Volume 22 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Security to Keep Peace — Commitment.—The form of commitment in proceedings for security to keep the peace is found in section 70 of the Penal Code, and section 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to cases of this kind.</p> <p>Id. — Commitment—Security.—In proceedings for security to keep the 'peace it is not necessary that the commitment should state the reason for the issuance thereof, but it must recite that the offender had been required previously to give an undertaking to keep the peace, for ail that the Legislature thought it neeessary for the jailer to know was that the prisoner was put in his custody for failure to give security.</p> <p>Id. — Commitment —In proceedings for security to keep the peace the Penal Code does not require that the particular threat preferred by the prisoner should be' mentioned in the. commitment.</p> <p>Id. — Aggravated Assault and Battery — Breach op Peace — Merger.—The threats made by the prisoner that he was going to knife and kill the prosecuting witness did not become merged in a crime of aggravated assault and battery or breach of the peace although it is charged in the complaint that he attempted to carry out his threats.</p>

<p>Fraudulent Conveyance — Complaint.—In this ease it was charged that the defendant maliciously, wilfully and with premeditated intention to defraud Hijos de J. Bird y León, sold a house "belonging to him which he' had previously given in guarantee to said Hijos de J. Bird y León by means of a document signed in his handwriting wherein he undertook and promised not to alienate said house without the previous consent in writing of said creditors. Held: That that act constitutes no crime against the laws of Porto Bico.</p> <p>Id. — Fraud.—For fraud to exist the person who is accused of the crime of having committed a fraud must be shown to have used some artifice, cunning or device' by which, while purporting to do a certain thing, he was really doing something else covertly, retaining a benefit for himself at the expense of another person. In other words, that he has enriched himself at another’s expense.</p> <p>Id. — Connivance—Intention.—In order that a fraudulent conveyance may exist there must be some connivance between the debtor and the person to-whom the property is conveyed, and an intent on the part of the grantor to retain some advantage for himself.</p> <p>Id. — Complaint—Conclusion op Law — Good Faith. — Although the complaint in this case charges that the accused wilfully and maliciously conveyed the house with intention to defraud his creditors, these words, which described the intention of the debtor, are mere conclusions of law which do not flow from . the specification of the act committed by the defendant. There is no showing that the conveyance was not a tona, fide one.</p> <p>Id. — Promise—Possession And Ownership — Proceeds 'op Sale. — The mere failure to keep a promise -or to perform a personal .contract not to sell without the consent of a creditor when the debtor is in the possession and ownership of the property and uses the proceeds of the sale to pay a prior creditor, is' not a fraudulent conveyance under section 111 of- the Penal Code. -</p> <p>Id. — Preference op Creditor. — The preference made by the debtor to one creditor-over another, in the absence of a special statute governing such preferences, is not fraudulent. (</p>

<p>Aggravated Assault and Battery — Complaint—Inference.—Although a complaint does not require the same particularity as an information, nevertheless when a statute enumerates in plain and unequivocal language the facts which would make a simple assault an aggravated one, said facts must be set forth clearly in the complaint and should not be left to inference.</p> <p>Id. — Noscitur a Sochs — Meeting Place. — The idea of subdivision -2 of section 6 of the Act to define and punish aggravated assault and battery, following „ the principle of noscitur a socns, is- to prevent rough or riotous occurrences in a meeting-place or assembly and to punish with greater severity any person who disturbs the peace and quiet of such meeting-place or assembly by assaulting and beating another human being.</p> <p>Id. — Meeting-Place.-—Subdivision 2 of section 6 of the Aggravated Assault and Battery Act does not apply to each and every concourse of people in the street or otherwise, but to a meeting-place, like courts, churches, theatres and the like, and the mere presence of old men, women and children does not create the circumstances, of aggravation set forth in the said subdivision.</p> <p>Id. — Insulting Weapons. — That which really constitutes the crime of aggravated assault and battery under subdivision 6 of section 6 of the act is the use of a weapon calculated. to infliet disgrace upon the victim; and when it is sought to allege that a person used a whip, cowhide, cane or similar weapon, it'must he so stated'in "clear terms in' the complaint-.</p> <p>Genebio Term — -Instjeting -Weapons. — The use of the word “stick” (palo) in a complaint charging assault and battery, does not imply that an insulting weapon was used in the commission of the offense, for said word, being the generic one, not only means “cane” - (bastón), but any other..wooden instrument, such as a club, a branch, of a tree or. a ba^e-ball bat,. , ,,</p>

<p>Public -Works — Loans—Municipal Council. — The provision contained in section 26 of Act No. 4 of February 19; 1913, requiring that the Executive Council shall first approve a loan, in nowise affects the power of a municipal council to engage and pay for the professional services of an expert to report on the technical part of projected works out of the ordinary funds of the budget.</p> <p>Id. — Municipal Law — Loans.—The provisions of Act No. 4 of Eebruary 19, 1913, do not abridge the powers conferred upon municipalities by the Act to establish - a system of local government and for other purposes, of March 8, 1906, except .in eases of indebtedness contracted by means of loans.</p> <p>Id.- — Municipal Law — -Loans.—The municipal councils of the island are empowered to pass ordinances making provision for any of the matters specified in section 25 of the Municipal Law without the authorization of the Executive Council, provided that payment therefor is to be made out of the regular budget and with the general municipal funds and' that no loan is to be contracted.</p> <p>Id. — Municipal Law — Powers op Municipalities- — Payment oe Professional Services. — Pursuant to section 84 of the Municipal Law, a municipality, in framing its budget, may appropriate therein a sufficient sum to pay for the services of an expert employed by the municipality in connection with the . construction of works which the municipality is fully authorized to order, and the approval of the Executive Council is not necessary for this purpose.</p>

<p>Cancellation op Mortgage — Express Power.' — An attorney in fact requires express power in order to cancel a mortgage.</p> <p>Power oe Attorney — Construction—Express Power. — Powers of attorney must he strictly construed, and when the law requires that an agent must have express powers from his principal in order to perform certain acts, the kind of acts he is expressly empowered to perform must he stated in the power of attorney. .</p> <p>Id. — Reference.—Powers of attorney must be drawn up in such terms as to show the powers conferred upon the attorneys in fact without having to refer to another document or to a statute in order to ascertain what they are, therefore a clause stating that the powers enumerated in section 1615 of the Civil Code are granted is not sufficient.</p> <p>Id. — -Express Power — Act of Strict Ownership. — When the statute requires that express power must be given in order to compromise, alienate, mortgage or execute any other act of strict ownership, the same words must be used in the power of attorney.</p>

<p>Judicial Administration — Interested Party — Provisional Support. — In a proceeding for judicial administration of the estate of a deceased person the widow is an interested party, especially when an order has been entered requiring the administrator to pay her a certain sum monthly for her provisional support..</p> <p>Contempt — Civil Contempt — Criminal Contempt. — Civil contempt consists in the disobedience of an order entered in a civil proceeding for the benefit of an adverse party to the proceeding, while criminal contempt is the commission of certain acts which show disrespect for the court, obstruct the administration of public justice or tend to discredit the court, such as disorderly conduct in the presence or immediate vicinity of the court, acts of violence which interrupt its proceedings, interference with property in its custody or misconduct towards its officers.</p> <p>Id. — Civil Contempt — Adverse Party. — When the contempt is of a civil character the party injured by the disobedience of the order of the court is really the adverse, party to the suit with an interest and a right to intervene in the result of the contempt proceedings. Applying the said rule to this particular case, it must be concluded that the widow of the deceased, who is an interested party and injured by the disobedience of the order entered in the proceedings' for judicial administration, is an adverse party to the contempt proceeding.</p> <p>Id. — Dismissal oe Appeal — Service oe Notice oe Appeal. — The notice of appeal not having been served on an adverse party really interested, the appeal should be dismissed.</p>

<p>CANCELLATION of Mortgage — Express Power. — The cancellation of a mortgage credit involves an actual act of alienation which cannot be executed without the express authorization of the person in whose favor the mortgage is created.</p> <p>Executor.' — 'When no special powers are conferred on the executors by the testator, they have only those powers enumerated in sections 876 and 877 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id.' — Cancellation of Mortgage. — Authority to perform acts of strict ownership, as is the cancellation of a mortgage right, is not included among the powers conferred on executors by sections 876 and 877 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Express Power — I-Ieirs.—Except when the executor is expressly authorized by the testator to consent to the cancellation of a mortgage, that right vests in the heirs, pursuant to section 669 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Administrator—Beal Bights. — The executor is not an administrator of the estate unless the testator has conferred that character upon him, and even when he is made such administrator by the will of the testator, by the heirs or by the court, he is not authorized to alienate real property or real rights because this right is not inherent in the power to administer.</p> <p>Cancellation of Mortgage — Judicial Authorization — Ex Parte Proceedings. — Judicial authorization granted in ex pm'íe proceedings brought by the executor does not add to his power to execute a deed of cancellation of a mortgage when an action has not been brought against the heirs or when the order of 'cancellation has not been obtained in proceedings for the con-signation of the debt.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of Municipal Ordinances.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Legal Portion- — Encumbranoe.-—A testator cannot encumber the legal hereditary portion of his children.</p> <p>Inheritance — Advance on Inheritance — Hereditary Estate. — Advances made on inheritances should be brought into the hereditary estate, pursuant to section 1001 of the Revised Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Conditional Grant by Parent — Record of Title. — The condition imposed, by a parent in granting property to his ehild as an advance on the inheritance, that he shall not sell or mortgage the same during the father's lifetime, is perfectly valid and a registrar acts correctly in refusing to record a mortgage created on said property by the grantee.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action for the Recovery of a ‘Secured Loan.</p> <p>The facts aro stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Possessory Title — Dominion Title — Record of Title — Evidence—Judicial Order of April 4, 1899. — The period of twenty years prescribed by article 393 of the Mortgage Law for the conversion of a possessory title into a dominion title having been reduced to six years by the Judicial Order of April 4, 1899, and the possessory title proceeding in this case having been recorded in 1894 and its conversion into a dominion title having been recorded in 1911, the period of six years had more than elapsed, counting not only from 1894 but from April 4, 1899, therefore it must be concluded' that the dominion title was secured and recorded according to law and was properly admitted in evidence.</p> <p>Res Judicata — Dominion Title — -Contestants.—The decision of the court dismissing the contest in proceedings for the conversion of a possessory title into a dominion title does not constitute res judicata' as to' the rights of the contestants.</p> <p>Ejectment — Evidence.—In an action of ejectment .it is essential that the plaintiff prove not only his right to recover the thing detained, but also the identity of the thing itself.</p> <p>Evidence — Passion, Prejudice or Partiality — Error.—In the present case the evidence as to the ownership of the parcels of land referred to in the complaint was contradictory, and in the absence of a positive showing that the trial court was influenced by passion, perjudiee or partiality, or committed manifest error, its findings thereon must prevail.</p> <p>Ownership — Prescription—Just Title — Good Faith. — Ownership is lost or acquired by prescription and in order to acquire title by the extraordinary prescription of thirty years neither just title nor good faith is required.</p> <p>Damages — Evidence.—Iu a case of this" kind a prayer for damages by one of the parties will not be sustained when no affirmative evidence has been introduced to show what damages may have been caused.</p>

<p>Demurrer — Misjoinder oe Parties — Second Mortgagees. — The second mortgagee is a proper party to an action praying for the sale of the mortgaged property and the cancellation of the second mortgage in the registry and the overruling of a demurrer setting up misjoinder of parties is not error.</p> <p>Mortgage — Extension oe Time — Maturity—Construction oe Contract. — The debt of $300 not having been paid in accordance with the mortgage contract, the sum of $695 due for merchandise delivered not having been' paid as agreed upon, and one of the clauses of the contract stipulating that in case one shipment should not be paid for at maturity the whole debt should be considered as due. Held: That although a period of two years was fixed as the exact time when the' mortgage should become due, a mortgage Being a subsidiary contract, it was the intention of the parties in using the said words that the maturity of the debt should be the maturity of the mortgage.</p>

<p>Appeal to Supreme Court op United States — Appeal and Error. — In accordance with the Act of Congress of the United States of April 7, 1874, chapter 80, section 2 (18 Stat., 27, 28), regulating appeals and writs of error from the supreme courts of the Territories to the Supreme Court of the United States, when a case has been decided on complaint and demurrer without going to trial and there are no facts or evidence to be certified to, no statement of the ease in the nature of a special verdict is required because the pleadings of the parties are sufficient for the purposes of the appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal — Appeal From Municipal Courts — Transcript op Record. — Although there is no statutory provision expressly authorizing a district eourt to dismiss an appeal when the transcript of the record has not been sent up within the twenty days fixed by the Act to regulate' appeals from judgments of municipal courts in civil cases, approved March 11, 1908, the provisions of section 7 of the Civil Code, which are applicable not only to questions of substantive law but also to matters of procedure, and especially the provisions of section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the appeal when the transcript of the record is not filed within the said period.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Appeal to Supreme Court. — Section 303 of the Code of Civil Procedure concerning appeals to this court and providing that if the appellant fail to furnish the requisite papers the appeal may be dismissed, is applicable by analogy to appeals taken from municipal to district courts.</p> <p>Reconsideration — New Pacts.' — New facts which have not been considered by the court that rendered the decision whose reconsideration is prayed for cannot be set up in a motion for reconsideration unless strong reasons constituting a reasonable excuse are given for not having done so before. . .</p> <p>Appeal — Motion to Set Aside Order Dismissing Appeal — -Discretion of Court. — A motion to set aside an order of a district court dismissing an appeal from a judgment rendered by a municipal court is addressed to the discretion of the judge of said district court, and unless it be shown that he abused said discretion, an order overruling the motion should stand.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction—Notice of Appeal — Stay of Execution. — Section 2 of the Act to regulate appeals from judgments of municipal courts in civil eases, approved March 11, 1908, provides that the presentation of the notice of appeal has the effect of staying execution of the judgment; therefore, from that moment the municipal court loses jurisdiction and the district court acquires it except when notice of appeal is not served 'on the adverse party, in which case the same act itself authorizes the municipal judge to dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Filing and Docketing Appeal. — When the transcript of the reeord is sent up to the district court and the appeal is filed and docketed, it is the duty of the court to hear and decide' the same even if the defendant-appellant fail to appear.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Deed of Liquidation • of a Commercial Partnership.</p> <p>■The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Legacies — ¡Cautionary Notice — Partition of Estate. — When' an estate of inheritance has already been settled by a deed of partition and the proper-allotments made for payment of the legacies, article 49 of the Mortgage Law is not applicable because a cautionary notice is not necessary to seeure payment of the legacies.</p> <p>Partition of Estate — Partitioner.—Even when the partition of the estate of a deceased person was made by the interested parties themselves without the participation of the partitioners appointed, their failure to take part in it does not invalidate the partition.</p> <p>Id. — Minors—Approval of Partition. — By common agreement the heirs, whether adults or minors, may make the partition of the estate themselves, the approval of the partition by the court being necessary when there are minors who are not represented by their father or by their mother, as the case may be.</p> <p>Id. — Legal Portion — Agreement by I-Ieirs. — The heirs may agree that the amount received by one of them as an advance on account of his legal portion may be charged as a debt due to the surviving spouse instead of being deducted from his share.</p> <p>Id. — -Property Acquired by Legatee — Good Consideration- — Valuable Consideration. — In the present case the registrar refused to record the deed of partition because the value of a house devised to one of the heirs and recorded in her name under title of purchase from the testator was brought into the common assets. Held: That the registrar erred in denying said record, because all the interested parties having agreed that the house was conveyed for a good and not for a valuable consideration and the real facts being thus established, the collation was proper in order that the widow might receive her half of the ganancial property intact and the heiress continue in the ownership of the house under her gratuitous title as legatee.</p> <p>Lease — Joint-Ownership—Record of Title. — The fact that, a contract of lease _ is extinguished by force o'f law as to the lessee heirs in so far as it affects that part of 'the common property allotted to them, is no legal reason why the recording of such common property should be denied.</p>

<p>Rape — Corroborative Evidence. — The corroborative evidence need not extend to every element of the crime. It is sufficient if it tend to show some details connecting the defendant with the crime.</p> <p>In. — Corroborative Evidence. — In the present case the victim testified that the accused, the teacher of her school, seized her by the arm, led her into the office of the building and there raped her. In corroboration, a schoolmate of the victim testified that the accused teacher took the prosecutrix to his office and locked the door, and besides there was expert evidence tending to show the rupture of the hymen. Held: That the evidence corroborating the testimony of the victim was sufficient in law.</p>

<p>License Tax — Intraterritorial Railroad — Tax as Condition Precedent to Doing Business — Receipts From Business in Porto Rico — Receipts From Carrying- Business Outside ojp Porto Rico — Interstate Commerce — Foreign Corporation — Domestic Corporation — Constitution—Organic Act.— The defendant in this case, Central Fortuna, is now doing a railroad business in Porto Rico and has. been doing such business prior to and since January 1, 1914. Pursuant to Act No. 134 of August 12, 1913, the Treasurer of Porto Rico requested the said corporation to furnish him with a certificate of its total gross receipts from the business operations transacted during the preceding year. This the respondent refused to do, alleging in its answer to the petition for a writ of mandamus that as a common carrier it is engaged in interstate commerce, i. e., commerce between the -various States of the United States and Porto Rico, and that the said Act No. 134, which imposes a license tax on business in Porto Rico, is a regulation of intei'state commerce and a burden thereon, wherefore it is contrary to the Constitution of the United States and the Organic Act. Seld:</p> <p>1. A state may exact a tax from a foreign corporation measured by its gross receipts, but a license tax cannot be exacted as a condition precedent to doing business when the burden falls on business which is necessarily and mainly outside of the state.</p> <p>2. Anything that a railroad receives from its transportation within Porto Rico is necessarily, owing to the physical conditions, for business done within Porto Rico; and Act No. 134 of 1913, establishing a new system of license taxes, contemplates all and any income from the railroad business in Porto Rico, whether or not the said income is derived partially from packages ultimately destined for shipment to New York.</p> <p>3. The Central Fortuna does a business passing over and depending exclusively upon the soil of Porto Rico, and no part of its railroad business is done outside of Porto Rico. The receipts for the railroad business done in Porto Rico are essentially and easily severable from the receipts for transportation outside of the island, therefore the tax sought to be imposed, although in the form of a license and a condition precedent to doing business, is regulative of a railroad business as such and is not a tax on interstate receipts.</p> <p>4. No railroad compiany in Porto Rico can escape this form óf tax and its regulation merely because it is a foreign corporation or transports packages ultimately destined for shipment to the United States; for the act does not seek to tax interstate packages, but to impose indiscriminately a graded license tax measured by its gross receipts on practically every kind of business carried on in Porto Rico.</p> <p>5. The pleadings only set forth that the Central Fortuna “is engaged in interstate commerce,” and while the Central Fortuna might be doing an express or forwarding business independently of its railroad business and claim to be an interstate carrier,' under the conditions in Porto Rico, even to say that the railroad is engaged in interstate commerce would be to state a conclusion ofl law rather than a fact; moreover, the burden was on the respondent to show not only that its railroad business was a part of the interstate business, but also to show that this form of taxation was a burden on such interstate business.</p> <p>6. The fact that goods are transported from the continent to the island in steamers apd then transferred by railroad to some other point in fhe island, does not convert a business, done by a railroad in Porto Rico into commerce between the States.</p> <p>on reconsideration.</p> <p>Railroads — Interstate Commerce — Judicial Notice. — This court is bound to take judicial notice of the fact that the business of a railroad as such, which is wholly located in Porto Rico, is not interstate commerce.</p> <p>Id. — Local Business. — "When the entire business of a railroad is conducted within Porto Rico the receipts therefrom are the proceeds of .a local business.</p> <p>Interstate Commerce — License Taxes.- — Act No. 134 of 1913 does not levy a tax on the instrumentality of interstate commerce, therefore no burden or prohibition is laid upon such commerce and there is no obstacle to the free conduct thereof.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayágüez in a Prosecution-for Carrying a Prohibited Weapon.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Voluntary Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Motion by Plaintiff-Respondent for Dismissal of the Appeal for Failure to File the Transcript of the Record. Oral Motion by Defendant-Appellant at the Hearing to Dismiss the Case on the Ground that the Mandamus Would Serve No Practical Purpose. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Appeal — TRANSCeipt op Record. — Although there is no provision fixing the time within which a transcript of the record should be filed in this court when there is no statement of the case or bill of exceptions, it should be filed within the period of thirty days proscribed by rule 40.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Attorneys. — Examination for ’Admission to Bar. — Section 3 of the Act to regulate the practice .of law in Porto Rico, of March 8, 1906, as amended by Act No. 51 of March 9, 1911, provides that only those who have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in each course shall be passed, therefore the fact that a candidate obtained an average of 75 per cent in some of the subjects will not exempt him from another examination thereon.</p>

<p>Petition for a- "Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Agnadilla in an Action for Acknowledgment of Natural Children.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record of Title — House Built on Own Land. — -A building constructed by a person on Ms own land belongs to the owner of the land, and, on the principle that the accessory follows the principal, no special record of the building is necessary.</p> <p>Id. — House Built on Land of Another. — When a building is constructed on the land of another person, both the land and the building are principal things for the purposes of the Mortgage Law, and must be recorded in favor of each owner.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Acquiescence of Owner of Land. — The fact that the owner of the land agrees to the construction of the building does not make it an accessory thing or destroy the provisions of article 20 of the Mortgage Law which require a prior record of the title of the grantor in order that it may be recorded in the name of his grantee.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court' of Guayama in a Prosecution for an Offense Against the Election Law (Violation of Section 162 of' the Penal Code).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Summons — Notice to Dependant — Default.—Although process is usually required to apprise the defendant of the result consequent upon his default, substantial compliance with the statutory requirement is sufficient, this proposition being sustained by the overwhelming weight of authority in every jurisdiction where there are provisions similar to those of section 142 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Unlawful Detainer — Notice to Defendant — Default.—The summons in this case, with which a copy of the complaint was served, cautioned the ■defendant that in case he should fail to appear “the case will proceed throughout its course without further notice or hearing to proper judgment,” ■and it having been alleged that under section 5 of the Unlawful Detainer Act the summons should caution the defendant that in ease of his failure to ■appear “judgment of unlawful detainer will he taken against him without further summons or hearing,” Held: That the said summons substantially, •and therefore sufficiently, complies with the requirements of the law as to the notice contained therein and that the technical defect complained of affects no substantial right of the defendant.</p> <p>Construction of Law — Unlawful Detainer. — Section 5 of the Unlawful De-tainer Act, referring to the notice to defendant, should be construed liberally and in connection with the other provisions of the said act.</p> <p>Summons- — Service—Public Interest — Private Act. — The act of a person in serving a summons upon the defendant is an act of public interest, inasmuch as it is a necessary step in the proceedings of a suit at law going to the regularity and validity of the proceedings, therefore it cannot be regarded as an act “of a mere private nature'' within the meaning of section í of the Act relating to affidavits, etc., approved March 12, 1908.</p> <p>Id. — Service—Beturn—Affidavit.—Under section 2 of the Act of March 12, 1903, as amended by the Act of 1910 and the Act relating to affidavits of March 12, 1908, municipal judges are empowered to administer oaths to the Teturn of service of process.</p>

<p>Motion by Appellant- for Extension of Time in which to File a Record of Appeal in the Supreme Court.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the decision.</p>

<p>Appeal — Due Diligence. — The mere lapse of the ninety days fixed by rule 59 of this court is not of itself sufficient for dismissal of an appeal, but it must be proved by other special circumstances that the appeal has not been prosecuted with due diligence.</p> <p>Statement of Case — Amendments-—-Negligence or Abandonment. — The failure of the appellant to include the amendments ordered by the court in the statement of the case does not of itself constitute negligence or abandonment when the court has not fixed a time within which it should be done.</p> <p>Id. — -Amendments.—Good practice requires that when the court orders amendments to be made to the statement of the case it should fix a time therefor, either of its own initiative or on motion of the respondent, and when said amendments are not made within the specified period, the presumption of negligence arises.</p>

<p>Conveyance — Succession—Deed oe Ratification. — By private document exe-' euted during his wedlock with Mieaela Rivera y Ríos Juan Dionisio Itu-rrino sold to Víctor Martínez y Martínez a piece of land with several houses thereon belonging to the conjugal partnership. The spouses Iturrino-Rivera died and were succeeded by Camila Teresa de Jesús Iturrino, heiress of both, and Blanca Teresa Arias y Rivera, heiress of Mieaela Rivera y Rios only as the offspring of her first marriage. Víctor Martínez y • Martinez died and was succeeded by his heir, Víctor Primo Martínez y González. The land and houses in question being community property, it devolved upon Camila Teresa de Jesús Iturrino and Blanca Teresa Arias y Rivera, as the persons composing the successions of Dionisio Iturrino and of Mieaela Rivera y Rios, to execute the deed of ratification of sale of the said property to Yíetor Primo Martínez y González, for if only one of them were a party to the deed, both successions would not be fully represented.</p> <p>Id. — Deed of Batification — Becord of Title. — In view of the foregoing doctrine, a registrar is justified at law in refusing to admit to record a deed of ratification of sale not executed by all of the parties having an interest in the property sold.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Authorization of Court — Minors.—The orders of a district court authorizing first the mother and then the tutor of one of the heirs to execute the deed of ratification in the name of the heir can have no other legal effect than that shown on their face, i. e., to give to the minor heir the legal capacity to execute the deed in so far as it concerns her interest, without prejudice to rights which any other interested person may have.</p> <p>on reconsideration.</p> <p>Pleading — New Questions.' — Questions of law already decided in the negative cannot be substituted by other new questions in motions for reconsideration for the purpose of obtaining a favorable result, for this would mean interminable controversies.</p>

<p>Statement of Case — Bill oj? Exceptions — Secretary ®e Court. — Act No. 70 <u 1911, amending section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, clearly makes it the duty of the secretary of the court in which the statement of the case or bill of exceptions has been filed to Submit 'the same to the trial judge on the same , day or the day following without waiting for any, action by the parties, in order that he may set a day for the appearance of the parties-for the purpose of considering the approval of the statement or bill.</p> <p>Appeal — Dismissal op Appeal. — The mere expiration of the ninety days feed by rule 59 for filing the record is not sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the appeal, but it must be shown also that the appeal is frivolous or has not been prosecuted with due diligence.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in Certiorari Procéedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Complaint—Judgment—Jurisdiction.—The writ of certiorari is not the proper proceeding for determining whether a complaint is sufficient to support a judgment for the plaintiff and for setting aside said judgment on the ground that it is not, unless a question of jurisdiction should be involved.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal.—The -writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy which cannot be availed of when the error ■ can be corrected by appeal, unless the circumstances should be such that to follow the ordinary remedy would result in a complete or partial failure of justice.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Complaint.—The sufficiency or insufficiency of the eomplaint to support a judgment for the plaintiff is a question reviewable by appeal and not by certiorari.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a Prosecution for an Electoral Offense.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Courts — Judges.—The one common and essential feature in all courts is a judge or judges — so essential; indeed, that they are even called the court as distinguished from the accessory and subordinate officers.</p> <p>Id. — Ministerial Officers. — Secretaries and marshals are ministerial officers and are in nowise necessary to the existence of a court.</p> <p>Id.' — Id.—Absence of Ministerial Officers During Trial. — The mere absence of the secretary and marshal does not invalidate the proceedings had at a trial, especially when, as in the ease at bar, the defendant had his day in court and has failed to show that he was deprived of any substantial right or in anywise prejudiced therein by reason of such absence or that he objected or called the attention of the trial court to the matter.</p>

<p>Dismissal oe Prosecution — Trial—Excuse for Delay. — The 120 days within which criminal actions must he brought to trial should be counted from the date on which the information is filed, but time taken up in interposing dilatory motions and disposing of the same is a good excuse for delay in bringing the case to trial and for not dismissing the prosecution.</p> <p>Evidence — Affidavit—Motion—Counter-Affidavit.—An affidavit regarding matters included in records of proceedings may be admitted in support of a motion, because it does not deprive the adverse party of his right to file counter-affidavits in rebuttal.</p> <p>Conspiracy — Merger.—The doctrine that an information charging conspiracy to commit a felony and at the same time the commission of the felony charges only the felony, because the lesser offense of conspiracy is merged in the greater offense,' is not followed by the great majority of courts or by commentators, and even some of the courts have rejected it.</p> <p>Id. — Falsification of Evidence — Merger.—The conspiracy to commit a crime, defined in section 62 of the Penal Code, is not merged in the felony of falsifying evidence, defined and penalized by section 128 of the same code, by the fact that the object of the conspiracy was realized, because section 62 refers only to the act of conspiracy regardless of whether the object of the conspiracy is carried out or not. Acts of conspiracy and those of the commission of the crime which is the object of the conspiracy are distinct acts.</p> <p>Houbt — Decision in Conformity with Law — Erroneous Grounds' — Appeal.—■ A statement by tile court that it has some doubt as to the decision it is rendering is not ground for its reversal, nor does it matter whether the grounds on which it is based are well taken or not provided its decision is really in conformity with the law. What is considered on appeal is whether or not the decision conforms to law and not whether the grounds on whieh it is based are well taken or not, the provision of law that when there is any doubt it should be decided in favor of the accused not being applicable in such cases.</p> <p>'Conspiracy' — Misdemeanor—Trial by Jury.- — -When the crime charged in the information is the misdemeanor of conspiracy there can be no trial by jury, for our laws do not confer that right in cases of misdemeanor.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Testimony of Co-conspirator — Discretion of Court. — While it is true that independent evidence of the commission of the offense of conspiracy is generally required before a conspirator is allowed to testify to acts and conversations of his co-eonspirators, this rule is not so absolute that the court may not change it, therefore, in the exercise of its discretional power relative to the order in which the evidence may be admitted, the court may admit the testimony of a co-conspirator under the condition that the conspiracy be proven independently, and with greater reason when the trial is not by jury.</p> <p>Evidence — Trial Without Jury. — When the trial is by the court without a jury greater liberality is permissible in the admission of evidence, because the court can free itself more easily than jurors from the impression caused by improper evidence.</p> <p>Evidence — Witnesses—Documents.—Witnesses may refresh their memory from documents.</p> <p>.Id. — Corpus Delicti — Statements of Co-Conspirators^ — The testimony .of a witness regarding conversations or statements by co-conspirators is direct evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for conspiracy if such conversations and statements are pertinent to the question under consideration.</p> <p>Id. — Documents.—The fact that a notarial deed is not presented to the court in the manner prescribed by the Notarial Act does not affect its validity or authenticity and is no ground for objection to its admission in evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Conspiracy—Statements of Conspirator After Accomplishment of Object. — Statements made by a co-conspirator after the accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy prejudice only the person -making them and not the others, therefore they are admissible as to him.</p> <p>Investigation by Eiscal — Contradictory Statements. — Testimony cannot be demanded of a fiscal in order to look for contradictions of or variances with the testimony given at the trial, and for the purpose of showing to a witness his prior deposition in any case it is necessary first to call his attention to the discrepancies, in. case they exist, so that he may explain them before any documentary evidence containing the same is introduced.'</p> <p>Conspiracy — Evidence—Accomplice—Corroboration.—After analyzing the evidence it was held that, taking the evidence as a whole, the appellants participated directly in the conspiracy and that the testimony of the accomplice was sufficiently corroborated.</p> <p>Id. — Accomplice—Corroboration.—The testimony of accomplices should be corroborated, in conformity with the provisions of section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and when, it is alleged that the testimony of the accomplice has not been corroborated and the court holds to the contrary, it should explain the manner in which it has been corroborated.</p> <p>Id. — EvideNce—Circumstantial Evidence. — A conspiracy such as that charged against the defendants must be proved almost always by circumstantial evidence, for the nature of the offense makes it impossible generally to show by direct proof the plottings and agreements of the conspirators.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.'—In order to determine whether all of the defendants are principals in the conspiracy, the part taken by each in' the accomplishment of the same should be considered in the light of all the acts performed by each, and if it is proven that by their acts the defendants pursue the same object by the same means, one performing one part and another another part, as in the ease at bar, the crime is proven.</p> <p>Evidence — Weight of Evidence — Passion, Prejudice or Manifest Error.— In cases of contradictory evidence the court will not interfere with the weighing of the evidence by the trial court unless it is shown that it was influenced by passion, prejudice or committed manifest error.</p> <p>Information — Duplicity.—When an information charges different offenses or ways of committing them, a sufficient allegation and proof of any of them justify a conviction.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, Refusing to Grant a New Trial in an Action of Filiation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement of Case. — Failure to file a statement of the ease in an appeal from a judgment is not of itself ground for dismissal of the appeal.'</p> <p>Id. — New Trial — Affidavit.—Failure to file in this qourt the affidavits which should accompany a motion for a new trial is not sufficient to justify dismissal of the appeal.</p> <p>Id. — New Trial — Transcript of Record. — A mere copy of the motion for a new trial is not a sufficient transcript of the record.</p> <p>Id. — Brief.—The failure of the appellant to file'a brief is ground for dismissal of the appeal.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Jrian, Section 2, in an Action for Divorce and Liquidation of Conjugal Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Solidary Debtors — Promissory Note — Intention—Contract.—In this case the promissory note reads: “We promise to pay, jointly and severally, to Antonio María Sorba, or his order, etc., ’ ’ and is signed by Solá & Son and Celes-tino Solá. Held: That the intention of the contracting parties, -which must serve as a guide in fixing the extent of the stipulations agreed upon, is indicated plainly by the wording of the note, a mere perusal of which shows that although the evidence was to the effect that the debt was contracted for the exclusive benefit of one of the subscribers, Solá & Son, Solá & Son and Celes-tino Solá acknowledged themselves to be principal debtors of Antonio Maria Sorba and bound themselves in solidum.</p> <p>Id. — Private Contract — Public Instrument. — When the genuineness of a private contract is not impeached it must be admitted, pursuant to section 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and,.being genuine, it has the same value as a public instrument between the parties to it and their successors in interest, according to section 1193 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Ip. — Novation—Extension of Time.- — An extension of time granted by the creditor to one of the solidary debtors cannot be regarded as a novation extinguishing the obligation when there is no change of the subject-matter or principal conditions of the obligation and the debtors are not substituted by another.</p> <p>Id. — Action.—Section 1111 of the Civil Code provides that a creditor may sue any one of the solidary debtors or all of them together.</p> <p>Id. — Demurrer—Indorsement—Cause of Action — Commission to Collect— Assignment. — It having been pleaded that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action on the ground that the undated indorsement can be considered only as a commission to collect, the plaintiffs not being the owners of the note but merely assignees subrogated to the assignor, it was held that whether the indorsement be considered as a commission to collect or, as an assignment, a cause of action existed.</p> <p>Default — Demand.—Section 1067 of the Civil Code provides that a demand by the creditor is not necessary to create default when the ■ obligation provides for it expressly.</p> <p>Id. — Commercial Loan — Interest.—Article 316 of the Code of Commerce is applicable to commercial loans and provides that debtors who do not pay their debts when due must pay the interest agreed on, or the lawful interest if there is no agreement, from the day following the date of maturity.</p> <p>Costs — Disbursements—Attorney Fees — Agreement.-—-When there- is an agreement between the parties the matter of costs, disbursements and attorney fees should be governed by the ágreement and not by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, for section 1058 of the Civil Code provides that obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled, in accordance with their stipulations.</p>

<p>Appearance — Solicitor—Attorney.—The solicitor referred to in subdivision 1 of article 169 of the Mortgage Law Begulations no longer exists in Porto Bieo, therefore its provisions cannot be complied with strictly; and pursuant to section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is sufficient if appearance be made by an attorney legally empowered to practise Ms profession.</p> <p>Attorney — -Officer -of Court.- — -According to the statutory provisions governing the matter, an attorney duly authorized to practise his profession is considered an officer of the court.</p> <p>Foreclosure Proceeding — Maturity of Instalment — Maturity -of Debt — Bbc-okd of Stipulation. — -Article 130 of the Mortgage Law is applicable to cases in which the whole debt is understood to be due when one instalment becomes due, and such stipulation should be made expressly and recorded in the registry; but it does not bar the collection of the instalment due by summary proceedings immediately after its maturity, as provided for in article 168 of the Mortgage Law Begulations.</p> <p>Id.- — Unquestionableness of Debt. — In order that execution may issue in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Mortgage Law, the unquestionableness of the debt must be shown in an authentic and specific manner.</p> <p>Mortgage — Debt—Doan—Puttjkg Obligation. — Although mortgages are usually-created to secure the payment of previously existing debts or loans of money, this does not imply that they cannot be created to secure debts due at a future date.</p>

<p>Collection of What is Not Due — -Quasi-Contract.—The matter of the payment of what fs not due, as it was called formerly, or the collection of what ' is not due, as it is now termed, gives rise to the quasi-contract which the Komaus knew by the name of solutio indebiti and which has been the object of repeated legislation and jurisprudence.</p> <p>Id. — Quasi-Contract—Eestitution.—According to the law in force and to jurisprudence, in order to constitute the quasi-obligation to pay back money unduly collected, two requisites must be shown: (1) That it was unduly paid and (2) that the payment was made through error or mistake and not through mere liberality or any other sufficient cause.</p> <p>Id.- — Id.—Error op Fact — Error op Law. — The error giving rise to the quasi-contract must be of fact and not merely of law.</p> <p>Id. — Knowledge op Pacts — Eestitution.—When payment of what is not due 'is made with a knowledge of the facts the restitution of the amount paid cannot be claimed.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Canceled Mortgage Credit. — A deed of sale of a mortgage credit cannot be admitted to record when, said credit is shown by the records of the same registry to have been canceled.</p> <p>Administrative Appeal — Brief.—In the ease at bar the appellant did not file a brief in support of the appeal, and it is his duty to present his argument on clear and definite grounds, this court not being required to act on mere conjecture which may be deduced more or less logically from an examination of the papers filed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Deed of Assignment of a Mortgage Credit.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Injunction Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Evidence — Discretion op Court. — Under rule 24 of the district courts permitting a party to present additional evidence after he has announced his case closed is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.</p> <p>Id.' — Nonsuit—Complaint.—The insufficiency of the complaint cannot be directly attacked by. a motion for nonsuit, which is directed only to the evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The weight of the evidence is not a matter to be raised by a motion for nonsuit. The question to be considered in such a ease is whether there is any evidence before the court.</p> <p>Id.' — Motion.—The form of a motion made for leave to introduce additional evidence is immaterial so long as it is clear that the court is permitting the presentation of additional evidence at the request of one of the parties.</p> <p>Id. — Reason or Excuse — Discretion op Court. — The question of whether a cause or excuse should be shown for previous failure to present the proof, as well as the condition to be imposed, are all-merged in the discretion of the court whose action will not be disturbed in the absence of a, clear showing of abuse of such discretion.</p> <p>Ii>. — Nonsuit—Waiver.—-Motions for nonsuit are addressed to the consideration of the court and'when a defendant wishes to demur to the plaintiff’s evidence he should stand on this point and not introduce his evidence, for this will be understood as an abandonment of said motion and the same will not be reviewable on appeal, if the evidence of the defendant supplies the defects which the evidence of the plaintiff may have contained.</p> <p>Id. — Ownership—Presumption.-—-Where ownership is once proved it is presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.</p> <p>Id. — Impeachment ot Testimony. — When a party attempts to impeach the testimony of a witness his objection must be specific.</p> <p>Negligence — Bailroad—Public Crossing. — Bailroad companies must maintain chains and gates, or an equivalent, at public crossings. This lack of adequate protection by chains, gates, or otherwise,' was a sufficient proof of negligence.</p> <p>Judicial Notice — Highway—-Public Boad-. — The word “carretera,” like the English word “highway,” means a public road, and in the case at bar the court had a right to take judicial notice that the road between Ponce and Santa Isabel is a public road.</p> <p>Negligence — Bailroad.—Even conceding that the order in which the ears proceeded and their failure to carry lights is not negligence per se, the court is justified in finding a ease of negligence when there are neither lights nor regular order, especially if the proof shows that the train was run at irregular intervals and neither rang a bell nor blew a whistle.</p> <p>Id. —• Contributory Negligence — Driver — Passenger. —■ The negligence of the driver of a carriage is not generally attributable to a passenger, unless the passenger has control over the driver or some other contributory element exists.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Evidence—Corroboration—Accomplice.—Whether the testimony of an accomplice is sufficiently corroborated is a question to be decided at the trial and not in habeas corpus proceedings, in which no person shonldl he‘liberated unless there is absolutely no evidence to justify his imprisonment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action to Recover Taxes Paid Under Protest.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Violation of the Election Law.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Motion by the Appellant Submitting this Case on the Brief Piled in Case No. 1295, which is of a Similar Character. Motion by the Respondent to Dismiss the Appeal for Failure to Pile a Brief. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Judicial Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Partnership — Civil Partnership — Commercial Partnership. — Both in civil and commercial partnerships each partner is required to contribute to the partnership, or to its capital, the amount agreed upon.</p> <p>Id. — Action by Partner — Capacity op Plaintiff — Sufficiency op Complaint.— Even when in an action to compel a special partner to contribute the amount of capital agreed upon the plaintiff does not appear in the name of the industrial and agricultural partnership of which he is the managing partner, if the allegation of the complaint is that he is the managing partner and the prayer of the complaint, is that the defendant be adjudged to pay the said contribution in order to start the business of the firm, the action brought by the plaintiff is in the interest of the firm and not in his own private interest.</p> <p>Appeal. — Questions which have not been raised in the lower court cannot be considered on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Error.—It is a well-established rule that courts of appeal will examine only the errors pointed out by the appellant and that the errors alleged by the respondent to have been committed by the lower court will not be taken into consideration.</p> <p>Id. — Statement op Case — Judgment Roll — Superfluous Matter. — The complaint and answer need not be transcribed literally in the statement of the case, pursuant to section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 70 of March 9, 1911, for they form part of the judgment roll and before approving the statement the judge should strike out all superfluous matter and see that the act is strictly complied with.</p> <p>Id. — Transcript op Record — Judgment Roll — Summary op Case. — Although the summary of the case which the judge is required to make in accordance with section 227 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1911, does not necessarily form a part of the judgment roll, it is good practice to include it in the transcript of the record for the better guidance of the court.</p>

<p>Attachment — Jurisdiction of Marshal — Property in Another District. — A marshal has no right to attach property outside of his own district under a writ of attachment to secure the effectiveness of the judgment, for his authority is limited by the law of his appointment to the judicial district for which he is appointed.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of Marshal. — There being a marshal for each judicial district, there is no conflict as to the jurisdiction of each.</p> <p>Id. — The action of a marshal in executing a writ of attachment outside of his own district is void.</p> <p>Id. — Waiver.—-Execution of process which is void because made by a marshal without jurisdiction can be attacked at any time and the mere silence or inaction of the defendant does not waive his rights.</p> <p>Id. — Record of Attachment. — Although the writ of attachment is valid, if the execution of it by the marshal is void because he acted without jurisdiction, the recording of the attachment in the registry of property should have been denied it being void also.</p>

<p>Possessory Title Proceedings — Record of Title — Conflicting Records — Cautionary Notice. — In accordance with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law, if the registrar, before recording an estate or interest’ by virtue of possessory title proceedings, should find any uncanceled record of acquisition of ownership or possession which is in contradiction with the fact of the possession as established by the judicial proceedings, he shall suspend the record, enter a cautionary notice, if the person interested should request it, and forward a copy of the .record to the judge who may have approved the proceedings so that he may affirm or revoke the order of approval, informing the registrar thereof for his proper action.</p> <p>Id. — Administrative Appeal — Construction op Law. — Article 393 of the Mortgage Law is not in conflict with sections 1 and 2 of the Act of March 1, 1902, providing for appeals from the decisions of registrars.</p> <p>Id.' — Conflicting Eeoords. — Notice.—Although the registrar does not forward a copy of the conflicting record to the judge who approved the proceedings, if he informs the interested party of his decision by returning the papers together with said copy, such omission does not prejudice said party, for he or his attorney can apply to the judge with the papers for due compliance with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law.</p>

<p>Summons — Service—Return—Appearance.—When a literal copy of the return with its date as appearing on the original is not endorsed on the back of the copy of the summons by the officer serving it, the service is defective, but if the defendant appear, answer and introduce evidence although he had pleaded said defect, he submits to the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>Unlawful Detainer — Motion to Dismiss — Notice.—A motion in writing for dismissal of a complaint in an action of unlawful detainer on the ground that more than ten days had elapsed between the date of the first appearance and the date set for the trial, may be made in open court at the beginning of the trial without the necessity of first serving notice in writing on the adverse party.</p> <p>Id. — Extension of Time — Discretion of Court. — Although it is true that section 6 of the Unlawful Detainer Act provides that the proofs submitted at the first hearing "shall be heard within a period which in no ease shall exceed ten days,” this period is not absolute and may be extended by the court under the authority inherent in its judicial powers.</p> <p>Id. — Discretion of Court. — Where the discretion, if exercised, would necessarily have been unfavorable, the appellate court will not reverse the judgment appealed from'.</p> <p>Id. — Tenancy at Sufferance — Complaint.—The only essential allegations of a complaint in unlawful detainer at sufferance are that the plaintiff is the owner or usufructuary of certain property or entitled to its possession, or is the successor in interest of such persons, and that the defendant withholds its material possession or holds the same at sufferance without paying any rental or other consideration therefor.</p> <p>Id. — Tenancy at Sufferance — Trial of Title to Real Estate. — The aetion of unlawful detainer is a special proceeding of a summary character the purpose of which is to recover the material possession of real property by evicting therefrom the person who may detain or hold the same at sufferance without paying any rental or other consideration, and it is not the proper action by which to try title to real property.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Acknowledgment—Civil Register — Approval op Court.— The acknowledgment of natural children made in a will executed before a notary public may be entered in the civil register although the testator may not have died and it does not require the approval of the court, which is necessary when the acknowledgment is made in any public instrument except a will or a certificate of birth.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment—Oivil Begister. — Not only the acknowledged minors hut also the father or the mother who acknowledges them are parties interested, in the entry of the marginal note of acknowledgment in the civil register, according to subdivision 1 of section 19 of the Act establishing a Oivil Begister.</p>

<p>Conflict of Laws — Bules of Decision. — Insular courts, in so far as they are at liberty to choose between rules for the prevention of a conflict of laws, should consider the substantial rights, interests, and convenience of the people in the light of the political status and future commercial relations of the Island, rather than the relative merits of conflicting theories; and, in so far as consistent with our special system of local laws, should seek to ■ align their rules of decision with those of the American courts, State and Federal. (</p> <p>Lex Bei Sitzb — Capacity of Parties — Civil Code — Beal and Personal Statutes — Effect of Foreign Laws. — The adoption and application of the rule of lex rei sites, as extended by the American courts to include and govern the capacity of the parties, does no violence either to the letter or to the spirit of our Civil Code or to any fundamental principle underlying the same, and establishes once for all a single, fixed, comprehensive and rational rule conducive to the avoidance of inconsistencies and confusion in our decisions as to real and personal statutes and the effect of foreign laws.</p> <p>Id. — Cancellation of Mortgage — Tutor—Authorization of Court — Construction of Law. — Construing sections 9, 10, 11, 282 and 284 of the’Revised Civil Code, each in relation to the .other and all in the light of the changes and amendments made by the Legislature in 1902 and thereafter, as well as the clear intention and purpose thereof, a. Spanish tutor of Spanish minors, .all residing in Spain, the tutor having been appointed by the family council pursuant to the Spanish Civil Code, or the agent or attorney in fact named for the purpose by the said tutor, must obtain' previously the authorization of the insular district court- of the district where the property is situated in order to execute a cancellation of a mortgage on real property situated in Porto Bieo.</p>

<p>False Representation — Complaint.—The complaint in this cáse charged that by false and fraudulent pretences the defendant obtained from the prosecuting witness the sum of $35 and appropriated the same to his own use. Held: That the complaint was sufficient according to section 470 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Complaint. — Generally; a complaint is sufficient when it substantially follows the language of the statute.</p> <p>Id. — InfokImation.—The same strictness is not required in complaints as in infor-mations drawn up by fiscals, it being sufficient if it inform the defendant of the charge made against him.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property Denying Admission to Becord of a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>SEDUCTION — Evidence.—A certain letter from tlie accused to the victim having been admitted in evidence,., the latter testified that, following an arrangement between them,. she had received and answered the said letter and that, although the accused did ■ not know how to write, she knew the letter was from him, and-this testimony was "corroborated by that of a witness who testified that he had written the said, letter at the request of the accused.. Held: That the court did not commit error in admitting the letter in evidence.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in a Prosecution for Murder in the First Degree.'</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Civil Rights — Constitutional. Law. — The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States creates no new privileges or immunities of citizens, no new right of life, liberty, or property, no new process of law. It only guarantees rights pre-existing, or those which- law, national or state, may after its date confer.'</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The Fourteenth Amendment does not affect the rights of citizens as among- themselves,- but is exclusively applicable -to state action.</p> <p>Id. — Restaurant—Ownership.—The owners of a café-restaurant have the ■ right to regulate its management in the manner they deem most suitable and beneficial to their interests without further limitations than those established by law, for that right is givep. them by section 354 of the Civil Code defining ownership.</p> <p>Id. — Colored Persons. — Neither the Act- defining the rights of the people, approved February 27, 1902, nor the Revised Civil Code, contains any abridgment, limitation, or restriction of the right of the owner of a café-restaurant to admit 6r refuse to admit therein persons of the colored- race.</p> <p>Id. — Judicial Power — Legislative Power. — The judiciary cannot supply the action of the legislative power by imposing conditions upon which the Legislature has not seen fit to legislate.</p> <p>Id. — Obligations—Fault or Negligence — -Indemnity.—-Obligations arising from fault or negligence are based upon an unquestionable principle of justice, according to which all injuries, damages, or impairment of the rights of a person, whether by act or omission, create' a legal relation from which arises a right on the part of the person injured to be indemnified and the corresponding liability on the part of the wrongdoer; and as neither the Civil Code nor any other law in force in Porto Rico recognizes the right of a colored person to go into a café-restaurant and be served, no right has been impaired, and therefore there is no ground upon which to base the responsibility arising from fault or ' negligence referred to in section 1803 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Natural Rights.- — The right to life, liberty, or property is natural, inher: ent, and fundamental, not requiring investiture by statute.</p> <p>Id. — Equality oe Races. — The right of equality of races generally depends upon the ruling social conditions and the will of the citizens, and until that right is imperatively declared by law there is complete liberty of action, both in soeial and business relations.</p>

<p>Appeal — Administrative Appeal — Record of Title — Acquiescence—Jurisdiction. — When the grounds of the decision appealed from are the consequence of what appeared in the registry in a previous record.whieh was acquiesced in, this court is without jurisdiction in an administrative appeal to determine whether the right of the purchaser, and consequently that of the vendor, should have been recorded without limitation.</p>

<p>Attobney Pees — Judgment by Default. — In order that an agreement to pay attorney fees may be enforced by a default judgment entered by the secretary, the amount claimed must be fixed by an agreement between the parties, and when this is not done the court must determine the amount of the fees.</p> <p>Id. — The obligation to pay fees when the amount has not been determined is enforceable only as to such fees as are reasonable.</p> <p>Id. — Complaint—Summons-—Discretion op Court. — The fact that the amount of attorney fees is arbitrarily fixed in the eomplaint by the plaintiff and that the said amount appears in the summons is not sufficient to convert an unliquidated amount into a liquidated amount, or to deprive the court of its discretional power to determine what should be paid as a reasonable attorney’s fee.</p>

<p>Record of Title — CONSOLIDATION of Properties — Properties of I-Ieirs in Common Pro Indiviso- — Record in Name of Predecessors. — In accordance with subdivision 4 of article 61 of the Mortgage Law Regulations, properties acquired by heirs in common and pro indiviso may be consolidated and recorded under one number in the registry of property even when such properties are ' recorded in the names of different predecessors in interest, but the consoli--dated property cannot be recorded without first recording the common and undivided joint-ownership in the names of the heirs.</p> <p>Id. — Application for Record. — When the instrument contains different aets and contracts subject to record, the applicant must state t,o the registrar what entries and records he desires him to make in -the registry, presenting his petition in clear and specific terms.</p> <p>Id. — Duty of Registrar. — When the registrar understands that he is asked to record all the operations set out in the instrument presented which are capable of being recorded, he should either record or refuse to record each of such operations, and in ease of refusal, state clearly and specifically at the foot of the instrument the legal grounds for his refusal, as provided by section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1902, providing for appeals from decisions of registrars.</p> <p>Id. — Cautionary Notice. — Section. 7 of the Act of March 1, 1902, makes it the duty of the registrar to enter a cautionary notice to he effective for the legal period of 120 days from the date thereof, whenever he refuses to make any record, entry, or cancellation.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Deny-ang Admission to Record in Part of a Deed of Conveyance of Joint Interest.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Juey — Challenges—Death Penalty — Life Imprisonment. — While it is true that section 223 o'f the Code of Criminal Procedure allows persons charged with crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment fifteen peremptory challenges, that right exists only when the penalty for .the crime is fixed at death or life imprisonment.</p> <p>Id. — Bape—Challenges.—When, as in the ease of rape, the law has not fixed the penalty for the cjrime at death or life imprisonment, but this latter penalty may be imposed by the court, according to section 33 of the Penal Code, for the reason that the minimum penalty is imprisonment for five years in the penitentiary and no maximum penalty is fixed, the provision of section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allowing the defense fifteen challenges is not applicable.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence—Certificate of Birth — Ybrdict of Jury. — When the court, with the consent of the parties, submits a certificate of birth to the jury , for it to decide as a question of fact whether the said certificate referred to the victim in a ease of rape and the jury finds the defendant guilty of the crime charged, there is no doubt that that question was decided against the accused.</p> <p>Bape — Evidence—Screams of Victim. — The mere fact that a girl screams while the defendant is deflowering her is not sufficient to prove that he used greater force or violence in doing so than is natural to coition between a man and a young girl.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Instructions to Jury — Age of Victim. — In the present case » the court gave the following instruction to the jury: “But the court instructs you that the principal statement of Dr. Veve tends to show that the victim is about thirteen years of age.” Seld: That although that instruction was not exact inasmuch as it could not be sustained by the language used by Dr. Veve in his testimony, the defendant was not prejudiced thereby, because if the jury considered that the certificate of birth introduced in evidence referred to the victim, it might well have disregarded the testimony of Dr. Yeve and arrived at the conclusion that the girl was under fourteen years of age, finding therefore a verdict of guilty.</p> <p>Id. — Peneickation.—Upon an examination of the evidence in this ease it was held that the jury was justified in concluding that penetration had been proven.</p> <p>New Tbial — IneormatioN.—"When the information contains different counts as to the ways in which the crime was committed, the failure to prove one of them is no reason for granting a new trial.</p>

<p>Services — Specific Price — Pleading.—In an action to recover for services other than professional services it is sufficient to allege the specific price agreed on or that such price is sanctioned by the custom and1 frequent use of the place in which the services were rendered. It is not necessary to allege the "reasonable value" of said services in order to constitute a cauSe of action.</p> <p>Id.- — Professional Services — Construction of Law. — The amendment to section 1486 of the Civil Code made by the Act of February 24, 1906, operates no change in the law save in eases involving professional services, therefore the jurisprudence previously laid down on that question is still in force.</p> <p>'Id. — Analysis of Evidence. — After a careful analysis of all the evidence as it appears in the record, it was held that not only does it disclose no satisfactory reason for disturbing the finding of the trial judge but creates the impression that substantial justice has been done.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Ponce in an Action for Nullity of Foreclosure Proceedings, etc.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Agnadilla in an Action for Malicious Prosecution.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for the Violation of Section 288 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Conspiracy.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for False Representation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from' the District Court of Guay ama in an Action of Debt and Intervention.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Loan — Evidence of Contract — Construction of Law. — In accordance with sections 1245 and 1247 of the Civil Code, construed in harmony with sections 1221 and 1225, even when the amount of the loan exceeds $300 evidence in writing is not necessary to prove the validity of the contract.</p> <p>In. — Contract—Effectiveness 'Of Contract — Construction of Law. — The effectiveness of contracts between the contracting parties depends exclusively upon their validity by virtue of the existence of the essential conditions and not upon the extrinsie formalities required by law for other different purposes, therefore the parties may compel each other reciprocally to comply with the obligations contracted. Section 1246 of the Revised Civil Code sustains that rule of law.</p> <p>Id. — Effectiveness of Contract. — A contract of loan exists and is perfected from the moment when both parties agree thereto, therefore the debtor assumes at the time he receives the money the obligation to return it within the time agreed upon.</p> <p>Contract — Public Instrument — Private Contract — Verbal ‘ Contract. — There is a manifest distinction between the necessity for a public instrument and for a private document, and it is that while the former may be necessary even after the verbal contract has been established by a judgment, the latter has hardly any objeet after such judgment, which presupposes greater authenticity and legal effect.</p> <p>Merchant — Commercial Employee. — When the plaintiff does not allege in his •complaint that the defendant is a merchant and the latter does not allege it in his answer, the fact that the evidence may be sufficient to prove that the defendant was a commercial employee is not proof that he is one who regularly devotes himself to trade as defined by article 1 of the Code of Commerce.</p> <p>Id. — Commercial Loan. — When it is' not shown that the money lent was used in commercial transactions, although borrowed for tbe establishment of a mercantile business, and there is no evidence to show that it was so used, the loan cannot be considered as a. commercial loan under the provisions of article 311 of the Code of Commerce.</p> <p>Evidence — Discretion op Court. — A court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to. allow the plaintiff to be asked while testifying whether it was true that he had transacted the business which is the subjeet-matter of the action with another person who was a partner of the defendant, when the plaintiff had already testified categorically on direct examination that he had transacted the business with the defendant. Besides, in this case if it had been desired to prove that the plaintiff had made the transaction with another person who was a partner of the defendant, that person could have been called as a witness for the purpose of contradicting the testimony of the plaintiff and of freeing the defendant of liability to the latter.</p> <p>Id. — Testimony not Influencing Result. — In this ease a witness was asked the following question: “Do you know where the $162 came from?” Held: That the court committed no error in ordering the question to be stricken out, because the plaintiff himself, and not the witness, was the proper person to testify as to. where the money came from, and he had already done so; and because the answer which the witness might have given to the said question would have had no influence on the result of the ease.</p>

<p>Appeal- — Adverse Party — Notice oCb' Appeal — Default.—An adverse party in a suit, although adjudged in default, is entitled to notice of appeal, pursuant to section 296 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Adverse Party. — The term "adverse party” referred, to in section 296 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is similar to section 940 of the California Code, does not include all persons who have been parties to the suit in the court a quo, but only those who would be affected by a reversal or modification of the judgment appealed from.</p> <p>Id. — Filiation—Adterse 'Party. — The present action was brought against a succession to obtain a judgment declaring the plaintiff to be an acknowledged daughter with all the rights to which she is entitled as such. One of the defendants composing the succession did not answer the complaint and default was entered against her. Held: That the party in default was an adverse party in the action and would be affected by a judgment reversing the judgment of the lower court in the same manner as the other defendants.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement >oe Case — Adjustment op Conflict — Error -or Inadvertence. — When a conflict exists as to the ’contents of a statement of the ease filed in the appellate court, application should be made to the trial judge for its adjustment; for, although the statement of the ease has been filed in the appellate court, the judge who approved it is authorized .to cancel his certificate subjoined thereto if convinced that his action was erroneous or performed inadvertently.</p> <p>New Trial — Jurisdiction.—Section 220 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the court which tried the ease is the one which has jurisdiction to entertain the motion for a new trial although the judge before whom the said motion is made may not be the same judge who rendered the judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Law. — The effect of section 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to prescribe expressly that the judge of the trial court, whether the „judge who rendered the judgment or not, may hear the motion for a new trial at chambers or in open court, either in his own district or in any other district of the island.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Discretion op Court. — When the judge who overrules a motion for a new trial holds that the evidence alleged to have been discovered after the trial was not sufficient to change the conclusion reached by the trial judge after a careful study of all the attendant circumstances and it is not shown that in so holding he abused his discretionary power, his ruling should be sustained.</p> <p>Malicious Prosecution —t- Essential Elements. — In an action for malicious prosecution there are four essential elements which must be alleged and proven, to wit: (1) That the plaintiff has been prosecuted by the defendant; (2) that the prosecution terminated favorably to the plaintiff; (3) that it was instituted maliciously and without probable cause; and (4) that the plaintiff sustained daipages thereby.</p> <p>Id. — Damaces—Rights op Injured Party — Compensation por Injury. — In an action for malicious prosecution the party injured is entitled to an adequate compensation for all the elements of the injury suffered. Such damages include loss of time, peril to life and liberty, injury to fame, reputation, character and health, mental suffering, general impairment of social and mercantile standing, decrease in earning capacity and all losses sustained in- business. Such damages must be the direct, natural, and proximate result of the former action.</p> <p>Libel — Attorneys—Publication of Charge. — The publication of a complaint containing a written charge against the good reputation of an attorney is libel per se.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Embezzlement.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Possession — Presumption—Possessory Title. — When a person is in possession as owner the legal presumption is that he holds under a just title and that presumption can be destroyed in courts of justice only by a person who proves that he has a better title.</p> <p>Possessory Title — Action to Annul 'Title. — Only a person having a better title to a property can institute proceedings to annul the possessory title of a person holding the samo as owner.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Usufructuary—Cause of Action. — Admitting that it was alleged in the complaint with sufficient clearness that the municipality of Arecibo had! a better right to the ownership of the land than the hermitage, which had proved its possession as owner, and that the municipality, after having-granted the usufruct to the plaintiffs of various lots included in the said land, refused to exercise its right of ownership to which the usufruct of the plaintiffs was subordinate and for that reason was made a party defendant in this suit, even then, the plaintiffs have no cause of action for the annulment of the possessory title generally; and even supposing they had the right to seek the annulment of the said title in so far as the same might affect their interests,' as such interests have not been specifically set up in any way in the complaint it would! have to be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action to Rescind a Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ApplioatioN for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>Motion by Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court Denying- Writ of Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Judgment Dismissing Complaint — Notice of Appeal — Parties to Appeal. — A judgment which simply dismisses the complaint discharges all the defendants from liability, and in orden that the appellate court may reverse the judgment and hold that a cause of action exists, it is necessary that all the defendants be served with notice of the appeal, especially in the present case in which as the action against two of1 the defendants is subsidiary to that against the other defendant who was not notified of the appeal ■ and dependent upon the existence of a cause of aetion against the last named, it would have to be determined first whether he is under obligation to pay the amount claimed, for, if not, there would then be no cause of action against . any of the defendants.</p> <p>Td. — Dismissal of Appeal — Notice of Appeal. — Failure to eomply with -the requirement of section 296 of the Code of Civil Procedure to serve notice of appeal on a necessary party is ground for the dismissal of the appeal, in conformity with section 303 of the same code.</p>

<p>Appeal — Notice op Appeal — Adverse Party. — In accordance with, section 296 of the Code of' Civil Procedure, for the purposes of an appeal the term "adverse party" does not include all the persons who may have been parties to the suit in the court a quo but only those who would be affected by a reversal or modification of the judgment appealed from. Therefore the question in the case at bar is whether the decision of this court on appeal can affect the rights of the person who, having been a party to the suit or proceeding below, has not been made a party to the appeal by being served with notice thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Foreclosure Proceedings — Adverse Party — Deposit.—The defendant in foreclosure proceedings is not an adverse party in an appeal from a decision ordering that after a certain error in the calculation of interest has been corrected the amount deposited in payment by a seeond mortgagee be returned and another sale announced for the purpose of satisfying all the obligations claimed in the proceeding, inasmuch as the said mortgagor would not be injured in any way thereby but rather benefited, because if all the items claimed should be covered by the proceeds of the sale he would be . relieved of his' present personal obligation to respond with his other property for the amounts not covered by the amount deposited.</p> <p>Ministerial Oemcers — Marshals—-Erroneous Orders. — The ministerial officers of the courts should confine, their actions to strict compliance with the orders addressed to them without stopping to consider whether the grounds on which such orders are based are correct or erroneous, therefore in executing an order the marshal should not inquire into the reasons in order to deduce therefrom what the judge might have ordered if he had not been mistaken.</p> <p>Judicial Sale — Error in Notice -op Sale — Depositor.—The fact that the entire amount stated in the notice of a judicial sale is deposited does not entitle the depositor to be considered as subrogated to the rights of the foreclosing mortgagee after the discovery of the error contained in said notice, especially when the depositor, who was a seeond mortgagee in this case, had been served with the summons requiring the debtor to make payment and knew of the error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez from an Order Setting- Aside a Default and from a‘Judgment in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal' from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Regarding the Admission to Record of a Deed of Sale With Curable Defects.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for the Violation of Section 85 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Attorney Pees — Judgment, by Default. — In order that an agreement to pay-attorney iees may be enforced by a default judgment entered by the secretary, the amount claimed must be fixed in the agreement between the parties, and when this is not done the court must determine the amount.</p> <p>Id, — Id.—The obligation to pay attorney fees when the amount has not been determined is enforceable only as to such fees as are reasonable.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Judges and not secretaries of courts are empowered by law to fix a •reasonable amount to be paid as attorney fees in cases where1 such fees are allowed and their payment ordered.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action to Enforce a Contract and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action to Set Aside a Judgment and for an Injunction.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Agent — Partnership—Managing Partner — Principal and Agent. — The managing partner of a firm is the agent who has the administration or sale of the property of the same and, as such, is included direetly within the prohibition established by subdivision 2 of section 1362 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Corporation—Board of Directors. — The president of a corporation is not per se such an agent oí the corporation as to "be included within the prohibition of section 1362, subdivision 2, of the Civil Code, such agent being the board of directors elected by the stockholders.</p> <p>Corporation— Corporate Officers — Voidable Sale. — It is a principle of American law that a sale of the property of a corporation to the officers of the corporation is voidable at the option of the corporation, but there are exceptions to this rule, especially when the corporation is insolvent or the sale is public.</p> <p>Id. — Becord of Title — Invalidity of Document. — When it does not appear on the face of a document presented in the registry that it is invalid, the registrar is not. required to anticipate any possible action by the corporation for that reason.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale, in Part.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Deny- • ing Admission to Record of a Mqrtgage Deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action To Enforce a Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of ITumacao in an Action of Ejectment and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the Judge of the District Court of Aguadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Lease — Assignment of Bents — Personal Obligation — Beal Bight. — The right of the lessor to recover rents from the lessee is a purely personal obligation between said lessor and lessee and is not a real right; therefore an assignment of said rents is not subject to record in the registry of property.</p> <p>Id. — Construction of Law. — The object of subdivision 5 of article 2 of the Mortgage Law is to protect the interests of the lessee and vests no rights in the lessor.</p> <p>Id. — Record of Lease. — By the record of the lease the landlord acquires no right that he did not have before.</p> <p>Id. — Assignment of Bight. — The transfer of a real right of possession must be express and does not follow from the right to receive a particular payment.</p> <p>Id. — Assignment of Bents — Bights of Assignee — Becord of Lease. — The right of an assignee of instalments of rents to protect himself against other assignees of such instalments does not arise directly from the Mortgage Law and cannot be given because a lease happens to be recorded. An assignee can protect himself, however, by taking a deed from the owner, whether by an assignment of all the real rights of the owner for a limited time or by mortgage or otherwise.</p> <p>Id. — Risk oe 'Assignees' — An assignee of instalments of rent must always take a risk of having the lease ended, for a condition "broken.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action to Establish Title of Ownership.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mortgage. — Advances—Construction oe Law. — Articles 59, 60 and 94 of the Mortgage Law refer to cautionary notices of credits for advances and to the conversion of such entries into mortgage records and not to mortgages expressly executed to secure sums already received and to he received in the future for a purpose indicated.</p> <p>Id.- — Puture Obligation — Third Parties. — According to articles 142 and 143 of the Mortgage Law, as a mortgage is an accessory obligation it may he created to secure tibie performance of any kind of contract allowed by law, whether it be absolute or conditional; to a day certain or from a day certain; for something contracted for the present, for the future or intended to be contracted; for all of the debt or a part of it; for natural obligations or civil obligations; wherefore the principal obligation may not be actionable while the mortgage created by a third party to secure it is actionable.</p> <p>Id. — Record of Mortgage — Third Parties. — In the record of a mortgage the amount for which the prpperty is to respond as principal, interest and costs should be dlearly expressed, but if this distinction is not made in the deed, the registrar should be guided by what it does set out and should not classify the lack of that distinction as a defect, because the important point is to know what the property is liable for as against third parties.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Bindings of Trial Court — Presumption.—When the finding of the court is in favor of the petitioner in mandamus proceedings, it must he presumed that all the averments thereof that are well pleaded are true.</p> <p>Bemoval of Employee — Political Beasons. — -A removal from office for a political cause is a removal without just cause- and against the provisions of section 32 of the Municipal Law of March 8, 1906, as amended March 10, 1910.</p> <p>Id. — Just Cause — Notice and Hearing. — Generally, where a statute gives a body or a person power to remove for “cause” or “just cause,” such power is held to be a judicial power, and the person or body in whom the power is vested may not remove without notice or a hearing.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Discretion-—-Defense.—Even when the question of the weight or sufficiency of the evidence rests solely in the discretion of the board or person having power to dismiss, the person about to be dismissed should be given an opportunity to defend himself and offer evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Beinstatement—Academic Question. — When the right of a plaintiff to be reinstated in a particular office may give him rights of which his removal .would tend to deprive him, the ease should be decided on its merits, unless it be shown that the question had become a purely academic one.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in a. Proseeu-. tion for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of tlie Registrar of Property Regarding tlie Record of a Judicial Order With. Curable Defect.</p> <p>•The facts áre stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record An Attachment.</p> <p>The faets are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Brief—Fundamental Error. — The failure of an appellant to file a brief in accordance with rule 42 of this court is bad practice and when it occurs the court will consider only fundamental errors.</p> <p>Nuisance — Malodorous Substance — Injunction.-—Courts of equity have enjoined the production of noxious substances on the ground that they are a public nuisance.</p> <p>Rude or Indecent Behavior.- — Rude or indecent behavior is any impolite action, contrary to the usual rules observed in society, committed by one person against another.</p> <p>Id. — Breach of Peace — Malodorous Substances — Lawful Assemblage. — When a person disseminates foul odors in the presence of another person or persons he is guilty of rude or indecent behavior, because it is an act contrary to the usual rules observed in society, and when, as in the present case, such an act is wilfully and maliciously committed at a meeting of persons lawfully assembled and causes the meeting to dissolve, it constitutes a violation of section 358 of the 'Penal Code, the object of which is to protect the right of lawful assembly by punishing those who disturb or molest the same by any of the means therein enumerated.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for an Offense Against the Public Health.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the • opinion.</p>

<p>Dismissal of Appeal — Civil Contempt, — Criminal Contempt — Notice of Appeal — Adverse Party. — The appellant -was adjudged in contempt by the District Court of Aguadilla for failing to comply with the requirements of a writ of injunction issued in a proceeding prosecuted by Joaquin Oronoz Podón in the said court in which the appellant was defendant. Joaquin Oronoz moved for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that he was not served with notice of the appeal. Held: That as the judgment appealed ■ from ivas plainly punitive in its self-evident character, even assuming that the proceedings culminating therein' were of an- equitable nature for civil' contempt, the appellant was justified in adopting the procedure for criminal appeals and in serving notice upon the fiscal as "attorney for the adverse party,” instead of upon the plaintiff in the injunction proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record an Instrument for the Grouping of Properties.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Municipal Courts — Construction op Law — Marshals.—After a careful examination of the act regarding municipal courts, it was held that it was the intention of the Legislature to confer upon the marshals of the said courts the same functions, powers, duties, authority and jurisdiction within their respective municipal districts with reference to the courts served by them and as to matters pending therein as had previously been prescribed for the government of the marshals of the various district courts with reference to the latte'r and to the larger judicial districts.</p> <p>Marshals — -Execution—Jurisdiction.—A marshal of a municipal court has no authority to levy on or sell real property outside of his municipal district; therefore a levy and sale so made are null and void.</p>

<p>Divorce — Venue—-Domicil of Defendant. — There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which fixes the venue of an action for divorce and in the absence of an express provision on tbis point the ease should be tried in the district where the defendant resided when the action was begun, in accordance with section 81 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Domicil — Intention—Transient.—A resident is a person coming into a place with the intention of establishing his domicil or permanent residence and who in consequence actually remains there. If the said intention to establish a domicil or fixed residence is lacking, the person is a mere transient.</p> <p>Id. — Presumption.—The wife's domicil is presumed to be the same as that of the husband and that presumption continues until it is shown that the wife has a separate domicil of her own or until she is enabled by means of a judicial decree of divorce or separation to acquire a domicil of her own.</p> <p>Divorce — Domicil—Abandonment oe Domicil — Venue.-—The act of the wife in abandoning the conjugal domicil in violation of the duties imposed by sections 156 and 158 of the Civil Code cannot confer upon her the right to be sued for divorce in the district in which she illegally resides.</p>

<p>Summons — Service oe Summons — Return oe Service — Construction oe Law— Judicial Agents. — The word “officer” used in the English text of subdivision 2 of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 70 of March 9, 1911, refers alike to a marshal and to a private person who may serve a summons, therefore there is no contradiction between the original and the English text of the said section. Both exercise public and official functions by acting as agents for the administration of justice, not- ■ withstanding that the manner of verifying the exercise of such functions is different in that the marshal certifies thereto while the private person is required to make oath. Thus there is no special reason why a copy of the return should be endorsed on the summons when it is served by the marshal and not so endorsed when it is served by a private person.</p> <p>Construction oe Law — Intention.—The most effectual and universal manner of discovering the true meaning of a law when its language is doubtful is by considering the reason and spirit thereof or the cause or motives which induced its enactment.</p> <p>Summons — Service of Summons — Oath to Return. — When service of summons is made by a private person who cannot comply with the formality of the oath at the time he serves the summons, it will be sufficient simply to endorse on the summons a copy of the return as it appears on the original at the time the summons is served and comply with the requirement of the affidavit of service before returning the summons to the secretary by -whom it was issued.</p> <p>Id. — Defective Service — Return.—The service of a summons is defective according- to the second paragraph of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1911, when the return appearing on the original at the time of service is not endorsed thereon, but said omission in the service is an irregularity only and does not vitiate the service.</p> <p>Certiorari — Summons—Irregularity in Service — Negligence.—A writ of cer-tiorari does not lié to quash the service of á summons for no other reason than a mere irregularity which does not substantially prejudice the petitioner's rights, especially when he has been negligent in his own defense.</p>

<p>Counterfeit Money — Knowledge and Criminal Intent — Passing Spurious Coin.- — -The mere fact that a single eotaiterfeit coin was onee paid out of the cash-drawer of any reputable business hs.an by a clerk and was afterwards returned and accepted by the proprietor is ’insufficient to show guilty knowledge and criminal intent upon the part of the latter in a prosecution for passing counterfeit money in the course of a subsequent business transaction.</p> <p>Td.- — After examining the evidence in this ease it was’held that the evidence as a whole, including both transactions referréd to, wa^s entirely insufficient to ♦ sustain the verdict of guilty inasmuch as the fonder transaction had no connection with the latter. ■ V.</p>

<p>Aggravated Assault and Battery — Information. — An information charging aggravated assault and battery is insufficient when it does not specify any of the circumstances enumerated in section 6 of the Aet of March 10, 1904.</p> <p>Id. — Essential Elements. — When the elements necessary to establish any of the aggravating circumstances of the offense are lacking in the information, it is fatally defective.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt. *</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Receiver—Discretion.—A writ of certiorari to review the appointment of a receiver will not issue when there is nothing to. show that the judge abused his discretional power.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Regarding tlie Admission to Record of a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Summons — Default—Judgment—Laches.—Even when the summons is defective because of failure to set out the amount for which the plaintiff would take judgment in ease of defendant's default, if the latter is served personally with the defective summons together with a copy of the complaint; if judgment by default is entered against him and served on him also; • if demand for payment is made on him by the marshal and refused and certain of his properties are sold at public auction and deeds of sale are executed, he is guilty of lashes and his action cannot prosper if he has allowed more than two years to elapse before moving to open the default and set aside the judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Return of Service. — When the person making the return of service swears that he is of age, as the age of majority in this island is twenty-one years, it is presumed that he was more than eighteen years old when he served the; summons.</p> <p>Id. — Return of Service. — Although the statute provides that a literal copy of the return shall be endorsed on the copy of the summons served, it does not prescribe that compliance with this requisite shall be stated in the return.</p> <p>Default — Excusable Negligence — Surprise—Discretion of Court. — A motion to set aside a judgment by default on the ground of excusable negligence or surprise is directed to the discretion of the court and unless it is shown that there was an abuse of such discretion on the part of the lower court, its decision must stand.</p>

<p>AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND BATTERY-SIMPLE ASSAULT AND BATTERY-EVIDENCE-Complaint. — -When tlie evidence only establishes the commission of an offense of simple assault and battery without any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in section 6 of the Act of 1904, it is not necessary to consider whether or not the complaint charged the crime of aggravated assault and battery.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in an Action' to Recover on a Promissory Note.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Judicial Proceedings' — Record oe Title — Jurisdiction.—When judicial proceedings are presented in the registry for record the appellant must show that the court had jurisdiction and that all the necessary parties appeared before it in the said proceedings.</p> <p>Will — Record oe Title — Presumption.—When a will orders a particular thing to be done, any party claiming recordable rights thereunder must show to the registrar that all the positive requirements of such will have been followed and not leave the same open to presumption.</p> <p>Affidavit — Public Document.- — An affidavit is not a public document of the kind required by the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>Partition — Record of Title — Description of Property. — Allusions in a deed of partition even to records in the registry are not sufficient to comply with section 30 of the Mortgage Law requiring property to be described in the deed itself.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action • of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judicial Security — Attachment.—A bond for an attachment to secure the effec- , tiveness of a judgment is a judicial security of a distinct nature by its origin from a voluntary or conventional security.</p> <p>Id. — Benefit of Discussion — Joint and Several Sureties. — In a judicial security by express statutory provision the surety cannot claim the benefit of discussion of the property of the principal debtor, a fact which places him in the position of a surety jointly and severally bound with the debtor.</p> <p>Id. — Attachment—Joint and Several Obligation. — The sureties are bound jointly and severally with the other debtor in a bond given for an attachment to secure the effectiveness of the judgment which may be rendered in a specific action; and this being so, an action may be maintained against the debtor and the sureties simultaneously or against any one of them.</p> <p>Measure of Damages — Losses—Profits Unrealized*. — Section 1073 of the Civil Code provides that indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of the loss which may have been suffered, but also that of the profits which may' not have been realized, therefore the amount earned previously during a like period of time and under identical circumstances may be taken as a basis for computing the profits which the plaintiff failed to realize.</p> <p>Appeal — Municipal Courts — Trial de Novo. — In appeals from municipal to district courts the cases are tried de novo and therefore the judgment appealed from is not reversed, affirmed, or modified, but another judgment is rendered based on the pleadings and evidence produced in the appellate court.</p> <p>Id. — Joint and Several Sureties — Trial de Novo — Judgment,—In the present, case the action was brought .in the municipal court against two solidary sureties and judgment was rendered against them for part of the amount sued for. Only one of the sureties appealed to the district court. A trial de novo having been had, at which only the creditor and the surety appeared, judgment was rendered against the former, who appealed to the Supreme Court and served notice of appeal upon the surety who was a party to the trial'in the district court. Held: That such action implies that the creditor elected to look to only the solidary surety who had appealed to the district court and that therefore the judgment of this court, in place of that which should have been rendered by' the district court, should be only against the surety who appealed to the said court, who may sue his co-debtors according to law for contribution.</p>

<p>■Conspiracy — Arson—Evidence.—Francisco Cofresi was the owner of a shop and Bernabé Acevedo was one of his clerks. The only proof against Acevedo was that he lived behind the shop; that on the night of the fire both defendants stayed in the shop after every one else had left, and that when the defendants were asked by the fiscal to explain the presence of incriminating combustible materials they kept silent. Held: That this, at most, would be very .scant proof that Acevedo aided Cofresi in the preparation for the fire, but it -would not prove that Acevedo consciously aided Cofresi to commit a crime and as there were two defendants and the cooperation 'of one is lacking, there is no proof of conspiracy.</p>

<p>Appeal — Complaint.—The .question of whether or not a complaint is properly-sworn to should be raised in the lower court.</p> <p>Evidence — Former- Acts or Crimes. — The mere proof of former acts or crimes-does not tend to-prove -the existence of a later act or crime.</p> <p>Td. — Objection—Offer to Prove. — A question addressed to the party’s own witness, if objected to, must be followed by an offer of what is expected to be-proved by the answer of the witness, if it is desired to complain of the-exclusion of the question, where the purpose of the question is not apparent and the question does not indicate whether the answer of the witness would’ be material, relevant, or competent; but where the question shows its purpose and the materiality of the evidence sought to be elicited, an offer to* prove is not necessary.</p> <p>Id. — Assault and Battery — Offer to Prove. — When the evidence tends to show that an adult man’ assaulted and beat a woman, hurling her to the ground and beating her while there, the question put to a witness as to the number of fits the prosecuting witness had had was not sufficient in the absence of' a more definite offer to prove.</p> <p>Id. — Contradictory Evidence. — The principle that a conflict in the evidence should be decided by the court below is applicable not.only when there is a conflict between the witnesses of the opposing sides, but also when the witnesses of the same party virtually contradict one another.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of .Property Denying Admission to Record of a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ cf Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Damages</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for - Trial of Right to Personal Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Evidence—Findings op Trial Court. — When the only ground of- appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment appealed from because some of the plaintiff's witnesses were his relatives and the testimony .of the others was not worthy of belief and it is not pleaded that the judge was influenced by passion, prejudice, partiality, or committed manifest error, his findings should be sustained.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Application for a Writ of Mandamus.</p> <p>Tire facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Conditional Writ of Mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the' opinion.</p>

<p>Partnership — Expiration op Extension — Dissolution.—According to article 221 of the Code of Commerce, the expiration of the extension of the partnership contract is one of the eauses for -which commercial associations of all kinds are completely dissolved, and if the members desire to continue in partnership they should enter into a new contract, subject to all the formalities prescribed for its establishment according to the provisions of article 119-of the said code.</p> <p>Id.- — Articles ojr Partnership — Registration in Mercantile Registry. — Article 119 of tie Code of Commerce prescribes that every commercial association, ' before beginning business, shall be obliged to record its establishment, agreements and conditions in a public instrument, which shall be presented for record in the mercantile registry, in accordance with the provisions of article 17, additional instruments which modify or alter in any manner the original articles of the association being subject to the same formalities in accordance with article 25, and the partners cannot make private contracts, but all agreements must appear in the articles of association.</p> <p>Id.- — Contracts with Parties Outside op Partnership — Liability op Partners. — The violation of articles 119 and 223 of the Code of Commerce does, not exempt from liability the managing partners of the firm as to agreements-made by them with persons outside of the partnership, because article 120' of the same code provides that the managers of a partnership who violate the provisions of article 119 shall be held liable jointly to third parties for contracts made by them in behalf of the partnership.</p> <p>Id. — Contracts—Third Parties. — Pursuant to the principle laid down, even when a commercial firm is not legally formed, the agreements and contracts made by the partners as such are binding against them and in' favor of third parties with whom they contracted.</p>

<p>Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the Judges of the District Courts of San Juan, Section 2, and of Humacao, in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Violation of Sanitaby Rules — Washing Clothing — Constbuction of Law.— The defendant was charged with haying "unlawfully, maliciously,'and wil-fully violated section 13 of Sanitary Rules and Regulations No. 2 by allowing the inmates of the tenement houses belonging to him to wash clothing therein in the absence of the required conditions.” The pertinent part of section 13 reads as follows: "The tenants of the house are permitted to wash their own clothes; this must be done in a special place with impervious floor and walls * * *.” Held: In accordance with the jurisprudence established in the case of The People v. Paratee, 22 P. R. R., 35, that as the provision cited is simply permissive the defendant was sentenced improperly because the acts charged did not constitute an offense, since they are not prohibited or penalized expressly by law. .</p>

<p>Lease — Administration—Express Power. — Although the contract of lease may • he considered an act of administration the.power to administer must he conferred.</p> <p>Id. — Lease for More Than Six Years — Becord of Title — Beal Bight — Encumbrance. — A lease for more than six years which gives the lessee, after it is recorded, a real right as against a purchaser, is a limitation of the rights of the lessor, hut it is not an encumbrance.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Partial Alienation — Express Power. — When a lease is for more than six years it is considered as a partial alienation of the property and can be made only under a special power.</p> <p>Power of Attorney. — Powers of attorney should always be eons'trued strictly. -</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property Denying Admission to Eecord of a Lease of Mangrove Swamp Land.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Closing of Establishments — Construction of Law — Labor Contracts. — Section 553 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 131 of 1913, providing that all work in the commercial establishments enumerated therein shall be suspended from 7 p. m., does not limit the right to contract in relation .to labor, inasmuch as the direct object of the statute is not the limitation of the hours of labor but the regulating of periods of rest .or, cessation from labor during the week.</p> <p>Id.* — Working Hours — Judicial Notice. — The Supreme Court will take judicial notice of the fact that men generally cannot ■ and will riot work nineteeri hours a' day. 1 . * ‘ . 1■</p> <p>II. — Constitutional Law — Givil Regulations. — The constitutionality of the Sunday closing laws has been upheld generally in most of the States on the theory that sueh regulations are essentially civil and not religious and. their validity is neither strengthened nor weakened by the fact that the rest they enjoin is on Sunday.</p> <p>Id. — Constitutional Law — -Duty op Courts. — It has been held generally that it is the duty of the courts to sustain the constitutionality of statutes unless the contrary plainly appears.</p> <p>Id. — Intention op Legislature. — The courts will not inquire into the reasons which the legislators may have had in mind in enacting regulations for the closing of establishments provided the regulations themselves are not unreasonable.</p> <p>Constitutional Law. — A law which operates generally should not be lightly declared unconstitional.</p> <p>Id. — Public Order — Police Regulations. — The fact that ordinances or police regulations oxierate as interferences with the free exereise of the classes of business made subject to them cannot alone be made a test of their validity, and if they afford reasonable facilities for the conduct of a business they do not amount to a prohibition but only to a regulation thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Law — Exemption.—-The fact that a statute exempts certain classes from its operation does not make it unconstitutional where it clearly appears that the exemptions were those where the particular occupation would suffer immediate losses, or where the excluded classes were works of necessity.</p> <p>Id. — Working Hours — Freedom to Contract. — Where a man is free to contract for eighteen or nineteen hours a day it cannot be said that an enforced cessation of labor for five hours is an unreasonable restriction of his liberty to .contract.</p>

<p>Agricultural Loan — Preferred Credit — Simple Credit — Surety.—Sobrinos de Ezqu'iaga made an agricultural financing contract with the Central Vannina * and loaned to the latter the sum of $200,000. At the time the contract was made the said Central Vannina owed the Banco Territorial y Agrícola the sum of $25,000 -which had been loaned to the said central and for whieh the said Sobrinos de Ezquiaga were sureties and upon demand said sureties paid the same in two instalments. The lower court ordered the master to consider the credit of $25,000 as a simple one and on appeal it was held:</p> <p>1. That the contract between Sobrinos de Ezquiaga and the Central Van-nina is an agricultural contract and falls within paragraph 2 of section 1824 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>2. That the loan of $25,000 made by the Banco Territorial y Agrícola to the Central Yannina and for which Sobrinos de Ezquiaga were sureties was not included in the original loan of $200,000.</p> <p>3. That there was a conflict, whieh was decided by the lower court, as to whether the $25,000 had a special aspect by which the creditors had a right to retain it as against the claims for sugar turned over to them. .</p> <p>4. That it is entirely plain that the appellants have not brought themselves within the provisions of paragraph 2 of section 824 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as their claim for the $25,000 was never reduced to a deed and never recorded.</p> <p>5. That the fact that Sobrinos de Ezquiaga were agricultural financing creditors by virtue of,the loan of $200,000 does not make the payment of the $25,000 a payment within the purport of section 3 of the Act of March 10, 1910, because Sobrinos de Ezquiaga did not make that payment-by reason of their position as agricultural creditors for the $200,000 loaned but by virtue of their obligation as sureties.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Humacao in a Case of Tutorship.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainee. — Ownership—Conflict of 'Titles. — When the question is one of ownership and conflict of titles it is not a proper question to be decided in the summary• proceedings of an action of unlawful detainer but should be considered within the wider scope of an ordinary action.</p> <p>Id. — Tenant at Sufferance.— Ownership. — When in an action of unlawful detainer against a tenant at sufferance the defendant alleges in his answer that he does not hold possession in such capacity but holds as owner and introduces evidence which tends to show that his possession is not at sufferance, the action of unlawful detainer should not be sustained.</p>

<p>Contracts — Public Instrument — Express Condition — Bargain and Sale— Meeting iof Minds. — For the same reason that if the contracting parties agree that their contract shall not be deemed perfected until it is set forth in a public instrument, such agreement must be respected, so also any other express condition stipulated for the perfection of a contract of bargain and sale must be equally binding, for until such condition is fulfilled it cannot be said that there has been a meeting of minds to give life to the contract and the contract will not be deemed perfected until all and each of the conditions which it contains are considered as satisfied.</p> <p>Id. — Condition oe Prinoipal Contract. — When the agreements referred to in section 1222 of the Civil Code are conditions of the principal contract, they have the same legal effeet, whether complied with or not, as when the essential obligations of the vendee are broken or fulfilled.</p> <p>Id — Intention oe Parties — Perfection of Contract — Conditions.—When a condition is attached to the intention of the parties with regard to the effectiveness of the contract and to the essential element of its perfection, it is plain that so long as the condition is not complied with the intention is not realized.</p> <p>Foreclosure — Certificate of Registrar — Interested Parties — Service of Summons — Return.—Subdivision 5 of article 171 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law requires that when the certificate of the registrar,' which must accompany the complaint, shows the residences of the interested parties, the judge shall order that the summons be served on them; but the fact that it is not shown that the proper official has complied with the requirements of section 262 of the old Code of Civil Procedure by serving a literal copy thereof, duly signed, setting out the matter to which it refers and stating such facts in the return, is not proof of non-compliance therewith.</p> <p>Id. — Service oe Summons Upon Parties Interested in Subsequent Liens;— Object oe Notice. — The object of the service of the summons upon persons interested in the liens recorded after the recording of the rights of the foreclosing creditors is to inform them of the proceeding in order that they may attend the public sale if they so desire.</p> <p>Id. — Valuation oe Property' — Upset Price. — When it is not stated in mortgages created before the Mortgage Law of 1893 went into effect that the valuation of the mortgaged property shall serve as the upset price for the public sale to be made in ease of foreclosure, it is necessary to exhibit a document expressing the agreement of the debtors to a valuation of the property in case of sale or ask for a judicial appraisement.</p> <p>Id. — Notice oe Sale. — Although article 172 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law requires that notices of sale shall be posted in the usual public places of the district where the proceedings are brought and of the place where the property is situated', it does not require that they be posted in the wards in which the properties to be sold are situated.</p> <p>Id. — Notice oe Sale — Description oe Property. — It is sufficient to state in the notices of sale the names by which the properties are known, the names of their owners, the number of cuerdas of land composing them and their value and the place where the title deeds are to be found, without mentioning tho boundaries of the properties and the wards in which they are situated.</p> <p>Id. — -Notice oe Sale — Junior Creditors. — The reason for giving the names of the junior creditors in the notices of sale is to notify them of the foreclosure proceedings when it has not been possible to serve them with the summons, according to subdivision 2 of article 172 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>Id. — Notice oe Sale — Annulment oe Sale — Waiver.'—The failure to publish the notices for 'the entire time required 'by law does not necessarily annul the sale inasmuch as this requirement may be waived.by the debtor, and in order that a junior creditor may obtain a decree of nullity on that ground it is a general principle of law that he must show that he has been gravely injured.</p> <p>Id. — Junior Mortgagee.- — A junior mortgage creditor has no other right in the mortgaged property than that to recover out of the difference between the senior mortgages and the actual and real value of the property.</p> <p>Costs and Disbursements — Attorney’s Pees — Guilt or Temerity — Discretion oe Court. — rThe law empowers the courts to impose diseretionally the costs and disbursements of the action upon the defeated party, taking into account his degree of guilt or temerity, and also the attorney’s fees in actions in which the amount involved exceeds $500, and unless it is shown that they have abused that discretion their decisions should be sustained.</p>

<p>Tutorship — Special Tutor — Ratification of Deed of Partition — Presumption. — -When the appointment of a special tutor is applied for with the sole object of ratifying a deed of partition, the approval of which has been denied, and it is not shown or alleged that sueh ratification would eliminate the cause for the former denial, the presumption is that the court would have to act after the ratification the same as it did before and refuse to approve the deed of partition; therefore the appointment would serve no purpose.</p>

<p>Appeal — Question oe Fact — Statement of Case — Bill of Exceptions. — When the judgment rendered by the lower court is based on questions of fact and such facts are not certified to in a statement of the case or bill of exceptions, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed.</p> <p>Damages — Bes Judicata. — When the question of damages has been discussed and decided in a former suit, the judgment there rendered is res judicata.</p> <p>Opinion — Statement of Case — -Bill of Exceptions. — Although the opinion is useful as showing the grounds for the judgment, it cannot serve as a substitute for a bill ofi exceptions or statement of the case.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in a Prosecution for Voluntary Homicide.</p> <p>Motion of the Defendant-Appellant that the Supreme Court Fix the Bail for His Temporary Discharge.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the decision.</p>