************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Marcus
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALPHONSO MARCUS
(AC 47513)
Westbrook, Wilson and DiPentima, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of, inter alia, assault of a correctional officer in connection with
an altercation with G, the defendant appealed. He claimed that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction because there was no evidence that he caused physical injury to G, which was an element of the
crime. Held:
The trial court reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force
of the evidence established the essential elements of the crime of assault
of a correctional officer beyond a reasonable doubt, including that G suffered
a physical injury, as the court reasonably could have inferred that G experienced pain when he scraped and scuffed his knee during the incident with
the defendant, and the state was not required to demonstrate that G had
an observable physical condition or a physical manifestation of his pain or
that he had sought medical attention or was impaired in his ability to work.
Argued September 10—officially released November 11, 2025
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with the crimes
of assault of a correctional officer and assault in the
third degree and with the infraction of failure to comply
with fingerprint requirements, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New London, geographical area number twenty-one, and tried to the court,
Hon. Arthur C. Hadden, judge trial referee; judgment
of guilty of assault of a correctional officer and failure
to comply with fingerprint requirements, from which
the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Mary Boehlert, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Raynald A. Carre, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Narducci, state’s
attorney, and Carlos Cruz, deputy assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
State v. Marcus
Opinion
DiPENTIMA, J. The defendant, Alphonso Marcus,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after
a trial to the court, of assault of a correctional officer
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c. On appeal,
the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because there was no
evidence that he caused physical injury. Specifically,
he challenges the court’s finding that the correctional
officer suffered any physical injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The state presented evidence of the following facts.1
On June 28, 2023, Travis Griggs and Charles Bernadeau,
correctional officers at Corrigan Correctional Center,
were conducting the intake process for the defendant,
a new inmate at the facility. Griggs and Bernadeau
asked the defendant to remove his sweatshirt pursuant
to a policy concerning certain bulky items of clothing
that could be used to hide contraband. The defendant
refused. In addition, the defendant had one of his hands
in his pants pocket, which Griggs viewed as a safety
concern because a strip search had not yet been conducted. Griggs ordered the defendant several times to
remove his hand from his pocket, but the defendant
did not comply.
As Griggs attempted to grab the defendant’s hand,
an altercation ensued. The defendant pulled away and
1
In rendering its oral decision, the trial court made limited findings with
respect to the elements of the charged offenses. Our recitation of the facts
includes the subordinate findings that the trial court, as the trier of fact,
reasonably could have found on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial.
See State v. Corver, 182 Conn. App. 622, 625 n.1,
190 A.3d 941, cert. denied,
330 Conn. 916,
193 A.3d 1211 (2018); see also, e.g., State v. Josephs,
328
Conn. 21, 24,
176 A.3d 542 (2018) (reciting facts that trial court reasonably
could have found on basis of evidence presented at trial); State v. Andres
C., 208 Conn. App. 825, 828,
266 A.3d 888 (2021) (same), aff’d,
349 Conn.
300,
315 A.3d 1014, cert. denied, U.S. ,
145 S. Ct. 602,
220 L. Ed. 2d
236 (2024).
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Marcus
attempted to strike Griggs in the face with his elbow.
Griggs used a ‘‘leg sweep’’ to get the defendant to the
ground. He attempted to put a wrist restraint on the
defendant and ordered the defendant to put his hands
behind his back. When the defendant refused to comply,
Griggs used a chemical agent on the defendant. Griggs
had ‘‘scraped’’ and ‘‘scuffed’’ his knee, either while falling to the ground or while attempting to get the defendant to comply with the wrist restraint placement.
Other staff members arrived to assist, and the defendant was restrained. Griggs and Bernadeau were relieved
from their duties related to the defendant due to their
involvement in the incident. Joel DeCaprio, a Connecticut state trooper, was dispatched to Corrigan Correctional Center. DeCaprio arrested the defendant as a
result of the altercation. The defendant refused to be
fingerprinted as part of the booking process. Thereafter,
the defendant was charged with assault of a correctional officer in violation of § 53a-167c, assault in the
third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61,
and failure to comply with fingerprint requirements in
violation of General Statutes § 29-17.
Following a trial to the court, Hon. Arthur C. Hadden,
judge trial referee, the defendant was found guilty of
assault of a correctional officer and failure to comply
with fingerprint requirements,2 and not guilty of assault
in the third degree. The court subsequently sentenced
the defendant to five years of incarceration, suspended
after two years, followed by three years of probation
in connection with his assault of a correctional officer.
In addition, the court imposed a fine of $50 in connection with its finding that the defendant failed to comply
with fingerprint requirements, which was remitted. This
appeal followed.
2
The defendant does not challenge his conviction of failure to comply
with fingerprint requirements.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
State v. Marcus
We set forth our standard of review and the relevant
legal principles. ‘‘When a criminal conviction is
reviewed for the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply
a well established [two part] test. First, we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the
facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [P]roof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond
all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis
of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been
found credible by the [trier of fact], would have resulted
in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether
there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would
support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask,
instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [trier of fact’s] verdict of
guilty. . . .
‘‘Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to
determining whether the inferences drawn by the [trier
of fact] are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . .
[T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes
that the evidence . . . established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Instead, the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘[W]e give great deference to the findings of the trial
court because of its function to weigh and interpret the
evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses. . . . In evaluating evidence that could yield
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Marcus
contrary inferences, the trier of fact is not required to
accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier [of
fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence
or facts established by the evidence it deems to be
reasonable and logical. . . . [W]e do not substitute our
own judgment for that of the [trier of fact] if there is
sufficient evidence to support its verdict.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Thompson-Baker, 231 Conn. App. 41, 45–47,
332 A.3d
334 (2025).
Pursuant to § 53a-167c, to prove a person guilty of
assault of a correctional officer, the state must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ‘‘with
intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable . . .
employee of the Department of Correction . . . from
performing his or her duties, and while such . . .
employee . . . is acting in the performance of his or
her duties . . . causes physical injury to such . . .
employee . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1);
see also State v. Kurzatkowski, 119 Conn. App. 556,
561,
988 A.2d 393, cert. denied,
296 Conn. 902,
991 A.2d
1104 (2010).
In the present case, the defendant challenges only
whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Griggs suffered a physical injury.3 The defendant
argues that there was no evidence that Griggs suffered
any physical impairment or pain.
At trial, the state presented evidence of physical
injury through testimony from Griggs.4 Specifically, during his direct examination of Griggs, the prosecutor
3
At oral argument before this court, the defendant’s appellate counsel
clarified that the defendant does not challenge causation but, rather, whether
Griggs suffered a physical injury.
4
During the trial, the state had also presented testimony from Bernadeau
and DeCaprio. In addition, a video of the incident and a handwritten letter
from the defendant to the prosecutor were admitted into evidence.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
State v. Marcus
asked: ‘‘So, as a consequence of the altercation that
you had with [the defendant], did you experience any
pain or physical injury or any sort of physical consequence?’’ Griggs responded: ‘‘In the scuffle, I scraped
my knee, my right knee, either during the fall to the
ground or just attempting to get him to comply with
the wrist restraint placement. Scuffed my knee.’’
During closing argument, defense counsel highlighted the fact that Griggs did not testify that he was
struck by the defendant. Defense counsel argued: ‘‘The
only testimony was that [the defendant] withdrew his
hands from his grasp. And at that point, I believe, the
testimony was that [Griggs] dropped him to the ground
and in the process of doing that, I believe, that Officer
Griggs may have injured his knee. I think he testified,
but I’m not quite certain about that. But there’s no
testimony in any way that [the defendant] struck anyone
or caused any injury to anyone.’’
In finding that the state had proven all of the elements
of assault of a correctional officer, the court stated:
‘‘The final element, which clearly is the element at issue
here, is that the defendant by his actions caused physical injury to the correction[al] officer.’’5 The court
rejected the defendant’s argument emphasizing the fact
that he did not strike Griggs, explaining: ‘‘That is not
the law of the State of Connecticut, sir. The law of
the State of Connecticut is that your conduct caused
physical injury. There’s no requirement that you punch
or kick.’’ The court told the defendant: ‘‘You did cause
physical injury, which is nothing more than the causing
of pain by your conduct to this correction[al] officer.’’
5
As to the other elements of § 53a-167c, the court found that Griggs was
a reasonably identifiable correctional officer, that he was acting in the
performance of his duties at the time of the incident, and that the defendant
possessed the requisite intent to prevent Griggs from performing those
duties. The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
with respect to these other elements.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Marcus
Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict, we conclude that, on the basis
of Griggs’ testimony, the trial court reasonably could
have found that Griggs suffered a physical injury.
‘‘ ‘Physical injury’ means impairment of physical condition or pain . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (3); see
State v. Cruz, 71 Conn. App. 190, 214–15,
800 A.2d
1243 (concluding that definition of physical injury under
§ 53a-3 (3) applies to charge of assault of peace officer
under § 53a-167c), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 934,
806 A.2d
1067 (2002); see also State v. Haughwout,
339 Conn.
747, 767,
262 A.3d 791 (2021).
Although in his testimony Griggs did not specifically
mention pain or impairment, the court reasonably could
have inferred, on the basis of its common knowledge
and experience, that Griggs experienced pain when he
‘‘scraped’’ and ‘‘scuffed’’ his knee during the incident
involving the defendant. See State v. Downey, 69 Conn.
App. 213, 217,
796 A.2d 570 (2002) (pain that officer
experienced when defendant kicked her shin satisfied
physical injury requirement); see also State v. Calabrese, 116 Conn. App. 112, 120–21,
975 A.2d 126 (in
reaching its verdict that defendant was guilty of crime of
assault of elderly person in third degree, which involves
same definition of ‘‘physical injury,’’ jury reasonably
could infer that grabbing arm and pulling hair of elderly
victim would cause her pain, even though victim’s statement did not mention pain or impairment), cert. denied,
293 Conn. 933,
981 A.2d 1076 (2009), and cert. denied,
293 Conn. 933,
981 A.2d 1076 (2009). ‘‘[Triers of fact]
are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observation and experience of the
affairs of life, but, on the contrary, to apply them to
the evidence or facts in hand, to the end that their
action may be intelligent and their conclusion correct.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Calabrese,
supra, 121; see also State v. Patrick M.,
344 Conn. 565,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
State v. Marcus
576, 280 A.3d 461 (2022) (‘‘[t]he [fact finder] is permitted
to rely on its common sense, experience and knowledge
of human nature in drawing inferences’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The defendant argues that Griggs’ testimony was
insufficient to support a finding that he suffered a physical injury because his testimony did not indicate, inter
alia, that he sought medical attention; that he was bleeding, bruised, or had any marks on him; that his pants
were torn or that he was sore; that he was impaired in
his ability to walk, drive, or continue to work; or ‘‘that
he needed any assistance, not even a Band-Aid.’’ In
addition, the defendant contends that there was no
other evidence to corroborate that Griggs suffered a
physical injury, such as medical records, or testimony
from medical personnel or Bernadeau, indicating that
Griggs had been injured or complained of pain.
Although such facts might have helped to establish
physical injury, the absence of this evidence does not
require the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence. The state did not need to demonstrate that
Griggs had an observable physical condition or a physical manifestation of his pain. See State v. Haughwout,
supra,339 Conn. 768 (‘‘[n]either the absence of an
observable physical condition nor the delayed onset of
pain requires the conclusion that the state’s evidence
was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction’’). In addition, the state was not required to demonstrate that Griggs sought medical attention or that he
was impaired in his ability to work. See State v. Mims,
61 Conn. App. 406, 408–409 and n.2,
764 A.2d 222 (pain
caused by kick to officer’s left testicle was sufficient
to support conviction notwithstanding fact that injured
officer sought no medical attention and took no time
off from work), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 944,
769 A.2d
60 (2001).
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Marcus
Accordingly, on the basis of the evidence presented
and the rational inferences drawn therefrom, we conclude that the trial court reasonably found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Griggs suffered a physical injury.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
