************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RANDY A. WRIGHT
(AC 47370)
Elgo, Moll and Clark, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted, following a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual
assault in the second degree, and risk of injury to a child, the defendant
appealed. Following the second day of trial, the defendant did not appear
in court, and the court completed the trial and sentenced the defendant in
absentia. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was
insufficient to support certain of his convictions. Held:
The jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the
evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as
there was sufficient evidence that the defendant’s abuse of the victim
occurred after the victim turned thirteen years old, as required to sustain
his convictions of sexual assault in the second degree and risk of injury to
a child.
The defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process and to counsel by denying his midtrial requests
for a continuance failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213
Conn. 233), as the defendant failed to show that the alleged constitutional
violations existed.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s requests
for a midtrial continuance, as the court considered the status of the case,
made reasonable efforts to accommodate the defendant, and marked off
two days of trial testimony to allow the defendant to prepare.
The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to advise the defendant
of the consequences of failing to appear and in trying and sentencing him
in absentia, as the defendant’s conduct constituted a waiver of his right to
be present at both his trial and sentencing, and the defendant failed to make
a showing that this case presented circumstances extraordinary enough to
merit this court’s exercise of its supervisory authority.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s
motion for a mistrial when the defendant failed to appear for the third day
of trial, as the court properly concluded that the defendant had waived his
right to be present when he failed to appear through no fault of the state,
and the court provided a curative instruction to the jury, directing it not to
draw any inferences adverse to the defendant as a result of his absence.
This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved constitutional
claim that the trial court’s denial of defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
State v. Wright
deprived the defendant of his due process rights under the federal constitution, as, pursuant to the first prong of Golding, the record was inadequate
for review.
This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the
trial court committed plain error by not sua sponte discharging defense
counsel and declaring a mistrial as the record was inadequate for review
of that claim.
This court dismissed as moot the defendant’s claim that the trial court
improperly relied on the rape shield statute to prevent him from cross-examining the victim about a false allegation of sexual misconduct she
allegedly had made, as the defendant failed to challenge all independent
bases for the trial court’s ruling.
Argued June 4—officially released September 16, 2025
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with two counts
of the crime of risk of injury to a child and with one
count each of the crimes of sexual assault in the first
degree and sexual assault in the second degree, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Windham,
geographical area number eleven, and tried to the jury
before Swords, J.; thereafter, the court denied the
defendant’s motions for a continuance; subsequently,
the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss his
counsel; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s
motion for a mistrial; verdict and judgment of guilty,
from which the defendant appealed to this court. Appeal
dismissed in part; affirmed.
Dina S. Fisher, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Danielle Koch, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Anne Mahoney, state’s attorney, and
Angela Macchiarulo, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
CLARK, J. The defendant, Randy A. Wright, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of one count of sexual assault in the first degree
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2),1 one
count of sexual assault in the second degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1),2 and two counts of
risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes
§ 53-21 (a) (2).3 On appeal, the defendant claims that
(1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of sexual assault in the second degree and one of
his convictions of risk of injury to a child, (2) the trial
court improperly denied his midtrial request for a
1
General Statutes § 53a-70 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person . . . (2) engages
in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is under
thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such
person . . . .
‘‘(b) . . . (2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if . . .
the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section.
Any person found guilty under said subdivision . . . (2) shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment . . . of which five years of the sentence imposed
may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under sixteen
years of age.’’
We note that § 53a-70 has been amended by the legislature since the
events underlying the present case. See Public Acts 2015, No. 15-211, § 16.
This amendment, however, has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In
the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
2
General Statutes § 53a-71 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in
sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen
years of age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more
than three years older than such other person . . . .
‘‘(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony or, if the
victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and
any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of which nine months of the sentence imposed may not be
suspended or reduced by the court.’’
3
General Statutes § 53-21 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person who
. . . (2) has contact with the intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65,
of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen
years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual
and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child
. . . shall be guilty of . . . a class B felony . . . except that, if the violation
is of subdivision (2) of this subsection and the victim of the offense is
under thirteen years of age, such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be
suspended or reduced by the court.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
State v. Wright
lengthy continuance in order to seek new counsel or
prepare to represent himself, (3) the trial court erred
in failing to advise him of the consequences of failing
to appear and in trying and sentencing him in absentia
after he absconded during his trial, (4) the trial court
improperly denied the request by the defendant’s counsel, Vincent Fazzone, for a mistrial when the defendant
failed to appear on the second day of evidence, (5) the
trial court improperly failed to sua sponte declare a
mistrial and remove Fazzone as defense counsel, and
(6) the trial court improperly prevented Fazzone from
cross-examining the victim about a prior accusation of
sexual misconduct that she allegedly had made. We
dismiss the appeal as to the defendant’s sixth claim and
otherwise affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. The victim4 was born on September 14, 1998,
and the defendant was born on September 24, 1973.
The defendant was a friend of the victim’s father, T,
and the victim had known the defendant for her entire
life. T and the victim’s mother, G, are divorced. Following the divorce, T moved out of the family home, and
the victim and her sister continued to reside with G.
The defendant began a romantic relationship with G
and moved into the home, at which point in time the
victim was approximately nine years old. Beginning
when the victim was nine years old, and at least once
4
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of
victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be
ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106,
136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
per week for several years after that, the defendant
touched the victim inappropriately when the two of
them were in her bedroom. The touching began as a
back massage during which the defendant removed the
victim’s bra, but eventually progressed to touching the
victim’s breasts and clitoris.
Although the victim and the defendant were largely
alone when this touching occurred, on one occasion a
family friend, A, who was residing in the home, walked
in on the two of them and observed the defendant
without a shirt on, laying on the victim’s bed with the
victim in a ‘‘cuddling position.’’ A ran out of the room
and downstairs to tell G what she had seen, but the
defendant ran out after her and denied wrongdoing; an
argument ensued. G did not believe A and did not call
the police. On another occasion, the victim told her
former boyfriend, C,5 that the defendant had touched
her breasts and ‘‘fingered’’ her but made C promise not
to tell anyone. The defendant’s touching of the victim
continued until approximately September, 2012, at
which point the victim moved out of the home and went
to live with T. The following month, the victim told T
that the defendant had touched her inappropriately, and
T subsequently took the victim to the police station so
that she could make a statement. In her statement, the
victim described an occasion on which the defendant
had given her a back massage, undone her bra, and
touched her vagina. She also stated that the defendant
had removed her bra on several occasions in the past.
The defendant was subsequently arrested and tried
before a jury of six on November 5, 6 and 10, 2014.
Although we refer to C as the victim’s former boyfriend, there was
5
conflicting evidence on whether C and the victim were still in a romantic
relationship at the time that she told him about the defendant’s abuse. C
testified that the victim told him that the defendant had touched her about
four or five months after C and the victim had broken up. The victim,
however, testified that C was ‘‘my boyfriend at the time’’ that she told him
of the abuse.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
State v. Wright
Fazzone represented the defendant throughout the trial.
On the morning of November 6, 2014, following the
first day of evidence, the defendant filed a handwritten
‘‘motion for dismissal/removal of counsel,’’ in which he
asked the court to discharge Fazzone for ‘‘misrepresentation and gross negligence of my case.’’ Shortly thereafter on that same day, the parties appeared before the
court, Swords, J., to address the defendant’s motion.
During the hearing,6 the defendant expressed his view
that Fazzone was not providing him with adequate representation and requested that the court grant him a
thirty day or, in the alternative, fifteen day continuance
so that he could find new counsel or prepare to represent himself. The court denied these requests but—
after the defendant requested that the court give him
at least ‘‘a couple days to . . . pull it together’’—
granted the defendant a continuance until the following
Monday, November 10, at which time the court stated
that it intended to canvass him regarding his ability to
represent himself.
The defendant did not appear in court on November
10. Fazzone represented to the court that he had
attempted to call the defendant over the weekend but
had not been able to reach him. The court adjourned for
approximately twenty minutes to allow the defendant
additional time to appear and to permit Fazzone to
attempt to contact him. When court reconvened, Fazzone stated that he had called the defendant again and
had been unable to reach him but that he had left a
voicemail telling the defendant that he needed to come
to court immediately. Fazzone then orally moved for a
mistrial ‘‘in light of my client’s . . . absence,’’ stating
that he ‘‘would not want the jury to see [the defendant’s]
absence as any indication of guilt in any way.’’ The
court denied the motion, stating that, ‘‘[i]f there is any
6
We discuss this hearing in greater detail in part II of this opinion.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
necessity for a mistrial, it’s been created by the defendant himself, and the court certainly finds it’s not—
does not reach the threshold of manifest necessity
. . . .’’ The court then adjourned for another twenty
minutes to afford the defendant a final opportunity to
appear, which he did not. Fazzone stated that he had
again attempted, without success, to get in touch with
the defendant via phone. The court accordingly found
that the defendant had ‘‘intentionally absented himself
in an effort to thwart the proceedings in this matter’’
and had thus waived his right to be present.
The trial thereafter resumed and proceeded in the
defendant’s absence. Before the resumption of evidence, the court instructed the jury that it was not to
speculate as to why the defendant was not present or
to draw any inferences adverse to the defendant as a
result of his absence. The state rested after calling one
additional witness and the defense rested without calling any witnesses. The jury returned a verdict of guilty
on all charges on that same day, November 10, after
deliberating for approximately thirty-five minutes.
On January 6, 2015, the defendant was sentenced to
a total effective sentence of twenty years of incarceration, five years and nine months of which were a mandatory minimum, followed by twenty-five years of special
parole. He was also ordered to register as a sex offender
for life. The defendant did not appear for his sentencing.
The court found that, ‘‘although there is no evidence
. . . that the defendant was aware of the sentencing
which is to take place today, there is also no evidence
. . . that the defendant had made any inquiry or any
attempts to find out the status of the case or the fact
that the sentencing would be held today. Significantly,
there’s also no evidence . . . that the defendant is
either unable or incapable of attending today’s proceedings.’’ Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendant had again ‘‘voluntarily, wilfully, and intentionally
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
State v. Wright
absented himself’’ from the proceeding and accordingly
had waived his right to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of his punishment.
The court stayed the execution of the sentence pending
the defendant’s reapprehension.
Later that month, the defendant was apprehended.
On January 20, 2015, the defendant was arraigned before
the court, Riley, J., on a charge of failure to appear in
the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
172.7 At that time, the court lifted the stay of execution
on the sentence that previously had been imposed by
Judge Swords, and imposed a standing criminal protective order on the victim’s behalf, to remain in effect
until 2075. The defendant did not timely appeal from
his conviction or seek sentence review.
On November 4, 2016, the defendant filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus and, thereafter, filed an
amended petition on October 7, 2019. See generally
Wright v. Commissioner of Correction, Superior Court,
judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXXS. In his operative amended petition, the defendant
claimed that Fazzone had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in various ways, including by failing
to file a direct appeal of his conviction and by failing
to file an application for sentence review. On June 6,
2023, following a trial, the habeas court, Bhatt, J., issued
a memorandum of decision in which it granted in part
and denied in part the defendant’s petition. The habeas
court concluded that Fazzone had rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to file appeal paperwork on the
defendant’s behalf and by failing to seek sentence
7
General Statutes § 53a-172 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of failure to appear in the first degree when (1) while charged with
the commission of a felony and while out on bail or released under other
procedure of law, such person wilfully fails to appear when legally called
according to the terms of such person’s bail bond or promise to appear
. . . .’’
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
review but otherwise rejected the defendant’s claims
of ineffective assistance. The habeas court accordingly
restored the defendant’s right to appeal from his conviction and to seek sentence review. On August 3, 2023,
the defendant filed a direct appeal from his conviction
with our Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal
to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1.8 Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as
necessary.
I
We begin with the defendant’s claim that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of sexual
assault in the second degree and one of his convictions
of risk of injury to a child.9 In support of this claim,
the defendant argues that it is ‘‘undisputed’’ that his
assaults of the victim stopped when the victim was
twelve years old. As such, he argues, there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions under § 53a-
71 (a) (1), which requires that the victim be between
thirteen and sixteen years old,10 and under count four
of the information, which charged him with a violation
of § 53-21 (a) (2) on the basis of conduct that was
alleged to have occurred on and after the victim’s thirteenth birthday. We disagree.
8
The defendant has also filed with this court an appeal from the judgment
of the habeas court denying in part his amended petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. See Wright v. Commissioner of Correction, Connecticut Appellate
Court, Docket No. AC 46768 (August 7, 2023). That appeal was argued before
this court on November 21, 2024. On January 14, 2025, this court sua sponte
stayed resolution of the defendant’s habeas appeal pending final resolution
of the present appeal.
9
Although this is the final claim that the defendant raises in his principal
appellate brief, ‘‘[w]e begin with this issue because if the defendant prevails
on the sufficiency claim, [he] is entitled to a directed judgment of acquittal
rather than to a new trial’’ on the counts for which he claims there was
insufficient evidence. State v. Moore, 100 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.2,
917 A.2d
564 (2007).
10
See footnote 2 of this opinion.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
State v. Wright
The following legal principles govern our review of
this claim. ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part]
test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether [on] the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact]
reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative
force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Ziolkowski, 351 Conn. 143, 160,
329 A.3d 939 (2025).
‘‘We note that the [finder of fact] must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but]
each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those
conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the [finder
of fact] to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact
is true, the [finder of fact] is permitted to consider the
fact proven and may consider it in combination with
other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant
guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond
a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘When there is conflicting evidence . . . it is the
exclusive province of the . . . trier of fact, to weigh
the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all
or none of a witness’ testimony. . . . Questions of
whether to believe or to disbelieve a competent witness
are beyond our review. As a reviewing court, we may
not retry the case or pass on the credibility of witnesses.
. . . We must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses that is made on the basis
of its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor
and attitude . . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether
there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask,
instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict of
guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. App. 427, 447–48,
238 A.3d 797, cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 974,
240 A.3d 676 (2020).
The victim, as we have explained, was born on September 14, 1998. Count two of the information charged
the defendant with a violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1), and
count four charged him with a violation of § 53-21 (a)
(2), on the basis of his having had sexual intercourse
with, and contact with the intimate parts of, the victim
‘‘on unspecified dates from about September 14, 2011
[the victim’s thirteenth birthday] to about November 6,
201211 . . . .’’ (Footnote added.) The victim testified
that the defendant’s touching of her continued until just
before she moved out of the family home and went to
live with T. She further testified that at the time she
moved out, she was twelve years old. T, however, testified that the victim came to live with him in September,
2012, at which time the victim would have been at least
thirteen, if not fourteen, years old. Moreover, on cross-examination, the victim testified that she had moved
in with T in 2012, to which Fazzone replied: ‘‘Well, it
just seems after doing the math that you would actually—when you moved in with your father, you weren’t
twelve, you were fourteen. Are we correct by saying
that? I’m not putting pressure on you.’’ The victim
replied: ‘‘I’m not sure.’’
The defendant is correct that the victim initially testified that she was twelve when she moved out and the
defendant’s abuse ended, but he is not correct that this
testimony was ‘‘undisputed.’’ To the contrary, there was
ample other evidence—including the victim’s own testimony on cross-examination—that she did not move out
11
November 6, 2012, is the date of the victim’s statement to the police.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
State v. Wright
until approximately one year after she turned thirteen.
Although the evidence was somewhat equivocal on the
victim’s precise age at the time the defendant ceased
touching her, ‘‘[i]t is well settled . . . that [e]vidence
is not insufficient . . . because it is conflicting or
inconsistent. . . . Rather, the [finder of fact] [weighs]
the conflicting evidence and . . . can decide what—
all, none, or some—of a witness’ testimony to accept
or reject.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Montana, 179 Conn. App. 261, 266,
178 A.3d 1119, cert.
denied, 328 Conn. 911,
178 A.3d 1042 (2018). Construing
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict, the jury reasonably could have concluded
that the defendant continued to touch the victim inappropriately until roughly one year after her thirteenth
birthday. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence
both that the defendant’s abuse continued until after
the victim turned thirteen years old, as required to sustain the defendant’s conviction for sexual assault in the
second degree, and that the defendant had contact with
the victim’s intimate parts between her thirteenth birthday and November 6, 2012, as alleged in count four of
the information. The defendant’s claim therefore fails.
II
Next, the defendant claims that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process and to
counsel, and, in the alternative, that the court abused
its discretion, when it denied his midtrial requests for
either a thirty day or a fifteen day continuance. Because
the defendant did not preserve the constitutional portion of this claim before the trial court, he seeks review
pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,
317 Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015). We are not
persuaded by the defendant’s claim.
The following additional procedural history is relevant. The defendant’s first appearance in this case
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
occurred in January, 2013, and the defendant was tried
in November, 2014. At the time that the defendant made
his request for a continuance, on November 6, 2014,
the jury had been empaneled and sworn, and the state
had presented testimony from: the victim; T; Erica Kesselman, a physician and expert in the field of pediatric
female genitalia]; A; George Grauer, a police officer;
and C. At the close of the first day of evidence on
November 5, the state had informed the court that it
‘‘ha[d] one final witness for tomorrow who will be ready
at 10 a.m.’’
During his cross-examination of the victim on November 5, Fazzone asked the victim whether she had
‘‘accused other people of doing this to you as well.’’
The state objected on relevance grounds, and the court
excused the jury for the morning recess while it heard
argument on the objection. When asked by the court
to justify his line of questioning, Fazzone appeared to
assert that, on a previous occasion, T had reprimanded
the victim for dressing inappropriately, and the victim
had then retaliated by falsely reporting to officials at
her school that T had committed unspecified sexual
misconduct against her.12 The court pressed Fazzone
12
Specifically, the following colloquy occurred:
‘‘The Court: All right. Mr. Fazzone, what was your claim with respect to
that line of questioning?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. That there was on one occasion
where [the victim’s] father—she had reported to the school that—it’s my
understanding anyway, that she had reported to the school that her father
had reprimanded her when she was not dressed or appropriately dressed.
And she took it to the attention of the school board and, apparently, her
father—it was found that he—he actually—that this didn’t—did not occur,
or that he did nothing wrong. That’s my understanding.
‘‘The Court: That who did nothing wrong?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: The father. I apologize. The father—the father—I
don’t know. These are just—I just—this is something I wanted to explore
on—
‘‘The Court: All right. What’s your claim? The father did what?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: That the father—at one point when they were together
in the home, the father, while trying to reprimand—reprimand [the victim],
had done so—[the victim] had said that the father had reprimanded her
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
State v. Wright
as to whether he had a good faith basis for believing
that the victim had in fact made such an accusation;
Fazzone conferred briefly with the defendant and then
asserted that the defendant had heard it from G, who
had in turn heard it from T. The court, after confirming
that Fazzone had not himself spoken to G, observed
that ‘‘everything that you reported to the court is at a
minimum triple hearsay. In other words, you got it from
your client, who allegedly got it from some other party,
who allegedly got it from some other party.’’ Fazzone
then attempted further to justify the relevance of his
inquiry by stating that, ‘‘if this is true and [T] was found
guilty of this, that would be one thing. But if he was
not found guilty, I think it’s relevant to the case at
hand.’’ The court responded: ‘‘Well, you’re assuming a
lot of things. You’re assuming not only that this happened, you’re assuming then a complaint was made
to a law enforcement authority that then pursued an
investigation and then made an arrest and then it was
brought to court and then he was somehow acquitted
of that charge. So, there’s a lot of assumptions in there.’’
Fazzone then asserted that he had also learned from
‘‘a Jennifer DuCharme’’ that the victim ‘‘likes to take
things to extreme; she had a friend . . . who had a
sixteen year old brother who sexually touched her. . . .
And [the victim] did not say anything until six months
later. And then the boy moved to Providence, Rhode
Island.’’ The court responded that there was nothing in
this offer of proof that would indicate that, even if the
when she was not dressed. And that she then went and said to the school
officials that she felt that she had been violated, that her father had done
something wrong, and that type of thing. So, I wanted to see if that—I think
it’s relevant, Your Honor. I’m not trying to be difficult, but I think it’s relevant
to the case.
‘‘The Court: How—how—
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: It shows a pattern. It shows a pattern of possible—
you know, she’s not being truthful as far as these allegations and it’s a
pattern of not being truthful of these types of situations.’’
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
victim had made such a complaint against her friend’s
brother, this complaint was false. Fazzone replied: ‘‘Fair
enough . . . . If she’s saying that, I understand. You
know, if she’s saying that didn’t happen, I don’t want
to rock the boat. . . . I agree, Your Honor. But as far
as [T] goes, I stand by my contentions.’’ The court then
sustained the state’s objection. It ruled that it was not
going to permit Fazzone to ask the victim about the
alleged false accusation of sexual misconduct that she
had made against T, because it determined that Fazzone
lacked a good faith basis for asking that question, and
‘‘a good faith basis is a minimum for that kind of attack
on credibility, notwithstanding the rape shield statute.’’13 The court explained that ‘‘that inquiry would be
more prejudicial than probative because there is no
good faith basis based upon what [Fazzone] indicated.’’
At the outset of the hearing on the defendant’s motion
to remove Fazzone as his counsel on November 6, the
defendant requested that the court grant him a continuance of ‘‘approximately thirty days so I could pull it
together and possibly find other counsel or figure out
where I need to go from here.’’ The court responded
that, in order to grant that request, it would have to
grant a mistrial because the jury had been empaneled
and ‘‘we’ve heard approximately three-quarters or more
of the state’s case-in-chief.’’ The court then inquired as
to why the defendant wanted to discharge Fazzone. The
13
The rape shield statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-86f, ‘‘prohibits the admission of a victim’s prior sexual conduct [in a prosecution for
sexual assault under §§ 53a-70, 53a-70a, and 53a-71 to 53a-73a, inclusive]
. . . unless such evidence is . . . offered by the defendant on the issue of
whether the defendant was, with respect to the victim, the source of . . .
injury, or . . . offered by the defendant on the issue of credibility of the
victim, provided the victim has testified on direct examination as to his or
her sexual conduct . . . or . . . otherwise so relevant and material to a
critical issue in the case that excluding it would violate the defendant’s
constitutional rights.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Shaw,
312 Conn. 85, 103–104,
90 A.3d 936 (2014).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
State v. Wright
defendant responded in relevant part: ‘‘Your Honor . . .
today’s supposed to be the beginning of my defense.
Mr. Fazzone has no witnesses for me; I have no one
speaking on my behalf today. There’s nobody here. . . .
Through [Fazzone’s] performance, [not] being able to
. . . introduce evidence properly, formulate questions
properly, being prepared to the best of, I believe, his
ability, I don’t feel that I’m getting represented to—fair.
. . . I feel like I was misled that he was actually a trial
lawyer, that he had this under control all throughout
the eighteen months. . . . And then for today, that
there’s no witnesses, that’s—he’s making a mockery of
the court in my eyes and I would, I guess, formally
request a mistrial so that way we could—I could find
someone that’s more adept for my situation.’’ The court
asked the defendant which specific witnesses he had
anticipated would be called in his defense. The defendant identified G, a person named Heather Green, T,
and Jennifer DuCharme, giving brief offers of proof
for each.
The defendant claimed that G’s testimony was ‘‘a
pivotal point in [his] defense’’ because she did not
believe the victim’s account, as evidenced by the fact
that she had remained in a relationship with the defendant for more than one year after the victim first made
her allegations. At the close of the previous day of
testimony, the state had represented to the court that
it had been unable to locate and subpoena G and thus
had no ability to produce her. When the court observed
during the November 6 hearing that, ‘‘[G], from what I
understand, has gone to parts unknown,’’ the defendant
replied: ‘‘She’s in—if you look on her Facebook account,
Your Honor, she’s in Agawam [Massachusetts]. I’m
sure—the daughter, the mother, half of her family was
here the other day. I’m sure if they tried, they could
. . . find her. I mean, it’s not like she fell off the face
of the earth, Your Honor.’’ With respect to Green, the
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
defendant claimed, without elaboration, that she would
‘‘testify under oath that [the victim] lied . . . about me
touching her.’’
The defendant claimed that DuCharme ‘‘could come
in here and testify that [the victim] actually accused
somebody else. This is firsthand information. . . . It
came from—this came directly from her. [The victim]
told [DuCharme] that another child had touched her.
She made another allegation. . . . So, the allegations
of—[the victim] has done this before. This child has
called—cried wolf on other people. They didn’t believe
her then. . . . [The victim] has a habitual lying process.
Tried to get an expert witness in here to testify about
that; never happened.’’ As for T, the defendant stated:
‘‘[T] . . . he reprimanded [the victim] while she was
half dressed. [The victim] went to the school to do
that. There’s documentation at the school through the
counselor there. I’ve asked counsel to get it. Your Honor,
there’s nothing there.’’
After the defendant made these offers of proof with
respect to DuCharme and T, the court responded that
Fazzone had attempted to cross-examine the victim the
previous day regarding the allegations of sexual misconduct she allegedly had made to DuCharme, and to her
school regarding T, and that the court had already determined that there was no good faith basis to question
the victim about the allegation regarding T. The court
further observed that, ‘‘even if there was a good faith
basis, there would need to be a showing that this evidence was admissible, despite the rape shield statute.
And that’s—that’s a fairly hard standard to overcome.’’
With respect to the defendant’s offer of proof as to G,
the court stated that the testimony the defendant sought
to elicit—that G did not believe the victim’s story—was
already before the jury through the testimony of A.
The court then proceeded to deny the defendant’s
request for a thirty day continuance and/or mistrial.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
State v. Wright
The court stated that it based its decision on several
factors: the fact that the jury had already been selected;
that the jury had already heard a full day of evidence
and the majority of the state’s case-in-chief; and that,
on the basis of the offers of proof put forward by Fazzone the previous day, the testimony that the defendant
hoped that DuCharme and T would give would likely
be inadmissible. The court further reasoned that Fazzone had ‘‘impeached the victim’s credibility by her
inconsistencies—or prior inconsistencies, and he does
have a trial strategy directed to putting in front of the
jury the victim’s motive to lie here.’’
The defendant then indicated that he was contemplating representing himself and requested a fifteen day
continuance ‘‘so I could try to pull it together if I’m
going to lead this.’’ The court denied this request as
well. It stated: ‘‘I have observed you throughout this
trial, starting with jury selection, consulting with Mr.
Fazzone repeatedly, even during the middle of the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses in this
case. You’ve been an active participant, even though
Mr. Fazzone’s been the one that’s been up in front of
the jury and asking the questions. So as far as I can
tell, you are fully conversant in the case here and the
trial strategy.’’ The court further reasoned that a fifteen
day continuance was unwarranted because the case had
been pending since January, 2013. Finally, the defendant
requested ‘‘a couple days to please pull it together,’’
which the court granted. Specifically, the court granted
the defendant a continuance until 10 a.m. the following
Monday, November 10, and indicated that, on that date,
it would conduct a canvass to determine if the defendant was able to represent himself. The court further
indicated that it would be willing to appoint Fazzone
as standby counsel if the defendant elected to represent
himself.
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
A
We begin with the defendant’s unpreserved constitutional claim. ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail
on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial
only if all the following conditions are met: (1) the
record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;
(2) the claim is of a constitutional magnitude alleging
the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived
the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]he inability to meet any
one prong requires a determination that the defendant’s
claim must fail. . . . The appellate tribunal is free,
therefore, to respond to the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Sweet, 214 Conn. App. 679, 693,
280 A.3d 1243, cert.
denied, 345 Conn. 920,
284 A.3d 983 (2022). For present
purposes, ‘‘[w]e assume, without deciding, that the
[defendant’s] claim is reviewable under the first two
prongs of Golding . . . and we proceed to determine
whether the [defendant] has met the third requirement
of Golding, i.e., that a constitutional violation exists
and deprived [him] of a fair trial.’’ (Citation omitted.)
In re Na-Ki J., 222 Conn. App. 1, 7–8,
303 A.3d 1206,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 929,
304 A.3d 860 (2023).
‘‘Although [a] reviewing court ordinarily analyzes a
denial of a continuance in terms of whether the court
has abused its discretion . . . [t]his is so where the
denial is not directly linked to a specific constitutional
right. . . . If . . . the denial of a continuance is
directly linked to the deprivation of a specific constitutional right, some courts analyze the denial in terms of
whether there has been a denial of [such right]. . . .
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
State v. Wright
Even if the denial of a motion for a continuance . . .
can be directly linked to a claim of a denial of a specific
constitutional right [however], if the reasons given for
the continuance do not support any interference with
the specific constitutional right, the court’s analysis
will revolve around whether the trial court abused its
discretion. . . . In other words, the constitutional right
alleged to have been violated must be shown, not merely
alleged.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 225
Conn. App. 263, 273–74,
315 A.3d 426, cert. denied,
349
Conn. 917,
316 A.3d 741 (2024).
The defendant argues that Fazzone’s performance
during the first day of evidence had been so poor14 that,
by refusing to grant the defendant a thirty or fifteen day
continuance in order to seek new counsel or prepare
to represent himself, the trial court violated his rights
to counsel and to due process under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. We
disagree. The defendant cites no case to support the
proposition that a court violates a criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights to counsel or to due process when
14
To the extent that the defendant asks us to conclude that Fazzone
rendered constitutionally deficient performance in the manner in which he
conducted the defendant’s trial—introducing exhibits, calling and cross-examining witnesses, and choosing which theories to advance—it is not
proper for us to review such a claim in the context of this direct appeal. It is
well established that, ‘‘[a]lmost without exception . . . a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must be raised by way of habeas corpus, rather than
by direct appeal, because of the need for a full evidentiary record for such
[a] claim. . . . On the rare occasions that we have addressed an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, we have limited our review
to allegations that the defendant’s sixth amendment rights had been jeopardized by the actions of the trial court, rather than by those of his counsel.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 259
Conn. 374, 385,
788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied,
537 U.S. 836,
123 S. Ct. 152,
154
L. Ed. 2d 56 (2002). ‘‘[W]e underscore that,’’ in the context of our review
of the present claim, ‘‘our review is of the actions of the trial court, not of
the actions of defense counsel.’’ Id.
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
it reasonably refuses such a midtrial request. To the
15
contrary, it is well established that ‘‘[a] defendant has
no unbridled right to discharge counsel on the eve of
trial’’; (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted) State v. Drakeford, 202 Conn. 75, 83,
519 A.2d
1194 (1987); and that, ‘‘[a]fter the commencement of
trial, neither a right to be represented by counsel of
choice nor a right to due process entitle a defendant
to a continuance on demand.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Crawley, 138 Conn. App. 124, 135,
50
A.3d 349, cert. denied,
307 Conn. 925,
55 A.3d 565 (2012).
Moreover—in light of the general rule that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are properly addressed in
a habeas corpus proceeding—this court has refused
to require that a court overseeing a criminal trial, in
considering a defendant’s request for a continuance
in order to secure new counsel, analyze whether the
defendant’s current counsel is constitutionally ineffective. See State v. Ross V., 110 Conn. App. 1, 9,
953 A.2d
945, cert. denied,
289 Conn. 939,
958 A.2d 1247 (2008);
see also, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673, 683–84,
535 A.2d 345 (1987) (‘‘The defendant argues that his
counsel’s alleged failure to represent the defendant zealously required the trial court to allow him to discharge
his attorney. . . . Since this argument is, in essence,
a disguised allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is governed by our decisions requiring such claims
to be pursued on a petition for a new trial or on a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .’’). Finally,
our Supreme Court has also recognized that, ‘‘[a]fter
trial commences, consistent with the defendant’s
sharply curtailed freedom to elect self-representation
. . . a trial court is not obligated to delay the proceedings in order to enable or facilitate a belated request
15
The defendant characterizes the trial court’s refusal to grant his continuance requests as ‘‘arbitrary and capricious,’’ but—for the reasons we set
forth in part II B of this opinion—we disagree.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 23
State v. Wright
for self-representation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bush, 325 Conn. 272,
320–21, 157 A.3d 586 (2017).16 We further note that our
review of the record does not indicate that the defendant had made a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself at the time he made his continuance
requests, which was the minimum required in order for
his constitutional right to self-representation to attach.
See, e.g., Abrams v. Commissioner of Correction, 192
Conn. App. 850, 862,
218 A.3d 729, cert. denied,
333
Conn. 939,
218 A.3d 1046 (2019). As such, the defendant
has failed to show that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process or to counsel, and his
claim accordingly fails under the third prong of Golding.
See, e.g., Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
225 Conn. App. 276–78.
B
In the alternative, the defendant claims that the denial
of his continuance requests constituted an abuse of
discretion. In general, ‘‘[t]he determination of whether
to grant a continuance is within the discretion of the
trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. . . . A reviewing court is bound
by the principle that [e]very reasonable presumption in
16
Although the defendant does not specifically argue that the trial court’s
denial of his continuance requests violated his right to self-representation,
we nonetheless consider the principles articulated by our Supreme Court
in Bush to be relevant to our resolution of this claim. The defendant challenges both the denial of his request for a thirty day continuance (which
he sought for the purpose of retaining new counsel) and his request for a
fifteen day continuance (which he sought for the purpose of preparing to
represent himself). Moreover, the sixth amendment right to counsel, which
the defendant argues that the trial court violated, affords criminal defendants
a correlative right to self-representation. See State v. Bush, supra, 325 Conn.
317–18. Finally, as we discuss herein, at certain points in his principal
appellate brief, the defendant contends that the trial court’s denial of his
continuance requests deprived him of the opportunity to adequately prepare
if he were to proceed in a self-represented capacity.
Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
favor of the proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion will be made. . . . To prove an abuse of discretion,
an appellant must show that the trial court’s denial of
a request for a continuance was arbitrary . . . . There
are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of
a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.
The answer must be found in the circumstances present
in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to
the trial judge at the time the request is denied. . . .
‘‘Among the factors that may enter into the court’s
exercise of discretion in considering a request for a
continuance are the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay . . . the impact
of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel
and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons
proffered in support of the request . . . the timing of
the request; the likelihood that the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend himself; [and] the availability of other, adequately equipped
and prepared counsel to try the case . . . . We are
especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion where
the court has denied a motion for a continuance made
on the day of the trial. . . . In order to work a delay
by a last minute [replacement] of counsel there must
exist exceptional circumstances.’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Ross V., supra, 110 Conn. App. 7–8. Moreover,
‘‘a denial of a continuance to enable a midtrial election
of self-representation is not an abuse of discretion if
the trial court has thoughtfully considered the status
of the case and otherwise made reasonable efforts to
accommodate the needs of the defendant, such as the
provision of standby counsel or breaks during the scheduled trial itself.’’ State v. Bush, supra,
325 Conn.
322.
In support of his claim that the court abused its discretion in denying his continuance requests, the defendant argues that Fazzone’s performance throughout the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 25
State v. Wright
trial thus far had been ‘‘bumbling and inept,’’ and that,
‘‘by the end of the first day of trial, Fazzone had demonstrated to the court, the jury, and the defendant that
he had never tried a case before, much less one as
serious as a sexual assault claim.’’ He argues that the
length of the delay he sought did not present an ‘‘insurmountable obstacle’’ under the circumstances, that a
substantial continuance was warranted in light of the
complexity and gravity of the charges against him, and
that if he had to continue with Fazzone as his counsel
he would have been effectively ‘‘exposed to a trial without a defense.’’ He further contends that the brief continuance the trial court granted him was insufficient
‘‘to line up witnesses and prepare (if need be) to proceed
[in a self-represented capacity] . . . under these circumstances.’’ He also argues that he was not at fault
for the belated timing of the request because he was
only able to ‘‘realize the extent of Fazzone’s ineffectiveness and lack of preparation’’ after observing his
performance on the first day of evidence and that his
request for a continuance was made sincerely and not
for the purpose of delay.
We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments.
At the time that the defendant made his continuance
requests, his trial was underway, and a duly empaneled
jury had heard testimony from the victim and all but
one of the state’s other witnesses. Under such circumstances, we are ‘‘especially hesitant’’ to conclude that
the court’s denial of the defendant’s requests constituted an abuse of its discretion. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Ross V., supra, 110 Conn. App.
8. Although the defendant attempts to downplay the
delay that his requested continuances would have
caused as a mere ‘‘inconvenience’’ that would ‘‘not
[have] present[ed] an insurmountable obstacle’’ to the
court, jury, state and witnesses, the trial court was
well within its discretion to consider the likelihood that
Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
pausing the proceedings for thirty or even fifteen days
could lead to jury loss and a mistrial.17 See State v.
Ross V., supra, 8; see also, e.g., State v. Komisarjevsky,
338 Conn. 526, 613,
258 A.3d 1166 (mistrial is ‘‘drastic
remedy’’ that, though ‘‘permitted under the rules of
practice . . . is not favored’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 617,
211
L. Ed. 2d 384 (2021). Moreover, the case was more than
one and one-half years old, and this court has upheld
denials of continuance requests for younger cases. See,
e.g., Cinotti v. Divers, 151 Conn. App. 297, 306,
94 A.3d
1212 (upholding denial of continuance where, inter alia,
case had been pending for approximately one year at
time request was made), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 924,
100 A.3d 855 (2014); State v. Youngs,
97 Conn. App.
348, 368,
904 A.2d 1240 (same), cert. denied,
280 Conn.
930,
909 A.2d 959 (2006). Although we are mindful of
the defendant’s contention that he was not responsible
for the timing of his requests, and the record does not
indicate that he made his requests in bad faith, ‘‘these
circumstances do not in themselves warrant a finding
that the trial court abused its discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Beckenbach, 198 Conn.
43, 50,
501 A.2d 752 (1985).
The court was entitled reasonably to conclude that
the reasons proffered by the defendant for the lengthy
continuances he sought—Fazzone’s performance, the
defendant’s desire to secure new counsel and additional
witnesses, and the defendant’s need to prepare if he
were to represent himself—were not sufficient to overcome these weighty countervailing considerations. As
we previously have explained, this court has determined that a court overseeing a criminal trial is not
17
We note that, on the first day of jury selection, the court, Seeley, J.,
had informed prospective jurors that they would likely need to be available
for trial between approximately November 5 and 14, 2014. The court, Swords,
J., reiterated this estimate to the venire on the second day of jury selection.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 27
State v. Wright
required to assess defense counsel’s constitutional
effectiveness in ruling on a motion for a continuance
to secure new counsel. See State v. Ross V., supra, 110
Conn. App. 9. It is also significant that the defendant
did not claim actually to have found an attorney, other
than Fazzone, who would be willing and able to take
his case; rather, he stated that he hoped to ‘‘possibly
find other counsel.’’ (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., State
v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 247–48,
636 A.2d 760 (1994).
Moreover, the witnesses whom the defendant sought
to call were witnesses whose testimony the court reasonably could have concluded was of minimal relevance
and/or already before the court, for whom the defendant
had provided little more than a cursory, undeveloped
proffer, or for whom the defense’s proposed line of
questioning, the court had already concluded, lacked a
good faith basis. Finally, the record reflects that the
court thoughtfully considered the status of the case (as
evidenced by its lengthy colloquy with the defendant
and counsel regarding the defendant’s concerns, the
witnesses the defendant sought to call, and the various
interests at stake) and that the court made reasonable
efforts to accommodate the defendant, including by
indicating its willingness to appoint Fazzone as standby
counsel if the defendant elected to represent himself,
and by marking off two days of trial testimony to allow
the defendant to prepare. For all the foregoing reasons,
we cannot conclude that the court’s denial of the defendant’s requests for a thirty or fifteen day continuance
constituted an abuse of its discretion.18
III
The defendant next claims that the court committed
plain error when it failed at the November 6, 2014 hearing to advise him of the consequences of failing to
18
‘‘Because we have concluded that the court did not act unreasonably
in denying the defendant’s [continuance requests], we need not engage in
harmless error analysis.’’ State v. Patel, 186 Conn. App. 814, 825 n.4,
201
A.3d 459, cert. denied,
331 Conn. 906,
203 A.3d 569 (2019).
Page 26 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
28 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
appear and thereafter proceeded to try and sentence
him in absentia. He further claims that the court’s
actions deprived him of his constitutional right to be
present at trial and seeks review of this unpreserved
claim under Golding. In the alternative, the defendant
asks us to exercise our supervisory authority to require
that, in circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that a criminal defendant will flee—such as, he
argues, the present case—the trial court must advise
him or her of the consequences of a failure to appear.
We are not persuaded.
The following additional legal principles are relevant
to our review of this claim. ‘‘In evaluating plain error
claims, we must determine whether the trial court in
fact committed an error and, if it did, whether that error
was indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily
discernable on the face of a factually adequate record,
[and] also obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . .
[T]he plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is
so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of
and public confidence in the judicial proceedings. . . .
A party cannot prevail under the plain error doctrine
unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both
so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the
judgment would result in manifest injustice.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Tahir L., 227 Conn. App. 653, 665,
322 A.3d 455, cert. denied,
350 Conn. 913,
324 A.3d 141
(2024). ‘‘[T]he plain error doctrine . . . is not . . . a
rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. That
is, it is a doctrine that this court invokes in order to
rectify a trial court ruling that, although either not properly preserved or never raised at all in the trial court,
nonetheless requires reversal of the trial court’s judgment . . . for reasons of policy.’’ (Internal quotation
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 29
State v. Wright
marks omitted.) State v. Jamison, 320 Conn. 589, 596,
134 A.3d 560 (2016).
With respect to the defendant’s request that we exercise our supervisory authority, we are mindful that
‘‘[b]ypass doctrines permitting the review of unpreserved claims such as [Golding] and plain error, are
generally adequate to protect the rights of the defendant
and the integrity of the judicial system . . . . [T]he
supervisory authority of this state’s appellate courts is
not intended to serve as a bypass to the bypass, permitting the review of unpreserved claims of case specific
error—constitutional or not—that are not otherwise
amenable to relief under Golding or the plain error
doctrine. Rather, the integrity of the judicial system
serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers. . . . Thus, a
defendant seeking review of an unpreserved claim
under our supervisory authority must demonstrate that
his claim is one that, as a matter of policy, is relevant
to the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a
whole, most typically in that it lends itself to the adoption of a procedural rule that will guide the lower courts
in the administration of justice in all aspects of the
criminal process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Leach, 165 Conn. App. 28, 35–36,
138 A.3d 445,
cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948,
169 A.3d 792 (2016). ‘‘Our
supervisory powers are not a last bastion of hope for
every untenable appeal. They are an extraordinary
remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are
such that the issue at hand, [although] not rising to the
level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless of the
utmost seriousness . . . . Thus, we are more likely to
invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct
or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in
Page 28 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
30 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709, 724–25,
275 A.3d 1181 (2022).
‘‘A trial court’s finding that a defendant has voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. . . . It has long been settled
that an accused enjoys a right both at common law and
pursuant to the sixth amendment’s confrontation clause
to be present at all stages of trial. . . . It is also well
settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be
allowed to be present at his trial to the extent that a
fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.
. . . Nevertheless, the defendant’s presence is not
required when the right is waived. . . . [T]he trial court
is authorized to direct the trial or a part thereof to
be conducted in the absence of the defendant who is
represented by counsel if the court determines that he
has waived his right to be present. . . . Waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Waiver
does not have to be express, but may consist of acts
or conduct from which waiver may be implied. . . .
Moreover, whether there has been an intelligent and
competent waiver of the right to presence must depend,
in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case. . . . [W]here the
accused is not in custody, the prevailing rule has been,
that if, after the trial has begun in his presence, he
voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify what
has been done or prevent the completion of the trial,
but, on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right
to be present and leaves the court free to proceed with
the trial in like manner and with like effect as if he
were present.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Hernandez, 197 Conn. App.
257, 262–63,
231 A.3d 266, cert. denied,
335 Conn. 960,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 29
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 31
State v. Wright
239 A.3d 1215 (2020). ‘‘[T]here can be no doubt what-
19
ever that the governmental prerogative to proceed with
a trial may not be defeated by the conduct of [an]
accused that prevents the trial from going forward. . . .
Not only may an accused waive his right to presence
by his misconduct . . . but he may also do so by simply
failing to show up for the trial through no fault of the
state. . . . It is reasonable to assume that a defendant
who had attended his trial for several days and had
knowledge of the date and time of its continuance
would know that as a consequence [of his failure to
appear] the trial could continue in his absence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Simino, 200 Conn. 113, 128–30,
509 A.2d 1039 (1986).
19
In a footnote of his principal appellate brief, the defendant contends
that the record of his habeas trial—which is not part of the record in the
present case, but is before this court in a separate appeal; see footnote 8
of this opinion—establishes as a matter of fact that ‘‘the defendant thought
that the trial would be postponed if he fled, and that Fazzone had given
him that impression.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The defendant requests that
we take this evidence—which he characterizes as ‘‘undisputed’’—‘‘as proof
that [his] failure to appear did not constitute an intentional waiver of his
rights.’’ We decline the defendant’s request.
‘‘Judicial notice . . . meets the objective of establishing facts to which
the offer of evidence would normally be directed. . . . The true concept
of what is judicially known [therefore] is that it is something which is already
in the court’s possession or, at any rate, is so accessible that it is unnecessary
and therefore time wasting to require evidence of it. . . . Thus, judicial
notice properly may be taken of [a court’s findings in another case] only if
those findings reasonably can be said to be not in dispute.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671,
702–703, 741 A.2d 913 (1999). A review of Judge Bhatt’s June 6, 2023 memorandum of decision in the defendant’s habeas case reveals that the defendant
testified in the habeas trial that, after the first day of evidence in his criminal
trial, he had conversations with Fazzone that left him with the impression
that he should flee the jurisdiction, purchase a burner phone, and change
his hair and that, if he fled, the trial would stop and he would be able to hire
alternative counsel. According to the memorandum of decision, however,
Fazzone also testified in the habeas trial that he did not, in any way, advise
the defendant to flee, and in fact advised him against it. Therefore, the
allegedly ‘‘undisputed’’ fact that Fazzone gave the defendant the impression
that his trial would stop if he fled, can, to the contrary, reasonably be said
to be in dispute, rendering it an improper subject of judicial notice.
Page 30 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
32 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
In support of this claim, the defendant argues that,
as of the November 6 hearing, ‘‘[t]he court was on notice
. . . of the desperate circumstances in which the defendant found himself’’ due to ‘‘the incompetence of [Fazzone] and the breakdown in the attorney/client relationship,’’ and should have inferred on that basis that the
defendant posed a flight risk and advised him of what
the consequences would be if he failed to appear for
the remainder of his trial. The defendant further argues
that, in the absence of any such advisement, ‘‘it cannot
be said that [he] waived his right to be present at his
own trial’’ because he was not ‘‘relinquishing a known
right.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) He concedes
that ‘‘Connecticut’s court rules do not currently expressly
require this advisement’’ but, nonetheless, argues that
this court ‘‘should adopt such a rule as an exercise of
its supervisory authority,’’ or that, ‘‘[a]t the very least,
the absence of such an advisement under the circumstances of this case was plain error.’’ He further contends that, by trying and sentencing him in absentia
without having delivered such an advisement, the court
violated his constitutional right to be present at his trial.
In response, the state argues that the defendant’s claim
is largely foreclosed by this court’s decision in State v.
Hernandez, supra,
197 Conn. App. 257, and that he is
not otherwise entitled to relief on this claim. We agree
with the state.
In Hernandez, the defendant, who had been convicted of assault in the first degree, failed to appear for
his sentencing. Id., 259. At the time, the defendant was
at liberty on bail, and the court previously had granted
the defendant’s request to delay sentencing by approximately one month so that he could ‘‘get his affairs in
order.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 259–60.
When the defendant failed to appear, the court called
the bond, ordered the defendant’s rearrest, and then
proceeded to sentence the defendant in absentia to a
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 31
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 33
State v. Wright
term of twenty years of incarceration. Id., 261. On
appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court had
violated his constitutional right to be present at all
critical stages of the trial when it had sentenced him
in absentia, because, inter alia, it had failed to notify
him that sentencing would proceed in his absence if he
did not appear. Id. Because this constitutional claim
was unpreserved, the defendant sought review under
Golding. Id.
This court rejected the defendant’s claim. It concluded that the defendant had waived his constitutional
right to be present at sentencing and that his claim
thus failed under Golding’s third prong. Id., 264–65. It
explained that, ‘‘[w]hile the defendant’s failure to
appear for sentencing alone satisfies waiver in this
case,’’ there was additional evidence in the record that
the defendant knew that he was required to be present
at sentencing and had knowingly and voluntarily relinquished that right. Id., 265. In particular, the court
observed that, in light of the fact that the defendant
was at liberty on bail, ‘‘it would be disingenuous to
suggest that [he] . . . did not know that he had a duty
to appear at sentencing or that he did not know of the
possibility that the sentencing would continue in his
absence.’’ Id. The court also noted that the record was
clear that the defendant was aware that sentencing was
scheduled for the date on which he failed to appear,
yet he elected not to attend. Id.
The court further disagreed that the trial court was
required to advise the defendant, prior to imposing sentence, that sentencing would proceed in his absence.
The court explained that, of the cases cited by the
defendant to support his proposition that such an
advisement was constitutionally required, all were factually distinguishable because they involved defendants
who had been removed from the courtroom due to
disruptive behavior or at their own request, and who
Page 32 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
34 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
were either in police custody or had elected to leave
trial in the middle of proceedings. Id., 267–68. The court
concluded that ‘‘[t]he trial court is not required to preemptively notify a defendant that his case will proceed
in his absence without any indication that he would be
absent at some later time.’’ Id., 268. It reasoned that to
impose such a requirement on the trial court ‘‘would
give the defendant the power to control the court by
unilaterally prevent[ing] his case from going forward,
allowing him to defy the law with impunity, and in
the process, to paralyze the [criminal] proceedings.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the record reflects that at the time
the defendant absented himself from trial, he was—
like the defendant in Hernandez—at liberty on bond.
The record further reflects that, as in Hernandez, the
defendant was aware of the date on which proceedings
would resume, because during the November 6 hearing,
the court clearly and repeatedly informed the defendant
that proceedings would resume on the morning of
November 10, and that the defendant indicated his
understanding of this fact.20 Furthermore, although
there is no indication that the defendant was aware of
the date set for sentencing, the court found, and the
defendant does not contest, that he made no effort to
learn that information and that there was no impediment to his attending his sentencing. The record does
20
For example, at one point the court stated: ‘‘On Monday morning, I
need to conduct a canvass with you as to your ability to represent yourself
if that’s your final decision. If I find that you are not able to represent
yourself . . . then Mr. Fazzone is going to remain your attorney.’’ The defendant replied: ‘‘Yes, Your Honor.’’ At another point, the court stated: ‘‘So, I
guess the defendant’s motion for dismissal and/or removal of counsel, the
court will make a final decision on that Monday morning. It will be the first
order of business. I think in light of that, we should start with that piece
of it at 9:30 on . . . Monday morning.’’ The defendant again stated: ‘‘Yes,
Your Honor.’’ At another point, the court stated that the defense ‘‘needs to
be prepared to present . . . all of its witnesses Monday morning,’’ to which
the defendant again responded, ‘‘Yes, Your Honor.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 33
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 35
State v. Wright
not reflect, nor does the defendant argue, that the state
was in any way at fault for the defendant’s failure to
appear on November 10, or for his sentencing. We therefore agree with the trial court that the defendant’s conduct constituted a waiver of his right to be present at
both his trial and sentencing. As such, the defendant
cannot show that the court violated his constitutional
right to be present or otherwise erred—let alone committed plain error—in trying and sentencing him in
absentia.
We are likewise unconvinced that the trial court
plainly erred or violated the defendant’s constitutional
rights when it failed to inform him of the consequences
of his failure to appear. The defendant’s concession
that such an advisement is not currently required in
Connecticut courts is fatal to his claim of plain error
in this regard, as ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that the trial court’s
proper application of the law existing at the time of
trial cannot constitute reversible error under the plain
error doctrine.’’ State v. Diaz, 302 Conn. 93, 104 n.8,
25 A.3d 594 (2011). As for the defendant’s unpreserved
claim of constitutional error, this court in Hernandez
rejected the argument that an advisement of the sort
the defendant seeks is constitutionally required when
the defendant gives no indication that he will be absent
at a later date. And, despite his assertions to the contrary, the defendant gave no indication of his desire to
flee during the November 6 hearing. To the contrary,
as we previously have discussed, after his requests for
a thirty and fifteen day continuance were denied, the
defendant requested, and the court granted, a ‘‘couple
days’’ to ‘‘pull it together,’’ implying that, the denial of
his requests for more time notwithstanding, the defendant intended to continue with the trial—whether counseled or in a self-represented capacity—on the following Monday. Moreover, the record reflects that, during
the November 6 hearing, the defendant repeatedly
Page 34 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
36 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
assented whenever the court discussed its plans to
resume proceedings on November 10. See footnote 20
of this opinion. Although the defendant argues that the
court should have inferred that he was likely to flee
because Fazzone was allegedly incompetent, and it was
clear that there had been a breakdown in their relationship, he cites no authority for the proposition that a
defendant’s dissatisfaction with his counsel’s performance, standing alone, is a sufficient basis from which
to conclude that the defendant is a flight risk, especially
when the defendant gives contrary indicia of his intent
to appear for future proceedings.
We further reject the defendant’s argument that we
should, through the exercise of our supervisory authority, impose a rule requiring that trial judges inform criminal defendants of the consequences of a failure to
appear whenever they reasonably conclude that the
defendant poses a risk of flight. The defendant has not
demonstrated that the failure to give such advisements
presents a ‘‘pervasive and significant problem’’ sufficient to justify the promulgation of a new rule pursuant
to our supervisory authority. State v. Hill, 307 Conn.
689, 706,
59 A.3d 196 (2013). Moreover, as we have
already determined, the defendant’s responses to the
court during the November 6 hearing indicated not that
he had any intention of fleeing but that he would appear
the following Monday; accordingly, we have no occasion, under the circumstances of this case, to establish
the rule that the defendant seeks. See, e.g., State v.
Weatherspoon, 332 Conn. 531, 553,
212 A.3d 208 (2019)
(declining defendant’s invitation to exercise supervisory authority to promulgate rule prohibiting generic
tailoring arguments, where record showed that prosecution made specific rather than generic tailoring argument, and ‘‘we do not disapprove of specific tailoring
arguments when they are warranted by the evidentiary
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 35
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 37
State v. Wright
record’’). As such, the defendant has not made a showing that this case presents circumstances ‘‘extraordinary’’ enough to merit the exercise of our supervisory
authority. The defendant’s claim therefore fails.
IV
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly denied Fazzone’s motion for a mistrial when the
defendant failed to appear on November 10, 2014. We
disagree.
‘‘[Although] the remedy of a mistrial is permitted
under the rules of practice, it is not favored. . . . If
curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic
remedy of a mistrial should be avoided. . . . The trial
court enjoys wide discretion in deciding whether a mistrial is warranted . . . and its evaluation as to events
occurring before the jury is to be accorded the highest
deference. . . . Every reasonable presumption will be
given in favor of the trial court’s ruling . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tarver, 166 Conn.
App. 304, 326,
141 A.3d 940, cert. denied,
323 Conn. 908,
150 A.3d 683 (2016). ‘‘On appeal, we hesitate to disturb
a decision not to declare a mistrial. The trial judge is
the arbiter of the many circumstances which may arise
during the trial in which [her] function is to assure a
fair and just outcome. . . . The trial court is better
positioned than we are to evaluate in the first instance
whether a certain occurrence is prejudicial to the defendant and, if so, what remedy is necessary to cure that
prejudice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Walker, 80 Conn. App. 542, 553,
835 A.2d 1058 (2003),
cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902,
845 A.2d 406 (2004).
We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
denial of Fazzone’s motion for a mistrial. As we previously have explained, the trial court properly concluded that the defendant had waived his right to be
present when, while at liberty on bond, he failed to
Page 36 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
38 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
appear at his trial through no fault of the state, despite
having been clearly informed that trial would resume
on November 10. See, e.g., State v. Parham, 174 Conn.
500, 506,
391 A.2d 148 (1978) (where court could reasonably conclude that defendant waived right to be present
by voluntarily absenting himself from trial after two
days of evidence, and defendant made no showing that
he was unable to appear through no fault of his own,
denial of defense motion for mistrial on basis of defendant’s absence was not erroneous). The court was not
obliged to ‘‘[permit] [the] defendant unilaterally to prevent his case from going forward’’ by granting him the
benefit of a mistrial when he failed to appear. State v.
Drakeford, supra,
202 Conn. 81. Moreover, the court
provided a curative instruction to the jury, directing it
not to draw any inferences adverse to the defendant
as a result of his absence or otherwise speculate as to
why he was not present in court, and ‘‘in the absence
of a showing that the jury failed or declined to follow the
court’s instructions, we presume that the jury followed
them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v.
Jones, 229 Conn. App. 487, 535 n.40,
327 A.3d 941 (2024),
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 923,
333 A.3d 105 (2025), and
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 923,
333 A.3d 106 (2025). The
court acted well within its discretion in determining
that such an instruction could obviate any prejudice that
the defendant had brought upon himself by voluntarily
absenting himself from the proceedings.
Although Fazzone did not articulate his request for
a mistrial in constitutional terms, the defendant nonetheless claims on appeal that the court’s denial of Fazzone’s motion for a mistrial ‘‘raises a deprivation of
the defendant’s due process rights under [the] federal
[constitution],’’ and the defendant seeks Golding review
of this unpreserved constitutional claim. He further
argues that the court was obligated, in light of Fazzone’s
allegedly poor performance, to grant the motion for a
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 37
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 39
State v. Wright
mistrial in order to protect the defendant’s right to
competent counsel—an argument that Fazzone never
presented to the trial court. Although his principal appellate brief is somewhat unclear on this point, we understand the defendant’s unpreserved claim of constitutional error to be that his right to counsel, as guaranteed
by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the federal
constitution, imposed a duty on the trial court to grant
a mistrial in light of Fazzone’s claimed deficiencies.
However, ‘‘[s]ince this argument is, in essence, a disguised allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel,
it is governed by our decisions requiring such claims
to be pursued on a petition for a new trial or on a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than on
direct appeal, so that a complete factual record can be
developed.’’ State v. Gonzalez, supra,
205 Conn. 684;
see also footnote 14 of this opinion. Accordingly,
because the record is inadequate for review of this
claim, it fails under the first prong of Golding.
V
The defendant next claims that the court should have
sua sponte discharged Fazzone as his counsel and
declared a mistrial because, ‘‘[b]y the end of the second
day of evidence, Fazzone had demonstrated to the court
that he did not have the minimum level of competence
to continue as defense counsel, and was ill-equipped
to provide even minimally effective assistance of counsel to the defendant.’’ The defendant claims that, by
failing to do so, the court committed plain error. We
decline to review this claim.
The defendant’s claim is substantially identical to the
unpreserved constitutional claim that we discuss in part
IV of this opinion. We have already determined that the
record is inadequate for our review of that claim under
Golding, and where ‘‘the record is inadequate for review
under Golding it is also inadequate for consideration
Page 38 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
40 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
under the plain error doctrine.’’ Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 69 n.3,
967 A.2d
41 (2009). We therefore conclude that the record is
inadequate for our review of this claim and decline to
review it.
VI
Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court
improperly relied on the rape shield statute to prevent
him from cross-examining the victim about a false allegation of sexual misconduct that she allegedly had made
against T.21 In response, the state argues that the defendant ‘‘myopically’’ overlooks the fact that the trial court
also precluded him from asking about the victim’s
alleged allegation on the ground that there was no good
faith basis for such a line of questioning. The defendant
does not address the state’s argument in his reply brief.
We conclude that this claim is nonjusticiable because
the defendant has failed to challenge all of the bases
for the trial court’s adverse ruling, and, accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal as to this claim as moot.22
21
At certain points in his principal appellate brief, the defendant also
appears to contend that the trial court improperly barred him from asking
the victim about an allegation of sexual misconduct she allegedly had made
against her friend’s brother. See part II of this opinion. Our review of the
transcript of November 5, 2014, however, reveals that, although Fazzone
did state that he intended to inquire both as to this claimed allegation and
as to the claimed allegation that the victim had made against T, when pressed
by the trial court as to the relevance of the former line of inquiry, Fazzone
backed down, stating that he did not ‘‘want to rock the boat’’ and that he
‘‘stood by his contentions’’ only with respect to his question about the
victim’s allegation against T. The court then proceeded to rule that the
defendant lacked a good faith basis for asking about the alleged allegation
against T. The court did not, however—and was not asked to—rule on the
permissibility of any questions the defendant may have had about a past
allegation of sexual misconduct against the brother of the victim’s friend.
To the extent that the defendant challenges any such ruling, he challenges
a ruling that the trial court never made, and we cannot pass on the correctness of such a ruling. See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 135 Conn. App. 193,
202,
41 A.3d 694, cert. denied,
307 Conn. 904,
53 A.3d 219 (2012).
22
Although the state does not couch its argument in jurisdictional terms,
its contention that the defendant failed to challenge an independent basis
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 39
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 41
State v. Wright
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
addressed as a threshold matter because it implicates
this court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . [I]t is not
the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief
or from the determination of which no practical relief
can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way. . . . Where
an appellant fails to challenge all bases for a trial court’s
adverse ruling on his claim, even if this court were to
agree with the appellant on the issues that he does
raise, we still would not be able to provide [him] any
relief in light of the binding adverse finding[s] [not
raised] with respect to those claims. . . . Therefore,
when an appellant challenges a trial court’s adverse
ruling, but does not challenge all independent bases
for that ruling, the appeal is moot.’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Lester, 324 Conn. 519, 526–27,
153 A.3d 647
(2017).
We previously have set forth the procedural history
relevant to this claim in part II B of this opinion. In
support of his claim, the defendant argues that the trial
court erroneously concluded that the rape shield statute
barred him from asking about the victim’s alleged allegation against T. He contends that the rape shield statute ‘‘prohibits questions into the complainant’s own
for the court’s adverse ruling implicates our subject matter jurisdiction,
which we are required to address once raised. See, e.g., Housatonic Railroad
Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 275 n.4,
21 A.3d
759 (2011). The defendant had the opportunity to respond to the state’s
argument in his reply brief but elected not to do so. See, e.g., Fischer v.
M&T Bank, N. A., 233 Conn. App. 147, 152–53,
338 A.3d 1222 (2025) (dismissing appeal for lack of appellate standing where issue of standing was raised
by defendants in appellate brief and plaintiff did not address issue in reply
brief or when asked during oral argument). Accordingly, we conclude that
the defendant has been afforded an adequate opportunity to address whether
the appeal should be dismissed as moot with respect to this claim.
Page 40 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
42 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Wright
prior sexual history, not into evidence of the complainant’s lack of veracity.’’ (Emphasis in original.) As the
state correctly points out, however, the defendant
ignores the fact that the trial court precluded him from
asking about the victim’s alleged allegation against T
primarily on the separate ground that Fazzone lacked
a good faith basis for asking that question. See, e.g.,
State v. Henry, 72 Conn. App. 640, 666,
805 A.2d 823
(‘‘[a] good faith basis on the part of examining counsel
as to the truth of the matter contained in questions
propounded to a witness on cross-examination is
required’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
denied, 262 Conn. 917,
811 A.2d 1293 (2002). The defendant not only fails to challenge this separate basis for
the trial court’s decision; at one point, he appears
expressly to concede the correctness of the court’s
ruling, stating: ‘‘It is true that . . . Fazzone failed to
provide any sort of cogent explanation of why this line
of questioning was proper and permitted under the
[Connecticut] Code [of Evidence].’’ Therefore, even if
we were to agree with the defendant that the trial court’s
interpretation of the rape shield statute was erroneous,
we would not be able to provide him any practical relief
on his claim. See, e.g., State v. Lester, supra,
324 Conn.
528. We therefore conclude that this claim is moot and,
accordingly, that we lack subject matter jurisdiction to
review it.23
23
In the section of his principal appellate brief discussing the reviewability
of this claim, the defendant contends that Fazzone preserved his objection
to the trial court’s ruling but, in the alternative, ‘‘submits that the claim is
also reviewable [under Golding] as it involves a violation of [the defendant’s]
constitutional right to confront witnesses and to cross-examination . . . as
required under the sixth amendment.’’ We agree that the defendant properly
preserved his claim, and thus we need not analyze the Golding prongs. To
the extent, however, that the defendant seeks now to raise a separate
unpreserved constitutional claim that his right to confrontation afforded
him a right to unfettered cross-examination of the victim, regardless of
whether his questions had a good faith basis, we disagree. The defendant
cites no authority for and provides no substantive analysis for any such
claim, rendering it inadequately briefed. Moreover, such a claim is contrary
to well established law. The confrontation clause ‘‘guarantees only an oppor-
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 41
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 43
State v. Wright
The appeal is dismissed as to the defendant’s claim
that the trial court improperly precluded him from asking the victim about a prior accusation of sexual misconduct that she allegedly had made; the judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
tunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish . . . .
Thus, [t]he confrontation clause does not . . . suspend the rules of evidence
to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Halili, 175 Conn. App.
838, 850,
168 A.3d 565, cert. denied,
327 Conn. 961,
172 A.3d 1261 (2017).
‘‘[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the [c]onfrontation [c]lause
is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based
on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant . . . . [W]e have upheld restrictions on the scope of
cross-examination where the defendant’s allegations of witness bias lack any
apparent factual foundation and thus appear to be mere fishing expeditions.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 853.
