Volume 236 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment denying its application for a prejudgment remedy against the defendant, the conservator of the person and estate of P. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that, on the basis of the definition of property in the statute (§ 52-278a) governing prejudgment remedies, the plaintiff was precluded from attaching P's interest, as an heir, in certain real property that was part of an estate then pending in a probate court. Held: The trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy on the basis of its conclusion that the plaintiff could not attach P's interest in the real property, as contingent interests in real property explicitly fall within the broad definition of property in § 52-278a; accordingly, this court remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on the application. Argued April 22—officially released October 21, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder and assault in the first degree, appealed following the denial of his petition for certifica- tion to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his underlying claims of error were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could have resolved the issues in a different manner, or that the questions were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the peti- tioner failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse the late filing of his habeas petition pursuant to statute (§ 52-470), as the petitioner's argument essentially attacked the credibility determinations of the habeas court, and this court does not second-guess such credibility determinations on appeal. It would not have been an abuse of the habeas court's discretion to deny the petition for certification to appeal if the petitioner had included his claim that the habeas court improperly denied his request to appoint counsel for the good cause hearing, as this court could not conclude that the habeas court's failure to provide such counsel only for the limited purpose of the good cause hearing was the type of egregious defect or ''truly extraordinary situation'' warranting reversal under the plain error doctrine or that it threat- ened the integrity of the judicial system or public confidence in the judicial system such that this court was required to invoke its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to guarantee a right to counsel at any stage of a habeas proceeding. Argued March 18—officially released October 28, 2025

The respondent attorney appealed from the trial court's judgment sus- pending him from the practice of law in Connecticut for five years as reciprocal discipline to his suspension from the practice of law in Virginia for five years for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. He claimed, inter alia, that the court lacked authority to suspend him for five years pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 2-39) because he was not a member of the Virginia bar and, thus, the discipline was not reciprocal. Held: The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the attorney discipline brought pursuant to Practice Book § 2-39, as that rule plainly outlines the court's authority to hear and determine whether discipline is appropriate for attorneys admitted in Connecticut and disciplined in another jurisdiction, and the respondent provided no analysis to support his claim that the court lacked authority because he was not admitted to practice in Virginia. The respondent's unpreserved claim that the trial court's imposition of reciprocal discipline against him violated his right to due process failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as he failed to establish a constitutional violation that deprived him of a fair trial. The trial court's finding that the respondent failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the Virginia proceedings against him were so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard that it would constitute a grave injustice to impose commensurate discipline in Connecticut was not clearly erroneous. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by suspending the respondent from the practice of law in Connecticut for a period of five years, as it fell within the discipline warranted under Practice Book § 2-39. Argued May 20—officially released October 28, 2025

The petitioner, who had been convicted after a jury trial of home invasion, robbery and other crimes, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rejected a freestanding constitutional claim, pursuant to McCoy v. Louisiana (584 U.S. 414), that his criminal trial counsel, M, violated his sixth amendment right to client autonomy by effectively conceding his guilt to a charge of conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree during closing argument to the jury without the petitioner's consent. Held: The petitioner failed to preserve a freestanding McCoy claim for appellate review because it was not distinctly raised before or decided by the habeas court, as the petitioner pleaded M's alleged concession of guilt in a count of the habeas petition labeled as sounding in ineffective assistance of coun- sel, and, even if a McCoy claim had been properly preserved, this court was unpersuaded that a McCoy violation existed, as the petitioner never made an intransigent and unambiguous objection to M regarding a concession of guilt, and M did not concede the petitioner's guilt to the jury but, rather, stated several times that the petitioner was not guilty as part of a strategic attempt to provide a more favorable view of the evidence. The petitioner failed to establish that M's performance at trial was deficient such that it amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. The habeas court correctly decided that M's closing argument and decision not to object to the prosecutor's contention that he had conceded the petitioner's guilt did not constitute deficient performance, as M reasonably could have believed it was essential to mitigate the impact of the prosecutor's contention by arguing that the petitioner, in acting only as a messenger between the conspirators, lacked the specific intent for the jury to find him guilty of conspiracy, and, had M decided to object to the prosecutor's argument, it could have had the undesirable effect of focusing the jury's attention on that argument. This court concluded, contrary to the petitioner's claim, that M's cross- examination of one of the petitioner's coconspirators, D, fell within the wide range of acceptable performance, as M emphasized to the jury that D faced multiple serious charges and had received a very favorable deal from the state by agreeing to testify against the petitioner, and M's decision not to object to the admission into evidence of D's cooperation agreement with the state was not objectively unreasonable or prejudicial to the petitioner. The petitioner failed to identify any evidence in support of his claim that M rendered ineffective assistance in failing to seek the dismissal of all charges against the petitioner on the ground that the state had recorded his prison phone calls that were made during the time he was self-represented or to suppress the state's use of those recordings, as the phone calls, rather than reflecting possible trial strategy, formed the basis of a witness tampering charge against the petitioner, and M's objections to the admission of those phone calls were overruled. The habeas court properly denied the petitioner's claim that M rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the trial court's canvass of the petitioner regarding the waiver of his right to self-representation and its appointment of M as full counsel, as M, who was acting as standby counsel at the time of the canvass, had no sixth amendment duty to object, and the petitioner's insistence that he would have represented himself had he been permitted to do so was belied by the record, which reflected his clearly expressed desire to be represented by counsel. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion by excluding as irrelevant D's testimony at the habeas trial that the handgun the perpetrators used in the home invasion was fake, as the operability of the gun was not an essential part of the state's case during the criminal trial, and evidence had been admitted at the criminal trial through the victim's testimony that the perpetra- tors had in their possession the victim's long guns, which they stole during the home invasion and which the victim had recently used, from which the jury could reasonably infer operability, and, even if the inquiry of D were relevant, the exclusion of his testimony regarding the gun was harmless. Argued March 13—officially released October 28, 2025

The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defen- dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any prejudice resulting from the defendant's delay in complying with her discov- ery requests. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review. The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025

Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and other crimes, the defen- dant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court failed to adequately make him aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation when canvassing him to determine if his waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently because the court did not explain to him the limited role of standby counsel as set forth in the rule of practice (§ 44-5). Held: The trial court's canvass of the defendant did not establish that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, as the court provided him with no information from which he could differentiate between the limited role of standby counsel and that of full counsel, and, without such an explanation, this court could not conclude that the defendant was adequately aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. This court, although it declined to address the defendant's claim that the trial court violated his due process rights, including his right to present a defense, when it improperly denied him a continuance to obtain authoriza- tion from the Office of the Chief Public Defender to obtain a DNA expert, noted its concern with the trial court's determination that the defendant himself was solely responsible for obtaining such authorization. Argued June 16—officially released October 28, 2025

The defendant appealed to this court from the trial court's judgments finding him in violation of probation in two criminal dockets and revoking his probation. The defendant, a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and driven by a friend, was arrested and charged with interfering with a police officer pursuant to statute (§ 53a-167a) for his conduct during a motor vehicle stop and for possession of narcotics with intent to sell and criminal possession of a firearm for items found in a backpack in the backseat of the vehicle. The court determined that the defendant constructively possessed the con- traband in the backpack and had interfered with the lawful duties of a police officer, all of which constituted conduct that violated the conditions of the defendant's probation. The defendant claimed that there was insufficient evidence for the court to find that he had violated the conditions of his probation. Held: The trial court's determination that the state had produced sufficient evi- dence that the defendant had violated § 53a-167a and, thus a condition of his probation, was not clearly erroneous, as the court's finding that the defendant's conduct in failing to comply with the police officers' commands and in resisting their efforts to place him in handcuffs had hampered the activities of the police in the performance of their duties was supported by the record evidence. The trial court erred in determining that the defendant was in constructive possession of the illegal drugs or the firearm that were found in the vehicle, as there was nothing in the record to support the finding that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband. This court concluded that a remand for resentencing was appropriate in light of the trial court's statements at the outset of the dispositional phase of the probation revocation hearing that the defendant had previously been convicted for offenses involving the possession and sale of illegal drugs and that it had rejected the defendant's claim that he had not possessed the contraband in the backpack, as this court could not be confident that the trial court would not have exercised its discretion differently had it sentenced the defendant solely on the basis of a violation of probation for interfering with an officer, for which there was sufficient evidence in the record. Argued March 20—officially released November 4, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of various charges in connection with the sexual assault of a minor and committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying in part his second habeas petition. He claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that his counsel from a prior habeas action, M, did not provide ineffective assistance because she failed to raise certain claims concerning the alleged failure of his trial counsel, H, to advise him of the consequences of pursuing a defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Held: This court, as a reviewing court, could not conclude that the petitioner had met his burden to establish that M had rendered ineffective assistance, as the subordinate facts underlying the petitioner's claim were in dispute and had not been resolved by the habeas court. The habeas court incorrectly determined that the successive petition doc- trine barred the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel, as the petitioner's claim that M had provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise the claims identified in count one of the habeas petition, which related to the alleged ineffective assistance provided by H in connec- tion with the underlying criminal proceedings, was premised on a different legal ground than the claims the petitioner raised in the prior habeas action. This court could not affirm the habeas court's judgment on the basis that its failure to address the petitioner's claim was harmless, as this court could not assume, from the habeas court's general conclusions, that it had concluded that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that M's assistance was ineffective, and the habeas court's factual findings did not implicitly resolve the petitioner's claim. Because the judge who heard the habeas action was no longer a judge of the Superior Court, a remand for an articulation was not possible and, consequently, this court remanded the case for a new trial only with respect to the petitioner's claim that M provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue the claim that H was ineffective for the reasons set forth in count one of the petition. Argued June 3—officially released November 4, 2025

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the plain- tiff's motion to enforce a settlement agreement and awarding the plaintiff $50,000. The defendant claimed that the court, in granting the motion, improperly determined that the parties had reached an enforceable settle- ment agreement. Held: The appeal was not moot despite full satisfaction of the judgment, as this court could afford the defendant practical relief by ordering restitution. The trial court reasonably determined that there was no dispute that the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement, as certain emails exchanged between the parties' counsel reflected that the parties had agreed to a settlement pursuant to the terms set forth in a draft settlement agree- ment, and, during a hearing held pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. (225 Conn. 804), the defendant's counsel acknowledged that the parties had entered into a settlement agree- ment as set forth in the draft agreement. Argued September 11—officially released November 4, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, appealed following the granting of his petition for certifica- tion to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that the court improperly concluded that certain undisclosed impeachment evidence was not material either to guilt or to punishment under the third prong of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83). Held: The habeas court properly rejected the petitioner's claim for relief from his conviction pursuant to Brady based on the state's failure to disclose to him certain impeachment evidence concerning D, one of the state's key witnesses at his criminal trial, as the undisclosed evidence would not have provided the petitioner with any significant impeachment material that was not already available to and used by him to cross-examine D at his criminal trial and, even though the undisclosed evidence could have cast doubt on D's general credibility, it was not of such significance, in the context of all the evidence adduced at trial, that it might reasonably have undermined confidence in the jury's guilty verdict. Argued September 2—officially released November 4, 2025

The plaintiff property owner appealed from the trial court's judgment dis- missing his appeal from the decision of the defendant town zoning board, which upheld the issuance of a certificate of zoning compliance by its zoning enforcement officer to the intervening defendants, abutting property owners. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded that a variance that had been granted to the intervening defendants in 2011 properly was considered in calculating the maximum building height of the interven- ing defendants' proposed residence. Held: The trial court properly determined that there were no conditions attached to the variance, as the line designated for conditions on the certificate of variance issued by the board and filed in the land records was left blank, and this court could discern no ambiguities in the certificate of variance because it contained no language that reasonably could be construed as imposing a condition. The zoning board properly considered the 2011 variance in calculating the maximum building height of the intervening defendants' proposed residence, as the variance was not rendered moot by a subsequent amendment to the town's zoning regulations, the plaintiff having cited no authority to support the proposition that a variance may be rendered moot by a subsequent amendment, and, pursuant to the statute (§ 8-6) governing a zoning board's authority to grant a variance, a variance runs with the land and is not personal to the recipient of the variance. Argued April 16—officially released November 11, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant town's motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging, inter alia, pregnancy discrimination. She claimed that the court erred in its determina- tion that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to her claims. Held: The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's claim of pregnancy discrimination, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered adverse employment actions when the defendant failed to reinstate her to her original job or an equivalent one and when it failed to promote her following her return from maternity leave, and a rational fact finder could conclude, on the basis of the evidence presented, including the timing and sequence of the alleged adverse employment actions, that the plaintiff pre- sented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination and that the defendant's stated reasons for its actions were a pretext for its unlawful discrimination; accordingly, this court remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to gender discrimination and in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim, as the claim was inadequately briefed. Argued October 15, 2024—officially released November 11, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant on her special defense of promissory estoppel in the plaintiff's mortgage foreclosure action. After the note had matured but there was still an outstand- ing balance due to the plaintiff, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an oral agreement that the defendant would pay the outstanding property taxes that the plaintiff had failed to pay as required by the terms of the mortgage, and, in return, the plaintiff would release her from further pay- ments on the outstanding debt and send her the deed to the property. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in finding for the defendant on her special defense of promissory estoppel. Held: The trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as the court was within its province to determine that the defendant's testimony regarding her agreement with the plaintiff was credible and persuasive and was corroborated by her payment of the delinquent taxes and by the testimony of an attorney for the city where the property was located. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that her agreement with the defendant was unenforceable under the statute of frauds (§ 52-550 (a)) because it was not in writing, as the plaintiff failed to preserve that claim in the trial court. Argued September 8—officially released November 11, 2025

The defendants, the prevailing parties in the underlying action seeking to enforce a foreign judgment against them, appealed from the trial court's judgment denying their motions for attorney's fees. The defendants claimed that the court improperly determined that the issue of whether they were entitled to attorney's fees was a procedural issue governed by Connecticut law, which follows the American rule, pursuant to which each party is responsible for its own attorney's fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise, rather than a substantive issue governed by the law of the foreign jurisdiction, which follows the English rule, pursuant to which a prevailing party generally is entitled to its litigation expenses, including attorney's fees. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendants' motions for attorney's fees on the ground that their request for attorney's fees was a procedural matter governed by Connecticut law, as the defendants did not dispute that the rule of the foreign jurisdiction allowing for the recovery of attorney's fees by a prevailing party was not specific to the cause of action at issue in this case but applied generally to all civil actions. Argued September 17—officially released November 11, 2025

Convicted of, inter alia, assault of a correctional officer in connection with an altercation with G, the defendant appealed. He claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because there was no evi- dence that he caused physical injury to G, which was an element of the crime. Held: The trial court reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established the essential elements of the crime of assault of a correctional officer beyond a reasonable doubt, including that G suffered a physical injury, as the court reasonably could have inferred that G experi- enced pain when he scraped and scuffed his knee during the incident with the defendant, and the state was not required to demonstrate that G had an observable physical condition or a physical manifestation of his pain or that he had sought medical attention or was impaired in his ability to work. Argued September 10—officially released November 11, 2025

Convicted of several crimes, including sexual assault in the first degree, in connection with an incident involving his adult stepdaughter, A, the defen- dant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of uncharged sexual assaults he committed against A when she was a minor. Held: The trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting A to testify about three prior incidents of uncharged sexual assault against her for the purpose of establishing the defendant's propensity to engage in similar aberrant sexual behavior pursuant to the exception to the hearsay rule in a provision (§ 4-5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, as the charged offense and the uncharged misconduct both involved aberrant sexual behav- ior and were similar in nature and circumstance to the charged conduct, the uncharged misconduct was relevant in that it was not too remote in time from the charged offense and was committed against the same person, and the highly probative value of the uncharged misconduct evidence out- weighed its prejudicial effect, which the court mitigated by giving the jury a limiting instruction. This court was not convinced that the trial court abused its broad discretion by permitting the state to offer expert testimony about why A never reported the defendant's past misconduct against her, as the testimony was relevant to the jury's assessment of A's credibility, and the defendant provided no authority to support his argument that the expert's testimony was irrelevant simply because A's delay in reporting pertained to only the properly admitted uncharged misconduct evidence. This court rejected the defendant's unpreserved claim that his conviction of both sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the third degree amounted to multiple punishments for the same act in violation of In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault and family violence, we decline to use the defen- dant's full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. his fifth amendment right against double jeopardy, there having been no constitutional violation as required under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as those two charged crimes were separate offenses under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299) because each required proof of a fact that the other did not, and the defendant's assertion that the Blockburger test was not controlling lacked merit, as the sexual assault statutes at issue and their legislative history contained no language sug- gesting any intent by the legislature to disallow multiple punishments if a person uses force to compel sexual intercourse with someone he knows to be a close relation. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his conviction of both unlawful restraint and sexual assault in the first degree violated the fifth amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy because his restraint of A was merely incidental to his commission of first degree sexual assault, as the defendant failed to show that he received multiple punishments for the same offense. The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court erred by not giving the jury an instruction regarding the charge of unlawful restraint similar to that required by State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509), was not of constitutional magnitude, as Salamon's holding and instructional requirement did not apply to unlawful restraint charges, and the instruction the court did give regarding unlawful restraint could not have misled the jury or resulted in an injustice. Argued May 20—officially released November 18, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant executor in her action seeking damages for, inter alia, breach of contract with respect to a settlement agreement that the two parties had entered into with respect to the defendant's action alleging that the plaintiff had unduly influenced the decedent to name the plaintiff as a joint owner of a brokerage account held at J Co. After the settlement agreement had been executed, the defendant filed an arbitration action against J Co. alleging that J Co. had failed to detect the plaintiff's alleged undue influence related to the brokerage account and seeking the remaining money in the brokerage account that he had not received under the settlement agreement. J Co. named the plaintiff as a third-party respondent in the arbitration, seeking indemnification. The arbitration panel denied the defendant's claims and J Co.'s third-party claims against the plaintiff, and she thereafter brought the action underlying the present appeal, claiming that the arbitration action constituted an indirect claim against her that was prohibited by the settle- ment agreement. On appeal, she claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that she lacked standing to bring her claims. Held: Although it was unclear whether the trial court decided the issue of standing, this court concluded that the plaintiff did have standing to bring her claims, as the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint set forth a colorable claim of injury establishing the possibility that her legally protected interests in the defendant abiding by the terms of the settlement agreement had been adversely affected. The trial court, having incorrectly determined that the defendant's pursuit of the arbitration was not prohibited by the terms of the settlement agreement, improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant, as the express language used in the settlement agreement denoted its broad scope and its paramount purpose that the parties were released from further claims against each other, and there were genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff's claims, including what the defendant knew at the time of the arbitration and the nature of his intent. Argued September 4—officially released November 18, 2025

Convicted of the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, attempt to commit assault in the first degree and larceny in the third degree, the defendant appealed. The defendant's conviction arose from an incident in which he shot the victim forty-two times and attempted to shoot his former girlfriend, L, in the face. After the shooting, the defendant drove his vehicle to his place of employment, an offsite airport parking lot, and took a vehicle owned by S, which he eventually drove to a police station and turned himself in. At trial, L testified that, after firing many bullets at the victim, the defendant put a gun to her face and pulled the trigger, but nothing happened, and that the defendant subsequently reloaded the gun and put it back in her face but thereafter shot the victim again and not her. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of attempt to commit assault in the first degree with a firearm and larceny in the third degree. Held: There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first degree with a firearm, as the jury was free to credit L's testimony that the defendant pulled the trigger the first time he put the gun to her face and reasonably could have inferred from this evidence that the defendant intended to shoot L and cause her serious physical injury. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of larceny in the third degree, as the evidence established that S did not know the defendant and was out-of-state at the time the defendant took his vehicle and, thus, the jury reasonably could conclude that the defendant's taking occurred without S's knowing consent and in the course of his flight from the scene of the shooting, and, although the defendant eventually drove S's vehicle to a police station and left it there, at the time he took the vehicle, it was with the intent to retain it permanently. This court concluded that, although certain questions the prosecutor posed while cross-examining the defendant were improper, that the prosecutor In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. 236 Conn. App. 428 NOVEMBER, 2025 3 State v. Antwon B. improperly made use of the defendant's responses to those questions during his rebuttal argument, and that the prosecutor improperly relied on facts not in evidence during his closing argument, these improprieties, under the circumstances of this case, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, as these improprieties were minor and unimpactful and did not implicate the fairness of the trial. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor's statements made during his opening and rebuttal closing arguments, which made use of the terms ''we'' and ''us'' to align himself with the jury, were improper, as the prosecutor's use of the first person was limited and the jury was properly instructed as to its exclusive role as fact finder. Argued April 15—officially released November 25, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of various crimes, includ- ing felony murder, appealed following the granting of his petition for certifi- cation to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied his freestanding constitutional claim, which asserted that the police had illegally obtained records containing his historical cell site location information (CSLI) in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. Held: This court declined to review the petitioner's claim that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter v. United States (585 U.S. 296), holding that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring an individual's CSLI, should be applied retroactively, as the petitioner had expressly abandoned that claim. This court declined to review the petitioner's various unpreserved claims related to the statute (§ 54-47aa) governing orders to compel disclosure of or applications to a telecommunications carrier or provider for certain CSLI, as he did not plead these claims in his petition for habeas corpus and, thus, they were not decided by the habeas court. This court concluded that, even if it is assumed that the petitioner's CSLI should have been excluded at his criminal trial, any error in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as that evidence was not critical to the state's case against the petitioner and, thus, did not contribute to or substantially affect the jury's verdict. Argued May 27—officially released November 25, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder, on a plea of guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), and, in a separate docket, had admitted to a violation of probation (collectively, plea), appealed following the granting of her petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying in part and dismissing in part her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed her claim that her plea was involuntary. Held: The habeas court properly denied the petitioner's claim that she was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel during the plea process, as she failed to demonstrate that, but for the alleged deficient performance of her trial counsel, she would have proceeded to trial and, therefore, that she was prejudiced by trial counsel's performance. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's claim that her plea was involuntary, as the petitioner failed to raise the issue before the trial court or on direct appeal, and the petitioner failed to show either good cause or actual prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default. Argued May 19—officially released November 25, 2025