Volume 256 — Federal Reporter

<p>3.Husband and Wipe <3=»56 — Note by Wipe — What Law Governs.</p> <p>in an action on a married woman’s note executed and payable in the state of Arkansas, the laws of that state control.</p> <p>2. Husband and Wife <g=»87(3) — Surety on Note for Husband.</p> <p>Prior to Act Ark. March 19, 1915 (Acts 1915, p. 681), a married woman would not be liable as a surety on a note for her husband, but since its passage all restrictions have been removed, and a married woman may sue and be sued, contract and bo contracted with, as though she were a feme sole.</p> <p>3. Husband and Wife <3=»171(1) — Mortgages—Surety for Husband.</p> <p>It is the settled law of Arkansas that a married woman may mortgage her separate estate as surety for her husband without any consideration passing to her, the consideration to her husband supporting the’mortgage.</p> <p>4. Husband and Wife ®=»85(C) — Note for Husband’s Debt — Validity—Renew au Notes.</p> <p>As prior to'Act Ark. March 19, 1915 (Ads 1915, p. 684), a note executed by a married woman as surety for her husband was merely voidable, a renewal note given after the passage of such act, which allowed a married woman t.o become surety for her husband, is not void under the rule that a contract absolutely void for illegality will not bo validated by a renewal note.</p> <p>5. Husband and Wife <@=>85(6) — Surety for Husband.</p> <p>Prior to Act Ark. March 19, 1915 (Ads 1915, p. 084), a note executed by a married woman as surety for her husband was not wholly void, lmt merely voidable; there being no statute prohibiting a married woman from becoming a surety.</p> <p>6. Husband and Wife <g=>85(0) — Surety for Husband — ■Renewal Notes.</p> <p>Where a married woman who had before Ad, Ark. March 19, 1915 (Acts 1915, n. 681), signed a note as surety for her husband, and after the passage of such act. with knowledge that part of the consideration was the note so signed, executed a renewal note, hold, that she is estopped from setting up the failure of consideration in an action on the renewal note.</p> <p>7. Infants @=57(1) — New Contract after Maturity.</p> <p>While infants. are not liable on contracts not for necessaries, yet if, after coming of age, they execute new contracts in writing, they are liable thereon.</p> <p>8. Infants @=57(1) — Contracts—•Acquiescence.</p> <p>An infant may be estopped by acquiescence after he comes of age to disclaim liability, under a contract executed during infancy not for necessaries.</p>

Cotteral, Judge. ■ Bill by the United States against George G. La Motte and others. From the decree, defendants appeal, and complainant cross-appeals.

Action by Michael Tomasco against the Delaware, Rackawanna & Western Railroad Company for personal injuries. Verdict and judg■ment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Action by James R. Elliott against the Michigan Central Railroad Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff after trial by the court, and defendants bring error.

Appeals from the. District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Two libels in admiralty, tried together, one by the Sutton & Suder-ley Brick Company, and the other by Jacob Rice, against the steam tug May McGuirl, her engines, etc.; the Shamrock Towing Company, claimant. From decrees for libelants, claimant appeals.

<p>Collision <&wkey;153 — Review—Findings—Conflicting Evidence.</p> <p>Finding that the C. was at fault in- a collision with the F. will be adopted on appeal; the testimony from the contending vessels being hopelessly conflicting, apparently disinterested evidence favoring the F., and the wrongdoing under explanation given by the C. being far more complicated and unusual than under the explanation of the F.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of'New York.</p> <p>Suit by the Procter & Gamble Company against the Berlin Mills Company. From a decree for defendant, complainant appeals.</p> <p>The action is upon claims 1 and 2 of patent No. 1,135,351, issued April 13, 1915, to the plaintiff herein, as assignee of John J. Burche-nal, who is and long has been an officer of the corporate plaintiff. The claims are as follows:</p> <p>“1. A homogeneous lardlike food product, consisting of an incompletely hy-drogenized vegetable oil. '</p> <p>“2. A homogeneous lardlike food product, consisting of incompletely hydro-genized cotton seed oil.”</p> <p>The court below held in substance:</p> <p>(1) The disclosure did not amount to invention;</p> <p>(2) If there was invention, Burchenal was not the inventor; and</p> <p>(3) Upon a proper construction of the claims in suit there was no infringement.</p> <p>The bill was accordingly dismissed, and the plaintiff took this appeal.</p>

Suit by the Weber. Electric Company against the Cutler-Hammer Manufacturing Company. From an order granting plaintiff an injunction pendente lite, defendant appeals. The order granted an injunction pendente lite, in action on patents to Weber, No. 743,206, claims 1 to 4, inclusive, and No. 916,812, claim 1.

In Equity. Suit by the American Electric Welding Company and others against the Ealance & Grosjean Manufacturing Company. On plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction filed June 15, 1917, and on defendant’s motions to quash service of process and dismiss bill for want of jurisdiction, filed June 26, 1917.

<p>1. Judgment (&wkey;143(10) — Default—Grounds foe Setting Aside.</p> <p>Defendants held not entitled to vacation of a default judgment, entered over a year after return day, although their nonappearance was apparently due to loss in the mails of a letter from their attorney to the clerk, asking a copy of the declaration when filed, to which no answer was received, where no further inquiry was made, and under the state statute, if no declaration was filed within three months, they were entitled to nonsuit or dismissal.</p> <p>2. Army and Navy <&wkey;34 — Soldiees’ and Sailobs’ Civil Belief Act — Con-steuction — Default Judgments.</p> <p>Provision of Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Belief Act March 8, 1918, § 200 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3078%bb), requiring plaintiff, before entry of judgment against a defendant in default, to file affidavit that he is not in the military service, construed, and the fact that such affidavit was not filed held not to entitle defendants, who were not in fact in the service, to have set aside a default judgment against them.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit for collision by R. J. Reseman, master of tlie schooner Melbourn P. Smith, against the steamship Ontario, with cross-libel. Decree for libelant.</p>

At Law. Actions by Gertrude Walsh and by Alfred E. Walsh against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. On motions to quash service, and to dismiss for want of jurisdiction over defendant.

<p>1. Bankruptcy <§=>184(1) — Claims—Rights op Parties.</p> <p>Where personal property oí the bankrupt, mortgaged in Illinois, was with consent oí the mortgagees removed to Tennessee, and thence removed to Mississippi, and later carried to Arkansas, wherein the mortgagor was adjudicated a bankrupt, rights of the mortgagees and general creditors must be determined by the Arkansas laws.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy >§=>184(1) — Rights op Mortgagees — Removal op Property.</p> <p>Where mortgaged chattels, with consent oí the mortgagee, were taken from the state where the mortgage was executed, and thence brought into Arkansas, held, that the mortgage lien continued and might be asserted by the mortgagee to obtain priority over general creditors, on bankruptcy of the mortgagor, which occurred while the property was in Arkansas; it appearing that the mortgage was registered in Arkansas prior to bankruptcy.</p> <p>S. Courts <@=>366(18) — Decision op State Court as Controlling.</p> <p>In absence of a decision by the highest court of the state, as to rights under a chattel mortgage, the federal District Court will follow the rule of decision prevailing in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the district.</p> <p>4. Acknowledgment <§=>5— Registration op Mortgage — Reacknowledgment.</p> <p>Where mortgaged chattels, with the consent of the mortgagee, were removed from the state where the mortgage was executed and registered, and later brought into Arkansas, held, that no reacknowledgment was necessary to registration in Arkansas.</p> <p>5. Chattel Mortgages <§=61 — Execution—Statutes.</p> <p>Where, after chattel mortgage was executed and registered in foreign state, chattels were brought into Arkansas, and the mortgage there registered, held, that Kirby & Castle’s Dig. Ark. §§ 840, 844, 6397, requiring chattel mortgages to be acknowledged as required for deeds of real estate, did not apply. . .</p>

<p>BANKRUPTCY <®=»40T(6) — RIGHT TO DISCHARGE-OBTAINING PROPERTY BY Fai.sk Statement — “Material False Statement in Writing” — Worthless Check.</p> <p>A bankrupt, who obtains property by means of a check which he knows to he worthless, obtains it upon a “materially false statement in writing,” within the meaning of Bankruptcy Act, § 14b (3), as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 4 (Comp. St. § 9508), which defeats his right to a discharge.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Materially False Statement.]</p>

<p>Army and Navy <S=k>44(2) — Persons Subject to Military Daw — “Retainer to Camp” — “Serving with the Armies” — Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>The driver of an automobile employed and paid by the owner, a contractor for construction work at a training camp in the United States, which is not under martial law, his duty being to transport civilian em-ployés of the government auditing, department at the camp, not shown to have any direct connection with the army, is not a “retainer to the camp or accompanying or serving with the armies,” within Articles of War, art. 2d (Comp. St. § 2308a), and not subject to trial by court-martial for a death inflicted by his machine within the camp.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Augustus W. Maier, bankrupt. On motion to vacate order extending time within which to file petition for discharge.

<p>Shipping ©=»132(5) — Damage to Cargo — Liability.</p> <p>Evidence held insiifiicieni to establish unseawortMness of a vessel at the beginning of the voyage or improper stowage, but to show that damage to cargo resulted from errors in navigation or dangers of the sea. for which neither vessel nor owners were liable under Harter Act, § 3'(Comp. Bt. § 8031).</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <@=>404(2) — Failure of Bankrupt to Obtain Discharge — Effect of Second Proceedings.</p> <p>Where' a bankrupt failed to obtain a discharge, creditors whose claims were proved are not affected by subsequent bankruptcy proceedings against him, which afford no ground for a stay of suits by them, nor are ■such suits^ barred by his discharge therein.</p>

<p>Collision i®=375 — Meeting Steam and Sailing Vessel — Failure to Show Lights.</p> <p>A collision in Long Island Sound on a clear night between a passenger steamer, with a lookout posted and officers on duts and a meeting schooner, held due solely to the fact that the schooner was not showing her port light.</p>

Suit for collision by Judson I,. Hamilton, master of the schooner Stetson, against the steamer Rexington. Decree for respondent, and libelant appeals.

<p>1. Admiralty ©=>31 — Laches.</p> <p>While courts of admiralty are not governed by any statute of limitations ladies or delay in judicial enforcement of maritime claims constitutes a valid defense, where the circumstances are such that it is to be inferred that, defendant was prejudiced thereby, because of it depriving him of evidence and the means of effective defense.</p> <p>2. Admikalty <f£s>34 — Laches.</p> <p>in absence of excuse or explanation, delay of five years, after explicit denial of liability because of no disclosure of fault as to claim filed, in filing libel, counting on faults of vessel for logs intended for cargo going adrift from alongside ship anchored, some distance from shore, at Axim, off west coast of Africa, hold laches constituting valid defense; the occurrence being such that knowledge of! it was likely to be confined to the officers and crew and poisons bringing the logs to the ship.</p>

Action by Joseph Curran against the Standard Bitulithic Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Tiros canso comes here on writ of error to the District Court for the Southern. District oí New York. The defendant in error, plaintiff below, and hereinafter called plaintiff, is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the borough of Richmond, city and state of New York.

<p>1. Chattel Mortgages i&wkey;>85 — Corporate Mortgages Against Real and Personal Property- — Filing as Chattel Mortgage.</p> <p>Cien Law N. Y., § 231, providing that “mortgages creating a lien on real and personal property executed by a corporation as security for the payment of bonds issued by such corporation” need not be filed as a chattel mortgage, applies to such a mortgage executed by a corporation to secure a single bond.</p> <p>2. Courts <&wkey;3(56(l) — Federal Courts — Following State Decisions.</p> <p>While a federal court will follow a settled construction of a state statute by its highest court, it is not bound to follow a single decision of a trial court of the state.</p> <p>3. Confusion of Goods <&wkey;>9 — Sale of Property by Trustee — Mingling of Mortgaged and Unmortgaged Goods.</p> <p>Where a trustee sells for a lump sum goods of the bankrupt, some of which are within a mortgage, although some, not identified, may not be, by the law of New York the mortgagee is entitled to the entire proceeds, on the principle of confusion of goods.</p>

Niles, Judge. Suit by the United States, for the use of the American Sheet Metal Works and others, against the National Surety Company. From an adverse decree, defendant appeals.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by D. L. Green, as receiver of the Bank of Panama City, against the Interstate Casualty Company. From the judgment, plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida; Rhydon M. Call, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Bank of Commerce & Trusts of Richmond, Va., against Adam McArthur and others. Bill dismissed (248 Fed. 138), and complainant appeals.</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. In the matter of the American Candy Manufacturing' Company, bankrupt. From orders of the District Court, Ella L. Moore and Josie G. Hanrahan separately appeal. Appeals by petitioners from orders in bankruptcy entered in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Action by the Kingdom of Roumania against the Guaranty Trust Company of New York. The Chatham & Phenix National Bank of the City of New York brings error to review an order requiring it to pay interest to defendant.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District oí: New York.</p> <p>Action at law by Victa Razua.sltine against the Rehigh Valley Coal Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Foster, Judge. Ribel by Ragnar Eldund and others against the steamship Baltic; the Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, claimant. Decree for libelants, and claimant and others appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi; Henry C. Niles, Judge.</p> <p>Action by C. A. Dee, administrator of the estate of Percy R. Johnson, deceased, against the Jackson Right & Traction Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Suit in equity by the Stanley Works against the Twisted Wire & Steel Company. Decree for plaintiff, sustaining the charge of infringement of patent and denying the relief for unfair competition. Both plaintiff and defendant appeal.

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Carl James, Boyd Smith, and Harvey Ainsworth. On demurrers to indictment.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the North American Construction Company against the Des Moines City Railway Company. On application of receivers for construction of franchise.</p>

<p>Towage <§=>11(10) — Damage to Tow — Negligence of Tug — Abandoning Tow.</p> <p>A steamer, which contracted to tow two harges up the Ohio river, held liable for damage to barges and cargo, caused by their being left at an intermediate point, where, after nine days, they were broken loose by a rise in the river and carried down stream.</p>

<p>Internal Revenue <@=»9 — “Manufacture of Shells.”</p> <p>A steel company, which manufactured billets for shells, piercing the billets, so as to make rough forgings, held engaged in manufacture of shells, within Act Sept. 8, 1916, § 301 (Comp. St. 1918, § 6336%b), imposing an excise tax on such business, though the rough forging required much more work before shells were completed.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Morris Maiman, bankrupt. On review of order of referee allowing claim of James W. Parker.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Delaware; J. Whitaker Thompson, Judge.</p> <p>Suit hi equity bjr Philip F. Du Pont and others against Pierre S. Du Pont and others. Decree for defendants, and complainants appeal.</p>

<p>1. Master asid Servant <&wkey;302(l) — Torts of Servant — Master’s Liability.</p> <p>Whether a servant’s act or omission, injuring a third person, is within the scope of his authority, so as to render the master liable, is to be determined from the surrounding facts and circumstances.</p> <p>2. Master and Servant <&wkey;302(3) — Torts of Servant — Master’s Liability.</p> <p>An aggrieved party cannot recover from a master 1'or an assault by his servant, unless it constituted a violation of an absolute duty owed him by the master, or was within the scope of the tort-feasor’s employment.</p> <p>3. Master and Servant <&wkey;332(2) — Torts of Servant — Master’s Liability.</p> <p>In an action Cor an assault on plaintiff by defendant’s sheep herder, whether the herder was acting within the scope of his authority hold, under the evidence, for the jury.</p> <p>4. Trial &wkey;>29(5(2) — Instruction—Construction as a Whole.</p> <p>In an action for an assault on plaintiff by defendant’s sheep herder, an instruction as to the herder's duties held, in view of others, to be correct.</p>

Suit by'William B- McFadden and others, owners of the steamer Albert T. Gowen, against the tug International and the International Bridge Company. Decree for libelants, and respondent Bridge Company appeals.

Action by George Greenzweig, an infant, by Bernard Greenzweig, his guardian ad litem, against Charles D. Napier. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. The defendant in error, who was plaintiff below, will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiff. The plaintiff and his guardian ad litem are citizens of Russia and residents of the Eastern, district of New York.

Ervin, Judge. Suit in admiralty by Henry W. Gordon and others against the steamship Cubadist; Harry E. Michelson, claimant. Decree for respondent, and libelants appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana; Geo. W. Jack, Judge.</p> <p>John W. Foster was convicted under Penal Code, § 225, and he brings error.</p>

Ervin, Judge. Action at law by Ann Hope Oliver, administratrix of the estate of William S. Oliver, against the Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore; John C. Rose, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Bayard Coal & Coke Company against John T. Mitchell and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>Collision <®=>105 — Boat at Fault- — Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence held to show that collision of tug, bound up East River, with ferryboat, bound for slip in borough of Manhattan, and lying less than 200 feet off shore, waiting for slip to clear, was caused by sole fault of tug, beginning with violation of statutory duty (Ash’s Greater New York Charter [4th Ed.] 1253, § 757) to keep in middle of river, and completed with violation of the ordinary rules of navigation.</p>

Dickinson, Judge. Suit in admiralty by T. M. Duche & Sons against the American Schooner John Twohy; Albert D. Cummins and Howard Compton, claimants. From the decree, claimants appeal. On motion by appellants for leave to withdraw appeal.

<p>Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>In the matter of David Siegel, bankrupt. Petition of Oscar Quinto to revise an order of the District Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; J. Warren Davis, Judge.</p> <p>Suits by James Francis Eddy and another against Henry E. C. Kramer and others, and against Charles E. Mather, Victor Mather, and Gilbert Mather, copartners trading as Mather & Co. Decrees for complainants, and defendants appeal.</p>

Petition of Eunice Mitchell for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner, Eunice Mitchell, is now held by Don W. McTntosh, Inspector of Immigration, under an order of deportation made by John W. Abercrombie, Acting Secretary of Labor, on the ground she is a person likely to become a public charge, and is threatened with deportation by virtue thereof.

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of L. B. Post, bankrupt. On review of order of referee. The opinion of Referee Friebolin is as follows: This matter comes before me upon the application of the trustee for an order requiring bankrupt to sign testimony previously given by him before the referee in the general examination of the bankrupt by the trustee, and the objection raised by the bankrupt to the granting of such order.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Consolidated Gas Company of New York against Charles D. Newton, Attorney General of the State of New York, Edward Swann, District Attorney of New York County, and Travis H. Whitney, Charles S. Hervey, and Frederick J. H. Kracke, constituting the Public Service Commission of the State of New York, First District. On motion by the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York for an order allowing said city to intervene as a party defendant.</p>

<p>1. Railiíoads &wkey;>5%, Now, vol. 6A Key-No. Series — Federal Control — In-TlSKI-’EKENCSi WITH OPERATION.</p> <p>An einployG, assisting In operating cars oí an express company which lias been taken over and is being operated by the government under Act March 21, 1918 (Comp. (it. 1918, §§ 3115%a-3115%p), who steals express matter being carried by it for litre knowingly interferes with and impedes tile “possession, use, operation, or control of! * * * transportation system,” which is made a criminal offense by section 11 of the act, (section 3115% k).</p> <p>2. Statujms <&wkey;241(!) — Construction—Renal Statutes.</p> <p>A penal statute is to be strictly construed, but not so narrowly as to defeat the purpose of its enactment.</p> <p>3. Railroads &wkey;5%, New, vol. 6A Key-No. Series — Federal Control — Rab-oeny op Property Being Transported — “Derived From.”</p> <p>Express matter being carried by an express company, while it is being operated by the government under Act March 21, 1918 (Comp. St. 3.918, §§ 3115'%a-3315%p), is “property derived from or used in connection with tlie possession, use, or operation of” the transportation system, and its larceny by employes constitutes a criminal offense against the United States, under section 11 of the act (section 3115%k).</p> <p>4. (Larceny <&wkey;7 — Government Ownership — Express Matter — “Property of the United States.”</p> <p>The United States has a special property in express matter being carried for hire by an express company operated by the government under Act March 21, 1918 (Comp. St 1918, §§ 3135%a-3H5%p), which will sustain a prosecuüon for larceny of such property under Criminal Code, § 47 (Comp. St. § 10214), making it an offense to steal any property or valuable thing whatever of the money or property of the United States.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Property of the United States.]</p> <p>5. Railroads <&wkey;5J4, New, vol. 6A I-Cey-No. Series — Federal Control — • “Tba nsportation System.”</p> <p>A “transportation system,” within Act March 21, 1918, § 11, (Comp. St. 191,8, § 3115%k), making it a criminal offense to interfere with or impede the possession, use, operation, and control of the transportation system, is a system which transports something from one place to another.</p> <p>6. Railroads <&wkey;.>i{., New, vol. 6A Key-No. Series — Federal Control — “Use” of Transportation System.</p> <p>The “use” of the system, within Act March 21, 1938, § 11 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%k), making it a criminal offense to interfere with or impede the possession, use, operation, and control of the transportation system, consists in taking up, carrying, and putting down property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Use.]</p> <p>7. Railroads <&wkey;5%, New, vol. 6A Key-No. Series — Federal Control — “Operation” of Transportation System.</p> <p>The “operation” of the system, within Act March 21, 1938, § 11 (Comp. St. § 3115% k), making it a criminal offense to interfere with or impede the possession, use, operation, and control of the transportation system, consists in running the cars and carrying therein property being moved from one point or place to another.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Operation.]</p>

In Equity. Suit by I. Tucker Burr and others against the City of Columbus, Ohio, and others. Op motion of complainants for preliminary injunction and by defendants to dismiss bill.

<p>Insurance &wkey;>627(l) — Suit Against Foreign Corporation — Service op Process.</p> <p>Under Nebraska statutes relating to service on insurance companies and other corporations, Rev. St. Neb. 1913, §§ 7635, 7636, and section 3172, providing that any one, who by authority receives money from another to be transmitted to an insurance company for a policy, shall be deemed an agent, a policy holder of a foreign mutual assessment life company, who, having a single blank application, procured another to flu it out, and forwarded it with the initial fee. but without letter, to the company, cannot, by reason of such transaction, be considered an agent on whom service may be made a year afterward in an unrelated case.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Essanay Film Manufacturing Company against William R. Kane.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Rufus E. Eoster, Judge.</p> <p>In Bankruptcy. C. C. Hartwell Company, Limited, and others, appeal from an order in favor of Mrs. Izabel Danziger Miller and others.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United' States for the Northern District of Georgia; Beverly D. Evans, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by J. W. Conway against the First National Bank of Rome, Georgia. Bill dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>1. Witnesses <&wkey;269(15) — Cross-Examination—Rebuttal op Inference.</p> <p>Testimony adduced on direct examination'of defendants’ witness being calculated to impress the jury that F., a coindictee, whose guilt was shown by the evidence, had been permitted to escape trial after giving a bond in an unnamed amount, and that this might have occurred because of his co-operation' in procuring evidence, and that as to him the prosecution was not in good faith, the government, to rebut this, could on cross-examination show he secured his release by giving a $5,000 bond, and that he fled and a forfeiture was entered on his bond.</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;356 — Evidence—Defense—Advice op Prosecuting Attorney.</p> <p>Defendant, prosecuted for conspiracy to transport liquor into the part of Oklahoma formerly the Indian Territory, held not entitled to show that before the conspiracy he was advised by the district attorney that a certain previous transaction was not criminal; identity between the transactions in material respects not being shown, so as to make the advice apply to the transaction in issue.</p> <p>3. Conspiracy &wkey;>43(12) — Variance—Number of Persons Conspiring.</p> <p>One charged with conspiring with several may be convicted on proof of his conspiracy with some of them.</p> <p>4. Conspiracy &wkey;>38 — Defenses—Acts as Employts.</p> <p>Defendant’s participation in a criminal conspiracy is not excused by showing that what he did was in performance of duties of his employment.</p> <p>5. Conspiracy <&wkey;43(12) — Variance—Participants in Overt Acts.</p> <p>The doing by one of an overt act to effect the object of a previously formed conspiracy being sufficient, under Criminal Code, § 37 (Comp. St. § 10201), to complete the offense, variance between indictment and proof as to number participating in such act is immaterial.</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <&wkey;717 — Trial—Argument—Reading Law to Jury.</p> <p>Arguing to jury intent of wholesale liquor dealer to aid purchasers to ship to forbidden territory, from fact of his not entering in books sales for such territory, while making entries of other sales, and in this connection reading to them statutes requiring entries of all sales, held not objectionable.</p>

<p>1. SHIPPING <&wkey;140 — CONTRACTS OF AFFREIGHTMENT-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.</p> <p>It is competent for a steamship company as a carrier of goods to limit its liability to a certain amount in case of loss or damage, even as against its own negligence, where the valuation is the basis on which freight is charged and this fact was fully known to the shipper.</p> <p>2. Shipping <&wkey;140 — Bills of Lading — Presumption of Agreement to Terms.</p> <p>A provision in a bill of lading limiting liability of the carrier 1o a certain amount raises a presumption that the shipment was made upon the agreed valuation, and that opportunity was afforded of shipping at a higher valuation by payment of a higher rate.</p> <p>3. Shipping <&wkey;140 — Action for Damage to Goods — Damages—Effect of Insurance.</p> <p>Under a provision of a bill of lading that the carrier, if liable for loss or damage, should “have the benefit of any insurance effected upon the goods,” where a policy on the goods clearly did not cover the risk from which the loss occurred, an arrangement by which the insurer advanced a sum to the insured on a borrowed and loan receipt does not inure to the benefit of the carrier.</p> <p>4. Evidence <&wkey;>555 — Opinion Evidence — Competency.</p> <p>The opinion of an expert, based upon his general knowledge as io the effect of a strain upon a winch, after its jaws had been worn, was properly admitted, although lie liad not examined the winch involved in tile case.</p> <p>5. Evidence <@=»123(12) — Res Gestas — Statements Aftek Event.</p> <p>Statements of the captain of a steamship with respect to an accident which had previously occurred in the unloading of cargo by stevedores, as to which the captain was charged with no duty, held incompetent as part of the res gestee as against the shipowner.</p>

Suit in admiralty by Dick Chiarello & Bros., Incorporated, against the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey and the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company. Decree for respondents, and libelant appeals. Respondent railways maintain a joint wharf in the Arthur Kill, where they receive for creosoting purposes ties brought to them by water.

In .Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Dibel by the United States against one bag, containing seven packages of Paradise and Ghoura feathers, one package containing 150 feathers of the bird of paradise and 150 quills, and 43 boxes containing heads and feathers of birds of paradise and Ghoura heads; Arthur Arbib, claimant. From the decree, libelant brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Uibel by the United States against Eour Packages of Cut Diamonds ; Max Goldstein, claimant. Judgment of District Court (247 Fed. 354), forfeiting goods, affirmed (255 Fed. 314, —• C. C. A.-). On rehearing.</p>

<p>Principal and Agent <@=>123(10) — Agency oe Payee oe Note to Collect eor Indorsee — Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence, consisting of course of dealing and correspondence, held to authorize finding that payee of notes, secured on cattle, engaged in making loans on such paper and selling the same, with guaranty, was recognized as agent for collection thereof by buyer and indorsee of some of the notes, thug relieving 1he maker so paying from further liability, and this though notes were in possession of buyer.</p> <p>Walker, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from and Petition to Superintend and Revise Decrees of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama ; William I. Grubb, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the Thoele-Phillips Manufacturing Company, bankrupt; W. H. Martin, trustee. The State of Alabama appeals from, and petitions to review, an order of the District Court denying priority to a claim by the State.</p>

Petition to Superintend and Revise from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas; Waller T. Burns, Judge. In the matter of C. Eckhardt & Sons and William Eckhardt, bankrupts. Petition by W. PI. Dunn, trustee of bankrupts, to superintend and revise a decree sustaining homestead exemption of William Eck-hardt.

<p>Petitions on Behalf of Respondents for Decision in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; W. H. Seward Thomson, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of Josiah V. Thompson, bankrupt. From an order obtained by George R. Shoup and others, George R. Scrugham and others, trustees, appeal. On petitions of Hugh G. Bourie, executor, and others, and James H. McGraw and others. Order for report by trustees.</p>

<p>1. Courts <3=363 — Following State Law — Actions Against County— Prior Presentation or Claim.</p> <p>A state law requiring claims against a county to he presented to the county board before suit may be maintained thereon is reasonable and valid, and will be recognized and enforced by a federal court unless the county board has taken action which was equivalent to rejection of the claim, and rendered its presentation unnecessary and futile.</p> <p>2. Counties <@=197 — Actions Against — Presentation of Claim to County Board.</p> <p>A claim for attorney’s fees, based on an injunction bond given by a county in a suit in which it was defeated, need not be presented to the county board; such fees, if recoverable, being an incident to litigation begun by the county.</p> <p>3. Counties <@=201 — Claims Against — Presentation.</p> <p>Presentation to a county board of a claim for a stated sum as “actual and exemplary damages” for an alleged libelous suit does not meet the requirement of a statute requiring an itemized statement.</p> <p>4. Counties <@=206(1) — Claims Against — Conclusiveness of Allowance.</p> <p>Under the law of Alabama a county may maintain a suit to have a claim against it allowed by the county board, which claim has not been substituted by a new character of county obligation, declared invalid, and a decision against it in such suit is an adjudication of the validity of the claim.</p> <p>5. Injunction <@=252(6) — Liability on Bond — Enforcement in Injunction Suit.</p> <p>Judgment may be given on an injunction bond for damages proved, arising from the issuance in the case of a preliminary injunction, which is dissolved, but attorney’s fees and other expenses incident to the suit are not allowable in a federal court.</p> <p>6. Set-Off and Counterclaim <@=34(2) — Counterclaim—Libel Based on Plaintiff’s Pleadings. ■</p> <p>Damages for libel based upon the allegations of the pleadings in a suit in equity in a federal court cannot be set up by way of counterclaim</p> <p>7. Counties <@=141 — Liability for Torts — Libel.</p> <p>A county cannot be held for damages for libel.</p>

<p>1. Beplevik &wkey;>70 — Issues—Burden ok Proof.</p> <p>A plea of property by both parties in replevin puts in issue plaintiff’s interest, and imposes upon it the burden of proving its right to the immediate and exclusive possession of all the property.</p> <p>2. Bailment <&wkey;7 — Contract to Manufacture Goods — Construction—• Bight of Possession,</p> <p>A contract under which plaintiff delivered certain parts of steel shells to defendant, which was to furnish the necessary work and materials for their completion, construed, and held to give defendant a special property in the shells, upon which it had expended work and materials, and the right to their possession until inspected and accepted by plaintiff.</p> <p>3. Replevin <&wkey;96 — Sufficiency of Verdict</p> <p>A verdict for defendant in replevin for a sum of money only, where the goods were taken by plaintiff on the writ, must be construed as for the value of the goods, where there was no evidence of damages for caption and detention, and is equally good at common law and under Act Pa. April 19, 1901 (P. L. 90') § 7.</p> <p>4. Replevin <&wkey;71(l) — Evidence—Value of Defendant’s Special Property Interest.</p> <p>In replevin for unfinished artillery shells, delivered by plaintiff to defendant under contract for completion, upon which defendant had expended labor and material, but which were unfinished and without market value when plaintiff broke the contract and replevied them, defendant may show the value of its interest by proving the cost of its labor and material, and in addition what would be a reasonable and ordinary profit thereon.</p> <p>5. Estoppel <&wkey;68 — Claim of Property by Defendant — Lien.</p> <p>A manufacturer, working on material furnished by plaintiff when such material was replevied, held not estopped to assert a property right therein by the fact that it had previously claimed a lien.</p> <p>6. Replevin <&wkey;72 — Lien of Defendant.</p> <p>Evidence held not to sustain the claim of a defendant in replevin to a lien on the property replevied.</p> <p>7. Words and Phrases — “Value.”</p> <p>“Value” of goods is not what they cost their owner; it is what they are worth to him or to others.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Value.]</p>

<p>Banks and Banking <§=>100 — Sale of Stock foe Customer — Liability fob Fraud of Customer.</p> <p>A bank held not liable in tort for the s.ale, for account of a customer, of shares of stock owned by plaintiff, where plaintiff had indorsed the certificates in blank and forwarded them to the customer as a broker for sale, and there was no evidence that the bank had knowledge or notice of his ownership.</p>

<p>On motions to modify decree of reversal. Addendum, to be considered in connection with original opinion. .</p>

<p>ín Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Eouisiana; George W. Jack, Judge,</p> <p>Actions by the Franklin State Bank against the Maryland Casualty Company and against the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. From judgments for defendant in each case, plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United S’tates for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington; Benjamin E. Keller, Judge.</p> <p>Prosecution by the United States against Gerald Malcolm. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Patents <§==>112(3) — Validity—Effect oe Interference Proceedings.</p> <p>The effect of Patent Office proceedings in interference is to settle on the record there made the question of priority between the parties, assuming that the claimed inventions are identical; but they do not finally establish that either party has made a patentable invention.</p> <p>2. Patents <@=>328 — Identity of Claimed Inventions — Prepared Roofing.</p> <p>The Bird patent, No. 1,181,827, and the Becker patent, No. 1,024,550, for prepared roofing held identical as to the invention claimed.</p> <p>3. Patents <3=106(1) — Second Patent fob Same Invention — Interference Pboceedings.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. § 4904 (Comp. St. § 9449) which expressly provides for declaring interference with an existing patent, priority of invention may be adjudged in the adverse party, and a patent issued to him.</p> <p>4. Patents <@=>328 — Validity and Infringement — Prepared Roofing.</p> <p>The Bird patent, No. 1,181,827, for a prepared roofing, held valid and infringed.</p> <p>5. Patents <3=328 — Validity and Infringement — Prepared Roofing.</p> <p>The Bird patent, No. 1,036,427, for prepared roofing, held valid, but not infringed.</p> <p>6. Patents <@=165 — Construction—Broad Claims.</p> <p>A broad claim does not extend invention, and if a patentee discloses one means, a statement that he does not confine himself thereto will not justify a claim covering all means.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Foundation Company against the Underpinning & Foundation Company. On motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>1. Commerce <&wkey;41(3) — Goods Shipped in Interstate Commerce — Packages.</p> <p>Goods packed in cartons, shipped in interstate commerce, and sold by importing wholesalers to retailers, by whom they are removed from the shipping cases, and the cartons placed on sale to consumers, are removed from the domain of interstate commerce.</p> <p>2. Commerce <&wkey;60(3) — Power op State to Regulate Sale — Misbranding.</p> <p>Food and Drugs Act June 30, 1906 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8717 et seq.), by prohibiting adulteration or misbranding, does not interfere with the power of a state, after a product has become a part of its retail commerce, to prescribe the standard of purity to entitle it to be sold under a certain brand or label.</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law <&wkey;62 — Delegation of Power — Regulation oe Sale oe Food.</p> <p>It is competent for a state, in regulating the sale of food products, to adopt the standard of percentage of ingredients fixed by the Department of Agriculture to entitle an article to be sold under a certain label, without making act an obnoxious delegation of power.</p>

<p>1. Internal Revenue &wkey;>9 — Corporation Excise Tax — Mutual Insurance Companies — “Income Received Within the Year.”</p> <p>Only premiums actually received in cash during the year, and not premiums accruing or becoming due, but not paid, within the year, nor money previously received in payment of a premium, but applied within the year to pay a different premium, on a renewal policy, instead of the policy holder, on expiration of his policy, taking his expiration return premium, or dividend, in cash as he had a right to do, are “income received within the year” by a mutual insurance company within Excise Tax Act, § 38, cl. 2; an estimation on a “cash,” as opposed to a “revenue,” basis being contemplated by the act.</p> <p>2. Trial <&wkey;145 — Abandonment oe Part oe Claim.</p> <p>Plaintiff, in action to recover back part of excise tax assessed against it and paid under protest, abandoning at the hearing its claim as to a certain item, the court will rule that as to such item there was no illegal exaction.</p> <p>3. Internal Revenue <&wkey;38 — Illegal Exaction — Recovery oe Successor in Office.</p> <p>Part of excise tax illegally exacted and paid under protest to collector of internal revenue may be recovered of his successor in office.</p>

<p>Internal Revenue <S=9 — Corporation Excise Tax — Mutual Insurance Companies — “Income Received Within the Year.”</p> <p>Increase or decrease in book value of bonds held by a mutual insurance company as investment does not affect “'income received within the year,” within Excise Tax Act, § 38, cl. 2.</p>

Petition by John Anderson Mason for writ of habeas corpus. This proceeding came on for hearing under a rule to show cause why an application for a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted on behalf of John Anderson Mason, the petitioner, late sergeant, Battery B, Second Artillery, confined in the Albany Penitentiary, under sentence of a general court-martial, for a violation of the Sixty-Second Article of War.

August Ferger, Thomas M. Dugan, and Robert H. Rasch were indicted for forging interstate, bills of lading. On motions' to quash and on demurrers.-

<p>In Admiralty. Ribel by the Mobile & Gulf Navigation Company against the Sugar Products Company. Decree entered for libelant.</p>

<p>Wab <@=nl5 — Trading with Enemy Act — Offenses.</p> <p>Correspondence by the American agent of a German insurance company with a foreign agent, relative to the business, between October 6 and October 30, 191T, MM not to constitute an offense under Trading with the Enemy Act Oct. 6, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, §§ 3115%a-3115%j), in view of the provision of section 4 (a) of the act (section 31151409), suspending its Operation in that regard for 30 days.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&wkey;303(3) — Preference—Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence that a bankrupt, whose sole bank account, which was kept with defendant trust company, had become inactivo and merely nominal, had endeavored to secure large loans from the defendant, held, in connection with other facts, to establish that defendant had reasonable cause to believe the bankrupt insolvent when he paid two notes not yet due by a third party’s check.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy @=>166(4} — 'Preference—Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence merely that a bankrupt’s account with defendant trust company had been inactive, and that he had requested larger loans, etc., held insufficient to show that defendant had reasonable cause to believe bankrupt insolvent when it received payment for two notes, one of which was not yet due.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by G. G. Campbell, trustee, against Sim Berryman and another. Heard on report of special master. Case re-referred to master.</p>

<p>.FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES <&wkey;>295(l) — -EVIDENCE.</p> <p>Circumstances, though suspicious, held insufficient to .-justify setting aside conveyance as fraudulent.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by Earl A. Davis against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. On plea in abatement.</p>

<p>1. COURTS <&wkey;274 — JURISDICTION OR FEDERAL COURTS — DISTRICT 01' SUIT — “DOING Business” — “Present in State.”</p> <p>A foreign railroad company, having no line of road in Massachusetts, but maintaining an office in Boston and an( agent authorized only to solicit business and take orders for tickets, which he obtained from a tourist agent supplied with tickets by such company and others, held not doing business or present in the state, so as to be subject to suit there under Judicial Code, § 51 (Comp. St. § 1033).</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Doing Business.]</p> <p>2. Commerce <&wkey;92 — Suit to Enforce Orders of Interstate Commerce Commission — J UR1SDICTI0N.</p> <p>Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, § 16, as amended by Act June 18, 1910, § 13 (Comp. St. § 8581), providing for suits against railroad companies to enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the district in which the complainant resides, does not authorize service of process beyond such district.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of. Thomas Reed,, bankrupt. On objections to discharge, and petition to review special master’s report, deciding against bankrupt.

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Delmonico’s, alleged bankrupt. On application by receivers for leave to continue busin'ess.</p>

Suit by the West India & Panama Telegraph Company and another against Jose E. Benedicto and others, composing the Public Service Commission of Porto. Rico, and another, for injunction, restraining enforcement of an order for reduction of foreign cable rates. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico; J. Hamilton, Judge.</p> <p>, Suit by the Porto Rican American Tobacco Company against Jose E. Benedicto, Treasurer of Porto Rico. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant, appeals.</p>

Burns, Judge. ' Action by Robert Bain and another against J. P. White and another. Judgment was adverse to plaintiffs, and they bring error.

<p>1. Contracts <&wkey;26 — Contract by Correspondence — Offer and Acceptance.</p> <p>Correspondence held to contain an offer by defendant and acceptance by complainant, constituting a contract by defendant to furnisli complainant for its newspaper daily special cable dispatches from the Peace Conference in Paris, so long as the President remained in Europe.</p> <p>2. Contracts <&wkey;147(2) — Construction—Intention.</p> <p>The primary rule in the construction of contracts is to give effect to the intention of the parties at the time they entered into the contract, and in ascertaining their real intention the courts look to what the parties said, and if tlie language used is ambiguous it is to be interpreted in the sense that the promisor knew, or had reason to know, that the prom-isee understood it.</p> <p>3. Contracts <&z>155 — Contracts b¡y Correspondence — .Construction Against Party Using Words.</p> <p>Where a contract is evidenced by correspondence, a letter is construed most strongly against the writer.</p> <p>4. Contracts <@=»154 — Construction—Reasonableness.</p> <p>An interpretation which evolves the more reasonable and probable contract should be adopted, and every intendment is to be made against a construction under which it would operate as a snare.</p> <p>5. Contracts <®=>9'3(1) — Validity—Mistake by One Party;</p> <p>A contract in writing, evidenced by an offer by one party and its unequivocal acceptance by the other, cannot be avoided by the party making the offer, on the ground that it was made through mistake or inadvertence.</p> <p>6. Injunction —Subjects of Protection — Restraining Breach of Contract.</p> <p>That a contract was entered into by one party through mistake will not prevent the granting of an injunction against refusal to perform by such party, if complainant is otherwise entitled thereto.</p> <p>Knox, District Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Arbitration and Awaud <&wkey;57 — Award—Gkounds iron Vacation.</p> <p>An award of arbitrators cannot bo set aside because of the failure to determino a question submitted to them by the agreement for arbitration, but upon which no evidence was presented.</p> <p>2. Arbitration and Award <&wkey;>60 — Sufficiency of Award — Certainty.</p> <p>An award' of arbitrators that is sufficiently certain to be obligatory as a contract is valid.</p> <p>Ward, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;794 — Circuit Court op Appeals — Motion to Dismiss or Affirm.</p> <p>Wlbile infrequent, motions to dismiss or affirm are well recognized in the Circuit Court of Appeals.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;1126 — Writ for Delay — Affirmance.</p> <p>The defenses, propounded by traverse to scire facias to obtain execution, being without merit, and the writ of error taken to overruling thereof appearing to be taken for purposes only of delay, judgment will be affirmed on motion.</p>

Clayton, Judge. Action by the N. P. Sloan Company against the Standard Chemical & Oil Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. This was an action by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error. The sustaining of a demurrer to counts 5 and 6 of the complaint as amended is assigned as error. The following is a copy of count 5 as amended: “5.

Holmes, Judge. Action by the J. W. Darling Lumber Company against Samuel Porter. From orders sustaining a demurrer and disallowing an application to file an amended declaration, plaintiff brings error.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company against the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company, the New York Municipal Railway Corporation, and the New York Consolidated Railroad Company. On motion for appointment of coreceiver.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company against the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company and others. On application by Bindley M. Garrison, receiver, for instructions as to whether he should take any proceeding seeking the return of certain bonds of the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company, pledged by it as collateral security for bank loans and collateral trust notes.</p> <p>Upon the obtaining of loans from various banks, the railroad company pledged its bonds as collateral security. These transactions have been referred to in the proceedings as the “induced loans.” In other instances, when loans became due, additional bonds were pledged in. consideration of new loans in renewal. These are referred to as “renewal loans.”</p>

At Taw. Action by the United States against Julia Boylan and Anna Siver Moyer. Judgment for the United States.

i ^Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; James M. Morton, Judge, Petition to limit liability by the Great Uakes Dredge & Dock Company, to which the Eastern Steamship Corporation, as damage claimant, filed an answer. From a decree (250 Fed. 916), both parties appeal.

Suit in equity by Stephen H. P. Pell and others against W. Gordon McCabe, Jr., and another. Decree for defendants, and complainants appeal.

<p>1. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS <&wkey;2-CHARACTER 01’ STOLEN PROPERTY.</p> <p>In a prosecution for receiving copper stolen from interstate train, held, the property did not lose its stolen character, where railroad detectives did not take physical possession of it, but merely watched the place whare it was hidden, in order to see what would become of it.</p> <p>2. Iíeokevxng Stolen Goods <&wkey;9(2) — Instruction—Evidence.</p> <p>instruction that testimony would justify inference that accused had received copper knowing it was stolen is not erroneous, because charging Hint mere possession imputed knowledge that property had been stolen, where evidence showed defendants proceeded directly to place where copper was hidden in a cemetery and were loading it into an automobile when arrested.</p>

H. Sawtelle, Judge. Suit by the Shannon Copper Company against -the Becker-Franz Company for partition. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota; Martin J. Wade, Judge.</p> <p>Joseph Couture was convicted of stealing property of the United States, and brings error.</p>

Orr, Judge. Action by A. W. Blackburn, trustee in bankruptcy, of the estate of John Franklin Kenney, against the First National Bank of Scott dale. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. The eighth assignment of error is as follows: (8) The court erred in refusing to affirm the seventh point of the defendant, to wit: “7.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Separate suits by A. G. Spalding & Bros, against John Wanamaker, New York, and against the Successors of Samuel Buckley & Co. of London and New York, for infringement of patent. Decrees for the defendant in each suit, and plaintiffs appeal.</p> <p>These are appeals from decrees of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Hough, J., presiding), dismissing the bills, with costs. The suits were based upon claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Patent No. 878,254, issued on February 4, 1908, to William Taylor of Leicester, England. In each case the plaintiff sues as assignee of Taylor, and some question was made upon the hearing of the sufficiency of the evidence of assignment; but this matter is not considered in the following opinion.</p> <p>The patent recites that the invention relates to golf balls, and has for its principal object to improve the flight of the ball by giving it “a sustained hanging flight” with “a flat trajectory with a slight rising tendency particularly towards the end of the flight” (page 1, lines 12-15). It acknowledges that in the past it was common to mark the surface of golf balls with grooves of even width, intersecting each other and leaving between them isolated polygonal portions; that another common marking consisted of separate prominences upon the surface, resembling the surface of a blackberry, and named for this reason the “bramble” pattern. The patent then proceeds as follows (page 1, lines 30-47):</p> <p>“The character of the marking which constitutes the present invention may be described in general terms as an inverted bramble pattern, and consists of isolated cavities the essential features of which are that they must be substantially circular in plan and substantially evenly distributed. They must be shallow, and their sides, particularly at the lip of the cavity, must be steep. Steepness of the cavity walls is essential to the hanging flight, but excessive depth besides promoting the collection of dirt, is detrimental to length of flight by offering great resistance to the passage of the air. Consequently the cavity must be shallow and the steepness of its walls confined to the immediate neighborhood of the lip.”</p> <p>Detailed drawings set forth sections of the proposed pits, and the specification states the limits of their proper diameter and that in no case should the depth exceed one-eighth of that diameter. Several forms of section are shown, all with steep sides at the lips of the cavity; the pits differ in section, in some cases being fiat at the bottom, in some elliptical, and in some the spherical surface of the ball proper, adjacent to the lip, slopes inwardly toward the lip. This last feature is not in issue in the suit at bar.</p> <p>The claims in issue are as follows:</p> <p>“1. A golf ball with spherical surface pitted with isolated cavities of large surface area relatively to their depth, substantially circular in plan, with steep sides at the peripheries only of said cavities, and a depth not exceeding one-eighth of their diameter.</p> <p>‘*2. Á golf ball with spherical surface pitted with isolated cavities of large surface area relatively to their depth, substantially circular in plan, with steep sides at the peripheries only of said cavities, and dished or concave bottoms. and of a depth not exceeding one-eighth of their diameter ”</p> <p>‘*4. A golf ball with spherical surface pitted with isolated cavities of large surface area relatively to their depth, substantially circular in plan, with steep sides at the peripheries only of said cavities, and of a diameter not less than vino-hundredlhs nor greater than fifteen-hundredths of an inch, and of a depth not exceeding fourteen-thousandths of an inch.</p> <p>“5. A golf ball with spherical surface pitted with isolated cavities with large surface area relatively to their depth, substantially circular in plan with steep sides at the peripheries only of said cavities, and dished or concave bottoms, and of a diameter not less than nine-lmndredths nor greater than fifteen-hundredths of an inch, and of a depth not exceeding fourteen-thousandths of an inch.”</p> <p>The defendants made balls pitted with spherical cavities similar in proportion and size to the plaintiff’s. The issue in the case was whether these conformed to the words, “with steep sides at the peripheries only of said cavities,” which are contained in all the claims in suit. The section of the defendants’ pits was 1he arc of a circle, and the angle subtended varied between 28 degrees for the defendant Wanamakor’s ball, and 35 degrees for the defendant Buckley’s. The tangents to the curve of the pit at the lip were therefore, in the first case, of 152 degrees, and, in the second, of 145 degrees. The District Court found that pits of this character did not answer the element of the claims above mentioned and dismissed the bills for noninfringement.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the H. Koppers Company against the Otto Coking Company and another for infringement of patent. On final hearing. Decree rendered for plaintiff.

<p>Trad®-Marks and Trade-Names <3=>8(4) — Name Subject to Ownership— General Use op Arbitrary Word.</p> <p>Where the name “Bethabara Wood,” invented by plaintiff, by general use became the descriptive name for a certain wood many years before he secured a registered trade-mark for it, he acquired no exclusive right to the name, preventing defendant from handling and selling wood under that name.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of William Goldberg, bankrupt. On application for a discharge.</p>

<p>Judgment <&wkey;>828(l) — Rks Judicata — Denial of Natukalizatioet.</p> <p>A state court’s denial oí leave to file a naturalization petition is res judicata, so as to be binding upon a federal court; and if the government continues to oppose the alien's application, bis only remedy is to renew the application five years after the occurrence for which the state court denied it.</p>

At Raw. Action by the United States, to the use of Erancino and others, against M. P. Welles, contractor, and the American Bonding Company, as surely. On rule to show cause why the case should not be stricken.

<p>Pleading <§=>362(3) — Striking Out Matter — Materiality—Subscription to Stock — Fraud.</p> <p>In a complaint to recover for subscriptions to corporate stock obtained by fraud, allegations that tbe corporation was never legally organized or authorized to transact business, because the capital, with which it was to begin business, was never paid in, and that the corporation was insolvent, were material to the question of damages, and will not be stricken from the complaint.</p>

<p>1. Telegraphs and Telephones <§=>56 — Failure to Furnish Telephone Connection — Liability—Absence op Contract.</p> <p>A third party’s failure to secure connection with fire department through defendant’s telephone exchange hy using a telephone not contracted for by plaintiff does not render defendant liable for fire damage to plaintiff’s property.</p> <p>2. Judgment <§=>570(5) — Merger* and Bar — Nonsuit.</p> <p>A nonsuit upon insufficient evidence is not an adjudication, but allows plaintiff to sue again.</p>

<p>1. Railroads <§=>5%, New, vol. 6A Key-No. Series — Federal Control — Actions.</p> <p>Under Act Aug. 29, 1916, authorizing President to take over transportation systems, President’s proclamation of December 26, 1917, delegating control to Director General of Railroads, Federal Control Act, § 10 (Comp. St. 1918. § 3115s'! .1), and General Order No. 50 of Director General, a personal injury aciion commenced subsequent to General Order No. 50 on a cause of action occurring during federal operation may be maintained against Director General of Railroads.</p> <p>2. Master and Servant <S=»354 — Federal Employers’ Diability — Exclusiveness.</p> <p>The federal Employers’ Compensation Act (Comp. St. §§ 8932a-8982uu) does not provide an exclusive remedy, so as to preclude a railway mail clerk from maintaining a personal Injury negligence action against the Director General of Railroads.</p> <p>On Demurrer to Particular Counts of Answer.</p> <p>8. United States <§£=>125 — Suits Against — Federal Control.</p> <p>Under Act Aug. 29, 1916, authorizing President to take over transportation systems, President’s proclamation of December 26, 1917, delegating control to Director General of Railroads, Federal Control Act, § 10 (Comr>. St. 1918, § 3115%j), and Genera] Order No. 50 of Director General, directing that certain actions be brought against him, a personal injury action against the Director General is not precluded, upon the ground that it is a suit against the United States without its consent.</p> <p>4. Railroads <@=^>5% — Federal Control — Process.</p> <p>Under Act Aug. 29, 1916, President’s proclamation of December 26, 1917, Federal Control Act, § 10 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%j), and General Order No. 50 of the Director General, regulating federal operation and control of railroads, no process will issue on judgment against Director General which will interfere with his possession of railroad property committed to his control.</p>

In Bankruptcy. Proceeding against the Plawley Down Draft Furnace Company. On petition to review a decision of the referee denying the claim of the McClintic Marshall Company for priority in payment from the funds in the hands of the trustee.

<p>1. Subrogation <§=>28 — Necessity of Payment.</p> <p>A surety on a public contractor’s bond to pay materialmen and laborers is not entitled to be subrogated to the contractor’s rights to deferred payments due from city before paying the outstanding labor and material claims.</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations <§=>370 — Contract—Construction'—Payment for Work.</p> <p>A public construction contract, making part of the consideration payable within 90 days after completion of the work, operates, not only to secure the municipality against labor and material claims, but also as an indemnity to the contractor’s surety.</p> <p>3. Subrogation <§=>7(2) — Subrogation to Priority of Creditors.</p> <p>The surety on a public contractor’s bond conditioned to pay laborers and materialmen, as required by Laws Or. 1913, p. 59, has a right to indemnify itself from deferred payments due the city to the contractor, which is superior to the claims of the contractor’s assignees.</p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations <§=374(1) — Contracts—Surety on Contractor’s Bonds — Remedy Before Payment.</p> <p>A surety on a public contractor’s bond may, before paying laborers and materialmen, require that enough of the deferred payments due from the city to the contractor to indemnify the surety be held by the city pending adjustment of the surety’s liabilities and be not paid to the contractor’s assignees.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus by Edward A. Rumely against Thomas D. McCarthy, United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York, and Samuel D. Hitchcock, United States Commissioner.</p>

<p>Pleading <&wkey;52(2) — Complaint—Separate Statement of Causes of Action.</p> <p>Where a complaint sets forth in one cause of action facts which might be regarded as violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830) and the Clayton Act, held, that defendants were entitled to have the commingled causes of action separately stated; the alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act being different from the alleged violation of the Clayton Act.</p>

<p>1. Monopolies <&wkey;17(l) — Violations—Suekman Anti-Tiujst Act.</p> <p>The appointment by a manufacturing corporation of another corporation as its exclusive selling agent is not a violation of any right of third persons, under the common law or the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830).</p> <p>2. Monopolies <&wkey;17(2> — Sherman Antt-Tbtjst Act — Violations.</p> <p>The refusal of a manufacturer of automobile tires and accessories, who did not have a monopoly, to sell to dealers who would not maintain suggested prices, and sold to other dealers, and not merely to consumers, is not a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830).</p> <p>3. Monopolies &wkey;>17(l) — Violations—Clayton Act.</p> <p>For a manufacturer of automobile tires and accessories to sell its products to manufacturers of automobiles at a less price than it sold to dealers is not a violation of Clayton Act, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8835b), forbidding discrimination in price between different purchasers, where such discrimination may tend to lessen competition, or to create a monopoly; there apparently being no competition between the manufacturer and dealers.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Grace Keator, administratrix of Alexander Keator, deceased, against the Rock Plaster Manufacturing Company. On exceptions to libel.</p>

K.’ Seward Thomson, Judge. Action by the Clinton Mining & Mineral Company a corporation of the state of Iowa, against William W. Jamison, a citizen of the state of Pennsylvania. To reverse a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff brings error.

<p>Petition to Review and Revise an Order of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; Charles P. Orr, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the B. M. Stern Company, bankrupt. Petition by Samuel Rosenblum against William J. Uber, trustee, to review and revise an order of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania sustaining findings of the referee.</p>

Petition by Cecilia Mendez for declaration of heirship of her children, as acknowledged natural children of deceased. Victor P. Martinez y Gonzales intervened in opposition, and from a decree of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, affirming a judgment of the district court adverse to him, he appeals.

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.</p> <p>Petition by Pedro Angel Martinez y Mendez and another for appointment of an administrator, opposed by Victor P. Martinez y Gonzales. Decree of appointment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, and respondent appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Southern District of California; Oscar A. Triplet, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Globe Grain & Milling Company against the National Surety Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Taxation <&wkey;713 — Tax Sales — Redemption—Record of Receipt — Bona Fide Purchaser.</p> <p>Under Code W. Ya. 1913, c. 31, § 16 (sec. 1074), providing that, if the receipts on redemption from tax sale are not filed with the clerk of the' county court, the redemption is void as to assignees for valuable consideration without notice, the assignee of a tax purchase must show that he was a bona fide purchaser to entitle him to the land as against the former owner, who paid the amount required to redeem to the purchaser after the assignment, but did not file a receipt.</p> <p>2. Taxation <&wkey;725 — Tax Sales — Redemption After Assignment oe Certificate — Notice to Owner.</p> <p>The assignee of the purchaser of land at tax sale cannot defeat the owner’s redemption by payment to the purchaser, unless the owner had notice of the assignment.</p> <p>3. Taxation <&wkey;725 — Tax Sale — Redemption—Assignment—Delivery of Receipt.</p> <p>Since Code W. Va. 1913, c. 81 (secs. 1058-3112), gives a receipt for money paid at tax sale no greater significance than an ordinary receipt, and section 19 authorizes the execution of a tax deed without surrender of the receipt, redemption on payment to the original purchaser is not ineffective against an assignee, because the receipt had been surrendered to the assignee and was not demanded by the owner.</p> <p>4. Taxation <&wkey;698 — Redemption from Tax Sale — Statutes—Construction.</p> <p>Statute authorizing redemption by the owner of land sold for taxes must be liberally construed in the owner’s favor.</p> <p>Rritchard, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Shipping &wkey;>54 — Charter—Liability op Charterer.</p> <p>Where'a barge is chartered to a corporation for a fixed time, the corporation to have exclusive possession it becomes subject to the same liability as a bailee.</p> <p>2. Bailment <&wkey;14(l) — Liability- op Bailee por Hire — Loss op Goods.</p> <p>A bailee for hire is responsible only for ordinary diligence in the care of the property bailed, unless by his contract he has. expressly or by fair ■ implication assumed a greater responsibility, but where he has contracted absolutely to return the property, he is liable for the loss of the goods ' from any cause.</p> <p>3. Contracts <&wkey;303(l) — Excuse for Nonperformance — Difficulty.</p> <p>A party must perform his contract obligations, unless performance is rendered impossible by act of God, the law, or the other party; unforeseen' difficulties in performance being no excuse.</p> <p>4. Bailment <&wkey;14(l) — Liability of Bailee — Contract.</p> <p>An express provision, in a contract of bailment for hire, to keep the property safely, does not enlarge the common-law liability of the bailee, and does not male him an insurer for the safety of the article.</p> <p>5. Bailment <&wkey;ll — Construction of Contract.</p> <p>The provisions of a contract of bailment should not be enlarged beyond their plain meaning to impose further liability upon the bailee.</p> <p>6. Shipping <&wkey;54 — Liability of Charterer — Injury to Vessel — Construction of Charter.</p> <p>Provision in the charter of a barge that the barge was to be returned in the same condition as received with usual wear and tear does not render the charterer liable as insurer, or enlarge his common-law liability as bailee to use ordinary care to preserve the barge.</p> <p>7. Shipping <&wkey;54 — Liability of Charterer — Injury to Vessel — Acts of God.</p> <p>The charterer of a barge under a charter which did not enlarge his common-law liability is not liable for injuries to the barge, occasioned by the acts of God, or of another person, for whom the charterer was not liable.</p> <p>8. Shipping <&wkey;58(2) — Liability of Charterer — Injuries to Vessel — Wear and Tear — Presumptions.</p> <p>The presumption of want of care arising from .failure to deliver a barge in as good order as it was received by charterer is rebutted, where the injury might have occurred through ordinary wear and tear, and the master testified that there was no fault in her navigation, nor any unusual occurrence, which would account for the damage.</p>

<p>1. Larceny <&wkey;32(2,9) — Indictment—Name op Owner.</p> <p>At common law, an indictment for larceny must charge that the thing stolen was the property of the actual owner, or of a person having a special property as bailee, from whom it was stolen, except that ownership might be charged to persons unknown to the grand jurors.</p> <p>2. Larceny &wkey;32(2>, 40(2) — Indictment—Ownership in United States.</p> <p>In a prosecution under Criminal Code, § 47 (Comp. St. § 10214), penalizing stealing property of the United States, the indictment must charge, and evidence must show, that the property belonged to the United States.</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;448(16) — Evidence—Conclusion—Ownership.</p> <p>A witness’ conclusion as to the ownership of property is admissible where only a question of fact is involved, but not when the ownership depends upon the legal effect of a transaction.</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <&wkey;448(16) — Evidence—Conclusion oe Law — Ownership.</p> <p>In a prosecution for stealing property of the United States, testimony that stolen sugar belonged to the United States, because it had been requisitioned under Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 10 (Comp. St. 1918, § SllS^ii), is inadmissible, because stating a conclusion of law.</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <&wkey;1169(9) — Harmless Error — Evidence.</p> <p>Error in admitting witness’ conclusion that the stolen property belonged -to the United States, because it had been requisitioned by the government, is not reversible error, if he was correct in his conclusion.</p> <p>6: Larceny <&wkey;7 — ‘Ownership of Property — “Property of United States.”</p> <p>Where the United States had requisitioned sugar as authorized by Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 10 (Comp. St. § 3115]4ii)> and the refiner had placed the specified quantity on a barge not under its control, the sugar became the “property of the United States,” within Criminal Code, § 47 (Comp. St. § 10214), penalizing persons stealing property of the United States.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Property of the United States.]</p> <p>7. Criminal Law ‘ <&wkey;1036(4) — Appeal—Reserving Grounds for Review-Evidence.</p> <p>The contention that requisition by the United States of certain sugar under Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 10 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%ii), had not been shown by the best evidence, cannot be made upon appeal, where not raised while testimony was being taken or during judge’s charge.</p> <p>8. Criminal Law <&wkey;1043(l) — Appeai>-Reservin& Grounds fob Review-Evidence.</p> <p>A request that a larceny indictment be dismissed for failure to show the stolen property belonged to the United States does not save the point that ownership was not established by competent evidence, where there is evidence in the record, either best or secondary, of ownership by the United States.</p>

<p>1. CONSPIRACY <&wkey;27 — ESSENTIALS—OVERT ACT.</p> <p>At common law, a conviction for conspiracy might be had without showing an overt act toward executing the conspiracy.</p> <p>2. Conspiracy <&wkey;27 — Overt Act.</p> <p>Under Cr. Code, § 37 (Comp. St. § 10201), it is necessary io prove, not only unlawful conspiracy, but that one or more of the parties did an act to effect its object.</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;680(I) — Conspiracy—Order op Proof.</p> <p>It is better practice to require evidence establishing a conspiracy before receiving evidence of overt acts to effect the conspiracy’s object.</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <&wkey;510 — Evidence of Accomplice — Corroboration.</p> <p>The uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, if straightforward and unequivocal, may sustain a conviction.</p> <p>5. Criminal Law <&wkey;780(l) — Instructions—1Testimony of Accomplice.</p> <p>Where a conviction is sought upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the court should clearly instruct the jury to exercise care and caution in accepting it.</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <&wkey;561(l) — Evidence—Reasonable Doubt.</p> <p>A conviction may be had only upon evidence showing accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.</p> <p>7. Conspiracy <&wkey;48 — Evidence—Directed Verdict.</p> <p>The unsupported testimony of an accomplice who contradicted himself and was discredited by his own testimony held to present no substantial evidence that defendant conspired with him to violate Cr. Code, § 37 (Comp. St. § 10201), by forging a document which should admit the prosecuting witness into the United States Military Academy without taking a mental examination, and motion to direct an acquittal should have been granted.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court .of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia; William T. Newman, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the Georgia Steel Company, bankrupt. Petition by the Trust Company of Georgia, trustee for the bondholders of the Georgia Steel Company, against Oscar T. Peeples, trustee for Georgia Steel Company, bankrupt. Decree for petitioner, and the bankruptcy trustee appeals.</p>

<p>1. SeameN &wkey;>24 — Wages—Recovery.</p> <p>Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322), authorizing seamen to collect half their wages at ports of call after voyage commences, provided demand be not made before expiration of five days, etc., authorizes demand two days after calling at port, where over five days had elapsed since commencing voyage.</p> <p>2. Seamen <&wkey;4 — Wages—Fobeiqn Seamen.</p> <p>Act March 4,1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322), empowering seamen to collect half their wages at ports of call, and providing section should apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in American harbors, is applicable to British seamen shipped on British vessel in British port, while vessel is in an American harbor.</p> <p>3. Seamen <&wkey;lo — Wages—Recovery in Amebican Posts — LegisiMtive Pow-eb — Foreign Contracts.</p> <p>Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322), empowering seamen to collect half their wages in American ports of call, is not invalid as rendering unenforceable in this country a wage contract lawfully made by foreigners in another country.</p> <p>4. Contracts <&wkey;101(l) — Validity.</p> <p>A contract may he valid and enforceable where executed, but unenforceable in another jurisdiction.</p> <p>5. Constitutional Raw <s&wkey;307- — Due Process — Denial oe Remedy — Seamen —Wage Contract.</p> <p>Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8822), empowering seamen to collect half their wages at American ports of call, does not unconstitutionally deprive a foreign vessel of contract rights without due process, because it renders unenforceable in American ports a. wage contract lawfully entered into abroad.</p>

<p>1. Charities <&wkey;36 — Devise to Free School — Charging Tuition Against NONRESIDENT.</p> <p>Any of the so-called “free” schools of a city, established under the public school laws of the state, for which Const. Ill. art. 8, § 1, and Hurd’s Rev. St. Ill. 1917, c. 122, § 127, call, satisfies a devise for support of “a school in said city the tuition of which school shall be free,” “such free school as said [city] council shall see fit,” though under section 115 tuition is required of nonresident pupils.</p> <p>2. Charities <&wkey;87 — Generar Charitable Intent — Cy Tres Doctrine.</p> <p>General charitable intent, making applicable the cy pres rule, were iithere no existing school to which the devise were applicable, held shown by devise for support of “a school” in a city, “the tuition of which shall be free,” “such free school as said [city] council shall see lit,” with declaration, “I have made the gift for the benefit of the young * * * and do not wish them to lose the benefit of the gift by the neglect of others.”</p> <p>3. Charities <&wkey;18 — Want of Trustee — Judicial Appointment.</p> <p>A charitable trust will not fail for want of a trustee, or inability of party named to act, but chancery will designate another trustee.</p> <p>4. Charities <&wkey;20(5) — Designation of Beneficiary by City.</p> <p>Even if a city cannot act as trustee of property devised for support of a school in the city, it may, as contemplated by the devise, designate the school to he supported.</p> <p>5. Charities <&wkey;38 — Perpetuities <&wkey;4(4) — Bequest in Charitable Gift.</p> <p>More request, in will making devise for support of a school in a city, that the city keep testator’s family burial lot in repair, imposes no obligation, much less creates a perpetuity, and so does not affect validity of charitable gift.</p> <p>8. Charities <&wkey;23 — Validity—Possibility of Misuse.</p> <p>A devise Cor support of a free school to be designated by a.city is not invalid, on the theory that it leaves the city free to designate a school whose teachings are contrary to public policy, as not only must it be presumed that it will properly discharge its duty, but, if it should fail therein, tlio courts could lend their aid.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas; Frank A. Youmans, Judge.</p> <p>Action by John M. Moore and others against the Coco-Cola Company. To review judgment for plaintiffs, defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Reformation of Instruments &wkey;>17(l) — Mistake—Interest in Land.</p> <p>A mutual mistake as to the interest of the grantor in the land is a mistake of fact, not of law, though induced by a mistaken view of the law.</p> <p>2. Reformation of Instruments <&wkey;>20 — Fraud of Orante® — Interest Conveyed.</p> <p>Where an Indian, who could not read English, mistakenly believed that he had only a one-half interest in the land conveyed, and was confirmed in that belief by statements of the grantee, equity will grant relief to the grantor from a deed conveying the entire estate.</p> <p>3. Reformation of Instruments <&wkey;>16 — Intent of Parties — Interest Conveyed.</p> <p>Where both parties to a deed believed that the grantor owned only a one-half interest in the land, and the grantee informed the grantor, who could not read English, that the deed conveyed only a one-half interest, the grantor is entitled to relief against the deed, which in terms conveyed the entire interest in the land.</p> <p>4. Equity <&wkey;262 — Motion for Judgment on Pleadings.</p> <p>Where a grantor is entitled to have a deed conveying a tract of land reformed, because of mutual mistakes and misrepresentations by the grantee, so as to convey only a one-half interest, a cross-bill in a suit to quiet the title by subsequent grantees, who were also grantees from the alleged husband of grantor’s daughter, alleging that the daughter was not legally married, so that the grantor inherited the entire interest, raised an issue of fact, and it was error to give judgment against him on the pleadings.</p> <p>5. Equity <&wkey;262 — Judgment on Pleadings.</p> <p>In a suit to quiet title, where the defendants filed a cross-bill to reform a deed, answers to the cross-bill, alleging plaintiffs to be bona fide purchasers, allege an affirmative defense, which must be proved, and do not entitle plaintiffs to judgment on the pleadings.</p> <p>Hook, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma; Ralph E. Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by Charles B. Shaffer against W. A. Aggers and others. Decree for complainant, and defendant Aggers appeals.</p>

<p>1. CRIMINAL Daw <&wkey;108(l) — Conspiracy—Venue—Overt Act.</p> <p>Tiie venue of conspiracy may be laid wherever an overt act is committed, under Criminal Code, § 37 (Comp. St. § 10201), making the commission of an overt act necessary to the offense, as well as at common law, though some of the indicted defendants were never in that district.</p> <p>2. District of Columbia &wkey;>4 — Application oe Criminal Code.</p> <p>The Criminal Code is a general act, and is coextensive with federal jurisdiction, unless otherwise specifically directed, and applies to the District of Columbia.</p> <p>3. Conspiracy <&wkey;28 — Violation oe Code oe District oe Columbia — “Often se Against Unítiod States.”</p> <p>A conspiracy to violate Code of Daw D. O. §§ 869a, 869b, enacted by Congress March 1, 1909, is a conspiracy to commit an offense against thc-Unifed States, within Criminal Code, § 37 (Comp. St. § 10201).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Offense against the United States.]</p> <p>4. Criminal Daw <&wkey;242(2) — Federal Practice — Removal oe Accused.</p> <p>Rev. St. | 1014 (Comp. Sc. § 1671), authorizing the removal of persons indicted for offenses to the district where trial is to be held, authorizes removal to the District of Columbia.</p>

Geiger, Judge. In the matter of Frank E. Walsh, bankrupt. From an order denying his application for discharge, the bankrupt appeals.

<p>In Error to the District Court oí the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma; John H. Cotteral, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by J. W. Agnew against the Interstate Compress Company. Judgment for plaintiff, which on error was reversed. 255 Fed. 508, - C. C. A. - — . On petition for rehearing.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit by the Stryker Deflector Company, Incorporated, against the Perrin Manufacturing Company, Nelson J. Quinn, E. L. Allen, and Asch & Co., Incorporated.</p> <p>This appeal comes here from a decree of the District Court for the Southern District of New York sustaining patent No. 1,148,128, for a deflector for electric lamps; patent granted July 27, 1915. Appellee is the assignor of the patent. It is designed for use in automobile headlights. Below, there was a decree for appellee sustaining the validity of the patent, finding infringement, and the decree provided for an injunction and an accounting. Defendants appeal.</p>

Suit by the General Electric Company against the Continental Fibre Company for infringement of patent. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. Action is upon claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of patent to Miller dated May 13, 1913, No. 1,001,770.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois. Proceedings between the Standard Scale & Supply Company and the Cropp Concrete Machinery Company and Andrew J. Cropp concerning patent rights. There was a decree in favor of the former as to one claim, and in favor of the latter as to other claims, and they both appeal.

Suit by Charles A. Geoghegan and others against Charles K. Ernst. Decree for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Appeal from decree in equity entered in the District Court for the Western District of New York. Action is upon claims, 1, 2, and 3 of patent to Rutan, dated February 1, 1916, No. 1,170,193. Of these claims the first is most general, and is as follows: “1.

<p>In Equity. Suit for infringement of patent by the Condron Company against the' Corrugated Bar Company.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Wire Rope Appliance Company against the Eureka Tool Company of Kansas. Decree for plaintiff. On motion to show cause why defendant and its president, Charles A. Towne, should not be punished for contempt.</p>

<p>1. Interpleader <@=>11 — Rights Which may be Subject op Interpleader— Trading With the Enemy Act.</p> <p>An American bank, indebted to a depositor, an American citizen, wliicli has been served with notice by the Alien Property Custodian that the deposit is the property of an alien enemy and required to pay the indebtedness to the custodian, where the depositor also claims it, may maintain a bill of interpleader in a federal District Court against the depositor and the custodian to have their respective rights determined.</p> <p>2. War <@=>12 — Trading with the Enemy — “Property.”</p> <p>The word “property,” as used-in Trading with the Enemy Act Oct. 6, 1917, § 7c (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%d), requiring money or property owing by, on account of, on behalf of, or for the benefit of enemies to be conveyed or paid over to the Alien Property Custodian, refers to a tangible res, or some evidence of debt, or share in property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Property.]</p> <p>3. War <@=>12 — Trading with the Enemy — “Money.”</p> <p>Where the relation of bank depositor and bank exists, an ordinary deposit is not “money,” within Trading with the Enemy Act Oct. 6, 1917, § 7c (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%d), requiring money or property owing by, on account of, on behalf of, or for the benefit of enemies to be conveyed or paid over to the Alien Property Custodian.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Money.]</p>

<p>Contracts <®=»10(4) — Mutuality.</p> <p>A contract by which defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff with such coal as should be ordered by him up to 25,000 tons per year, but which did not obligate plaintiff to purchase any quantity, held not enforceable by plaintiff for lack of mutuality.</p>

<p>Seamen <@^>21 — Wages and Effects — Desertion—What Law Governs.</p> <p>A British seaman, who had signed for a voyage on a British ship from England to the United States and return, and who deserted on arrival here before making any demand for wages, forfeited his right to wages and effects under the law of the United Kingdom, and he could not thereafter claim the benefits of Rev. St. § 4530 (Comp. St. § 8322), entitling a seaman to receive at each port half the wages earned, and to recover all wages earned if the master refused to pay the half on demand.</p>

<p>1. Telegraphs and Telephones <@=>26%, New, yol. 7A Key-No. Series — Regulation oe Rates — Power oe Postmaster General — “Police Regulations.”</p> <p>In Resolution July 16, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%x), authorizing the' President to assume control of the telephone and telegraph lines, provided that the existing police regulations of the several states should not be affected, which is the same proviso as used in Railroad Control Act March 21, 1918, c. 25, § 15 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115 %o) which act by section 10 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%j), gave the President power to increase rates with the consent of the Interstate Commerce Commission, “police regulations” is used in its narrow sense of regulations affecting the public safety, health, and morals, not in the broad sense of any regulation to. promote the general welfare, and does not include regulation of rates, so that the Postmaster General can Increase the rates without the consent of the state authorities.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Police Regulations.]</p> <p>2. Telegraphs and Telephones <@=>26%, New, vol. 7A Key-No. Series — Construction oe Resolution — War Measure.</p> <p>The resolution of July 16, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%x), authorizing the President to .assume control of telegraph and telephone lines, being a war measure, should be liberally construed.</p> <p>3. Statutes <@=>228 — Construction—Proviso.</p> <p>A proviso to a statute should be strictly construed.</p> <p>4. Telegraphs and Telephones <@=>26%, New, vol. 7A Key-No. Series — Discretion oe President — Control by Courts.</p> <p>The compensation to be paid the owners of telegraph and telephone lines was Intrusted to the discretion of the President by the resolution of July 16, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%x), authorizing him to assume control of such lines, and the Postmaster General, in making contracts therefor, acts for the President, and his decision cannot be questioned by the courts.</p>

<p>Suit for injunction by G. Ricordi & Co., Incorporated, against the Columbia Graphophone Company.</p>

<p>1. War <&wkey;l — Powers or Congress — Price of C'oai,.</p> <p>Act Cong. Aug. 10, 1917, c. 53, § 25 (Comp. St. 1.918, § 311514 Q), authorizing the President to fix the maximum prico for coal and to make it an offense to demand more than the price fixed, is a measure necessary for (he efficient prosecution of war and within the constitutional powers of 'Congress, though it imposes restrictions which in time of peace might be unlawful.</p> <p>2. Conspiracy <&wkey;43(5) — Indictment—Description op Object.</p> <p>An indictment under Act Cong. Aug. 10, .1917, c. 53, § 25 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%q), authorizing the fixing of the price of coal by the President, which charges that defendants with full knowledge that the price had been fixed conspired to demand a greater price with allegation of overt acts, is sufficient, though an indictment for the specific offense would have had to allege both the price fixed and the price demanded.</p> <p>3. Conspiracy <&wkey;>43(5) — Indictment—Overt Acts.</p> <p>An indictment for conspiracy need not allege in what manner the overt acts tended to effect the purpose of the conspiracy, it being sufficient to allege that the overt acts were done to effect the object of the conspiracy.</p> <p>4. Conspiracy <&wkey;43(6) — Indictment—Requisite.</p> <p>An indictment for conspiracy, -which sets forth the names of the conspirators and alleges that the conspiracy was to commit an offense against the United States, the nature of the offense, the time and place, and tlio overt acts committed to execute the conspiracy, is sufficient.</p>

<p>1. Status <&wkey;l — Congressional Powers — Powers Remaining in States.</p> <p>Suppressing disorderly houses, etc., ordinarily comes under the police power reserved to the states by Const. U. S. Amend. 10, and is not within the legislative power of Congress, except in timo o£ war or other great public peril.</p> <p>2. Was &wkey;>33 — Termination.</p> <p>The President’s declaration to Congress that the war ended on November 11, 1918, will be accepted as prima facie correct until events show the contrary, so that Act Cong. May 18, 1917, § 13 (Comp. St. 1918, § 2019b), authorizing the suppression of disorderly houses around encampments ‘‘during the present war,” is inapplicable to an offense committed after November 11, 1918.</p> <p>3. Evidence <&wkey;83(l) — Presumptions—Presidential Declaration.</p> <p>All citizens may bo presumed to have been informed of, and to have relied on, the President’s declaration to Congress that the war ended November 11, 1918.</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <&wkey;905, 906 — New Trial — Motion in Arrest — Termination or War.</p> <p>Since events may subsequently prove the President’s declaration to Congress that the war ended November 11, 1918, to be inaccurate, one convicted of violating in December, 1918, Act May 18, 1917, § 13 (Comp. St. 19L8, § 2019b), authorizing suppression of certain disorderly houses “during tho present war,” will be granted a new trial, instead of arresting judgment.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Daniel Cauffiel against Rachel Jackson Lawrence. On petition of the United States to be substituted as complain- . ant.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Eibel by Arthur Hopwood, master of the steamship Tambov, against the steamer tugs Pickwick and M. Mitchell Davis.</p>

<p>1. JUDGMENT <&wkey;585(2) — COLLUSIVENESS—MATTERS CONCLUDED — “ILLEGAL Mining.”</p> <p>Where plaintiff’s right to damages caused by defendant’s illegal mining under her lot has been adjudicated in an action brought therefor, she cannot bring another suit for failure to afford her property lateral support, since term “illegal mining” in first suit covered damages both from removing vertical and lateral support.</p> <p>2. Judgment <&wkey;713(2) — Collusiveness—Matters Concluded.</p> <p>A judgment is conclusive upon the merits of every question raised, or which could have been raised, in the proceeding.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas; W. R. Smith, Judge.</p> <p>Severo Sotello was convicted of transporting munitions of war for export, and brings error</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United. States for the Southern District of Mississippi; Henry C. Niles, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by J. B, Sullivan against the Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Western District of Washington;- Jeremiah Neterer, Judge. Morris Pass was convicted of having violated the Selective Service Daw, and he brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Western District of Washington; Jeremiah Net-erer, Judge.</p> <p>Joseph Pass was convicted of having violated the Selective Service Raw, and lie brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska; Joseph W. Woodrough, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by the Union Pacific Railroad Company against the American Smelting & Refining Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. 1</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota; Charles E. Amidon, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by Alson Blodgett, Jr., against Ida M. Caldwell, executrix of the will of W. A. Caldwell, deceased. Judgment for plain-, tiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;>369(l) — -Violation or Espionage Act — Evidence!—Other Offenses.</p> <p>On trial of a defendant for violation of the Espionage Act (Comp. St. 1918, §§ 10-212a-10212h), by making false reports and doing other acts with intent to interfere, with the prosecution of the war, it was prejudicial error to admit evidence of threats made by him against the President, not connected with the acts with which he was charged.</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;721i4(l) — Trial—Argument of Counsel.</p> <p>Argument by a district attorney to the jury, based upon his state- ■ ment that no friend of defendant or citizen had appeared to testify in his behalf, or objected to his prosecution, evidence of which, if offered, would have been Incompetent, held, improper.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas; Jacob Trieber, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Dora McCray against the West Helena Consolidated Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error, and plaintiff also brings error, from the order refusing a new trial, if plaintiff should remit $4,000 from the verdict.</p>

Petition to Revise Order of and Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Petition by Louis R. Hammerslough for reclamation of certain property from Ezra P. Prentice, as receiver in bankruptcy of Clarence C. Perpall. Order for claimant, and said receiver brings a petition to revise and also appeals.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana; George W. Jack, Judge. Suit by Hubbard Bros. & Co. and others against the Southern Pacific Company and the Liquidators of the Ouachita National Bank and Monroe National Bank. The liquidators of the Ouachita National Bank and the Southern Pacific Company file cross-bills.

<p>1.' Exceptions, Bill of <&wkey;36(l) — Time for Presenting — Statute—Canal Zone.</p> <p>The provision of Panama Canal Act Aug. 24, 1912, that the appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals on appeals from the District Court of the Canal Zone may be exercised in the same manner, as nearly as practicable, as in reviewing judgments of the District Courts of the United States, shows that the earlier provision of the same section, that existing laws of the Canal Zone should be applicable to practice in new • courts, was not intended to make applicable to appeals to the Circuit Court of Appeals Code Civ. Proc. Canal Zone, § 136, requiring bills of exception for review by the Supreme Court of the Canal Zone to be presented to trial court within 10 days.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error &wkey;709 — Costs <&wkey;108 — Security—Discretion of Court —Record—Evidence.</p> <p>The executive order of August 14, 1914, relating to the Canal Zone, that plaintiff in any suit may be required to give security for costs, does not require such security whenever moved for by defendant, but confers on the court discretion to exercise the power, and his denial of a motion to compel a resident plaintiff to give security will not be reversed, where the record does not contain the evidence on the hearing of the motion.</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error <&wkey;684(2) — Discretion of Trial Court — Motion for Continuance.</p> <p>The overruling of a motion for a second continuance will not be reversed, where the evidence, if any, adduced on the hearing, is not in the record, so that there is no showing that the ruling was improper.</p> <p>4. Railroads <&wkey;5y2, New. vol. 6A Key-No. Series — Liability for Torts— Government as Stockholder.</p> <p>Since Act June 25, 1910, Act Aug. 24, 1912, § 6 (Comp. St. § 10042), and other statutes and regulations and rulings, indicate an intention to preserve the corporate existence of the Panama Railroad Company, though the government owns all its stock, that corporation may be sued by a private individual for injuries caused by the negligence of its employés.</p> <p>5. Corporations &wkey;>491 — Liability for Torts — Ultra Vires Act.</p> <p>A corporation cannot escape liability for negligent conduct of a business in which it engages, by showing that it was not authorized to carry on that business.</p> <p>6. RAILROADS <&wkey;281(l) — Injuries to Third Person — Negligence oe Employes.</p> <p>Evidence that employes of the Panama Railroad Company oiled the floor of a commissary operated by it, so as to make it dangerously slippery, as a result of which a. customer was injured, establishes negligence for which the corporation was liable, under the law of the Canal Zone.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the Canal Zone; Wm. H. Jackson, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Evelina Robert against the Panama Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi; Henry C. Niles, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Board of Commissioners of the Muddy Bottom Swamp Land District No. 1, Tippah County, Miss., against the Equitable Surety Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Homicide ©=3.300(1) — Instructions—Sbilf-Defense,--Evidence.</p> <p>The killing being when deceased was standing inoffensive and unarmed, in peaceful conversation with third person, submission in instruction of issue of self-defense, even under rule of apparent danger, is not required, on evidence merely that deceased, who had a bad reputation for peace and quietness, had recently threatened defendant’s life, and had his hand in his pocket, where it remained till he was shot.</p> <p>2. Homicide ©=253(1) — Murder in First Degree — Malice Aforethought— Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence in homicide case held to warrant finding of capacity to form, and of forming, deliberate and malicious intent to kill, necessary for murder in first degree.</p> <p>3. Homicide ©=22(1), 28 — Responsibility—Intoxication—Mental Condition.</p> <p>Abnormal mental and nervous condition, during recovery from spree, of one committing homicide, does not serve to excuse or lower the degree of his offense, provided he was capable of knowing right from wrong, and had will power to do right and abstain from wrong, and capacity to form the deliberate and malicious intent necessary for first degree murder.</p> <p>4. Courts ©=337 — Federal Courts — Following State Practice — Criminal Procedure.</p> <p>The federal courts in criminal procedure do not follow the practice of the courts of the states in which they sit.</p> <p>5. Courts ©=337 — Procedure of State Courts — Documentary Evidence-Authentication .</p> <p>Provision of Rev. .St. § 906 (Comp. St. § 1520), authorizing use in federal courts of authenticated documents from state courts and offices, that they shall have such faith and credit given them as they have by law or custom in the courts or offices of the state, is not an adoption of the rules of practice, under the state’s law, as to the preliminaries necessary for their introduction, as length of time of filing before trial and notice to adverse party.</p> <p>6. Criminal Law ©=1213 — Cruel and Unusual Punishment — Grievance with Yerdtct.</p> <p>Grievance, on which is bottomed complaint that infliction of sentence of life imprisonment l’or a murder committed while defendant was in an abnormal mental condition is a cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Constitution, is not with the sentence, but with the verdict of first degree murder.</p> <p>7. Indictment and Information ©=110(17) — Murder—Feloniously.</p> <p>Indictment for murder need not use the word “feloniously”; it not being used in Pen. Code, §§ 273, 274 (Comp. St. §§ 10446, 10447), creating the offense, and defining murder, its two degrees, and manslaughter.</p>

<p>1. Poisons <§==>9 — Violation of Narcotic Act — Averment of Character of Drugs.</p> <p>An indictment charging violation of the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), which averred that defendant at the time of the offense knew that cocaine was a derivative of coca leaves, and that morphine and heroin were salts and derivatives of opium, sufficiently averred by implication the fact that cocaine was a derivative of such leaves, and that morphine and heroin are salts or derivatives of opium.</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <§=>1186(4) — Indictment—Appeal—Harmless Imperfections.</p> <p>In view of Rev. St. § 1025 (Comp. St. § 1691), imperfections in indictment for violating the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), in that it did not aver that cocaine is a derivative of coca leaves, and that morphine or heroin are salts or derivatives of opium, held harmless imperfections, carrying no consequences.</p> <p>3. Indictment and Information <@=>111(1) — Harrison Narcotic Act — Failure to Avoid Exceptions of Act.</p> <p>Under Harrison Narcotic Act, § 8 (Comp. St. § 6287n), indictments charging violation of the act were not defective, because not averring facts showing defendants did not come within any of the exceptions of the act.</p> <p>4. Poisons @=>9 — Harrison Narcotic Act — Derivatives of Drugs — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>In prosecutions for violating and conspiracy to violate the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), evidence in one case held sufficient to show the drugs, cocaine, morphine, and heroin, are salts and certainly derivatives of coca leaves or opium, and, in the second case, sufficient to authorize submission of the issue to the jury.</p> <p>5. Criminal Law i§=>304(1) — Judicial Notice — Pacts of Chemistry.</p> <p>The courts take judicial notice of the facts of chemistry contained in tho United States Pharmacopoeia.</p> <p>6. Criminal Law @=>371(1) — Other Oefensks — Sale of Narcotics — Evidence —Intent.</p> <p>In prosecution of a physician for violating the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), order forms used by defendant to procure morphine from a druggist, other than the one with whom he was charged with having conspired and with having made a sale, were admissible on the issue of intent to furnish the drug to an addict, and not to aid or cure a patient in his practice as a physician.</p> <p>7. Cbiminai, Law <@=»472 — Harrison Narcotic Act — Expert Evidence.</p> <p>In prosecution' of physicians for violating the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), the testimony of qualified medical experts that the prescribing of the drug under stated quantities and circumstances would not be in the course of a physician’s regular practice was admissible, on the issue whether the drug was dispensed in the legitimate course of defendants’ practice as physicians.</p> <p>8. Conspiracy <§»48 — Harrison Narcotic Act — Guilt of Physicians — Question for Jury.</p> <p>In prosecutions of physicians for having conspired to violate the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), and having made sales illegally, question whether or not each defendant had conspired with a druggist, a codefendant, to dispense the drug in the guise of prescriptions to patients, but really to addicts for the gratification of their appetite, and not for their cure, held for the jury under the evidence.</p> <p>9. Poisons <S=9 — Harrison Narcotic Act — Prosecution oe Physicians— Questions for Jury.</p> <p>In prosecution of physicians for sale of drugs in violation of Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), whether dispensing of drug in each ease was a dispensing of it by a physician to a patient, in which case no order form was required, or whether the form of prescription was used by defendants as an evasion of the law, and not in good faith, in which ease the dispensing would be a sale, and an order form necessary to bring it within the law, held for the jury.</p> <p>10. Poisons <S=>9 — Harrison Narcotic Act — Character of Drug Users— Knowledge of Physicians — Questions for Jury.</p> <p>In prosecution of physicians for having violated the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), whether two persons were consumers of the drug and not patients of defendants, and whether defendants, and the druggist on whom they issued prescriptions, their codefendant, knew the true character in which such persons sought to procure drugs, held for the jury.</p> <p>11. Criminal Law <S=>1177 — Harmless Error — Establishment of One of Two Counts — Sentence.</p> <p>If either count of indictments for having violated and having conspired to violate the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q) was established, defendants have no just complaint; the sentence imposed having been within the maximum prescribed for the offense charged in either count.-</p> <p>12. Poisons <5^9 — Harrison Narcotic Act — Eaith of Physicians — Submission of Issue.</p> <p>In prosecution of physicians for having violated and conspired to violate the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), the trial court in his general charge properly submitted an issue as to the good faith of defendants in issuing their prescriptions to supposed patients, since the defendants could only protect themselves if the prescriptions were issued legitimately in their practice.</p>

<p>Appeal, from the District Court of the United States for the El Paso Division of the Western District of Texas; William R. Smith, Judge.</p> <p>Information against the Morris Dand & Cattle "Company for forfeiture of cattle, wherein J. J. Kilpatrick, Jr., and others, appeared and filed answer to the information, claiming the cattle, or, in lieu thereof, recovery of an appraised value from the company. From a judgment for the interveners, the Cattle Company appeals.</p>

Bill by the United States against the Economy Eight & Power Company. From a decree in favor'of the plaintiff, defendant appeals.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District Court of Rhode Island; Arthur E. Brown, Judge.</p> <p>Joseph M. Coldwell.was convicted of violating the Espionage Act, and he brings error.</p>

Abraham Goldstein was convicted of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor to soldiers in uniform, and he brings error. Writ of error to review sentence .pronounced upon the defendant, who was found guilty upon three counts of an indictment charging him with unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor to soldiers in uniform.

Action by H. W. Herbert, as administrator of the goods and estate of John R. Little, against James H. Hustis, as receiver of the Boston & Maine Railroad. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>1. Bankruptcy c&wkey;3S7 — Attachment Liens — Effect of Confirmation of Composition.</p> <p>In view of Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, §§ 67c, 67f, 70f (Comp. St. §§ 9651, 9651), confirmation of an offer of composition by bankrupt debtor prior to any adjudication in bankruptcy dissolved liens of attachment placed within four months of the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, under section 14e (section 9598).</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;391(3) — Restraining Proceedings in State Courts.</p> <p>Tlie District Court in bankruptcy has jurisdiction to issue an order slaying, until adjudication or until dismissal of the petition for adjudication of bankruptcy, proceedings in actions in state courts in which attachment liad been placed upon the bankrupt’s property within four months prior to commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.</p>

<p>1. Equity @=>66 — Maxims—Seeking and .Doing Equity.</p> <p>One is not entitled to the aid of a court of equity for the enforcement of any right he may have, unless he is ready and willing to do equity.</p> <p>2. Injunction @=>108 — Condition Precedent — Payment oe Debt to Defendant.</p> <p>The owner of a capsized vessel, which has gone aground, is not entitled to an injunction to restrain a creditor having a lien on it from saving it, where he has not, by pleading or otherwise, offered to pay the debt owing to the creditor, or to do equity, even though the creditor has no legal right •to save the vessel.</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error @=>843(2) — Matters Review able — Moot Questions.</p> <p>On appeal from an order granting an injunction, the question of the propriety of the issuance of an injunction will not be reviewed, where the injunction is no longer effective.</p> <p>4. Trial @=>11(3) — Transfer of Cause.</p> <p>In a suit for injunction, where plaintiff was denied relief on the ground that he refused to do equity, court should not have dismissed the bill, under equity rule 22 (198 Fed. xxiv, 115 C. C. A. xxiv), but should have ■transferred the cause to the law side of the court, where a state of facts was alleged which, if proved and not rebutted, would entitle the plaintiff to some relief in an action at law.</p>

<p>Bribery <®=5ll — Conspiracy <§=»47 — Bribery oe United States Omtcek— Stiet-tciency ot? Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence held insufficient to sustain a conviction of one of two defendants jointly indicted for bribery of a post office clerk and of conspiracy to commit such offense, but sufficient to sustain the conviction oí his codefendant of the former offense.</p>

<p>1. Costs <S=>70 — Determination as to Items.</p> <p>Until final judgment, incidence of costs is not determinable, and any attempt to adjudicate correctness of items at the instance of one party might be futile, and hence the court need not adjudicate the correctness of ’loins prior to final judgment.</p> <p>2. Costs <S=»2~■Taxable Cost3.</p> <p>Taxable costs are made so either by statute, rulo of court, or order of court in a specific case, or by established usage, equivalent of a rule.</p> <p>3. Costs <@=>251 — Premiums Paid for Appeal Bond.</p> <p>There being no statute, rule of court, order of court, or established usage requiring it, a District Judge did not err in disallowing a premium paid for an appeal bond to be taxed as costs.</p>

Reed, Judge. Suit in equity by the First Trust Company, as trustee, against the Crooked Creek Railroad & Coal Company, in which the Illinois Central Railroad Company, the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, and the Northern Pacific Railway Company separately intervened. From the decree for interveners, complainant appealed. Reversed in part (252 Fed. 965,-C. C. A. -), and interveners petition for rehearing.

Bourquin, Judge. Petition for writ of habeas corpus by John Napore against James PI. Rowe and others, members of the Focal Draft Board of Butte, Mont., John K. O’Rourke, Sheriff of Silver Bow County, Mont., and the United States, a party affected by the decision.

'. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Canal" Zone; William H. Jackson, Judge. Suit by Tomas Reina against Beatriz Bracho and others. Bill dismissed, and complainant appeals.

Jackson, Judge. Action by Noel Pigott, a minor, by his guardian ad litem, George Morrell, against the Panama Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Foster, Judge. Habeas corpus proceeding by the United States, on the relation of Madamoiselle Eaure Jobin, against John P. Mayo, Commissioner of Immigration, and the United States of America. From an order directing that the relator, an alien, be released from custody by the Commissioner of Immigration, defendants appeal.

<p>Bankruptcy <®=»345 — Peiobity—Agreements.</p> <p>Where a president of a bankrupt corporation advanced money to the corporation to enable it to carry through a composition agreement, president stating in a circular letter to the creditors, “To effect the settlement, $2,500 in cash, which is no part of the assets of the corporation, has been put up to guarantee the first payment,” the agreement being intended to give to the settlement creditors priority in any liquidation of the assets, the agreed subordination of the rights of such lender to those of other creditors will be enforced.</p>

<p>Criminal Law <@=5423(4) — Evidence—Acts op Coconspirator.</p> <p>Where a conspiracy has been shown, the act of one conspirator in furtherance of the common purpose is admissible in evidence against all; and this is so, though the conspirator committing the act was not a defendant in the case being tried.</p>

<p>Maritime Ennis <§=>25 — Executory Contract^-Services.</p> <p>Act June 23, 1910, § 1 (Comp. St. § 7783), giving maritime liens to persons furnishing certain services to vessels, does not authorize a libel in rem against a vessel for breaching an entirely executory contract to remove her cargo.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of South Carolina, at Greenville; Joseph T. Johnson, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Eouise Finley. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Collision <§=339 — Steam Vessels Meeting — Grossing Signals.</p> <p>Decree, holding one of two meeting steamships solely in fault for a collision for crossing and failing to comply with the proper signal of the other for passing port to port, affirmed.</p>

. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois. Bill by the Eureka Smokeless Furnace Company against the Foltz Smokeless Furnace Company and Ira W. Foltz. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

<p>In Equity. Suit by Samuel M. Kintner and Halsey M. Barrett, receivers of the National Electric Signaling Company, against the Hoch-Frequenz-Mascliinen Aktien-Gesellschaft fur Drahtlose Telegraphie, impleaded with Emil E. Mayer. On motion for an order extending defendants’ time to answer until after the cessation of hostilities and the reopening of communication between the United States and the German Empire.</p>

<p>1. Seamen <&wkey;29(5) — Purchase op Vessels by United States — Exemption prom Legal Liability — Statute.</p> <p>Under Comp. St. § 8146e, the Shipping Board Act, § 9, merchant vessels when employed solely .as such, gain, no exemption from ordinary legal liabilities, as for injuries to a seaman, because of any interest which the United States may have in them through their purchase by the Shipping Board and registry in the name of the United States.</p> <p>2. Evidence <&wkey;48 — Judicial Notice — Requisitioned Shipping.</p> <p>It is a matter of common knowledge that a gréat part of the shipping of the country has been requisitioned by the Shipping Board.</p> <p>3. Admiralty <&wkey;43 — Areest op Government Vessel.</p> <p>A government vessel is exempt from arrest</p> <p>4. Seamen >&wkey;29(5) — Libel por Injury — Exemption oi^-Ahrest op Vessel-Burden op Proof.</p> <p>On libel against a steamer purchased by the Shipping Board and registered in the name of the United States, pursuant to Shipping Board Act, § 9 (Comp. St. § 8146e), to recover for personal injuries sustained by a seaman, libelant has the burden to establish that the vessel came within the excepted class of government vessels subject to arrest; that is, those in mercantile employment.</p> <p>5. Admiralty &wkey;s43 — Exemption op Vessel prom Abrest — Employment in Mercantile Service.</p> <p>A steamship purchased by the Shipping Board and registered in the name of the United States pursuant to Shipping Board Act, § 9 (Comp. St. § 8146e), while proceeding from the Great Lakes to New York, via Montreal and Halifax, “for entering upon the public service of the United States,” was not employed solely as a merchant vessel, and was entitled to claim exemption from arrest as a government vessel.</p>

<p>CARRIERS <&wkey;37 — Carriage op Live Stock — Penalties—Violation of Regulations.</p> <p>A carrier, which delivered a shipment of hogs at the proper place according to the car tickets before the time to unload under the Twenty-Eight Hour Law (Act June 29, 1906 [C'omp. St. §§ 5159^5161]), which shipment the consignees refused to accept, because the car tickets made by a connecting carrier did not agree with the bills of lading, which called for delivery at another point, so that the time for unloading had expired before the shipment could be redelivered, and further delay was occasioned by the refusal of another connecting .carrier to accept shipment after government inspector had ordered it unloaded for rest and feed, there was no willful disobedience of the act, or even negligence, and the carrier is not liable for the penalty.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of George Graham Rice, bankrupt. On motion by bankrupt’s receiver that the post office authorities turn over to him certain mail of the bankrupt, or that he be allowed access to it.

<p>BANKRUPTCY &wkey;>23é — -EXAMINATION OF BANKRUPT-CONTRACTS OF TRUSTEE.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Act, § 21a (Comp. St. § 9605), authorizing examinations before the referee “concerning the acts, conduct and property of the bankrupt,” is inapplicable to an examination concerning an alleged contract regarding the bankrupt’s property, made, not by the bankrupt, but by the trustee In bankruptcy.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Joseph Perlmutter and Harry Perlmutter, individually and as copartners trading as “Perlmutters” and “The Quality Shop,” bankrupts. • On petition to review order of a referee allowing, as entitled to priority, the claim of the city of Jersey City in the sum of $3,035.60.

<p>1. Bankruptcy <@=>414(3) — Discharge—Acts Preventing — Fraudulent Credit and Transfer or Property — Degree of Proof.</p> <p>. The acts referred to in Bankruptcy Act, § 14b, els. 3, 4 (Comp. St. § 9598), ■ commission of which works denial of the bankrupt’s discharge, are civil in their nature, and do not require for their establishment evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; a clear preponderance of the evidence being sufficient to prove them.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <@=>414(1) — Discharge—Fraudulently Obtained Credit-Presumption of Intent.</p> <p>A member of a firm of tradesmen which subsequently became bankrupt is presumed to have intended the effect his statement of the financial condition of the firm produced upon a lender to it; the lender having a right to assume the statement was true.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <@=>407(5) — Discharge—Loan Fraudulently Obtained — Pri-ma Facie Case. ■ ’</p> <p>When creditors, objecting to the discharge of a bankrupt, showed that his statement of his firm’s financial condition, presented to a lender to induce the loan, was imtrue in a material respect, that the bankrupts had obtained money on its credit, and that its untruthfulness related to a subject within the knowledge of the bankrupt, who gave currency to the untruth, they made a prima facie case disentitling him to discharge. .</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy <@=>414(1) — Discharge—Loan Fraudulently Obtained — Presumption of Intent — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Where creditors, objecting to a bankrupt’s discharge, had established facts from which was presumed his intent to deceive in issuing to a lender to the firm a statement of assets, tbe burden to remove such presumption was on tbe bankrupt</p> <p>5. Bankruptcy <§=414(8) — Discharge—Doan Fraudulently Obtained — Sufficiency oe Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence held to show that a bankrupt, applying for discharge, in issuing a false statement of the financial condition of his firm to a lender, intended to and did deceive the lender, so that, under Bankruptcy Act, § 14b, cl. 3 (C'omp. St. § 9398), discharge must be denied.</p> <p>6. Bankruptcy <§=408(3) — Deniai, oe Discharge — -Concealment oe Assets— Intent.</p> <p>A discharge in bankruptcy must be denied the bankrupt, under Bankruptcy Act, § 14b, cl. 4 (Comp. St. § 9598), for having concealed assets, even though no intent to defraud be proved; it being sufficient if the intent to hinder and delay creditors existed.</p> <p>7. Bankruptcy <g=414(l) — Denial oe Discharge — Concealment oe Assets— PRESUMPTION.</p> <p>The effect of a bankrupt’s withdrawal of assets from his insolvent firm being to hinder and delay the creditors in securing payment of their debts, in the absence of contrary proof on his application for discharge, objected to by creditors, it is io be presumed that the withdrawal was so ini ended.</p> <p>8. Bankruptcy <§=114(1) — Denial oe Discharge — Withdrawal oe Assets— Primv Facie Case — Burden oe Proof.</p> <p>When' creditors, objecting to a bankrupt’s discharge, made a prima facie case of unlawful abstraction of his firm’s funds by him, within Bankruptcy Act, § 14b, cl. 4 (Comp. St. § 9598), the burden shifted to him to overcome the case so made.</p> <p>9. Bankruptcy <®=<U4(3) — Denial oe Discharge — Withdrawal oe Assets— Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence of a bankrupt on creditors’ objections to his discharge held insufficient to meet the burden to overcome the prima facie case made by the creditors by proof that he withdrew funds from his insolvent firm when the appointment of a receiver was imminent.</p>

In Equity. Bill by Percy A. Atherton and others, tiustees in bankruptcy, against Nathaniel P. Beaman, to obtain certain lumber in possession or custody of a storage company, and seeking an injunction against the defendant, who had taken action to prevent the delivery of the lumber to the trustees.

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the American Steel Supply Syndicate, Incorporated, Bankrupt. On petition of the Dalton Adding Machine Company for reclamation..</p>

At Law. Action by Emilio Matarazzo, as administrator of Raffelo Matarazzo, deceased, against James H. Hustis, as receiver of the Boston & Maine Railroad. On motion by the plaintiff to remand the case from the state court, from which it was removed by defendant.

<p>In Admiralty. Petition of the Cornell Steamboat Company, as owner of the steam tug Ice King, for limitation of its liability, in which the Morris & Cumings Dredging Company intervened, claiming damages for injuries to two barges occasioned by the negligent navigation of the tug, and the Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Company, intervened to recover salvage against one of the barges.</p>

In Bankruptcy. Proceeding against George A. Campion, Sr., and others, as individuals and as copartners of the firm of Campion & Sons. On review of a decision of a referee awarding a fund of about $1,217 to the trustee as against the claim of the William Klein Company under a chattel mortgage.

In Bankruptcy. Involuntary proceedings against the J. F. Growe Construction Company. On application for confirmation of the report of Edwin A. King, as special master, finding that claimant, the Trus-con Steel Company, formerly the Trussed Concrete Steel Company, was entitled to certain property as against both the trustee in bankruptcy and William C. Vrooman, adverse claimant.

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Louis Mardenfeld, an individual,, trading as Mardenfeld & Grossman, bankrupt. Motion to confirm the report of Hon. James A. Van Voast, as special master,, and return of order to show cause why the above-named bankrupt, Louis Mardenfeld, should not bo punished for contempt for neglecting ana failing on demand to pay over to Tilomas 1!.

<p>In Equity. Suits by the Muscatine Righting Company against the City of Muscatine, by the Ft. Madison Gaslight Company against the City of Ft. Madison and others, by the Iowa Gas & Electric Company against the City of Mt. Pleasant and others, by the Southern Iowa Electric Company against the City of Chariton, and by the Iowa Electric Company against the City of Eairfield. Recommendation that confiscatory character of rates be stipulated before entry of order.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the A. G. Morse Company against the Walter M. Eowney Company.</p>

<p>1. Trade-Marks AND Trade-Names &wkey;57, 70(1) — Infringement-Test.</p> <p>Whether there is infringement of trade-mark or unfair competition is to be determined by taking the trade-mark, labels, and dress as a whole, and determining whether the resemblances so far dominate the differences in appearance, sound, and dress as to be likely to deceive the average, ordinary, and unwary customer.</p> <p>2. Trade-Marks awd Trade-Names &wkey;59(5) — Infringement— Similarity of Name and Dress,</p> <p>The name “Virginia Dare,’’ as a trade-mark for a wine, held infringed by the name “Virginette,” used for wine of similar color and taste, in connection with bottles, caps, and labels ah purposely made similar in appearance.</p> <p>3. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <&wkey;93(l) — Infringement—Unfair Com- ' petition.</p> <p>The burden rests on a later comer in an established held to show that it exercised a proper degree of care to so differentiate its product as to avoid deception of purchasers by retail dealers.</p> <p>4. Trade-Marks and Tradis-Names &wkey;86 — 'Suit for Infringement— Laches.</p> <p>Complainant in a suit for infringement of trade-mark and unfair competition held not barred by limitation or ladies of the right to relief by injunction and accounting.</p>

<p>1. Vendor and Pur.cuasmr <S=76, 130(1) — Construction of Contract.</p> <p>Contract for the sale and purchase of land held to entitle the purchaser to a marketable title, and to make the acts of Anal payment and conveyance concurrent.</p> <p>2. Punr.xc Rands <@=114(5) — Oregon Donation Rands--Perfecting of Titee After Death of Settler.</p> <p>A settler on public land in Oregon held, on the evidence, to have completed his residence to entitle him to patent prior to his death in 1855, so that under the statute the land was subject to sale by his administrator for payment of his debts, in proper proceedings, although patent was subsequently issued to his heirs at law.</p> <p>3. Executors and Administrators <@=337 — Sale of Rands — Notice to He rus.</p> <p>Where the statute required notice to the heirs at law of an intestate decedent of proceedings to subject his real estate to payment of his debts, a proceeding and sale on published notice “to whom it may concern,” although the heirs were named in the petition, held void, and the defect not curable by retroactive legislation.</p> <p>4. Partnership <@=>252 — Partnership Administration — Partnership Rands.</p> <p>Under R. O. R. § 1168, the administrator of a partnership estate has power to sell lands owned by the partnership for the payment of partnership debts, although the title is in the names of the individual members.</p> <p>5. Executors and Administrators <@=378 — Sale of Rand — Irregularities in Proceedings — Curative Statute.</p> <p>Mere irregularities in proceedings by an administrator for the sale of land, which do not affect substantial rights of the heirs, may be remedied by curative legislation.</p> <p>6. Vendor and Purchaser <@=>117, 122 — Rescission of Contract by Purchaser — Condition Precedent.</p> <p>A party is not permitted to rescind a contract for the purchase of realty, and at the same time keep possession of all or any part, of the laud bargained for, but must proffer its return, so as to put the vendor .ta, statu quo.</p> <p>7. Vendor and Purchaser <@==>117 — Rescission of Contract by Purchaser-Tender of Possession.</p> <p>A tender of a deed by a purchaser to the vendor of land is not equivalent to a tender of possession for the purpose of a rescission.</p> <p>8. Quieting Title <@=>12(1) — Vendor and Purchaser <@=>144(1) — Contract of Sale — Title of Vendor.</p> <p>Decree, in a suit by a ^endor of land under contract to convey on full payment of the price, brought while the purchaser was in possession, and quieting the title in plaintiff, held, sufficient to render the title marketable within the terms of his contract.</p> <p>9. Vendor and Purchaser'<@=>144(2) — Suit to Foreclose Contract — Defective Title.</p> <p>Where the vendor brings suit to foreclose a contract for the sale of land, in which defendant pleads defective title, when time is not of the essence of the contract, or delay has been the fault of the defendant, complainant may clear up defects in the title at any time before final decree.</p>

<p>Internal Revenue &wkey;>25 — Adulterated Butter — Finding oe Facts by Department — Review.</p> <p>Under Act Hay 9, 1902, § 4 (Comp. St. 1916, § 5978), imposing a special tax on manufacturers of adulterated butter, the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, pursuant to Act Aug. 2, 1886, § 14 (Comp. St. 1916, § 6226), that a substance is adulterated butter, where no unfairness or irregularity is charged, is conclusive, and not reviewable by the courts.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Wilson-Nobles-Barr Company, a corporation, bankrupt. On petition to reclaim property alleged to have been sold to bankrupts through fraudulent representations. From an order of the referee requiring return of the goods or payment therefor, the trustees petition for review.

Action by Webster D. Griffith against the Alois Aufrichtig Copper & Sheet Iron Manufacturing Company. On motion to vacate attachment and increase security given by plaintiff on obtaining same.

In Admiralty. Libel by M. P. Howlett, owner of the steam tug John J. Howlett, against the Norwegian steamship Admiralen and cargo. Hearing on libel, answer, and proofs. Finding for libelant.

Criminal prosecution by the United States against Harry Krichman. On motion by defendant for new trial. This is a motion for a new trial upon conviction by the defendant upon three counts of an indictment, which alleged that he attempted to bribe a baggage porter employed by the Director General of Railways at the Pennsylvania Terminal, New York.

Libel by Sebastian Gonzales and others against the Powell Barges Nos. 5 and 7, to which an answer was filed seeking to make the Bran-nock Lumber Company and the Southern Fuel & Material Company parties to the case. Or; motion of the Southern Fuel & Material Company to quash process.

<p>1. Quieting Title <&wkey;7(l> —Cloud on Title.</p> <p>Tho recording of a sheriff’s certificate for sale of land under execution on a judgment against a third person would constitute a cloud upon title, and would authorize a suit to quiet title as against such cloud.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;387 — Discharge op Bankrupt — Judgment Lien.</p> <p>A discharge of a bankrupt, after adjudication of bankruptcy by a composition, does not discharge a lien of a judgment rendered more than four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <&wkey;387 — Compositions with Creditors — Judgment Liens—</p> <p>“Discharge.”</p> <p>Under Bankruptcy Act, §§ 12a, lie (Comp. St. §§ 9596, 9598), providing that the confirmation of a composition shall discharge the bankrupt from Ms debts other than those “not affected by a discharge,” the lien of a judgment obtained more than four months prior to tho filing of a petition in bankruptcy was not discharged by a composition with creditors prior to adjudication of bankruptcy; the word “discharge,” in the phrase “not affected by a discharge,” in the last-named section, referring to a discharge of the bankrupt after adjudication.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Discharge.]</p>

<p>Puooioss &wkey;sl20 — Service—Privilege.</p> <p>Service on the chief executive officer of a fraternal order resident in another state, while temporarily in the state of service to give testimony In an action against the order, held void, despite the officer’s incidental attendance at a business conference between the secretary of the investment board of the order and a third person, which did not constitute other and independent business on the part of the officer than that of attending as a witness.</p>

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Oscar J. Lynch.</p>

<p>Sai.iís t&wkey;456 — “Conditional Sai.e” — What Constitutes.</p> <p>An agreement that motors might be rented at a stipulated monthly sum for an indefinite period, and that, if purchased, the first three months’ rent should be applied on their purchase price held, not a “conditional sale,” withiii Rem. & Bal. St. Wash. § 3070, malting unrecorded conditional sales of personalty absolute as to subsequent creditors in good faith, etc.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Conditional Sale.]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Now Jersey; John Relistab, Judge. libel by A. W. Tidwell against the Allanwildo Transport Corporation. A decree for libelant (247 Fed. 236) was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified certain questions to the federal Supreme Court; the questions being answered in 248 U. S. 377, 39 Sup. Ct. 147, 63 L. Ed. • — .</p>

libel by the Vacuum Oil Company against the Allanwildo Transport Corporation. A decree for libelant (247 Fed. 236) was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified certain questions to the federal Supreme Court, which were answered in 248 U. S. 377, 39 Sup. Ct. 147, 63 L. Ed.-.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. Suit by Paul T. Brady against the South Shore Traction Company. From an order and decree of the District Court, A. H. Flint & Co. appeal.</p>

Appeals from Hie District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore; John C. Rose, Judge. Suits for collision by the Consolidation Coastwise Company, the Consolidation Coal Company, and James Ressler against the Merchants’ & Miners’ Transportation Company, and by the Merchants’ & Miners’ Transportation Company against the Consolidation Coastwise Company.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the-United States for the Western District of Tennessee;</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio; D. C. Westenhaver, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States ior the Western District of Michigan; Clarence W. Sessions, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United Slates for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error i:o the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky; Andrew M. j. Cochran, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of New York. Aeiion by Cecil A. Burleigh against the International Harvester Company of America for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan; Arthur J. Tuttle, Judge.</p>

<p>Petition for Writ of Mandamus.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio; D. C. Westenhaver, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. Criminal prosecution by the United States against Lena Miller. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio; D. C. Westenhaver, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. Criminal prosecution by the United States against John Rudolf. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio; D. C. Westenhaver, Judge.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of tlie United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee; Edward T. Sanford, Judge.</p>

<p>Petition for Writ of Mandamus.</p>

<p>Petition for Writ of Prohibition.</p>

<p>lAppeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio; John M. KiUits, Judge.</p>

<p>Petition for Writ of Mandamus.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from the 'District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Autopiano Company against the Otto Higel Company, Incorporated. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.</p>