246
Submitted July 9, 2019, affirmed April 1, 2020
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
COLBY LEE POSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Coos County Circuit Court
17CR50877; A166797
463 P3d 551
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for failure to report as a sex
offender, ORS 163A.040(3)(a). He assigns error to the trial court’s denial of a
motion to suppress evidence of that charge, arguing that police discovered the
evidence during an unlawful traffic stop. An officer had pulled defendant over
for failure to obey the traffic control device of a stop sign, ORS 811.265 and ORS
811.260(15), after observing defendant stop his car with the front tires resting
on the stop line and the front of the car extending beyond it. Defendant contends
that, because the statute only requires a driver to stop “at” the line, and not
before it, the officer lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop as Article I,
section 9, of the Oregon Constitution requires. Held: The stop-sign provision of
ORS 811.260 requires vehicles to cease movement before crossing over the stop
line.
Affirmed.
Martin E. Stone, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Brett J. Allin, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and
James, Judge.
DeVORE, J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 303 Or App 246 (2020) 247
DeVORE, J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for
failure to report as a sex offender, ORS 163A.040(3)(a). He
assigns error to the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence related to that charge, arguing that police
discovered the evidence during an unlawful traffic stop. An
officer had pulled defendant over for failure to obey a stop
sign, ORS 811.265 and ORS 811.260(15), after observing
defendant stop his car with the front tires on the stop line.
Defendant contends that, because the statute only requires
a driver to stop “at” the line, and not before it, the officer
lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop as Article I,
section 9, of the Oregon Constitution requires.1 We conclude that the stop-sign provision unambiguously requires
vehicles to cease movement before crossing the stop line.
Accordingly, we affirm.
We review the trial court’s legal conclusions regarding a motion to suppress for errors of law. State v. Ehly, 317
Or 66, 75,
854 P2d 421 (1993). The facts relevant to this
case are undisputed. Oregon State Trooper James Jarrell
was driving on the highway when he began driving behind
defendant’s car. Jarrell observed defendant turn off of the
highway and commit what Jarrell believed to be multiple
traffic infractions. Jarrell followed defendant. Soon after, the
vehicles approached a stop sign. Defendant stopped with the
front tires of his car on the stop line and the front of the car’s
body over it. Jarrell believed defendant had failed to obey a
traffic control device, ORS 811.265 and ORS 811.260(15).2
He pulled defendant over and, during the stop, discovered
evidence of the crime of failing to report as a sex offender.
Based on that evidence, the state charged defendant with failing to report as a sex offender. Defendant filed
a motion to suppress evidence related to that charge, arguing that the underlying traffic stop which led to its discovery
1
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in relevant part,
that “[n]o law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure.”
2
Jarrell also stopped defendant for another possible infraction. Because we
conclude that the officer had probable cause, at the very least, to stop defendant
for failing to stop at the stop sign, we need not address whether the officer otherwise had probable cause under the other statutes.
248 State v. Posey
was unconstitutional. Defendant asserted that the traffic
stop was an unlawful seizure under Article I, section 9, of
the Oregon Constitution because Jarrell lacked probable
cause to justify it, and that the evidence obtained during
that stop was therefore inadmissible. The state countered
that Jarrell had probable cause to believe that defendant
failed to obey the stop sign when defendant’s vehicle crossed
over the stop line before ceasing movement. The trial court
agreed with the state on that issue and denied defendant’s
motion. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea which
preserved his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling on his
motion to suppress.
Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s denial
of his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during
the traffic stop. He renews his argument that Jarrell lacked
probable cause to permit the stop in the first instance.
Defendant and the state disagree as to whether what Jarrell
observed could constitute a violation of failure to obey a traffic control device, ORS 811.265. Specifically, the dispute centers around the question of what ORS 811.260(15) requires
of drivers at stop signs, and whether defendant met those
requirements.
Oregon law makes it an offense when a driver
“fails to obey any specific traffic control device described
in ORS 811.260 in the manner required by that section.”
ORS 811.265(1)(b). That cross-referenced statute, in turn,
provides,
“Stop signs. A driver approaching a stop sign shall stop
at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering
the marked crosswalk on the near side of the intersection
or, if there is no marked crosswalk, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view
of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before
entering it.”
ORS 811.260(15). Defendant highlights that ORS 811.260(15)
only requires the driver to stop “at” the clearly marked
stop line. He argues that the dictionary defines the word
“at” as “presence in, on, or near,” and thus, consistent with
the word’s plain meaning, the car stopped “at” the stop line
when it stopped on or near the line. Defendant claims that,
Cite as 303 Or App 246 (2020) 249
if the legislature intended to require a driver to stop before
the stop line, it would have explicitly stated so, and that the
use of the word “at” illustrates the intention to “grant some
leeway” to drivers. As a result, he concludes, he abided by
the statute when he stopped with his vehicle’s tires on the
stop line.
The state responds that a driver violates ORS
811.260(15) when the front of his vehicle passes the stop line
before coming to a halt. The state argues that, if the word
“at” meant near, the definition would be too vague to meaningfully follow or enforce, or to achieve the Oregon Vehicle
Code’s stated purpose of providing “maximum safety for all
persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of
this state” under ORS 801.020(11). The state contends that
the context of the statute shows that the word “at” cannot
mean near. It notes that the word is used in connection with
a line “that is otherwise drawn in very precise terms.” The
state explains that the statute provides three scenarios
involving a stop sign: (1) a marked stop line, (2) a marked
crosswalk with no marked stop line, and (3) no marked stop
line or crosswalk. The state argues that the law operates
similarly in each instance and that, because it requires
a vehicle to stop “before entering” the intersection in the
other scenarios, it requires the same when the stop line is
marked. Accordingly, the state concludes, a violation occurs
if any part of the vehicle enters the area past the stop line,
and therefore defendant violated the law.
The parties’ arguments raise a question of statutory construction. We must discern what the legislature
meant by the phrase “at a clearly marked stop line” (emphasis added). When determining the meaning of the statute,
we give the greatest weight to its text and context. See State
v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73,
206 P3d 1042 (2009) (outlining
the methodology). We may also look, as necessary, to pertinent legislative history.
Id.
In this case, the text, when considered in the context of the entire statutory provision, demonstrates that
the state’s view is correct. See Hale v. Klemp, 220 Or App
27, 32,
184 P3d 1185 (2008) (“When we examine the text
of the statute, we always do so in context, which includes,
250 State v. Posey
among other things, other provisions of which the disputed
provision is a part.”). The meaning of the word “at” is clarified by reference to other words in the same sentence. See
Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, Inc.,
359 Or 694, 702,
375
P3d 463 (2016) (discussing noscitur a sociis textual canon
and noting that “[i]t is a familiar rule that the meaning of
words in a statute may be clarified or confirmed by reference to other words in the same sentence or provision”); see
also Johnson v. Gibson,
358 Or 624, 629-30,
369 P3d 1151
(2016) (“[T]he meaning of an unclear word may be clarified
by the meaning of other words used in the same context.”).
That sentence explains what it means to obey a stop sign.
It offers multiple methods for determining where the stopping point is, depending on the road markings. All explain
the same requirement: stopping at the stop sign. In addition to stopping “at a clearly marked stop line,” the sentence
explains, obeying the stop sign means ceasing movement
“before entering” the area beyond the line, whether that
line is marked (crosswalk) or unmarked (intersecting roadway). The legislature likely intended stopping “at” a marked
stop line to have the same meaning as stopping otherwise
described in the same sentence, that is, “before entering”
the area beyond that line.
The legislative history of ORS 811.260(15) also suggests that the requirements for obeying stop signs are uniform, regardless of road markings. Notably, it indicates that
the legislature intended to create one line at which drivers
must stop and that the line that it established was one upon
which vehicles could not encroach. Lawmakers enacted the
stop-sign statute in 1975, as part of a broader motor vehicle code revision. See Or Laws 1975, ch 451, § 37 (enacting
ORS 487.255, repealed by Or Laws 1983, ch 338, § 978).3
The drafters of that provision recognized that Oregon was
among a minority of states that had no law setting out where
to stop at a stop sign. Tape Recording, Joint Committee
on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Revision, Oregon Vehicle
Code Preliminary Draft No. 1, Feb 6, 1974, Tape 8, Side 1
(Statement of Marion Embick, Research Counsel). They
wanted to create “a clearly delineated line” at which vehicles
3
The provision became ORS 811.260 in 1983, after a subsequent reorganization of the motor vehicle code. Or Laws 1983, ch 338, § 609.
Cite as 303 Or App 246 (2020) 251
must stop, as well as to articulate the ways that drivers could
find that line.4
Id. Thus, the stop-sign provision’s main goal
was to establish a clear and precise expectation for where
drivers must stop. Although the provision included multiple
methods for ascertaining that stopping point, the drafters
expressed no intention of varying the stopping point itself.
The drafters also indicated an intention to apply
a standard to stop lines similar to that for crosswalks
and intersecting roadways. They cited with approval the
Suggested Uniform Traffic Ordinance, prepared in cooperation with the League of Oregon Cities, acknowledging it
as a contribution to the stop-sign law. Id. That suggested
ordinance stated:
“Where a stop sign is erected at or near the entrance to
an intersection, the operator of a vehicle approaching shall
run the vehicle to a stop before crossing the stop line or
crosswalk or, if none, then before entering the intersection.”
Id. (emphasis added). That discussion suggests that, although
the stop-sign provision only tells drivers to cease movement
“before entering” crosswalks or intersecting roadways, the
drafters likewise envisioned that drivers would cease movement before crossing stop lines.
In sum, we conclude that the stop-sign provision
imposes the same requirement on drivers at stop signs
regardless of the marking on the road; vehicles must cease
movement before proceeding to the area beyond the stop line,
crosswalk, or intersecting roadway. When Jarrell observed
defendant’s vehicle cross over the stop line before coming to
a halt, he had probable cause to believe that defendant had
committed the traffic infraction of failing to obey the traffic
control device of a stop sign. The officer’s traffic stop was
4
To that end, the drafters adopted the language of the Uniform Vehicle Code,
which nearly mirrors today’s statute. Section 11-403 of the Uniform Vehicle Code
provided:
“[E]very driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly
marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side
of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting
roadway before entering it.”
Commentary to Preliminary Draft No. 1, Part I, Article 4, Joint Committee on
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Revision, Oregon Vehicle Code, Feb 6, 1974.
252 State v. Posey
lawful under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.
For that reason, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered during that
stop.
Affirmed.
