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State v. Ragalis
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RYAN E. RAGALIS
(AC 46652)
Moll, Suarez and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of various crimes in connection with a motor vehicle accident
involving a pedestrian, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant
claimed, inter alia, that his conviction of assault in the second degree with
a motor vehicle and assault in the second degree, arising from a single
occurrence, violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to
the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution. Held:
The defendant could not prevail on his claim that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle
and assault in the second degree, as the state adduced ample evidence for
the jury to reasonably conclude that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle that struck
the victim, that the defendant’s intoxication caused the victim’s injuries,
and that the victim suffered serious physical injuries.
The defendant’s conviction of assault in the second degree with a motor
vehicle and assault in the second degree did not violate double jeopardy
because the defendant failed to establish a clear legislative intent to treat
the relevant statutes (§§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and 53a-60d) as one offense for double
jeopardy purposes pursuant to Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299),
as the statute and the information on each charge at issue required proof
of elements that the statute and the information on the other charge did
not, neither statute refers to the other, each statute sets a different penalty,
and the statutes have distinct purposes, and the fact that the same evidence
was used to establish that the defendant committed each crime was irrelevant.
The trial court’s supplemental instruction to the jury in response to a note
it received regarding whether ‘‘serious physical injury’’ to the victim must
be long-term did not mislead the jurors, as the court answered the jury’s
question and that answer was correct in law, the court did not state that
permanence was not a factor that the jury could consider in determining
whether the victim sustained a serious physical injury, and the court referred
the jury to its original instructions, a copy of which was in the jury’s possession, and those instructions provided the correct definition of ‘‘serious physical injury.’’
Argued April 15—officially released October 7, 2025
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State v. Ragalis
Procedural History
Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first part, with the crimes of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs, assault in the second degree with a
motor vehicle, assault in the second degree, and evasion
of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle,
and, in the second part, with the crime of operating a
motor vehicle while the operator’s license was under
suspension, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New London, where the first part of the
information was tried to the jury before K. Murphy, J.;
verdict of guilty of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs,
assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle, and
assault in the second degree; thereafter, the second part
of the information was tried to the court, K. Murphy,
J.; finding of guilty; subsequently, the defendant was
presented to the court, K. Murphy, J., on a plea of
guilty to having previously been convicted of operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs; judgment of guilty in accordance
with the verdict and the finding, and sentence enhanced
in accordance with the plea, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Kayla R. Stephen, deputy assistant public defender,
for the appellant (defendant).
Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Paul Narducci, state’s
attorney, and David J. Smith, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Ryan E. Ragalis, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
jury trial, of assault in the second degree with a motor
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State v. Ragalis
vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60d1 and
assault in the second degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (3).2 On appeal, the defendant
claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle
and assault in the second degree, (2) his conviction of
assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and
assault in the second degree violates the double jeopardy clause of the United States constitution, and (3)
the trial court’s supplemental instructions to the jury
in response to a note misled the jury.3 We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
On the basis of the evidence presented, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the
evening of June 16, 2019, Bethany Billing (victim), was
at Pizzetta, a restaurant and bar located on Water Street
in Mystic, with friends. The victim and her friend, Jessica Clapper, left Pizzetta and walked across the street.
Shortly after midnight, while walking back to Pizzetta,
1
General Statutes § 53a-60d (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of assault
in the second degree with a motor vehicle when, while operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he
causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the
effect of such liquor or drug.’’
2
General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is
guilty of assault in the second degree when . . . (3) the actor recklessly
causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly
weapon or a dangerous instrument . . . .’’
3
The jury also found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of
General Statutes § 14-227a. Thereafter, the defendant pleaded guilty to the
charge in the state’s part B information of having previously been convicted
of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or drugs in violation of § 14-227a as a repeat offender. Following a trial to
the court, the defendant also was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle
while his operator’s license was under suspension in violation of General
Statutes § 14-215 (c). The defendant does not challenge his conviction of
these offenses on appeal.
The defendant also was charged with one count of evasion of responsibility
in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224
(b) (1). The jury found him not guilty of that charge.
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State v. Ragalis
Clapper saw a vehicle stopped in front of another restaurant farther down the street. Clapper and the victim
began to cross the street,4 when Clapper felt a ‘‘swoosh’’
and saw the victim’s body being thrown in front of
Pizzetta by a vehicle. At the time of the impact, Clapper
and the victim were on the side of the roadway closest
to Pizzetta.
An eyewitness to the Water Street accident (first accident),5 Patrick Scheurer, was working that night as a
bouncer at a bar located diagonally across the street
from Pizzetta. Scheurer was sitting outside the bar when
he heard an engine ‘‘rev.’’ He looked down the street
and saw a dark sedan back up, nearly hitting another
vehicle, and then slam on its brakes. He observed the
vehicle driving forward down the street, hitting the victim and leaving the scene.
Jose Cepeda-Grullon, an Uber driver, was driving
toward Pizzetta when he first observed the vehicle that
struck the victim.6 Cepeda-Grullon saw the vehicle back
up out of a parking lot, almost hitting his vehicle. After
Cepeda-Grullon honked his horn, the vehicle began
accelerating forward. Cepeda-Grullon continued to drive
forward, following the other vehicle, and saw two
women crossing the street, heading toward Pizzetta. He
4
Clapper and the victim did not cross the street in a crosswalk. Clapper
had been drinking alcohol on the night of the accident. Although the victim
did not have any memory of the accident, Officer Brenna Bolduc of the
Groton Police Department, who responded to the scene, testified at trial
that she had noted in her police report that the victim was most likely
intoxicated.
5
As will be discussed in greater detail in this opinion, shortly after the
victim was struck on Water Street, the defendant was involved in an accident
in Stonington, in which he was found in a vehicle that had hit a fence and
crashed into a tree. For clarity, we refer to the accident involving the victim
that occurred in Mystic as the ‘‘first accident,’’ and to the accident that
occurred subsequently in Stonington as the ‘‘second accident.’’
6
At various points during the trial, Cepeda-Grullon was referred to as Cepeda.
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State v. Ragalis
then saw the vehicle strike the victim with the right
side of its bumper and leave the scene.
Police officers quickly arrived at the scene of the first
accident. Lieutenant Anthony LaFleur of the Groton
Police Department collected evidence, including the
plastic casing for a vehicle mirror that was later found
to be from the defendant’s vehicle. Video surveillance
footage was acquired from the area of the accident.
The footage shows two females walking down Water
Street and then crossing the street toward Pizzetta.
Subsequently, the footage shows a dark colored vehicle,
similar to the vehicle in which the defendant was later
found at the scene of a second accident in Stonington
(second accident), striking one of the females and leaving the scene. The footage depicts Cepeda-Grullon’s
vehicle following the dark colored vehicle from the first
accident scene.
As Cepeda-Grullon pursued the vehicle, he lost sight
of it twice. Before Cepeda-Grullon lost sight of the vehicle the second time, he saw the vehicle on the left side
of the road. At first, he passed the vehicle. At this time,
however, Cepeda-Grullon was on the phone with a 911
operator, who instructed him to go back to the location
where he had seen the vehicle on the left side of the
road. He arrived at the second accident scene less than
two minutes later. By the time he arrived, the vehicle
had hit a fence and crashed into a tree, facing oncoming
traffic. Cepeda-Grullon told the police that he saw only
one individual in the vehicle, in the driver’s seat.7 He
described the individual as a younger white male with
short dark hair and a black beard.8
Although Cepeda-Grullon testified at trial that he never saw the defendant
7
exit his vehicle, Groton Police Officer Shawn Paradis testified that Cepeda-Grullon had told him that he did see the defendant exit the vehicle.
8
Cepeda-Grullon’s physical description of the individual in the vehicle
was consistent with video footage taken from the body camera of Officer
Shawn Paradis of the Groton Police Department, which depicts the defendant at the scene of the second accident and at the hospital.
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State v. Ragalis
Shortly after the first accident in Mystic, the police
responded to the scene of the second accident in Stonington. Police officers and emergency personnel
removed the individual, who later was identified by
Officer Shawn Paradis of the Groton Police Department
as the defendant, from the vehicle. The defendant’s
identification was found inside the vehicle. A DNA profile produced from a swab of the passenger side door
of the defendant’s vehicle was later found to match a
known DNA profile from the victim. At the scene of
the second accident, the defendant exhibited aggression and slurred speech.
The defendant was taken from the scene of the second accident to Lawrence + Memorial Hospital by
ambulance. Paradis followed in his police cruiser. At
the hospital, the defendant became combative and had
to be restrained. The defendant appeared intoxicated
at the hospital. Paradis, who assisted the staff in
restraining the defendant, smelled alcohol on the defendant and noted that his eyes were bloodshot, red, and
glossy.9 Paradis also observed that the defendant lacked
coordination when trying to stand and saw the defendant swaying while sitting up in his bed. Blood tests
revealed that the defendant had an elevated blood alcohol content of 0.27.
The victim was also transported to Lawrence +
Memorial Hospital from the scene, where she was intubated and admitted to the intensive care unit. She stayed
at the hospital for more than one week. The victim
exhibited severe confusion at the hospital. As a result
of the accident, the victim was diagnosed with a closed
head injury, fractures to her neck, back, pelvis, and
teeth, and required a total of twenty-five staples to
9
The police did not perform field sobriety tests of the defendant at the
scene of the second accident, but Paradis observed that the defendant
exhibited nystagmus, which Paradis testified is the ‘‘bouncing . . . involuntary control of [one’s] eyes’’ and is indicative of intoxication.
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State v. Ragalis
repair scalp lacerations. She also had a broken nose,
numerous scrapes and abrasions, and received stitches
in her chin. After being discharged, the victim had extensive dental work to repair her teeth. She required medical treatment for six or seven months thereafter. For
approximately three months, the victim had to live with
her parents because she was not able to care for herself.
The victim testified that, as of the time of trial, she
continued to have problems with her short-term memory, as well as constant neck and lower back pain.
The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged
in a substitute information containing two parts. In the
first part, the defendant was charged with operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle,
assault in the second degree, and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of
General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (1). He was charged, in
the second part, with operating a motor vehicle while
his operator’s license was under suspension. The defendant was also charged in a separate part B information
with previously having been convicted of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a.
The first part of the operative information was tried
to the jury. At trial, the state presented testimony from
several witnesses, including, inter alia, Clapper, Scheurer,
Cepeda-Grullon, the victim, the victim’s mother, and
the investigating officers. On the first day of trial, Groton Police Officer Brenna Bolduc testified regarding
her response to the first accident scene. She was dispatched at approximately 12:15 a.m. and, upon arrival,
saw the victim lying on the sidewalk adjacent to Water
Street. Bolduc followed the ambulance that transported
the victim to the hospital, where Bolduc also encountered the defendant, whom she described as ‘‘hostile
. . . .’’ The next day, Bolduc was recalled by the state
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State v. Ragalis
and testified regarding her training and experience as
a ‘‘drug recognition expert.’’10 Bolduc testified regarding
the effects of a person who is under the influence of
alcohol, including its effects on a person’s ability to
perceive events and to operate a motor vehicle. She also
testified that ‘‘alcohol is considered a central nervous
system depressant. So, under that category of drugs, it
would slow your central nervous system and cause slow
motor skills and slower functioning.’’
After the prosecutor rested the state’s case-in-chief,
defense counsel made an oral motion for judgment of
acquittal on all counts, which the court denied. Thereafter, the defense presented testimony from Captain
Gregory J. McCarthy, Groton Police Department’s shift
commander at the time of the accident. When asked
by defense counsel why an accident reconstruction was
not completed at the scene of the first accident, McCarthy testified that there were not any skid marks, yaw
marks, or other vehicles on the roadway and that,
‘‘[w]ithout skid marks or yaw marks or a vehicle at the
scene, you cannot truly place the vehicle right there
and . . . make measurements . . . .’’
The jury found the defendant guilty of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence, assault in the
second degree with a motor vehicle, and assault in the
second degree, but not guilty of evasion of responsibility. The defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the
charge in the part B information, and the court found
the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle while
his operator’s license was under suspension. On April
27, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the
verdict, which the court denied on May 1, 2023. On May
1, 2023, the court sentenced the defendant to a total
10
Bolduc testified that a drug recognition expert is a person who has
‘‘received advanced training and . . . [has] the ability to use a scientifically
validated process to determine if somebody is under the influence of a drug.’’
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State v. Ragalis
effective term of fifteen years of incarceration, suspended after twelve years, one year of which was mandatory, followed by five years of probation. This appeal
followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
I
We first address the defendant’s claim that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of assault in the
second degree with a motor vehicle and assault in the
second degree. Specifically, he argues that there was
insufficient evidence that (1) he was the operator of
the motor vehicle that struck the victim, (2) his alleged
intoxication caused the victim’s injuries, and (3) the
victim suffered serious physical injuries. We disagree.
We begin our analysis with well settled legal principles governing our review of evidentiary sufficiency
claims, including our standard of review. ‘‘In reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the
facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have
concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘[T]he jury must find every element proven beyond
a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty
of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and
inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic
fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to
consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether
the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the
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State v. Ragalis
defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean
proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof
beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every
hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that,
had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would
have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do
not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of
fact’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosa, 233 Conn. App. 211, 217–18,
338
A.3d 1207 (2025), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June
26, 2025) (No. 240414).
‘‘Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force
of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of
evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . .
It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving
substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating
evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept
as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with
the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact]
may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or
facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Calabrese, 279 Conn. 393, 402–403,
902 A.2d
1044 (2006).
A
The defendant first argues that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that he was the operator of the
motor vehicle that struck the victim. We are not persuaded.
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State v. Ragalis
Counts two and three of the operative substitute
information charged the defendant with assault in the
second degree with a motor vehicle and assault in the
second degree on factual allegations that the defendant,
‘‘while operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of intoxicating liquor . . . cause[d] serious physical
injury to . . . [the victim], as a consequence of the
effects of such liquor and drugs,’’ and ‘‘recklessly
cause[d] serious physical injury to . . . [the victim] by
means of a dangerous instrument.’’11 To convict a defendant of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle, the state must prove that the defendant, ‘‘while
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both . . . causes serious
physical injury to another person as a consequence of
the effect of such liquor or drug.’’ General Statutes
§ 53a-60d (a). Because operating a motor vehicle is an
essential element of the crime of assault in the second
degree with a motor vehicle, ‘‘that element must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ State v. Teti, 50
Conn. App. 34, 39,
716 A.2d 931, cert. denied,
247 Conn.
921,
722 A.2d 812 (1998). A person ‘‘operates a motor
vehicle within the meaning of § 14-227a (a) (2) when
in the vehicle he intentionally does any act or makes
use of any mechanical or electrical agency [that] alone
or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of
11
A motor vehicle qualifies as a ‘‘dangerous instrument’’ under § 53a-60
(a) (3). See General Statutes § 53a-3 (7) (‘‘ ‘[d]angerous instrument’ means
any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in
which it is used or attempted or threatened to be used, is capable of causing
death or serious physical injury, and includes a ‘vehicle’ as that term is
defined in this section’’); see also, e.g., State v. Rios, 171 Conn. App. 1, 26,
156 A.3d 18, cert. denied,
325 Conn. 914,
159 A.3d 232 (2017). At trial, the
evidence offered to prove that the defendant operated a motor vehicle under
§ 53a-60d was the same evidence offered to prove that he used a dangerous
instrument to cause the victim’s injuries under § 53a-60 (a) (3). We conclude,
for the reasons stated in this opinion, that there was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the defendant operated a motor vehicle under § 53a-60d
and that he utilized a dangerous instrument for purposes of § 53a-60 (a) (3).
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State v. Ragalis
the vehicle.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
38. We interpret the meaning of the term ‘‘operating’’
in § 53a-60d similarly in the present case. Moreover, to
convict a defendant of assault in the second degree
under § 53a-60 (a) (3), the state must prove that the
defendant ‘‘recklessly causes serious physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument . . . .’’ Accordingly, the use of a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument is an essential
element of assault in the second degree. See, e.g., State
v. Chapman, 46 Conn. App. 24, 33–34,
698 A.2d 347,
cert. denied, 243 Conn. 947,
704 A.2d 800 (1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1063,
118 S. Ct. 1393,
140 L. Ed. 2d
652 (1998).
In the present case, the state adduced evidence from
Cepeda-Grullon, which was corroborated by video surveillance footage, that he had been following the defendant’s vehicle when he saw it hit the victim and leave
the first accident scene. Cepeda-Grullon then testified
that he pursued the vehicle and ultimately located it at
the second accident scene. Police officers identified the
defendant as the individual in the driver’s seat of the
vehicle that crashed at the second accident scene. A
plastic casing that was found to match the defendant’s
vehicle was found at the first accident scene, and the
victim’s DNA was found on the defendant’s vehicle.
Moreover, the police responded to the second accident
scene only a short time after the first accident. Considering the combined impact of all of the foregoing evidence, the jury reasonably could have concluded that
the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was the operator of the vehicle that
struck the victim.
The defendant’s attacks on the evidence introduced
by the state are unavailing. The defendant argues that
‘‘neither [Clapper] nor [Scheurer], who both witnessed
the accident, testified that they could see inside of the
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State v. Ragalis
vehicle, how many passengers there were, or the identity of the driver.’’ There was evidence, however, that
Cepeda-Grullon observed the vehicle strike the victim,
followed the vehicle from the first accident scene, and
found the same vehicle at the second accident scene
only a short time later. Although Cepeda-Grullon lost
sight of the vehicle on two occasions, he found the
vehicle at the second accident scene, where the defendant was found in the driver’s seat. Cepeda-Grullon
then provided a physical description of the driver to
the investigating officers, which was similar to that of
the defendant.12 The defendant also relies on Cepeda-Grullon’s testimony that he did not see anyone exit
the vehicle after the second accident and was not 100
percent certain that there was only one person in the
vehicle; however, there is no evidence that any person
other than the defendant was in the vehicle or that any
other person was seen near the vehicle at the second
accident scene. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 179 Conn. App.
734, 750–51,
181 A.3d 118 (determining that there was
sufficient evidence that defendant was operator of
motor vehicle when there was ample evidence that he
had operated vehicle just prior to his arrest), cert.
denied, 328 Conn. 927,
182 A.3d 637 (2018); State v.
Sienkiewicz, 162 Conn. App. 407, 411,
131 A.3d 1222
12
We note that, although the defendant argues that Cepeda-Grullon ‘‘was
never asked by the police to identify the driver of the vehicle and did not
make an identification of the driver in court,’’ the jury could still rely on
the physical description of the driver that Cepeda-Grullon gave to the police
as circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., State v. Makins, 232 Conn. App. 199,
215–16, 335 A.3d 67 (2025), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June 10, 2025)
(No. 240398). The defendant’s argument that the jury had to ‘‘speculate’’
that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle because he was taken
to the hospital is belied by the evidence, including that his identification
was located inside the vehicle and that Cepeda-Grullon saw the defendant
in the driver’s seat. Moreover, Cepeda-Grullon was prevented from identifying the defendant in court because the court had sustained defense counsel’s own objection to such an identification, pursuant to State v. Dickson,
322 Conn. 410, 445–47,
141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert. denied,
582 U.S. 922,
137
S. Ct. 2263,
198 L. Ed. 2d 713 (2017).
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State v. Ragalis
(concluding that there was sufficient evidence of element of operation of motor vehicle when defendant
was in driver’s seat and no one else was observed in
vicinity), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 924,
134 A.3d 621
(2016).
The defendant’s attempt to distinguish State v. Teti,
supra, 50 Conn. App. 34, is not persuasive.13 In Teti,
this court held that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant operated a vehicle while
under the influence of liquor or drugs for purposes of
§ 14-227a. See id., 40–41. Although the defendant in that
case argued that the evidence did not preclude the
‘‘reasonable hypothesis’’ that a third party had operated
the vehicle; id., 41; this court held that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant operated
the vehicle on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
including that there was only one set of footprints in
the snow coming from the vehicle, that those footprints
matched the defendant’s, and that the ‘‘only footprints
in the area were those of the defendant and the police
officers.’’ Id., 40. In the present case, there was no
evidence that another individual was operating the vehicle or was in the vicinity of the second accident, where
the vehicle was found.
In short, the defendant asks us to draw inferences
from the evidence consistent with his theory of innocence. The jury, however, was not required to draw
13
The defendant also attempts to distinguish State v. Tine, 137 Conn. App.
483,
48 A.3d 722, cert. denied,
307 Conn. 919,
54 A.3d 562 (2012), on the
ground that, in Tine, the state had the benefit of the statutory presumption
in General Statutes § 14-107 (b) with respect to the element of operation
because the defendant owned the vehicle involved in the accident. See id.,
489; see also General Statutes § 14-107 (b) (‘‘[w]henever there occurs a
violation of section . . . 14-224 . . . proof of the registration number of
any motor vehicle therein concerned shall be prima facie evidence in any
criminal action . . . that the owner was the operator thereof’’). Although
it is true that the statutory presumption in § 14-107 (b) is not applicable in
the present case, the jury had more than sufficient evidence before it, even
in the absence of such a presumption, from which it reasonably could
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State v. Ragalis
only those inferences consistent with innocence. See
State v. Calabrese, supra, 279 Conn. 402–403. Accordingly, although the state relied on circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant was the operator of
the vehicle, that evidence was amply sufficient for the
jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant was the
operator of the vehicle that struck the victim. See, e.g.,
State v. Seeley, 326 Conn. 65, 76,
161 A.3d 1278 (2017)
(‘‘[w]hen evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence,
[t]here is no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Sienkiewicz, supra, 162 Conn. App. 410 (‘‘[t]here is no requirement that the fact of operation be established by direct
evidence’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
B
The defendant also argues that there was ‘‘no evidence presented that the defendant’s intoxication was
the proximate cause of the accident.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) We disagree.
Causation is an essential element of the crimes of
assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and
assault in the second degree. See General Statutes § 53a-
60 (a) (‘‘[a] person is guilty of assault in the second
degree when . . . (3) the actor recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument’’ (emphasis
added)); see also General Statutes § 53a-60d (‘‘[a] person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a
motor vehicle when, while operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug
or both, he causes serious physical injury to another
person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor
have concluded that the defendant operated the motor vehicle that struck
the victim.
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State v. Ragalis
or drug’’ (emphasis added)). ‘‘In order for legal causation to exist in a criminal prosecution, the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was both the cause in fact, or actual cause, as well as
the proximate cause of the victim’s injuries. . . . In
order that conduct be the actual cause of a particular
result it is almost always sufficient that the result would
not have happened in the absence of the conduct; or,
putting it another way, that but for the antecedent conduct the result would not have occurred. . . . On the
other hand, proximate cause requires that the forbidden
result which actually occurs must be enough similar
to, and occur in a manner enough similar to, the result
or manner which the defendant intended (in the case
of crimes of intention), or the result or manner which
his reckless or negligent conduct created a risk of happening (in the case of crimes of recklessness and negligence) that the defendant may fairly be held responsible
for the actual result even though it does differ or happens in a different way from the intended or hazarded
result . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Leroy, 232 Conn. 1, 5–6 n.6,
653 A.2d 161 (1995).
The defendant argues that evidence of his alleged
intoxication was insufficient, standing alone, to establish causation. Contrary to the defendant’s argument
that the state did not present any evidence of the ‘‘effect
of [his] intoxication’’ on the victim’s injuries; (emphasis
omitted); we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have
inferred that his intoxication caused the victim’s injuries. Here, the evidence revealed that the defendant’s
blood alcohol content was 0.27, well above the legal
limit. During trial, the jury heard testimony from Bolduc, who testified that alcohol intoxication inhibits a
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State v. Ragalis
person’s ability to drive.14 She further testified that alcohol acts as a central nervous system depressant, which
can slow motor skills and functioning. The jurors could
have inferred, on the basis of Bolduc’s testimony and
their own common knowledge and experience, that the
defendant’s intoxication while operating a motor vehicle caused the victim’s injuries. ‘‘The condition of intoxication and its common accompaniments are a matter
of general knowledge.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gordon, 84 Conn. App. 519, 528,
854 A.2d
74, cert. denied,
271 Conn. 941,
861 A.2d 516 (2004).
Moreover, the jury heard evidence from eyewitnesses
that the defendant almost backed into Cepeda-Grullon’s
vehicle, accelerated toward the victim, hit the victim
without braking before the impact, and then left the
scene.15 See, e.g., State v. Guitard, 61 Conn. App. 531,
14
The defendant argues that Bolduc did not respond to the scene of the
second accident or administer any field sobriety tests to the defendant and
that Bolduc did not become a drug recognition expert until after the accident.
We agree with the state, however, that Bolduc’s recall testimony related to
the general effects of alcohol and that there was other direct evidence of
the defendant’s intoxication.
The defendant also asserts, for the first time in his reply brief, that Bolduc
was not an expert witness and that expert testimony was required to demonstrate the effects of his intoxication. First, ‘‘[i]t is . . . a well established
principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson, 232 Conn.
App. 586, 595 n.6,
336 A.3d 1275 (2025). Moreover, regardless of whether
Bolduc’s testimony properly is characterized as lay or expert testimony, the
defense neither objected to the admission of Bolduc’s testimony before the
trial court nor argued that expert testimony of the effects of the defendant’s
intoxication was necessary and not presented. We therefore decline to
address this unpreserved argument.
15
Although the defendant relies on Bolduc’s testimony that the victim
most likely was under the influence and failed to yield the right of way, the
jury heard that evidence at trial and still concluded that the defendant’s
intoxication, rather than any conduct of the victim, caused the accident.
‘‘We will not now entertain the defendant’s request that we discount the
state’s evidence and give greater weight to evidence proffered by him. The
trier is the judge of the credibility of all the witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony and, therefore, has the right to accept part or disregard
part of a witness’ testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
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State v. Ragalis
542, 765 A.2d 30 (there was sufficient evidence that
defendant’s intoxication was proximate cause of victim’s injuries when defendant ‘‘crossed into the lane of
oncoming traffic and did not appear to decelerate his
vehicle’’), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 952,
770 A.2d 32
(2001); State v. Kwaak, 21 Conn. App. 138, 147,
572
A.2d 1015 (holding that there was sufficient evidence
that defendant’s intoxication caused victim’s death
when defendant did not take evasive action to avoid
collision), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 811,
576 A.2d 540
(1990). The jury viewed video surveillance footage that
corroborated the witnesses’ recollection of the first
accident. Officers noted the absence of any skid marks
at the first accident scene.16 The jury also heard evidence regarding the second accident, which occurred
shortly after the first accident, including that the vehicle
in which the defendant was later found had crashed
into a tree, facing oncoming traffic. When the defendant
was removed from the vehicle, he was hostile, and
Paradis observed at the hospital that the defendant’s
eyes were bloodshot, red, and glossy. Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict, the jury could have reasonably concluded
that the evidence established beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant’s intoxication caused the victim’s injuries.
C
The defendant further claims that the record contains
insufficient evidence that the state proved that the victim suffered serious physical injuries pursuant to
§§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and 53a-60d. We disagree.
Guitard, 61 Conn. App. 531, 542,
765 A.2d 30, cert. denied,
255 Conn. 952,
770 A.2d 32 (2001).
16
The defendant argues that an accident reconstruction was not done at
the scene of the first accident. McCarthy testified, however, that it was not
possible to conduct an accident reconstruction investigation because there
were no skid marks, yaw marks, or vehicles left at the scene. Even in the
absence of accident reconstruction evidence, there was more than sufficient
other evidence to establish causation in the present case.
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State v. Ragalis
‘‘Serious physical injury’’ is defined by General Statutes § 53a-3 (4), for the purposes of both §§ 53a-60 (a)
(3) and 53a-60d, as ‘‘physical injury which creates a
substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily organ
. . . .’’ The evidence adduced at trial revealed that the
victim was brought by ambulance to Lawrence + Memorial Hospital, where she exhibited severe confusion.
She was diagnosed with a closed head injury, multiple
fractures, and several abrasions and lacerations. After
the accident, the victim could not care for herself for
approximately three months and had to move in with
her parents. The victim testified that, as of the time of
trial, she still suffered from short-term memory loss
and constant neck and back pain.
Notwithstanding the defendant’s argument that medical expert testimony was not offered in this case, such
testimony was not required.17 See State v. Rumore, 28
Conn. App. 402, 414,
613 A.2d 1328 (‘‘our case law . . .
does not require expert medical testimony to establish
the element of serious physical injury’’), cert. denied,
224 Conn. 906,
615 A.2d 1049 (1992). The jury heard
testimony regarding the victim’s injuries directly after
the accident, and their sequelae, from the victim and
her mother. The jury also had before it the victim’s
medical records, which confirmed her diagnoses, as
well as multiple photographs of the victim in the hospital that depict her wearing a neck brace, as well as
multiple lacerations of her scalp, nose, and feet, and
17
The defendant also argues that the jury was not instructed that ‘‘ ‘it may
be inferred that’ any of [the victim’s] injuries created an impairment of the
function of an organ of her body.’’ To the extent that the defendant, for the
first time in his reply brief, attempts to raise a separate instructional error
claim with respect to that element of ‘‘serious physical injury,’’ which was
not raised before the trial court, we decline to review it. See, e.g., ECR 2,
LLC v. Thompson, 232 Conn. App. 586, 595 n.6,
336 A.3d 1275 (2025).
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State v. Ragalis
broken teeth. The jury also viewed Bolduc’s body camera footage in which the victim is shown lying on the
ground at the scene and bleeding.
The defendant argues that the victim did not lose
consciousness, was speaking after the accident, and
did not require surgical operations to treat her injuries.
The absence of such evidence, however, did not preclude the jury from reasonably concluding that the victim sustained serious physical injuries. The nature of
the serious physical injury inquiry is fact intensive and
is not predicated on a threshold showing of grievousness. See State v. Ovechka, 292 Conn. 533, 545–46,
975
A.2d 1 (2009); see also, e.g., State v. Lewis,
146 Conn.
App. 589, 607–608,
79 A.3d 102 (2013) (concluding that
there was sufficient evidence of serious physical injuries when, although victim did not lose consciousness
and recovered, victim sustained forehead laceration
that required stitches, nasal fracture, and chipped teeth
and had blurred vision and difficulty breathing), cert.
denied, 311 Conn. 904,
83 A.3d 605 (2014). The defendant also argues that the victim was able to live on her
own and to work after the accident. It is well established, however, that ‘‘the term ‘serious physical injury’
does not require that the injury be permanent.’’ State
v. Barretta, 82 Conn. App. 684, 689,
846 A.2d 946, cert.
denied, 270 Conn. 905,
853 A.2d 522 (2004); see also,
e.g., State v. Petion, 332 Conn. 472, 489,
211 A.3d 991
(2019) (stating that permanence is not ‘‘a necessary
condition for serious disfigurement . . . neither is it a
sufficient condition, in and of itself, to establish serious
disfigurement’’ (citation omitted; footnote omitted)).
Moreover, even though the victim was living on her
own at the time of trial, she testified that she continued
to suffer the effects of her injuries. Accordingly, the
jury reasonably rejected the defendant’s invitation to
conclude that the victim did not suffer serious physical
injuries.
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State v. Ragalis
‘‘[W]hether [the victim] suffered a ‘serious physical
injury’ was a question of fact for the jury.’’ State v.
Almeda, 211 Conn. 441, 450,
560 A.2d 389 (1989). We
decline to substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
See, e.g., id. On the record before us, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that there was insufficient
evidence from which the jury could reasonably have
found that the victim suffered a serious physical injury.
See, e.g., State v. Leveille, 232 Conn. App. 687, 698
and n.10, 337 A.3d 797 (2025). We therefore reject the
defendant’s sufficiency claim.
II
The defendant also claims that his convictions of
assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and
assault in the second degree, arising from a single occurrence or act, violated his rights as guaranteed by the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution. We disagree.
‘‘A defendant’s double jeopardy claim presents a
question of law, over which our review is plenary.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bernacki,
307 Conn. 1, 9,
52 A.3d 605 (2012), cert. denied,
569
U.S. 918,
133 S. Ct. 1804,
185 L. Ed. 2d 811 (2013). ‘‘The
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States constitution provides: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . . This constitutional provision is applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. . . . The Connecticut constitution provides coextensive protection,
with the federal constitution, against double jeopardy.
. . .18 This constitutional guarantee serves three separate functions: (1) It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. [2] It protects
18
‘‘The Connecticut constitution does not contain an express prohibition
against double jeopardy, but the due process guarantees of article first,
§ 8, of the constitution of Connecticut have been interpreted to include a
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State v. Ragalis
against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. [3] And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense [in a single trial]. . . . In
the present appeal, the defendant’s claim implicates the
last of these three functions.
‘‘The double jeopardy analysis in the context of a
single trial is a two part process. First, the charges must
arise out of the same act or transaction. Second, it must
be determined whether the charged crimes are the same
offense. Multiple punishments are forbidden only if
both conditions are met. . . . With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the [d]ouble
[j]eopardy [c]lause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than
the legislature intended. . . . [T]he role of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy] is limited to
assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative
authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the
same offense. . . . On appeal, the defendant bears the
burden of proving that the prosecutions are for the
same offense in law and fact. . . .
‘‘With respect to the first part of this two part process,
it is not uncommon that we look to the evidence at trial
and to the state’s theory of the case . . . in addition
to the information against the defendant, as amplified
by the bill of particulars. . . . If it is determined that
the charges arise out of the same act or transaction,
then the court proceeds to [part two of the analysis],
where it must be determined whether the charged
crimes are the same offense. . . . At this second step,
we [t]raditionally . . . have applied the Blockburger
protection against double jeopardy. See State v. Michael J., 274 Conn. 321,
349–50, 875 A.2d 510 (2005). The scope of this state constitutional protection
consistently has been construed to mirror, rather than to exceed, the protection afforded under the federal constitution. Id.’’ State v. Oscar H., 204 Conn.
App. 207, 241 n.25,
252 A.3d 842, cert. denied,
338 Conn. 912,
259 A.3d
654 (2021).
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State v. Ragalis
test to determine whether two statutes criminalize
19
the same offense, thus placing a defendant prosecuted
under both statutes in double jeopardy: [W]here the
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact [that]
the other does not.20 . . . In applying the Blockburger
test, we look only to the information and bill of particulars—as opposed to the evidence presented at trial—
to determine what constitutes a lesser included offense
of the offense charged. . . .21 Stated differently, only
19
‘‘See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304,
52 S. Ct. 180,
76
L. Ed. 306 (1932).’’ State v. Oscar H.,
204 Conn. App. 207, 242 n.26,
252 A.3d
842, cert. denied,
338 Conn. 912,
259 A.3d 654 (2021).
20
‘‘Both our Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have
clarified that the Blockburger test, which also is referred to as the sameelements test, inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the same offence and double jeopardy
bars additional punishment and successive prosecution. . . . United States
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696,
113 S. Ct. 2849,
125 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1993). In
State v. Bernacki, [supra, 307 Conn. 21–22], our Supreme Court emphasized
that it is irrelevant for purposes of a Blockburger analysis that the state
may have relied on the same evidence to prove that the elements of both
statutes were satisfied; id., 21; and that proper application of the Blockburger
test looks at whether each statute contains a different statutory element
requiring proof of a fact that the other does not . . . . Id., 22. The court
further noted that emphasis on the conduct at issue, rather than purely on
the statutory language and charging instruments, is not consistent with our
well established case law holding that the Blockburger analysis is theoretical
in nature and not dependent on the actual evidence adduced at trial. Id.,
21 n.16.’’ (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Oscar H., 204 Conn. App. 207, 242–43 n.27,
252 A.3d 842, cert. denied,
338
Conn. 912,
259 A.3d 654 (2021).
21
‘‘As our Supreme Court has stated, the Blockburger test is, at its core, a
rule of statutory construction, and ‘because it serves as a means of discerning
[legislative] purpose the rule should not be controlling [if], for example,
there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. . . . Thus, the
Blockburger test creates only a rebuttable presumption of legislative intent,
[and] the test is not controlling [if] a contrary intent is manifest. . . . [If]
the conclusion reached under Blockburger is that the two crimes do not
constitute the same offense, the burden remains on the defendant to demonstrate a clear legislative intent to the contrary.’ . . . State v. Alvaro F., 291
Conn. 1, 12–13,
966 A.2d 712, cert. denied,
558 U.S. 882,
130 S. Ct. 200, 175
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State v. Ragalis
[i]f the elements of one offense as defined by the statute
include the elements of a lesser offense; or if one offense
is merely nominally distinct from the other will double
jeopardy attach.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted;
footnotes in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Oscar H., 204 Conn. App. 207, 241–43,
252 A.3d
842, cert. denied,
338 Conn. 912,
259 A.3d 654 (2021).
The state does not dispute the defendant’s assertion
that his conviction of assault in the second degree with
a motor vehicle and assault in the second degree arose
from the same act or transaction. The issue is whether
they constitute the same offense.22 We must therefore
examine the language of §§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and 53a-60d,
as well as the operative substitute information,23 to
determine whether, as charged, ‘‘there was any element
that the state was required to prove under one statute
that was different from an element under the other.’’
State v. Nixon, 231 Conn. 545, 551,
651 A.2d 1264 (1995).
Section 53a-60 (a) (3), assault in the second degree,
requires the state to prove that a person ‘‘recklessly
causes serious physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument
. . . .’’ Section 53a-60d (a), assault in the second degree
with a motor vehicle, requires the state to prove that
a person, ‘‘while operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both . . .
causes serious physical injury to another person as a
consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug.’’ The
operative substitute information with which the defendant was charged essentially duplicated this language.24
L. Ed. 2d 140 (2009).’’ State v. Oscar H.,
204 Conn. App. 207, 243 n.28,
252
A.3d 842, cert. denied,
338 Conn. 912,
259 A.3d 654 (2021).
22
The defendant has not argued that either assault in the second degree
with a motor vehicle or assault in the second degree is a lesser included
offense of the other.
23
The defendant has not disputed that he did not request a bill of particulars in this case.
24
Count two of the operative information provided in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he
defendant . . . while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intox-
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State v. Ragalis
We conclude that the relevant statute and information
on each charge at issue requires proof of elements that
the statute and information on the other charge do not.25
Most significantly, with respect to the element of
intent, to prove assault in the second degree under
§ 53a-60 (a) (3), the state must prove that the defendant
‘‘recklessly’’ caused serious physical injury to another
person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument. In contrast, assault in the second degree
with a motor vehicle under § 53a-60d is a general intent
crime, requiring the state to prove that the defendant,
while operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, caused another person serious
physical injury. ‘‘The intent element in each statute consequently requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Nixon, supra,
231 Conn. 552; see, e.g.,
id., 553–54, 563
(concluding that defendant’s convictions of assault of
correctional officer pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-
167c (a) (1) and assault in second degree under § 53a-
60 (a) (5) did not violate double jeopardy clause because
it was possible for defendant to commit one crime and
not other).
Furthermore, § 53a-60 (a) (3) requires proof that a
person used a ‘‘deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument’’ to cause serious physical injuries to another person. Section 53a-60d is narrower, however, and requires
proof that a person caused serious physical injury to
another person ‘‘while operating a motor vehicle under
icating liquor and any drug [or] both, cause[d] serious physical injury to
another person . . . as a consequence of the effects of such liquor and
drugs.’’
Count three of the operative information provided in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he
defendant did recklessly cause serious physical injury to another person
. . . by means of a dangerous instrument.’’
25
We agree with the defendant, and the state does not dispute, that the
elements of ‘‘serious physical injury’’ and causation require the same proof
under both §§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and 53a-60d.
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State v. Ragalis
the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both
. . . .’’ Thus, a person may commit the crime of assault
in the second degree under § 53a-60 (a) (3) without
operating a motor vehicle and/or being intoxicated,
which is an essential element of assault in the second
degree with a motor vehicle under § 53a-60d. See, e.g.,
State v. Ovechka, supra,
292 Conn. 547 (evidence supported finding that pepper spray was dangerous instrument). Likewise, a person may commit the crime of
assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle without committing the crime of assault in the second
degree if the fact finder determines that the defendant’s
conduct was not reckless. Cf., e.g., State v. Borrelli, 94
Conn. App. 849, 862,
895 A.2d 257 (2006) (trial court
did not issue inconsistent decisions when it rejected
defendant’s defense of involuntary intoxication with
respect to charge of operating motor vehicle while under
influence because defendant showed general intent to
operate motor vehicle, while also finding defendant not
guilty of reckless driving in light of defendant’s involuntary intoxication). Accordingly, it is possible for a person to commit either assault in the second degree with
a motor vehicle or assault in the second degree, without
committing the other crime.
Indeed, the defendant’s counsel acknowledged at oral
argument before this court that the statutory language
of the two offenses differs. To the extent that the defendant argues that ‘‘neither charge required proof of a
fact that the other did not,’’ we disagree. For example,
the defendant argues that his alleged intoxication was
the same evidence used to show that his conduct was
reckless under § 53a-60 (a) (3).26 The defendant also
26
Because we decline to examine the evidence at this stage of the
Blockburger analysis, we need not address the state’s argument that it presented other evidence of the defendant’s recklessness at trial, namely, evidence that Cepeda-Grullon saw the defendant’s vehicle speed up as it headed
toward the victim.
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State v. Ragalis
asserts that, although the statutory language differs
because § 53a-60d requires proof that the defendant
‘‘operat[ed] a motor vehicle,’’ whereas § 53a-60 (a) (3)
requires proof that the defendant utilized a ‘‘dangerous
instrument,’’ ‘‘in effect and as applied to the defendant’s
case, they are the same element and require proof of the
same fact . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) These arguments
essentially invite us to look beyond the information to
the evidence to determine whether assault in the second
degree with a motor vehicle and assault in the second
degree are the same offense. Under the technical analysis of the Blockburger test, however, we look only to
the statutory elements and the operative information
in determining whether the crimes at issue constitute
the same offense. See, e.g., State v. Nixon, supra,
231
Conn. 551. As we previously stated, the fact that the
same evidence was used to establish that the defendant
committed each crime is irrelevant. See State v. Oscar
H., supra,
204 Conn. App. 242 n.27.
Our analysis, however, does not end here. ‘‘[T]he
Blockburger rule is not controlling when the legislative
intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history. . . . The Blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction, and because it serves as a means of
discerning congressional purpose the rule should not
be controlling whe[n], for example, there is a clear
indication of contrary legislative intent. . . . The language, structure, and legislative history of a statute can
provide evidence of this intent. . . . If the legislature
clearly expressed an intention that the statutes were
designed to punish the same offense, then prosecution
under both statutes would violate the double jeopardy
clause.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Nixon, supra,
231 Conn. 555.
‘‘When divining legislative intent in the double jeopardy context, our Supreme Court has considered several factors, including: (1) whether the statutes were
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State v. Ragalis
designed to protect separate and distinct interests of
society . . . (2) whether the statute in question references other statutory offenses . . . (3) whether the
statute in question set[s] forth a separate penalty rather
than using a multiplier of the penalty for another offense
. . . (4) the presence of language expressly prohibiting
cumulative punishments . . . (5) the placement of
each offense within the General Statutes . . . and (6)
the legislative history of the challenged statute . . . .’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Burgos, 170 Conn. App. 501, 552,
155 A.3d 246,
cert. denied, 325 Conn. 907,
156 A.3d 538 (2017).
The defendant argues that the legislature did not
intend for multiple punishments under these circumstances. Specifically, the defendant asserts that he cannot be convicted of assault in the second degree and
assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle when
‘‘there is a single assault, and an absence of legislative
history indicating an intent for multiple punishments to
be available for one criminal act.’’ We are not persuaded.
First, the statutory scheme supports our determination
that §§ 53a-60 and 53a-60d are different offenses. Neither statute refers to the other, and each statutory
offense sets out its own penalty: assault in the second
degree is a class C felony when the offense results in
serious physical injury, and assault in the second degree
with a motor vehicle is a class D felony. See, e.g., State
v. Delgado, 19 Conn. App. 245, 255,
562 A.2d 539 (1989);
see also General Statutes §§ 53a-60 (b) and 53a-60d (b).
Furthermore, § 53a-60d (b) provides for penalties that
§ 53a-60 (a) (3) does not. Specifically, § 53a-60d (b)
provides in relevant part that, upon conviction, ‘‘the
court shall suspend the motor vehicle operator’s license
or nonresident operating privilege of any person found
guilty under this section for one year. The court shall
also order such person not to operate any motor vehicle
that is not equipped with an approved ignition interlock
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State v. Ragalis
device, as defined in section 14-227j, for a period of
two years after such person’s operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege is restored by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.’’
We further note the absence of any express language
in § 53a-60d to indicate that the legislature intended
that a person convicted of assault in the second degree
with a motor vehicle could not also be convicted of
assault in the second degree. By contrast, ‘‘our Penal
Code is replete with other statutes in which the legislature expressly has barred conviction of two crimes for
one action. See, e.g., General Statutes § 53a-55a (a)
(‘[n]o person shall be found guilty of manslaughter in
the first degree and manslaughter in the first degree
with a firearm upon the same transaction’) . . . . In
view of this common practice, we ordinarily presume
that the legislature’s failure to include such terms in
[§ 53a-60d] indicates that it did not intend a similar
result.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Kirsch, 263 Conn.
390, 418–19,
820 A.2d 236 (2003).
The defendant also argues that he cannot be convicted of §§ 53a-60 and 53a-60d ‘‘whe[n] there is a single
assault and an absence of legislative history indicating
an intent for multiple punishments to be available for
one criminal act.’’27 We are unpersuaded.
27
In support of his argument that the legislature did not intend for multiple
punishments in these circumstances, the defendant cites State v. Nixon, 92
Conn. App. 586, 589, 597,
886 A.2d 475 (2005), for the proposition that
‘‘multiple assault convictions arising out of a single act of assault violate
double jeopardy.’’ That case is distinguishable. In that case, the defendant
was charged with two counts of the same crime, assault in the second
degree under § 53a-60 (a) (2), for conduct that arose from one continuous
assault. State v. Nixon, supra, 587. In the present case, by contrast, although
it is true that there was only one assault, the defendant was charged with
two separate crimes: assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and
assault in the second degree. ‘‘It is well settled that a single transaction can
give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the
[d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause.’’ Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 345
n.3, 101 S. Ct. 1137,
67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981).
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In 1969, the legislature approved Public Acts 1969,
No. 828, the first iteration of Connecticut’s Penal Code.
See State v. Terwilliger, 314 Conn. 618, 654,
104 A.3d
638 (2014). Thereafter, the legislature codified § 53a-
60, to take effect on October 1, 1971. See Public Acts
1969, No. 828, § 215. Section 53a-60 (a) originally proscribed several types of conduct, including recklessly
causing serious physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument,
the conduct alleged in the present case. See Public Acts
1969, No. 828, § 61. The legislature enacted § 53a-60d
in 1982 as a new statute, which was introduced as part
of a comprehensive reform effort to enhance criminal
penalties for driving while under the influence. See Public Acts 1982, No. 82-403, § 2 (P.A. 82-403).
The statutes at issue have distinct purposes. An obvious purpose of § 53a-60 (a) (3) is to proscribe reckless,
assaultive conduct. Section 53a-60d has the more targeted, specific purpose of proscribing the operation
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor or drug.28 See, e.g., Albernaz v.
United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343,
101 S. Ct. 1137,
67 L.
Ed. 2d 275 (1981) (concluding that Congress intended
to permit imposition of consecutive sentences with
respect to two conspiracy statutes when those statutes
were directed to ‘‘separate evils’’); State v. Greco, 216
Conn. 282, 293, 296,
579 A.2d 84 (1990) (conviction of
felony murder, robbery in first degree and burglary in
first degree did not violate double jeopardy because
‘‘[a]n obvious purpose of the felony murder statute . . .
is to protect human life,’’ whereas robbery statutes were
intended to protect against forcible taking); State v.
28
Although §§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and 53a-60d are located in the same part of
the Penal Code, titled ‘‘Assault and Related Offenses,’’ ‘‘that the statutes
were designed to protect separate and distinct interests of society, rather
than where they are situated is more indicative of whether the legislature
intended to create separate crimes and separate punishments.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bernacki, supra, 307 Conn. 29.
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State v. Ragalis
Dunbar, 37 Conn. App. 338, 346–47,
656 A.2d 672 (defendant’s convictions of assault on peace officer and
assault in second degree did not violate double jeopardy
because statutes were enacted with different intents),
cert. denied, 233 Conn. 906,
657 A.2d 644 (1995).
The apparent intent of the legislature was not to
merge § 53a-60 (a) (3) into § 53a-60d but, instead, to
enact a new offense.29 See, e.g., State v. Nixon, supra,
231 Conn. 561 (concluding that apparent intent of legislature was ‘‘not to merge the class D felony of § 53a-
60 (a) (5) into the class C felony of § 53a-167c (a) (1),
but instead to make the class D felony of § 53a-60 (a)
29
In making this determination, we are mindful of our Supreme Court’s
recent decision in State v. Williams, 352 Conn. 104, 107–109,
335 A.3d 792
(2025), in which the court held that the defendant’s conviction of criminal
possession of a firearm and criminal possession of ammunition in violation
of the same statute, General Statutes § 53a-217 (a), violated double jeopardy.
The court concluded that § 53a-217 (a) was ambiguous with respect to the
legislature’s intent to treat criminal possession of a firearm and ammunition
as separate offenses. Id., 134–35. The court looked to the legislative history
and stated that ‘‘the addition of ‘ammunition’ in § 53a-217 appears to be
directed to a situation in which someone, who was not legally allowed to
have ammunition, was found in possession of ammunition, such as on their
person or in a car, but not in a loaded gun.’’ Id., 136. The court concluded,
applying the rule of lenity, that, even if the legislative history did not clarify
the meaning of the statute, allowing multiple punishments for possessing
a firearm and the ammunition contained within that firearm would violate
double jeopardy. Id., 136–37.
We believe that the present case is distinguishable because, here, the
statutory scheme unambiguously reveals the legislature’s intent, in enacting
§ 53a-60d, to create the new offense of assault in the second degree with a
motor vehicle. See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, supra, 450 U.S. 342
(noting that ‘‘touchstone’’ of rule of lenity ‘‘is statutory ambiguity,’’ and,
when the legislature ‘‘has manifested its intention, we may not manufacture
ambiguity in order to defeat that intent’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As stated previously, §§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and 53a-60d were enacted with distinct
purposes. By contrast, the harm targeted by the criminal possession of
firearms and ammunition in § 53a-217 (a) is the same: to prevent the unlawful
arming of felons. See State v. Williams, supra, 352 Conn. 135–37. Finally,
although the addition of ‘‘ammunition’’ was apparently added to § 53a-217
to fill a gap in prosecutions under that existing statute; see id.; in the present
case, § 53a-60d was enacted as one of several new statutes to fill a gap
contained in the criminal law generally.
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State v. Ragalis
(5) the basis of a new class B felony’’ (emphasis in
original)). It is well settled that ‘‘the legislature, in
amending or enacting statutes, always [is] presumed to
have created a harmonious and consistent body of law
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 709,
998 A.2d 1 (2010); see
also State v. Nixon, supra, 231 Conn. 559 (‘‘[w]hen the
legislature acts . . . it is presumed to know the state
of the law’’).
The defendant argues that § 53a-60d was designed to
fill a ‘‘gap’’ in the law, specifically, to ‘‘address a problem
the legislature saw in drunk driving accidents resulting
in serious physical injury.’’ We agree that the legislature
enacted § 53a-60d with the intent to fill a gap in the
existing law. See 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1982 Sess., p.
2271, remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano
(noting that legislation ‘‘sets up a new series of penalties
for causing injury or death while driving a motor vehicle
while intoxicated by either drugs or alcohol’’); see also
25 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1982 Sess., p. 3601, remarks of Senator
Myron R. Ballen (noting that existing laws proscribing
driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or
other drugs ‘‘are not strong enough to put people
away’’); id., p. 3642, remarks of Senator Russell L. Post,
Jr. (‘‘What we’re saying is that if, indeed, you are
involved, while intoxicated, in an accident that involves
a fatality, manslaughter or what have you, you’ve got
to be prosecuted. . . . We’re trying to . . . make it
clear that if, indeed, you’re arrested for drunken driving
and there is this kind of an accident, you’re going to
be prosecuted for that offense.’’).30 Number 82-403 of the
1982 Public Acts is titled ‘‘An Act Concerning Criminal
30
Moreover, in written testimony submitted to the Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Austin J. McGuigan, then chief state’s attorney, submitted that ‘‘[t]he increasing number of alcohol-related deaths and injuries on
[s]tate highways makes it necessary to advocate stiffer penalties for those
driving under the influence.’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Judiciary, Pt. 2, 1982 Sess., p. 419.
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State v. Ragalis
Penalties For Driving While Intoxicated,’’ which indicates the legislature’s intent to enact a series of new
criminal offenses, including § 53a-60d, to address the
same harm: operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug. See, e.g.,
State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 678,
509 A.2d 20
(1986) (‘‘[i]n attempting to glean legislative intent, it is
often useful to examine the title of a proposed bill . . .
and the purpose the legislature intended to accomplish
by its enactment’’ (citation omitted)).
Our Supreme Court also previously has noted—in
discussing manslaughter in the second degree pursuant
to General Statutes § 53a-56b, which was also enacted
as part of P.A. 82-403—that the legislature had intended
to ‘‘enhance the existing criminal penalties for causing
physical injury or death when driving while intoxicated
in order to deter such conduct.’’ State v. Kirsch, supra,
263 Conn. 419; see also, e.g., McCoy v. Commissioner
of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 170,
12 A.3d 948 (2011).
Although we agree with the defendant that the legislature enacted § 53a-60d with the apparent intention of
filling a gap in the existing law, we disagree that this
intention clearly demonstrates that the legislature
intended to treat §§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and 53a-60d as the
same offense. This court has stated that, ‘‘[w]henever
the legislature fills a gap in the criminal law, it is fair
to infer, absent clear legislative history to the contrary,
that it is seeking to provide the executive branch with
an addition to its existing law enforcement arsenal,
rather than a substitute for an already existing offense.’’
State v. Delgado, supra,
19 Conn. App. 256. We have
carefully reviewed the legislative history of §§ 53a-60
(a) (3) and 53a-60d and have not found any indication
as to whether the legislature intended to preclude or
to permit the prosecution of assault in the second
degree or assault in the second degree with a motor
vehicle when the state has commenced the prosecution
of the other offense for the same conduct. ‘‘Therefore,
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State v. Ragalis
we are left with silence on the issue, from which we
do not determine legislative intent.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Wyatt, 80 Conn. App. 703, 713,
836 A.2d 1242 (2003), cert. denied,
267 Conn. 918,
841
A.2d 1192 (2004); see also, e.g., Albernaz v. United
States, supra, 450 U.S. 341–42 (‘‘[I]f anything is to be
assumed from the congressional silence on this point,
it is that Congress was aware of the Blockburger rule
and legislated with it in mind. It is not a function of
[appellate courts] to presume that Congress was
unaware of what it accomplished . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
We conclude that the defendant has not established
a clear legislative intent to treat §§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and
53a-60d as one offense for double jeopardy purposes.31
See, e.g., State v. Dunbar, supra, 37 Conn. App. 347–48.
Having failed to rebut the presumption under Blockburger,
the defendant cannot prevail on his double jeopardy
claim.32
31
We decline the defendant’s invitation to apply the rule of lenity because
‘‘that principle is inapplicable given the lack of ambiguity in the statutory
scheme after application of the Blockburger analysis and review of the
legislative history. See . . . Albernaz v. United States, [supra, 450 U.S. 342]
(Where [the legislature] has manifested its intention, we may not manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat that intent. . . . Lenity thus serves only
as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. The
rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what [the
legislature] has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers. . . .).’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bernacki, supra, 307 Conn. 30 n.24.
32
We also reject the defendant’s argument that ‘‘[t]here has only been one
case . . . where a defendant was convicted of assault [in the] second
[degree] under the theory that operation of a motor vehicle constituted the
use of a dangerous instrument, and where the defendant was intoxicated
at the time of the accident,’’ citing State v. Guitard, supra,
61 Conn. App.
531. First, the defendant’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument before
this court that there may be cases aside from Guitard in which a defendant
was convicted of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and
assault in the second degree that were not appealed. Furthermore, the
‘‘decisions by the state’s attorneys as to the offenses with which they will
charge a defendant require inherently fact intensive inquiries. We will not
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State v. Ragalis
III
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court’s
supplemental instruction to the jury in response to a
note misled the jury. Specifically, the defendant argues
that the court’s ‘‘supplemental instruction that serious
physical injury did not need to be long-term crossed
into the purview of the [jurors], who were the sole
fact finders tasked with determining what constituted
‘serious physical injury,’ and misled them.’’ We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. After closing
arguments, the court delivered its initial instructions to
the jury on the relevant law, which included an instruction on ‘‘serious physical injury,’’ an essential element
of both §§ 53a-60 and 53a-60d. Specifically, the court
instructed the jury in relevant part: ‘‘Serious physical
injury is something more serious than mere physical
injury, which is defined as impairment of physical condition or pain. It is more than a minor or superficial
injury. It is defined by statute as physical injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes
serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or
serious loss or impairment of the function of any . . .
bodily organ.’’33
The court provided the jurors with a paper copy of
the jury instructions for their use during deliberations.
The jury then began its deliberations and, thereafter,
sent the following note to the court: ‘‘Serious physical
[second-guess] the rationality of those decisions in the absence of persuasive
reasons for doing so.’’ State v. Kirsch, supra, 263 Conn. 422–23.
33
The defendant has not challenged the court’s initial charge on the element of serious physical injury. The court’s initial instruction tracks the
definition of ‘‘ ‘[s]erious physical injury’ ’’ pursuant to § 53a-3 (4) and as
contained in the Connecticut model criminal jury instructions. See Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 6.1-9, available at https://jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/
criminal.pdf (last visited September 22, 2025).
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State v. Ragalis
injury, must this be long term or at [occurrence]?’’ Upon
receiving the note, the court discussed the matter with
counsel. The court proposed responding to the note by
informing the jurors that ‘‘it does not need to be long-term, and I will refer them to the instruction that I’ve
already given them regarding serious physical injury.’’
Defense counsel, in response, requested that the court
‘‘reread the instruction on serious physical injury to
them and [not] give them a direct answer on that.’’ In
the alternative, defense counsel requested that the court
‘‘remind them they’re the finders of fact and [permanence] is something they can consider in consideration
of that question.’’ The court noted defense counsel’s
exception. The court then called the jury back to the
courtroom and issued a supplemental instruction: ‘‘Court
exhibit five indicates, ‘serious physical injury, must this
be long-term or at occurrence?’ And, the answer is—
one is, obviously, I’m referring to the instruction on
serious physical injury, does describe in some detail as
to what the state . . . considers serious physical
injury. So, I do refer to that. I’m not [going to] read it
again. I know you have a copy of that. But, the short
answer to your question is, it does not need to be long-term, [it] does not need to be permanent.’’
With the entirety of the court’s jury instructions in
mind, we next set forth the legal principles that guide
our analysis. ‘‘[I]ndividual jury instructions should not
be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in
the context of the overall charge. . . . The pertinent
test is whether the charge, read in its entirety, fairly
presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice
is not done to either party under the established rules
of law. . . . Thus, [t]he whole charge must be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the [jurors] in
guiding them to the proper verdict . . . and not critically dissected in a microscopic search for possible
error. . . . Accordingly, [i]n reviewing a constitutional
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State v. Ragalis
challenge to the trial court’s instruction, we must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether
it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the
jury. . . . In other words, we must consider whether
the instructions [in totality] are sufficiently correct in
law, adapted to the issues and ample for the guidance
of the jury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Turner, 181 Conn. App. 535, 570,
187 A.3d 454 (2018),
aff’d, 334 Conn. 660,
224 A.3d 129 (2020). ‘‘A challenge
to the validity of jury instructions presents a question
of law over which [we have] plenary review. . . . This
standard of review also applies to supplemental instructions.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moon, 192 Conn. App. 68, 75,
217 A.3d 668
(2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 918,
222 A.3d 513 (2020).
On the basis of our review of the entire jury charge,
we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the
jury was misled by the court’s supplemental instruction.
The defendant does not challenge the court’s original
instruction regarding the element of serious physical
injury. With respect to the supplemental charge, the
court ‘‘properly answered the specific question that was
raised by the jury; see Practice Book § 42-27;34 and did
not contradict . . . its previous instructions.’’ (Footnote in original.) State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App.
571; see also, e.g., State v. Delgado,
247 Conn. 616,
627,
725 A.2d 306 (1999) (concluding that ‘‘it [was] not
reasonably possible that the jury was misled’’ when
court did not contradict concededly correct initial and
first supplemental charges in challenged second supplemental charge).
34
‘‘Practice Book § 42-27 provides: ‘If the jury, after retiring for deliberations, requests additional instructions, the judicial authority, after providing
notice to the parties and an opportunity for suggestions by counsel, shall
recall the jury to the courtroom and give additional instructions [necessary]
to respond properly to the request or to direct the jury’s attention to a
portion of the original instructions.’ ’’ State v. Turner, supra, 181 Conn. App.
571 n.21.
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The defendant’s argument that the court’s instruction
was ‘‘unnecessarily rigid and misled the [jurors] by taking away their fact-finding ability to determine what
constitutes serious physical injury . . . and whether
[the victim’s] injuries fit that description’’ is unavailing.
The court answered the jury’s question, namely,
whether the victim’s injuries must be long-term, and
that answer was correct in law. See State v. Barretta,
supra,
82 Conn. App. 689; see also, e.g., State v. Moon,
supra, 192 Conn. App. 83 (defendant could not prevail
on supplemental instructional error claim because
instruction was proper statement of law). The court
did not state that permanence was not a factor the
jury could consider in determining whether the victim
sustained a serious physical injury. Finally, the court
referred the jury to its original instructions, a copy of
which was in the jury’s possession, and those instructions provided a correct definition of serious physical
injury.35 The defendant therefore cannot prevail on his
claim of instructional impropriety.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
35
We also reject the defendant’s argument that the court should have
‘‘remind[ed] the jury that it was the sole fact finder . . . .’’ The court’s
original instructions informed the jurors that they were the ‘‘sole judges of
the facts.’’ The court need not have repeated that instruction when the jury
did not express any confusion on that point.
