Volume 254 — United States Reports

Held: That the coal dealer had no maritime *2 lien for furnishing supplies “to a vessel . . . upon the order of the owner,” under the Act of June 23,1910, c. 373, § 1, 36 Stat. 604 , because the coal furnished the vessels was furnished by their owner and not by the coal dealer, p. 6, et seq.; (2) That the fact that such maritime use had been contemplated did not render the sub-' sequent appropriation by the owner a…

Hi EQUITY. This cause came on to be heard by this court, on the motions and suggestions of counsel for the respective parties, for the appointment of a commission to run, locate and designate the boundary line between the State of Minnesota and the State of Wisconsin, as indicated in the opinion of this court, delivered on the 8th day of March A. D. 1920, [252 U. S. 273],' and thereupon and on consideration thereof—

Held: That the message was interstate, irrespective of the motive of the defendant company in routing it outside the first State or of the necessity for so doing, and (2), if a motive to evade the jurisdiction of that State were material, it was error to lay the burden on the defendant company of disproving it. 178 N. Car. 146, reversed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has not power to certify questions to this court under Jud. Code, § 251, nor has this court power to entertain such certificate, in a case wherein the judgment or decree of the Court of Appeals would be reviewable here by error or appeal under § 250. P. 21. Argnt v. Lane, 245 U, S. 166.</p> <p>A judgment or decree of that court is so reviewable here, under the third paragraph of Jud. Code, § 250, when it involves the constitutionality as well as the construction of an act of Congress, though the act be local to the District of Columbia. Pi 22. American Security & Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491, distinguished.</p> <p>The power to construe a statute is a necessary incident of the power to determine its constitutionality. P. 23.</p> <p>Paragraphs third and sixth of Jud. Code, § 250, being reenactments of preexisting law, must retain the settled meaning attached to them before reenactment, in the absénce of plain implication to the contrary. Id.</p> <p>Dismissed.</p>

<p>certiorari to the circuit court op appeals por the THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Patent No. 959,008, claims 1 and 3, to Elias H. Henderson, for improvements in scaffold-supporting means, exhibits no invention over the prior art. Pp. 34, et seq. New York Scaffolding Co. v. Liebel-Binney Construction Co., ante, 24.</p> <p>The fact that a change in a composite instrumentality was readily made may be evidence that the change was the result of mere mechanical facility as opposed to invention. P. 36.</p> <p>Advantages found in a patented device may count in favor of the patentee though he did not discern them when he secured his patent; but if the device is only an alteration of an earlier patented device', involving no invention, they redound to the benefit of the earlier patentee though he also was unawarg, of them and did not attribute them to his invention. P. 37.</p> <p>245 Fed. Rep. 747, reversed.</p>

Writ of error under the Criminal Appeals Act (c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246), to review a judgment sustaining a motion to quash an indictment charging defendant with bringing certain Chinese aliens into the United States, viz., into the bay and port of San Francisco by vessel, in violation of § 8 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 880, which reads as follows: “That any person, including the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any vessel, who shall bring…

Held: erroneous under repeated decisions of this court defining the nature and effect of assumption of risk and adjudging that the Act prevails over state law. Id. 272 Missouri, 613, reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, with whom Mr. James L. Minnis and Mr. N. S. Brown were on the brief, for petitioners. Mr. Roy W. Rucker for respondent.

* This was a prosecution based on § 143 of Art. 56 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, as amended by c. 85, Acts of 1918. The opinion states the case. To assert that there may be reasonable regulation of a federal operation or agency by a State acting under its police power, is to deny the complete sovereignty of the Federal Government in the discharge of its constitutional functions.

Held: that an assessment so made by the Board of County Tax Assessors, increasing the valuation returned by a property owner, without notice or hearing, was without due process of law, where his remedy by arbitration proved abortive because the arbitrators, though agreeing that the assessment was excessive, could no two of them unite on a new assessment before the ten day limitation expired.

Held: that by filing the schedules he did not waive his privilege under the Fifth Amendment. P. 72. The privilege of the Amendment applies if it cannot be said that the questions propounded, considered in the light of the circumstances disclosed, may be answered with entire impunity.

<p>CERTIORARI TO . THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE. EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That the plaintiff’s right, if any, Was a right to protect the contract between the defendant corporation and its workmen from the interference complained of; that the defendant corporation was an indispensable party to the controversy, and that, having no interest in conflict with the plaintiff’s, it must be aligned as a plaintiff in determining whether the District Court had jurisdiction through diverse…

Held: that a delay ordered to await an .appropriation by Congress for substituted materials and another in anticipation of the passage of a postal law because of which the plans were altered, would not support claims for damages under the contract. P. 85. 54 Ct. Clms. 206, affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Abram R. Serven and Mr. Burt E.- Barlow for appellant.

Held: That the warehouse owner might lawfully permit such storage of the liquors to continue ■ after the National Prohibition Act became effective; (2) .that the warehouse owner did not “possess” the liquors, within the meaning of § 3 of the act, nor-would it “deliver” them, in the sense of that section, if it permitted their owner to have access to them to take them to his .dwelling for lawful use; (3) nor would it be…

Held: harmonizing the sections, that the proviso of § 9 is to be taken as referring only to adult full-blood heirs, and that a probate court having jurisdiction over the persons and property of minor full-blood heirs, but not of the settlement of the estate of the deceased allottee from whom they inherited, was the proper court to sanction a conveyance of the allotment made by their guardian, P. 111. 7.

Held: that the fact that the amount of net income so allocated to the taxing State greatly exceeded in this case the portion actually received there, does not prove that income earned outside was included in the assessment. 5. The principle discussed in Southern By.

Held: at his death in 1917, certain bonds on which neither the general property tax nor the stamp tax had been paid. The transfer tax appraiser, appointed by the Surrogate’s Court, reported that there was payable by the executors in respect to those bonds the additional transfer tax prescribed by the Act of 1917.

Held: That the new company had no charter contract immunity from being required to add the foot and carriageways in New York under power reserved by the State to amend the charter, arid that such requirement was not inconsistent with the contract clause of the Constitution; nor, in the absence of anything to show that the additions would not yield a reasonable return, could it be held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held: that if the defendant suffered any wrong from the manner in which such instructions were given in the present case, it was purely formal, since there could be no doubt of his guilt on the facts admitted; and the error, if any, was cured by § 269, Jud. Code, as amended February 26, 1919. P. 138. 48 App. D. C. 380 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Henry E. Davis for petitioner.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the> continued use of the name with the picture was not a fraud depriving the plaintiff of the right to enjoin infringement and unfair competition in selling a like preparation under the name of “Koke”; but that the injunction should not restrain use of the name-“Dope,” a featureless word not specifically suggestive of “Coca-Cola” by similarity or in use, nor forbid manufacture and sale of the product,…

Held: that the claim, being founded on alleged torts of federal officials, was not within the Tucker Act or the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. P. 155. 53 Ct. Clms. 522, reversed. The case is stated in the opinion.. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Davis for the United States.

The case is stated in the opinion.. The claim sued on is founded both upon a law of Congress and upon a regulation of an executive department of the Government, and the Court of Claims clearly had jurisdiction. Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 611; Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445.

<p>certiorari, to the circuit court of appeals for the SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: upon application of general principles, did not show that the plaintiff had any lien upon or interest in the property authorizing him to invoke the procedure outlined in § 57 of the Judicial Code.

Held: that his contract was valid and bound him to the express company not to assert' such a liability .against either company, and that the express company was equitably entitled to enforce the obligation by a suit against him in the District Court (diverse citizenship being present) in which collection of the judgment should be enjoined. P. 188. 249 Fed. Rep. 109 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>1. In a case properly here on a constitutional question under Jud. Code, §238, the court retains its jurisdiction to decide other quest.ons presented, after the constitutional question has been settled in another case. P. 191.</p> <p>2. In an indictment charging defendant with unlawfully selling morphine in violation of the Anti-Narcotic Act by issuing a prescription, the clause as to issuing the prescription, being intimately involved in the description of the offense, cannot be treated as surplusage, but it is not repugnant to the charge of selling, since under the act one person may take a principal part in a prohibited sale of morphine. belonging to another by issuing a prescription for it, in view of Crim. Code, § 332, making whoever aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of an offense a principal. P. 192.</p> <p>3. Subdivision (a) of § 2 of the Anti-Narcotic Act,- in allowing the dispensing or distribution of narcotic drugs “to a patient” by a registered physician “in'the.course of his professional practice only,” confines the immunity strictly within the appropriate bounds of a physician’s professional practice, not permitting sales to dealers or distributions intended to satisfy the appetites or cravings of persons addicted to the use of such drugs. ■ P. 194.</p> <p>4. In a criminal prosecution in the District Court in Pennsylvania; the defendant’s wife is not competent to testify for her husband, either generally or by contradicting testimony that certain matters transpired in her presence. P. 195.</p> <p>253 Fed. Rep. 213, affirmed.</p>

Held: ■ 3. That the terminal company .took the title in trust to maintain and operate the property and to exercise all its corporate powers for the common use and benefit of the three railroad companies, their successors and assigns, and such other companies as might be admitted by them to a proprietary participation in the terminal. Pp. 202-206. 4.

<p>error to the county court of kings county, state OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: assuming an implied obligation to pay for the hay, there was none to pay the loss due to forced sale of the cattle and destruction of business. Id. ' To review a judgment of the Court of Claims, the Government must appeal; it cannot attack it on the claimant’s appeal. P. 233. 54 Ct. Clms. 203, affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. *232 Mr. Charles H. Merillat for appellants.

Held: that adequate and timely reservation of the' right was made in this case. ■ 255 Fed. Rep. 242 , reversed. *234 The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. John G. White, with whom Mr. Austin V. Cannon was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion</p>

<p>The rule that contracts for the construction of ships are non-maritime and riot within the admiralty jurisdiction applies to contracts for the work and material necessary to finish a partly constructed vessel which has been launched. P. 243.</p> <p>Affirmed.</p>

Held: that they could not be insisted upon as grounds for reversal by this court. P. 249. 251 Fed. Rep. 499 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. E. Crosby Kindleberger for petitioner. Mr. Jorge V. Dominguez, for respondent, submitted. Mr. Justice Brandéis delivered the

Held: that the combination effected a restraint of' trade or commerce among the States and constituted an attémpt to monopolize. and an actual monopolization of a part of such trade or commerce in anthracite coal; within the meaning of the first and second sections of the Anti-Trust Act. P. 269.

Held: that the appropriation acts evinced the willingness of Congress to expend money in testing his patented devices, but no intention to pay him until their usefulness should be proved; and that no promise of the Government to pay him for the use made ' could reasonably be implied. P. 278. 53 Ct. Clms 591, affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

IN EQUITY. Upon consideration of the motion of the General Oil Company filed herein November 15, 1920, for an order authorizing Frederic A. Delano, Esq., Receiver herein, to return to said company certain lands claimed under patents from the State of Texas, and the consent of T. P. Roberts and R. S. Allen, owners of patented lands, filed on the date last mentioned, and the response of the Receiver to said motion filed November 20, 1920.

United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920), was an 8-to-1 landmark decision of the US Supreme Court that held that the Constitution alone does not grant the federal government the power to prosecute kidnappers, even if moving abductees across state lines on federally-regulated railroads at the behest of local law enforcement officials, and only the states have the authority to punish a private citizen's unlawful violation of another's freedom of movement. The case was a landmark interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, and contains a classic legal statement of the right to travel which continues to undergird American jurisprudence.

Held: where it was objected that enforcement of the statute would destroy a heavy investment in a plant for the manufacture of carbon black, a substance of great utility, the value of which, with that of the gasoline also produced in the process, was claimed to exceed any other value obtainable from a like quantity of gas, and the manufacture of which, it was claimed, would be impracticable if the heat from the gas must…

Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, was a case heard and decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1920. The case concerned the right to freedom of speech. The Court held that while the First Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to the States, Minnesota's sedition act could stand.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OP APPEALS OP THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion. As soon as a petition is filed, the court has the duty, and the statute gives it the power, to decide whether an alleged bankrupt comes within the class that may be declared bankrupt. The decision of that fact involves the exercise of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is none the less real and valid because the court might decide the question wrongly.

Held: that the amount of her recovery was limited under the Carmack Amendment by the carrier’s published tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce'Commission. Id. 3. The right of a carrier, under the Carmack Amendment, to limit by tariff the amount of its liability for the baggage of a passenger, was not altered by the Act of March 4, 1915, known as the Cummins Amendment, as amended August 9,1916.

Held: that the change did not impair the constitutional rights of property or of contract of an employer who had elected to'take the privilege of direct payment and had insured - himgelf with an insurance company before the change was made. P.366. ' • 99 Oh. St. 120 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>A judgment of a state court cannot be reviewed here by writ of error upon the claim that it gives effect to a local rate statute in violation of a carrier’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, when it is apparent, from the state court’s opinion, that it did not uphold asd enforce the statutory rate as such but rested its decision on other, independent grounds, substantial in character, broad enough to-sustain the judgment, and not' involving any federal question of a kind for which review may be had by writ of error uijder Jud. Code, § 237, as amended by the Act of September 6,1916. ’ P. 373.</p> <p>Writ of error to review 40 N. Dák. 69, dismissed.</p>

<p>A decree of this court affirming “without prejudice” an injunctive decree of a state court upholding a statutory railroad rate against a charge of confiscation, determines the adequacy of the rate for the period antedating the decree, and is not . superseded by a decree in a subsequent suit holding the rate confiscatory upon new evidence developed by a further test. P. 377.</p> <p>A federal question which has been specifically settled and is no longer an open one in this court, is not an adequate basis for a writ of error. Id.</p> <p>Writ of error to review 35 N. Dak. 331, dismissed.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That a formal assessment prior to July 1, 1902, was not necessary to. bring the taxes within the saving clause as taxes “imposed” prior to that date. P. 390. 2. That such assessment was not necessary to ascertain the value of life interests in trust funds, their value being ascertainable by computation upon mortality tables and rules lawfully adopted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Held: that the question whether 'such installation was negligence should not have been submitted to the jury. 3.

Held: irrespective of the technical operation of the releases, that the petitioner had no valid claim to reimbursement against the trustee of the son’s firm in bankruptcy. - . 266 Fed. Rep. 278 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Abram J. Rose for petitioner. Mr. Frank B. Lown was also on the brief. Mr. R. D. Whiting for respondents. Mr. C. W. H. Arnold was. also on the brief.

Held: that an application made to the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case was an application of that character, and not an application to have the other decree pronounced res judicata by that court. P.432. 5.

Held: that tha giving of such notice conditions the' applicability of the treaty to a foreign possession, not merely in respect of the property there situate, but also in respect of the subject? and citizens there residing; so that, no notice having been given on-behalf of Canada, a subject of Great Britain who was a citizen and resident of that Dominion acquired no right under the treaty to inherit land in the United…

Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), is a United States Supreme Court case which examined the labor provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Act and reaffirmed the prior ruling in Loewe v. Lawlor that a secondary boycott was an illegal restraint on trade. The decision authorized courts to issue injunctions to block this practice, and any other tactics used by labor unions that were deemed unlawful restraints on trade.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP FLORIDA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that a shipper, complaining of such changes, should apply for relief to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that the Diátrict Court was without jurisdiction, in the first instance, to annul the changes and enjoin carriers from complying with them. The case is stated in the opinion.

The case is stated in the opinion. Forfeiture of the property of an innocent man for the wrong of another is violative of fundamental rights. The exact, language of §3450, Rev. Stats., if strictly taken, authorizes such a forfeiture. Therefore § 3450 is unconstitutional, unless it can be so construed as not to authorize such a forfeiture. Such a construction is possible. United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86.

<p>PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND/OR FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Counsel also distinguished: The Ckarkieh, L. R. 8 Q. B. 197; L. R. 4 Adm. & Eccl. 59; Oyster Police Steamers of Maryland, 31 Fed. Rep. 763; Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552; The Florence H, 248 Fed. Rep. 1012; The Prins Frederik, 2 Dod. 451 (see The Parlement Belge, L. R. 5 P. D. 213; De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171); The Swallow, Swab. 30; The Inflexible, Swab. 32.</p> <p>The criteria of immunity are government control and dedication to the public service. When government control intervenes, neither ownership nor .technical possession fixes liability ~to process, mesne or final, upon the vessel or her owners. See The Utopia [1893], A. C. 492, 499.</p> <p>, In this case the Privy Council referred to The Parlement Beige, supra, as an accepted authority, and in The Castlegate [1893], A. C. 38, 52, the House of Lords also cited it with approval.</p> <p>The public importance of the, question is not affected by the armistice.</p> <p>The suggestion of immunity by counsel for the British Embassy is a proper method of procedure, and is conclusive as to the official facts thus stated. Dillon v. Strathearn S. S. Co., 248 U. S. 182.</p> <p>This court has power to grant appropriate relief in this proceeding and such relief is necessary to meet the situation.</p>

Held: void as an undue burden on interstate commerce. P. 536. 277 Missouri, 264, reversed. The case is, stated in the opinion. Mr. William F. Evans and Mr. Edward T. Miller for plaintiff in error. Mr. James D. Lindsay for defendant in error. Mr. R. Perry Spencer was also on the brief. Mr. Justice McReynoldS' delivered the

Held: a delivery under the original consignment. P. 542. 2. Under the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, a carrier is justified in delivering the goods to the person in physical possession of the order bill of lading properly endorsed, unless it has information that such person is not lawfully entitled to them. P. 543. 3.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the defendant railroad company was not harmed in this case by leaving it to be determined ■ by the jury on conflicting evidence of experts. Id. 3. Due care may require a railroad company to keep a flagman at a dangerous street crossing. Id. 4. Conduct that would be contributory negligence as a matter of law in an older person may not be so in a boy of seven. Id. 256 Fed. Rep. 837 , affirmed.

Held: shall be conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid over to the alien property custodian.” Held, that, upon a determination after investigation by the Custodian, exercising the President’s power by delegation under § 5 of the act, that certain securities were held by trustees for the benefit of enemy insurance companies, followed by demand, the duty arosé to deliver them to the Custodian; that the question…

Held: in view of the broad language of the section and its interpretation by Congress. Id. 9. Neither under the common law nor under the statutes of Oklahoma may a testator impose an indefinite restriction on the right of his devisee to alienate the land devised. P. 580. 10.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI to the court of appeals of the district of COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

IN EQUITY. The motion of the Sinclair Oil and Gas Company, filed herein on December 20, 1920, for an order to require Frederic A. Delano, Esq., Receiver, to refund to it one-sixteenth (1/16) of the proceeds of the oil produced from certain premises in said motion described and heretofore deposited with said Receiver pursuant to the order of this Court, together with the interest collected thereon by said Receiver, and to require said Receiver to surrender and pay to said…