage whereof amounts to $195.49, and that…

This was a libel in admiralty. The facts of this case are fully detailed in the following report by John H. Bailey, Esq., commissioner, to whom the matter was referred: “To the Hon. Wilson' McCandless, Judge of said Court: In pursuance of an order of your honorable court, made in the above cause, on the 26th day of last month, by which it was referred to me to ascertain and determine the amounts due the libellants and intervenors, and whether any have or are entitled to…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Western district of Pennsylvania.] [These were appeals in admiralty from the judgment of -the United States district court, of July 16, 1861 [Case No. 13,272], confirming the report of the commissioner, Mr. John H. Bailey, which report, with a full syllabus of the points ruled therein, was published in our paper of September 16, 1861, being No. 9, page 73, of this volume.

By I. T. WILLIAMS, Register: 2 [I, the undersigned register, in charge of the above-entitled matter, do hereby certify that pursuant to the directions of the… Held: and Mr. Bailey was elected assignee, on the 3d day of November, 1869. His election was approved and he received his assignment on' the 11th of the same month. The first item of this claim is $100 for services rendered on the 9th day of February previous, tne. very day the petition in bankruptcy was: filed.

[In the matter of Henry A. Stafford, a bankrupt.] On exceptions to the decision of the register refusing to act on the petition of William H. Parks for an order requiring the assignee to pay him seventy-five dollars for his services in making the schedules filed by the bankrupt.

Action to recover damages for the infringement of a patent on an improvement in haircloth looms. Defendants [the Pawtucket Hair-cloth Company] pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that they should prove the complainant [Rufus J. Stafford] not to be the original and first inventor of the improvement. Pitman, District Judge, presided at the trial, which was had at the November term, 1860, and charged the jury. Verdict for complainant for the sum of $2,500.

<p>Appeal from decree of the district court, dismissing the suit. [Case unreported.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,277</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade.</p> <p>.Vessel and cargo condemned for violation of the blockade.</p>

This was a bill in equity [by John' Stain-thorp and Stephen Seguine against Willis Humiston] filed to restrain the defendant from infringing letters patent [No. 12,492], “for improvement in machines for making candles,” granted to John Stainthorp, March 6, 1855. The claims of the patent may be found in the report of the cáse of Stainthorp v. Elkinton [Case No. 13,278], and are also quoted in the opinion.

This was a bill in equity [by John Stain-thorp, John W. Hunter, and Stephen Seguine against George M. Elkinton] filed to restrain the defendant from infringing letters patent [No. 12,492], for an “improvement in machines for making candles,” granted to John Stainthorp, March 6, 1855.

This was a bill in equity [by Joseph Stain-thorp and Stephen Seguine against Willis Humiston), filed to restrain the defendant from infringing letters patent for “improvement in machines for making candles” [No. 12,492], granted to John Stainthorp, March 6, 1855. A motion for an injunction in the same case is reported [Case No. 13,280].

[This was a libel for breach of charter party by Thomas Stalker against the ship Henry Kneeland, — Miln and others, claimants.]

This was an action [by Thomas Stalker and others] against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back discriminating duties exacted on invoices of bales and cases of licorice root, imported by the plaintiffs from Amposta, in a Spanish vessel.

<p>Appeal from Washington circuit court, in an action by Thomas Dowlin, for the use of John McPhail, against Abraham Standeferi</p>

This was an action founded upon a patent granted to the plaintiff, Henry Stanley, by the United States, the 17th December, 1832, upon a specification and application made to the patent office the 11th of October, 1832, for-an improved rotary cooking stove.

<p>Case No. 13,286.</p> <p>Patents — Invention — Corrected Specifications — Utility—New Trial — Pleadings.</p> <p>1. To entitle an individual to an exclusive right, under the patent law, his invention must be substantially different from any machine or thing, in use.</p> <p>2. A patent is void where, in his specifications, the patentee claims more than he has invented.</p> <p>3. Under the patent law of 1836, a patent which contains corrected specifications, has relation back, and, for all legal purposes, covers the whole time, from the emanation of the first patent, which, for defective specifications, had been declared void.</p> <p>[Cited in Hussey v. Bradley. Case No. 6,946; House v. Young, Id. 6,738; Bowman v. Read, 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 604.]</p> <p>4. In such case a contract to sell the right is made good by the second patent.</p> <p>5. A patent, to be valid, must be of some utility.</p> <p>[Cited in Rowe v. Blanchard, 18 Wis. 442.]</p> <p>6. The hooks of a party are not evidence,' unless made so by a call to produce them, &c.</p> <p>7. A verdict will not be set aside where the evidence conflicts. It was for the jury to weigh the evidence. A declaration must contain a statement of facts, which in law, gives the ■plaintiff a right to recover.</p> <p>8. This is the question to be answered on a demurrer. But after verdict, defects, in substance. are cured, if. from the issue in the case, the facts omitted, or defectively stated, may fairly be presumed to have been proved ■on the trial.</p> <p>[Cited in Illinois Cent. It. Co. v. Simmons, 38 Ill. 244: McClure v. McClure, 10 Ind. 188; Pennsylvania Co. v. ICllett. 132 Ill. 163, 24 N. E. 562.]</p> <p>9. Where a contract binds the defendant to pay five dollars for each stove sold, as in this case, the special contract need not be declared on; the amount received may be recovered on the general count for money had and received.</p> <p>[See Ames v. Le Rue, Case No. 327.]</p> <p>[10. Cited in Allen v. Blunt, Case No. 217. to the point that, if the damages are slightly more than the court deem proper, they are not to be regarded as a ground for a new trial.]</p> <p>. [11. Cited in Brooks v. Bicknell, Case No. 1,-944, to the point that specifications which show the parts patented, and so clearly describe their structure as to enable a person, possessing ordinary skill, to construct such an article, are sufficiently certain to answer all legal requirements.]</p> <p>(For another case involving this patent, see Stanley v. Hewitt, Case No. 13,285.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by the Stanley Rule & Level Company against Leonard. Bailey for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 6,49S, granted to defendant .Time 22, 1S75, the original letters patent, No. 67,398, having been granted August 6, 1867.]

<p>[This was a bill by the Stanley Rule & Level Company against Leonard L. Davis, for infringement of a patent relating to spirit levels.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity filed to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 4S,555] for “improvement in door bolt,” granted to William H. Hart, July 4, 1SG5, and assigned to complainants. The claim of the patent was as follows: “Making the barrel of a door or shutter bolt of one piece of sheet-metal, punched, formed, and secured to the plate d, substantially as described.”] 2

<p>Case No. 13,291.</p> <p>Neutralitt Laws — Foreign Commission — Vessel Armed and Fitted Out in This Countrt — Right to Bring in Prizes.</p> <p>A French armed ship, duly commissioned, but fitted out here, may bring in and carry away her prizes, without being subject to the jurisdiction of this court.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,292.</p> <p>Vendor and Purchaser — Defect in Title — Right to Withhold Purchase Monet — Notice — Claim for Conveyance — Adverse Possession-Tax Title.</p> <p>1. A purchaser of land, with a full knowledge of the title and of certain pretended claims, who receives a deed, cannot withhold a part of the purchase money on account of the alleged defect.</p> <p>2. He must seek redress on the warranty, should he suffer damage by the adverse claim.</p> <p>3. Until the adverse claim shall be established. there is no ground to injoin the recovery of the purchase money.</p> <p>4. Where a purchase is made of land to be paid for in carpenter’s work, the deed to be made when the work was done, until the work is done, there is no ground on which to claim a conveyance.</p> <p>5. A possession under such a purchase without deed cannot, by lapse of time, ripen into a title.</p> <p>6. The purchaser’s possession is the possession of the vendor, the same as landlord and tenant.</p> <p>7. But possession under a deed is adverse.</p> <p>8. The nature of the possession is always ascertained, when the statute or lapse of time is pleaded.</p> <p>9. A tax title is utterly void, if the land be sold in a wrong name, under a wrong assessment.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Western district of Michigan.</p> <p>[In bankruptcy.]</p>

This is a motion to ■■dismiss the specifications filed in opposition to the bankrupt’s discharge, upon the ground that the opposing creditor has not a provable debt, and consequently no interest in the question of discharge. The petition for an adjudication was filed against the bankrupt May 21, 1874. With his own consent he was adjudged a bankrupt the same day.

There were three firms, each comi>osed of the same three partners, — Buckner, Stanton & Co., of New Orleans, of which Henry S. Buckner was the resident partner; Stanton, Buckner & Co., at Natchez, of which Frederick Stanton was the resident partner; and M. B. Hamer & Co., at Manchester, of which M. B. Hamer was the resident partner.

In equity. The bill in this case was filed by the trustees of a first mortgage deed executed by the defendant railroad company to secure its first mortgage bonds for the purpose, among oilier things, of bringing to sale the property conveyed by the mortgage, and to the end that the proceeds of the sale might be applied to the payment of the liens upon said property according to their priority.

[This was a bill in equity by JohD C; Stanton and others, trustees, against the Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company and others.J Heard upon petition of certain bondholders. The case was this: The defendant company was a corporation of the state of Alabama, whose existence and franchises had been recognized by legislation in the states of Tennessee, Georgia and Mississippi.

<p>[This was an action for false imprisonment by Elijah Stanton against James Seymour and others.]</p>

<p>[This is a suit to recover an assessment, by Edwin L. Stanton, receiver of the First National Bank of Washington, D. C., against Catherine C. Wilkeson. Heard on demurrer.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,301.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Powers of Supervisors.</p> <p>1. A supervisor of internal revenue is entitled, under the provisions of the internal revenue act of July 20. 1868, § 49 (15 Stat. 144), to examine the books and papers belonging to banks, bankers, brokers, and banking associations. and is not bound to inform the owners of his purpose in making such examination.</p> <p>2. Where a summons for the production of books has been issued by the supervisor of internal revenue, and such summons has been duly executed, but not complied with, a United States district judge may, upon application, and proof of these facts, issue a writ of attachment.</p> <p>3. Section 49 of the act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 144), which gives supervisors of internal revenue the right to examine such books and papers as show the operation of banks, &c., with the public, and are connected with the internal revenue of the United States, — is not unconstitutional, either as purporting to authorize an unreasonable seizure and search, or as compelling a party to testify against himself.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Platt, Case No. 11.212; U. S. v. Three Tons of Coal, Id. 16,515.]</p>

[This was a suit by Catherine Stapleton, ad-ministratrix, against E. P. Reynolds and others.] Motion to remand the cause to the superior court of Cincinnati.

The creditor’s petition charged that the defendant had committed an act of bankruptcy by suspending payment of his commercial paper, and specified the non-payment of the note held by the plaintiff, and of some twenty other notes.

<p>Case No. 13,305.</p> <p>Mabitime Lien — Waivek — Admikalty Jubis-diction — Following State Decisions.</p> <p>1. A person having a valid maritime lien on a steamboat, who proceeds to enforce it in a state court, and obtains judgment therefor, thereby waives his original lien, and occupies a footing of equality with other creditors having no maritime lien, who also proceeded under the state law.</p> <p>[Distinguished in The Brothers Apap. 34 Fed. 352; The D. B. Steelman. 48 Fed. 582; The Cerro Gordo, 54 Fed. 393.]</p> <p>2. In the construction of a state law, this court is bound to adopt the views of the supreme court of the state.</p> <p>3. Claims not founded on maritime liens have no standing in this court in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction, and' will be dismissed.</p>

On December 21, 1808, the plaintiff, Stark, commenced separate actions against six persons, then in possession of different portions of the premises in controversy. On May 3, 1809, the defendants in these several actions answered, disclaiming any interest in the property, and alleging that they were in possession simply as the tenants of the defendant, Starr. On the same day Starr appeared, and was made defendant in place of the tenants. Code Or. (Gen. Laws 1845-64, p. 226).

This libel was filed by Jesse W. Star and others, the owners of the brig Topaz, to recover the damages sustained by her by a collision with the schooner off Barnegat. on the night of October 14.1855. The evidence as to the facts was contradictory and irreconcilable.

<p>Case Wo. 13,308.</p> <p>Insurance — Transfer op Policy — Rights op As-signee in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>1. A clause in an insurance policy declaring that the policy shall be void if assigned without the consent of the company, does not apply to a transfer made under the bankrupt law, by a register in bankruptcy, to an assignee appointed for the insured.</p> <p>[Cited in Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick, 36 Neb. 233, 54 N. W. 519; Hammel v. Queen’s Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 77, 11 N. W. 349.]</p> <p>2. An assignee in bankruptcy does not acquire the beneficial interest in the assets, but is merely clothed with the title and control as agent for the bankrupt and his creditors, and for the purpose of converting them into money and applying them towards the discharge of the debts. The statutory transfer to such as-signee is not within the purpose or operation of a condition in a contract, restricting alienation of the beneficial interest.</p> <p>[See Case No. 13,309.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Ohio.] This was a case where a policy of insurance had been issued by the defendant to the bankrupt several months before any proceedings in bankruptcy. Proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced, the insured was declared a bankrupt, and all his property transferred to and vested in said assignee, the property covered by said policy included.

In admiralty. Libel in rem by a vessel close-hauled upon the starboard tack for damages sustained by collision with a vessel on the port tack with the wind free. Cause heard on libel, claim, answer and proof.

<p>Case No. 13,311.</p> <p>Coukts — Federal Jurisdiction — Real Parties.</p> <p>1. Where from the facts of the case a conveyance of land appears to be only colorable, with the view to give jurisdiction to the courts of the United States, the writ will be dismissed, on motion or on a plea.</p> <p>[Cited in Blackburn-v. Selma, M. & M. R. Co., Case No. 1,467.]</p> <p>2. If the suit is to be prosecuted under the direction of the grantor, and at his expense, and where he has the option within a stipulated time to take back the land, on returning the bond; and where a similar right is given to the grantee, it is sufficient to show that the object of the conveyance was. to give jurisdiction to the circuit court of the United States, and for the benefit of the grantor.</p>

In admiralty. Libel by the owners of the Star of Hope in personam against the charterers of that vessel for freight due upon a charter-party, stipulating that the charter shall commence when the vessel is ready to receive cargo at the place of loading and notice thereof is given to the charterers.

<p>Case No. 13,313.</p> <p>Shipping — Place op Storage — Bill op Lading— Supplemental Agreement — Evidence.</p> <p>1. Where goods were received on board a vessel marked "in cabin state-room,” and an extra freight was paid in consideration of their being so carried; and the receipts given for the goods specified that they were to be carried in the cabin, but the bill of lading, by an evident mistake, was in the usual form; and the goods were not stowed in the cabin, and sustained damage in consequence; held, that the libellant was entitled to recover.</p> <p>2. That though parol evidence of an agreement that goods shipped under a clean bill of lading should be carried on deck is inadmissible, yet such evidence may be received to show a supplemental agreement for a particular mode of stowage under deck.</p> <p>3. When such evidence has been taken on commission, the interrogatories of 'which were settled before the judge without objection, and the testimony was directly responsive to such interrogatories, whether it is not too late, at the hearing, and' after publication of the depositions, to object that such evidence is inadmissible. Quere?</p> <p>[NOTE. On apneal to the circuit court, the above judgment was affirmed. Case unreported. Claimants then appealed to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was affirmed. 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 651.]</p>

This was an action [by Addison M. Starr against Alexander Hamilton and Christina E. Hamilton] for the recovery of the possession of real property in the city of Portland. and by the stipulation of the parties, was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury. The facts of the case are stated in the findings of the court as follows: I. That the defendants, Alexander Hamilton and Christina Hamilton, were intermarried in the year 1853. at Portland.

<p>Case No. 13,315.</p> <p>Sale —Attached Property — Execution' — Officer — Loss of Propertt — Plea.</p> <p>1. An attachment laid upon property, does not change the ownership of such property.</p> <p>2. The defendant may sell it subject to the lien of the attachment.</p> <p>3. The same may be said of property levied on by execution.</p> <p>4. A levy is said to be a satisfaction of the debt, if the property be of sufficient amount. And this is said to be the case, though the property should be wasted by the negligence of the officer.</p> <p>[Cited in Lustfield v. Ball (Mich.) 61 N. W. 341.]</p> <p>■ 5. The officer is the agent of both parties, and may be liable to either.</p> <p>6. But, if the property be lost, without the neglect of the officer or the plaintiff, the loss must be sustained by the defendant, who has failed to pay the amount due.</p> <p>7. A plea that property was attached and lost, is defective in not showing how the loss occurred.</p> <p>[Cited in Stewart v. Nunemaker, 2 Ind. 51; McCullough v. Druly, 3 Ind. 434; Dorman v. Kane, 5 Allen, 40.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Lewis Starr against Benjamin Stark.] Motion for a provisional injunction to stay the enforcement of a judgment at law for the recovery of the possession of real property.

<p>The complainant and his grantors having been for many years in possession of lots one and two, and the north half of lot four, in block eighty-one, in the city of Portland, the premises in controversy, the defendant Benjamin Stark, on December 22, 1868, commenced an action on the law side of the court for their recovery, in which judgment for the possession thereof was rendered in favor of said Stark. February 15, 1870. [Case No. 13,-307.] The complainant [Lewis M. Starr] then filed this bill in equity, setting uji what he claims to be a good, equitable title to the premises as against defendant, Stark, and praying that defendant be decreed to convey the'legal title, and be enjoined from executing his judgment at law for the possession, etc.</p> <p>[A motion for a preliminary injunction against Stark to enjoin him from setting up his legal title was denied. Case No. 13,316.]</p> <p>The following facts satisfactorily appear, either from the admissions of the pleadings or the evidence:</p> <p>On September 22, 1848, Francis W. Petty-grove executed to Daniel II. Lownsdale a conveyance, which purported, in consideration of the sum of five thousand dollars, to convey to the latter all the “right, title, interest, claim and demand in law, and in equity, present and in expectancy,” of said Pettygrove to a certain tract of land specifically described, containing about six hundred and forty acres, “together with all and singular the houses, out-houses, fences, wharves and other improvements,” excepting certain designated lots. On March 22, 1849, Stephen Coffin, by conveyance from, and agreement with, said Lownsdale, became the owner of one half of the interest so acquired by said Lownsdale in said land claim. On December 13, 1849, by further conveyance from Lownsdale and Coffin, Wm. W. Chapman became the owner, of-one third interest in said land claim, the three, from that time, holding and dealing with the same as partnership property. The several conveyances and agreements between these parties; their acts under them in connection with the said Portland land claim; the general facts of the case, and condition of affairs at Portland at the time, are the same as fully set out in the case of Lamb v. Davenport [Case No. 8,015], and need not be repeated here. From said March 22, 1849, Lownsdale and Coffin, and, from said December 13,1849, Lownsdale, Coffin and Chapman were in the possession of said land, except such town lots as had been from time to time sold by these parties, and their grantors, claiming the title thereto under said several conveyances and agreements against all the world except the United States, or, in other words, all the title that at that time it was possible for a private party to obtain under the laws of the United States — the real title being in the government, and there being yet no law authorizing a sale or conveyance of the government’s title. They actually lived upon the land, cultivated portions of it, improved it, erected houses thereon, and occupied others already built f exercised acts of ownership over the land, which were generally recognized by the inhabitants of Portland, and laid off portions into blocks and lots, and sold them as town property. Although the tract does not appear to have been enclosed by a fence, yet these parties entered and claimed under deeds, with designated boundaries, and this, in connection with living upon it, and performing the acts indicated, upon well settled legal principles, constituted possession ot all of said tract not actually adversely occupied by other parties. Hicks v. Coleman, 25 Cal. 122, and cases cited, including cases in the United States supreme court; Ayres v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 620. They continued so in possession of said land claim, disposing of town lots, till April 15, 1850, during which time certain transactions took place which will now be mentioned. About January 8, 1850, said Lownsdale departed from Portland for San Francisco, leaving Coffin and Chapman in charge of the said land claim. Before his departure, on January 7th, he executed a power of attorney to Chapman, being “Exhibit A,” annexed to Chapman’s deposition in evidence. It is brief, and, in general terms, authorizes Chapman “to superintend and transact my business in said territory during my absence;” “to do and perform anything pertaining to my interests in Oregon which he, in his judgment, may think advisable, particularly in signing deeds to Portland lots” — -this last clause containing the only particular specification in it. Lownsdale met defendant. Stark, at San Francisco. Stark had before ret up a claim to an undivided half of the Portland land claim, which he now insisted on. He claimed that the Portland land claim had been taken up and held by said Pettygrove, not alone, but in conjunction with one Love-joy; and that.Lovejoy had conveyed his half interest to him (Stark) and by virtue of said alleged right of Lovejoy and conveyance to himself, he claimed title to an undivided half.</p> <p>Subsequently, Lownsdale and Stark came to a settlement of their controversy by fixing upon a certain designated east and west line, nearly coincident with the street in Portland, now known as Stark street, Lownsdale agreeing to relinquish to Stark, with certain speei-.fied exceptions, all his right, title, interest and claim in and to that párt of the Portland land claim lying north of said line, and Stark to relinquish to Lownsdale, with certain exceptions, all his right, title and interest in and claim. to that part lying south of said line. Lownsdale and Stark are the .only ostensible parties to this agreement. In pursuance of this arrangement, Lownsdale and Stark, at San Francisco, on March 1, 1850, executed, under their hands and seals, an instrument in writing, bearing date on that day, a copy of which is annexed to the bill of complaint, as “Exhibit A.” This instrument, among other things, contains the recital: “Whereas, it is deemed expedient by the parties hereto, to determine, settle and adjust the title and possession of certain lands hereinafter described, and to preclude all future controversy in the premises,” etc. It. then, on the part of Stark, purports to “bargain, sell, remise, release and forever quit-claim to Lownsdale, his heirs and assigns,” “all his right, title and interest in all that portion” of said “Portland land claim,” “situate south” of the line agreed upon, “hereby ratifying and confirming, so far as his right, title and interest is concerned, all conveyances which” Lownsdale “has heretofore made, or may hereafter make, in the premises hereinbefore quit-claimed.” And, on the part of Lownsdale, it purports to make a similar sale, conveyance, etc., to Stark, with similar ratifications with respect to all of said kind situate north of said line: It also contains the following covenants, which it is important to consider in this case. Firstly, Stark covenants that he, “so far as his right, title and interests are concerned, hereby ratifies and confirms all conveyances made by the said party of the second part (Lownsdale) or his lawful attorney, previous to the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and fifty,” of certain lots specifically described “lying north of said line,” that is to say, in the part conveyed to Stark. “And said Stark likewise ratifies and confirms all grants or conveyances made of said party of the second part (Lownsdale) or his lawful attorney, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, to this date (March 1st), subsequent to said first day of January, of said lots situate north of said line,” that is to say, in the part released to Stark. “Provided always, and said party of the second part (Lownsdale) hereby covenants for himself, his heirs, etc., that he will pay over all sums of money which have, since the first day of January, been, or may hereafter be, paid unto the said party of the second part, etc., in consideration of the grants and conveyances aforesaid” — that is to say, made subsequent to January 1st. And, secondly, Lownsdale further covenants “that, in case any person, or persons, holding or claiming under him, except the holders of those lots, and under the conveyances especially herein-before confirmed by said party of the first part (Stark), shall refuse to ratify and confirm this indenture, he, the said party of the second part (Lownsdale), will, at the option of the said party of the first part (Stark), at any time within six months from this date, cancel and release all fights acquired under these presents by the parties hereto.”</p> <p>Either before Lownsdale left for San Francisco, by Lownsdale. Coffin and Chapman, or after he left, and prior to March 20, 1850, by Coffin and Chairman — and it does not appear which — blocks seventy-eight, seventy-nine, and fractional block eighty-one, of the town of Portland, were laid off on said land claim. On March 20, 1850, before Lownsdale’s return. and before Coffin and Chapman had notice of the said agreement between Lowns-dale and Stark, dated March 1, 1850, Coffin and Chapman, acting for themselves, and Chapman, assuming to act for Lownsdale as his attorney under said power of date January 7. 1850. fixed a price upon said three blocks, valuing lots seventy-eight and seventy-nine at $3,000 each, -and fractional block eighty-one at $2,000, and agreed that each should take one of these blocks at those prices; Lownsdale to have block seventy-eight, Coffin seventy-nine, and Chapman fractional block eighty-one. Conveyances to the respective parties were accordingly made on that day, bearing date March 20, in pursuance of this arrangement. "Exhibit F,” of the evidence is a copy of one of the said deeds, being the deed to Chapman. It purports to be a deed from Coffin, Lownsdale and Chapman, “proprietors of Portland,” to Chapman, and in consideration of the sum of $2,000, the receipt of which is acknowledged, to release, confirm and-quit-claim to Chapman “lots numbers one, two, three and four, in fractional block number eighty-one, being the warehouse fraction,” etc. There was, at the time, a warehouse upon the block. The deed was signed Stephen Coffin, D. H. Lownsdale, by his attorney in fact, W. W. Chapman, and W. W. Chapman. The sums agreed upon were charged to each of these parties, respectively, in the accounts of their transactions between themselves in relation to the business of selling town lots; and. after Lownsdale’s return, adjusted and allowed in the settlement of these matters between the parties, Lownsdale acquiescing in the arrangement made in his absence. Chapman, after said conveyance, went into the actual possession of the block, and thereafter possessed and claimed it under the said arrangement and conveyance till he sold the several lots to defendant and' his grantors. Said fractional block includes the premises in controversy, and is situate north of said line designated in said instrument of March 1, 1850, executed by said Lownsdale and Stark, and within the tract thereby purporting to be conveyed - by Lownsdale to Stark. Other sales had been •made by Coffin and Chapman during Lowns-dale’s absence.</p> <p>After March 20,1850, and either on or within two or three days before April 13, 1850, Lownsdale returned to Portland from San Francisco; and, after said return, Coffin and Oliapman were informed, for the first time, of the said arrangement, and execution of the said indenture of March 1, 1830, between said Lownsdale and Stark; and, upon being so informed, refused to ratify or confirm said contract. At that time John H. Couch was a partner of said Stark in mercantile business, carried on at Portland in a store situate but a short distance from said block eighty-one. He professed to be the agent of Stark in respect to the interest claimed by him in the Portland land claim, and assumed to act as such. After some negotiations between Coffin and Chapman, and Couch, in reference to said claim, and the said indenture executed by Lownsdale and Stark, the said parties came to an understanding, and, in pursuance thereof, executed and appended to said indenture, by indorsement thereon, instruments, of which Exhibits B and C, annexed to the bill, are copies. The first is as follows, to-wit: “We, Stephen Coffin and W. W. Chapman,- partners with Daniel H. Lownsdale in the town of Portland, hereby ratify and confirm a certain agreement between Benjamin Stark and D. H. Lownsdale, bearing date the first day of March A. D. 1830, respecting an adjustment of title, hereby placing the disposition of property up to notice of said adjustment upon the same footing with the disposition of property before the first day of January last. In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this the 13th day of April, A. D. 1850. (Signed) S. Coffin, (L. S.) W. W. Chapman, (L. S.)” Under which is the following, to-wit: “Portland, O. T., April 15, 1850. I ratify the above agreement as far as my interest is concerned in said property. (Signed) John H. Couch, for Benj. Stark.”</p> <p>Before the execution of said last named instrument by said Couch, for said Stark, on September 26, 1849, said Stark had executed a power of attorney to said Couch, of the most general character, without any enumeration of- specific acts to be performed. Its language is, “to do any and all acts, during my absence from this territory, which I might, myself, lawfully do were I personally present.” The said indenture of March 1, 1850, and the two instruments of ratification indorsed thereon, the one executed by Coffin and Chapman, and the other by Couch for Stark, were all recorded together, in the proper recorder’s office, on November 23, 1850, at the request of George Sherman, who, at the time, represented himself as acting as attorney for Stark and Couch. After the execution of said several instruments, Lownsdale, Coffin and Chapman relinquished all possession and all claim to the portion of the Portland land claim not embraced in said indenture, as modified by said instruments. situate north of said line agreed on, and Stark all claim to the lands south of said line — each party thereafter possessing and exercising acts of ownership over the part so relinquished to him. Stark returned to Portland in June, 1850, when he was furnished by Coffin and Chapman with a list of the lots sold before the date of said modification of contract. Couch and Sherman had, before the execution of said instruments of ratification, been furnished a list of all lots sold during Lownsdale’s absence. Stark, also, after said return and notice, stated to Coffin that he would sanction or submit to the contract as modified, and carryout its provisions; and he never did, down tothedate of his patent, make any claim to the lots so embraced within said modification, either upon Lownsdale, Coffin or Chapman, or upon any of the parties in possession as their grantees. September 27, 1850, the donation act was passed by congress, under which Stark, on September 10, 1853, obtained from the surveyor-general a donation certificate to the part of tlife Portland land claim so lying north of said agreed line, released to him as aforesaid, he having dated his possession in his notification from September 1, 1849. Upon this certificate a patent of the United States issued to Stark, dated December 8, 3860. being the patent which vests in him the legal title to the lands in controversy.</p> <p>Lownsdale, Coffin and Chapman, also, in pursuance of an agreement between themselves, dated March 10, 1852, commonly called the “Escrow,” set out in Lamb v. Davenport [Case No. 8.015], before referred to, divided that portion of the Portland land claim lying south of said line among themselves; and each, respectively, obtained a similar donation" certificate and patent thereon to the part of said tract allotted to him, under said agreement.</p> <p>On October 3, 1850, said Chapman, being then in possession of said block eighty-one, conveyed to complainant, Starr, the south half of said lot two; and on October 8, 1850, the north half to one Butler. On November 11, 1850, Chapman conveyed said lot four to one Powell, and on January 30, 1851, said lot one to Winter and Latimer. All the .right, title and interest so derived from Chapman in and to said lots in controversy, so conveyed by Chapman to parties other than complainant, Starr, had, since said conveyances from Chapman, and before defendant’s patent issued, by mesne conveyances, become vested in complainant, Starr. All of said conveyances were for a valuable consideration, and the said several grantees from Chapman, under said conveyances to them, entered into actual possession, and erected valuable improvements on said lots; and all the said premises have been in the actual possession and occupation of Starr, and his several grantors, for'mercantile and other business purposes, ever since their said several entries under, and soon after their said several purchases from Chapman. The said premises have always been, from 1850 to the present time, in the heart of the business part of Portland.</p> <p>On December 7, 1800, one day prior to the issue of said patent to Stark, a patent of the United States in due form, issued to the corporate authorities of the city of Portland for the tract of land upon which- said city is located, which, patent includes the lots in controversy. It purports to have been issued under the act of congress of 1844. known as the “Town Site Act-,” and to grant the land “in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof according to their respective interest.” It also reserves “any valid claims which may exist in virtue of the several donations of Benjamin Stark, certificate No. 69,” and of Daniel H. Lownsdale, William W. Chapman and Stephen Coffin, under their several certificates. The patent to Stark, on said certificate 69, issued on the next day,' contains a similar reservation of any rights that may exist in favor of the city of Portland. The complaiñant, Starr, and his brother, Addison M. Starr, at the date of said patents, were in the occupation of the premises in controversy, claiming the pos-sessory title as hereinbefore set out, and were, therefore, as to these lots, the parties for whose benefit the legal title thereto, so far as any passed, vested in the city of Portland by virtue of said patent of December 7, 1860.</p> <p>In January, 1864, said Addison M. Starr, and the present complainant, Lewis II. Starr, being at the time in possession of said premises in controversy, in conformity with the provisions of the statute of Oregon authorizing said proceedings, filed their bill on the equity side of the circuit court of Oregon, for the county of Multnomah, against said defendant Stark, to determine his adverse claim made under his patent. An amended bill was filed in August, 1864, in which the complainants alleged two separate grounds of relief. In the first they set up a title in themselves, relying on the title derived through the patent to the city of Portland; secondly, they set up the e'quitable title upon which they now rely, and claimed that Stark should be adjudged to hold the legal title derived under his patent in trust for them. They prayed that Stark’s patent should “be set aside and held for naught, and that he be held to release to plaintiffs all his right, title and interest, claim and demand, to said lots, etc.” On October 28, 1864, an order was entered in the cause by said court' by which the complainants “are ordered to elect which cause of suit they will proceed upon, and to set forth the same in the amended bill to be filed, to which order, requiring the plaintiffs to elect, the plaintiffs except.” In obedience to said order the complainants elected to rely upon the patent to the city, and accordingly, on November 1, filed a second amended bill or complaint, as it is designated in the Oregon Code of Practice, in which, the cause of action now relied on was omitted, and the cause of action resting upon the title, derived through the patent to the city, and the-fraudulent procuring of a patent by Stark, more fully set out. Issue having been taken on the complaint, and the case heard on the testimony introduced, the circuit court entered a decree jn favor of the plaintiffs, in pursuance of the prayer of the complaint, which decree was affirmed on appeal by the supreme court of Oregon. An appeal having been taken thence to the supreme court of the United States, that court held the patent to the city to.be void, and that to Stark valid, reversing the decree of the -supreme court of Oregon, and remanding the case, with instructions to enter a decree directing the circuit court to dismiss the action [6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 402], which was accordingly done, and the action finally dismissed in pursuance of said mandate and directions. The defendant Stark now sets up these proceedings in his answer, and insists that, by reason thereof, the cause of action now relied on is res adjudicata, and the former decree a bar to further litigation.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,318.</p> <p>Judgment — Res Judicata — Identity of Title.</p> <p>1. A had two lots, numbers 1 and 2, held under two distinct chains of title. In a suit. between A and B, involving lot number 1, one of A’s titles was directly put in issue and determined, but the other was not. In a subsequent suit between the same parties, embracing lot number 2, held, that A was not es-topped by the judgment in the suit relating to lot number 1. from setting up in the suit embracing lot number 2. the title not actually put in issue or determined in the first suit relating to lot number 1, only.</p> <p>2. He was estopped from setting up the iden.tical title which was actually put in issue and determined in the first action.</p> <p>3. A party is not bound in an action relating to one lot to litigate his title to another and different lot, even though the title to both be the same; but if he does put the title in issue and have it determined in an action relating to one, he will afterwards be bound by the determination in an action relating to the other, so far as the identical title litigated is concerned. .</p> <p>STARR (STARK v.). See Case No. 13,307.</p>

<p>[This was an action on a promissory note by Starr & Smith against Taylor, Moore & M’Griff.] ’</p>

[This was a bill in equity by the Star Salt Caster Company and others, against Charles P. Grossman and others, for the infringement of letters patent No. 71,643, granted to G. B. Richardson, December 3, 1867.]

Bill in equity |by the Star Salt Caster Company and others against Charles P. Crossman and others) to restrain the respondents from making salt bottles, casters, &c., in conformity with the patent of the complainants [granted December 3, 1807. No. 71,643). The respondents owned a patent earlier in date than that of the complainants.

<p>[This was an action by the state of Indiana against Jane A. Miller and others.]</p>

On the 7th day of November, 1870, Tim Dunivan deposited in the State National Bank at Keokuk, Iowa, nine hundred dollars, and received therefor a certificate of deposit, of which the following is a copy: “$900. State National Bank, Keokuk, Nov. 7, 1870. Tim Dunivan has deposited in this bank nine hundred dollars, current funds, payable to the order of himself hereon in like funds on the return of this certificate. In currency, $900.

[This was an action by the State National Bank of Minneapolis against H. G. O. Morrison to recover the amount of taxes alleged to have been illegally exacted.]

This was a cause of collision instituted by the Harlem & New York Transportation Co... owners of the steamboat Sylvan Stream, against the steamboat State of New York, to recover the damages sustained by the former vessel, in a collision which occurred in the East river, on the afternoon of the 13th day of June, 1867.

<p>Case No. 13,326.</p> <p>Salvage — Steamboat Disabled in New York Bay — Custom—Practice—Laches,</p> <p>[1. Rescuing and taking to a place of safety a steamer caught in the ice in New York Bay on a dark, foggy night, with a broken crank, which disables her for the time being, is a salvage service, but calls only for a small reward.]</p> <p>[2. An alleged custom of boats running in New York Bay to assist each other in distress free of charge, held not to have been proved.]</p> <p>[3. An objection to a claim for salvage by the owners of the salving vessel on the ground that their cosalvors, the officers and crew, were not joined in the libel, comes too late at the final hearing, especially when it appears that the claims of the cosalvors are barred by laches.]</p>

The bill of complaint of John G. Steacy sets forth, among other matters, that Steacy, as the surviving partner of the firm of Peirce, Steacy & Yorston, on or about the 31st day of August, 1875,… Held: as aforesad, were unpaid stock, and that any subscriptions are due and payable upon the same, or ever have been since said defendants severally became the holders or owners of said shares of stock.

<p>Case No. 13,328.</p> <p>Passenger’s Baggage — Married Woman-Parties.</p> <p>1. A married woman shipped on board of a steamboat a trunk, containing wearing apparel, given her by her husband to be carried from New York to Essex. Conn. The steamboat was delayed, and reached Essex at Sunday noon, where the trunk was placed in a warehouse by the hands of the boat. It remained there till next day. when it was taken by a carman, who noticed and remarked upon its extreme lightness. Its condition was then tlie same as when landed from the boat, and the warehouse had been securely locked, and did not appear to have been disturbed. When the trunk was received by the owner, the contents liad been abstracted, and she filed a libel against the steamboat to recover the damages. Held, that the action was properly brought in her name, instead of in that of her husband.</p> <p>2. On the evidence, the articles were abstracted while the trunk was on the boat, and the libellant was entitled to a decree.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,330.</p> <p>LiAnolord axi> Tenant — Bankruptcy — Possession op Baxkuupt — Contempt.</p> <p>1. A lease to S. terminated by condition broken, after S. filed his petition in bankruptcy, and before the appointment of an assignee. The lessor, by summary proceedings in the state courts, evicted S. and took possession of the premises leased. On petition of S.’s as-signee in bankruptcy, to require the lessor to restore possession or show cause why he should not be attached for contempt, held, the possession of the bankrupt, after petition filed, is the possession of the bankrupt court, and any interference therewith, except by leave of that court, is in contempt of its authority.</p> <p>[Cited in Lockett v. Hill. Case No. 8.443; Lansing v. Mantón. Id. 8,077; Be Jessup, 19 Fed. 95; Be Lyman. 55 Fed. 42.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Weeks v. Prescott, 53 Vt. 69.]</p> <p>2. Ordered, that lessor restore possession of the property leased within 20 days, or, in default. attachment absolute for contempt issue.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by the Steam Stone Cutter Company against Charles Sheldon and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 40,584, granted to G. J. Ward-well, November 10, 1863; reissued October 10, 1865, Nos. 2,087 and 2,088.] [Final hearing on pleadings and proofs.]

In equity. Bill by the assignee in bankruptcy of Samuel B. Scribner, against him and his mother and sister, seeking to annul a conveyance by the bankrupt to his mother and sister of his distributive share in his father’s estate, made within one month of his bankruptcy proceedings as a fraudulent preference and a conveyance made in fraud of the bankrupt act.

[This was a bill in equity by the Steam Stone Cutter Company against David Short-sleeves for the infringement of letters patent No. 40,5S4, granted to J. G. Wardwell November 10, 1863; reissued October 10, 1865, Nos. 2,087 and 2,088.]

<p>Case No. 13,335.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement—Gains and Profits— Cost of Manufacture — Insurance—Salaries— Liabilities on Guaranties — Interest — Master’s Report — Power to Set It Aside.</p> <p>1. A court has power to set aside a report of a master for any manifest error, either in law or fact, and to recommit it for further proceedings, or to correct it, if the means of correction are furnished.</p> <p>2. The principle stated, upon which gains and profits are recovered from an infringer, in a suit in equity.</p> <p>[Cited in Steam Stone-Cutter Co. v. Shel- • dons, 21 Fed. 878.]</p> <p>3. Where infringing machines have been made and sold for profit by the infringer, the plaintiff is entitled to whatever of that profit arose from appropriating the patented inventions by making and selling those machines, although other infringing machines were disposed of by the infringer without profit, or are still on hand and caiinot be disposed of, involving loss to the infringer.</p> <p>[Cited in Porter v. Standard Measuring Mach. Co., 142 Mass. 195, 7 N. E. 928.]</p> <p>4.The value of the use of real and personal estate belonging to the infringer, such as shops, fixtures and machinery, including repairs, employed in making the machines made and sold for profit, is to be allowed as part of their cost.</p> <p>, 5. The amount paid for insurance on such property, the insurance being for the safety of the property, generally, and not for the benefit of the manufacture of those machines, is not to be allowed as part of their cost: nor is the amount paid for local taxes On such property.</p> <p>6. The infringer being a corporation;'.salaries paid to stockholders in it employed, in making those machines, such salaries having been paid in good faith, for services actually rendered, and not as a mode of dividing profits, or for the purpose of concealing profits, are to be allowed as part of the cost of those machines.</p> <p>7. Where a portion of the prices at which those machines were sold was due to an arrangement of the boiler in the machine, different from the plaintiff’s, but the defendant had no monopoly of such arrangement, such portion of the price being allowed to the plaintiff, the cost of- the workmanship is to be allowed to the infringer.</p> <p>■ 8. Where $750 of the price at which each of those machines was sold was due to a patented improvement of the infringer, called a bow-string, attached to and sold with the machine. no part of the $750 is to be allowed to the plaintiff, and no part of the cost of making the bow-spring is to be allowed to the in-fringer.</p> <p>9. The infringer had incurred liabilities on guaranties and warranty of title, as to those machines, but nothing is to be deducted on that account from the avails of their sales, because those liabilities will be extinguished by satisfying the plaintiffs’ recovery as to those machines.</p> <p>(Cited in Steam Stone-Cutter Co. v. Shel-dons, 15 Fed. 608.]</p> <p>10. Interest on the profits decreed was charged against the infringer from the time of the entry of the interlocutory decree.</p> <p>[Cited in Burdett v. Estey. 3 Fed. 572; Bisch-offsheim v. Baltzer, 21 Fed. 532.]</p> <p>[11. If the avails of a sale are claimed and taken, the right to the thing sold must be parted with. It will be like taking judgment and satisfaction for the conversion of the property, which always operates so that the defendant hath now the same property therein as the original plaintiff had, and this against all the world.]</p> <p>[Cited in Booth v. Seevers, Case No. 1,648a.]</p> <p>[NOTE. This cause was again heard upon an additional report of the master, and the exceptions thereto. The exceptions were overruled. Case No. 13,336. For a motion for an attachment for contempf, see 3 Fed. 298. For other cases involving this patent, see Cases Nos. 13,331 and 13,334.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,336.</p> <p>Patents— Damages — Profits—Interest—Injunction.</p> <p>1. The master's former report as to profits in this case [Case No. 13,335] reviewed and confirmed.</p> <p>2. Interest allowed on profits.</p> <p>3. The question reserved as to an injunction beyond the term of the patent as to machines made during the term.</p> <p>[For a hearing on a motion for an attachment for contempt, in which the motion was denied, see 3 Fed. 298. For other cases involving this patent, see Cases Nos. 13,331 and 13,334.]</p>

[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was a proceeding in the district court,… Held: that the verdict was perfect without the nisi, and so entered for the plaintiff. West v. Monson, Cro. Eliz. 480. Where the jury find, that the defendant did not promise, &c. nevertheless if two witnesses are to be believed, and they think they are, they find the verdict for the plaintiff; it was held a good verdict for the defendant.

Bill in equity, brought by George B, Stearns, of Boston, as administrator de bonis non of John O. Page, against Rufus K. Page.

<p>Case No. 13,341.</p> <p>Courts — State and Federal — Jurisdiction ove» Federal Causes — Penal Actions — Suretv —Discharge in State Court.</p> <p>1. The act of congress of August 2, 1813 (4 Bior. & D. Laws, 611 [3 Stat. 72]), giving to the state courts jurisdiction in certain specified cases of penalties, incurred under the laws of the United States, must be considered pro tanto a repeal of the judiciary act of 1789 [1 Stat. 73], whereby exclusive original cognizance of the same was given to the district courts.</p> <p>2. Congress may vest exclusively in the courts of the United States all the judicial power of the United States; and no part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can. consistently with the constitution, be delegated to the state tribunals.</p> <p>[Cited in Sherman v. Bingham, Case No. 12.-762.]</p> <p>3. The state courts may exercise jurisdiction in all cases authorized by the laws of the state, and not prohibited by the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Congress may revoke and extinguish the concurrent jurisdiction of the state tribunals in every case in which the subject-matter can constitutionally be made cognizable in the federal courts. But without an express provision to the contrary, the state courts will retain a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases where they had jurisdiction originally over the subject-matter. It is, however, optional with the state courts to exercise such jurisdiction or not.</p> <p>[Cited in McConologue’s Case, 107 Mass. 166.]</p> <p>4. The United States and the state governments are not to be considered as entirely foreign to each other. Although the laws of one state may be deemed as foreign in relation to the government and citizens of another state, because in no sense binding without the jurisdiction of the state; yet the laws of the United States are not to be considered as the laws of a foreign government, but rather as laws binding on the same people as the government and laws of the several states.</p> <p>5. The state courts are not inferior tribunals-in the sense of the constitution. Congress cannot. therefore, compel them to entertain jurisdiction in any case; but leaves them to consult their own duty from their own state authority and organization.</p> <p>6. The jurisdiction of the state courts over federal causes is confined to civil actions for civil demands, or to enforce penal statutes. They have no criminal jurisdiction over offences exclusively existing as offences against the-United States.</p> <p>7. Actions for penalties being founded upon the implied contract which every person enters into with the state, to observe its laws, are civil actions both in form and substance.</p> <p>8. In suits for penalties incurred under the act of congress of August 2, 1813 (4 Bior. & D. Laws, 611 [3 Stat. 72J), giving a moiety to the United States and the other moiety to the collector or informer, the state courts have jurisdiction.</p> <p>9. The United States are a body corporate, having capacity to contract and to take and hold property, and in this respect stand upon the same footing with other corporate bodies; and if they prosecute their suits in the state courts and avail themselves of the state laws, such state process as they use for the purpose of enforcing their rights, must be subject to the state law.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Tetlow, Case No. 16,456.]</p> <p>10. Where, therefore, one committed to prison upon a judgment recovered against him as bail, in a suit for a penalty, under the act of congress, of August 2, 1813, brought in a state court, was discharged from imprisonment under a law of the state, and the defendant plead such discharge in bar of an action of debt brought by the United States on the bond given for the jail liberties, it was held that the plea was good, and a judgment rendered upon a de-murier to the plea was reversed.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,342.</p> <p>Equity — Mistake —Vendor and Purchaser — Quantity.</p> <p>1. Where a farm is sold at so much per acre, if the quantity be mistaken by the parties, a court of equity will relieve the party injured by the mistake.</p> <p>[Cited in Trinkle v. Jackson, 86 Va. 241, 9 S. E. 986.]</p> <p>2. In such case the vendee has a right to take the farm at the price of the real- number of aeres, and to have compensation for .the deficiency, if he has paid the consideration.</p> <p>3. So where the sale is for .a gross sum, and there is a positive representation of the quantity by the vendor.</p> <p>[Cited in Farris v. Hughes, 89 Ya. 933, 17 S. E. 519.]</p> <p>4. But it may be otherwise, if the statement of the quantity be mere matter of description, and not of the essence of the contract: as where the contract contains the words, so many acres, ‘‘more or less.” or “containing by estimation.” &c.; for in such cases the vendee may take upon himself the risk of the quantity.</p> <p>[Cited in Harrell v. Hill, 19 Ark. 102; Libby v. Dickey (Me.) 27 Atl. 255; Noble v. Googins. ’99 Mass. 233: Tarbell v. Bowman, 103 Mass. 344. Distinguished in Bel-knap v. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 154. Cited in Paine v. Upton, 89 N. Y. 336; Pickman v. Trinity Chuich' 123 Mass. 7; Caldwell v. Craig, 21 Grat. 140; Crislip v. Cain. 19 IV. Ya. 496, 526; Depue v. Sergent. 21 W. Va. 333.]</p> <p>5. But if there be any fraud or wilful misrepresentation of the quantity, equity will afford relief in these latter cases.</p> <p>[Cited in Foster v. Swasey. Case No. 4,984.]</p> <p>[Cited in Chrysler v. Canaday. 90 N. Y. 277: Morris Canal Co. v. Emmett, 9 Paige, 170.]</p> <p>6. A sale was at first made of a farm upon a -contract of so much per acre, to be ascertained by measurement. Afterwards the parties agreed to waive any measurement, and the ven-dee took the farm at the gross sum of $2500, supposing it to contain fifty acres, from the representation of the vendor; and in the deeds of conveyance the land was stated to contain forty-seven and a half acres, “more or less.” Held, that as the vendor was not guilty of any fraudulent misrepresentation, but expressed his bona fide belief, the vendee was not entitled to relief in equity, although the quantity turned cut, upon subsequent measurement, to be forty and a half acres only, each party having been well acquainted with the local boundaries cf the farm.</p> <p>[Cited in Phillbrook v. Enswiler. 92 Ind. 592; Cabot v. Winsor, 1 Allen, 551; Bradbury v. Haines. 60 N. H. 124; Davis v. Lottieh, 46 N. Y. 400; Collette v. Weed, 68 Wis. 435, 32 N. W. 753.]</p>

<p>[This was an action by Stedman, Maynard & Co. against Hamilton & Hamilton.]</p>

This was an action [by Henry Steegman and others] against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court on a case.

<p>Case No. 13,345.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Validity or Levt — Attachments —Lies—Priorities.</p> <p>1. Where an attachment upon property of the bankrupt for its full value is dissolved by an adjudication, a judgment creditor who has made a levy subject to such attachment is not entitled to priority as against the assignee.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Nelson. Case No. 10,100; Clar-idge v. Ivulmer. 1 Fed. 402.]</p> <p>2. But where a creditor has obtained a valid and effectual lien by attachment, and has prosecuted his suit to judgment, and made an execution levy, his lien under such levy is to be considered as prior in time, to that of other creditors who have levied attachments intermediate the attachment and execution levy of such creditor, and is not affected by the dissolution of such attachments.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,346.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Exemptions.</p> <p>1. Where the register allowed the bankrupt, who was engaged in commerce, a watch of small value: Held, proper, as the same was a necessary article.</p> <p>[Cited in Stewart v. McClung, 12 Or. 431.]</p> <p>2. The court construes the words in the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)] “other articles,” “necessaries,” and • “wearing apparel,” also what is meant in the books by “necessaries.”</p>

This was what, in the technical language of the admiralty, is called a cause of damage, brought by Steele for certain wrongs alleged by him to have been done by the respondent, to his son, being a minor under the age of twentj'-one.

<p>Case No. 13,349.</p> <p>Affreightment — Diminution During Carriage-Shipping — Claim por Shortage — Usage.</p> <p>1. Quiere, how far the responsibility of a master of a vessel, for the accuracy of the accounts of the lading and delivery of a cargo, may be affected by the usage of a particular trade.</p> <p>2. In a common contract of affreightment, the master is entitled to full freight on ¿11 the goods laden and borne on the bill of lading, though they may be by natural causes, and without his fault, deteriorated in quality, or diminished in quantity when delivered.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in The Muriel, Case No. 9,944.]</p> <p>[Cited in Gage v. Libby, 14 Allen, 263.]</p>

Debt against the defendant, the late sheriff of Providence county, in the state of Rhode Island, for an asserted escape of one Joseph Witmarth. who was committed to the gaol of that county, upon an execution in favor of the plaintiff, while the defendant was sheriff, and of course while he had the care and eustodj-of that gaol in virtue of his office.

<p>Case No. 13,351.</p> <p>Dower — Forfeiture—Leaving Her Husband— Open Adultery — Personal Estate — Uterine Bastardy — Presumptions — Testimony of Mother — Issue to Try Legitimacy.</p> <p>1. Under the act of assembly of Virginia (1 Rev. Code. c. 107, § 10), which declares, that if a wife willingly leave her husband, and go away and continue with the adulterer, she shall forfeit her dower, &c.; that part of the provision which relates to her willingly leaving her husband, is satisfied by any separation which is voluntary on her part: and any separation is voluntary which is not brought about by the husband’s act, or by some constraint on her person. Therefore, where the husband wished his wife to accompany him. and she refused, although her parents objected to her going, and she excused herself on that ground, and because of reports that he was married to another woman, the separation must be considered voluntary on her part.</p> <p>2. The words “and go away and continue with the adulterer,” are satisfied by an open state of adultery, whether the woman reside in the same house with the adulterer, or in another house; whether in her own. or a friend’s house, or his; or whether with or without the ceremony of marriage; in either case, she forfeits dower.</p> <p>3. The claim of the wife to a distributive share of her husband’s personal estate, stands on a different ground: her right to it under tile statute of distributions is absolute, and she does not forfeit it by her conduct, however unworthy (1 Rev.' Code, c. 104. § 29); and the court of equity is bound to carry this statute into effect, though the conduct of the claimant in equity has been reprehensible.</p> <p>4. The presumption of law is in favour of the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock; but. this presumption may be rebutted by other testimony. It is true that a mere probability of non-access by the husband, is not sufficient to repel the presumption: but it is not necessary for the pnrty objecting to the legitimacy, to prove that non-access was impossible. If the evidence places the non-access beyond all reasonable doubt, it is sufficient to repel the presumption of legitimacy.</p> <p>[Cited in Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 250, 6 N. W. 654; Watkins v. Carlton, 10 Leigh, 567.]</p> <p>5. If a man marries a woman in such an advanced state of pregnancy, that the situation of his wife must have been known to him, it must be considered as a recognition of the child, afterwards born, as his own: any conduct of the husband after the birth, indicating a belief that the child is his, is decisive. But where the marriage takes place where the pregnancy is probably unknown; where the acquaintance between the parties most probably commenced too late for the husband, according to the law of gestation, to be the father of the child after-wards born; where the common opinion of the neighbourhood assigns the child to another man; where the boy grows up, not in the house of the husband of the woman, nor looking on him as a father, nor being considered as a son, and the reputation of the woman is not good: these are all circumstances which go strongly to repel the presumption of legitimacy.</p> <p>[Cited in Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. St. 422.]</p> <p>6. A court of equity should direct an issue to try the fact of legitimacy, where the circumstances above narrated are supported by the depositions in the cause.</p> <p>7. The unsworn declarations' of the mother, that her son. born six months after marriage, is the son of another man, are not admissible to prove his illegitimacy, and a fortiori, the declarations of that man are not admissible; if their evidence is proper, their depositions should have been taken.</p> <p>8. The general report of the neighbourhood on the question of legitimacy, is not to be disregarded, but its weight depends on the circumstances of the case, on the remoteness of the time when the fact occurred, and the difficulty of producing any positive evidence respecting it.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Alexander Stein, a bankrupt. For another case involving this litigation, see Case No. 12,480.]</p>

The action was brought to recover damages for the alleged violation of a patent. The plaintiffs sue as assignees of the patent for the state of California. A demurrer was filed by defendants; and the ground on which it rested was, that the complaint or declaration showed upon its face that the assignment of the patent to the plaintiffs is for separate interests, one undivided third part being assigned to one, and two undivided third parts to the other plaintiffs.

Huber, a certificated bankrupt, had made an agreement (while in business as a cutler, and long before the bankruptcy) with two of his apprentices (the petitioners) to pay them for “all overwork, according to the rate of wages that should be paid from time to time to .-journeymen.” The facts were proved by Huber himself.

<p>Case No. 13,355.</p> <p>Penal Action — Illegal Impoktation — Manifest —Who Bound to Deliver — Declaration — W itness — Accomplice.</p> <p>1. Under the act of congress of March 2, 1821 [3 Stat. 016], regulating the entry of merchandise, the master of a vessel is not the only person bound to deliver a manifest of merchandise imported in the vessel. That duty devolves on him who has the charge and control of the merchandise; and for a violation of the law he is subject to its penalty.</p> <p>2. And it is not essential that he should be actually on board the vessel when it enters the waters of the United States. As, where one put goods belonging to him on board a boat in Canada, and after she had proceeded about a mile and crossed the line, got on board himself, and remained on board until his goods were landed, he was held subject to the penalty for not delivering the manifest.</p> <p>3. The act of congress declares that it shall be the duty of every person coming from a foreign territory, adjacent to the United States, into the United States, with merchandise, to deliver the manifest. The declaration averred that the defendant came from a foreign territory, viz., from Montreal, and the evidence was, that he did not come from Montreal, but from Caldwell’s Manor. Held, that after judgment the allegation under the videlicit might be rejected as surplusage.</p> <p>4. An accomplice being a competent witness, it is not erroneous for a court to direct a jury to find a verdict upon his uncorroborated evidence, if they believe him.</p> <p>[Cited in Collins v. People. 98 Ill. 580; People v. Clough, 73 Cal. 352, 15 Pac. 7.]</p>

<p>Motion to remand.</p>

In bankruptcy. [In the matter of Louis E. Steinman, a bankrupt.] This was a creditor’s-petition filed previous to the passage of the-amendment of June 22, 1S74, and amended immediately thereafter by adding new petitioning creditors and inserting the required allegations as to the number and amount of' creditors. on the return day of the rule to show cause to the amended petition, presented a denial that the requisite-number of creditors had joined in the petition,, with -a…

On the petition of G. W. Stell, administrator of L. N. Stell, deceased, claiming $10,000 damages for death caused by a railroad train, on his motion.for a jury and issue out of chancery.

<p>Case No. 13,359.</p> <p>New Trial — Surprise—Evidence to be Produced.</p> <p>When a motion for a new trial on the ground of surprise is made, because witnesses have failed to testify as they represented, before the trial, they would testify, the question is, whether the evidence to be produced on another trial is such as will probably secure a different result.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Anson G. Stenchfield against Edward Robinson, administrator of Nathaniel Kimball, Alexander H. Howard, and Joseph Baker.] Bill seeking to enjoin Baker from collecting from Robinson an unpaid balance of an execution .against Kimball’s estate in favor of Howard, that Baker has in his hands, and asking that Robinson may be decreed to pay the same to the orator, who claims that the amount due thereon belongs to him.

This was a libel upon a charter party filed by Martin Stepanovit, Jr., the master of the Austrian ship Imperatrice Elizabetta, against Edmund Gillibrand and 4,922 bushels of wheat. The vessel being in this port, the master, on the 9th of September, 1863, chartered her to Gillibrand by a written charter party to carry a full cargo of wheat and flour to London. By a clause in the charter the libelant was to have a lien on the cargo for freight, dead freight and demurrage.

<p>Case No. 13,361.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Maritime Liens — Surplus Proceeds op Vessel — Suit ■ in Rem — In Personam.</p> <p>1. Courts of admiralty in this country are not limited in their jurisdiction by the rules of the common law.</p> <p>2. Materials furnished to a vessel in another stare than that to which she belongs, create a lien which is enforced in admiralty under the general maritime law.</p> <p>3. For materials furnished a vessel in her home port, a lien is created, if at all. only under the state law, which lien is enforced, however, in the admiralty courts.</p> <p>4. Under the statute of New-York, (2 Rev. St. 493) which gives such a lien where a debt of 550 or upwards is contracted a debt of 549, which, by the accumulation of interest, exceeds 550 at the time suit is brought upon it, is not a iien upon the vessel.</p> <p>5. A right of action in rem, by a material man, for supplies furnished a vessel in her home port, which is lost by a neglect to prosecute within the time limited by the statute, may still be enforced against the surplus proceeds of the vessel in court.</p> <p>[Cited in The Boston, Case No. 1.069; Remnants in Court, Case No. 11.097.]</p> <p>0. This right to proceed against such surplus proceeds holds good where a party has a right to proceed in admiralty in personam, though not in rem, on the ground that the court has jurisdiction of the parties, and that the subject or fund is already under its control.</p> <p>[Cited in The Lady Franklin. Case No. 7,983.]</p> <p>7. So a master, who has a right to sue in per-sonam for wages, may proceed by summary petition against such surplus proceeds.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,364.</p> <p>Prize -- Attempt to Violate Blockade — Contraband Goods.</p> <p>1. In this case the cargo of the prize vessel, consisting wholly of articles contraband of war, was unladen and inventoried and appraised, and reported to the court, before the hearing. Nearly all of the cargo -was delivered to the government for its use, at the appraised value. The court, on the application of the libellants, permitted the cook of the vessel, and one of the witnesses, to be re-examined on one of the standing interrogatories, it appearing from his affidavit that he did not fully answer that interrogatory in relation to certain papers on board, although he had testified to the omitted facts on an examination made of him on board of the capturing vessel.</p> <p>2. The court, on the application of the libel-lants, permitted the first mate of the vessel, one of the witnesses, to be re-examined on the standing interrogatories, it appearing from his affidavit that he had the virtual control of the vessel on her voyage, and had, on his examination, not disclosed the truth as to the true destination of the vessel and cargo.</p> <p>3. The question of the admissibility of depositions given on the re-examination of persons found on board of a capturing vessel is one resting in the sound discretion of the court.</p> <p>4. If, in this suit, the case, upon the depositions as originally taken, without the re-examination of the two witnesses, were a dear one in favor of the claimants, and free from all doubt, the court would hesitate, perhaps, to admit the re-examination.</p> <p>5. A prize case is, in the first instance, to be tried on evidence coming from the captured. If, upon such evidence, no doubt arises, the property is to be restored; and the privilege, on the part of the captors, of giving further proofs is, in such cases, rarely granted.</p> <p>6. Within these principles, the court has endeavored, in all proper cases, to exhaust the knowledge of the person found on board of captured vessels.</p> <p>7. The instructions of the navy department of the United States to the naval commanders of the United States, of August 18, 1862, that the vessel is not to be seized “without a search carefully made, so far as to render it reasonable to believe that she was engaged in carrying contraband of war for or to the insurgents, and to their ports directly, or indirectly by transshipment, or otherwise violating the blockade,” are in accordance with settled public law.</p> <p>8. The views of the members of the government of Great Britain as to the administration of prize law by the courts of the United States during the present war, as to the belligerent right of search, as to violation of the blockade, and as to the carrying of articles contraband of war, stated.</p> <p>9. The course of trade during the present war, in regard to running the blockade from neutral ports in the vicinity of the enemy’s country, commented on.</p> <p>10. The question whether or not property laden on board of a neutral vessel was being transported in the business of lawful commerce is not to be decided by merely deciding the question as to whether the vessel was documented for and sailing upon a voyage between two neutral ports.</p> <p>11. The commerce is in the destination and intended use of the property laden on board of the vessel, and not in the incidental, ancillary, and temporary voyage of the vessel, which may be but one of many carriers through which the property is to reach its true and original destination.</p> <p>12. Nor is the unlawfulness of the transportation of contraband goods determined by deciding the question ns to whether their immediate destination was to a port of the enemy.</p> <p>13. The proper test to be applied is whether the contraband goods are intended for sale or consumption in tbe neutral market, or whether the direct and intended object of their transportation is to supply the enemy with them. To justify the capture it is enough that the immediate object of the voyagt is to supply the enemy, and that the contraband property is certainly destined to his immediate use.</p> <p>14. If a contraband cargo is really designed, when it leave.' its neutral port of departure. for the use of the enemy in the country of the enemy. a..d not for sale or consumption in a neutral port, no principle of the law of nations, and no consideration of the rights and interests of lawful neutral commerce, can require that the mere touching at such neutral port, either for the purpose of making it a new point of departure for the vessel to the port of the enemy, or for the purpose of transshipping the contraband cargo into another vessel, which may carry it to the destination which was intended for it when it left its port of departure, should exempt the vessel or the contraband cargo from capture as prize of war.</p> <p>15. The division of a continuous transportation of contraband goods into several intermediate transportations, by means of intermediate voyages by different vessels carrying such goods, cannot make a transportation which is, in fact, a unit, to become several transporta-tions. although, to effect the entire transportation of the goods requires several voyages by different vessels, each of which may. in a certain sense and for certain purposes, be said to have its own voyage, and although each of such voyages, except the last one in the circuit, may be between neutral ports. Nor can such a transaction make any of the parts of the entire transportation of the contraband cargo a lawful transportation, when the transportation would not have been lawful if it had not been thus divided.</p> <p>1C. The inception of the voyage completes the offence. From the moment that the vessel with the contraband articles on board quits her port on the hostile destination, she may be le-gaily captured. It is not necessary to wait until the ship and goods are actually endeavoring to enter the enemy’s port. The voyage being illegal at its commencement, the penalty immediately attaches, and continues to the end of the voyage, at least so long as the illegality exists.</p> <p>17. Where it is claimed that an enemy vessel has been transferred during the war to a neutral. competent proof of the transfer must be produced, or the vessel will be regarded as enemy property.</p> <p>18. The registry of the vessel in the name of the neutral claimant as owner is not enough. The bill of sale of the vessel must be proved, or the payment of the consideration for the transfer.</p> <p>19. Where enemy property is transferred to a neutral residing at the time in the enemy’s country, the property is still regarded as enemy property.</p> <p>20. In this case .it was held that the claimant of the vessel had given up the entire control of her movements to the owners of her cargo, and had involved her in any illegality of which they or her master had been guilty in respect to the cargo.</p> <p>21. The letters of instruction found on board of the vessel, and the absence of any manifest, bills of lading, or invoices, commented on as affecting the question of the destination of her cargo.</p> <p>22. The test oaths to the claims commented on as affecting the same question.</p> <p>23. The vessel had on board a flag of the enemy, which was secretly thrown overboard after her capture.</p> <p>24. Alleged ignorance of her master as to her having on board articles contraband of war.</p> <p>25. Letters of instruction not delivered up by the master to the prize master at the time of capture, but only produced by him on his examination on the standing interrogatories.</p> <p>26. Attempted suppression, by the first officer of the vessel, of letters showing an intention to violate the blockade.</p> <p>27. The spoliation of papers is a strong circumstance of suspicion. It is not, however, either in England or in the United States, held to furnish, of itself, sufficient ground for condemnation, but is a circumstance open to explanation. But if the explanation be not prompt and frank, or be weak or futile, if the cause labors under heavy suspicions, or if there be a vehement presumption of bad faith or gross prevarication, it is ground for the denial of further proof, and the condemnation ensues from defects in the evidence which the party is not permitted to supply.</p> <p>28. Held, on the evidence, that the cargo of the vessel was intended, on its departure from England, to be carried into the enemy’s country for the use of the enemy, by a violation of the blockade of some one of the enemy’s ports, either in that vessel or in another vessel into which the cargo was to be transshipped, for the purpose of being transported by sea to the enemy’s country.</p> <p>29. Held, also, that the claimant of the vessel was, under the circumstances of this case, responsible fer the use to which the master and the claimants of the cargo put the vessel, namely, the carrying, for a portion of the distance on its way to the enemy’s country, of a cargo contraband of war, intended for the use of the enemy, and to enter the enemy’s port, by a violation of the blockade.</p> <p>30. The carriage of contraband with a false destination works a condemnation of the vessel as well as the cargo.</p> <p>31. Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to introduce contraband goods into the enemy’s country by a breach of blockade.</p> <p>[An appeal was taken to the supreme court from this decree, and it was there affirmed. 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 559.]</p>

This was a motion on behalf of the as-signee in bankruptcy to expunge certain debts proven by Satterlee Warden against the bankrupt’s estate, on the ground: First, that he had received a preference by way of payment from the bankrupt which he had not wholly surrendered; second, that the debts were void as arising out of a transaction between the parties entered into to defraud the creditors of the bankrupt. ' For about five years prior to March 31, 1870, E. R. Stephens and…

<p>Case No. 13,366.</p> <p>Salvage — Services—Risk—Amount of Compensation — Who Entitled to Share — Lost Vessel.</p> <p>1. Vessel wrecked on Charleston bar; her cargo of cotton, &c. cast ashore on the adjoining islands, and there secured by great labour, much risque of health, and some of life, of the salvors. One third of the cotton, and one half of the other articles given as salvage.</p> <p>[Cited in The Wave, Case No. 17,297; Baker v. The Slobodna, 35 Fed. 541.]</p> <p>2. A schooner lost in transporting these articles to Charleston, after they had been placed in a state of safety, not entitled to compensation.</p>

This was an action for the violation of the plaintiff’s patent for the manufacture of blue writing ink, or a blue liquid for staining paper, &c. The cause occupied the court from April 21 to May 11, numerous witnesses having been examined on both sides, — on the part of the defendants [D. & W. Felt], to prove a discovery and use of the article prior to the patent; and on the part of the plaintiff, to counteract that evidence, and prove he was the first and original…

<p>This was an action at law, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent granted to the plaintiff for a writing fluid [granted October 28, 1837, to the plaintiff, reissued April 21, 1838.] 2 The plaintiff liad a verdict for $2,000, and the defendants now moved for a new trial, on a case, upon the ground that there was no legal evidence authorizing the amount of damages given by the jury.</p>

This is a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage executed by B. F. Allen to the firm of Allen, Stephens & Co. The members of that firm were B. F. Allen, the mortgagor, William A. Stephens, and Herman Blennerhas-sett. The mortgage is in these words: “New York, 18 Nov.. 1S74.

<p>The Western Union Telegraph Company had; laid, some years previously, submarine cables across the Passaic river, at the draw of a railroad bridge at Newark, N. J. In October, 3872, a propeller the Cement Rock, backed, up to the side of the bridge, near a bulk head where she was accustomed to go, to adjust her course, and one of her twin-screws caught up one of the cables. The officers of the boat, finding that one of the screws had caught on the cable and stopped the engine, undertook to free the screw by working the engine the other way, but only succeeded in catching the cable on the other screw. They continued working their engine back and forth for several hours, pulled the cable out from the shore, and finally broke it oft. While they were so engaged, the telegraph company sent word to the boat that they would have men there next morning to free the cable. And about six o’clock the next morning the agent of the company came and from the bridge asked the captain of the boat if he desired help to free the cable. The captain answered that he knew his own business, and at once started his boat to go down the river. The cable proved to be still entangled on the screw, and was at once wound upon the shaft so as to injure the machinery and to make it necessary to take the steamboat to a dock and have the cable cut off. The owners of the steamboat filed a libel against the telegraph company to recover the damage to the boat; and the telegraph company filed a libel against the owners of the boat to recover for the injury to the cable.</p>

<p>[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the district of West Virginia.]</p> <p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] Admiralty appeal in a cause of collision. [William Sterling and others] the owners of the brig William Nickels exhibited their libel in the court below, against the brig Jennie Cushman [William H. Lewis, claimant], in a cause of collision, civil and maritime. The place of the collision was in the-Penobscot river between Bangor bridge and the north line of the town of Hampden.

<p>Case No. 13,376.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Petition to Annul — Assignment of Claims.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,377.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Confession op Jcugmekt as Preference op Creditors.</p>

<p>Case No. 13,378.</p> <p>Raii.uoau Compant — Mortgage—Foreclosure by Bondholder.</p> <p>A mortgage of a railroad was given to secure the holders of bonds. Default having been made in payment of the interest, a bill was filed by the trustees of the mortgage, asking that they be put into possession. A funding system was adopted by which payment of interest on the bonds was postponed, and the money used in completing the road. The proceeds of sale of certain lands were also used in construction of the road, to which the trustees, under the mortgage, assented. On a bill filed by a bondholder who had not assented to the funding arrangement, held, that although there had been a diversion of the funds of the road, yet there having been no demand by the bondholders upon the trustees to foreclose and sell, the plaintiff, as one of the bondholders, could not by original bill proceed and ask for a foreclosure and sale; he should ask to be made a party, for the protection of his interest, to the litigation already pending in court.</p>

On motion of complainant [Charles V. Ster-rick] for a preliminary injunction to restrain defendants [James W. Pugsley and others] from using a deed of assignment of a patent by complainant to defendant Pugsley, and from claiming or exercising any rights thereunder.

William Stetler was tried at the last sessions of the district court of the United States for counterfeiting the coin of the United States. On the trial one Lewis George was offered as a witness for the United States. He was objected to by the prisoner’s counsel on the ground that he was convicted for the same offence in 1850, and sentenced. A pardon was then produced for the witness.

<p>Case No. 13,381.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Application to Vacate Discharge —Notice—Omission op Property from Schedules.</p> <p>1. A bankrupt obtained his discharge on February 3d, 1808. On March 28th, 1868, a petition was filed by a creditor to vacate the discharge, on the ground that the creditor had no notice of the filing of the petition, or of the adjudication, till February 3d, 1868, and was not served with notice of the issuing of the warrant, and of the meeting of creditors to prove debts and choose an assignee, and on various grounds of fraudulent omission of property from his schedules. The papers showed that notice of the issuing of the warrant and of the first meeting of creditors was published, and that a like notice was mailed to the credit- or; and it appeared that he attended that meeting and afterwards, before the discharge, deposed to a proof of his debt before a register, which proof was, after the discharge, filed in court, but it did not appear whether it was presented to the register in charge of the case: Held, that, the notice being duly published and served by mail, if the creditor failed to receive the notice, the regularity of the proceeding would not be thereby affected.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Pattison v. Wilbur, 10 R. I. 449.]</p> <p>2. On the merits, the property in question was not shown to have belonged to the bankrupt, and the petition must be dismissed, with costs.</p>

<p>[These were cross-libels by Stetson, Garry & Co. against the bark Pepita and Von Lind & Co. against the schooner William Slater.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13,383.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade — Loa Book.— False Destination'.</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade. *</p> <p>2. Imperfection and mutilation of the log book. False destination stated in vessel's papers.</p> <p>[This decree was affirmed, on appeal, by the circuit court, November 14, 1803. [Case No. 13,3S4.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

This decision -has been made in the ease of mortgagees and trustees of the Steubenville & Indiana Railroad Company against the' treasurer of Tuscarawas county, who seized' the rolling stock for taxes.

Action for money had and received. The case was as follows. An action was instituted in the state court of North Carolina, in the name of Thomas Bartow, against J. Goodman in September 1793, for the recovery of a sum of money due, in which suit the plaintiff was bail for Goodman. In March 1794, judgment was rendered for - dollars.