Volume 253 — United States Reports

Held: That a contractor which relied upon such representations of the results of the borings and of the Government’s belief based thereon,’and whose reliance was confirmed by the Government’s approval of its plant, — adapted only to the lighter materials and submitted for inspection as to its adequacy pursuant to the specifications — was entitled to stop work after part performance *2 and recover the difference between…

Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a state may tax the income received by a resident as the beneficiary of a trust that is administered by the resident of another state.

Held: first, that the taxes were not collected by coercive means, but were paid voluntarily, and could not be recovered back as there was no statutory authority therefor; and, secondly, that there was no statute making the county liable for taxes collected and then paid over to the State and municipal bodies other than the county, — which it was assumed was true of a portion of these taxes, — and that the petition did not…

<p>Decided upon the authority of Ward v. Love County, ante, 17.</p>

Held: that the combination both before and after the induction of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and that the relations between the Reading Company, the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company and the Central Railroad *28 Company of New Jersey must be so dissolved as to give to each of them a position in all respects…

Held: that the law of North Dakota permitting actions respecting • title to property or arising upon contract to be brought against the State as against a private person does not clearly allow such an adequate remedy, since an action to recover money wrongfully extorted is a case in contract only in an artificial sense.

Held: wholly as a matter of first impression, that the identity between the two (cattle yards and cattle scales) was so complete that *77 the obligation which existed to erect cattle yards at every station also established the duty to install a cattle scales at every station. The judgment of the intermediary court was therefore reversed and the order of the Board affirmed.

Held: employed, at time of injury, in interstate commerce, within the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. P. 82. Damages may be allowed by a jury for shame and humiliation resulting from an injury and personal disfigurement due to negligence. P. 85 259 Fed. Rep. 172 , affirmed. *78 The cáse is stated in the opinion.

Held: employed in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. P. 89. Erie R. R. Co. v. Collins, ante, 77, followed. 259 Fed. Rep. 178 , affirmed. ' The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: 'That since the duty to pay the judgment was absolute, L’s estate wa§ not entitled to be reimbursed out of the fund for the expense of defending against proceedings by the United States in the Surrogate Court to secure payment of its judgment. P. 95.

<p>CEBTIOBABI TO THE CIBCUIT COUBT OF APPEALS FOB THE EIGHTH CIBCUIT.</p> <p>. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: not an option terminable at the will of the vendees by failure to meet deferred payments; but an absolute agreement on their part to buy, the provision for forfeiture of past payments and termination of the agreement in case of their default being intended for the. protection of the vendors, and exercisable at the vendors’ election. P. 110. Stewart v. Griffith, 217 U. S. 323 .

United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that changes to the statute during the appeals process made the lawsuit moot.

Held: that this evidence, including the admissions ■ that might be implied from the carriers’ approval of the summaries, was sufficient to justify the Commission in finding that the shipments were made as claimed and the overcharges paid ultimately by the shippers. P. 127. A decision by the Commission that a witness before it is qualified as an expert must be accepted by the courts unless clearly unfounded. P. 130.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the court lost its power to receive and settle a bill of exceptions when the term as extended by rule had expired and when a further period of less than thirty days, allowed by order made before such expiration, had also expired; notwithstanding further attempted extensions, each ordered before expiration of its predecessor. P. 145.

The case is stated in the opinion. Congress has power to amend or create the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country (Butler v. Boston & Savannah S. S. Co., 130 U. S. 527; In re Garnetty 141 U. S. 1, 14), but that is the limit of its power. It cannot delegate this power to the States, nor authorize the enactment of laws that will destroy the uniformity of the maritime law.

<p>CEETIOEAEI to the supeeme couet of appeals of the STATE OF VIEGINIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion;</p>

Held: that this court might open the record and reverse the decree or dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution, leaving the court below free to take appropriate action to prevent itself from being used as an instrument of illegality. ' P. 185. 47 App. D. C. 102 , reversed in part; appeal of Newman, administratrix, dismissed for want of prosecution. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: that no express or implied contract to pay any royalty, cognizable by the Court of Claims under Jud. Code, § Í45, could be derived from the facts stated. P. 189. To maintain an infringement suit against the United States under the Act of June 25,1910, the claimant must have at least such an interest in the patent a's independently of that act would support a suit • against a defendant other than the United States.

<p>The proposition that a municipality, having granted to a company the right to use the streets for distributing electricity, would impair the rights of the grantee and deprive it of property without due process if it granted a like right to a rival company, is frivolous if the first grant is plainly non-exclusive; and an appeal from the District Court based on such claim must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. P. 194.</p> <p>Appeals dismissed.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion. The clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois during the period involved was a salaried officer, expressly prohibited from receiving any additional pay, allowance, or compensation. Act of July 31, 1894, 28 Stat. 204. As such he was clearly subject to the provisions of Rev. Stats., § 1765. Hoyt v. United States, 10 How. 108; Lends v. United States, 244 U. S. 134; United States v. King, 147 U. S. 676.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>In completing the rolls of members of the Five Civilized Tribes pursuant to the Act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, § 2, 34 Stat. 137, the Secretary of the Interior had jurisdiction, on March 4, 1907, to revoke without notice his approval of a report of the Commissioner to the Five Civilized Tribes in favor of applicants for enrollment;</p> <p>and such applicants cannot secure their enrollment through mandamus upon the suggestion that the revocation was due to mistake. Cf. Garfield v. GoUsby, 211 U. S. 249.</p>

Held: that A was liable to C. P. 213. An amendment to a declaration-which leaves the original cause of action unchanged is not objectionable because made after the running of the statute of limitations. P. 216. 253 Fed. Rep. 987 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles Alvin Jones, with whom Mr. Allen J. Hastings, Mr. James R. Sterrett and Mr. M. W. Acheson,- Jr., were on the brief, for petitioner.

<p>A writ of error to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia dismissing a petition for mandamus against the Secretary of the Treasury must be dismissed if, after respondent’s resignation from office, his successor has not been substituted within twelve months. P. 218. Act of February 8, 1899, c. 121, 30 Stat. 822.</p> <p>In default of such timely substitution, the petition cannot be retained to charge the respondent personally in damages.(D. C. Code, § 1278), since damages are only incident to allowance of the writ. P. 219.</p>

Held: ■ that the application was addressed to the discretion of the District Court, and that an order denying it was not final for purpose of appeal. P. 221. When the Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously assumes jurisdiction of a case in which the District Court’s jurisdiction is based wholly on constitutional grounds, and makes a final order, this court has *220 jurisdiction to correct the error upon appeal under Jud.

Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), was a United States Supreme Court case coming out of the state of Ohio. It challenged the constitutionality of a provision in the state constitution allowing the state legislature's ratification of federal constitutional amendments to be challenged by a petition signed by six percent of Ohio voters. This would then bring the issue to referendum. In the case of Ohio and the 18th Amendment, the legislature ratified the amendment and, before the ninety-day waiting period had passed, the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, declared the 18th Amendment to be in effect.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP OHIO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a state's creation of a public welfare program is not reviewable by the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: the power to tax carries with it “the power- to embarrass and ddstroy”; may be applied to every object within its range “in such measure as Congress may determine”; enables that body “to select one calling and- omit another, to tax one class of property and to forbear to tax another”; and may be applied in.different ways to different objects so long as there is Vgeographical uniformity” in the duties, imposts and…

<p>CERTIORARI to the circuit court op appeals for the first circuit.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that failure to provide necessary protection did not render the United States liable to pay for horses stolen and Omahas killed by the Sioux, in the absence of a finding that the protection was deemed by the President to be necessary. Pp. 280, 283.

Held: in applying the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, that the first movement was part of an interstate movement. P. 286. 264 Pa. St. 220 , reversed. The case is stated in -the opinion. Mr. George Gowen Farry for plaintiff in error and petitioner. Mr. Hannis Taylor for defendant in error and respondent. *285

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR WRIT OF PROHIBITION.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that á consignee, party to the Average Agreement plan, which was prevented from unloading a number of carloads of frozen ore during the free' time, due to their accumulation and delivery by the carrier in numbers exceeding its facilities for thawing and unloading, was not relieved from demurrage by the clause governing frozen shipments. P. 323. 263 Pa. St. 205 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>A State may tax a domestic corporation on the excess of the market value of its outstanding stock over the value of its real and personal property and certain indebtedness.although the corporation does no business within the State and has there no tangible, real or personal property nor any papers by which intangible property is customarily evidenced; and it is immaterial whether the tax be considered a franchise or a property tax. P. 328.</p> <p>The limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the power of a State to tax the property of its residents which has acquired a permanent situs outside the State does not apply to intangible property even though it has acquired a “business situs” and is taxable in another State. P. 329.</p> <p>The Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent double taxation. P. 330.</p>

Held: that the action of the general in taking possession of the land was tortious and no liability on the part of the Government was created until the action was approved by the *331 Secretary of War, and since this approval occurred within six years before the commencement of this suit the suit was not barred by § 156 of the Judicial Code. P. 333.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP APPEALS OP THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>In the provision of the Act of March 2, 1917, c. 145, 39 Stat. 965, which gives the United States District Court for Porto Rico jurisdiction “where all the parties on either side of the controversy are citizens or subjects of a foreign State or States, or citizens of a State, Territory, or District of the United States not domiciled in Porto Rico,” etc., the clause “not domiciled in Porto Rico” relates to both preceding clauses, so that jurisdiction is not conferred over an action by an alien domiciled in Porto Rico against a local corporar tion. P.'346.</p> <p>When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the clause should be read as applicable to all. P. 348.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OP THE STATE OP VIRGINIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: plainly insufficient to show an unfair method of competition. Id. 258 Fed. Rep. 314 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Huston Thompson, with whom The Solicitor General and Mr. Claude R. Porter were on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. Thomas F. Magner for respondents. *422

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OP CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

IN EQUITY. Upon consideration of the First Report of Frederick A. Delano, Receiver, in the above-entitled cause and of the supplemental report of June 3, 1920, and the various suggestions of the United States, intervener, and of the State' of Texas, and of the several motions, applications, exceptions, and suggestions heretofore filed by parties claiming an interest in the subject-matter of this suit, it is this seventh day of June, A.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.</p>

<p>Error .to • the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. Submitted April 30, 1920.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri,.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska..</p>

<p>Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.</p>