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State v. Haughey
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. NORMAN HAUGHEY
(AC 47637)
Alvord, Elgo and Keller, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of murder,
felony murder and capital felony, appealed from the trial court’s dismissal
of his motion for sentence modification. The defendant claimed that the
court erred in determining that his sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of release was a mandatory minimum sentence that the court
was precluded from modifying pursuant to statute (§ 53a-39 (d)). Held:
The trial court correctly determined that § 53a-39 (d) precluded the modification of the defendant’s sentence, as a definite sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of release required to be imposed pursuant to the
capital felony statute (§ 53a-35a (1) (A)) operated as a mandatory minimum
sentence, despite the absence of the phrases ‘‘mandatory minimum’’ or ‘‘may
not be suspended or reduced,’’ and § 53a-39 (a) did not offer any express
terms or criteria that would have allowed the court to modify that sentence.
The trial court improperly dismissed the defendant’s motion for sentence
modification on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the
limitation set forth in § 53a-39 (d) operated to limit the court’s authority to
modify the defendant’s sentence but did not affect the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, and, accordingly, the court should have denied the motion.
Argued September 3—officially released October 14, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts each of the crimes of murder and felony
murder, and with one count of the crime of capital
felony, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New Haven and tried to the jury before
Thompson, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty; thereafter, the court, P. Brown, J., dismissed the defendant’s
motion for sentence modification, and the defendant
appealed to this court. Improper form of judgment;
reversed; judgment directed.
Michael W. Brown, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
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State v. Haughey
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, was John P. Doyle,
Jr., state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The defendant, Norman Haughey,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing
his motion for modification of his sentence pursuant to
General Statutes § 53a-39 (a). On appeal, the defendant
claims that the court erred in its determination that
his definite sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of release imposed a mandatory minimum
sentence that was precluded from modification under
§ 53a-39 (d). Although we agree with the trial court that
§ 53a-39 (d) precludes modification of the defendant’s
sentence, we conclude that the trial court improperly
determined that it lacked jurisdiction. Therefore, the
form of the judgment is improper, as the court should
have denied, rather than dismissed, the motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment dismissing the defendant’s motion for modification of his sentence and
remand the case with direction to deny the motion.
The following facts underlying the defendant’s conviction, as set forth by this court in his direct appeal,
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. ‘‘Sometime
in the late evening of December 1, 2003, the defendant
visited the home of the victims, Donna Sosa and Mary
Tomasi, located on Albert Street in Hamden. The defendant was personally familiar with the victims, as his
grandmother, with whom he occasionally shared a residence, lived on Green Hill Road, which abutted the
victims’ property. Intent on acquiring money to support
his crack cocaine addiction, the defendant gained
access to the victims’ home and shortly thereafter
attacked Sosa in the kitchen, stabbing her repeatedly
in the face, neck and right shoulder. The defendant then
proceeded upstairs armed with a ten pound dumbbell
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State v. Haughey
retrieved from the living room floor, where he found
Tomasi sleeping in her bedroom. After striking Tomasi
in the face with the dumbbell, fracturing her skull, the
defendant searched through her purse, stealing cash
and several blank checks, which he later forged in an
attempt to acquire additional funds. Sosa and Tomasi
died from these attacks.
‘‘The defendant subsequently was arrested and
charged with two counts of murder in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-54a (a), two counts of felony murder
(burglary) in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-54c
and one count of capital felony in violation of [General
Statutes (Rev. to 2003)] § 53a-54b (7).1 A jury trial followed and the defendant was convicted on all counts.
At sentencing, the court merged the conviction of the
murder and felony murder charges with the capital felony conviction, imposing a term of life imprisonment
without the possibility of release.’’ (Footnote added.)
State v. Haughey, 124 Conn. App. 58, 60–61,
3 A.3d 980,
cert. denied, 299 Conn. 912,
10 A.3d 529 (2010).
On December 26, 2023, the defendant filed a motion
for modification of his sentence, asking the court to
modify his sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of release. The court, P. Brown, J., held
a hearing on the motion on March 15, 2024. Before
presenting his argument on the merits of the motion,
defense counsel raised a threshold issue of whether the
defendant’s sentence is eligible for modification. As to
this issue, counsel argued that the phrases ‘‘mandatory
1
All references in this opinion to § 53a-54b are to the 2003 revision of
the statute. ‘‘Section 53a-54b was amended by No. 12-5, § 1, of the 2012
Public Acts to substitute ‘murder with special circumstances’ for ‘capital
felony.’ ’’ State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378, 425 n.25,
215 A.3d 1154 (2019).
We refer to the crime proscribed by § 53a-54b as ‘‘capital felony’’ because
that was the language used in the statute until its amendment in 2012 and
that is the nomenclature employed by the parties and the trial court in
this case.
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State v. Haughey
minimum’’ and ‘‘sentences that may not be suspended
or reduced’’ are ‘‘terms of art’’ and that, because the
statutes under which the defendant was convicted and
sentenced do not specifically contain that language,
§ 53a-39 (d) does not render the defendant’s sentence
ineligible for modification.
On April 3, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision in which it stated that, although ‘‘the defendant
is correct that [General Statutes] § 53a-35a (1) (A) does
not expressly provide that the sentence imposed is a
‘mandatory minimum’ or ‘may not be suspended or
reduced,’ the defendant cites no case holding that these
phrases must be used by the legislature in order to
impose a mandatory minimum sentence.’’ The court
determined that the defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release constitutes a
mandatory minimum sentence and, thus, § 53a-39 (d)
precludes modification. Therefore, the court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction over the motion and dismissed
it. This appeal followed.
The defendant’s claim on appeal requires our interpretation of § 53a-39 (d). ‘‘The interpretation of a statute, as well as its applicability to a given set of facts
and circumstances, presents a question of law over
which our review is plenary. . . . In construing [§ 53a-
39 (d)], our fundamental objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . .
In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned
manner, the meaning of the statutory language as
applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question
of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In
seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General Statutes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the
statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If,
after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous
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State v. Haughey
and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Webber, 225 Conn. App. 16,
29–30, 315 A.3d 320, cert. denied,
349 Conn. 915,
315
A.3d 301 (2024).
In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with
the text of the relevant statutes. Section 53a-39 (a) provides: ‘‘Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, at any time during an executed period of incarceration, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence,
order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant
discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a
period not to exceed that to which the defendant could
have been originally sentenced.’’ Subsection (d) of the
statute limits its applicability by providing that ‘‘[t]he
provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion
of a sentence imposed that is a mandatory minimum
sentence for an offense which may not be suspended
or reduced by the court.’’ General Statutes § 53a-39 (d).
Also relevant to our analysis are the statutes under
which the defendant was convicted and sentenced. The
defendant was convicted of capital felony under § 53a-
54b, which, at the time of the offense, provided in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of a capital felony who is
convicted of any of the following . . . (7) murder of
two or more persons at the same time or in the course
of a single transaction . . . .’’ General Statutes (Rev.
to 2003) § 53a-54b (7). Accordingly, he was sentenced
under the capital felony statute—§ 53a-35a—which provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[f]or any felony committed
on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment
shall be a definite sentence and, unless the section of
the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty
for the crime specifically provides otherwise, the term
shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) (A) For a
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State v. Haughey
capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under
the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April
25, 2012, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed
in accordance with section 53a-46a . . . .’’
On appeal, the defendant claims that § 53a-39 (d)
does not apply to his sentence because the text of the
sentencing statute, § 53a-35a (1) (A), specifically, ‘‘life
imprisonment without the possibility of release,’’ does
not expressly include the phrase ‘‘mandatory minimum’’
or ‘‘may not be suspended or reduced.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) The state counters that ‘‘[t]he pertinent statutes
plainly and unambiguously establish that, for a capital
felony conviction, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release is a mandatory, nonsuspendable sentence for purposes of [§] 53a-39 (d).’’2 We
agree with the state.
The defendant contends that ‘‘[t]he terms used to
signify mandatory minimum sentences are mandatory
minimum and may not be suspended or reduced’’ and
that, ‘‘[a]bsent this specific terminology in any part of
a statute setting forth a crime or category of offense,
§ 53a-39 (d) does not preclude modification.’’ (Emphasis in original.) We note, however, that § 53a-35a provides in relevant part that ‘‘the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence’’ of ‘‘a term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of release . . . .’’
This language already requires a court to impose a sentence of no less than life imprisonment without the
possibility of release and, thus, operates as a mandatory
2
The state also argues that, because the sentence is a mandatory minimum
and, thus, cannot be modified, the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the
motion. Alternatively, however, the state argues that, if the court improperly
determined that it lacked jurisdiction, ‘‘it only erred in the form of its
judgment, and it should have denied, rather than dismissed, the [motion].’’
We agree with the state’s alternative argument.
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State v. Haughey
minimum sentence. To require that ‘‘mandatory minimum’’ or ‘‘may not be suspended or reduced’’ be
included in the text to reflect a mandatory minimum
sentence would be requiring superfluous language in a
statute. See, e.g., State v. Webber, supra,225 Conn. App.
31 (‘‘statutes must be construed, if possible, such that
no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void
or insignificant’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This interpretation finds support in the decisions of
our appellate courts that have recognized that sentences imposed under statutes devoid of the specific terminology cited by the defendant still constitute a mandatory minimum. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 197 Conn. 337,
354–55 and n.10, 497 A.2d 390 (1985) (where sentencing
statute for murder provided for ‘‘a term [of incarceration] not less than twenty-five years nor more than life,’’
court found that, under ‘‘§ 53a-35a, murder is defined
as a class A felony requiring a mandatory minimum
sentence of twenty-five years [of] imprisonment’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). This refutes the defendant’s claim that a statute must contain the term ‘‘mandatory minimum’’ to be considered a mandatory minimum
sentence.
Although prior decisions do not specifically address
§ 53a-35a (1) (A), the statute under which the defendant
was sentenced, our courts’ interpretation of § 53a-35a
(1) (B), murder with special circumstances, presents a
comparable example. See, e.g., State v. Silva, 339 Conn.
598, 601,
262 A.3d 113 (2021) (identifying sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of release provided
by § 53a-35a (1) (B) as mandatory sentence). The phrase
‘‘mandatory sentence,’’ like that identified in State v.
Silva, supra, 601, operates as a mandatory minimum,
as it prohibits the imposition of anything other than
what the statute prescribes, including a lesser sentence.
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State v. Haughey
Section 53a-35a (1) (B) derives from the same subsection of the same statute and includes the same sentencing term—‘‘life imprisonment without the possibility of
release’’—as § 53a-35a (1) (A). We are guided by our
Supreme Court’s recognition that § 53a-35a (1) (B)
imposes a mandatory sentence in concluding that § 53a-
35a (1) (A) imposes a mandatory sentence that constitutes a mandatory minimum as described in § 53a-39
(d).
The defendant, however, seeks to distinguish his sentence, which he refers to as an ‘‘authorized sentence,’’
from a ‘‘mandatory minimum’’ sentence to argue that
§ 53a-39 allows courts ‘‘to impose a sentence other than
an ‘authorized sentence’ as long as it does so within
the other specifications of the sentence modification
statute.’’ The defendant notes that ‘‘the legislature
always maintains the power to make a life [sentence]
without the possibility of release something less than
a natural life sentence, and that is what the legislature
has done with . . . § 53a-39.’’ In support of his argument, the defendant relies on General Statutes § 54-
125a (g), which provides in part that a person convicted
of one or more crimes committed while under the age
of twenty-one who received a definite sentence of more
than fifty years may become eligible for parole after
serving thirty years. Although the defendant concedes
that this statute does not apply to him, he maintains that,
by implication, a definite sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of release may be modified under
exceptions and that § 53a-39 (a) offers such an exception.
Under our state’s law, ‘‘[t]he judiciary may impose a
specific sentence, but the legislature has the power to
define crimes, prescribe punishments for crimes, [and]
impose mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for
certain crimes . . . .’’ State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378,
416, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019); see also State v. Darden, 171
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State v. Haughey
Conn. 677, 679–80, 372 A.2d 99 (1976) (‘‘the constitution
assigns to the legislature the power to enact laws defining crimes and fixing the degree and method of punishment and to the judiciary the power to try offenses
under these laws and impose punishment within the
limits and according to the methods therein provided’’).
‘‘A trial court’s power to impose a particular sentence
is defined by statute, and the constitution does not
require that the judiciary be given discretion in sentencing.’’ State v. Lopez, supra,197 Conn. 353. Section 53a-
35a (1) (A) requires the court to impose a definite sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
release. The trial court does not have the authority to
modify this sentence in the absence of an exception
provided by the legislature.
Unlike § 54a-125a (g), which expressly defines the
exception to a definite sentence by stating eligibility
criteria and the extent to which a sentence may be
reduced, § 53a-39 (a) does not offer any express terms
or criteria that would allow a court to modify a definite
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
release. Moreover, subsection (d) of § 53a-39 explicitly
restricts the court from modifying mandatory minimum
sentences. If the legislature intended to create an exception for a sentence associated with the most serious
crimes, while also precluding modification of all other
mandatory minimums, it would have done so explicitly.
See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 227 Conn. App. 760, 766,
323
A.3d 1166 (‘‘[i]t is the duty of the court to interpret
statutes as they are written . . . and not by construction read into statutes provisions which are not clearly
stated’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
denied, 350 Conn. 922,
325 A.3d 1093 (2024). For all of
these reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that § 53a-39 (d) precludes modification of
the defendant’s sentence.
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State v. Haughey
We disagree, however, with the court’s determination
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and conclude
that it improperly dismissed, when it should have
denied, the defendant’s motion for sentence modification. ‘‘Our Supreme Court has recognized the distinction
between a trial court’s jurisdiction and its authority to
act under a particular statute. Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the
type of controversy presented by the action before it.
. . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before
it. . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which
the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action. . . .
Although related, the court’s authority to act pursuant
to a statute is different from its subject matter jurisdiction. The power of the court to hear and determine,
which is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused
with the way in which that power must be exercised in
order to comply with the terms of the statute.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 769.
‘‘Our courts consistently have held that under the
common law a trial court has the discretionary power
to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the
sentence has been executed. . . . [But] the court loses
jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the [C]ommissioner of [C]orrection and begins serving the sentence. . . . After this
occurs, the trial court has jurisdiction to modify or
vacate the criminal judgment if the legislature or the
state constitution grants continuing jurisdiction.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Ward, 341 Conn. 142, 149,
266 A.3d 807 (2021). ‘‘[T]he
legislature has granted criminal courts continuing statutory authority to make changes to a duly imposed sentence in two ways. First, the legislature has authorized
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State v. Haughey
the courts to conduct sentence review pursuant to General Statutes § 51-196. Second, a criminal defendant may
seek sentence modification of or discharge from his
sentence pursuant to § 53a-39.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Barnes, supra,227 Conn.
App. 770.
As this court held in Barnes, ‘‘[t]hrough the enactment of § 53a-39, the legislature has determined that a
court has competence to entertain sentence modifications and, thus, has conferred upon the court jurisdiction to modify a sentence.’’ Id. Therefore, the statutory
limitation set forth in § 53a-39 (d) that ‘‘[t]he provisions
of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed that is a mandatory minimum sentence
for an offense which may not be suspended or reduced
by the court’’ limits the court’s authority and not its
subject matter jurisdiction. See State v. Barnes, supra,227 Conn. App. 770 (where defendant had been released
on special parole, court had subject matter jurisdiction
over motion to modify sentence but lacked authority
to afford defendant relief). In the present case, because
the defendant is serving a mandatory minimum sentence, which the court does not have the authority to
modify as provided by § 53a-39 (d), the court should
have denied the motion, not dismissed it.
The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment
is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to
render judgment denying the defendant’s motion for
sentence modification.
