State v. Dykstra

                                       766

     Argued and submitted September 6, 2018, affirmed December 9, 2020


                      STATE OF OREGON,
                       Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                 v.
                  ANDREW RYAN DYKSTRA,
                      Defendant-Appellant.
                 Washington County Circuit Court
                      16CR50085; A163419
                                   

    After a stipulated-facts bench trial in which the trial court granted the
state’s motion for a mistrial based on the absence of a written jury waiver, as
required by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, the state reindicted
defendant on the same charges, amending one of them. The trial court found
defendant guilty except for insanity on five of the six charges and entered a
judgment placing him under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board. Defendant appeals that judgment, contending, among other assignments
of error, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the second
indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Held: Because the absence of a written
jury waiver is plain error requiring reversal on appeal, State v. Barber, 

, 

 (2007), the state established manifest necessity for a mistrial
in the first prosecution; consequently, double jeopardy did not bar defendant’s
prosecution under the second indictment.
    Affirmed.



    James Lee Fun, Jr., Judge.
  Ryan Scott argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.
   Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and
Aoyagi, Judge.*
    DeHOOG, P. J.
    Affirmed.

______________
   * DeVore, J., vice Hadlock, J. pro tempore.
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           DeHOOG, P. J.,
         This appeal requires us to examine the double
jeopardy implications of reprosecuting defendant after a
stipulated-facts bench trial, in which—after accepting the
stipulated facts, finding defendant guilty except for insanity (GEI) on various charges, dismissing other charges, and
announcing a sentence—the trial court granted the state’s
motion for a mistrial based on the lack of a jury waiver.
The state then reindicted defendant on the same charges
(amending one of them), and, in the second trial, the court
found defendant GEI on five of the six charges, including
those that the state had agreed to dismiss as part of the
earlier stipulated-facts trial. Defendant appeals the judgment in that second case, raising three assignments of
error based on double jeopardy principles, namely, that the
trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to dismiss the
second indictment, (2) not dismissing two counts that had
been dismissed on the state’s motion in the first trial, and
(3) allowing the state to proceed in the second trial on an
amended version of one of the counts. With respect to defendant’s first assignment of error, we conclude that, because
the state established manifest necessity for a mistrial in the
first case, double jeopardy does not bar defendant’s retrial;
the court therefore did not err in refusing to dismiss the
indictment in the second case. We reject defendant’s second
and third assignments of error without written discussion.
         The material facts, which are primarily procedural, are undisputed. Defendant was charged, in Case No.
C152591CR, with first-degree arson, ORS 164.325 (Count 1)1;
unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894
(Count 2); attempted assault of a public safety officer, ORS
163.208 (Count 3); resisting arrest, ORS 162.315 (Count 4);
recklessly endangering another person, ORS 163.195 (Count 5)
and second-degree criminal mischief, ORS 164.354 (Count 6).

    1
      ORS 164.325 provides, as relevant, that a person commits first-degree
arson if, by starting a fire, the person intentionally damages “[p]rotected property
of another,” ORS 164.325(1)(a)(A), or “[a]ny property, whether the property of the
person or the property of another person, and such act recklessly places another
person in danger of physical injury or protected property of another in danger of
damage,” ORS 164.325(1)(a)(B). As relevant, “ ‘[p]rotected property’ means any
structure, place or thing customarily occupied by people[.]” ORS 164.305(1).
768                                                    State v. Dykstra

With respect to first-degree arson (Count 1), the indictment
alleged:
   “The defendant, or about October 14, 2015, in Washington
   County, Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally damage protected property at 14256 SW Farmington Road,
   Beaverton, by starting a fire, thereby recklessly placing protected property of another, located at 14256 SW
   Farmington Road, Beaverton, in danger of damage.”

(Emphasis added.) After “a long course of negotiation,” the
state and defendant agreed to a stipulated-facts trial as
to Counts 1, 4, and 6, with the expectation that the court
would find defendant GEI as to those counts, and that the
state would dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 5.2
          Pursuant to their agreement, the parties stipulated
to the following facts. Early one morning, defendant leaned
a “ ‘Presto’ type fire log” against the victims’ fence, which is
attached to their home. Defendant intentionally ignited the
fire log. The fire from the fire log ignited the fence, which
allowed the fire to spread towards the victims’ home, which
is protected property, putting the home in danger of damage. When a police officer contacted defendant shortly after
the fire had been extinguished, defendant “became angry
and swatted [the officer’s] hand and attempted to punch [the
officer] in the face.” When the officer attempted to arrest
him, defendant resisted the arrest “by physically struggling
with” the officer. Officers found fire-starting paraphernalia
and methamphetamine in defendant’s home.
         A bench trial was held on July 13, 2016. The parties
recited their agreement, and the court admitted the stipulation of facts signed by the parties, along with two psychiatric reports (one offered by the state and one by defendant)
reflecting defendant’s diagnosis of schizophrenia and the
doctors’ GEI-related findings. Consistent with the parties’
agreement, the state moved to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 5,

    2
      The state also agreed to dismiss a separate case, Case No. D152135M
(charging interfering with public transportation and theft of services), and,
in a probation violation proceeding in another case, Case No. D140575T,
to recommend termination of probation as unsuccessful, without imposing
sanctions.
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and the court granted that request. The state then rested its
case, arguing that the evidence was sufficient to find defendant GEI as to the remaining counts.
         At that point, defendant moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the arson charge, Count 1, arguing that the
state had failed to prove that defendant had unlawfully
and intentionally damaged “protected property,” as alleged
in the indictment, because the stipulated facts established
that defendant damaged only the fence, which is not protected property under the definition of the offense. The
state responded that the first use of the word “protected” in
that count was surplusage, which the court had authority
to strike by interlineation.3 Defendant contended that the
court lacked that authority because jeopardy had attached
when the court received the stipulated facts. The state disagreed. After further argument, the court asked the parties
to submit authority for their respective positions and continued with the trial.
         The court found defendant GEI on the remaining
two undisputed counts (Counts 4 and 6) and indicated that
it would find defendant GEI on Count 1 also, assuming it
could strike the word “protected” from the indictment. More
particularly, the court stated that it would “craft [its] sentence” assuming the state was correct about that, but, if the
court “change[d its] mind” after reviewing the case law, it
would inform the parties by written opinion. The court then
proceeded to pronounce sentence on all three counts, placing
defendant under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board (PSRB) for a period of 20 years on Count 1
and for a period of one year each on Counts 4 and 6. It does
not appear that any order or judgment memorializing those
decisions or the court’s earlier dismissal of Counts 2, 3, and
5 was ever entered in the court’s register. Defendant filed a
written motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on Count 1
the same day.
         On July 26, the court reconvened the parties to
resolve defendant’s MJOA on Count 1 and the issue “whether
    3
      See State v. Pachmayr, 

, 

 (2008) (explaining that
Article VII (Amended), section 5, of the Oregon Constitution allows amendments
to charging instruments as to form without resubmission to the grand jury).
770                                         State v. Dykstra

[the court] was going to strike the word ‘protected’ ” from
the indictment. The court told the parties that it was not
planning to decide the question, explaining that, since
the parties had contemplated a stipulated-facts trial that
would result in a GEI sentence, “it seems to this Court
that it should be resolved in that manner with an agreement to the sentence that I basically already gave or we
should vacate the sentence and have you guys go to trial.”
The prosecutor then asserted that the trial was invalid in
any event because defendant had not submitted a jury trial
waiver, necessitating a mistrial. The court and the parties
debated the issue further; eventually, the court indicated
that, notwithstanding defendant’s objection, it was declaring a mistrial, and then set the case over for defense counsel
to have time to confer with his client as to how he wanted to
proceed.

         At a subsequent hearing, on August 5, the court
stated that the case was back in a pretrial posture due to
the mistrial and allowed defendant to put any objections
on the record. Defense counsel argued that returning the
case to pretrial status was inappropriate because “double jeopardy attaches upon the tendering and acceptance
of stipulated facts.” Counsel further argued that, because
the mistrial was caused by the state as the result of the
state’s “direct motion without the consent of the Defense,”
the state could not retry defendant. Counsel indicated that
the problem that the state argued required a mistrial was
“easily repaired” because defendant was willing to sign a
jury waiver. The state responded that the mistrial was not
caused by the state; rather, the lack of a signed jury waiver
was “a legal defect that made the trial unlawful.” The state
also requested that the court rule on its motion to amend
the indictment to strike “protected” from Count 1, which
it had filed before the hearing. The court declined to rule.
Later, the court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the
indictment in Case No. C152591CR.

       The state then obtained a new indictment in Case
No. 16CR50085 (the subject of this appeal), charging defendant with the same offenses except that, with respect to
Count 1, the indictment now alleged that defendant did
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“unlawfully and intentionally damage ‘property,’ rather
than ‘protected property.’ ” 4 A different judge presided.

         Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
for subjecting him to double jeopardy under the state and
federal constitutions, arguing, among other things, that
jeopardy attached at the moment the stipulation of facts was
received by the court in the earlier trial.5 Defendant also
argued that jeopardy attached to the counts dismissed on
the state’s motion at that trial, Counts 2, 3, and 5. As to the
implications of the mistrial, defendant reasserted that the
state cannot recharge defendant when the state moves for a
mistrial it caused, except in the case of “manifest necessity,”
which was not present here because the lack of a jury waiver
was repairable. Finally, defendant argued that contract law
barred the state from re-indicting defendant on the previously dismissed charges.

         The state responded that the stipulated-facts trial
was not valid—and therefore jeopardy had not attached—
because defendant had not submitted a written jury waiver,
as required under Article I, section 11. The state also argued
that the mistrial was justified by manifest necessity and
ORS 131.525(1)(b)(B), which provides that a mistrial terminates jeopardy if the trial court finds that termination of
the previous prosecution is necessary due to “a legal defect
in the proceeding that would make any judgment entered
upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law,” and there was
no authority to suggest that the defect could be repaired by
the retroactive submission of a jury waiver. According to the
state, the relevant case law also permitted it to modify the
charges in the new indictment, as it did with Count 1. As
to defendant’s contract law argument, the state responded

    4
      Count 1 of the new indictment alleged:
    “The defendant, or about October 14, 2015, in Washington County, Oregon,
    did unlawfully and intentionally damage property at 14256 SW Farmington
    Road, Beaverton, by starting a fire, thereby recklessly placing protected
    property of another, located at 14256 SW Farmington Road, Beaverton, in
    danger of damage.”
    5
      The court admitted as an exhibit the transcript of the hearings in that case
(Case No. C152591CR), as well as the statement of stipulated facts. The court also
took judicial notice of all the pleadings filed in the case.
772                                                   State v. Dykstra

that, because he failed to submit the jury waiver, defendant “never followed through on his obligation of having a
valid bench trial.” In summary, the state requested that the
court deny defendant’s motion, “despite jeopardy attaching,”
because the court was required to grant a mistrial under
the doctrine of manifest necessity.
         The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss,
reasoning that the lack of a jury trial waiver rendered the
stipulated-facts trial a “nullity,” as if “it [did] not occur,” and,
therefore, it “has no effect on a subsequent prosecution.” The
court expressed some doubt as to whether it was correct to
label what had occurred a “mistrial”; however, when defense
counsel asked the court to clarify, the court stated, “I suppose if asked, I would say there was manifest necessity.”
With regard to the charges that had been dismissed on the
state’s motion in the stipulated-facts trial, the court concluded that neither party was bound by the previous agreement and the state could proceed with those charges.
         The case proceeded to a bench trial on the new
indictment, defendant having now waived his right to a
jury trial. The court ultimately entered a judgment finding
defendant GEI on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and placing him
on conditional release under the jurisdiction of the PSRB for
20 years as to Count 1, five years as to Count 2, and one year
each as to Counts 3, 4, and 6.6
          Defendant appeals the judgment, raising, as noted
above, three assignments of error based on double jeopardy:
first, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the second indictment; second, that the court erred in
refusing to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 of that indictment; and
third, that the court erred in permitting the state to proceed
to trial on an amended version of Count 1.
         With respect to defendant’s first assignment, he
posits that dismissal of the indictment was required under
the doubly jeopardy protections of the Oregon and United
States Constitutions because jeopardy had attached to all of
the charges when the trial court received the stipulation of

   6
     The court found defendant not guilty on Count 5, recklessly endangering
another person.
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facts in the first trial. He also argues that the state lacked
authority under ORS 131.525(1)(b)(B) to seek a mistrial
because the trial had already proceeded to verdict, and the
grounds for mistrial in subsection (1)(b) are limited to events
that occur prior to that point; in other words, in defendant’s
view, under ORS 131.525, a mistrial does not annul jeopardy if, as defendant contends occurred here, the trial court
has reached a verdict.7
         For its part, the state recognizes that jeopardy generally attaches in a stipulated-facts bench trial when the
court accepts the stipulation, State v. Ellis, 

,

 (1973); however, the state contends that it
“does not attach if the court accepts the stipulation without obtaining a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial,” as
required by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.8
(Emphasis in state’s brief.) In those circumstances, according to the state, “the trial court lacks authority to hold
a trial on the stipulation” (emphasis in state’s brief) and,
therefore, a defendant is not at risk of conviction and the
submission of the stipulation of facts is insufficient to place
the defendant in jeopardy. The state further contends that,
even if jeopardy attached, it was properly terminated under
ORS 131.525(1)(b)(B) and the state and federal constitutions
by the grant of a mistrial before judgment, under circumstances that constituted manifest necessity.9 At the very
least, in the state’s view, the court was not precluded from
granting a mistrial under ORS 131.525(1)(b)(B) on the arson
charge, because the court’s GEI finding on that charge was
“expressly a conditional ruling” subject to the court’s consideration of defendant’s MJOA. We need not resolve the state’s
first and third arguments, because, as explained below, we
agree with the state that, even if jeopardy attached, it was

    7
       By its terms, ORS 131.525(1), the full text of which is set out below, 307 Or
App at 775. does not affirmatively provide authority for mistrial motions. Our
recitation of defendant’s arguments should not be read to suggest otherwise.
    8
       Article I, section, 11, provides, in part, that “any accused person, in other
than capital cases, and with the consent of the trial judge, may elect to waive
trial by jury and consent to be tried by the judge of the court alone, such election
to be in writing.”
    9
       The state also contends that defendant’s contrary view regarding the
application of ORS 131.525(1)(b)(B) was not preserved. We discuss that issue
below.
774                                                       State v. Dykstra

properly terminated by the trial court’s grant of a mistrial
under the constitutional doctrine of manifest necessity.
          We begin with the basic legal principles. Article I,
section 12, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part,
that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offence.”10 Similarly, the double jeopardy provision of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 

, 

, 

 (1969)), states, “nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.” Although the analysis differs in certain respects not applicable here, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy embodied in the two provisions
is, “in principle, the same.” State v. Kimsey, 

, 

 (2002). It is “designed to spare a criminal
defendant the embarrassment, expense, and harassment
of being subjected to successive prosecutions for the same
offense.” 

; see also Serfass v. U. S., 

, 

, 

 (1975) (“The underlying
idea … is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent
he may be found guilty.”). As the parties readily acknowledge, in a stipulated-facts trial, jeopardy generally attaches
when the defendant enters the stipulation of facts and it is
accepted by the court. Ellis, 

; cf. Serfass, 

 (“In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when the
court begins to hear evidence.”).
         Under both constitutions, double jeopardy principles
preclude retrial of a defendant when the trial court grants
a mistrial over the defendant’s objection, as was the case
here, unless the mistrial is the result of “manifest necessity.” State v. Moore, 

, 

 (2017)

    10
       The protection against double jeopardy is also set forth in state statute.
See ORS 131.525(1) (providing that “[n]o person shall be prosecuted twice for the
same offense”).
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(citing United States v. Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) 579, 

 (1824), and Arizona v. Washington, 

, 

, 

 (1978)). The state has the burden of
establishing that the trial court’s granting of a mistrial
was consistent with that standard. Moore, 

.
         The requirements for manifest necessity are also
codified in state statute, ORS 131.525(1). State v. Cole, 

, 

, cert den, 

 (1979); see
also Moore, 

 n 2 (noting that “ORS 131.525(1)
is, in part, a codification of the test of ‘manifest necessity’
set forth in” Perez). ORS 131.525(1) provides:
      “A previous prosecution is not a bar to a subsequent
   prosecution when the previous prosecution was properly
   terminated under any of the following circumstances:
       “(a) The defendant consents to the termination or
   waives, by motion, by an appeal upon judgment of conviction, or otherwise, the right to object to termination.
       “(b) The trial court finds that a termination, other than
   by judgment of acquittal, is necessary because:
       “(A) It is physically impossible to proceed with the
   trial in conformity with law; or
     “(B) There is a legal defect in the proceeding that would
   make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a
   matter of law; or
       “(C) Prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom,
   makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the state; or
      “(D)   The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
       “(E) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a
   fair trial.
     “(c) When the former prosecution occurred in a court
   which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.
       “(d) When the subsequent prosecution was for an
   offense which was not consummated when the former prosecution began.”
(Emphases added.)
776                                          State v. Dykstra

         Returning to the parties’ arguments, as an initial
matter, we agree with the state that defendant failed to
preserve his appellate contention that ORS 131.525(1)(b)(B)
does not apply in this case. On appeal, he argues that the
circumstances described in paragraph (b)—in contrast to
those set out in paragraphs (a), (c), and (d)—are limited to
events that occur prior to verdict, and, because defendant’s
first trial proceeded to verdict, ORS 131.525(1)(b)(B) does
not avoid the bar of double jeopardy in this case. However,
he did not make that statutory argument to the trial
court.

         Nor is any error in that regard plain. See Ailes
v. Portland Meadows Inc., 

, 

 (1991) (to qualify for plain error review, among other
requirements, the legal “point must be obvious, not reasonably in dispute”). As the state points out, ORS 131.525
(1)(b)(B) references entry of judgment—i.e., retrial is permitted following a mistrial if it is based on “a legal defect
in the proceeding that would make any judgment entered
upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law.” Thus, among
other plausible readings of the text is that the entry of a
judgment—rather than the acceptance of a verdict—is the
controlling event. In other words, ORS 131.525(1)(b)(B) could
be understood to mean that a mistrial based on a legal defect
in the verdict itself terminates jeopardy as long as judgment has not been entered and the defect would result in
certain reversal if judgment were entered. Cf. State v. Vann,

, 

 (1999) (trial court erred in
denying motion for mistrial after accepting verdict rendered
by insufficient number of jurors). Defendant’s legal point,
therefore, is not obvious, and we decline to review it as plain
error.

         We turn to defendant’s constitutional argument,
which he did preserve. Whether defendant was entitled to
dismissal on double jeopardy grounds is ultimately a legal
question. Moore, 

. However, in these circumstances, that is, when “reviewing the denial of a motion to
dismiss an indictment … following a mistrial, we must
determine whether granting a mistrial over the defendant’s
objection ‘was outside the constitutional bounds of discretion
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and constituted legal error.’ ” 11 State v. Gillespie, 

, 

 (2019) (quoting Moore, 

).
As mentioned above, under both the federal and state constitutions, “that decision is examined against the standard
of ‘manifest necessity,’ ” Moore, 

, which is the
state’s burden to establish, 

.
          The state contends that a mistrial was manifestly
necessary here because defendant had not waived his right
to a jury trial—in writing or otherwise—in violation of
Article I, section 11 (set out above, 307 Or App at 773 n 8), a
defect that would, under State v. Barber, 

, 

 (2007), result in certain reversal on appeal. In Barber,
the Supreme Court held that, because of the “unique wording” of Article I, section 11, and the “unique kind of rights”
it represents, “[t]here is no waiver of a jury trial unless that
waiver is in writing and, without a waiver, [a] defendant
should [be] tried by a jury.” 

. Thus, absent a written jury waiver, the trial court errs “in going to trial at all.”

 (emphasis in original). And, the Barber court further
counseled, an appellate court may not “refuse to recognize
the error or, having recognized it, refuse to correct it.” 

In other words, proceeding to a bench trial without a written jury waiver is reversible as plain error on appeal. See,
e.g., State v. Herrington, 

, 

 (2016).
Thus, according to the state, the absence of a jury waiver
in the stipulated-facts trial was a legal defect constituting
manifest necessity for a mistrial.
        In response, defendant argues only that we should
not reach the question, because, in his view, the trial court
“expressly declined to decide whether manifest necessity
required a mistrial.” We disagree. The issue was fully
    11
       It is worth noting as we begin this discussion that “[t]he constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following
an acquittal.” Arizona v. Washington, 

, 

, 

 (1978) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court explained in Arizona:
    “The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an
    acquitted defendant may not be retried even though ‘the acquittal was based
    upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.’ See Fong Foo v. United States, 

, 

, 

. If the innocence of the accused
    has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.”

.
778                                             State v. Dykstra

briefed and argued before the second trial. And, although
the court reasoned that the first trial was a nullity, when
pressed, it also concluded that “there was manifest necessity.” Accordingly, we proceed to the merits.
         Manifest necessity is a “flexible standard”; there is
no “mechanical formula” for determining the validity of a
manifest necessity ruling. Illinois v. Somerville, 

, 

, 

 (1973). Rather, we look to
“the unique circumstances that each case presents,” Moore,

, keeping in mind that a “ ‘high degree’ ” of
necessity is required, 

 (quoting Arizona, 

).
One kind of necessity is the “ ‘necessity of doing justice,’
which arises from the duty of the court to ‘guard the administration of justice’ from prejudice[.]” Cole, 

(quoting State v. Schuler, 293 NC 34, 

(1977)). In Perez, the Court’s “fountainhead decision” concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause in this context—that
is, where a mistrial is granted over the defendant’s objection, Somerville, 410 US at 461—the Court explained:
   “[T]he law has invested Courts of justice with the authority
   to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in
   their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends
   of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”

Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 580; see also Cole, 

(noting that the Model Penal Code section upon which what
is now ORS 131.525(1) is based was an attempt to clarify the
manifest necessity test articulated in Perez, including “legal
necessity” as one of the five general reasons justifying termination of jeopardy). As we observed in State v. McFerron,

, 

, rev den, 

 (1981),
“there can be a conflict between the rights of the defendant
and the interest of the public in ‘… fair trials designed to
end in just judgments …,’ Wade v. Hunter, 

, 

, 

 (1949), and the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full, fair opportunity to
present his case can be the prevailing interest.” (Ellipses
in McFerron.) See also State v. Embry, 

,

 (1974) (“A trial judge, then, is not to foreclose
the defendant’s option to go to the jury unless he reasonably
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concludes that the ends of public justice cannot be served by
a continuation of the proceedings.”).
        In Somerville, 

, the Court articulated
a “general approach, premised on the ‘public justice’ policy
enunciated in United States v. Perez”:
   “A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare
   a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if
   a verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to
   be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error
   in the trial. If an error would make reversal on appeal a
   certainty, it would not serve ‘the ends of public justice’ to
   require that the Government proceed with its proof when, if it
   succeeded before the jury, it would automatically be stripped
   of that success by an appellate court.”
(Emphasis added.) The trial court in Somerville declared
a mistrial, over the defendant’s objection, after concluding that the indictment was insufficient to charge a crime
and the defect, as a matter of state law, was not curable
by amendment. 

. Holding that the mistrial
met the manifest necessity requirement, the Court observed
that, if a mistrial was not constitutionally available in that
situation, “the State’s policy [preserving a defendant’s right
to have prosecution commenced by grand jury action] could
only be implemented by conducting a second trial after verdict and reversal on appeal, thus wasting time, energy, and
money for all concerned.” 

. The Court concluded:
       “The determination by the trial court to abort a criminal proceeding where jeopardy has attached is not one to
   be lightly undertaken, since the interest of the defendant
   in having his fate determined by the jury first impaneled
   is itself a weighty one. Nor will the lack of demonstrable
   additional prejudice preclude the defendant’s invocation of
   the double jeopardy bar in the absence of some important
   countervailing interest of proper judicial administration.
   But where the declaration of a mistrial implements a reasonable state policy and aborts a proceeding that at best would
   have produced a verdict that could have been upset at will
   by one of the parties, the defendant’s interest in proceeding
   to verdict is outweighed by the competing and equally legitimate demand for public justice.”

 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
780                                                     State v. Dykstra

         That is the case here as well. Barber establishes that
the absence in the record of a written jury waiver requires
reversal on appeal. Thus, the trial court reasonably could
have concluded that any judgment entered in the stipulated-facts trial would automatically result in reversal of the judgment on appeal (necessitating a new trial) and, consequently,
that the “ends of public justice” would be defeated by allowing the proceedings to continue to judgment. Moreover,
under the circumstances present here, defense counsel’s
belated suggestion that defendant was willing to sign a jury
waiver did not require the trial court to conclude otherwise
and, therefore, deny the state’s mistrial motion.
         Before we explain why that is so, we first note that,
on appeal, defendant does not address “manifest necessity,”
except, as discussed above, to argue that we should not
reach it.12 In the trial court, however, defendant argued that
mistrial was not a necessity; rather, he contended, the lack
of a jury waiver was “an easily repaired oversight,” because
he had offered to sign and submit a jury waiver when the
state initially raised the issue. We disagree with defendant’s
assessment.
          First, as defendant acknowledged at oral argument,
there is no authority for the proposition that a belated jury
waiver could cure the Article I, section 11, violation. Second,
defendant never actually tendered a signed jury waiver as
to the first trial; only after the trial court had granted a mistrial did defense counsel suggest that defendant would be
willing to sign one, and even then there may have been some
question whether defendant had the capacity to sign as promised. Third, though we might posit that, if the trial court
had accepted a belated jury waiver at defendant’s request,
he would have been precluded from challenging the waiver
on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings, defendant did
not offer such assurances to the trial court as it evaluated
whether upholding its verdict would lead to pointless effort
and delay. Under those circumstances, the trial court was
not required to accept that counsel’s offer of a belated jury

    12
       Defendant does not, for example, suggest that the legal defect—the lack
of a jury waiver—was the result of prosecutorial manipulation or misconduct,
which would raise different questions.
Cite as 

 (2020)                             781

waiver would render a mistrial unnecessary. See Cole, 

 (serious illness of trial judge constituted manifest necessity for mistrial, notwithstanding the possibility
of continuing the trial before a different judge; under the
“flexible standard of Arizona,” the state was not required
to show that no other judge was available, where nothing
in the record showed that defendant would have agreed to
a continuation of the trial before another judge); McFerron,

 (manifest necessity satisfied, although
trial court had alternative, under the law at the time, of
proceeding with 11 jurors; the state was not required to proceed with fewer than the jury of 12 to which it was entitled);
cf. Gillespie, 

 (manifest necessity standard
not satisfied where trial court did not “adequately consider
reasonable alternatives” before declaring a mistrial (emphasis added)).
        Because the state established manifest necessity
for a mistrial in the stipulated-facts trial, we conclude that
double jeopardy did not bar defendant’s prosecution under
the second indictment. We therefore reject defendant’s first
assignment of error. As noted, we have rejected defendant’s
other assignments of error without written discussion.
Accordingly, we affirm.
        Affirmed.