Volume 245 — United States Reports

Held: by inference that the same understanding attached to a further bond for appearance at trial, and that the depositary’s conduct in retaining only shares constituting the deposit, while settling with the defendant for others, confirmed such intention.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OP APPEALS OP THE STATE OP MARYLAND.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p> <p>in support of the contention that the order of the Public Service Commission here in question was unconstitutional, relied principally upon Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, and Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, citing in addition the following as sustaining the authority of the Lake Shore Case: Wisconsin &c. R. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 297; Erie R. R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685, 701; Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U. S. 491, 499; Beardsley v. New York C. &c. R. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 230; Commonwealth v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 106 Virginia, 61; State v. Bonneval, 128 Louisiana, 902; State v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 17 N. Dak. 370; Attorney General v. Old Colony R. Co., 160 Massachusetts, 62.</p> <p>Interstate Consolidated Street Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79, they distinguished upon the ground that the constitutionality of the state statute there in question — requiring street car companies to carry school children at half fare — was not involved. The statute was an exercise of the State’s, reserved power over the corporation. The. reasoning of the decision in no way detracts from the authority of the Lake Shore Case.</p> <p>The analogy between the Lake Shore Case and the case at bar would seem to be complete, for the difference between a 1,000-mile ticket and a 100-trip ticket, both required to be issued contrary to the managerial will of the carrier and at rates less than the maximum or standard one-way single fare, is not fundamental.</p>

Held: nevertheless, that it was not final in the sense of the Act of September 6, 1916, supra, and that an application for certiorari under that statute was premature. Petition for a writ of certiorari to review 39 S. Dak. 64 , denied. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: that the contract could not be successfully.opposed to the power of condemnation; and this quite apart from the attempt to condemn the contract right itself, since, if the contract exemption were otherwise valid, its defeat by such a method would ■ be a mere evasion.

Held: that the effect of the meander was to exclude the meandered area from the township, and that neither the selection, the confirmatory act nor the patent could be construed as embracing it. *26 Chapman & Dewey Lumber Co. v. St. Frauds Levee District, 232 V. S. 186.

Held: That the investigation, particularly as related to and defined by the questions asked, was not ‘to be regarded as directed to the political activities of the carrier or to its efforts to suppress competition, but as seeking to ascertain the amounts of expenditures made by the carrier, their allocation, and the manner in which they were charged upon its books.

<p>Decided on the authority of Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, ante, 33.</p>

<p>Decided on the. authority of Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, ante, 33.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the tax, whether considered as a tax on property or as a tax on the individual measured by property, was within the power of the State imposing it. A state court’s decision does not deprive the complaining party of the equal protection of the laws merely because it departs from decisions made by the court in earlier cases. 168 Kentucky, 71; 171 Kentucky, 509; 172 Kentucky, 451, affirmed.

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), is a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States addressed civil government-instituted racial segregation in residential areas. The Court held unanimously that a Louisville, Kentucky, city ordinance prohibiting the sale of real property to blacks in white-majority neighborhoods or buildings and vice versa violated the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against denying property rights without due process of law. The ruling of the Kentucky Court of Appeals was thus reversed. Previous state court rulings had overturned racial zoning ordinances on grounds of the "takings clause" because of their failures to grandfather land that had been owned before enactment.

Held: that the court had taken' jurisdiction and decided the case upon its merits and that mandamus would not lie to compel it to inquire into and pass upon the Secretary’s refusal. Rule discharged. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Vincent P. Donihee, with whom Mr. Edward S. Hatch was on the brief, for petitioner.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the bill was dependent and ancillary, that the jurisdiction to entertain it was referable to that invoked in the actions at law, and that the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals was therefore reviewable by appeal. Jud. Code, §§ 128, 241.

Held: that the county’s action in other cases, viewed with the present controversy, revealed ' well-defined plans of its officials, in notorious operation long before the passage of the amendment, to avoid payment of the county’s adjudicated indebtedness and a deliberate design to deprive its creditors of an efficacious remedy provided by law and incorporated into its contracts; that this court could not ignore actual…

<p>A court of bankruptcy has no jurisdiction over a suit in equity brought by the trustee of a bankrupt corporation in the State of the corporation’s domicile, against a number of its shareholders there residing, for the purpose of collecting from each an ascertained sum of money which by the terms of such shareholder’s individual subscription contract had become unconditionally due and payable to the corporation at times specified and without regard to the obligations of other shareholders.</p> <p>Where the liabilities of the shareholders of a corporation to pay stock subscriptions are several, independent, and unconditional, and no issue with the corporation touching such liabilities is common to the shareholders, the remedy of the corporation, or its trustee in bankruptcy, is by action at law against each shareholder separately; the equitable jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of actions does not ai’ise merely because the claims are very numerous; and a single suit by. the corporation, or by its trustee in bankruptcy, against many of the shareholders, to collect their subscriptions, cannot be maintained on that ground.</p> <p>An order of the court of bankruptcy, calling for the payment of shareholders’ subscriptions to a bankrupt corporation which, before and independently of the order, were ascertained and payable, adds nothing to the liabilities of the shareholders or to the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy, and cannot justify a single suit by the trustee against many of the shareholders to collect their subscriptions which, in the absence of the order, would not have been cognizable in equity; and neither can an order of the bankruptcy court directing the trustee “to institute a suit in equity” to make such collections confer such equitable jurisdiction.</p> <p>The amendment to § 47, clause (2) of subdivision a of the Bankruptcy Act, made by the Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 840, § 8, did not confer new means of collecting ordinary claims due the bankrupt.</p> <p>Where causes of action and citizenship of parties are such that a bankrupt, before-bankruptcy, could, have sued only in a state court, the bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to enforce them at the suit of the trustee, even if as a matter of eqtiity jurisdiction the trustee might join all causes in one bill to prevent a multiplicity of suits, while the bankrupt would have been obliged to sue upon each of them independently at law.</p> <p>Contested claims of a bankrupt corporation against persons alleged to be shareholders, for moneys alleged to be due and payable on subscriptions to the corporate stock, are not to be regarded as property in the possession of the trustee in- bankruptcy for the purpose of determining whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enforce them; nor does the fact that such alleged debtors are shareholders of the corporation enable the trustee to sue them in that forum to collect their subscriptions.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOB THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution intends,'-not to express .the law of' extradition as usually prevailing among independent nations, but5 to provide a summary executive proceeding whereby the States may promptly aid one another in-bringing accused persons to trial. Its provisions, and the statutes passed in execution of them, should be construed liberally to effectuate this purpose.</p> <p>A person indicted in due form for an offense against the laws of a State, who was present in that State at the time when the offense .is so alleged to have been committed and subsequently leaves it, becomes,, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution and laws, a fugitive from justice; and upon the making of demand, accompanied by cer- ' tiffed papers, as required by § 5278 of the Revised Statutes, the governor of the State in which he is found must cause him to be arrested and delivered for extradition into the custody of the authorized agent of the State whose laws are alleged to have been violated.</p> <p>An accused person arrested in interstate extradition proceedings, who sues out habeas corpus to obtain his discharge on the ground that he is not a fugitive from justice, is not entitled to introduce evidence to prove that after the date of the alleged offense he was “usually and publicly resident” within the demanding State for a time sufficient to bar the prosecution under its limitation statutes. The statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted on the trial ■ by the defendant in criminal cases; and this court has frequently decided that matters of defense can not be heard on habeas corpus to test the validity of an arrest in extradition, but must be heard and decided, a.t the trial, by the courts of the demanding State.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.,</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT O'F THE STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the contract was for the completion of the works and that the cost of protecting them from floods in the meantime was within the contractor’s undertaking. 48 Ct. Clms. 128; 50 id. 421, affirmed. *160 The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Benjamin. Carter, with whom Mr. Frank Carter Pope was on the briefs, for appellants. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Thompson for the United States.

The case is stated in the opinion. besides suggesting that, under § 4 of the Act of September 6, 1916, the writ of error if improper might be taken as an application for certiorari, contended that error was proper because the validity of the New York statute upon which the service and jurisdiction in the New York courts depended was challenged.

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Article 7 of the treaty with Denmark of April 26, 1826, 8 Stat. 340, (renewed April 11, 1857,11 Stat. 719,) places no limitation upon the right of either government to deal with its own citizens and their property, within its dominion.</p> <p>Therefore, where a native of Denmark, who became a naturalized citizen of the United States, died a resident and property owner in the State of Iowa, and in the settlement there of his estate inheritance taxes were imposed in respect of legacies to subjects and residents of Denmark, the treaty affords the legatees no basis for complaining of the discrimination of the Iowa law (1907 Supp. Code, § 1467), which taxes legacies to nonresident aliens higher than those given under similar conditions to residents of the State without regard to the residence or nationality of the testator.</p> <p>The favored nation clause in Article 1 of the above cited treaty with Denmark is applicable only "in respect of commerce and navigation;” it does not apply where the discrimination complained of is in the rates of state inheritance taxes. -</p>

Held: following Petersen v. Iowa, ante, 170, that such discrimination was not violative of either Article VI, or Article II (the favored nation clause), of the treaty with Sweden of April 3,1783, 8 Stat. 60 , renewed and revived by later treaties. 168 Iowa, 511 , affirmed. The caséis stated in the opinion. Mr. Nelson Miller, with whom Mr. G. T. Struble was on the bi ef, for plaintiff in error.

Held: that the franchise and permit'taxes both violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and directly burdened interstate commerce. A suit to enjoin state officials from enforcing an unconstitutional tax is not a suit against the State. 218 Fed. Rep. 260 , affirmed.

<p>Under the Act of April 26,1906, § 19, c. 1876,34 Stat. 137, and the Act of May 27, 1908, § 4, c. 199, 35 Stat. 312, providing that allotments in the Five Civilized Tribes from which restrictions on alienation have been removed.shall be subject to taxation, land allotted to a Creek Freedwoman as a homestead under the Act of June 30, 1902, c. 1323, 32 Stat. 500, lost its tax exemption when the restrictions were removed by the Secretary of. the Interior upon the petition of the allottee under the townsite provision of the Act of March 3, 1903, c. 994, 32 Stat. 996. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, distinguished.</p>

Held: upon the evidence, that the invention is meritorious and entitled to invoke the doctrine of equivalents. Paper Bag Patent Case, 210 U. S. 405 .

Held: that the proceeding to set aside the judgment amounted to an independent action, and that the question of jurisdiction, as it related only to the power of the court in the original action, could not be made the basis of a direct •writ of error, under Judicial Code, § 238, to determine the correctness of the order overruling the application. Writ of error dismissed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: a public purpose for which taxes may be levied without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Revised Statutes of Maine, 1903, e. 4, § 87, sustained. 113 Maine, 123, affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Eben Winthrop Freeman for plaintiffs in error: The legislature may not make a use public by declaring it such.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP SOUTH DAKOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that plaintiff was clearly entitled to an injunction. 214 Fed. Rep. 685 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Hannis Taylor, with whom Mr. George R. E. Gilchrist was on the briefs, for petitioner. Mr. Charles E. Hogg for respondents. Space will not permit an adequate presentation of the elaborate arguments submitted by opposing counsel.

Held: in view of specific denials and supporting affidavits, not rebutted, that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not err in dissolving the temporary injunction.

Held: that the questions whether the part of the tax based on frontage was severable, though the other part was void, and whether, and by what agency, a new and just area assessment should be made, were questions of state law, untouched by this court’s .decision and mandate, and left for determination by the state court? Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55 , explained. 269 Missouri, 561, affirmed.

<p>This court determines the constitutionality of a state tax upon its own ' judgment of the actual operation and effect of the tax, irrespective of its form and of how it is. characterised by the state courts.</p> <p>A state tax on the business of selling goods in foreign commerce, meas- ■ ured by a percentage of the entire business transacted, is both a regulation of foreign commerce and an impost or duty on exports, and is therefore void. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1, distinguished.</p>

<p>The power of a State under the Webb-Kenyon Law to forbid shipment into its territory of intoxicating liquor from other States includes the lesser power to prescribe by law the conditions under which such shipments may be allowed.</p> <p>The Webb-Kenyon Law having subjected interstate shipments of intoxicating liquor to state legislation, a state law requiring carriers to keep records of such shipments, open for the inspection of' any officer or citizen, is valid, notwithstanding the prohibition of § 15 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended June. 18,1910, against the divulging of information by interstate carriers.</p>

Held: “The only means provided by the act for procuring intoxicating liquors in a prohibition district for any purpose relates to wine to be used for sacramental purposes and pure alcohol to be used for scientific or mechanical purposes, or for compounding or preparing mediciné, so that the possession of whiskey, or of any intoxicating liquor, other than wine and pure alcohol for the uses above mentioned, is prohibited.”…

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that no right to the principal passed to his trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act, § 70a (5). 155 App. Div. 636 ; 213 N. Y. 315 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. *313 Mr. Walter S. Heilborn, with whom Mr. David J. Gallert was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Frederick Getter, with whom Mr. Edward H. Blanc was on the brief, for Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company.

<p>Article IV, § 2, subdivision 2, of the Constitution places no limitation upon the power of the States to arrest in advance of extradition proceedings; with Rev. Stats., § 5278, it deals merely with the conditions under which one State may demand rendition from another and under which the alleged fugitive may resist compliance by the State upon which the demand is made.</p>

Held: that the certificate of naturalization was subject to be set'aside, in a suit by the United States under § 15 of the act, as a certificate “illegally procured.” Sections 11 and 15 of the Naturalization Act afford cumulative protection against fraudulent or illegal naturalization.

<p>Error committed by the District Court in admitting former judgments in evidence and in rendering judgment on such evidence against a party who objects that they do not bind him but who is fully heard does not constitute a denial of due process of law.</p>

Held: that certain sums paid by savings banks to the receiver of a' national bank in which they held shares were intended to be applied against their liabilities under the National Banking Act, to enforce which an assessment, made by the Comptroller, was then outstanding. A second assessment, exceeding the differences between their statutory liabilities and the amounts so paid, was void.

Held: upon the facts, as found by the court below, that the site selected before the execution of the contract was selected provisionally and subject to be changed by the Government for some other location within the navy yard, and that claimant so understood when the contract was made.

<p>An order of a state public service commission requiring a city gas company to extend its mains and service pipes to meet the reasonable needs of a growing community within the city can not be deemed arbitrary or capricious, and so contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where it appears that the company was accorded full hearing before the commission and on review in the state courts, that it is the only one authorized to serve the community in question with gas, and that the rate of return upon the cost of the extension, though low initially — from cl\i% to 4% per annum — , will probably soon become ample with the growth of the community; and where, moreover, the record does not show, and the company does not claim, that the comparatively small loss asserted would render its .business as a whole unprofitable.</p>

Held: that, in face of the doubt concerning the power to abate the nuisance as prayed, the District Court erred in refusing the. motion, and (2) that the possibility of granting relief against the defendants in personam, did not justify retaining the case, against the plaintiff’s will. When a decree dismissing a bill is meant to be without prejudice, the better practice is to express it so. 219 Fed. Rep; 365, affirmed.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APEEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR. THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: mortgaged and otherwise dealt with as the property of the intervening company, subject to the merger agreement, and the validity of the deed of trust of 1872 had been challenged in 1890, and denied by a decree taken pro confesso against the trustee, which, however, the plaintiffs here claimed was collusive, and not binding, and not applicable to the right of way.

Held: that comity did not call for its enforcement by the .courts of Texas, against the wife’s separate property there, if contrary to the public policy of Texas; for it is one thing for a court to decline to be an instrument for depriving citizens belonging to the jurisdiction of their property in ways not intended by the law that governs them, another to deny its *413 offices to enforce obligations good by the lex…

Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that "a stock dividend based on accumulated profits was not 'income' within the true intent of the statute." Congress passed a new law in reaction to Towne v. Eisner and so the case was soon overturned by the Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber. It includes the quotable passage: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and time in which it is used." ― Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.

Held: a reservation including part of the reservation of 1852, with some additional townships.

Held: that, as the treaty and reservation operated to withdraw the sections before survey and the allotments merely provided a home for the Indians as promised by the treaty, in furtherance of the purpose of *437 the reservation, the sections were disposed of within the meaning of the school section grant in the Wisconsin enabling act, and title did not pass to the State either before or after the allotments.

<p>CERTIORARI to the circuit court of appeals for the FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that plaintiff was not entitled to have the jury instructed that “the risk the employee now assumes, since the passage of the ' - Federal Employers’ Liability Act, is the ordinary dangers incident to his employment, which does not now include the assumption of risk incident to the negligence of the carrier’s officers, agents or employees.” 218 Fed. Rep. 367 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

from pages 446-448 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Constant Southworth, Charles A. Groom and Walter M. Schoenle, all of Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant. Messrs. Lawrence Maxwell, Alfred C. Cassatt, Ellis G. Kinkead, and George H. Warrington, all of Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellees. Mr.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The cases are .stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The Selective Draft Law of May 18, 1917, upheld as constitutional, on the authority of the Selective Draft Law Cases, ante, 366, in a case of conspiracy to violate the act by dissuading persons from registering.</p> <p>In reviewing directly a judgment of the District Court in- a criminal case,.when the constitutional questions upon which the jurisdiction of this court depends are. not frivolous but are resolved against the plaintiff in error, other questions raised are to be considered and passed upon.</p> <p>It is well settled that, under § 37 of the Criminal Code, a conspiracy to commit an offense,'when followed by overt acts, is punishable as a substantive crime, whether the illegal end has been accomplished or not.</p> <p>Upon a review of the whole record, the court finds that the objection that there was no evidence of guilt for the jury is absolutely devoid of merit, and based upon the false assumption that the power to review includes the right to invade the province of the jury by determining questions of credibility and weight of evidence.</p>

<p>error to the district court of the united states FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that, there being sufficient evidence upon that point to warrant the verdict, petitioner’s judgment should be affirmed.

Held: Under the commerce clause of the Constitution Congress has ample power to prevent the common in-, strumentalities of interstate and intrastate commerce, such .as the railroads, from being used in their intrastate operations in such manner as to affect injuriously traffic which is interstate. 2.

Held: that no construction or application of the Constitution was involved, and hence this court lacked jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the District Court. Appeal dismissed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. William D. Williams, Mr. Renwick F. H. MacDonald and Mr. Dell H. Thompson for appellant. Mr. John J. Carton for appellees.

Held: that the face of the decree, with the cross bill, showed a plenary adjudication of the liability for alimony with consent of parties; that this was confirmed by the parties’ conduct, and the weight of-the testimony in this ease, concerning the former proceedings; that in yirtde of the consent, if not under the Arkansas statutes (Kirby’s Digest, §§ 2681, 2684), the decree was within the jurisdiction of the Arkansas…

Held: not an action against the State, but within the jurisdiction of the District Court, there being diversity of citizenship. Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S. 461 , distinguished.

Held: that the action was not against the State but against the defendant Bank Commissioner personally (and his surety) because of his alleged tortious conduct in violating the state law, and (2) that allegations to the effect that by the Commissioner’s wrongful administration of the state law plaintiff’s privileges and immunities were abridged and his property taken without due process, in violation of the Constitution,…

Held: that § 43 preserves the judicial proceedings prescribed by the Chinese Exclusion acts for the cases to which those acts apply, and that, where the ground was a violation of the Exclusion Acts and not a violation of the Immigration Act, the summary administrative method provided by § 21 cannot be used. United States v. Wong You, 223 U. S. 67 , distinguished. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case' is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the school section grant was not intended to embrace land known to be valuable for coal. It is the settled policy of Congress to dispose of mineral lands only under laws specially including them. This is evinced by very numerous enactments, beginning even with the Ordihance of May 20, 1785.

of the case, which in Ohio has the approval of the entire court, reads: “While much regard will be given to the clear intention of the parties, yet where the contract is entirely silent as to a particular matter, the courts will exercise great caution not to include in the contract, by construction, something which was intended to be excluded.” This decision was rendered in 1909 by a unanimous court, and six years later it was made authority for the decision of this case.

<p>APPEAL FEOM THE CIRCUIT COUET OF APPEALS FOE 'THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that, in a non-statutory receivership proceeding brought to preserve the good-will and pay the -debts of a company occupying premises as lessee, the lessor; which reentered during the receivership; had a proper claim for rent up to reentry, and for damages .based .on the lessee’s covenant to pay the difference between the rental value at time of reentry and the rent and other payments reserved for the residue of the…

Held: that such provisions are consistent with the Bankruptcy Law,'and that, availing, of them pursuant to § 70s of the latter, a‘ trustee in bankruptcy proceedings, which'followed within a few days of the debtor’s general assignment, could administer for the creditors generally property which had been transferred by the debtor in trust for particular creditors more than four months previously.

Held: that the trial court properly received evidence that the shipment was made to fill an order obtained by the defendant’s agent by so misrepresenting the artielé, and properly declined to confine the jury’s attention to the label borne by the article when it was shipped.

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Néw Mexico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.,</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota.</p>

<p>In'error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota.</p>

<p>In error, to the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Ip error to the Supreme Judicial Court of thé State of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p>

<p>Appeal from- the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, State, of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals, Fourth Supreme Judicial District, State of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the, Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico.</p>

<p>In error to and on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.</p>

<p>Appeal , from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>In error to the County Court of Kauffman County, State of Texas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Eighth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>