Volume 236 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment denying its application for a prejudgment remedy against the defendant, the conservator of the person and estate of P. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that, on the basis of the definition of property in the statute (§ 52-278a) governing prejudgment remedies, the plaintiff was precluded from attaching P's interest, as an heir, in certain real property that was part of an estate then pending in a probate court. Held: The trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy on the basis of its conclusion that the plaintiff could not attach P's interest in the real property, as contingent interests in real property explicitly fall within the broad definition of property in § 52-278a; accordingly, this court remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on the application. Argued April 22—officially released October 21, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder and assault in the first degree, appealed following the denial of his petition for certifica- tion to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his underlying claims of error were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could have resolved the issues in a different manner, or that the questions were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the peti- tioner failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse the late filing of his habeas petition pursuant to statute (§ 52-470), as the petitioner's argument essentially attacked the credibility determinations of the habeas court, and this court does not second-guess such credibility determinations on appeal. It would not have been an abuse of the habeas court's discretion to deny the petition for certification to appeal if the petitioner had included his claim that the habeas court improperly denied his request to appoint counsel for the good cause hearing, as this court could not conclude that the habeas court's failure to provide such counsel only for the limited purpose of the good cause hearing was the type of egregious defect or ''truly extraordinary situation'' warranting reversal under the plain error doctrine or that it threat- ened the integrity of the judicial system or public confidence in the judicial system such that this court was required to invoke its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to guarantee a right to counsel at any stage of a habeas proceeding. Argued March 18—officially released October 28, 2025

The petitioner, who had been convicted after a jury trial of home invasion, robbery and other crimes, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rejected a freestanding constitutional claim, pursuant to McCoy v. Louisiana (584 U.S. 414), that his criminal trial counsel, M, violated his sixth amendment right to client autonomy by effectively conceding his guilt to a charge of conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree during closing argument to the jury without the petitioner's consent. Held: The petitioner failed to preserve a freestanding McCoy claim for appellate review because it was not distinctly raised before or decided by the habeas court, as the petitioner pleaded M's alleged concession of guilt in a count of the habeas petition labeled as sounding in ineffective assistance of coun- sel, and, even if a McCoy claim had been properly preserved, this court was unpersuaded that a McCoy violation existed, as the petitioner never made an intransigent and unambiguous objection to M regarding a concession of guilt, and M did not concede the petitioner's guilt to the jury but, rather, stated several times that the petitioner was not guilty as part of a strategic attempt to provide a more favorable view of the evidence. The petitioner failed to establish that M's performance at trial was deficient such that it amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. The habeas court correctly decided that M's closing argument and decision not to object to the prosecutor's contention that he had conceded the petitioner's guilt did not constitute deficient performance, as M reasonably could have believed it was essential to mitigate the impact of the prosecutor's contention by arguing that the petitioner, in acting only as a messenger between the conspirators, lacked the specific intent for the jury to find him guilty of conspiracy, and, had M decided to object to the prosecutor's argument, it could have had the undesirable effect of focusing the jury's attention on that argument. This court concluded, contrary to the petitioner's claim, that M's cross- examination of one of the petitioner's coconspirators, D, fell within the wide range of acceptable performance, as M emphasized to the jury that D faced multiple serious charges and had received a very favorable deal from the state by agreeing to testify against the petitioner, and M's decision not to object to the admission into evidence of D's cooperation agreement with the state was not objectively unreasonable or prejudicial to the petitioner. The petitioner failed to identify any evidence in support of his claim that M rendered ineffective assistance in failing to seek the dismissal of all charges against the petitioner on the ground that the state had recorded his prison phone calls that were made during the time he was self-represented or to suppress the state's use of those recordings, as the phone calls, rather than reflecting possible trial strategy, formed the basis of a witness tampering charge against the petitioner, and M's objections to the admission of those phone calls were overruled. The habeas court properly denied the petitioner's claim that M rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the trial court's canvass of the petitioner regarding the waiver of his right to self-representation and its appointment of M as full counsel, as M, who was acting as standby counsel at the time of the canvass, had no sixth amendment duty to object, and the petitioner's insistence that he would have represented himself had he been permitted to do so was belied by the record, which reflected his clearly expressed desire to be represented by counsel. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion by excluding as irrelevant D's testimony at the habeas trial that the handgun the perpetrators used in the home invasion was fake, as the operability of the gun was not an essential part of the state's case during the criminal trial, and evidence had been admitted at the criminal trial through the victim's testimony that the perpetra- tors had in their possession the victim's long guns, which they stole during the home invasion and which the victim had recently used, from which the jury could reasonably infer operability, and, even if the inquiry of D were relevant, the exclusion of his testimony regarding the gun was harmless. Argued March 13—officially released October 28, 2025

Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and other crimes, the defen- dant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court failed to adequately make him aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation when canvassing him to determine if his waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently because the court did not explain to him the limited role of standby counsel as set forth in the rule of practice (§ 44-5). Held: The trial court's canvass of the defendant did not establish that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, as the court provided him with no information from which he could differentiate between the limited role of standby counsel and that of full counsel, and, without such an explanation, this court could not conclude that the defendant was adequately aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. This court, although it declined to address the defendant's claim that the trial court violated his due process rights, including his right to present a defense, when it improperly denied him a continuance to obtain authoriza- tion from the Office of the Chief Public Defender to obtain a DNA expert, noted its concern with the trial court's determination that the defendant himself was solely responsible for obtaining such authorization. Argued June 16—officially released October 28, 2025

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the plain- tiff's motion to enforce a settlement agreement and awarding the plaintiff $50,000. The defendant claimed that the court, in granting the motion, improperly determined that the parties had reached an enforceable settle- ment agreement. Held: The appeal was not moot despite full satisfaction of the judgment, as this court could afford the defendant practical relief by ordering restitution. The trial court reasonably determined that there was no dispute that the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement, as certain emails exchanged between the parties' counsel reflected that the parties had agreed to a settlement pursuant to the terms set forth in a draft settlement agree- ment, and, during a hearing held pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. (225 Conn. 804), the defendant's counsel acknowledged that the parties had entered into a settlement agree- ment as set forth in the draft agreement. Argued September 11—officially released November 4, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, appealed following the granting of his petition for certifica- tion to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that the court improperly concluded that certain undisclosed impeachment evidence was not material either to guilt or to punishment under the third prong of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83). Held: The habeas court properly rejected the petitioner's claim for relief from his conviction pursuant to Brady based on the state's failure to disclose to him certain impeachment evidence concerning D, one of the state's key witnesses at his criminal trial, as the undisclosed evidence would not have provided the petitioner with any significant impeachment material that was not already available to and used by him to cross-examine D at his criminal trial and, even though the undisclosed evidence could have cast doubt on D's general credibility, it was not of such significance, in the context of all the evidence adduced at trial, that it might reasonably have undermined confidence in the jury's guilty verdict. Argued September 2—officially released November 4, 2025

The plaintiff property owner appealed from the trial court's judgment dis- missing his appeal from the decision of the defendant town zoning board, which upheld the issuance of a certificate of zoning compliance by its zoning enforcement officer to the intervening defendants, abutting property owners. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded that a variance that had been granted to the intervening defendants in 2011 properly was considered in calculating the maximum building height of the interven- ing defendants' proposed residence. Held: The trial court properly determined that there were no conditions attached to the variance, as the line designated for conditions on the certificate of variance issued by the board and filed in the land records was left blank, and this court could discern no ambiguities in the certificate of variance because it contained no language that reasonably could be construed as imposing a condition. The zoning board properly considered the 2011 variance in calculating the maximum building height of the intervening defendants' proposed residence, as the variance was not rendered moot by a subsequent amendment to the town's zoning regulations, the plaintiff having cited no authority to support the proposition that a variance may be rendered moot by a subsequent amendment, and, pursuant to the statute (§ 8-6) governing a zoning board's authority to grant a variance, a variance runs with the land and is not personal to the recipient of the variance. Argued April 16—officially released November 11, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant town's motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging, inter alia, pregnancy discrimination. She claimed that the court erred in its determina- tion that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to her claims. Held: The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's claim of pregnancy discrimination, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered adverse employment actions when the defendant failed to reinstate her to her original job or an equivalent one and when it failed to promote her following her return from maternity leave, and a rational fact finder could conclude, on the basis of the evidence presented, including the timing and sequence of the alleged adverse employment actions, that the plaintiff pre- sented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination and that the defendant's stated reasons for its actions were a pretext for its unlawful discrimination; accordingly, this court remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to gender discrimination and in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim, as the claim was inadequately briefed. Argued October 15, 2024—officially released November 11, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant on her special defense of promissory estoppel in the plaintiff's mortgage foreclosure action. After the note had matured but there was still an outstand- ing balance due to the plaintiff, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an oral agreement that the defendant would pay the outstanding property taxes that the plaintiff had failed to pay as required by the terms of the mortgage, and, in return, the plaintiff would release her from further pay- ments on the outstanding debt and send her the deed to the property. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in finding for the defendant on her special defense of promissory estoppel. Held: The trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as the court was within its province to determine that the defendant's testimony regarding her agreement with the plaintiff was credible and persuasive and was corroborated by her payment of the delinquent taxes and by the testimony of an attorney for the city where the property was located. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that her agreement with the defendant was unenforceable under the statute of frauds (§ 52-550 (a)) because it was not in writing, as the plaintiff failed to preserve that claim in the trial court. Argued September 8—officially released November 11, 2025

Convicted of, inter alia, assault of a correctional officer in connection with an altercation with G, the defendant appealed. He claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because there was no evi- dence that he caused physical injury to G, which was an element of the crime. Held: The trial court reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established the essential elements of the crime of assault of a correctional officer beyond a reasonable doubt, including that G suffered a physical injury, as the court reasonably could have inferred that G experi- enced pain when he scraped and scuffed his knee during the incident with the defendant, and the state was not required to demonstrate that G had an observable physical condition or a physical manifestation of his pain or that he had sought medical attention or was impaired in his ability to work. Argued September 10—officially released November 11, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant executor in her action seeking damages for, inter alia, breach of contract with respect to a settlement agreement that the two parties had entered into with respect to the defendant's action alleging that the plaintiff had unduly influenced the decedent to name the plaintiff as a joint owner of a brokerage account held at J Co. After the settlement agreement had been executed, the defendant filed an arbitration action against J Co. alleging that J Co. had failed to detect the plaintiff's alleged undue influence related to the brokerage account and seeking the remaining money in the brokerage account that he had not received under the settlement agreement. J Co. named the plaintiff as a third-party respondent in the arbitration, seeking indemnification. The arbitration panel denied the defendant's claims and J Co.'s third-party claims against the plaintiff, and she thereafter brought the action underlying the present appeal, claiming that the arbitration action constituted an indirect claim against her that was prohibited by the settle- ment agreement. On appeal, she claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that she lacked standing to bring her claims. Held: Although it was unclear whether the trial court decided the issue of standing, this court concluded that the plaintiff did have standing to bring her claims, as the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint set forth a colorable claim of injury establishing the possibility that her legally protected interests in the defendant abiding by the terms of the settlement agreement had been adversely affected. The trial court, having incorrectly determined that the defendant's pursuit of the arbitration was not prohibited by the terms of the settlement agreement, improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant, as the express language used in the settlement agreement denoted its broad scope and its paramount purpose that the parties were released from further claims against each other, and there were genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff's claims, including what the defendant knew at the time of the arbitration and the nature of his intent. Argued September 4—officially released November 18, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of various crimes, includ- ing felony murder, appealed following the granting of his petition for certifi- cation to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied his freestanding constitutional claim, which asserted that the police had illegally obtained records containing his historical cell site location information (CSLI) in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. Held: This court declined to review the petitioner's claim that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter v. United States (585 U.S. 296), holding that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring an individual's CSLI, should be applied retroactively, as the petitioner had expressly abandoned that claim. This court declined to review the petitioner's various unpreserved claims related to the statute (§ 54-47aa) governing orders to compel disclosure of or applications to a telecommunications carrier or provider for certain CSLI, as he did not plead these claims in his petition for habeas corpus and, thus, they were not decided by the habeas court. This court concluded that, even if it is assumed that the petitioner's CSLI should have been excluded at his criminal trial, any error in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as that evidence was not critical to the state's case against the petitioner and, thus, did not contribute to or substantially affect the jury's verdict. Argued May 27—officially released November 25, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder, on a plea of guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), and, in a separate docket, had admitted to a violation of probation (collectively, plea), appealed following the granting of her petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying in part and dismissing in part her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed her claim that her plea was involuntary. Held: The habeas court properly denied the petitioner's claim that she was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel during the plea process, as she failed to demonstrate that, but for the alleged deficient performance of her trial counsel, she would have proceeded to trial and, therefore, that she was prejudiced by trial counsel's performance. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's claim that her plea was involuntary, as the petitioner failed to raise the issue before the trial court or on direct appeal, and the petitioner failed to show either good cause or actual prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default. Argued May 19—officially released November 25, 2025