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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
LARRY ALLEN MOORE v. CHELSEA
BRYANT-MITCHELL
(AC 47053)
Seeley, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his
appeal from the decree of the Probate Court removing him as executor of
the estate of the defendant’s decedent. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that
the Superior Court improperly limited the scope of its review of his appeal
and thus failed to allow him to present evidence to refute the defendant’s
allegations of misconduct against him and to challenge the admission of
the decedent’s will to probate. Held:
The Superior Court did not improperly limit the scope of its review of the
plaintiff’s appeal, as the court’s jurisdiction extended only to the matter
that the plaintiff challenged on appeal, which was the Probate Court decree
removing him as the executor of the decedent’s estate, and the requirement
that the Superior Court conduct a trial de novo in a probate appeal did not
mean that it could decide matters beyond what was appealed.
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s inadequately briefed claim that
the Superior Court precluded him from presenting evidence to refute the
defendant’s allegations of his misconduct in the administration of the estate,
as the plaintiff did not identify any particular evidentiary ruling with respect
to his claim or any specific erroneous factual findings that followed therefrom.
The Superior Court did not commit plain error by failing to overrule the
Probate Court’s admission of the decedent’s will to probate, as the plaintiff
did not appeal from the admission of the will to probate, and, thus, the
Superior Court could not have overruled or reviewed the merits of a Probate
Court decree that was beyond the scope of what was before it on appeal.
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claims that the Superior Court
abused its discretion by quashing subpoenas he issued to nonparties who
had knowledge about the execution and filing of the decedent’s will, the
plaintiff having abandoned those claims due to inadequate briefing.
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claim that the Superior Court
abused its discretion by holding him responsible for the failures of attorneys
he retained to assist with the administration of the estate, as he did not cite
any legal authority or provide any legal analysis in support of his claim,
which would fail even if it were reviewed, the Superior Court having found
that the plaintiff was unable to administer the estate, failed to cooperate
and follow the legal advice given by the attorneys he had engaged as counsel
for the estate, was unwilling to comply with court orders and was motivated
to pursue his self-interest over the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries.
Argued March 17—officially released August 12, 2025
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the Probate Court for
the district of Norwalk-Wilton removing the plaintiff
as executor of the estate of the defendant’s decedent,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Hon. Edward
T. Krumeich II, judge trial referee; judgment denying
the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Herbert I. Mendelsohn, with whom was John T. Irick,
pro hac vice, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Lindsay T. Reed, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Larry Allen Moore, appeals1
from the judgment of the Superior Court removing him
as the executor of the estate of the decedent, Clifton
Dewayne Bryant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
the Superior Court, in adjudicating his appeal from the
decree of the Probate Court granting a petition filed by
the defendant, Chelsea Bryant-Mitchell, to remove him
as executor, improperly (1) limited the scope of its
review to the Probate Court’s removal of the plaintiff
as executor and, as a result, failed to allow the plaintiff
to present evidence (a) to refute the allegations concerning the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct in administering the estate and (b) to challenge the decedent’s will
1
The plaintiff’s appeal form indicates that he is challenging eleven different
rulings of the Superior Court and ‘‘all other orders or decision[s] refusing
to order enforcement of trial subpoenas.’’ With the exception of the Superior
Court’s ruling removing him as executor of the decedent’s estate and its
rulings quashing certain subpoenas, which are addressed in this opinion,
the plaintiff’s appellate brief is devoid of any argument, claims or analysis
regarding the other rulings listed on his appeal form. We, therefore, deem
any such claims to be abandoned. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank National Trust
Co. v. Bertrand, 140 Conn. App. 646, 648 n.2,
59 A.3d 864, cert. dismissed,
309 Conn. 905,
68 A.3d 661 (2013); Corrarino v. Corrarino,
121 Conn. App.
22, 23 n.1,
993 A.2d 486 (2010).
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
that had been admitted to probate, (2) failed to overrule
the Probate Court’s admission of the will to probate,
and (3) prevented him from introducing evidence challenging the authenticity of the will. He also claims that
the Superior Court abused its discretion in holding him,
as a layperson, responsible for the failures of the attorneys he had retained on behalf of the estate to assist
with the administration of the estate.2 We affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
The following facts, as found by the Superior Court
or established by the record, and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The decedent died on January 13, 2020. The plaintiff is the decedent’s cousin,3 and the defendant is the decedent’s
widow. The decedent left a will, dated December 5,
2018, naming the plaintiff as executor of his estate
(will). The will devised the decedent’s interest in a limited liability company, 40 Wall Street, LLC (company),
to the defendant, with her children as residuary beneficiaries, and provided that ‘‘[t]he business affairs’’ of
the company ‘‘shall be managed by [the plaintiff].’’ The
company is the owner of property at 40 Wall Street in
Norwalk (property).
The will was admitted to probate,4 and, on April 9,
2020, the plaintiff was appointed executor of the dece-
2
The plaintiff also claims, for the first time in his appellate reply brief,
that he was subjected to certain constitutional due process violations and
that the ‘‘cumulative effect of the [Superior Court’s] evidentiary rulings and
the attorneys’ failures to protect the plaintiff’s interests constitute[d] plain
error . . . .’’ We decline to review these claims because ‘‘[i]t is . . . a well
established principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in
a reply brief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dearing v. Commissioner
of Correction, 230 Conn. App. 145, 168 n.9,
329 A.3d 988, cert. denied,
351
Conn. 910,
331 A.3d 158 (2025).
3
Although the Superior Court, in its memorandum of decision, refers to
the plaintiff as the decedent’s cousin, the defendant testified that the plaintiff
was a childhood friend of the decedent and that she was unaware of a blood
relation between them.
4
The plaintiff did not appeal from the Probate Court’s decree admitting
the will to probate.
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
dent’s estate by a decree of the Probate Court. On June
3, 2020, the decedent’s former business partner, Steven
G. Ferguson, petitioned the Probate Court, claiming that
he had a 50 percent ownership interest in the company.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Probate Court
‘‘issued a decree . . . in which it determined that, on
the basis of the company’s operating agreement . . .
[Ferguson] and the decedent’s estate were equal owners
of the company, each holding a 50 percent interest.’’5
Moore v. Ferguson, 232 Conn. App. 797, 799, A.3d
(2025).
On June 4, 2021, the defendant filed a petition with
the Probate Court to remove the plaintiff as executor
of the estate. In the petition,6 the defendant asserted
that the plaintiff should be removed as executor due
5
In addition to engaging in various other litigation relating to the estate,
the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the Probate Court’s decree
determining the ownership interests in the company. See Moore v. Ferguson,
Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-23-
5027938-S. The plaintiff’s appeal in that matter was dismissed on May 1,
2023, for lack of standing, and this court affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
See Moore v. Ferguson, 232 Conn. App. 797, 809, A.3d (2025).
6
In the defendant’s June 4, 2021 petition, she also renewed arguments
made in a prior petition she had filed to remove the plaintiff as executor.
That prior petition set forth claims that the plaintiff should be removed as
executor because he (1) failed to file a timely inventory for the estate, (2)
failed to timely request and obtain an extension for the filing of the estate’s
tax return, (3) fired counsel retained by the estate to litigate Ferguson’s
claimed interest in the company, (4) claimed an ownership interest in the
company, (5) failed to make a timely mortgage payment for the property
and (6) refused to communicate with the defendant about the estate. The
defendant claimed that, based on that conduct, the plaintiff had (1) ‘‘failed
to fulfill his fiduciary duty . . . [and] to make necessary court filings,’’ (2)
‘‘not kept the [defendant], a beneficiary, updated and aware of his activities
in connection with the estate, and has acted rashly in [regard] to the estate’s
litigation,’’ (3) ‘‘shown a clear misunderstanding of how to act in the estate’s
interest and a disregard for the decedent’s testamentary wishes,’’ and (4)
‘‘a conflict of interest and cannot continue as executor’’ based on his claimed
ownership interest in the company. In the prior petition, the defendant also
requested that ‘‘any powers’’ granted to the plaintiff under the will concerning
the management of the company’s ‘‘business affairs’’ be voided. The Probate
Court denied the prior petition without prejudice.
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
to issues relating to his (1) failure to complete an estate
accounting and comply with a court order concerning
the accounting, (2) self-dealing as a tenant of the property, (3) failure to manage the property, (4) failure to
communicate with the defendant, (5) conversion of a
2011 Range Rover vehicle owned by the estate to himself, (6) inability to properly administer the estate and
follow court orders and (7) misunderstanding of the
law. After an evidentiary hearing, the Probate Court
issued a decree on February 17, 2022 (decree), removing
the plaintiff as executor of the estate. In addition to
granting the defendant’s petition to remove the plaintiff
as executor, the Probate Court appointed Kurt M. Ahlberg, a probate attorney, as administrator of the decedent’s estate.7
The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, pursuant
to General Statutes § 45a-186 (b),8 from the Probate
Court’s decree removing him as executor of the estate.
In the plaintiff’s complaint, he sought ‘‘a hearing in
which the circumstances surrounding the will’s drafting
and editing can be explored identifying the circumstances that resulted in [the defendant’s] submission
of the [will admitted to probate], which [the plaintiff]
believe[d] [was] fabricated,’’ and requested, inter alia,
that the plaintiff be reinstated as executor of the estate.
The Superior Court, sitting as a court of probate; see
Connery v. Gieske, 323 Conn. 377, 390,
147 A.3d 94
(2016); conducted a trial de novo on the plaintiff’s appeal
over the course of five days in May and August, 2023.
Thereafter, the court, Hon. Edward T. Krumeich II,
judge trial referee, issued a corrected memorandum of
decision dated October 11, 2023, denying the plaintiff’s
7
In the decree, the Probate Court also denied a motion to transfer filed
by the plaintiff with the Probate Court, which he has not challenged in
this appeal.
8
General Statutes § 45a-186 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person
aggrieved by an order, denial or decree of a Probate Court may appeal
therefrom to the Superior Court. . . .’’
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
appeal. In doing so, the court concluded: ‘‘While [the
plaintiff] was executor [of the estate], he displayed an
inability to administer the estate [and] an unwillingness
to comply with court orders and to cooperate with Mary
[E.] Hoyt . . . the accountant appointed by the Probate
Court to prepare the inventory and accounting [for the
estate] that [the plaintiff] failed to prepare. [The plaintiff] failed to cooperate with and follow legal advice
given by [the] attorneys he engaged as counsel for the
estate. Seven attorneys represented [the plaintiff] [in
his capacity] as executor during the less than two years
[he] served as executor. [The plaintiff’s] conduct demonstrated [that] he lacked the competence, understanding and temperament to continue as executor.9
‘‘[The plaintiff] also has serious conflicts of interest
with the estate that are irreconcilable with his continuing as executor. [The plaintiff’s] [barbershop] business
occupied a portion of the property . . . which was the
principal asset of the estate, on which he failed to pay
rent. [The plaintiff] testified that he had a deal with
[the decedent] that he was not obligated to pay rent
and could use income from the property to pay the
mortgage and for related maintenance and expenses.10
When [the] Probate [Court] . . . ordered [the plaintiff]
to pay $1500 in monthly rent, [he] failed to do so,
9
‘‘[The plaintiff] blamed the seven attorneys who represented him as
executor for [his] failure to marshal estate assets and to obtain [the] financial
information needed for an accounting. [The plaintiff] explained [that] the
attorneys were not willing to help him. [The plaintiff] testified [that] he fired
three of these attorneys, one had a conflict and withdrew, and two resigned.
[The plaintiff] needed competent probate counsel to function as executor
because he lacked the knowledge and skill to function as fiduciary for the
estate. The court acknowledges that some of the delays resulted from the
[COVID-19] pandemic, but [the plaintiff’s] failures may not be excused for
that reason but, rather, reflect his approach, which was motivated to pursue
his self-interest over the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries.’’
10
‘‘In addition to not paying rent for the barbershop [he operated] at [the
property], [the plaintiff] retained the fees paid by other barbers for their
chairs at the barbershop. [The plaintiff] also testified that he was not required
to pay fees for his barber chair, unlike the other barbers, because he was
the manager.’’
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
explaining that, because [the probate judge] recused
himself in the same order in which he directed the
rental payment, [the plaintiff] felt he need not obey the
order. [The plaintiff] transferred title to an automobile
that was an estate asset to himself without payment to
the estate.11 [The plaintiff] used estate assets and
income to support properties in which he had an interest or claimed to have an interest.12 [The plaintiff] testified [that] he also used his personal funds to support
[the] propert[y] and has made claims against the estate
for reimbursement. [The plaintiff] also testified that he
has an interest in [the company], the main asset of the
estate, which he testified [he] was supposed to manage
and control in accordance with [the decedent’s] wishes
as property manager, executor and trustee of a testamentary trust.13
‘‘The most egregious conflict of interest, by far, is
that [the plaintiff] asserts that he has an interest in
11
’’The [automobile owned by the estate that the plaintiff transferred to
himself, a] 2011 Range Rover, was valued at $9559 in the interim accounting
filed by [the plaintiff]. In an earl[ier] text message, [the defendant] indicated
[that] she was willing to give [the plaintiff] the vehicle, but the transfer of
title took place after the two were no longer on friendly terms. [The plaintiff]
testified [that] he had the power as executor to transfer title to the [vehicle]
to himself, even though there was not a specific bequest of the vehicle to
him [in the will].’’
12
‘‘[The plaintiff] was bequeathed property [located] at 107A William Street
in Bridgeport [in the will]. Rents from the tenant in that property were used
by [the plaintiff] to pay [for] expenses and repairs for the property . . .
and his barbershop located there. [The plaintiff’s] barbershop operates as
Metro Hair Station, LLC. [The plaintiff] described the decedent, as a ‘partner’
in [his] business but did not list this interest as an asset of the estate, which
is another potential conflict. [The plaintiff], and/or his [business], were the
defendants in a [related] summary process action and have agreed to vacate
[the property]. [See 40 Wall Street, LLC v. Moore, Superior Court, judicial
district of Stamford-Norwalk, Housing Session at Stamford, Docket No. CVXX-XXXXXXX-S, appeal dismissed, Connecticut Appellate Court, Docket No.
AC 47482 (October 16, 2024).] Being sued by the company, the interest in
which is the largest asset of the estate, is another potential conflict.’’
13
‘‘[The plaintiff] also testified [that] he was supposed to be a ‘member’
of [the company], but the court does not believe he understood the term,
which he used interchangeably with ‘manager.’ If he meant that he had a
membership interest in [the company], that would be another conflict.’’
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
estate assets that are contradictory to the terms of the
will admitted to probate under which he was appointed
executor. [The plaintiff] testified [that] he went to [the
decedent’s] house after his death and removed the . . .
will . . . from the place where [the decedent] had put
it and filed the will with the Bridgeport Probate Court.
When there was a problem with ‘paperwork’ in connection with the filing of the will, according to the [court]
clerk, he engaged Attorney Nathaniel W. Shipp to assist
him [with] admit[ting] the will [to] probate, hav[ing]
[the plaintiff] appointed executor and . . . carry[ing]
out his duties as executor. [The plaintiff] testified that
he had not seen the will admitted to probate but later
learned someone had ‘edited’ the will from the version
he had attempted to file with the Bridgeport Probate
Court after [the decedent’s] death. According to [the
plaintiff], the will had been ‘edited’ to remove him as
residuary beneficiary and to substitute . . . [the defendant], and to omit the testamentary trust for the decedent’s two daughters with [the plaintiff] as trustee. [The
plaintiff] admitted that he did not know who ‘edited’
the will, but he identified his then probate attorney . . .
Shipp, and [court] clerks at the Probate Court, whom
he identified by name, as persons who could be responsible for filing the ‘edited’ will [that was] later admitted
to probate. [The plaintiff] testified the will was filed in
substitute to the ‘non-edited’ . . . will . . . of the
decedent that he said named him as principal beneficiary of the estate and trustee of a testamentary trust
with [the property] and most other estate assets held
in trust and under his control. [The plaintiff] testified
that he has filed a ‘motion to open’ pending in the
Probate Court to challenge the admitted will.14
‘‘The evidence was clear and convincing that [the
plaintiff] consistently acted in his own self-interest
14
‘‘[The plaintiff] also attacked the bona fides of the will in his reply brief.
The court has not considered the [identification] exhibits referred to in [the
plaintiff’s] initial brief.’’
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
rather than for the benefit of the [estate] beneficiaries
. . . engaged in self-dealing with assets of the estate
. . . has irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the
estate . . . [and] failed persistently and is unfit to
administer the estate effectively. The delays in the
administration of the estate were often attributed to
[the plaintiff] and his inability to carry out the duties
of executor. [The plaintiff] has been unwilling and
unable to work with the Probate Court, the attorneys
for the estate, the accountant engaged to assist in estate
administration, and the principal beneficiary.15 [The
plaintiff] misunderstood his role as fiduciary, would not
heed advice from his attorneys or comply with court
orders, conflated his personal interests with the interests of the estate and acted primarily out of his self-interest to ensure his personal control of estate assets.
[The plaintiff] has acted to undermine the decedent’s
estate plan expressed in the will and to promote a
competing will that benefits him at the expense of the
decedent’s widow and children. The court finds that
the defendant has met her burden of proving that removing [the plaintiff] as executor was required ‘to protect
against harm caused by the continuing depletion or
mismanagement of an estate.’ . . . [Emphasis omitted.] [In re Probate Appeal of McIntyre, 207 Conn. App.
433, 448,
263 A.3d 925 (2021)].16
‘‘[The plaintiff] was properly removed as executor
pursuant to [General Statutes] § 45a-242 (a)17 . . . for
15
‘‘The court rejects [the plaintiff’s] argument that the attorneys [for the
estate] and [the defendant] sabotaged his ability to carry out his duties as
executor as contrary to credible evidence.’’
16
‘‘The court finds the evidence for removal to be clear and convincing
and [that it] would meet the heightened standard argued [for] by the plaintiff
but states no opinion as to the appropriate burden of proof for removal of
a fiduciary.’’
17
General Statutes § 45a-242 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Probate
Court having jurisdiction may, upon its own motion or upon the petition of
any person interested or of the surety upon the fiduciary’s probate bond,
after notice and hearing, remove any fiduciary if: (1) The fiduciary becomes
incapable of executing such fiduciary’s trust, neglects to perform the duties
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
neglect to perform the duties of the fiduciary’s trust
and waste of the estate in his charge and . . . because
of his unfitness, unwillingness and persistent failure to
administer the estate effectively, and [as a result of]
the court’s determination that removal of the fiduciary
best serves the interests of the [estate’s] beneficiaries.
This court finds the estate’s interests would suffer continuing harm if [the plaintiff] were not removed as fiduciary. [The plaintiff] has mismanaged the estate and has
conflicts of interest that render him unfit to continue
in the service of the estate. [The plaintiff] was properly
removed as executor of the estate.’’ (Footnote added;
footnotes in original.) This appeal followed. Additional
facts and procedural history are set forth as necessary.
As a preliminary matter, we begin by setting forth
the standard of review. ‘‘In appeals in which the trial
court has ruled on a probate appeal de novo, we treat
our scope of review as we would with any other Superior Court proceeding. . . . When the court has made
factual findings, we defer to those findings unless they
are clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to
support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . With regard to matters
of law, however . . . our review is plenary.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Salce v.
Cardello, 210 Conn. App. 66, 72–73,
269 A.3d 889 (2022),
aff’d, 348 Conn. 90,
301 A.3d 1031 (2023). ‘‘Whether
grounds exist for an executor’s removal is a question
addressed to the sound discretion of the Probate Court.
of such fiduciary’s trust, wastes the estate in such fiduciary’s charge, or
fails to furnish any additional or substitute probate bond ordered by the
court . . . [or] (3) because of unfitness, unwillingness or persistent failure
of the fiduciary to administer the estate effectively, the court determines that
removal of the fiduciary best serves the interests of the beneficiaries . . . .’’
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
. . . On appeal from probate, the trial court may exercise the same discretion de novo, reviewing the facts
relating to the propriety of removal without regard to
the Probate Court’s decision.18 . . . Our task, then, is
to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion . . . .’’ (Footnote added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Saccu’s Appeal from Probate, 97 Conn. App.
710, 713–14,
905 A.2d 1285 (2006).
I
The plaintiff claims that the Superior Court improperly limited the scope of its review with respect to his
probate appeal and, as a result, failed to allow him to
present evidence (1) to refute the allegations concerning his alleged misconduct in administering the estate
and (2) to challenge the decedent’s will that had been
admitted to probate. In particular, he asserts that,
‘‘although [his probate appeal] was brought to the
[Superior Court] as an appeal of the Probate Court’s
decree removing [him] as executor of the [decedent’s]
estate, its inquiry, in its role as a court with coextensive
jurisdiction [to] the Probate Court and hearing the
appeal as a trial de novo, should not have ended there.’’
According to the plaintiff, this resulted in the court’s
‘‘arriv[ing] at erroneous findings of fact that could have
been avoided had the . . . court allowed [him] to present evidence that called into question many of the defendant’s allegation[s] relative to [his] alleged misconduct
18
‘‘As to the order or decree appealed from, the jurisdiction of the Superior
Court is coextensive with that of the Probate Court in the first instance.
[I]f a de novo trial which will be fully effective is to be granted in the
[S]uperior [C]ourt on appeal from a probate decree, the [S]uperior [C]ourt
must logically be given the same power as the [P]robate [C]ourt itself had,
including any discretionary power. In other words, after consideration of
all evidence presented on the appeal which would have been admissible in
the [P]robate [C]ourt, the [S]uperior [C]ourt should exercise the same power
of judgment which the [P]robate [C]ourt possessed and decide the appeal
as an original proposition unfettered by, and ignoring, the result reached
in the [P]robate [C]ourt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silverstein’s
Appeal from Probate, 13 Conn. App. 45, 54–55,
534 A.2d 1223 (1987).
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
in his attempts to administer the estate, including the
admission of the . . . will [to] probate in the first
place.’’ We disagree that the Superior Court improperly
limited the scope of its review and decline to review
the remaining portion of the plaintiff’s claim.
‘‘An appeal from a Probate Court to the Superior
Court is not an ordinary civil action. . . . When entertaining an appeal from an order or decree of a Probate
Court, the Superior Court takes the place of and sits
as the court of probate. . . . In ruling on a probate
appeal, the Superior Court exercises the powers, not
of a constitutional court of general or common law
jurisdiction, but of a Probate Court. . . .
‘‘The function of the Superior Court in appeals from
a Probate Court is to take jurisdiction of the order or
decree appealed from and to try that issue de novo.
. . . Thereafter, upon consideration of all evidence presented on the appeal which would have been admissible
in the [P]robate [C]ourt, the [S]uperior [C]ourt should
exercise the same power of judgment which the [P]robate [C]ourt possessed and decide the appeal as an
original proposition unfettered by, and ignoring, the
result reached in the [P]robate [C]ourt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wolfel v. Wolfel, 218 Conn. App.
760, 766–67,
292 A.3d 1261, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 902,
301 A.3d 528 (2023).
‘‘[A] probate appeal . . . brings to the Superior
Court only the order appealed from. The order remains
intact until modified by a judgment of the Superior
Court after a hearing de novo on the issues presented
for review by the reasons of appeal. . . . The Superior
Court may not consider or adjudicate issues beyond
the scope of those proper for determination by the order
or decree attacked. . . . The Superior Court, therefore,
cannot enlarge the scope of the appeal.’’ (Emphasis
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Probate Appeal of McIntyre, supra, 207 Conn. App. 440.
In the present case, therefore, the Superior Court had
jurisdiction over only the matter that was appealed by
the plaintiff, namely, the Probate Court decree removing him as the executor of the decedent’s estate. To
the extent that the plaintiff contends on appeal that the
Superior Court was not limited in that respect, the claim
lacks merit. The plaintiff confuses the nature of the de
novo proceeding before the Superior Court. Although
the Superior Court, in an appeal from a decree of the
Probate court, must conduct a trial de novo and decide
the appeal on the basis of the evidence presented, unrestrained by the Probate Court’s decision, that does not
mean that a Superior Court can decide matters beyond
what has been appealed. On the contrary, case law is
clear that ‘‘[a] probate appeal . . . brings to the Superior Court only the order appealed from.’’ (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In connection with this claim, the plaintiff also asserts
that the court improperly precluded him from presenting evidence to refute the allegations concerning his
alleged misconduct in administering the estate and to
challenge the decedent’s will that had been admitted
to probate. We decline to review this claim. ‘‘As our
Supreme Court recently has stated, it is the responsibility of parties, not an appellate court, ‘to clearly identify
how and where in the record the claim that the party
is raising on appeal was preserved for review and where
in the record the trial court’s ruling on the claim may
be found . . . .’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.) State ex rel.
Dunn v. Burton, 229 Conn. App. 267, 294,
327 A.3d 982
(2024), quoting Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 349 Conn. 513,
589–90, 321 A.3d 295 (2024); see also Aspiazu v. Orgera,
205 Conn. 623, 636–37 n.5,
535 A.2d 338 (1987) (‘‘[w]hen
raising evidentiary issues on appeal, all briefs should
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identify clearly what evidence was excluded or admitted, where the trial counsel objected and preserved his
rights and why there was error’’).
Although the plaintiff asserts that the court improperly precluded him from presenting certain evidence,
which resulted in the court’s making erroneous factual
findings, he does not identify any particular evidentiary
ruling made by the court with respect to this claim. He
also has not identified the specific erroneous factual
findings that followed. In all, his appellate briefing on
this aspect of his claim consists of a single short paragraph, without citation to relevant authority regarding
evidentiary rulings on the admission of evidence. Thus,
in light of the plaintiff’s failure ‘‘to clearly identify . . .
where in the record the trial court’s ruling on the claim
may be found’’; (emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted) State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton, supra,
229 Conn. App. 294; and because he has not adequately
briefed this claim; see, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Bissonnette, 232 Conn. App. 501, 519,
337 A.3d 1
(declining to review claim as inadequately briefed when
totality of discussion of claim was contained in one
short paragraph that was devoid of any legal citations
or analysis), cert. denied, 352 Conn. 910,
336 A.3d 84
(2025); we decline to review this claim. See also Murthy
v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 67 n.7,
144 S. Ct. 1972,
219 L.
Ed. 2d 604 (2024) (‘‘[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting
for truffles buried [in the record]’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); State v. Tocco, 120 Conn. App. 768,
786–87, 993 A.2d 989 (‘‘this court is not an advocate for
any party; it would be beyond the proper role of this
court in resolving the issues raised on appeal to sift
through the voluminous record before us and speculate
as to the specific evidence at issue in the present
claim’’), cert. denied, 297 Conn. 917,
996 A.2d 279 (2010).
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II
The plaintiff’s next claim is that the Superior Court
committed plain error19 by failing to overrule the Probate Court’s admission of the will into probate despite
‘‘obvious and facial defects in the will’’ and an accompanying Probate Court form, PC-200.20 The plaintiff asserts
that this resulted in a manifest injustice to him and ‘‘the
integrity of the entire estate administration process
. . . being compromised.’’ In support of this claim, the
plaintiff states that the decree of the Probate Court
admitting the will to probate was based on clearly erroneous factual findings, and he identifies numerous purported deficiencies in the will and the PC-200 form. We
reject this claim because the plaintiff’s probate appeal
was taken from the decree of the Probate Court removing him as executor of the estate, not from the decree
of the Probate Court admitting the will to probate. Consequently, any claims pertaining to the admission of
the will to probate were beyond the scope of what was
before the Superior Court on appeal.
The contours of the Superior Court’s jurisdiction over
an appeal from a decree of the Probate Court are well
19
‘‘[The plain error] doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60-5, is an
extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed
at trial that, although unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that
they threaten to erode our system of justice and work a serious and manifest
injustice on the aggrieved party. . . . It is axiomatic that, [t]he plain error
doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility.
. . . Put another way, plain error review is reserved for only the most
egregious errors. When an error of such magnitude exists, it necessitates
reversal. . . . [I]t is not enough for the defendant simply to demonstrate
that his position is correct. Rather, the party seeking plain error review
must demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and
indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn. 437,
445,
307 A.3d 249 (2024).
20
Probate Court form PC-200 is titled ‘‘ ‘Petition/Administration or Probate
of Will,’ and contains an instruction that ‘[a]ny person may use this form
to petition the court for administration or probate of a will and the appointment of an administrator or executor.’ ’’ Vecchiarino v. Potter, 223 Conn.
App. 676, 688,
309 A.3d 322, cert. denied,
349 Conn. 906,
313 A.3d 511 (2024).
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established. ‘‘In a probate appeal . . . the Superior
Court’s jurisdiction is statutory and limited to the order
appealed from. . . . The Superior Court cannot consider or adjudicate issues beyond the scope of those
proper for determination by the order or decree
attacked. This is so even with the consent of the parties
to the appeal because the court has subject matter
jurisdiction limited only to the order or decree appealed
from. . . . [The Superior Court] tries the questions
presented to it de novo, but in so doing it is . . . exercising a special and limited jurisdiction conferred on
it by the statute authorizing appeals from probate.’’
(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Eder’s Appeal from Probate, 177 Conn.
App. 163, 168–69,
171 A.3d 506 (2017). Simply put, it
has long been a key principle of our jurisprudence that
a probate appeal ‘‘brings to the Superior Court only the
order [or decree] appealed from. . . . The Superior
Court, therefore, cannot enlarge the scope of the
appeal.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Silverstein’s Appeal from Probate, 13 Conn. App. 45, 54,
534 A.2d 1223 (1987); see also Stevens’ Appeal,
157
Conn. 576, 581,
255 A.2d 632 (1969).
In the present case, the plaintiff’s complaint states
that he is appealing the ‘‘February 17, 2022 . . .
[d]ecree granting a motion filed by the defendant . . .
removing [him] from [his] role as executor’’ of the
estate. The plaintiff did not appeal from the April 9,
2020 decree of the Probate Court admitting the will to
probate. As we have stated, the Superior Court cannot
‘‘enlarge the scope of the appeal.’’ Silverstein’s Appeal
from Probate, supra, 13 Conn. App. 54; see also Marshall
v. Marshall, 71 Conn. App. 565, 571,
803 A.2d 919 (concluding that Superior Court was without jurisdiction to
consider ‘‘issue of whether counsel committed misconduct,’’ as ‘‘the plaintiff appealed from the admission of
the will to probate and the approval of the defendant
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as executrix’’ and, thus, issue of whether counsel committed misconduct went beyond scope of ‘‘the decree
attacked in the appeal’’), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941,
808 A.2d 1132 (2002); see also In re Probate Appeal of
McIntyre, supra, 207 Conn. App. 439–40.
Because the Superior Court could not have ‘‘overruled’’ or reviewed the merits of a Probate Court decree
that was not properly before it on appeal, the plaintiff’s
claim of plain error fails.
III
The plaintiff’s next claim is that the court abused its
discretion by preventing him from introducing evidence
challenging the authenticity of the will. Specifically,
he argues that the court abused its discretion when it
‘‘quashed the subpoenas of key witnesses who possessed direct knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the execution and filing of the will.’’21 To the
extent that this claim involves a challenge to the admission of the decedent’s will to probate, it fails for the
reasons stated in part II of this opinion. To the extent
that we construe the claim as a challenge to the court’s
rulings quashing subpoenas, we conclude that the plaintiff has abandoned this claim due to inadequate briefing
and decline to review it.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. Prior to the commencement
of trial, the plaintiff subpoenaed several nonparties,
including Diane Ely, Stephanie Bergamo and Libby
21
The plaintiff also argues, for the first time in his appellate reply brief,
that the court abused its discretion when it denied his request for Hoyt, the
accountant appointed by the Probate Court to prepare an inventory and
accounting of the estate, ‘‘to email copies of her records or to bring [certain]
files with her to [court] the following day . . . .’’ We decline to review this
claim given the ‘‘well established principle that arguments cannot be raised
for the first time in a reply brief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dearing v. Commissioner of Correction, 230 Conn. App. 145, 168 n.9,
329 A.3d
988, cert. denied,
351 Conn. 910,
331 A.3d 158 (2025).
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Scott, staff members of the Probate Court; Christine D.
Benham, the attorney who prepared the will; Michael
W. Benham and Teresa Carasone, the witnesses to the
will’s execution; and Ferguson. Three motions to quash
were subsequently filed on behalf of these nonparties,
one for the three Probate Court staff members (probate
staff motion), another for the individuals involved in the
preparation and execution of the will (Benham motion)
and one as to Ferguson (Ferguson motion).22 Ultimately,
the court quashed the subpoenas as to the aforementioned nonparties.23
‘‘[O]ur appellate courts repeatedly have recognized
that [w]e are not required to review claims that are
inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held
that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised
22
It is unclear whether the plaintiff on appeal is challenging the court’s
quashing of the subpoena targeting Ferguson. Although the plaintiff, in his
principal appellate brief, cites to the court’s order granting the Ferguson
motion, nowhere in his appellate briefing on this claim does the plaintiff
specifically argue that the court abused its discretion by granting the Ferguson motion nor does he explain why such ruling constituted an abuse of
discretion. As a consequence, any challenge by the plaintiff to the court’s
quashing of the subpoena targeting Ferguson is deemed abandoned. See
State v. Wright, 76 Conn. App. 91, 94 n.1,
818 A.2d 824 (2003) (‘‘[c]laims not
briefed are deemed abandoned’’), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 911,
840 A.2d
1175 (2004).
23
The court granted the probate staff motion on the ground that ‘‘[t]he
jurisdiction on this probate appeal is limited to the decree on appeal, [and]
[n]o proper purpose would be served by permitting the deposition of Probate
Court staff.’’ It granted the Ferguson motion because, ‘‘on the narrow issue
before [the court], which is the removal of [the plaintiff] as executor,’’ it
did not view Ferguson’s testimony as ‘‘material . . . to this trial.’’ The court
initially granted the Benham motion in part only as to Michael W. Benham and
Carasone because it determined that those ‘‘witnesses [were] not material
to the removal of the executor.’’ Later in the proceedings, however, the
court also granted the Benham motion as to Christine D. Benham because,
‘‘[b]ased on an offer of proof at trial, the court . . . deemed the witness
[was] not material to the issue of the removal of the executor; at best,
information that the witness may have . . . [was deemed] cumulative.’’
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Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell
on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set
forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse
the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges
to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed.
. . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle
without analyzing the relationship between the facts of
the case and the law cited. . . . Where the parties cite
no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we do
not review such claims.’’24 (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App. 124, 133,
101 A.3d 279, cert. denied,
315 Conn. 901,
104 A.3d
107 (2014).
We do not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claims
as to the Benham motion and the probate staff motion
because we deem those claims abandoned due to inadequate briefing. The plaintiff’s appellate briefing on this
issue is completely devoid of any citation to legal
authority or substantive legal analysis. The plaintiff’s
principal appellate brief contains five paragraphs discussing this issue, four of which are only one sentence
long. None of these five paragraphs includes a single
citation to any form of legal authority. Moreover, the
brief does not set forth the standard of review concerning a trial court’s granting of a motion to quash, nor
does it include relevant case law setting forth the legal
principles that apply to such a claim. The brief is also
completely bereft of any legal analysis discussing similar precedent or applying pertinent legal principles to
24
In applying this principle, this court has held that briefing that is devoid
of any substantive legal analysis is inadequate. See, e.g., Lafferty v. Jones,
229 Conn. App. 487, 511 n.26,
327 A.3d 941 (2024) (deeming two claims
abandoned due to lack of ‘‘any substantive legal analysis’’), cert. denied,
351 Conn. 923,
333 A.3d 105 (2025), and cert. denied,
351 Conn. 923,
333
A.3d 106 (2025); In re Olivia W.,
223 Conn. App. 173, 198,
308 A.3d 571
(2024) (deeming claim abandoned based on ‘‘fail[ure] to present any substantive legal analysis addressing the court’s reasoning’’); see also Connecticut
Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57,
87 n.28, 942 A.2d 345 (2008); Margolin v. Kleban & Samor, P.C.,
275 Conn.
765, 776 n.10,
882 A.2d 653 (2005).
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the facts of this case. The plaintiff’s appellate reply brief
is similarly deficient in that its discussion of this issue
contains no citations to legal authority or substantive
legal analysis whatsoever.25
Accordingly, we deem the plaintiff’s claims concerning the court’s rulings on the Benham motion and probate staff motion to be abandoned due to inadequate
briefing.
IV
The plaintiff’s final claim on appeal is that the court
abused its discretion by holding him responsible for
the failures of the attorneys he had retained on behalf
of the estate to assist with the administration of the
estate. According to the plaintiff, he had been ordered
by the Probate Court to perform certain tasks by dead-
25
See, e.g., Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 503 n.4,
72 A.3d 367 (2013)
(deeming claims abandoned because appellant ‘‘failed to provide any legal
analysis’’ to support them); Northeast Ct. Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC
Partnership, 272 Conn. 14, 51 n.23,
861 A.2d 473 (2004) (‘‘[i]nasmuch as the
plaintiffs’ briefing of the . . . issue constitutes an abstract assertion completely devoid of citation to legal authority or the appropriate standard
of review, we exercise our discretion to decline to review this claim as
inadequately briefed’’); Jalbert v. Mulligan, supra, 153 Conn. App. 133 (‘‘The
defendant’s appellate brief fails to cite to any legal authority in regard to
these claims. . . . As a result, the defendant has not adequately briefed
those issues.’’); Marlow v. Starkweather, 113 Conn. App. 469, 472–73,
966
A.2d 770 (2009) (‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s brief is devoid of any legal analysis . . .
accordingly, we cannot reach the merits of his claims and deem them abandoned’’); Rock Rimmon Grange #142, Inc. v. The Bible Speaks Ministries,
Inc., 112 Conn. App. 1, 8,
961 A.2d 1012 (2009) (appellant’s claims were
‘‘devoid of any legal analysis or citation to legal authority’’ and thus abandoned); Verderame v. Trinity Estates Development Corp., 92 Conn. App.
230, 232,
883 A.2d 1255 (2005) (‘‘[w]e cannot reach the merits of the defendants’ claims because their brief is devoid of any legal analysis and, therefore,
we deem their claims abandoned’’); Trappe v. Bolgard, 80 Conn. App. 384,
385,
835 A.2d 115 (2003) (‘‘we simply cannot consider a claim when the
plaintiff has provided the court with what amounts to a one page brief that
is devoid of any legal authority for or analysis of her claim’’); Hill v. Bartels,
73 Conn. App. 588, 589,
808 A.2d 1176 (2002) (deeming claims abandoned
when appellant ‘‘cite[d] no legal authority to support’’ them).
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lines set by the court, including completing an inventory
of the property of the decedent, filing a tax return for
the estate, and settling the estate. He contends that he
engaged the services of a number of attorneys to assist
in completing those tasks but that those attorneys either
were unable or unwilling to do the necessary work to
complete the tasks and that he was left alone, as a
layperson, to obtain the necessary information. He
asserts that, ‘‘[a]t all times during the administration of
the estate for which [he] was responsible, he was denied
access to any of the sources of information necessary
to comply with’’ the orders of the Probate Court. We
decline to review this claim.
Aside from setting forth these assertions, the plaintiff
has not cited any legal authority or provided any legal
analysis in support of this claim. As we already have
stated in this opinion, ‘‘[w]e are not required to review
claims that are inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere
abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.
. . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court
on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not
been adequately briefed. . . . Where the parties cite
no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we
do not review such claims.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Jalbert v. Mulligan, supra, 153 Conn. App.
133.
Even if we were to review this claim, we would conclude, nonetheless, that it fails. In its memorandum of
decision, the Superior Court found that, although ‘‘[the
plaintiff] was executor, he displayed an inability to
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administer the estate, an unwillingness to comply with
court orders and to cooperate with . . . Hoyt . . . the
accountant appointed by the Probate Court to prepare
the inventory and accounting that [the plaintiff] failed
to prepare. [The plaintiff] failed to cooperate with and
follow legal advice given by attorneys he engaged as
counsel for the estate. Seven attorneys represented [the
plaintiff] as executor during the less than two years
[he] served as executor. [The plaintiff’s] conduct demonstrated [that] he lacked the competence, understanding and temperament to continue as executor.’’ The
court further found that ‘‘[the plaintiff] blamed the
seven attorneys who represented him as executor for
[his] failure to marshal estate assets and to obtain financial information needed for an accounting. [The plaintiff] explained [that] the attorneys were not willing to
help him. [The plaintiff] testified [that] he fired three
of these attorneys, one had a conflict and withdrew, and
two resigned. [The plaintiff] needed competent probate
counsel to function as executor because he lacked the
knowledge and skill to function as fiduciary for the
estate. The court acknowledges that some of the delays
resulted from the [COVID-19] pandemic, but [the plaintiff’s] failures may not be excused for that reason but,
rather, reflect his approach, which was motivated to
pursue his self-interest over the interests of the estate
and its beneficiaries.’’26 Those findings are supported
by the record.
26
Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘[a]n important aspect of an
executor’s fiduciary responsibility is the duty to maintain an undivided
loyalty to the estate. . . . [O]ne interested in an estate has the right to have
its representative wholly free from conflicting personal interests . . . .
When the executor of an estate places itself in a position where its interests
conflict with those of the estate, the executor’s ability to represent fairly
the interests of the estate is irreparably tainted. When [such] a situation
appears . . . it is the positive duty of the court to remove the executor
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 326 Conn.
438, 454,
165 A.3d 1137 (2017).
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For example, the court’s finding that, during his tenure as executor, the plaintiff acted improperly and
against the interests of the estate in various ways was
supported, in part, by its finding that the plaintiff used
his powers as executor to transfer an asset owned by the
estate, a 2011 Range Rover valued at $9559, to himself
without making any payment to the estate, despite the
lack of any such bequest in the will. It also was supported by the court’s finding that the plaintiff had disobeyed various court orders, including orders to pay
rent monthly to the company for his tenancy at the property and to provide Hoyt with the records necessary to
complete the estate accounting, and that he ‘‘used estate
assets’’ and diverted from the estate rental income that
was owed to it and, instead, used that income ‘‘to support’’ a property in Bridgeport that was bequeathed to
him in the will.
Furthermore, the court’s finding that the plaintiff had
retained seven attorneys in two years to assist him with
fulfilling his duties as executor, but still failed to do so,
along with Hoyt’s testimony describing the estate as a
‘‘[v]ery simple’’ one, supports the court’s conclusion
that the plaintiff was responsible for his failure to perform his duties as executor. The plaintiff’s argument to
the contrary—that he was hamstrung as executor by
the attorneys he hired—is unavailing in light of the
court’s finding that the plaintiff also failed to cooperate
with Hoyt. The Probate Court ordered the plaintiff to
provide Hoyt with the records necessary to complete
an accounting for the estate after he had failed to do
the same, but he never complied with the order. The
fact that the plaintiff was unable or unwilling to obtain
those records for Hoyt and to work effectively with
any of the attorneys he retained supports the court’s
determination that he was unfit to administer the estate
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because he lacked the ‘‘knowledge and skill’’ to fulfill his
duties as executor without the assistance of counsel.27
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
27
We also note that, in asserting this claim, the plaintiff disregards the fact
that the court’s determination that his removal as executor was necessary
to prevent continuing harm to the estate was based on a number of findings,
some of which are unrelated to whether the plaintiff completed the tasks
he was obligated to perform as executor. Those findings included that the
plaintiff ‘‘consistently acted in his own self-interest rather than for the benefit
of the [estate] beneficiaries . . . engaged in self-dealing with assets of the
estate . . . ha[d] irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the estate . . .
conflated his personal interests with the interests of the estate . . . acted
primarily out of . . . self-interest to ensure his personal control of estate
assets . . . [and] . . . acted to undermine the decedent’s estate plan . . .
and to promote a competing will that benefits him at the expense of the
decedent’s widow and children.’’ See General Statutes § 45a-242 (a) (1) and
(3). On appeal, the plaintiff has not challenged any of those findings, which,
by themselves, support the court’s judgment.
