Volume 26 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record an Agricultural Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Removal op Employee — Notice and Hearing — Just Cause. — When an employee of a municipality is removed from his position by the mayor without previous notice and hearing he has a legal right to a writ of mandamus for reinstatement, although the lower court found that there was just cause for his removal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gruayama in an Action to Annul a Will, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Deed of Sale with Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Adulterating Milk.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the ’ opinion.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Property Acquired by Widower. — Wien it is sought to record in the registry of property the usufruct of a lot and of a house built thereon as the separate property of the person acquiring the same, a widower who alleges that he acquired the property while single, there being some doubt as to whether the land was acquired during wedlock, must show the date of the ijiarriage and that the property belonged to him prior to that date.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record an Agricultural Contract.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of the Motor Vehicles Act.</p> <p>The facts are- stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Motor Vehicles — Criminal Intent — Due Care and Dilisenoe. — The defendant was charged with a violation of section 8 of the act regulating the operation of motor vehicles, in that he drove an automobile with the rear red light extinguished. He contended that the evidence, considered in the light of sections 11 and 12 of the Penal Code, did not disclose any criminal intent and that in any event the testimony of the defendant and of the owner of the ear shows the total absence of mens rea. Seld: That the ignorance of the accused of the true fact of the case is no defense, although a proper showing of due care and diligence might relieve him from criminal responsibility.</p>

<p>Community Property — Complaint.—After examining the complaint it was held that the facts stated therein were sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the division of community property.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction.—In an action brought in a district court for the division of community property the value of the property need not be alleged in order to give the court jurisdiction, for the district courts in Porto Bieo are courts of general jurisdiction.</p> <p>Continuance — Evidence.—In order to comply with the provisions of section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is not enough that the party moving for a continuance for lack of evidence file a verified motion alleging that the evidence was essential and could not be obtained notwithstanding his diligence and offer evidence in support of such allegations, but he must allege facts to show the essential importance of the evidence and also to show that he used due diligence to obtain the same.</p> <p>Judoment. — The better practice is to announce in open court the judgments rendered, but this is not an absolute requirement for the validity of the judgments.</p> <p>Complaint — Amendment—Discretion ' op Court. — Courts have ample discretion to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint at the trial, especially when the amendment does not in any way change the terms in which the issue was first raised and there is not the slightest ground for the. assumption that it would prejudice the defendant. '</p> <p>Community Property — Division op Property.' — The real issue finally joined, argued and submitted by the parties in this ease was whether or not the plaintiff owned 96 per cent of the property; whether or not the defendant was the owner of all of the property or of only 4 per cent of it, and whether, in the event that the issue be decided in favor of the plaintiff, the division of the property should be adjudged and in what form. Held: That in such circumstances the district court did not err in rendering judgment disposing of all the questions finally submitted to it.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence.—In an action for the division of community property it is not a fundamental error to admit the testimony of witnesses familiar with the property for the purpose of showing its topographical conditions in order to decide whether the said property would deteriorate in value as a result of its division into two parcels.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the Attorney General of Porto Rico.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action to Recover Dividends.</p> <p>The facts are stated in- the opinion.</p>

<p>Certiorari' — Academic Question. — When by reason of the subsequent actions of the parties, and especially of the petitioner, constituting a waiver of any right to a writ of certiorari the legal situation is so changed as to leave nothing but an academic question for decision, the writ of certiorari must be annulled.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Docketing Cause — Hearing—Issue of Fact. — Under section 3 of the Act of March 11, 1908, district courts are required to place a cause on the calendar which has been appealed from a municipal court and call it for trial, and the court cannot render judgment for the plaintiff-appellee on motion by him based on the fact that the default of the defendant-appellant had been noted in the municipal court and that there was no issue of fact before the court. The California practice of allowing only issues of fact to be reviewed finds no countenance in the words of our law.</p> <p>Id. — Demurrer—Answer.—When a demurrer is filed in the municipal court a defendant-appellant has a right to move that it be disposed of "when the appeal is called for trial, ’ ’ and the court may give him further time to answer, immediately or later, _as best conforms to the spirit of the Code of Civil Procedure and especially to section 36 thereof.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Breach of Peace — Stolen Property — Pursuit of Thief. — Conceding for the sake of argument that one may follow a thief into the house of a neighbor and there wrest from him the stolen property without criminal responsibility because of the absence of guilty intent, yet if the pursuer resort to the use of deadly weapons without apparent, justification in order to accomplish his purpose, thereby disturbing the tranquility of the home, he is guilty of a breach of the peace.</p>

<p>Complaint — Deficiencies Supplied. — Academic Question. — When the defendant pleads that a complaint is deficient and the alleged deficiencies are supplied by the defendant himself in his answer and by his evidence, a decision on appeal as to whether the complaint is deficient is of purely academic interest.</p> <p>Written Contract — Evidence.—While oral evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, add to or take from the terms of a valid document, this rule is. not applicable when the controversy is between one of the parties to the contract and another person who is not a party thereto nor interested therein.</p> <p>Debt — Time of Payment — Action to Fix Time. — When in an action to recover a debt which has been acknowledged in a public instrument the court, after considering the evidence, finds that it was intended to set a time for payment but that this was. not done; it may, -under the provisions of section 1095 of the Civil Code, fix what it considers a reasonable time therefor, it not being necessary to bring an action solely for the purpose of fixing such time.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action to Recover a Debt and Cancel a Mortgage Record.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to tlie District Court of Ponce in an Action for Damages for Seduction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Reconsideration — Notice op Motion. — Notice of a motion for the reconsideration of a judgment based on matters of procedure previous to the judgment should be served on the adverse party in. accordance with rules 4 and 5 of the district courts, which require not only the notice of a motion but also proof of service, and in the absence of such notice the court has no right to set aside its judgment on such motion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>PetitioN for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Humacao in a Proceeding for the Approval of a Statement of the Case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Assault and Battery — Public Official. — In order that an assault and battery upon a public official may be considered aggravated under subdivision 1 of section 6 of the Act of March 10, 1904, it is necessary that the official be acting in the discharge of his official duties at the time of the assault and battery.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—An information for assault and battery upon an official which fails to allege that the official was acting in the discharge of his duties when the assault was committed charges only simple assault and battery.</p>

<p>DESIGNATION OE HEIRS-NATURAL CHILD — ACKNOWLEDGMENT-BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE — Authentic Document. — In an eos 'parte proceeding for designation of heirs, when there is no suggestion of fraud, an authentic baptismal certificate issued by a parish priest in 1851 expressly referring to a document on file in the parochial archives in order to prove the truth of the recital in the certificate regarding the civil status of an acknowledged natural child sufficiently identifies a document of the same date found among the local archives after more than sixty years which follows the recitals of the reeord, bears the signature of the putative father and contains the following statement: “I acknowledge this child referred to in the preceding entry as my natural child, desiring that this document should have the effect of a formal acknowledgment.1 ’</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of tbe Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Partition.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>DrvoBCE — Abandonment—Separation.—A firm and steadfast determination on .the part of one of the spouses not to live with the other and comply with the duties imposed by the natural and civil law and persisted in for more than one year, is what constitutes abandonment, which is included in see- ■ tion 164 of the Civil Code as one of the grounds for divorce. A mere separation with the consent and even with the desire of the other spouse can not constitute abandonment. An indispensable element of abandonment is the nolition of the other spouse.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Proceeding for Designation of Heirs.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>PetitioN for a Writ of Certiorati to the District Court of Gruayama in a Prosecution for Conspiracy.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in a Proceeding for the Appointment of a Beceiver.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Conspiracy.</p> <p>The facts áre stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Notice—Adverse Party — Default—Mortgage.—The object of this action was to secure the annulment of a foreclosure proceeding, the cancellation of a mortgage on a house which was destroyed by fire and the recording of another mortgage on a new house .erected on the same lot. The action was brought by the second mortgagee against the first, who purchased the property at public auction, and against the mortgagor. The default of the mortgagor was entered and judgment having been rendered for the plaintiff, an appeal was taken by the second mortgagee, a defendant, but without notice thereof to his co-defendant. Held: That the co-defendant had a real interest in the suit adverse to that of the appellant and would be directly affected by the result of the appeal if the judgment were reversed; therefore no notice of the apx>eal having been given to him, the appeal should be dismissed for want of. jurisdiction to consider the same on its merits.</p>

<p>Pleading — -Jurisdiction—Summons—Service.—Pleadings in the district courts should be made in writing in consonance with sections 118 and 135 of the ■Code of Civil Procedure, but this does not prevent the lower court or the Supreme Court from considering whether the court had jurisdiction over the defendant by inquiring into whether the summons was served according to the substantial requirements of the law.</p> <p>Id. — Unlawful Detainer — Caution to Dependant — Summons.—Omitting to caution the defendant that in case of his failure to appear either in person or by lawful agent judgment of unlawful detainer will be taken against him without further summons or hearing, as required by subdivision 2 of section 5 of the Unlawful Detainer Act, is a material defect which invalidates the summons, as it deprives the defendant of his right to be informed of what may result if he should fail to appear.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Judgment of Ownership.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Aguadilla in an Action for Libel and Damages.</p> <p>Motion by Defendant to Correct the Record.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administration — Accounts—Claim oe Administrator as Creditor. — According to section 58 of the Act relating to special legal proceedings, a court may order, on the petition of an heir, the termination of the judicial administration of the estate by the surviving spouse and grant the administrator a reasonable period for the presentation of his final accounts. Furthermore, after hearing the parties and in connection with the settlement of the final accounts and without necessity of independent litigation, the court may rule upon a claim of the surviving spouse as creditor of the estate for expenses incurred and paid by him in connection with the last illness and burial of the deceased.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of Mr. Justice Hutchison in a Habeas Corpus Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gruayama in a Matter of Attachment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administration — Provisional Support — Appealable Orders. — An order overruling the opposition to the appointment of a judicial administrator is a final judgment, as it puts an end to the elaim of opposition, and therefore is appealable, as is also an order granting provisional support entered after judgment, according .to section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Execution—Stay.—Quaere: When execution of judgment is considered stayed by an appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Judicial Notice — -Amendment.—The Supreme Court will not take judicial notice of another record in any but exceptional cases, although in a proper case it might permit, in the interest of justice, an appellant to amend his record.</p> <p>Id. — Legitimate Son — Possession-—Ordinary Action.- — The fact that a legitimate son is in possession of the property of the ancestor and contests every step that some other heirs take for the appointment of an administrator does not make it necessary for such other heirs to have recourse to an ordinary suit nor prevent the appointment of such administrator.</p> <p>Id. — ¡Averment oe Petition — Property—Exhibits.—In a petition for administration there is no necessity for anything but a general averment of the property to be administered, and it is not at all necessary to attach the particular deeds as exhibits to the petition.</p> <p>Id. — Appointment oe Administrator — Legitimate Child — Exceptional Case.— When there is no question of a widower it is evident that as between heirs a legitimate son should generally be preferred to illegitimate children; but when the legitimate heir is in possession of all of the property and the peti-ticm aveis that he claims part of it as his own to the exclusion of the minor heirs, the case becomes an exceptional one and the court may vary the practice.</p> <p>Id. — Answer.—Quaere: Whether the facts of a petition ought not to be taken as confessed when the answer or contest is vague and ambiguous.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administrative Appeal — Record op Title — Curable Defects — Validity or Deed — Matter not Involved in Appeal. — When a deed of sale, grant and , delivery of property has been declared valid by the registrar by being recorded, although with curable defects — for he would have denied its admission to record if in his opinion it had contained any defect neessarily vitiating the obligation, as required by article 65 of the Mortgage Law— its validity cannot be assailed in ah appeal based on the defects assigned because this question would not be involved in the appeal, which should be considered and decided exclusively as to whether, the record having been made, the said defects may be assigned.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Purchase and Sale — Purchase Price — Covenants—Consideration— Curable Defects. — When a deed of sale, grant and delivery of property clearly states that there is no purchase price and that the only considera tion to the vendor from the vendee consists of the covenants contained in the deed, but notwithstanding this and the wording of section 1348 of the Civil Code, providing that in a contract of purchase and sale one of the contracting parties binds himself to deliver a specified thing and the other to pay a certain price therefor in money or its equivalent, the registrar holds that the parties entered into a contract of purchase and sale, he is estopped, in recording the deed, from requiring the showing of a different consideration from that which he held the parties had fixed as such.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Wife of Purchaser — Curable Defect. — The omission of the name of the wife of the purchaser in a deed is a curable defect.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action to Rescind a Contract, and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Certificate of Sale at Public Auction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Certiorari.—Writs of certiorari and habeas corpus are distinct' in character, proceeding and purpose, ¿s the statutes governing them show. The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is only to obtain the release of a petitioner who is imprisoned unlawfully, and can never take the place of a. writ of certiorari. Therefore a court has no authority to change the nature of the remedy by habeas corpus by diverting it from its'proper sphere in order to give it the character and effect of a writ of certiorari.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in a Matter of Costs and Attorney Fees.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu. the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from an Order of the District Court of Aguadilla Concerning a Memorandum of Costs.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Distinct Court of Guayama in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Proceeding to Set Aside a Default Judgment.</p> <p>The facts are stated'in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Injunction Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Inheritance — Property Set Apart. — An action to enforce compliance with the obligation to set apart property should he governed by section 936 of the Revised Oivil Code in connection with section 935, and not by repealed section 799; when the complaint, in order to show' the reservable character of the half of a house, sets up that the predecessor of the defendants acquired said property while a widower, from a son of his first marriage who succeeded thereto, upon the death of the mother, and that the plaintiff is the only descendant of the deceased spouse.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Lineal Reservation. — The obligation to set apart property established by sections 935 and 936 of the Civil Code is special, for it affects only the survivor who contraéis a second marriage, while the lineal reservation referred to in section 799 affects any ascendant who may be in the conditions therein specified.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—Gift.—Section 937 of the Civil Code, providing that the obligation to set apart shall cease when things given or left by the children to their father or mother, with knowledge that they had married a second time, are in question, should be taken to refer to gifts and wills, inasmuch as things otherwise given or left are excluded from the reservation beforehand by section 969 of the code.</p> <p>Things.- — For a definition of the term “things” the provisions of Title I, Book Second, of the Civil Code may be consulted.</p> <p>Right op Reservation — Nullity or Record. — When there is no right to have property set apart the nullity of the mention of such right in the registry and its consequent cancellation necessarily follow.</p> <p>Id. — Possessory Title. — A possessory title proceeding is not an adequate one for the recording of the right of reservation.</p>

<p>Appeal from tile District Court of Humacao iu Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>Motion by Intervenor and Appellee for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action to Recover Possession.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administration — Possession ojp Property. — When objections to an administrator’s possession ol property are limited to simple statements unsupported by documentary evidence or oath, they are not sufficient to serve as a basis for a ruling, therefore the court can not take them into consideration in order to grant the relief sought.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The property of which the administrator of an estate may take possession is that which was in the possession of the deeedent at the time of his death.</p> <p>Id.- — Property Not oe the Estate- — Possession—Restitution.-—When it is clearly shown that property which was not in the possession of the decedent has been taken possession of as a part of his estate, the court should order its restitution in the same proceeding and it is not necessary that the person claiming it should have to resort to an ordinary action independent of the administration proceeding.</p> <p>Id.- — -Possession—Ordinary Action. — An ordinary proceeding to recover property whieh is in the possession of an administrator is neeessary only when another person considers himself entitled to the property although it was in the possession of the decedent at the time of his death.</p> <p>Id. — Bond of Administrator.- — Pursuant to section 32 of the Act relating to Special Legal Proceedings, the security furnished by an administrator is only for the benefit of the heirs and to answer 'for the acts of his administration.</p>

<p>Venue — Action por Annulment — Jurisdiction—Residence op Dependants.— When the complaint shows that the defendants are all residents of a certain judicial district and that the action prays only for certain annulments, the action does not fall within any of the subsections of section 77 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the ease should be governed by section 81 of that Code, whieh provides that the jurisdiction is in the district in which the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action.</p>

<p>Venue — Jurisdiction—Submission.—It does not follow that by submitting to the jurisdiction of a court in a prior action the parties waived all right to move for a change of venue if sued in another action even though the second ease arose out of the first, therefore the case does not' fall within the exceptions enumerated in section 75 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

<p>Injunction — Attachment—Personal Property — Discretion oe Court. — In order to recover personal property taken under attachment or execution, it is not the invariable rule to resort to the proceeding specially marked out by the Act of March 12, 1908. Eelief by injunction may be sought and in this case the court has discretion to deny the writ under the general principles of equity.</p>

<p>Inpoemation — Weights and Measures — Fraud. — Neither the Penal Code nor the Weights and Measures Act requires an information for the violation of section 15 of the act to state that the defrauding was for the benefit of the defendant or of any other person.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Criminal Intent.- — Criminal intent is not a necessary element of the crime defined and penalized by the Weights and Measures Act of August 18, 1913, therefore it need not be alleged nor proved.</p>

<p>Appeals from the District Court of Gfuayama in an Action to Annul Acknowledgment of. Natural Child.</p> <p>•Motion by Plaintiff for Dismissal of Appeals.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action for an Injunction and Damages.</p> <p>Tlie'facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 263 of the Penal-Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action to Annul a Foreclosure Proceeding.</p> <p>Motion of Appellees for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from, a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Cancellation of Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Action op Debt — Open Account — Complaint.—When an action of debt is based on an open account the various items of merchandise sold and delivered to the defendant and not paid for by him, as well as the price thereof and all other necessary details, shonld be stated in the complaint in order that a true and exact conclusion as to the transactions may be arrived at.</p> <p>Id. — Account Stated — Complaint.—If an action of debt is based on various accounts stated it is not enough to allege that a statement of the defendant's account has been made and shows a certain balance in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. It should be alleged further that the account was rendered to the defendant and that he, in some of the ways recognized by law, admitted the said balance.</p>

<p>Brief of Appellant — Fundamental Errors. — It is bad practice for appellants to omit to file written briefs, as required by Buie 42 of this court, and in such a case only fundamental errors will be considered.</p> <p>Workmen's Belief Act — Trial by Jury. — The appellant having been charged with violating section 16 of the Workmen's Belief Act of April 13, 1916, he has no right to a trial by jury.</p> <p>Id. — Information. — An information which charges that the defendant has a bakery and regularly employs six workmen, whose wages do not exceed $1,200 annually; that he had not rejected the benefits of the Workmen’s Belief Act, and that he wilfully and unlawfully failed to file with the Workmen’s Belief Commission a duplicate statement showing the number of workmen employed by him who were entitled to the' benefits of the act and the total amount of wages paid to said employees during the previous fiscal year, contains all the necessary allegations to charge the offense defined in section 16 of the said aet.</p> <p>Id. —Workman — Employee. —According to section 32 of the Workmen’s Belief Act, the word "workman” or "employee” shall be interpreted to include any person engaged by an employer of workmen entitled to the benefits of the aet, whether a man, a woman or a child.</p>

<p>Abandonment of Minors — Information.—In order that an information for abandonment of minors may charge the commission of the real criminal act penalized by section 263 of the Penal Code, it must allege that the accused acted without lawful excuse.</p> <p>Id.' — Legitimate Children — Bastard Children. — The statute providing for the punishment of a person who neglects to support his or her child when able to do so, applies only to parents of legitimate children and not to those of bastard children.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Prohibition to the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, and José E. Benedicto, Treasurer of Porto Rico, in an Aciion for the Refund of Taxes Paid Under Protest.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Action op Debt — Interest.—When the sum claimed is a debt due which originally was interest and was duly claimed and acknowledged by the debtor it loses its special character of interest and becomes the same as any other debt.</p> <p>Interest in Suit — Weisht of Evidence. — Tlie question of the interest which a person may have in a suit goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its probative force.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Adultery.</p> <p>The facts ¿re stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of the Weights and Measures Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Intervention.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Attachment — Effectiveness of Judgment — Security.—A judge has no discretionary power to require that personal security furnished to secure the effectiveness of a judgment shall specify the particular real property which is to respond therefor, for the law requires no such specification.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for the Eescission of a Contract and Damages.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Venue — Affidavit of Merits. — The term “declaración jurada y fundada’’ referred to in section 82 of the Oode of Civil Procedure corresponds to the term “affidavit of merits” in the English text.</p> <p>Id. — Defense.—In a motion for change of venue facts must be stated which will enable the court to determine whether the defendant has good grounds of defense against the action.</p> <p>Id —Convenience oe Witnesses. — When a change of venue is sought for the convenience of the witnesses it must be shown that these witnesses are important or necessary or what facts the defendant expects to prove by them; otherwise the lower court will not be in a position to appreciate the matter of convenience.</p>

<p>Appeal — Acquiescence.—The appeal having been taken after the expiration ■ of the statutory period of twenty days fixed for taking an appeal from a registrar’s decision, the decision was acquiesced in by the lapse of time and the appeal cannot be considered on its merits.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainer — Conflict of Titles. — The settled jurisprudence of this court clearly determines that -when it appears from the pleadings and the evidence that there is a conflict of titles an action of unlawful detainer does not lie.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District. Court of Humacao in Mandamus Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Mortgage and Assigning Curable Defects.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Weights and Measures — Short Measure. — The offense defined and penalized by Act No. 135 of 1913 consists in selling short measure no matter whether the goods were manufactured before or after the law went into effect.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Criminal Intent. — Malicious intent is a mere surplus averment in a complaint charging a sale by short measure.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Unlawful Practice of Medicine.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Support — Alimony.—The defendant having moved to he relieved from the payment of the alimony which he was adjudged to pay because the evidence showed that there was no further need therefor, it was held that the sum of fifty dollars fixed as the plaintiff's alimony was not proportional to the means of tlie defendant and the needs of his divorced wife and therefore that instead of reducing or revoking the alimony it should he increased go seventy-five dollars, which does not exceed one-third of the defendant •’s income.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—It is immaterial whether the father of a divorced woman is in good financial circumstances, for it is not he hut her former husband who is required to comply with the provisions of section 177 of the Civil Code.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Designation of Heirs.</p> <p>Motion of Appellee for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District (hurt of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Pokeclosure — Retention OF Peoceeds. — The retention of all or a part of the amount which should be delivered to the mortgagee in a foreclosure proceeding must be ordered by the court after considering the documents presented, and it is the province of the court to decide whether or not the reasons alleged are sufficient to justify the retention.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Guaranty.—The previous and sufficient guaranty referred to under the last subsection of article 175 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law should be required to answer for interest on account of delay and compensation for any other loss or damage which the creditor may be caused when the petitioner is not known to be sufficiently solvent.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—Id.—Solvency of Debtor.- — When the insolvency of a debtor is alleged it is incumbent upon the debtor himself and not upon the creditor to prove to the court that he is known to be sufficiently solvent.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Attachment—Security.—The act of 1902 to secure the effectiveness of judgments, and not the Mortgage Law, determines whether or not security must be given for levying an attachment on property in an action for damages arising from a foreclosure proceeding, and the said act of 1902 provides that security shall not be required only when it is shown by means of an authentic document that the obligation may be legally enforced.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainer — Conflict 'of Titles. — When in an action of unlawful detainer the defendants allege ownership of the lands of which they are in possession, exhibit recorded titles, swear that the land covered by these titles is a part of the land described in the complaint and their evidence in this regard is uneontradieted, a question of title is raised.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Nullity of Will.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Attorney — Professional Services — Lien.—It was alleged that an attorney has the same lien here that he would have at common law. Quaere: Whether an attorney in Porto Eico, as in the United States, has a lien for his services and disbursements on the personal effects of his client that come into his possession in the due course of the relation of attorney and client.</p> <p>Larceny — Pledgor and Pledgee — Ownership—Special Property. — A pledgor may be guilty of larceny from his pledgee, and one having a general ownership of personal property may be guilty of larceny from one having a special property therein.</p> <p>Id. — False Pretenses — Pledgor and Pledgee. — Generally a defendant may be guilty of obtaining goods under false pretenses from a pledgee under the same circumstances that would distinguish the crime of obtaining goods under false pretenses from the crime of larceny in a case in which the prosecuting witness is the sole owner.</p> <p>False Bepresentation. — The prosecuting witness performed professional services as attorney for the accused, the value of which was conceded by the acts and conduct of the latter. The accused proposed to the complaining witness that if the latter would turn over to the former certain jewels of the former upon which the latter claimed a lien, he would sell them and from the proceeds pay to the said attorney the value of his professional services. The jewels were delivered, but the promise was not kept. Held: That as it was not alleged or shown that the accused made a false representation of an existing or past fact, no crime was committed.</p>

<p>Release — Liquidator—Partnership.—In the circumstances of this ease it was held that the liquidator of a certain commercial partnership, who was intrusted with the liquidation of another firm, had authority to execute a release of the deferred price of certain real property belonging to the second firm and sold by the first firm as liquidator of the second.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in ilie opinion.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Ins Pendens Lien — Segregation of Property. — When a complaint for the recovery of the moiety of a property is recorded in the registry and later the defendant segregates a parcel of six acres therefrom and sells the same, the segregated parcel continues subject to the effect of the lien created on the said moiety although recorded as an independent property; therefore a purchaser is clearly put on notice of the said action by the registry.</p>

<p>Damages — 'Master and Servant — Employer’s Liability. — The jurisprudence established by this court in the ease of Vélen v. Llavina, 18 P. R. R. 63'4, is not that the owner of an automobile is liable for the acts of his chauffeur only when the automobile is a part or the whole of a public transportation concern. If the automobile is used in the service of any business and the chauffeur is an employee of said business concern and causes the damage in the discharge of his duties, the concern is responsible for the acts of its employee according to said jurisprudence and to sections 1803 and 1804 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Diligence.—It not having been expressly alleged or proved that the defendant acted with the diligence of a good father of a family in relation to this case, the exception provided for in the last paragraph of section 1804 of the Civil Code is not applicable.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Performance of Contract.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Professional Services. — In. the circumstances of this case it was held that the trial court’s appraisement of the reasonable value of the medical services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant was fair and proper.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Prescription.—It appearing from the evidence that in the year 1877, or thirty-nine years before the action was brought and thirty-five years before the first step was taken by the plaintiffs in the defense of their rights, the present possessor’s vendor entered into possession of the property as owner and continued as such quietly, publicly and uninterruptedly until she conveyed it to the defendants, a title by extraordinary prescription superior to that shown by-the plaintiffs must be recognized in the defendants.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Proceeding for Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Assault.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing; to Record a Deed of Partition.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for the Division of Community Property and Delivery of Inheritance with its Profits.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record an Agricultural Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Curable Defect. — In order to correct a defect appearing in the registry the copy of the instrument endorsed as recorded with the defect need not necessarily be presented, since the presentation of said copy in no -way influences the correction of the defect.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Declaration oe Payment. — After considering the terms of the correcting instrument, the origin of the present appeal, it was held that the declaration of payment was not made solely by the person who assumed the obligation to pay the liabilities, but was made in agreement with the person who imposed that condition, and that the cancellation sought should ba recorded.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Construction—Usufruct.—When a person has a right of usufruct to a lot belonging to a municipality recorded in the registry and applies for admission ■ to record of a house built on the lot and acquired by title of construction there is no doubt that he constructed the house, particularly when, as in the present ease, the declarations of the usufruc-tuary are supported by a certificate of the municipal secretary in which it is stated that the usufructuary possesses a house constructed on the lot in question.</p>

<p>Principal and Agent. — The powers of an agent are prima facie eo-extensive with the business entrusted to his care and will not be narrowed by limitations not communicated to the persons with whom he deals.</p> <p>Id. — Contract—Acts and Conduct. — In the circumstances of this case it was held that the acts and conduct of the various agents of the defendant steamship company gave the complainant the right to believe that the Ponce agent was acting within the scope of his authority in entering into the transportation contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Assault and Battery. — When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object whether through the physical volition of one, or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is 'in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone.</p>

<p>Assault and Battery — Aggravating Circumstances. — The use in any manner of a cane or a whip to beat a person is calculated to inflict disgrace. In this ease, in which there was sufficient evidence to show that the appellant ordered his driver to beat the prosecuting witness with a whip', the battery was committed with the handle of the whip. Therefore, according to the foregoing doctrine, the appellant was guilty of aggravated assault and battery.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in Habeas Corpus Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal—Notice—Death 'op Attorney — Excuse.—In the present ease the appellants did not come clearly within the exception of Buie 58 of this court, as they were notified of the motion for dismissal of the appeal before they filed the transcript. In the record the appellants make no appeal to the discretion of the court, but at the hearing they urged the death of the original attorney as an excuse. Even in such circumstances it is the duty of an appellant to make it appear of record that the death or illness of the attorney really prevented the filing.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—-When the appellant suggests no matter of law or pleading reviewable on appeal and the ease seems to turn on facts a motion to dismiss must prevail.</p>

<p>Pre-emption — Pleading—Contract—Purchase and Sale. — After considering the allegations of the complaint in this action it was held that the contract referred to therein is a contract of purchase and sale, for it contains all of tlie elements lequired by section 1348 of the Civil Code. In an action of pre-emption it is immaterial that the plaintiff failed to allege in the complaint that he was willing to be subrogated to the purchaser under the same conditions of the contract, for ho alleged that he availed himself of his right of pre-emption which itself consists of such subrogation; therefore the allegations of the complaint show a cause of action.</p> <p>Id. — Invalid Acts — Estoppel—Evidence.—The question of the invalidity of the acts of a court cannot be considered when the person raising the question is estopped from doing so. If a party acquires real rights which are alleged to be subject to pre-emption and admits that his grantor acquired them by virtue of the same acts which he considers invalid, he cannot attack such acts, because he is estopped from repudiating his own acts, and the evidence introduced by the plaintiff to prove the coownership on which the right of pre-emption is based is not open to attack.</p>

<p>Incest — Natural Child — Information. — An information which alleges that the accused had carnal intercourse with his unacknowledged natural daughter charges the commission of the crime defined and penalized by section 275 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Under our laws a man who has carnal intercourse with his daughter is guilty of incest, whether she is acknowledged or not.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Investigation of Paternity. — The general rule that the paternity of a child may not be investigated — i. e., that the courts may not be invoked to establish a civil relation between father and child — is fundamentally rather a rule of property than of anything else. The criminal law is different and section 275 of our Penal Code was aimed to prevent carnal intercourse between persons having a blood relation within the grades of consanguinity in which marriage is forbidden.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 328 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated iu tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama in an Action for tbe Recognition of Joint Ownership.</p> <p>Motion by Appellant to Amend tbe Record.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Dominion Title. — A presented in the registry of property for record a decision in a dominion title proceeding declaring that he had proved that he was the owner of a certain property. The registrar refused to record the same because the registry showed that the said property was already recorded as a part of another. Held: That the registrar’s decision should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Adulterated Milk — Sale—Evidence.—Evidence that two inspectors saw the defendant carrying milk to one place and the testimony of the defendant that the milk came from another place is no proof of a sale by the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in a Prosecution for an Offense against Public Health.</p> <p>The facts are stated iii the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court o'f San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Violation of the Automobiles Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Automobiles — License—Passengers.—Paragraph 13 of section 10 of Act No. 75 of 1916 does not mate it an offense for the owner of an automobile in the municipal service to go to another municipality with passengers. If the idea in this case was to charge the use of a machine in a particular way without a license therefor, then the complaint is fatally defective in not stating that the appellant made the trip without such proper license.</p> <p>Complaint — Pleadings—Construction.—While liberality may be employed in construing pleadings in a municipal court, it is none the less true that a complaint must allege the offense charged in such a manner as not to leave it a matter of conjecture.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Violation of the Automobiles Act.</p> <p>■The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>SANITARY Begulations — Bread.—According to the sanitary regulations in force in Porto Bico all bread sold to the public must be wrapped. It is immaterial that the bread made by the appellant in the present ease was ‘ ‘ sweet. ’' The article was clearly bread.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a Prosecution for Murder in the Second Degree.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Power of Attorney — Construction.—The construction given to a power of attorney by the acts of the parties for several years relieves the court of the ' duty of carefully considering the terms in which it is expressed.</p> <p>Id. — Compromise — Doubtful Claim — Collateral Attack. — A doubtful claim is sufficient to support a compromise agreement. If the compromise Qf the parties must depend upon the question of whether the parties have settled the disputes just as the law would have done, then it may be truly said that a compromise is a useless act and benefits nobody, even putting in question the capacity of the parties to make the compromise. Although in view of the conclusion already reached we need not now decide the question, it would appear to follow that here, as in Louisiana, and apart from general principles governing all contracts, such an agreement is not open to collateral attack.</p>

<p>Possessory Title — Uecord of Title — Certificate of Payment of Taxes.-— When one in possession of unrecorded property dies, an heir may institute possessory proceedings for the purpose of recording the property belonging to the estate, first in the name of the predecessor in interest and then in the name of the heir, both, of course, after making the proper showing. However, a certificate of the payment of taxes by the widow of the deceased twenty years later on a different property of greater area, without any proof that this iM'operty includes the property in question, does not accord with the theory of the petition and affords no proper basis for the decree sought to be obtained.</p>

<p>Beoord of Title — Dominion Title — Possessory Title. — When there are no contradictory interests and a competent court, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, in affirming a dominion title proceeding expressly converts the possessory title recorded in the registry in favor of the petitioner and of the former owner of the property into a dominion title without ordering the cancellation of any entry and there is no possibility of prejudice to third persons, the mere fact that the said former records of possession appeared in the registry is no ground for refusing to record the decree.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Waiver.—When the district attorney waives his right of appeal in a dominion title proceeding, such waiver renders the decree unappealable.</p>

<p>Common Property — Action eor Division.- — An essential requirement for an action communi dividmido is that the property sought to be divided be owned pro indiviso and in common by the plaintiff and the defendant, for this is what determines the right of the coowner to demand the division of the common property and the possession can be deemed joint or in common only when the property is held collectively in the interest and name of all the eoowners or participants and not when, as in this ease, the property is held or enjoyed individually under a more or less perfect title and the possessor acts in his own name as exclusive owner without the concurrence of the others.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Parties.—An action communi dwidwndo should be brought against all the participants or owners in common so that the judgment for the division of the common property may be effective. And since, according to the finding of the trial court, some of these are lacking, the action set up in the complaint cannot prosper.</p> <p>Appeal — Motion to Dismiss.- — As the sustaining of a motion to dismiss an appeal leaves the judgment appealed from in force and effect and as the court affirms the judgment after considering the ease on its merits, no practical purpose would be served by considering such motion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Violation of the Act to Regulate the Weight of Bread.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement oe Case — Bill oe Exceptions — Transcript oe Record— Negligence oe Stenographer. — Inasmuch as the appellant must suffer the consequences of his own carelessness or neglect when he himself prepares the statement of the case or hill of exceptions, in accordance with the Act of 1911, so must he also suffer the consequences of the acts of the court stenographer when he voluntarily selects that employee to do the work for him; therefore, if the stenographer fail to present the transcript of the evidence within the time fixed by the court, it is the same as if the appellant had failed to present it when he was in charge of its preparation. There being no statement of the case or bill of exceptions, the thirty days allowed the appellant for filing the transcript in the appellate court are not to be computed from the date of the approval of the statement of the case but from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy. — Abandonment of Proceeding. — Under the Law of Civil Procedure which went into effect in Porto Rico in 1876, the Royal Decree of October 27, 1885,'and article 1044 of the Code of Commerce of 1829, a bankruptcy proceeding can not be regarded as having been abandoned because of the fact that it was suspended, when such suspension was independent of the will of the parties, as in the present ease.</p> <p>Id. — In Custodia Legis — Acts of Ownership — Rights of Successors. — When upon the adjudication in bankruptcy of a person, corporation, or mercantile firm' the estate of the bankrupt was taken charge of by a reciver who, according to the Law of Civil Procedure of 1886, had to be named by tho judge, as he was in the present case, pending the appointment of the trustee in bankruptcy at’the first meeting of creditors, said estate was in custodia legis from the time it came into the possession of the custodian. This was the status of the Rufina plantation in this case until ten years later, when it was seized and sold to satisfy the amount due to the mortgagees of tho bankrupts, who could not set up a claim to the property because they were incapacitated to perform acts of ownership and because the property was in the custody of the court. Therefore the heirs or successors in interest of the bankrupts cannot do now what their predecessors in interest could not do then.</p>

<p>Demurrer — Complaint—Frivolous Pleading. — The defendants’ allegation that the complaint in this case does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is frivolous, for the complaint contains all of the allegatons necessary for obtaining a judgment against the defendant for the amount claimed therein.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Although the third allegation of the complaint might have been more specific as regards the bankruptcy of R. B. Barletta & Company and their agreement with their creditors to pay twenty per cent of their debts, nevertheless it sets up these facts with sufficient clearness.</p>

<p>Taxes Paid Under Protest — Voluntary Payment — Threat of Seizure. — The rule is firmly established that taxes paid voluntarily cannot be recovered, and payments made with knowledge and without compulsion are voluntary; but where a coloration is required to make a complete report of its assets and is threatened with' seizure of its property under a complete and unmistakable system of collection of taxes, it is doubtful that a payment then made is voluntary.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Collection op Taxes — Steps to Collect. — The disjunctive used in section 1 of the act of 1911 militates against the theory that in saying “shall institute any proceeding or take any steps” the Legislature was associating a slightly different forth of the same concept. “To collect” frequently means a measure outside of courts. “To take any steps” is a most general way of expressing any kind of action to collect. “To take steps” means to take action, to move in the matter.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Attempt to Collect Taxes Illegally — Remedy.—The act of 1911 abolishes all remedies in ease of the collection of, or attempt to collect, revenue illegally other than that provided in the act itself, and a threat to seize property if the taxes are not paid is an attempt to collect; therefore if the person threatened conceive the taxes exacted to be unjust or illegal, his only recourse is to pay the amount under protest and sue the Treasurer for its recovery.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Parties—Assignee.—Taxes were assessed against two other corporations and the appellant, the present owner of the properties sought to be taxed, paid the taxes as the assignee of the other corporation. It was maintained by the appellee that the appellant was not the proper person to sue for the recovery of these taxes and held by the court that the objection was without merit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Internal Revenue — Tax on Alcohol — Bonded Warehouse. — All spiritous liquors manufactured in or imported into Porto Rico, of which, exclusive of water, distilled spirits form the chief component, shall be subject to the payment of the tax imposed by law. The tax shall be paid before the alcohol is removed from the distillery .except when taken to a general bonded warehouse established according to law.</p> <p>Id. — Definition of Distilled Spirits or Alcoholic Spirits — Diluted Alcohol— Bum. — In defining the meaning of the words ' ‘ distilled spirits ’ ’ and ‘ alcoholic spirits” the Legislature included in the substance known as ethyl alcohol, hydrated oxide of ethyl, or spirit of wine, any dilution thereof. There- : fore, pure alcohol to which water is added, or diluted alcohol, which is converted into rum at the end of a certain period of time is distilled or alcoholic spirits, subject, as an independent article, to the payment of the tax I)rescribed by the statute.</p> <p>Id. — Exemption from Taxation — Lost Alcohol. — As the statute expressly enumerates the cases of exemption from the payment of the tax on alcohol which is lost or intended for certain uses and the case at bar is not included therein— that is, the case of diluted alcohol or rum placed in wooden receptacles and stored in a general bonded warehouse — it cannot be held that the quantity lost is exempt from the payment of the tax.</p>

<p>Contract — Evidence—Condition Precedent. — A contract must be conclusive in its terms. It does not become effective as an act until all of its terms and conditions are fully expressed.</p> <p>When a document is introduced in evidence against a party as implying a contract entered into by him there is no rule of law which prevents him from showing that the contract was never consummated.</p> <p>Oral evidence is admissible to show that a document in the form of a contract never became effective as a contract. In other words, oral evidence may be admitted to prove a separate agreement constituting a condition precedent to the enforcement of the obligation in accordance with the terms of the document.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record op Title — Agricultural Contract. — An indispensable requisite to tire recording of a contract for the planting and cultivation of sugar cane on a property owned in common is the previous consent of all the coowners of the property.</p>

<p>A ppeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Conjugal Partnership — I-Ieirs.—The purchase of a property having been agreed upon during the existence of the conjugal partnership) and a part of the purchase price having been paid by the husband as a member of such partnership, the property is understood to have been ae- . quired by the conjugal partnership, and after the death of the husband the widow cannot sell, without the assent of his heirs, a part of the property so acquired, although the sale may have been negotiated after the death of the husband.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, In in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 288 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Eeplevin.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a .Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in an Action for the Violation of Section 47 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of tbe Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Renunciation of Inheritance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Attachment — Rents and Profits — Alienation — Injunction — Judgment.— In this case the lower court adjudged that the defendants surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the Rufina plantation as described in the complaint and dismissed the complaint in so far as it prayed for an accounting of all the rents, profits and crops produced by the property up to the date of the judgment and for the restitution of said rents and profits.</p> <p>On motion of the plaintiffs the trial court ordered alternatively that the alienation of the improvements made on the Rufina plantation and their removal therefrom be enjoined during the pendency of the action, without obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to furnish security; or the attachment of any other property than the improvements, upon giving security in the sum of $50,000.</p> <p>Trujillo & Mercado appealed from the said order and the court held that as the judgment of May 28, 1916, denied the prayer for the restitution of the rents, profits and crops produced by the Rufina plantation up to that time, if the plaintiffs believe that they have any right to such rents, profits and crops after that date it is evident that no action could be taken by the court to secure such right, even supposing it to exist, because the judgment ■was silent as to these matters.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Annulment of Designation of Heirs, Partition of Property, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Conspiracy.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Corporation — Association not for Pecuniary Profit — Capital Stock. — No provision having been made for capital stock in this case, the situation of the charter members being rather that of a given number of v owners in common who contribute to the funds of the association and are protected and secured to the extent of their contributions, the court is of the opinion that tho things conferred upon the charter members are not stocks in the ordinary sense of the word and that the association only has capital in the sense that any association having' funds must have capital.</p> <p>The whole spirit of Act No. 22 of 1911 shows that its primary object is the incorporation of associations for non-peeuniary purposes.</p>

<p>Hoose of III Fame — Prostitution—Information.—The appellant in this case having alleged that the information is ambiguous and uncertain in that it may include two offenses, namely, those defined in sections 287 and 288 of the Penal Code, and that she did not know with which of the two she was charged, it was held that the information clearly charges the defendant with keeping a house of ill fame which is resorted to for purposes of prostitution; that this is the essence of the offense referred to in section 287 of the Pénal Code, and that the evidence examined at the trial tended to show the commission of the offense.</p>

<p>Contract — Conveyance—Partition—Property of Minors — Ratification—Inheritance. — In a partition the conveyance without the authorization of the proper court of real property of a minor to another heir or to a stranger for the payment by him of the debts of the estate, which is null and void according to the jurisprudence laid down in the ease of Longpré v. Diaz, 237 TI. S. 512, may be lawfully confirmed, ratified or acknowledged by the minor when he attains his majority.</p> <p>Id. — Ratification of Contract — Property of Minors — Authorization of Court. — The ratification or confirmation of a contract by the person in whose name it was entered into by a third person who had no authority to do so revives the contract as from the time of its execution. When a contract is made in the name of a minor without the authorization of the court, as is required, the interested minor, upon attaining his majority, may cure the defect by expressly or impliedly ratifying the contract and acknowledging its validity.</p>

<p>Dismissal op Prosecution — 'Waiver.—-When after the trial has begun a defendant moves for dismissal on the ground that more than 120 days have intervened between the filing of the information and the calling of the case for trial, he will be considered as having waived his right to that plea.</p> <p>Id. — Delay in Trial. — The question in this ease is not the hardship that the delay in the trial may have worked upon the defendant, but whether the court had good grounds for ordering a continuance.</p> <p>Murder — Information—Robbery.—When the information charges that the death was caused by the defendants in an unlawful and wilful manner, with malice aforethought and with fixed and deliberate intent, by waylaying and attacking the deceased treacherously, it charges murder in the first degree although it does not allege that the death was caused while committing a robbery, and it may be proved at the trial that the defendants killed the victim while they were committing a robbery.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction.—The jurisdiction of a court in a ease of murder is not determined by the place where, the death occurred, but by the place where the wound which caused the death was inflicted.</p> <p>Id. — Information.—The allegation that a person was mortally wounded on a certain date and died immediately from the effects thereof is sufficient to show that he died before the information was filed and, therefore, within 120 days from the time the wound ivas inflicted.</p> <p>Id.. — New Trial. — -When the trial court commits an error, but such error is not shown to be prejudicial, the judgment should not be reversed and a new trial ordered.</p> <p>Id. — Corpus Delicti. — The death and the cause thereof are the only elements which constitute the corpus delict, and in order to justify a conviction these two elements of the corpus delicti must be proved and it must be shown then that the defendant is the person who committed the act.</p> <p>Id. — Charge to Jury. — -The fact that the court charged the jury in the present case that the death occurred within a year and a day after the infliction of the mortal wound does not mean that it instructed the jury by those words that the deceased met his death at the hands of another as the result of a criminal act, for the cause of death might have been accidental and not due to a criminal aet.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Appeal.—The manner of making the instructions to the jury more specific is by motion to the lower court, and when this is not done the instructions cannot be attacked as insufficient in the appellate court.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Homicide.—When the evidence clearly shows that the crime charged is not homicide but murder, the judge is not required to instruct as to the former.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Attempted Murder.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action for Survey.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for the Eefund of Taxes.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action for Annulment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property Eecording a Dominion Title with Curable Defects.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Rescission of Contract and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action to Rescind a Sale and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>.Ejectment — Conjugal Partnership — Conveyance.—The conveyance of real property belonging to a conjugal partnership by the husband without the consent of his wife on December 3, 1902, is null and void according to sections 159 and 1328 of the Eevised Civil Code which was in force at that time.</p> <p>Ib. — Id.—Liquidation.—A title oí heir of one of the members of a conjugal partnership is not sufficient for the recovery of half of a property which forms part of the assets of the conjugal partnership when the said partnership has not been liquidated, for until the partnership has been liquidated it cannot be considered that there is a surplus which belongs to the spouses in equal shares. Succession of Morales v. Kiechoefer et al., 17 P. B. B. 889.</p> <p>Cause or Action. — After considering the complaint and the evidence it was held that the plaintiffs had no cause of action and that the plea of sine actione agis would defeat them.</p>

<p>■ -Street Railroad — Speed—Custom—Negligence.—A street railroad company must operate its cars at such a rate of speed as under all the circumstances is reasonable and compatible with the customary use of the street or highway by pedestrians and vehicles; but in the absence of an express regulation limiting the rate of speed of street cars, the mere fact that a car is running , at a rapid rate does not establish that it is being run in a' negligent manner.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Negligence—Proximate Cause. — Mere great velocity of travel is not negligence per se, but some other element must concur, or at least it must be shown that the excessive speed was the proximate cause of the accident.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Larceny — Demurrer.—It is established by the jurisprudence of this court that matters not privileged in the nature of a demurrer presented on the day of the trial come too late.</p> <p>Id. — Information.'—The failure to describe in detail in an information charging larceny of wood the kind, class or value of the -wood stolen and to express the exact date of the alleged appropriation is not' fundamental error.</p> <p>Id. — -Agent.—The crime of larceny may be committed by an agent, bailee of trustee.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Damages for Non-performance of Contract.</p> <p>Motion for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in Administration Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action for the Return of a Deposit.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Dominion Title Proceeding — Authority of Registrar. — Pursuant to the jurisprudence established by this court, registrars are not authorized to inquire into the grounds upon which the courts base their decisions, nor to rest their refusals to record such decisions in the registry on their opinions regarding the legality of such grounds; but this does not mean that they are not authorized to deny admission to record of said decisions when it does not appear from the decisions that the requirements prescribed by law were complied with as a condition precedent to their rendition.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—-The registrar is supported by the law in refusing to record the ownership of a property when it appears from the judgment itself that the property was encumbered by a mortgage in favor of a person who was not shown to have been summoned as required by law, and when there was no specific showing of who were the successors in interest of the former owner of the property for the purpose of summoning them as required by law on account of the death of their predecessor in interest.</p> <p>Retroactive Effect. — Act No. 20 of the Legislative Assembly, approved March 11, 1918, not being in force when the judgment in the present ease was rendered, it is not applicable, as held in the case of Rivera v. Registrar of Gua-yama, decided July 23, 1918.</p>

<p>INTERVENTION- — Lienors.—The appellant herein alleged that the complaint in intervention did not lie because the intervenor had no interest in the litigation inasmuch as the subject-matter thereof was a debt pending between the plaintiff and the defendant in which the intervenor was not concerned, and because the attachment was a mere incident in the course of the action. Held: That inasmuch as the defendant in the principal action had contracted an agricultural loan with the intervenor, the complaint in intervention was proper, since the governing statutes should be construed liberally and persons having liens on the property affected by the action, or whose rights may be affected by the judgment, are entitled to intervene.</p> <p>Id. — Pleading—Preference.-—It appearing from the complaint in intervention that the date of the maturity of the loan was subsequent to that of the filing of the complaint, the intervenor was not required to state expressly therein that, in accordance with the law, he had exercised his preferred right within the twenty days following the maturity of the obligation.</p> <p>Id. — Custody of Property — Forced Sale. — The fact that the action of the in-tervenor was pending in the same court which at the time of the attachment by the plaintiff-appellant already had the legal custody of the chattels pledged to secure the loan, relieved the intervenor of the necessity of instituting a separate proceeding for the forced sale of said property.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action of Intervention.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action . of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Jurisdiction.—The plaintiff did not necessarily have to bring his suit in ejectment in the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico because he was dispossessed of his property by an order of that court. The court of general jurisdiction of the district in which the property is situated' — in this case that of the district of Arecibo — has jurisdiction of the action.</p> <p>Id. — Notice.—The fact that in recording the sale of the property involved in this case in the name of Frau & Company it was set out in the registry that said sale was made without prejudice to such rights as the law firm of Hart-zell & Rodríguez Serra might have to half of the property, without specifying these rights, or whether they referred to the ownership or to any other property right, cannot be considered as constituting a legal notice within the purview of the mortgage system in force in Porto Rico.</p> <p>Id. — Forced Sale — Statement of Marshal — Attachment — Private Contract. — The property having been previously attached by Frau & Company, the statement of the marshal at the time of the sale with regard to the rights which Hartzell & Rodríguez Serra might have to one-half thereof could not of itself destroy the rights acquired hy Hrau & Company hy virtue of the attachment. To maintain successfully that they had acquired the property free of lien Hartzell & Rodriguez Serra would have had to prove that the date of the conveyance by their client to them was prior to that of the attachment, and this they did not do.</p> <p>Id. — Damages.—After considering the evidence the court concluded that it was sufficient to justify its adjudging that the defendants pay to the plaintiff a certain sum as damages.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Sale oe Property — Property op Minors — Authorization op Court — Jurisdiction.-—According to articles 54 and 74 of the former Law of Civil Procedure, the parties could apply for authorization to sell the-property of minors to any court having jurisdiction of the matter, and as such jurisdiction was undoubtedly vested in the courts of first instance, the court applied to could not refuse to take jurisdiction of the case by holding that it had no jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.-—Id.—Id.—Construction up Law. — Although article 164 of the Spanish Civil Code requires authorization of the court for the sale of property belonging to minors and also invests the court of the domicile with jurisdiction to grant such authorization, that does not prevent the parties from applying, under article 56 of the Spanish Law of Civil Procedure, to any court of ordinary jurisdiction for such authorization, inasmuch as the provision-of article 1976 of the said Civil Code only repeals the common law in all' matters which are treated of in the code and not in matters foreign thereto,, such as those of procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Law — Repeal. — Articles 56 and 58 of the former Law of Civil Procedure, referring to jurisdiction and submission of the parties, were not repealed by article 164 of the Spanish Civil Code in the specific matter to which the said article refers, but remained in force as supplementary thereto. They can be harmonized and there is no real conflict between them.</p> <p>Id- — Id.-—Law op the Case. — The court may repudiate a decision previously rendered in the same ease, for the traditional law of the ease can never justify a deliberate sacrifice of the essential principles of justice or prevent the correction of an error which has been committed.</p>

<p>Decided on the grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. 1499, Ma/rtorell et al. v. J. Ochoa Sr Brother et al., ante.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action to Annul a Contract, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record op Title — Possessory Title — Parties—Appearance.—The fact -that the record in a possessory title proceeding does not show that the district attorney was cited is not a defect which prevents its admission to record if. as in this case, it appears from the record that the district attorney actually appeared and submitted his report without making any objection.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Written Recordable Title. — In this ease the registrar was of the opinion that it was an incurable defect “not to allege, much less to prove, any cause which prevents the petitioner from presenting the written title of ownership by which he claims to have acquired the property.” It was held that as the petitioner alleged that although he had acquired the property by a public instrument he had no written recordable title, this fact entitled him to the benefits of a possessory title proceeding.</p> <p>Id. — Td.—Pinal Order. — When a possessory title proceeding is prosecuted without objection from anyone the order approving the proceeding is final from the moment it is signed by the judge.</p> <p>Ib. — Id.—Owner.—It is presumed that the person who appears as paying taxes to the Insular Treasury is in possession as owner, and when a municipal court arrives at that conclusion the registrar cannot question its decision.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Indictment—Grand Jury. — An indictment found by a grand jury in the Insular courts and containing tlie signature of the district attorney and the other formalities of law is not void because the grand jury has no legal existence in the judicial system of Porto Pico; therefore a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted on this ground.</p> <p>Id. — Information—Objection..—-The failure of the district attorney to swear to an information is considered waived when such defect is not duly objected to in the lower court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Cancel a Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Intervention.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement of Case. — When an appeal is based exclusively on the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain certain conclusions on which the judgment appealed from rests and on the erroneous weighing of such evidence, a statement of the ease containing the evidence examined at the trial, approved by the lower court as prescribed by law, must be submitted to the appellate court. When it is shown that after a statement of the case was approved and filed in this court as a part of the transcript the trial judge ordered a new statement of the ease to be prepared in order to include details which the former did not.contain and approved the same, the original statement cannot be considered in the appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Correction of Record — Authenticity.'—If the copy of the second approved statement of the caso filed bears only the signature of the attorney for the appellant, we cannot take the same into consideration for the purpose of correcting the record and deciding the appeal, because the signature of the attorney alone is not sufficient to give it authenticity.</p>

<p>Injunction' — Unlawful Detainee. — The extraordinary writ of injunction does not lie to stay proceedings in an action of unlawful detainer under pretext of the pendency of an action which affeets the validity of the title of the plaintiff in the action of unlawful' detainer. If so, the action of unlawful detainer would be illusory because the eviction could be evaded by the institution of an ordinary action which would allow the defendant in unlawful detainer to retain possession during the entire pendency of the suit.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Damages-—Notice of Action. — The remedy for avoiding the damages which may he caused the defendant who is unahle to stay the unlawful de-tainer proceedings is the common one prescribed by law of recording a notice of the ordinary action in the registry of property.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for G-aming (Forfeiture of Surety Bond).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Community Property — Separate Property — Curable Defect.- — Wien a notarial deed recites that the husband who executes the deed built a house upon a lot granted him in usufruct by a certain municipality in whose name it was recorded, without, showing the origin of the money invested in the building, the registrar acts correctly in recording the deed with the curable defect of failure to show that the money invested in the building was the private money of the husband.</p> <p>Id. — Id. — Mortgage — Express Consent. — When community property is mortgaged the express consent of both spouses is necessary and the simple recital of #the notary that both parties accepted the deed is not sufficient.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in Proceedings for an Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Possession — Construction—Record oe Title. — When the possession of a building is recorded in the name of a certain person the possession of the lot must be understood also as recorded in his name, unless he holds as a mere tenant or there is evidence to show that the lot belongs to another person. This doctrine is founded on the presumption that the owner of a building is also the owner of the ground on which it stands.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Mortgage Deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Cancelation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action for the Nullity of a Mortgage and the Bestitution of Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Murder — Motive.—It is not indispensable to a conviction of murder in the first degree that a motive be shown. There is no obligation on the part of the Government to establish a cause or reason to explain the commission of the crime if it clearly appears that the accused committed the murder with malice aforethought.</p> <p>Id. — Lying in Wait. — Death caused under the circumstances set forth in section 201 of the Penal Code is murder in the first degree, and as our code, unlike that of Texas, specifies lying in wait as one of such circumstances, the killing in the present ease must be termed murder in the first degree.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions to Jury — Exceptions—Waiver.—Generally when no exception is taken to the instructions of the judge to the jury, the appellate court will not take into consideration the assignments of error referring to the instructions unless it is convinced that such errors are fundamental. If the attorney for the defendant had an opportunity to except to any of the instructions given by the judge to the jury and failed to do so, he thereby waived any error that might exist and established the presumption that he was satisfied with the instructions. People v. Ramírez de Arellano, 25 P. E. E. 243.</p> <p>Id. — View—Exception.—-When the action of the district judge in viewing the seene of the crime is not duly excepted to it is too late to raise the objection for the first time on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Death Sentence. — Under Act No. 36 of 1917 abolishing the death penalty in Porto Eico and giving the act retroactive effect applicable to convicts sentenced to death and whose sentences have not been executed, the judgment appealed from in this ease was modified to the effect that the prisoner be sentenced for the crime of murder in the first degree to confinement in the penitentiary for life.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action for Damages for Libel.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to tbe District Court of Aguadilla in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>ApplicatioN for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Intervention.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in a Prosecution for Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Indecent Exposure — Deliberation.—It having been shown that the defendant deliberately exposed his private parts in an imperfectly screened place and there being not the slightest evidence of a wrong motive on the part of the persons who witnessed the indecent exposure, the trial court was justified in finding that they might be or actually were offended and consequently convict the defendant of the offense defined and punished by section 283 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Id. — Public Place. — The English text of section 283 of the Penal Code does not require that the crime of indecent exposure must be committed in a public place, but .the offense may be committed in “any place,” and this was the general law without any special statute.</p>

<p>Notables — DISCIPLINARY Dine — Appeal.—Under the impression that for the weeks in which he executed no deeds the Notarial Act imposed no duty upon him to make a return to the district court as prescribed by section 26 of the Notarial Act, the notary failed to report to the said court and was fined. Having appealed from tliat decision, it was held that while there may he per- ■ haps some other way of obtaining a review of the action of the district court, no appeal lies, because no provision is made for an appeal in the said act and the failure to make the return does not fall within the general provisions relating to crimes. '•</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Conjugal Partnership — Surviving Spouse — Parties—Personal Action. — In a personal action for tbe recovery of a debt contracted by a husband during wedlock it is not necessary to make tbe widow a party defendant as a member of tbe conjugal partnership. After tbe death of the husband it is sufficient to bring the action against his widow and heirs.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Creditors—Liquidation.—The fact that a conjugal partnership has not been liquidated does not prohibit creditors from bringing actions against it.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Dormant Inheritance — Heirs.-—The forced sale of a property by the marshal in representation of the widow and unknown heirs of the deceased husband is, as to the heirs, a sale in the name of a dormant inheritance, and this being so, a previous record in the names of said heirs is not required.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Loan—Act of Administration — Attorney in Pact. — Talcing into account the letter and spirit of section 1615 of the Civil Code, the aec of lending money on a mortgage in favor of the creditor is an act of administration and not one of strict ownership. Therefore, in order that the mortgage may be recorded in the registry it is not necessary to show that the agent was expressly empowered by the principal to perform the said act.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Id.—Power of Attorney — Curable Defect. — In such a case the failure of the attorney in fact to show his power is a curable defect.</p> <p>Id. — Civil Status — Curable Defect — Correction of Defect — Marriage Certificate. — The failure of the registry to show the name of the spouse at the time the mortgaged property was acquired is a curable defect which can be corrected by presenting in the registry a certified copy of the marriage certificate.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>REMAINDERMAN — Segregation — Conveyance—Usueructuary.—A remainderman who segregates a part of the property and, after a proper description thereof, conveys it by public instrument, saving the rights of the usufructuary, does not violate the provisions of section 488 of the Civil Code which forbids the owner of the fee to change the form or substance of the main property or do anything else thereon prejudicial to the usufructuary.</p>

<p>Power of Attorney — Alienation of Real Property' — Community Property'— Record of Title. — In the first paragraph of the power of attorney the wife authorized the husband "to exercise the power in connection with the principal’s separate property and the community property of both, as follows: * * ” In the sixth clause he was authorized ‘ ‘ to sell, with or without conditions, the rural and urban properties now belonging to the undersigned, as well as those which she may acquire in the future.’’ A copy of a deed of sale of real property executed by the husband in his own right and as representative of his wife having been presented for record, the registrar denied its admission to record because "it does not appear that said husband is empowered to sell the real property belonging to the conjugal partnership.’’ Held: That although the wording of the sixth clause of the power of attorney gives rise to some doubt, such doubt disappears when the said clause is interpreted in relation to the first paragraph of the power of attorney.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—Id.—Curable Defect — Certificate of Marriage. — -When the name of the spouse at the time of the acquisition of the property sold is not shown in the registry, the omission constitutes a curable defect which may be cured by presenting in the registry a certified copy of the marriage certificate.</p>

<p>Appeal from a, Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Deed with Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama in Habeas Corpus Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court' of Mayagiiez in an Action of Denial of Servitude.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Ejectment and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Construction of Law. — The provision of section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is the same as section 473 of the California Code, is a remedial provision and should be construed liberally with a view to effect its objects and promote justice. It is best observed by disposing of causes on their substantial merits rather than with strict regard to technical rules of procedure.</p> <p>Discretion oe Court. — Under section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, tho discretion of the lower court ought always to be exereised, as it was in this ease, in conformity with the spirit of the law, and in such manner as will subserve rather than impede or defeat the ends of justice, regarding mere technicalities as obstacles to be avoided rather than as principles to which effect is to be given in derogation of substantial right.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section .1, in an Action for the Eefund of Taxes.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Dieferences in Acreage — Title Deed. — The mere fact that the sum total of all the acreage owned in separate tracts by a defendant exceeds by a few acres the total amount called for by Ms title papers, wMle the total area of the different properties owned by a plaintiff happens to be somewhat less than appears from the face of his title deed, can hardly justify the taking from said defendant of so much of such excess as may be required to make good, in the aggregate, the shortage of the plaintiff.</p> <p>Attorney and Client — Privileged Communications. — Where two or more persons employ the same attorney in the same business, their communications with the attorney in relation to such business are not privileged inter sese, even though the interests of such persons are adverse to each other, where the disclosures were made in the presence and hearing of all concerned or were intended for the information of all.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property Eefusing to Eeeorci. a Deed of Cancelation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for the Division of Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama in an Action for the Abatement of a Nuisance.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>AoministratioN — Heir.—The mere fact of being an heir of one of the spouses confers no right to apply for the administration of the estate left by the other spouse at his death, for such right pertains exclusively to the persons mentioned in section 23 of the act relating to special legal proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a Prosecution for Murder in the Second Degree,</p>