Volume 22 — Minnesota Reports

Appeal by plaintiffs from an order of the district court for Scott county, Ohaifiéld, J., presiding, setting aside a judgment.

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Winona county, Orosby, J., presiding, (sitting for the judge of the third district,) refusing a new trial.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Scott county, the action having been tried before Qhatfiéld, J., and a jury.

Action to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of plaintiff’s cow. Trial in the district court for Anoka county, before Vanderburgh, J., (a jury being waived,)upon whose findings judgment was entered for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appeals. The only negligence-alleged by plaintiff, or found by the court, was the defendant’s omission to fence its road.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff was the owner of a lot on First street in Minneapolis, and of three dwelling-houses thereon; that defendant established the grade of that street at a height of four feet above its original level and the level of plaintiff’s lot, and filled the street up to the grade so established; that, to keep the gravel from sliding from the street into his houses, and to keep his houses from being flooded by water flowing down from the street In…

Appeal by plaintiffs from an order of the district court for Chisago, Pine and Kanabec counties, Crosby, J., presiding, refusing a new trial after verdict for defendant. To the statement of the case in the opinion it is necessary to add merely that the complaint alleges that the quantity of lumber sawed under the contract sued on was 74,261 feet, that the contract was made March 1, 1867, and the lumber sawed between that date and May 27 following.

Appeal by Johnston from a judgment of the district court for Nicollet county, entered pursuant to an order of Hans-come, J., confirming an award of arbitrators, and directing judgment in accordance therewith.

Plaintiffs in their complaint declare upon two promissory notes dated October 27, 1878, and payable at thirty and. seventy-five days after date respectively, “ with interest after maturity at the rate of twelve per cent, per annum until ¡laid.” The}r also allege, as a third cause of action,, an account for goods sold and delivered.

<p>• Corporation — Compensation of Officer — Quantum Meruit__Plaintiff brings this</p> <p>action to recover compensation for services which he claims to have rendered to defendant (1) as its secretary, (2) as its land commissioner, (3) as Its attorney and legal adviser. Defendant’s charter provides that the board of directors shall “ appoint a secretary and other officers, and shall fix their compensation, for the services to be rendered.” Plaintiff was appointed secretary by resolution of defendant’s directors, but his compensation was not fixed. Held, that plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered by him as secretary as upon a quantum meruit.</p> <p>Same — Officer acting without Formal Appointment — Director acting as Attorney.— Por a period of four years plaintiff, without any formal appointment by resolution, but with the knowledge and assent, and at the request, of the president and directors of defendant, acted as its land commissioner, and also as its attorney and legal adviser, and in both those capacities rendered services to defendant. Held, 1. That defendant is liable upon an implied assumpsit to pay the reasonable value of the services thus rendered by plaintiff. 2. That the fact that, at the time when he acted in the capacities above mentioned, plaintiff was a member of defendant’s board of directors does not preclude him from recovery for his services in such capacities, the same being outside of and beyond his duties as director.</p>

This, like the next following case, was an action to recover ■damages from defendant for maliciously operating its railroad on a street in Sliakopee, between the centre thereof and plaintiff’s adjacent lots, on which she resided.

The complaint in this action was, in substance,- identical with that in the next preceding case. At the trial in the district court for Scott county, before Crosby, J., (sitting for the judge of the eighth district,) the plaintiff had a verdict for $170.00, on which judgment was entered, and defendant appealed.

<p>Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Rice county, Lord, J., presiding, granting a new trial.</p>

Proceeding by plaintiff, before a justice of the peace, under Gen. St. ch. 84, to dispossess the defendant, his tenant, for non-payment of rent. Upon filing the complaint (which contained no averment of a demand of the unpaid rent) a summons issued, returnable six days thereafter, at ten o’clock a. m., at which time the case was called, the plaintiff alone appearing, and upon the evidence adduced the justice rendered judgment for plaintiff for restitution and for costs.

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the district court for Fillmore county, where the action was tried before Page, J., a jury having been waived. In addition to the facts, stated in the opinion, as to the place of filing of the chattel mortgage, it was stipulated, as a fact in the case, that “no alphabetical index of the chattel mortgage record was kept in the office where said mortgage was filed or placed.”

Action for wages, brought in the municipal court of the city of Minneapolis. The only question made at the trial was, whether the defendant, in operating the cotton mill where plaintiff was employed, was acting on his own account or as an officer of the Minneapolis Cotton Manufacturing Company, a corporation. The jury found for the plaintiff, a new trial ivas refused, and defendant appealed.

Defendant was convicted in tbe district court for Ramsey •county, Wilkin, J., presiding, on an indictment for embezzlement. He appeals from tbe judgment and tbe order ■denying bis motion for a new trial.

<p>Evidence of Value, when admissible on an Issue as to Price. — Kumler v. Ferguson, 7 Minn. 442, and Schwerin v. De Graff, 21 Minn. 354, followed as to the rule that where there is a dispute as to a price agreed upon in a verbal contract, evidence of the value of that of which the price is in dispute is competent.</p>

Motion that appellant (defendant) be required to file a bond as stated in the opinion, and that, in default thereof, the appeal be dismissed.

The summons in this action was issued on April 7, 1875, by S. Y. Hanft, Esq., a justice of the peace in the city of St. Paul, before whom both parties appeared on the return day, April 17, when the defendant filed an affidavit for a transfer of the action, and the justice, against plaintiff’s objection, transferred it to the municipal court of the same city. In the latter court the defendants moved for a dismissal on the ground of want of jurisdiction in Justice Hanft.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Eamsey county, Wilkin, J., presiding, sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.

<p>Indictment — -Assault with. Intent to do Great Bodily Harm. — Boyd v. The State, 4 Minn. 321, followed. A person charged with an assault with intent to do great bodily harm, being armed with a dangerous weapon, is charged with an assault with intent to commit a felony, within the provisions of Gen. St. ch. 91, 2 12.</p>

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Chisago county, Orosby, J., presiding, sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.

Pursuant to an act of the legislature, the question of the removal of the county seat of Le Sueur county from the town of Le Sueur to the village of Cleveland was submitted to the vote of the electors of the county, at the general election held November 3, 1874.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Winona county, Mitchell, J., presiding, refusing a new trial after verdict for defendant.

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Dakota county, Qrosby, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

This action was brought in the district court for Eedwood county. At the trial before Hariscóme, J., (a jury being waived,) the defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was taken under advisement, and the case was tried and submitted. Afterwards the judge filed his decision, ordering judgment for defendant on the pleadings, which was entered accordingly, and plaintiff appealed.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment against bim on the pleadings, in the district court for Eamsey county, pursuant to an order of WilJcin, J.

The defendant was arraigned in the district court for Eamsey county, which constitutes the second judicial district, upon two indictments, each entitled, “State of Minncsota, County of Eamsey, District Court, First Judicial District.” The first indictment is as follows : “ Emil Munch is accused, by the grand jury of the county of Eamsey and state of Minnesota, by this indictment, of the crime of embezzlement of public money, exceeding in amount the sum of one hundred…

The defendant was tried in the district court for Hennepin county, before Vanderburgh, J., upon the following indictment: “Thomas New is accused by the grand jury of the county •of Hennepin, in the state of Minnesota, by this indictment, ■of the crime of larceny, committed as follows: The said Thomas New, not being an apprentice, nor under the age of •sixteen years, on the 20th day of August, A. D. 1873, at the city of Minneapolis, in said Hennepin county, then and there…

Appeal by defendants from a judgment of tbe court of common pleas of Bamsey county, the action having been tried before Hall, J., without a jury.

Appeal by defendants, Allis and Emmett, from a judgment of the court of common pleas of Ramsey county, where the action was tried before Hall, J., without a jury.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for TVmsey county, Wilkin, J., presiding, refusing a ‘new trial.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Vanderburgh, J., presiding, setting-aside a former order, etc., as stated in the opinion.

This was an action against the defendant, formerly treasurer of Mower county, to recover moneys alleged to have been received by him as such treasurer, and fraudulently converted by him during his four successive terms of office, covering the period from March 1, 1862, to March 18, 1869, when he resigned before the expiration of his last term.

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of tbe district court for McLeod county, entered on the report of Hon. Isaac Atwater, referee.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court-for Washington county, Crosby, J., presiding, refusing a new trial. The cutting in front of plaintiff’s lots was made by* defendant in May, 1872.

On January 19, 1858, Philip Goldsmith, the defendant’s testator, conveyed with warranty to William Coffin, the plaintiff’s intestate, certain real estate in Ramsey county, from which Coffin was afterwards evicted by one Greve. See Qreve v. Coffin, 14 Minn. 345.

This action was commenced before a justice of the peace, who rendered judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the district court for Winona county on questions of law only, the only question raised being upon the jurisdiction of the justice.

This was an action for a wrongful taking and detention of personal property, and was commenced in a justice’s court. On the return day of the summons, January 15, 1874, the parties appeared before the justice, the plaintiff filed his complaint, and thereupon, by consent of parties, the cause was adjourned to January 23, at which time the parties again appeared, and defendants moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and for insufficiency of the complaint.

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the district court, for Washington county, entered upon the report of a. referee.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the court of common pleas of Hennepin county, Young, J., presiding, refusing a new trial after verdict for defendant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Faribault county, where the action was tried before Waite, J., without a jury.

Action on a promissory note by one of the next of kin of the payee against the maker. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled by the district court for Hennepin county, Vanderburgh, J., presiding, and defendant appealed.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Washington county, Grosby, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Carver county, Hariscóme, J., presiding, (sitting for the judge of the eighth district, 1 refusing a new trial after verdict for plaintiff.

Defendant mortgaged certain real estate to plaintiff. The mortgage contained the usual poAver of sale, and, upon default in payment, Avas foreclosed by advertisement, the plaintiff becoming the purchaser. After the expiration of the year of redemption plaintiff brought this action for unlawful detainer, under Gen. St. ch. 84, to recover possession of the premises so mortgaged and sold to him. The justice rendered judgment for plaintiff, from which defendant appealed.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the municipal court of the city of Minneapolis, where the action was tried before Cooley, J., without a jury.

<p>Contributory Negligence — When a Bar to Recovery. — As applicable to cases of ordinary negligence, when the injury is not claimed to have been wilfully, wantonly or intentionally inflicted, the rules laid down by this court in Donaldson v. Milwaukee Si. Paul R. Co., 21 Minn. 293, “that to maintain the action it must appear that the injury was occasioned by negligence on defendant’s part, and it must not appear that there was contributory negligence on plaintiff’s part,” and that “it is proper for the court, when the uncontroverted facts of the case show contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, to rule, as a matter of law, that he cannot recover,” cited and approved.</p> <p>■Same — Failure to Use Available Means to Avoid Known Danger — A failure, under ordinary circumstances, to make diligent use of the available means at one’s command to avoid a known and apprehended danger, where it is apparent that such danger might have been avoided if such moans had 'been so used, is to be regarded as concurring negligence, and so declared by the court.</p> <p>Railroad-crossing — Duty of Traveller on Highway. — A railroad-crossing over a public highway, upon the same grade, is a place of danger, and is of itself a warning to one about to go upon it to be careful and vigilant, to the extent of his opportunity, in the use of his senses of sight and hearing, to discover an approaching train in time to avoid it.</p> <p>Same — Presumption of Negligence. — "When the vision of the traveller is so unobstructed along the track that he can easily discover an approaching train, or the circumstances are such that his sense of hearing, if used, must apprise him of the same fact in time to escape it, it will be presumed, under ordinary circumstances, in case of collision, that ho did not look or listen, or, if so, that he heedlessly disregarded the knowledge thus obtained. In either of these oases, as a general rule, no action can be maintained.</p> <p>Contributory Negligence Imputed to Plaintiff in this Case. — Upon the uncontroverted facts in the present case, considered and stated by the court, Held, that contributory negligence on the part of the deceased clearly appears, and that the action cannot be maintained.</p> <p>Railroad Company need not Whistle for Crossing. — In the absence of any statutory provision upon the subject, no legal obligation rests upon a railroad corporation to blow its whistle in approaching a public crossing with one of its trains.</p>

The railroad company instituted proceedings, under Gen. St. ch. 34, to condemn lots 7 and 8, in block 59, in Kittson’s addition to St. Paul, for the purposes of its railroad. The petition of the company set forth that the present respondents were tenants in common of the land in fee, and that certain other persons held a mortgage thereon. The mortgagees took no appeal from the award of the commissioners.

Appeal by the railroad company from an order of the district court for Bamsoy county, Chatfield, J., presiding, (sitting for the judge of the second district,) refusing anew trial.

After rendering a tax judgment in this case, against defendant’s objections, the district court for Mille Lacs county, McRelvey, J., presiding, certified the case to this court.

Appeal by defendants from an order of tbe district court for Blue Earth county, Waite, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

Action' under the statute to determine the adverse claims of defendants to certain lands in Fillmore county in possession of plaintiff, and to quiet plaintiff’s title thereto. The defendant, Howell, answered, denying plaintiff’s title, asserting title in fee in himself, and praying that his title be confirmed as against the plaintiff and his co-defendants, and for possession of the land. By consent of parties the action was referred to JohnQ.

Appeal bjr defendant from an order of the court of common pleas of Hennepin county, Young, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

Plaintiff, in April, 1873, was designated, by the board of auditors of Washington county as one of the depositaries of the county funds, and filed a proper bond, properly approved.

Proceeding to condemn land for railroad purposes. The petition set forth the names of the respondents, as owners, and that of one Kelly, as mortgagee, and in the award the compensation awarded to the mortgagee and that awarded to the owners were separately stated. The mortgagee did not appeal from the award. The land owners appealed to the district court for Nicollet county, where a trial was had before Hariscóme, J., and a verdict rendered in excess of the award.

Plaintiff having recovered a joint judgment by default, in the district court for Scott county, against the defendants, Lougli and Pitman, in this action, on their joint promissory note, the defendant, Lough, moved in the adjoining county of Dakota, before Crosby, J., to vacate the judgment and all subsequent proceedings as to him on the ground that he had never been served with the summons in the action. The motion was granted, and plaintiff appealed

Plaintiff sold and delivered to defendant, at Winona, a stock of goods. In payment of $2,500.00 of tbe purchase money the defendant assigned to plaintiff, “without recourse,” an interest to that amount in a judgment of the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, for $5,398.13, in favor of defendant and against one E. E. Wilson, of Eau Claire, in that state, with authority to plaintiff to enforce payment of the same to such amount.

Action for the wrongful talcing and conversion of a stock of goods, sold by one Mills to the plaintiff, and taken from the latter’s possession by the defendant, Brown, as sheriff, by virtue of executions against Mills in favor of the other defendants. Defence — that the sale to plaintiff was in fraud of the creditors of Mills.

Action in tbe nature of quo warranto, the relator being also joined as plaintiff, to try the title to the office of assessor of the city of Duluth. The relator was elected April 15, 1873, the defendant April 29, 1874; but, on behalf of' the relator, it was claimed that the latter election was invalid, and that the relator was entitled to continue in office until a valid election of a successor to him.

Plaintiff brought this action, in April, 1871, in the district court for Dakota county, asking that the satisfaction of a former judgment in the same court, in his favor and against the same defendants, might be vacated, and such judgment reinstated to the amount of $2,906.00, and to have execution for that amount, and for general relief.

The defendant is a Pennsylvania corporation, having its principal office at Philadelphia.

The defendant was tried in the district court for Ramsey county, at the December term, 1874, upon the following indictment, under Laws 1873, ch. 9, the two first sections of which are given in the margin:1 “ Jay Owens is accused by the grand jury of the county •of Kamsey, by this indictment, of the crime of abortion, committed as follows: “ The said Jay Owens, on the twenty-third day of April, A. D. 1874, at the city of Saint Paul, in this county, did wilfully, unlawfully…

Appeal by defendants from a judgment of the district court for Scott county, where the action was tried before Ohatfleld, J., and a jury.

<p>Appeal by Walbridge and the National Exchange Bank of Minneapolis, garnishees, from a judgment of the municipal court of the city of Minneapolis.</p>

Appeal by defendant from an order of tbe district court for Nicollet county, Hariscóme, J., presiding, overruling a demurrer to tbe complaint.

The plaintiff having appealed to the district court for Wabasha county, from the commissioners’ award of compensation (one dollar) for the taking of certain land for the purposes of its railway, the action was tried before Van JDyJce, J., and a jury. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove that long prior to the taking of the land by defendant the plaintiff’s assignor ivas owner of a larger tract, including the premises in question.

<p>Alteration of Deed by Stranger. — An alteration, even though material, of a deed by a stranger, without the privity, knowledge, or consent of the party interested, will not render it void.</p> <p>Same — Correction by Scrivener of an Error made by Mm in a Deed. — G-. & Co. were agents of S., with authority only to loan money on note and mortgage, and to hold the securities so taken subject to the order of their principal. Plaintiff agreed with them as such agents for a loan, to be secured by a mortgage on certain land to her belonging, in section 5, etc., and employed one S. C. G., a member of the firm, to draft such mortgage. In doing so he misdescribed the premises as being-in section 25, and the mortgage was executed in ignorance of such mistake. Afterwards the scrivener corrected the mistake without the consent or knowledge of any of the parties to the mortgage. field, that the scrivener was a mere stranger, and his act in altering the mortgage did not affect it so as to prevent its reformation by the court.</p>

<p>Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the district court for Nicollet county, Hanscome, J., presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the district court for Winona county, Mitchell, J., presiding.</p>

Appeal by Nathan from an order of the district court for Scott county, Hanscome, J., presiding, (sitting for the judge of the eighth district,) denying a motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the probate court of that county, admitting a will to probate.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for St. Louis county, Orosby, J., presiding, (sitting for the judge of the seventh district,) refusing a new trial after a trial before a referee.

<p>Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Benton county, McKélvey, J., presiding.</p>

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Washington county, Crosby, J., presiding, striking out, as frivolous, a demurrer to the complaint.

Appeal by plaintiff’ from an order of tbe district court for Hennepin county, Vanderburgh, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of tbe district court for Olmsted county, Mitchell, J., presiding, sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.

<p>Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Douglas county, McKélvey, J., presiding.</p>

Appeal by defendant from an order of the court of common pleas of Hennepin county, Young, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

The plaintiff (a corporation) alleges in its complaint that on August 22, 1872, one Eobbins made and delivered to defendant his two promissory notes, secured by areal estate mortgage of the same date, which notes were payable to defendant’s order on or before January 1, 1874, andón or before January 1,1875, respectively; that on March 31,1873, the defendant, for value, sold and assigned the notes and mortgage to plaintiff by the following endorsement on each of them: “Notice…

Tbe defendant having instituted proceedings to condemn certain land of plaintiff, the latter appealed from the award to the district court for Ramsey county, where the action was tried before WiVtin, J., and a verdict rendered for plaintiff for an amount in excess of the award. A new trial was refused, and defendant appealed.

On and for some years prior to September 24, 1858, the plaintiff and the defendants, George B. Judd and Orange Walker, together with Albert H. Judd and Asa H. Parker, were copartners in business as Judd, Walker & Co. This firm carried on a general logging and lumber business at Marine, in this state, having a saw-mill and store at that-place, and being the owner of a large amount of pine lands and other real estate.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district •court for Dodge county, where the action was tried before Lord, J., and a jury.

Defendant, being the contractor for building a church at Minneapolis, made a contract with plaintiff to slate the roof, being 121 48-100 squares, at the price of $15.00 per square, plaintiff to furnish the slates, which, as well as the work, were to be of the best quality.

<p>Garnishment — Denial of Indebtedness where Facts Disclosed show a Debt.— In garnishee proceedings, although the garnishee deny any indebtedness, if the facts which he discloses clearly show that he owes the defendant a debt which is subject to the garnishee proceedings, judgment should go against him.</p> <p>Same — Claimant must Show his Interest in the Debt Garnished. — A claimant in such proceedings, claiming under an endorsement on a policy of insurance making it payable to him to the extent of his interest — the character and extent of such interest not appearing — must, to protect his claim to the debt, prove what his interest is.</p> <p>Same — Judgment on Appeal where Claimant has Failed to Show his Interest. — ■ Where the court in which the garnishee proceeding is instituted gives to a claimant full opportunity to establish his claim, and he omits to do so, and the court thereupon renders judgment upon the disclosure of the garnishee, discharging the garnishee, upon an appeal by the plaintiff, upon questions of law alone, the appellate court may, upon reversing the judgment of the eourt below, render judgment on the disclosure against the garnishee.</p>

Defendants were tried and convicted in the district court for Dodge county, before Lord, J., upon the indictment set out in the opinion. An objection to the admission of any evidence for the prosecution, and a motion in arrest of judgment, were both overruled, judgment was duly rendered, and the defendants appealed.

This and the next following case were prosecutions for selling liquor without the license required by Laws 1873, ch. 10, the title and material sections of which are stated at length in the following opinion. In this case the defendant was convicted before a justice of the peace in Olmsted county, and appealed to the district court for that county, where the judgment of the justice was, by order of Mitchell, J., affirmed, and the defendant appealed to this court.

After the decision of the next preceding case, sustaining the validity of Laws 1873, ch. 10, the defendant in this action was prosecuted in the municipal court of the city of St. Paul for selling liquor without having taken out the special license required by that act. At the trial he offered in evidence a license from the city of St. Paul, and also a license from the United States, both of which were excluded, and exceptions were duly taken.

Alternative writ of mandamus from this court, directed to the respondent as auditor of Hennepin county, and commanding him to issue to the relator a certificate of election as judge of probate for that county. The admitted facts of the case, as shown by the writ and answer, are stated in the opinion.

<p>Contract — Consideration.—A writing promissory to pay to A. a specified sum when A. shall perform certain acts, though it contains no promise of A. to do the acts, and shows no past or present consideration, becomes binding upon the promissoT if, before it is revoked, A. perform the acts pursuant to it.</p> <p>Pleading — Performance of Conditions. — An allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff “ has fully performed all the terms and conditions of said contract to be done and performed by him in accordance therewith,” is a sufficient averment of the doing of the things required to render the promise obligatory.</p>

Action to foreclose a mortgage. . In his answer the defendant alleged, as a counter-claim, the payment by him to plaintiff of interest in excess of twelve per cent, upon a loan other than that secured by the mortgage sought to be foreclosed, and ashed that the amount of such excess be set off against the mortgage debt. A demurrer to this counterclaim was sustained by. the district court for Blue Earth •county, Dickinson, J., presiding, and defendant appealed.

After verdict for plaintiff on a trial in the district court for Scott county, before (Jhatfield, J., the defendant moved for a new trial before J. II. Brown, J., (sitting for the judge of the eighth district,) and a new trial was ordered unless plaintiff* should remit $300.00 from the amount of the verdict,, from which order the plaintiff appeals.

Action for the conversion of certain hay. At the trial in the district court for Becker county, before Stearns, J., the principal questions were upon the ownership of the hay and upon its value at the time of the conversion. The exceptions taken in the latter branch of the case are stated in the opinion.

This is an action under Laws 1874, ch. 66, § 1, (approved March 5, 1874,) which provides that “ whenever a married man shall be deserted by his wife, or a married woman shall be deserted by her husband, for the space of one year, * * * he or she may bring an action in the district court of the proper county, asking for a decree which shall debar him or her so deserting * * * from any right or estate, by the curtesy or in dower, * * * in or to his or her lands, and which will…

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Scott county, where the action was tried before Ohatfield, J., on appeal from a justice’s court, and a verdict directed for plaintiff.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Otter Tail county, Stearns, J., presiding, refusing a new-trial.

Proceedings in the district court for St. Louis county, under the tax law of 1874, to enforce collection of delinquent taxes for the year 1874 on real estate in that county. The defendants, owners of real estate in the city of Duluth, appeared and objected to the validity of the taxes on their respective parcels of land, whereupon the case was tried before Stearns, J., and by him certified to this court.

By Sp. Laws 1870, cb. 100, E. H. Eobinson, Neil McNeil, of Hennepin county, and A. Bartlett, of Wright county, are appointed commissioners “for the purpose of 'Contracting for and superintending the rebuilding of the bridge across Crow river, near its mouth, between the town of Dayton, in the county of Hennepin, and the town of Otsego, in the county of Wright.” It is also provided “that if either of said commissioners shall be unable to ■discharge said duties, he shall have…

<p>Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Vanderburgh, J., presiding, modifying an injunction.</p>

Complaint as follows, verified March 3, 1875 : “ The plaintiff complains and alleges : “1. That he is now, and for more than two years last past has been, the owner in fee simple of, and seized of an estate of inheritance in, and is now, and has been during all the time of his said ownership, entitled to the possession of, the following described real estate,” (particularly describing it.) “2.

Appeal by defendant from an order of tbe district court for Ramsey county, WilJcin, J., presiding, refusing a new trial after verdict for plaintiff.

Action under Gen. St. ch. 75, § 1, to determine the defendant’s adverse claim to lot 10 in block 144, in Minneapolis, in possession of plaintiffs. The defendant answered, denying plaintiffs’ title, alleging title in fee in himself, and praying that his title be confirmed, that he have judgment for possession, and that the plaintiffs be barred of all claim to the land.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the court of common pleas of Bamsey county, refusing a new trial, the action having been tried before Brill, J., without a jury.

Petition for a writ of certiorari to review proceedings wherein judgment had been rendered against certain real estate of the petitioner, in the city of St. Paul, for the amount of an assessment for a local improvement. The petition sets forth various alleged errors in the proceedings, and also that the petitioner, being a non-resident, had no notice or knowledge of the proceedings until after judgment rendered.

Appeal by defendants, Snure and Franklin, from an order of the district court for Houston county, refusing a new trial, after a trial before Page, J., without a jury.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Kamsey county, refusing a new trial, after a trial before Wilkin, J., without a jury.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the court of common pleas of Hennepin county, Young, J., presiding, refusing a new trial after a trial by the court without a jury.

Oertiorari to the court of common pleas of Ramsey county, in which court a judgment had been rendered against certain land of the • plaintiff for the amount of an assessment for a local improvement in the city of St. Paul. The sole ground on which it was sought to reverse the judgment was that the amendment to Const, art. 9, § 1, upon which depended the validity of Sp.

This action was brought in a justice’s court, where plaintiff had judgment. The defendant appealed, on questions of law and fact, to the district court for Ramsey county, where a trial was had before Willcin, J., and a verdict rendered for plaintiff. A new trial was refused and defendant, appealed.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the court of common pleas of Ramsey county, Simons, J., presiding, where the prisoner was tried on an indictment for rape, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for thirty years.

By a contract in writing made May 19, 1873, the plaintiff agreed to sell and deliver to the defendant 425,000 feet of lumber, at the price of $15.50 per 1,000 feet, the lumber to be delivered at the rate of not less than 20,000 feet per week from the date of the contract until the whole should be delivered, and the defendant agreed to deliver to plaintiff, upon the execution of the contract, his promissory note for $3,000.00, payable July 10, 1873, and to pay him the further…

Action for the conversion of a quantity of grain, including 1,029 bushels of wheat, part of 26,465 bushels purchased for plaintiff, and with money furnished by it, by the firm of Coon & Platt, of which defendant is surviving partner. The answer admits the purchase of 26,431 bushels only, and alleges that all of the same, except 2,657 bushels, were duly delivered to plaintiff prior to October 31, 1871, the date of the alleged conversion.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the court of common pleas of Bamsey county, refusing a new trial, after a trial before Brill, J., anda jury.

The defendant was arraigned in the district court for Stearns county upon the following indictment: [Title.] “ Pleas B. Davis is accused by the grand jury of the county of Stearns, by this indictment, of the crime of voting more than once at the same election, committed as follows: Said grand jury, upon their oaths, say that, on the third day of November, A. D. 1874, the annual election for United States, state and county officers was duly held in the town of Getty in said…

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court, for Faribault county, Dickinson, J., presiding, denying a. motion to set aside the levy of an attachment. The grounds of the motion were : 1. That the goods attached belonged to-the firm of Eoyce & Goodwin, in which the defendant was a partner, and that the firm property was insufficient to pay the firm debts. 2. That the attachment was levied on the-partnership property, and not on defendant’s interest therein. 3.

The complaint alleges the sale of a pair of horses by defendant to Albert Scheffer, with warranty that they were good roadsters, good and true workers in harness, and not balky; a breach of the warranty, and damages resulting therefrom to Scheffer, and an assignment of the cause of action from Scheffer to the plaintiff. The answer puts in issue the sale, the warranty, and the assignment.

The plaintiffs, sub-contractors under defendants, by a written contract, for doing the earth-work on a portion of the line of the St. Paul, Stillwater & Taylor’s Falls Railroad, brought this action to recover (among other things) the value of building a box culvert, as work not included in the contract, and the increased cost of work done in frozen ground, as to which last item it is alleged that the necessity for doing frost-work was occasioned by wrongful conduct of…

The plaintiff, a resident and tax payer in tbe city of Hastings, brought this action in the district court for1 Dakota county to restrain the proposed issue of the bonds of the city to the Saint Paul & Chicago Railway Company. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained by Crosby, J., and the plaintiff appealed.

This action, was brought in the court of common pleas of Ramsey county to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff by reason of a defective sidewalk, near the corner of Sixth and Fort streets, in the city of St. Paul. The case was transferred to the district court for the same county, and tried before Wilkin, J. The plaintiff had a verdict for $300.00; a new trial was refused, and defendant appealed.

The plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Hennepin county, to recover $1,425.00 damages for the breach, of an alleged contract, by which, in consideration that plaintiff would open at Minneapolis, for defendant, a branch of Tapp an, McKillop & Co.’s Commercial Agency, and canvass and solicit subscriptions therefor, the defendant agreed to furnish and provide, at the joint cost of the parties, all books and stationery necessary to open and maintain such…

<p>Judgment having been entered in the district court for Uamsey county in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, and au execution on the judgment having been returned unsatisfied, an order for the examination of the defendant was granted on plaintiff’s application, pursuant to which .order the defendant was examined, and disclosed the facts stated in the opinion. Thereupon a receiver was appointed by order of Wilkin, J., from which order the defendant, appealed.</p>

Action for slander. Plaintiff was city justice of the city of Faribault. Two horses had been stolen at that city, and one Quackenbush and others had been arrested, on a warrant issued by plaintiff, as the supposed thieves, and brought before plaintiff for examination, and upon such examination discharged.

Plaintiff conveyed in fee to Crocker & Rowlandson a mill-site at Minneapolis, with one mill-power of water, to have and to hold to the grantees, subject to certain conditions as to user, and “yielding and paying to said company and their assigns forever, for such mill-power above granted, the yearly rent of $133.33,” to be paid as provided in the deed.

This action being on the calendar at a general term of the district court for Winona county, Mitchell, J., presiding, the defendants moved for a continuance, which was denied. The case being reached in its order, the defendants did not appear, and their default was entered, a jury called, and the plaintiff’s damages assessed. A motion to open the default was denied, and judgment entered for plaintiff, from which the defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Wilkin, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.</p>

Action to recover §5,706.12, as the agreed price of 20,379 railroad ties furnished by the plaintiff to the defendants.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Eamsey county, Wilkin, J., presiding, refusing a new trial, after verdict for plaintiff. See Blakeley v. Le Due, 19 Minn. 187 ; McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277; s. c., 12 Minn. 530.

This was an original proceeding by writ of quo warranto, on the information of the attorney general, to try the title of the office of judge of the eighth judicial district, as between the relator and the respondent. The respondent ■demurred to the information, the substance of which is stated in the opinion.

Action for the wrongful taking and conversion of certain personal property of plaintiff, a portion of which, it is claimed, was exempt from execution.

Ejectment for a lot of land in the city of Red Wing. Defence, a denial of plaintiff’s title, an averment of title in defendant, and an allegation that defendant had peacably taken possession of and held the land under certain official deeds, under color of title in fee, and in good faith, and had made improvements thereon of the value stated in the answer, and had paid taxes, etc. Reply, putting in issue the new matter in the answer.

Appeal by defendants from an order of the court of common pleas of Ramsey county, refusing a new trial after a trial before Simons, J., without a jury. The proceedings in that court are fully stated in the report of the next following case.

■On July 10, 1873, the common council of the city of St. Paul passed and transmitted to the board of public works of that city a resolution referring to the board a petition for the paving of Third street, from the Seven Corners (so-called) to Sibley street, requesting the board to report to' the council: 1. Is the paving of Third street, with a Nicholson pavement or other wooden pavement, proper and necessary? 2.

The defendant was separately tried in the court of common pleas of Ramsey county, before Brill and Simons, JJ., upon the following indictment: [Title.] “ George Lautenschlager, Frank Rapp and Sophie Rapp are accused by the grand jury of the county of Ramsey, by this indictment, of the crime of murder committed as follows : The said George Lautenschlager, Frank Rapp and Sophie Rapp, on the first day of November, A. D. 1874, at the city of St. Paul, in this county, wrongfully,…

This action was broughtún the district court for Eamsey county to recover for the injury alleged to have been occasioned to plaintiff’s lots on Mississippi street, in the city of St. Paul, by the change of the grade of that street. At the trial, before WiIMn, J., the plaintiff had a verdict, on which judgment was entered, and defendant appealed.

Complaint under the statute to determine the adverse claim of defendants to real estate in Olmsted county, in possession of plaintiff. Answer, denying plaintiff’s title, alleging title in defendant Angeline E. Keyes, and praying that her title be confirmed. Trial before O. B. Gould, Esq., as referee, upon whose report judgment was entered for defendant Keyes, from which plaintiff appeals.

Complaint for wilful trespass, in entering plaintiffs’ close and cutting and carrying away timber therefrom, to their damage in the sum of 1250.00, for which amount judgment is demanded. Defence, a general denial.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the municipal court of the city of Minneapolis. The action was for nine days’ services at the agreed price of $1.50 per day, the complaint also alleging that such services were reasonably worth that sum per day. The defence was the general denial stated in the opinion, and facts claimed to constitute a special contract, and a breach of such contract by plaintiff.

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Benton county, McKelvey, J., presiding, denying their motion for change of place of trial.

Appeal by plaintiffs from an order of the district court for McLeod county refusing a new trial, after a trial by jury before John H. Brown, J., sitting for the judge of the eighth •district.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for McLeod county, where the action was tried before J. II. Broiun, J., acting for the judge of the eighth district, without a jury.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Vanderburgh, J., presiding, sustaining a demurrer to his answer to a supplemental complaint.

Appeal by defendant from an order of tbe district court for Kandiyohi county, Vanderburgh, J., presiding, overruling a demurrer to the complaint.

Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant in a justice’s court in Wright county. The defendant undertook to appeal therefrom. The justice having refused to allow the appeal and make a return, the defendant made a motion in the district court for Wright county, before Vanderburgh, J., that the justice be required to.make a return on the appeal.

Proceeding in the district court for Houston county, under the tax law of 1874, (Laws 1874, ch. 1,) to enforce payment of taxes on real estate in that county remaining delinquent on June 1, 1875. The defendants, owners of lands proceeded against, appeared and filed an answer, the substance of which is stated in the opinion.

Action on a promissory note. Defence, that the note in suit and certain other notes were given in consideration of a permit from plaintiff and others to cut pine timber on lands in Douglas county, Wisconsin, represented as belonging to plaintiff and the other parties granting the permit, but that a large part of such lands did not then belong to the plaintiff or the other grantors, and that since the giving of the permit they have neglected to pay the taxes on such of the…

Appeal by defendant from an order of tbe district court for Scott county, Mitchell, J., presiding, (acting for the judge of the eighth district,) refusing a new trial, and from the judgment entered on the verdict.

Plaintiff recovered judgment by default in the municipal court of the city of St. Paul.

Action to reform and foreclose a mortgage on real estate, made by defendant to one Irish, to secure the purchase money upon a sale and conveyance of the same real estate by Irish to him, and by Irish assigned, together with the mortgage notes, (which were payable to bearer,) to the plaintiff. Defence, want of title in Irish to the premises conveyed, and consequent failure of the consideration of the notes and mortgage, and a partial payment before the assignment to plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover for the conversion of certain wheat. The plaintiff claimed title to the wheat under a chattel mortgage from one Gauthier.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Kandiyohi county, where the action was tried befóre Vanderburgh, J., and a jury.

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Goodhue county, Orosby, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.