Volume 24 — New Hampshire Reports

Debt, for tbe penalty of taking illegal fees. The action was commenced Nov. 17, 1848.

Assumpsit, upon an account annexed, for labor and services. Tbe defendants severally pleaded tbe general issue.

Petition for a new highway in the town of Dover. The petition was duly filed in the clerk’s office, and due notice thereof was given to the town of Dover, agreeably to the requirements of the law, and at the January term of the court of common pleas, 1851, the town of Dover did not appear but made default, of which a due record was made.

Trespass, for breaking and entering the plaintiffs’ close in Durham; described particularly in the declaration, bounded north by the centre of Lamprey river, extending back from the river about two hundred and six feet, and containing about one acre, lying southerly of Packer’s Falls, on said river, and bounded on the west by the highway called Packer’s Falls road. Plea — 'the general issue.

Case. The declaration alleged that on the third day of April, 1848, the defendants were common carriers of goods for hire, from Dover to Boston, and on that day the plaintiff, at their request, delivered to them 144 reams of paper, to be taken care of, safely kept, and securely conveyed from Dover to Boston, there to be safely delivered to Grant, Daniell & Co., for a certain reward; in consideration whereof the defendants received the goods and became bound by law, and then…

Assumpsit. In this action the plaintiff claimed the amount of two promissory.notes, one dated May 16, 1843, for $1140.88, tbe other dated September 14,1843, for $835.49, both payable to the plaintiffs, or order, in' six months from date, and also the amount of two bills of goods sold and delivered, of the same amount. The plea was the general issue.

Trespass, quare clausum fregit. The locus in quo was described in the declaration as situate in Somersworth, containing twenty square rods, more or less ; and bounded, beginning at a point on the northeasterly side line of Court street, and distant southeasterly from the southeasterly side line of High street one hundred feet, thence running northeasterly, parallel with said High street, one hundred and twenty-five, feet, to land of Oliver H. Lord, thence southeasterly at…

To show the limits of the Company, the plaintiff produced the regimental records, in which was found the following entry: “ Head Quarters, 10th Reg., N. H. Militia, at Gilmanton. “ Ordered, that all persons liable to do military duty, living on the hundred acre lots in Barnstead, except one range on the northeasterly end of said lots, shall constitute the second company of Infantry. The remaining part of said town shall constitute the sixth company of Infantry.

Case. The plaintiff founds his action on the provisions of the statute passed July 3,1847, entitled “ an act to amend an act entitled an act to render railroad corporations public in certain cases, and to constitute a board of railroad commissioners,” setting them forth, and then states his claim as follows: That the defendants, in and by the construction of their railroad through the lands of the plaintiff, situate in Sanbornton, in said county, bounded, &c., have cut off…

The plaintiff declared in assumpsit, upon a promissory note made by the defendant’s intestate.

This was an appeal from a decree of the judge of probate, passed November 19th, 1850, appointing the appellee administrator on the estate of Solomon Munsey, who resided in Barn-stead, and died there, intestate, October 21st, 1850, leaving a widow, two sons and six daughters, all of age, and residing in this State.

Debt upon a bond. Plea, non est factum ; and there was a denial of the signature, in the manner required by the forty-third rule of court. The declaration alleged that the defendant at, &c., on, &c., “ by his writing obligatory of that date, sealed with his seal, and here in court to be produced, bound and acknowledged himself indebted to the, plaintiff in the sum of one thousand dollars, to be paid to the plaintiff on demand.” The action was referred under a rule of court.

This is a real action, in which the plaintiff claims one undivided half of a tract of land in Ossipee, in this county. Upon the general issue, it appeared that both parties derive their titles from Moses Colby. The plaintiff claims under an attachment and levy. The defendant claims under a mortgage made after the attachment. The attachment was made on the 5th of April, 1828, and the mortgage on the 2d of August, 1828.

<p>Statutes which prescribe new rules for the decision of existing causes of action are retrospective, and therefore unconstitutional and inoperative in such cases.</p> <p>An affidavit which says, “ I am confident that a petition was presented to the selectmen before any petition was filed in court,” is not sufficient evidence of that fact. It does not shew personal knowledge of the existence of the petition, nor its loss, nor due inquiry where it should be found.</p> <p>Objections to the jurisdiction or to the regularity of the proceedings on petitions for highways, must be taken early, or they will be regarded as waived.</p> <p>Pourteen days notice of the laying out of highways to towns and corporations is sufficient.</p> <p>It is not necessary to state the width of a new road in a petition.</p> <p>Petitioners for a new road are not admissible as witnesses at the hearing before the road commissioners, if then objected to.</p> <p>Landowners, over whose land a new highway is proposed to be laid out, are admissible as witnesses at such hearing if they have not made themselves parties to the proceeding.</p> <p>"Where a road is laid out along the line of a man’s land, but not over it, no damages can he awarded to him.</p>

Indictment for larceny. The respondent having pleaded guilty, moved in arrest of judgment, because no place is set forth in the indictment where the alleged offence was committed. He also moved that if judgment should not be arrested, that he be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty. The indictment was substantially as follows: a State of New Hampshire, Oarroll ss.

Case, for words spoken by the defendant, charging the plain tiff with poisoning his first wife. The plaintiff introduced three witnesses, who testified that the words were spoken by the defendant, as charged in the plaintiff’s declaration. One of these was William H. Hadley.

Petition, addressed to the court of common pleas, for the suspension or removal from office of John S. Bryant, an attorney, admitted to practice under the provisions of section 7, chap. 177, of the Revised Statutes.

<p>It is unnecessary to appeal from a void judgment.</p> <p>The plaintiff brought an action of debt against the defendant, to recover a penalty under the statute, for cutting trees on the land of the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded that he was in possession of the land by virtue of a lease from the plaintiff, and that he lawfully cut the trees; to which the plaintiff replied that the lease was cancelled before the trees were cut. The .justice rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed. Upon a complaint for not entering the appeal, it was held, that the plea brought the title to real estate in question; that the justice had no jurisdiction to render a judgment, and that it was unnecessary to enter the appeal, and the complaint was dismissed.</p>

<p>Foreign Attachment. Tbe trustee, Hazeltine, made disclosure that be was indebted to tbe principal defendant for bis labor, performed between tbe 29tb of May and 4tb of July, 1850; that on said 29tb of May tbe deputy sheriff wbo made service of the writ in this action, handed to him a copy of the writ, and the trustee understood it to be for the purpose of making service of the writ on him as trustee of the principal defendant ; that on the 4th of July the same deputy handed him again a copy of the writ, which was the same paper, or one similar to it, that had been handed to him in May.</p> <p>At the taking of the disclosure, the defendants’ attorney requested the trustee to make the affidavit of the deputy sheriff a part of his disclosure, by annexing it thereto, in which affidavit it was stated that service was made on the trustee in May, and the return written out upon the writ accordingly; that having kept the writ in his, the officer’s hands, until July, without having made service thereof on the principal defendant, the officer, by direction of the plaintiff, went to the trustee and asked him if he was willing to accept a discharge of the previous service on him, to which he replied that he was; that the trustee then gave back to the officer the copy of the writ which he had received from the officer at the time of the service in May, and the same copy was again handed to the trustee, who was informed that service would commence from that time, and that the principal defendant had no knowledge of this proceeding. The trustee declined to annex the affidavit to his disclosure. The return of the officer making the service is as follows:</p> <p>“May 29th, 1850. I then summoned the within named Frederick Hazeltine, as within commanded, by giving to him a true and attested copy of the within writ, and on the 4th day of July, by direction of the plaintiff, I asked the said Hazeltine for the copy I gave him on the 29th May. He gave it me and said he would accept of a discharge, when I made the above service.</p> <p>J. H. Angier, Deputy Sheriff.”</p> <p>“July 4th, 1850. Then I summoned the within named Frederick Hazeltine, as within commanded, by giving to him a true and attested copy of the within writ.</p> <p>James H. Angier, Deputy Sheriff.”</p> <p>“July 5th, 1850. Then I summoned the within named E. D. Dunn, as within commanded, by reading to him this writ.</p> <p>• James H. Angier, Deputy Sheriff.”</p> <p>The return under date of 29th May, 1850, is placed upon the back of the writ, immediately beneath the return, under date of 4th July, and this last return appears to have been altered by an erasure, and the insertion of the date as it now is where the erasure was made.</p>

Trover, for a quantity of hay. After the judgment of the court was pronounced in this case, as reported 2 Foster, 167, the case was amended by adding to it a further portion of the deposition of Ira Howland, as follows, but which was not read nor offered to be read to the jury: Question.

Assumpsit for $200, money bad and received by tbe defendant to tbe plaintiffs5 use before tbe date of tbe writ. Tbe suit was commenced on tbe 18tb of September, 1851, by capias, and on tbe day of tbe date of tbe writ tbe body of the defendant was arrested and held to bail. There was no affidavit on tbe back of tbe writ. Tbe defendant moved to quash tbe writ.

Trespass, guare clausum fregit. Plea, the general issue. The action was brought to the court of common pleas by an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace.

The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that in consequence of the building of the railroad, a part of his land was liable to be washed, and to cave off where there was a bank; and that the sand drifted from the railroad and injured his- adjoining land.

<p>Assumpsit for money had and received, may be maintained by the third endorser of a promissory note against the first.</p> <p>The statements or confessions of a witness that he is interested in the result of the action, are inadmissible, as evidence aliunde, to show his interest and render him incompetent.</p> <p>Where a witness, before trial, made statements showing that he was the real plaintiff in the action — held, that these statements were inadmissible as evidence addressed to the court to show the witness to be incompetent.</p> <p>It seems that where it is proved that the witness offered is the leal plaintiff, that mutual releases between the witness and nominal plaintiff will not render him competent. Being the real plaintiff, he is still liable to the defendant for costs in case of failure in the suit.</p> <p>Whether a bond of indemnity against such costs from a solvent obligor, or a deposit with the clerk of a sufficient sum to cover the liability, would be sufficient to remove the interest, qucere ?■</p>

<p>If, on the return of the report of an auditor, it appears that the ease was an im- ■ proper one to he submitted, or that incompetent evidence has been received, or that an informal and illegal report has been made, the proper practice is to move to recommit or reject the report, according to the nature of the objections. Where, however, no motion to recommit or reject is made, but the report is submitted to the court upon questions of law raised on the evidence reported by the auditor, the court will proceed to pass upon the report in the same manner as though the facts presented were an agreed case.</p> <p>It is the general practice in this State for auditors to receive the testimony of either party to the suit; and the court will not interfere with a report because one of the parties has testified, unless it is perfectly clear that injustice has been done.</p> <p>A parol agreement, made at the time of the execution of a written contract, by which the terms of the contract are changed, cannot be given in evidence by the parties thereto to change the contract. An'd where the payee of a promissory note agreed at the time it was signed that the first money that was paid to him by the principal on the note should be applied thereon — held, that evidence of such an agreement, and that the money was not applied in accordance with it, was incompetent to change the terms of the note and discharge the surety.</p> <p>An agreement for delay in the payment of a note, made between the payee and principal, must, in order to discharge the surety, be such as binds both debtor and creditor. And where the payee held two notes against the principal, and the latter, on paying money to the payee, requested it to be indorsed on the note now in suit, but the payee said, “pay this note and let the other (the one nowin suit) run” — held, that the evidence was incompetent as tending to show any contract for delay.</p>

Assumpsit for two dollars, paid, laid out and expended. It was admitted that the parties are severally owners of adjoining lots of land in the town of Lebanon, upon which there was a fence between them; that they could not agree about the division of the fence ; that the defendant contended that the fence was not on the true line; that the fence viewers of the town were called out, who made division where the fence was to be built, which was on the line of the old fence; and…

In this case the parties agree as follows in regard to the timber which is the subject of this action: The timber was taken within the limits of a highway, duly laid out by the town of Holderness, over lands of the plaintiff and others, adjacent thereto, if the officers of said town were duly elected and authorized for that purpose. Previous to the taking, the damages awarded were duly'tendered by the town to the plaintiff.

Assumpsit, for the use and occupation of a house and other buildings, in Lebanon, from November 1,1847, to April 1,1848. Plea, tender of eight dollars. Replication, that the plaintiff sustained greater damages. It appeared that the defendant, on the 1st of November, 1847, entered into the premises under the plaintiff, by virtue of a verbal agreement, to hold at a rent of eight dollars per month, and kept actual possession about one month.

Writ or Entry. The demandant counted as follows: “ W. T. Mitchell, &c., is summoned to answer to W. Waldo, &c., in a plea of land, wherein the said Waldo demands against the said Mitchell a certain tract of land, situate in said Orange, bounded on the north by land of Samuel Andrew, east by land of C. M. Sanborn and H. McGrath, south by land of said Mitchell, and west by land of said Mitchell and land of W. Cheney; it being the southerly half of lot No. 32, in the first…

Trover, for the conversion of four barrels of apples. The action was brought before a justice, and came to the court of common pleas by appeal. It is now submitted upon an agreed statement. The defendant was duly appointed collector of taxes of the town of Holderness for the year 1850, and was duly qualified. The plaintiff was a resident of the town, and was assessed in the taxes of that year.

Assumpsit, for money had and received by the defendants to the plaintiff’s use. To sustain the action the plaintiff offered in evidence a promissory note, as follows: “ Lyme, October 4,1848. “ For value received of James Heaton, we jointly and severally promise to pay him, or bearer, seventy dollars, payable in one year from date, and interest. “ Signed, Orrin Pales, George.

Assumpsit, for tbe use and occupation of tbe saw mill, sbingle mill, clapboard mill, and tbe farm and buildings in Littleton • called tbe Gile- farm and mill, for one year, ending December 15tb, 1847. Also on a quantum meruit for tbe use and occupation of tbe same property from December 15tb, 1846, to tbe commencement of tbe suit January 31st, 1848.

Assumpsit, on an account annexed to the writ. The writ also contained a general count for goods, wares and merchandize sold and delivered. Plea, the general issue. The case having been committed to an auditor, a report was made, by which the auditor found a balance of $108.48 due the plaintiff.

Assumpsit, on a policy of insurance against fire, insuring $166 on the plaintiff’s house and shed No. 1; $75 on his furniture and provisions therein; $77 on his barn and shed No. 2; $75 on his hay and grain in the barn, and $7 on his swine house.

This was a proceeding under the landlord and tenant act, to procure the possession of certain premises in the town of Bristol. The pleadings before the magistrate raised the question of title, and the action was entered in the court of common pleas, under the provisions of the statute in such cases.

Assumpsit. The writ was dated April 12th, 1849, and contained two counts.

Assumpsit, on a contract of warranty in the sale of a horse. The declaration contained two counts. Held: for the purposes of the trial, that the written contract contained a warranty that the horse was six years old, and admitted the evidence, subject to the exception.

Assumpsit, on a promissory note dated October 8th, 1847, payable to one John Hopkinson, or order, for $150, on the first day of June following, with interest annually, and endorsed by Hopkinson to the plaintiff.

Trover, for a horse. Plea, the general issue. The plaintiff claimed title to the property by virtue of a mortgage from the. defendant to himself, dated October 17th, 1846. The mortgage was dtdy signed, sworn to and recorded, and included the property in question. The condition of the mortgage was to pay two promissory, notes due from the defendant to the plaintiff, as follows: “ One, dated Guildhall, June 15th, 1844.

Assumpsit, on an account annexed, consisting of the following items, to wit: “ Sept. 19, 1846. To work on frame of flume in mill, $3.50 Oct. 1846. To work of my son Hazen, three weeks, 8.50 March 26,1847. To two hundred pounds of fish, 6.50 $18.50 ” On the general issue, the defendant admitted that the account was once due.

The issue in this case was upon a plea in abatement, that the name and office of the officer who served the writ by virtue of which the defendant’s goods were attached, were not indorsed upon the summons when delivered to the defendant. The plaintiff contended that the summons, at the time it was delivered to the defendant, was indorsed in pencil, and admitted it was not indorsed with ink.

Case. It was alleged in the first count that the plaintiff, on, &c., purchased of the defendants forty-three gallons of N. E. rum, at thirty-two cents a gallon, and furnished to the defendants good and sufficient casks to contain said rum; and it then and there became the duty of the defendants to put up and deliver said rum in said casks; yet the defendants, not regarding, &c., did not put up and deliver said rum in said casks furnished by the plaintiff, but carelessly and…

Assumpsit, on an account annexed to tbe writ. The case was committed to an auditor, who allowed sundry items of the plaintiffs' account, amounting to $195.07, and disallowed other items. He also allowed several items of the defendant’s set-off, amounting to $80.32, and disallowed the rest. He found a balance due the plaintiffs of $114.75.

The issue in this case was upon a plea in abatement, setting forth that the summons left with the defendant by the officer who served the writ and attached the defendant’s goods, was not indorsed with the name and office of the officer serving the same. It appeared that the name and office of the officer who served the summons was written upon the back of the summons with a lead pencil.

Assumpsit, for the price of certain plank used by the plaintiff, as a surveyor of highways, to repair a bridge in Carroll, in June, 1847, and tbe expense of hauling them. The plaintiff offered the records of the town to show that he was highway surveyor in the district No. 3, in that town, for the year 1847. It appeared by the records that the annual meeting was held on the 9th day of March, 1847.

Assumpsit. It was alleged in the declaration that on the 10th day of November, 1833, David Ash died seized of real and personal estate, in which his daughter Hannah, the wife of the plaintiff, had an interest, and that the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiffs would make to him an acquittance of all the right which the plaintiffs had in the estate, promised the plaintiffs to pay them on demand the sum of seventy-five dollars.

Complaint, for costs. It appeared that the bank on the 81st of August, 1850, sued out a writ against Chadbourn. An affidavit was made upon the writ, charging Chadbourn with concealing his property, &e., and he was thereupon arrested. Upon his application he was taken before two justices, as provided by the statute, and upon examination, was discharged.

Assumpsit.^ Tbe writ contained two counts, tbe first of which was as follows: “ In a plea of the case, for that the said Buck-minster, at said Keene, on the 26th day of July, 1849, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the instance and request of the said Buckminster, had then and there bought of him a certain number, to wit: fifteen sheep, at and for a certain price then and there agreed upon between them, whereof the plaintiff then and there paid him fifteen dollars, the…

Debt, on a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendants, at the superior court for the county of Cheshire, on the first Tuesday of October, 1830. The writ is dated February 21st, 1851. At March term, 1851, the defendants pleaded— 1st. Nul tiel record; to which the plaintiff replies that there is such record. 2d. That the cause of action did not accrue within twenty years before the commencement of the plaintiff’s suit.

Trover, for forty-five loads of manure, April 1,1848. It appeared that on the 13th of September, 1847, the defendant conveyed to the plaintiff his farm in Dublin, in this county, which the defendant then occupied. By á clause in the deed he reserved the possession until the first of April, 1848, and agreed at that time to give the plaintiff the possession.

Writ oe Error. The original action was a writ of entry, in which the demandants counted on their own seizin in fee and in mortgage, and on a joint disseizin by the tenant. At the March term of the common pleas, in 1849, the demandants recovered judgment against both the tenants, on their default without appearance. The error assigned was the infancy of Hamilton, one of the defendants in the original action.

Case, for causing the water to flow back upon the plaintiffs’ mills, situated on Sugar river, in Claremont, and obstructing tbe same with back water and ice. The writ was dated January 9, 1849. Plea, the general issue. On the trial it appeared that there is an island in said river, called Rock Island; that in low water the largest quantity of water flows on the north side of said island, and in high water the largest quantity of water flows on the south side.

Assumpsit, on review. The original action was founded on two promissory notes of the said Polly, and an account filed by leave of court for work and labor done and performed by said Samuel. On the entry of the action at the February term, 1850, of the common pleas, Polly Pike was defaulted; and Ovid Chase, of Claremont, was permitted by the court to defend the suit, in the name of Polly, on his filing bonds for costs.

On the 20th day of April, 1837, John Tappan made his last will and testament, of that date. By his will, after various legacies and devises, he devised as follows: “ Item: all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, whether real, personal, or mixt, in Claremont aforesaid, wheresoever being, after payment of my just debts, I give, devise and bequeath to my son, John W. Tappan.

Trespass, qucere clausum, for cutting and carrying away from the plaintiff’s land, in Pembroke, a quantity of wood and timber. Plea, the general issue. It appeared that the plaintiff owned land in the town of Pembroke, bounded by the line between Pembroke and Chichester, and adjoining land of the defendant. The defendant’s land was also bounded by said line between the two towns ; and the principal controversy between the parties was as to the true line between the towns.

Assumpsit. The writ was dated October 6th, 1849, and contained one count for $500, money had and received by the defendant to the use of Clarissa Pierce, while covert of Daniel Pierce.

Assumpsit, on a premium note dated December 9,1848, given on the issuing of a policy of insurance by the plaintiffs to the defendants, for the sum of six hundred dollars, payable in such portions and at such times as the directors might, agreeably to their act of incorporation, require. The writ was dated September 12,1851, and the declaration alleged an assessment on the 26th of August, 1850, of forty-two dollars, upon the note, and notice to the defendants.

The case was submitted to the jury late in the evening. The presiding justice being under the necessity of attending a distant court in the morning, the jury were directed, by consent of ipar* ties, to seal up their verdict and return it at the opening of the court the next morning. The verdict was returned sealed by the foreman to the court, then held by the county justices.

Trespass, for an assault, battery and wounding. The second plea set forth that the defendant was possessed of a close, &c., (described.) The plaintiff with a strong hand, without license, and against the will of the defendant, broke and entered said close, and being requested to depart, refused; and the defendant thereupon molliter manus imposuit to remove him, and did gently remove him, quae est eadem, &c. The second replication to this plea averred that the plaintiff was…

This action was commenced August 8,1850, to recover two parcels of land, under the statutes relative to the action against tenants, before a justice of the peace. The defendant, as to the first tract, pleaded, first, a disclaimer; secondly, not guilty.

Indictment against five stockholders of the Concord and Claremont Railroad, as proprietors thereof, under the 7th section of the act approved July 13,1850, entitled “ an act in amendment of the laws in relation to railroad corporations.” It was agreed that at the time of the accident set forth in the indictment, the whole number of stockholders in the road was between three and four hundred, of whom the respondents were five.

Case, for flowing the plaintiff’s land by a dam. For a long time before, and until 1829, those under whom the defendant derived his title had been accustomed to flow the plaintiff’s land in spring and autumn, drawing off the water during the summer. In that year and the next the defendant took away the old dam and built a new one of stone, and put up valuable mills, to be operated through the entire season.

Writ or Entry, for land in Andover, in this county. Plea, nul disseizin. Both parties claim title under Erie W. Stewart, the plaintiff, by a mortgage deed, dated Jan. 1st, 1849, signed, sealed, witnessed by one witness, and recorded March 16th, 1849 : the defendants, under an attachment in mesne process, made by them in a suit against Erie W. Stewart, Jan. 25,1851, and the extent of an execution on a judgment recovered in that suit, March term, 1851.

Assumpsit. The declaration was special, and in the following words : “ For that said Gibbs, at Manchester, on the 30th day of January, 1849, agreed with and promised said Whittemore to sell and deliver to him a certain mortgage which he, the said Gibbs, then held against one S. F. Stanton, of Nashua, and given by said Stanton to one William Goodnow, and relinquish all of his claim in and to a certain machine shop in said Manchester, situated on Manchester street, and owned…

Case. The first count alleged that the-plaintiff was the owner of a saw-mill and appurtenances, on a certain rivulet or stream in Merrimack, and had a right to the free course of the water in said stream, to and from said mill, without obstruction; that the defendants,-on the 2d of October, 1848, by placing earth, stones and an embankment across said stream, so obstructed and impeded the course of the water in said stream from said mill, as to raise it above its natural…

Review of an action of assumpsit, granted by tbe superior court on petition of tbe trustee, against whom judgment was rendered on default in tbe original action. Tbe principal defendant and tbe trustee were described in tbe original writ and writ of review as of Salem, N. H., and the plaintiff as of Lawrence, Mass.

Assumpsit. The writ was dated March 21,1848, and contained two counts; one for use and occupation, and the other for money had and received. The case was committed to an auditor, who allowed the plaintiff’s claim to the amount of $819.08, and the defendant’s set-off to the amount of $1180.91, leaving a balance of $361.88 ,due to the defendant. The auditor’s report was submitted to the jury, and a copy of the same formed a part of the case sent up.

Assumpsit, by the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Samuel Burbank,.of Limington, in the -State of Maine, on a policy of insurance against loss by fire, issued by tbe defendants to said Samuel Burbank, the intestate, on the 10th day of February, 1845, insuring six hundred dollars on his grist-mill, in Limington, for six years. The declaration alleged a total loss by fire on the 13th of February, 1847.

Petition for alimony. At tbe December term of this court, 1849, a decree was passed dissolving tbe bonds of matrimony between William H. Sbeafe, tbe libellant, and bis wife Eboda Sbeafe, tbe libellee and present petitioner, for tbe alleged crime of adultery. At tbe next term after tbe divorce was decreed, tbe petitioner made this application for alimony.

Writ oe Entry, dated August 21, 1849. The plaintiffs demanded one undivided eleventh part of a piece of land in Chester, which was set off to Abigail Hall, widow of Benjamin Hall, as her dower in the lands of her said husband. Plea, nul disseisin.