Mann v. State

FINAL COPY
                   S19A1256. MANN v. THE STATE.


      BENHAM, Justice.

      David Mann, Jr., was convicted of malice murder and two

counts of first degree cruelty to children in connection with the death

of seven-year-old Ethan Martinez.1 Following the trial court’s denial

of his motion for new trial, Mann appeals, arguing that the evidence



      1 The crimes occurred on September 18, 2012, and Ethan died as a result

of his injuries on September 21, 2012. On December 7, 2012, a Newton County
grand jury indicted Mann for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
predicated on aggravated battery — family violence (Count 2), felony murder
predicated on cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 3), aggravated
battery — family violence (rendering Ethan’s brain useless by throwing his
body to the ground) (Count 4), cruelty to children in the first degree (throwing
Ethan to the ground) (Count 5), cruelty to children in the first degree (grabbing
and squeezing Ethan’s penis) (Count 6), and cruelty to children in the first
degree (hitting Ethan on his back and buttocks) (Count 7). At a trial held from
September 29 to October 2, 2014, a jury found Mann guilty of all counts. The
trial court sentenced Mann as follows: life in prison on Count 1; 20 years on
Count 6 (to be served consecutively to the life sentence); and 20 years on Count
7 (to be served consecutively to the other sentences). The remaining counts
were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. On March
22, 2018, Mann moved the trial court for leave to file an out-of-time motion for
new trial; the trial court granted the motion on that same day. Also on March
22, 2018, Mann filed a motion for new trial, which he amended twice. Following
a hearing, the trial court denied Mann’s motion for new trial (as amended) on
February 19, 2019. Mann filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and this case
was docketed to the August 2019 term and thereafter submitted for a decision
on the briefs.
was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court

committed reversible error in multiple instances; and that he was

denied the effective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that

his claims are meritless, we affirm.

     Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence

presented below established as follows. In September 2012, Mann

lived in a Newton County home with his fiancée, Dora Martinez, and

her son, Ethan. On the morning of September 18, Dora woke early

to dress Ethan, who was well and behaving normally when she left

the house for work around 6:30 a.m. Shortly after 7:00 a.m., Mann

placed a 911 call and reported that Ethan was unresponsive and

vomiting and had soiled himself.

     When first responders arrived, they found Ethan surrounded

by a pool of vomit and unconscious but breathing. Ethan had signs

of a head injury and had urinated and defecated on himself. Mann

indicated to first responders that, two days earlier, Ethan had fallen

from a playset and hit his head. Ethan was transported to the

Newton County Medical Center, where a nurse observed a large

                                   2
hematoma on the back of his head, bruising to his buttocks, and

abrasions on his arms. A CT scan showed bleeding along the side of

Ethan’s brain, as well as brain swelling. Ethan was then transported

to Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta, where he was admitted with a

traumatic brain injury. His other injuries included a circumferential

bruise to his penis and scrotum, a bruised back, elevated liver

enzymes, and retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes. Doctors eventually

confirmed brain death, and Ethan was taken off life support on

September 21.

     Before Ethan was declared brain dead, Mann was driven by a

relative to the Newton County Sheriff’s Office for an interview. After

ending the initial interview by requesting counsel, Mann was taken

into custody on charges of cruelty to children and aggravated

battery. During the booking process, Mann completed an inmate

request form, indicating that he wanted to speak with officers again.

During the second interview, Mann admitted to officers that he had

“whooped” Ethan after learning that Ethan had not completed his

homework. Using a doll, Mann demonstrated how he had “scooped

                                  3
up” and held Ethan over his shoulder while spanking him; Mann

also indicated that he may have inadvertently hit Ethan on the back

during the spanking. According to Mann, he spanked Ethan “less

than ten times” but admitted that he was “very strong and . . . didn’t

hit [Ethan] soft.” Mann also admitted that, after he finished

spanking Ethan, he “squeezed” Ethan between the legs because he

“was mad”; he assumed that this squeezing caused the penile

bruising. Mann said that he then “picked [Ethan] up in the air . . .

[and] tried to throw him on the bed” but missed the bed and Ethan

hit the ground. Mann reported that the back of Ethan’s head hit the

ground and then “his body like lifted up. Like he lifted his stomach

up, like he was having a seizure or something.”

     At trial, Ethan’s pediatrician testified that she saw Ethan for

a regularly scheduled check-up on September 17, the day before the

incident. She conducted a head-to-toe exam and observed no injuries

anywhere on Ethan’s head or body. Ethan’s school principal testified

that no incident reports were on file indicating that Ethan had fallen

on the school playground. Other school officials testified that Ethan

                                  4
told them he was afraid to go home because Mann would get mad,

yell at him, hit and choke him, and “make him run.” Ethan had

explained to them that Mann’s rage stemmed from Ethan’s inability

to do his homework on his own.

     The State also presented the testimony of four of Ethan’s

treating physicians, including a pediatric intensive care unit

physician, a pediatric neurosurgeon, and a child-abuse pediatrician.

These physicians all testified that Ethan’s brain injury was not

consistent with a fall from either a playset or a bed and that his

injuries were more consistent with, in the words of one physician,

“something that would allow more high energy, such as car accidents

or some severe trauma.” The physicians also agreed that Ethan’s

injuries would have been inflicted within hours, not days, of the

onset of his symptoms. As to the penile bruising, the child-abuse

pediatrician testified that, because the bruising circled the entire

base of the penis, it resulted from the penis being squeezed; the

medical examiner’s testimony echoed this conclusion. Both the child-

abuse pediatrician and the medical examiner testified that the

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bruising on Ethan’s buttocks was clearly a hand-slap mark. The

medical examiner testified that Ethan’s cause of death was blunt-

force head trauma.

      1. Mann asserts that the evidence presented against him at

trial was insufficient to support his convictions.2 He also claims that

the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict. We

apply the same standard of review to both claims: “whether the

evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable

to the verdicts, was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the

appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which

he was convicted.” Virger v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2019). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (

, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). The evidence recounted above, including

Mann’s inculpatory statements in which he admitted to causing


      2 Mann also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for felony murder

predicated on aggravated battery — family violence (Count 2), felony murder
predicated on cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 3), aggravated
battery — family violence (rendering Ethan’s brain useless by throwing his
body to the ground) (Count 4), and cruelty to children in the first degree
(throwing Ethan to the ground) (Count 5). However, Mann was not sentenced
on any of these counts, and, accordingly, these claims are moot. See, e.g., Mills
v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2010).
                                       6
Ethan’s injuries, to squeezing Ethan between the legs, and to hitting

Ethan on his back and buttocks, was clearly sufficient to support

Mann’s convictions. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying

Mann’s motion for a directed verdict

     2. Mann contends that the trial court committed reversible

error in five respects. We address each in turn.

     (a) Mann first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to

give his requested charge on the affirmative defense of accident

because, he says, he indicated during his interrogation that he

intended to throw Ethan on the bed rather than on the ground.

According to Mann, that statement constitutes the slight evidence

necessary to authorize a jury instruction on accident. See

Wainwright v. State, 

 (5) (

) (2019) (“[T]o

authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be slight

evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). As an initial matter, “[c]laims by a defendant

that he ‘didn’t mean to do it’ and ‘it was an accident’ are insufficient

without more to authorize a charge on accident.” (Citation and

                                   7
punctuation omitted.) Mills v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2010). However, “[e]ven if the evidence presented authorized

the requested charge, the failure to give a requested charge which is

authorized by the evidence can be harmless error. The inquiry is

whether it is highly probable that the error contributed to the

verdict.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Reddick v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2017).

     The evidence demonstrated that Ethan suffered devastating

injuries, including bruising to his genitals, bruising to his body,

retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes, bleeding and swelling in the

brain, and ultimately brain death as a result of Mann’s intentional

acts of beating, squeezing, and throwing Ethan.            Given this

evidence, the jury likely would have discounted any reliance on

accident. Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury’s

finding that Mann acted with malice, which is inconsistent with the

defense of accident and his claim that he acted without criminal

intent. See Thomas v. State, 

 (2) (

)

(2015). Accordingly, any error by the trial court in failing to instruct

                                   8
the jury on the law of accident was harmless.

        (b) Mann also asserts that the trial court erred by denying his

requested jury charge on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser

included offense of both malice murder and felony murder. Georgia

law provides that “[a] person commits the offense of involuntary

manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes

the death of another human being without any intention to do so by

the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.” (Emphasis

supplied.) OCGA § 16-5-3 (a).

        Mann asserts that, because he told investigators that he did

not intend for Ethan to hit the floor, his act of throwing Ethan could

constitute either simple battery, see OCGA § 16-5-23 (a) (2), or

reckless conduct, see OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), both misdemeanors. Mann

again contends that this statement was sufficient to require the trial

court     to   give   his   requested   jury   charge   on   involuntary

manslaughter. See 

        Again, assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court

erred, we conclude that any error was harmless. Because the State

                                    9
played the admitted portions of Mann’s custodial statements for the

jury, the jury was aware of Mann’s claims that he intended only to

throw Ethan on the bed and that Ethan’s injuries were inflicted

unintentionally. However, Mann’s admissions reflect that he threw

Ethan in the course of an angry encounter, that he beat the child,

and that he squeezed Ethan’s penis. The jury also heard testimony

from multiple medical experts that Ethan’s injuries could only have

been inflicted by “significant tremendous forces that were applied to

[his] head” and were consistent with Ethan’s being picked up and

slammed to the ground. There was extensive evidence before the

jury that Ethan’s injuries were inflicted intentionally and that his

death was intentional. Indeed, the jury found as much because it

returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of malice murder. See

Bonman v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2016)

(holding   that   trial   court’s   refusal   to   charge   involuntary

manslaughter as a lesser included offense was harmless error where

the jury, by finding appellant guilty of malice murder, necessarily

found that he intended to kill the victim). Accordingly, it is highly

                                    10
probable that any error in refusing Mann’s requested charge on

involuntary manslaughter did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.

See Rogers v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2011)

(“[T]he jury, by also finding appellant guilty of malice murder, made

an additional, specific finding that [a]ppellant intended the victim’s

killing. In light of these circumstances, it is highly probable that the

trial court’s refusal to give a charge on involuntary manslaughter

did not contribute to the verdict.” (punctuation omitted) (quoting

Rhode v. State, 

 (10) (c) (

) (2001))).

     (c) Mann also contends that the trial court erred when it did

not suppress incriminating custodial statements that he made to

law enforcement. Specifically, Mann contends that his statements

were involuntary and inadmissible under OCGA § 24-8-824 because

they were induced by a “hope of benefit.”

     Under Georgia law, a confession is admissible where it was

“made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the

slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” OCGA § 24-8-

824. “This Court has consistently interpreted the phrase ‘slightest

                                  11
hope of benefit’ not in the colloquial sense, but as it is understood in

the context within the statute, focusing on promises related to

reduced criminal punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges,

or no charges at all.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Price v.

State, 

 (2) (

) (2019). The trial court

concluded that the video-recorded statements were voluntarily

made and, thus, were admissible; we review that decision de novo.

See Benton v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2017)

(recognizing that “where controlling facts are not in dispute, such as

those facts discernible from a videotape, our review [of a trial court’s

decision on a motion to suppress evidence of a defendant’s custodial

statement to investigators] is de novo” (citation and punctuation)).

      Mann was interviewed on September 20, 2012, beginning at

2:56 p.m., by Investigator Sharon Stewart and Lieutenant Tyrone

Oliver. Before beginning the interview, Investigator Stewart read

Mann the Miranda3 warnings; Mann thereafter signed a “Miranda



      3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (

, 16 LE2d 694)

(1966).
                                   12
Rights - Waiver Form” and agreed to speak with the investigators.

After approximately 20 minutes, Mann invoked his right to counsel;

Investigator Stewart and Lieutenant Oliver told Mann that Ethan

had woken up and had told investigators that Mann was responsible

for his injuries. The interview concluded, and Mann was taken to be

booked.

     Approximately 40 minutes after the first interview ended,

Mann reinitiated contact with Investigator Stewart and Lieutenant

Oliver via an inmate request form. Mann was returned to the

interview room, and Investigator Stewart again advised Mann of his

Miranda rights. Mann signed a second waiver form and again

expressed his desire to speak with the investigators. After being

asked by the investigators to “walk [them] through . . . what

happened,” Mann made his inculpatory statements but maintained

that Ethan’s injuries were unintentional: he confessed that he

“whooped” Ethan and then “threw him on the ground” but claimed

that his “intentions was [sic] to throw [Ethan] on the bed.” Later in

the interview, Mann asked the investigators whether they had lied

                                 13
to him during the first interview when they told him Ethan had

woken up. Both Investigator Stewart and Lieutenant Oliver denied

lying to Mann but refused to give him any further information about

Ethan’s state.

     On appeal, Mann argues only that the investigator’s

representations about Ethan’s medical condition and availability to

give a statement to law enforcement amounted to a hope of benefit,

in that Mann believed, based on those representations, that he

would not be charged with murder. To support his position, Mann

relies solely upon this Court’s decision in State v. Ritter, 

(1) (

) (1997). In Ritter, the interrogating officer told the

defendant that the victim would “be okay” except for “a bad

headache.” 

 (punctuation omitted). The investigator failed

to inform the defendant that the victim had, in fact, died and that

the interrogating officer had obtained a warrant for the defendant’s

arrest on charges of murder and armed robbery. And perhaps most

importantly, we concluded that the investigator’s “representation

regarding the victim’s state of health constituted an implied promise

                                  14
that Ritter could not be charged with murder if he gave a statement

to the police, but could only be charged with aggravated assault.” 

 (1).

      The facts of Mann’s case, however, are distinguishable from

those in Ritter.4 Here, though the interrogating officers falsely told

Mann that Ethan had woken up and told them that Mann caused

his injuries, the statement that Ethan was still alive was truthful;

indeed, Ethan was not declared dead until the day after Mann’s

confession, and investigators did not obtain a warrant for Mann’s

arrest on charges of murder until September 24.                   “It is well

established that artifice and deception do not render a statement

involuntary so long as they are not calculated to procure an untrue

statement.” Drake v. State, 

 (3) (

)

(2014) (no hope of benefit when officers represented to the defendant

that the deceased victim had survived the shooting). Throughout

the interview, the officers exhorted Mann to be honest with them


      4 We have serious doubts as to whether Ritter was rightly decided;
however, because there are sufficient distinctions between Ritter and this case,
we are not concerned that Ritter controls here.
                                      15
and to tell them the truth about what happened on the morning

Ethan sustained his injuries. See Reed v. State, 

, ___ (2)

(a) (___ SE2d ___) (2019) (“[E]xhortations or encouragement to tell

the truth and comments conveying the seriousness of a suspect’s

situation do not render his subsequent statements involuntary.”).

     Additionally, unlike the defendant in Ritter, Mann seemed to

place little, if any, reliance on the statements regarding Ethan’s

health and simply wanted to explain that Ethan’s death was an

accident. Mann continued to express his disbelief of their earlier

statements regarding Ethan’s improvement and asked the

investigators numerous times whether they were being truthful

with him. He also stated that he did not “want [Ethan] laying [in the

hospital] about to die” and that he had administered CPR on Ethan

to “try to save his life,” indicating that he was aware of the severity

of Ethan’s injuries, regardless of what the investigators told him.

Accordingly, there is no merit to Mann’s contention that his second

statement was involuntary as being induced by a hope of benefit.

     (d) Mann contends that the trial court erred by denying his

                                  16
motion for a continuance. Again, his claim is without merit.

     In June 2014, Mann retained new trial counsel and was

granted a continuance to afford his new counsel time to prepare for

trial. Mann filed a second motion to continue in September 2014.

The trial court held a hearing on this motion on September 24, 2014,

during which trial counsel argued that he required another

continuance to secure an expert to rebut the testimony of the State’s

medical witnesses in support of Mann’s accident defense. Trial

counsel also noted that he, counsel, had been retained in June 2014

and had only recently obtained Mann’s file from prior counsel. The

trial court indicated that, because the trial would not start for

several days and because the State would not rest for several days

longer, Mann had time to secure a witness. The State indicated that,

so long as it had the expert’s opinion 24 hours before the expert

would testify, it would not object to the expert’s testifying. The trial

did not begin until September 29, and the State did not rest until

October 2.

     “In considering a motion for continuance, the trial court enjoys

                                  17
broad discretion and may grant or refuse the motion as the ends of

justice may require.” (Punctuation omitted.) Phoenix v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2018) (quoting OCGA § 17-8-22).

To obtain a new trial based upon the denial of a motion for a

continuance, an appellant must show not only a clear abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion but

also that he was harmed by that denial. Id. Mann has not met this

burden.

     Our review of the record shows that the trial court considered

several factors before denying Mann’s motion: that it had granted

Mann’s prior motion for a continuance, that Mann’s counsel had not

previously apprised the trial court of any difficulties he encountered

while preparing for trial, and that one of the State’s witnesses

rescheduled surgery in order to be available for the September trial

date. Given these facts, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Mann’s motion for continuance. See Phoenix,

 (2). See also Terrell v. State, 

(2) (

) (2018) (“[T]rial judges necessarily require a great

                                 18
deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems

is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same

time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for

compelling reasons.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

     (e) In his final claim of trial court error, Mann challenges the

admission of post-autopsy photographs. The photographs at issue

depict a vertical incision extending the length of Ethan’s chest,

which was made to harvest Ethan’s organs for donation. Relying

only upon our decisions in Brown v. State, 

 (

) (1983), and McClure v. State, 

 (

)

(2004), Mann claims that the “gruesome” photographs were

“prejudicial and inflammatory.”

     As an initial matter, we note that, although Mann objected to

some of the photographs he now challenges, he did not object to all

of them, and the basis on which he challenged the photographs at

trial is not the same basis on which he now challenges the




                                  19
photographs on appeal.5 We therefore review his appellate claim for

plain error only. See Thompson v. State, 

 (6) (

) (2018). See also OCGA § 24-1-103 (d). To establish plain

error,

     [Mann] must point to an error that was not affirmatively
     waived, the error must have been clear and not open to
     reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his
     substantial rights, and the error must have seriously
     affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
     judicial proceedings. To show that the error affected his
     substantial rights, [Mann] is required to show that error
     probably affected the outcome of his trial.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bozzie v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2017). See also State v. Kelly, 290 Ga 29 (

) (2011).

     In Brown, this Court held that “[a] photograph which depicts

the victim after autopsy incisions are made or after the state of the

body is changed by authorities or the pathologist will not be

admissible unless necessary to show some material fact which

becomes apparent only because of the autopsy.” 

 (5).


     5 At trial, counsel argued that the photographs were inadmissible under

OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403.
                                    20
We applied this rule in later cases, including McClure. However,

because Mann’s trial occurred in 2014, it was governed by the new

Evidence Code. As we recently explained, “the rule in Brown is no

doubt abrogated by the new Evidence Code.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Venturino v. State, 

 (2) (b)

(

) (2019). We have “disavow[ed] the application of the

rule announced in Brown, and applied in its progeny, in cases

governed by the new Evidence Code.” 

 As such, Mann’s claim of

error predicated on Brown and its progeny is meritless.6

      3. Finally, Mann argues that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance in two regards. To succeed on

these claims, Mann must demonstrate both that his trial counsel

performed deficiently and that, absent that deficient performance, a

reasonable probability exists that the outcome at trial would have

been different. Strickland v. Washington, 

, 694




      6   We remind counsel that “Georgia lawyers do this Court no
favors . . . when they fail to recognize that we are all living in a new evidence
world and are required to analyze and apply the new law.” Davis v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2016).
                                       21
(

, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If a defendant fails to satisfy

one part of the Strickland test, then this Court is not required to

consider the other. See Stripling v. State, 

 (3) (b)

(

) (2018). Mann has not met this standard in regard to

either of his claims.

     (a) Mann first argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to pursue solely an accident defense. Mann

argues that trial counsel confused the jury by presenting multiple

theories, through cross-examination and argument, that someone

else had caused Ethan’s injuries or, alternatively, that the injuries

had developed over time.

     “An attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a

question of trial strategy,” and trial strategy, if reasonable, does not

constitute   ineffective   assistance   of   counsel.   (Citation   and

punctuationomitted.) Bryant v. State, 

 (2) (c) (

) (2019). “A defendant who contends a strategic decision

constitutes deficient performance must show that no competent

attorney, under similar circumstances, would have made it.”

                                  22
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Davis v. State, 

(3) (g) (

) (2019).

     At the hearing on Mann’s motion for new trial, trial counsel

testified that, before trial, he had prepared two separate defenses

for trial. The first was to be used if the trial court suppressed Mann’s

inculpatory statements and involved multiple theories of defense,

including accident, alternative perpetrator, and slow-developing

injury; the other, which focused on the sole defense of accident,

would be used if the trial court admitted the statements. Counsel

explained that he focused on the accident defense until the trial

court, at the mid-trial charge conference, declined to give Mann’s

requested charge on accident; thereafter, trial counsel chose to cross-

examine witnesses regarding an alternative perpetrator and a slow-

developing injury and to argue the same theories in closing because

he wanted to offer “other avenues where a jury could find [Mann]

not guilty.”

     Mann has not articulated how this strategy fell outside the

wide range of reasonable professional conduct or, much less, shown

                                  23
that no competent attorney under similar circumstances would have

pursued the same strategy. See Walker v. State, 

 (2)

(e) (

) (2014) (“The fact that present counsel would

pursue a different strategy does not render trial counsel’s strategy

unreasonable.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Given the facts

of this case, we conclude that trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable

— and, thus, that trial counsel did not perform deficiently — and

that Mann is not entitled to relief on this claim.

     (b) Mann also argues that trial counsel was ineffective by

failing to request a jury charge on the voluntariness of his custodial

statement. Assuming that this failure constitutes deficient

performance, Mann’s claim nevertheless fails because he cannot

demonstrate prejudice.

     As discussed above, ample evidence was before the jury that

Mann’s second statement was made freely and voluntarily. After

invoking his right to counsel during the first interview, Mann

reinitiated contact with the investigating officers by signing an

inmate request form, and he affirmed his desire to speak with the

                                  24
officers before the second interview. Both Investigator Stewart and

Lieutenant Oliver testified that the Miranda warnings were read to

Mann before the start of each interview and that Mann

acknowledged both verbally and in writing that he understood those

warnings. Mann offered no rebuttal evidence, and the jury could

readily conclude that the officers were not seeking to obtain an

untrue statement. Given these circumstances, there is no reasonable

probability that the outcome at trial would have been different

absent trial counsel’s presumed deficiency.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




                  DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2020.
     Murder. Newton Superior Court. Before Judge Johnson.
     Mark H. Yun, Anthony S. Carter, for appellant.

                                25
     Layla H. Zon, District Attorney, Candice L. Branche, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.




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