Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

308 Or. App. 376

Stanton v. Medellin

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided January 6, 2021

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2021-01-06

Applies OR 9 § 9.080 · OR 9 § 9.200 · OR 90 § 90.115 · OR 90 § 90.220 · OR 90 § 90.245

Affirmed · Decided 2021-01-06

                                      376

      Argued and submitted February 14, 2020, affirmed January 6, 2021


                         Janelle STANTON,
                   Conservator for Janice Hoglan,
                         Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                   v.
                        Vickie MEDELLIN,
                     AND ALL OCCUPANTS,
                      Defendant-Respondent.
                     Polk County Circuit Court
                        18LT10713; A169557
                                  
481 P3d 1004

    In this action for forcible entry and detainer arising from a residential tenancy, plaintiff landlord appeals a general judgment in favor of defendant tenant
and a supplemental judgment awarding fees, costs, and disbursements to defendant. The rental agreement at issue in this case contained a provision purporting to prohibit the plaintiff’s ability to terminate the tenancy for reasons that
the plaintiff would otherwise be entitled to do so under the Oregon Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act (the ORLTA). Plaintiff contends that the trial court
erred when it determined that that provision was enforceable because (1) the
provision was not allowed under the ORLTA and (2) the provision violated public
policy. Held: Neither the ORLTA nor public policy prohibited plaintiff from bargaining away plaintiff’s ability to terminate the tenancy for reasons otherwise
allowed under the ORLTA.
    Affirmed.



    Norman R. Hill, Judge.
   Matthew G. Shepard argued the cause and filed the brief
for appellant.
    Alexander Spalding filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge,
and Aoyagi, Judge.
    TOOKEY, J.
    Affirmed.
Cite as 
308 Or App 376
 (2021)                                               377

           TOOKEY, J.
         In this action for forcible entry and detainer (FED)
arising from a residential tenancy, plaintiff landlord appeals
a general judgment in favor of defendant tenant. Additionally,
plaintiff appeals a supplemental judgment awarding fees,
costs, and disbursements to defendant.1
          With respect to appeal of the general judgment,
plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred when it determined that plaintiff “had no right to terminate [the tenancy]
without cause pursuant to ORS 90.427 [(2017), amended by
Or Laws 2019, ch 1, § 1; Or Laws 2019, ch 641, § 5] and in
ruling that a landlord can prospectively waive its right to
terminate [a] month-to-month tenancy except for nonpayment of rent by the terms of a rental agreement.” Defendant
responds that the trial court “correctly found that [a] rental
agreement provision allowing the tenant to only be removed
for non-payment of rent (thereby limiting the landlord from
filing a ‘no cause’ ORS 90.427(3) eviction) was enforceable.”
        With respect to the appeal of the supplemental
judgment, as we understand plaintiff’s argument, plaintiff
asserts that the trial court erred in awarding fees, costs,
and disbursements to defendant, because the trial court
erred when it ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to prevail
in the FED action.
         For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the
trial court did not err, and we affirm the general judgment
and supplemental judgment.
         At the outset, however, we pause to note that ORS
90.427(3)(c) (2017), which was in effect at the time of the trial
court’s decision, allowed for “no-cause” evictions, even after

    1
      The rental agreement in this case was entered into by Janice Hoglan, as a
landlord, and defendant, as a tenant.
    We note that various parties have been the “plaintiff” in this case at various
stages of this litigation, including Hoglan’s conservator, Hoglan’s successor conservator, and the personal representative of Hoglan’s estate. In this opinion, we
refer to all such parties as “plaintiff.”
    We assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that each of those plaintiffs
stepped into Hoglan’s shoes with regard to the rental agreement at issue and
was bound by the rental agreement and ORS chapter 90, the Oregon Residential
Landlord Tenant Act.
378                                      Stanton v. Medellin

the first year of occupancy. It provided that, with regard to
month-to-month tenancies, “At any time after the first year
of occupancy, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by
giving the tenant notice in writing not less than 60 days
prior to the date designated in the notice for the termination
of the tenancy.”

         ORS chapter 90, the Oregon Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act (the ORLTA), including ORS 90.427, was
amended extensively during the 2019 legislative session,
culminating in the legislature’s enactment of Senate Bill
(SB) 608 (2019), which, in most cases, “prohibits no-cause
evictions for tenants who have lived in their homes for at
least a year.” Testimony, Senate Committee on Housing, SB
608, Feb 4, 2019, Ex 7 (statement of Senate Majority Leader
Ginny Burdick). The current version of ORS 90.427(3) provides that, after the first year of occupancy, with some minor
exceptions, a landlord may terminate a month-to-month
tenancy only for a “tenant cause” or for a “qualifying landlord reason for termination.”

         The limitation on no-cause terminations of month- to-month tenancies created by passage SB 608 applies to
“[t]erminations of month-to-month tenancies occurring on
or after” March 30, 2019. Rider v. Carranza, 
306 Or App 616, 620
, 
475 P3d 467
 (2020). In this case, as explained below, the
termination notice plaintiff sent to defendant purported to
terminate the tenancy on July 17, 2018, which is prior to the
effective date of SB 608.

         On appeal, neither party contends either that the
provisions of SB 608 related to no-cause evictions obviate
the need for us to consider the parties’ arguments on appeal
or that the provisions of SB 608 are controlling with respect
to this appeal.

         Our opinion in this case analyzes the parties’ arguments under the ORLTA as it existed prior to passage of
SB 608; that is, under the ORLTA as it existed at the time
that plaintiff purported to terminate defendant’s tenancy.
All references to statutes in ORS chapter 90 in this opinion
are to those in effect at that time, unless otherwise noted.
Cite as 
308 Or App 376
 (2021)                                              379

             I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        In 1995, Janice Hoglan, as a landlord, and defendant, as a tenant, entered into a written rental agreement
under which defendant would rent a mobile home situated
on a piece of land in Amity, Oregon. Hoglan and defendant
became close friends. In 2014, they entered into a subsequent rental agreement, after Hoglan approached defendant about entering a new agreement to “make sure everyone knew what [Hoglan’s] wishes were.”
         The 2014 rental agreement provided for monthly rent
at a set amount and prohibited defendant from subletting
without written consent.
        The rental agreement also contained various provisions imposing obligations on defendant. For example,
Clause 11 of the agreement provided that defendant had
various maintenance responsibilities and was obligated to
reimburse the landlord for certain costs, and Clause 13 prohibited defendant and defendant’s guests from engaging in
certain activities on the premises.2
         The rental agreement also contained two clauses
concerning termination of the rental agreement. Clause 22
of the rental agreement, titled “additional provisions,” purported to restrict Hoglan’s ability to terminate defendant’s
tenancy for reasons other than failure to pay rent. That
clause provided:

   2
       Clause 11 provided, in part:
       “Tenant will: (1) keep the premises clean, sanitary, and in good condition
   and, upon termination of the tenancy, return the premises to Landlord in a
   condition identical to that which existed when Tenant took occupancy, except
   for ordinary wear and tear; (2) immediately notify Landlord of any defects
   or dangerous conditions in and about the premises of which Tenant becomes
   aware; (3) reimburse Landlord, on demand by Landlord, for the cost of any
   repairs to the premises damaged by Tenant or Tenant’s guests or business
   invitees through misuse or neglect.”
   Clause 13 provided, in part:
       “Tenant and guests or invitees will not use the premises or adjacent
   areas in such a ways as to: (1) violate any law or ordinance …; (2) commit
   waste (severe property damage); or (3) create a nuisance by annoying, disturbing, inconveniencing, or interfering with the quiet enjoyment and peace
   and quiet of any other tenant or nearby resident.”
380                                         Stanton v. Medellin

       “[Defendant] may continue to live at this property at
   this rent for as long as she choose[s]. She can’t be removed
   for other than failure to pay rent.”
        Additionally, Clause 24, titled “grounds for termination of tenancy,” provided that “failure of Tenant or
Tenant’s guests or invitees to comply with any term of this
Agreement, or the misrepresentation of any material fact
on Tenant’s rental application, is grounds for termination of
the tenancy, with appropriate notice to tenants and procedures as required by law.”
         In 2017 plaintiff was named as Hoglan’s conservator, and, on May 11, 2018, plaintiff issued a 60-day termination notice pursuant to ORS 90.427 purporting to terminate defendant’s tenancy on July 17, 2018, without a stated
cause.
        Ultimately, plaintiff filed a FED complaint seeking
possession of the premises.
         Plaintiff argued that the tenancy at issue is a
month-to-month tenancy; the ORLTA provides a statutory
right for a landlord to terminate such a tenancy upon 60
days’ notice as provided in ORS 90.427; the landlord cannot waive that right because it serves the “broader public
policy of having a uniform statutory regulation of the landlord tenant law within the State of Oregon”; and that giving
effect to Clause 22 of the rental agreement would prohibit
eviction even if defendant “intentionally inflicts substantial
damage to the property.”
        In response, defendant acknowledged that the tenancy was a month-to-month tenancy, but argued that in
Clause 22 of the rental agreement plaintiff “bargained away
her right to terminate the lease without cause, or indeed for
any cause other than failure to pay rent.” Defendant took
the position Clause 22 was valid and enforceable, as, in her
view, ORS 90.220(1) allows parties to a rental agreement to
include any terms and conditions in a rental agreement that
are not prohibited by law.
       The trial court ruled in favor of defendant, determining that the “landlord has not met their burden.” The
Cite as 
308 Or App 376
 (2021)                                381

trial court noted that, reading Clause 22 and Clause 24
together, “to give effect to the intent of the parties, … the
right to terminate this [rental agreement] resides in the
tenant,” and noted that plaintiff did not point the court
to “anything in the Landlord-Tenant Act that says that a
landlord cannot enter into that agreement.” The trial court
also noted during plaintiff’s closing argument that it is
“not really accurate to say that [defendant] could tear the
place up or do anything like that because that would violate
Clause 24.”
           Following the trial court’s ruling, the parties sought
clarification of the ruling with regard to the “interaction
between Clause 22 and 24” and asked the trial court to provide “additional insight.” The trial court responded that the
action is a “landlord-tenant action,” and it is “either a ‘yes’ or
a ‘no,’ ” and that it “found ‘no.’ ”
        On appeal, both parties primarily take the position
that the effect of Clause 22 of the rental agreement was to
prohibit termination of defendant’s tenancy for any reason
other than nonpayment of rent.
         Although the exact contours of the trial court’s construction of Clause 22 when interpreted in conjunction with
Clause 24 is not precisely clear, at bottom, we understand
the trial court to have concluded that the effect of Clause 22
and Clause 24 is to limit plaintiff’s ability to terminate the
rental agreement for reasons that plaintiff would otherwise
be entitled to do so under the ORLTA.
       After its ruling, the trial court issued a general
judgment in favor of defendant, and a supplemental judgment awarding fees, costs, and disbursements to defendant.
              II. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
        On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court
erred. Plaintiff argues that the ORLTA “only permits three
types of tenancies” and that a “month-to-month tenancy,”
such as the one in this case, “is always terminable by the
landlord or the tenant, as provided in the ORLTA, notwithstanding any language in the rental agreement to the
contrary.”
382                                                     Stanton v. Medellin

         Plaintiff also argues that “a landlord’s right to terminate a month-to-month rental agreement is a statutory
right that cannot be waived.” That is so, in plaintiff’s view,
because “that right was granted to landlords by the legislature, at least in part for the public good.” Therefore, according to plaintiff, any “purported waiver must be ignored as
against public policy and therefore void and unenforceable.”
         Defendant, for her part, contends that the ORLTA
“confers upon a landlord and tenant an absolute contractual
right to include different terms than those in the ORLTA—
so long as such terms are not ‘prohibited.’ ” In defendant’s
view, there is no prohibition on a landlord contracting away
the landlord’s ability to terminate a rental agreement.
Defendant also contends that there is no “public policy” prohibition that prevents a landlord from waiving a right or
contractually altering eviction options, and that the “public
good” is not “implicated in the rental agreement provision at
issue in this case.”
                        III. ANALYSIS
         In analyzing the parties’ arguments, we first turn
to whether the ORLTA permits a landlord and tenant
to enter a rental agreement such as the one in this case,
which provided that the tenant “may continue to live at
th[e] property … for as long as she choose[s]” and “can’t be
removed for other than failure to pay rent.” That is, under
the ORLTA, whether a landlord is permitted to limit their
ability to terminate a rental agreement for reasons that the
landlord would otherwise be entitled to terminate the rental
agreement under the ORLTA. That presents a question of
statutory interpretation, which we review for legal error.3
Rider, 
306 Or App at 618
.
         We have previously observed that the “purpose”
of ORS chapter 90, the ORLTA, is to “protect the public.”

     3
       We note that, even if the agreement at issue violated the ORLTA, whether
the agreement was unenforceable for that reason presents a separate question.
Mayfly Group, Inc. v. Ruiz, 
208 Or App 219, 222
, 
144 P3d 1025
 (2006), rev den, 
342 Or 344
 (2007) (“When, however, the alleged illegality [of a contractual provision]
is based on the violation of a statute, the question of the contract’s enforceability
is one of legislative intent.”). Nevertheless, given plaintiff’s arguments on appeal,
a necessary first step is determining whether the agreement at issue in fact violated the ORLTA.
Cite as 
308 Or App 376
 (2021)                           383

LeBrun v. Cal-Am Properties, Inc., 
197 Or App 177, 183-84
,
106 P3d 647
, rev den, 
338 Or 488
 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ORLTA, “applies to, regulates and
determines rights, obligations and remedies under a rental
agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located
within this state.” ORS 90.115. Importantly, ORS 90.220(1)
provides, “A landlord and a tenant may include in a rental
agreement terms and conditions not prohibited by [ORS
chapter 90] or other rule of law including rent, term of the
agreement and other provisions governing the rights and
obligations of the parties.”
         Plaintiff contends that ORS 90.220(1) “simply allows
for landlords and tenants to contract for particular terms
(e.g., amount of rent, or the length of term), which are not
in contradiction of the rights and remedies already ‘determined’ by the ORLTA.” That interpretation is contrary
to precedent. As we explained in Morat v. Sunset Village,
LLC, 
294 Or App 427, 441
, 
432 P3d 327
 (2018), “[i]n effect,
ORS 90.220 frees a landlord and tenant to include terms
more favorable to the tenant than the statutorily mandated
terms.”
          We note that certain terms and conditions in rental
agreements are expressly prohibited by the ORLTA. For
example, ORS 90.245(1) provides that a “rental agreement
may not provide that the tenant” agrees “to waive or forgo
rights or remedies under” ORS chapter 90; ORS 90.250
provides that a “rental agreement … may not permit the
receipt of rent free of the obligation to comply with ORS
90.320(1),” which imposes an obligation on landlords to
“maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition”; and
ORS 90.255 provides that in “any action on a rental agreement or arising under [ORS chapter 90], reasonable attorney
fees at trial and on appeal may be awarded to the prevailing
party together with costs and necessary disbursements, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.”
         No provision of the ORLTA, however, prohibits a
landlord from contracting away their ability to terminate
a tenancy for reasons that they would otherwise be entitled to under the ORLTA. Although plaintiff is correct that
the ORLTA recognizes three types of tenancies, see ORS
384                                        Stanton v. Medellin

90.100(38), and that the ORLTA provides landlords the ability to terminate tenancies, see ORS 90.427, the restriction on
evictions in the rental agreement at issue in this case—i.e.,
those found in Clause 22—are “more favorable to the tenant
than the statutorily mandated terms,” Morat, 
294 Or App at 441
, and are not prohibited by the ORLTA or any other rule
of law. Accordingly, under ORS 90.220(1), the parties were
permitted to agree to them.
         We next turn to whether the agreement in this case
is barred by public policy as plaintiff contends. As noted
above, plaintiff contends that “a landlord’s right to terminate a month-to-month rental agreement is a statutory right
that cannot be waived” because “that right was granted to
landlords by the legislature, at least in part for the public good,” and that, therefore, any “purported waiver must
be ignored as against public policy and therefore void and
unenforceable.”
          In discussing this issue, it is helpful to note three
general principles of Oregon contract law, as articulated by
the Supreme Court in Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 
356 Or 543
, 
340 P3d 27
 (2014). First, “It is a truism that a contract
validly made between competent parties is not to be set aside
lightly.” 
Id.
 at 551 (citing Bliss v. Southern Pacific Co. et al,
212 Or 634, 646
, 
321 P2d 324
 (1958) (“When two or more persons competent for that purpose, upon a sufficient consideration, voluntarily agree to do or not to do a particular thing
which may be lawfully done or omitted, they should be held
to the consequences of their bargain.”)). Second, “The right
to contract privately is part of the liberty of citizenship, and
an important office of the courts is to enforce contractual
rights and obligations.” 
Id.
 And finally, “contract rights are
not absolute”; “equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.” 
Id.
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
         Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that
“Oregon does not enforce contracts that are unconscionable
or otherwise violate public policy.” Trinity v. Apex Directional
Drilling LLC, 
363 Or 257, 261
, 
434 P3d 20
 (2018). “In determining whether an agreement is illegal because it is contrary to public policy, the test is the evil tendency of the
Cite as 
308 Or App 376
 (2021)                                             385

contract and not its actual injury to the public in a particular instance.” Bagley, 
356 Or at 552
 (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted).
         In this case, in support of her contention that the
restrictions on termination of defendant’s tenancy in the
rental agreement violated public policy, plaintiff principally
relies on In re Leisure, 
336 Or 244
, 
82 P3d 144
 (2003). That
case concerned an attorney who entered into an agreement
with the Professional Liability Fund (PLF). 
Id. at 246-47
.
The Bar asserted that, under the agreement, the attorney
waived her right under ORS 9.200(1) to “a 30-day default
period and 60 days’ notice before being suspended for failure
to make a PLF payment.”4 
Id. at 252-53
. ORS 9.200(1) provided, in relevant part, that:
   “ ‘[A]ny member in default in payment of assessed contributions to a professional liability fund under ORS 9.080(2) for
   a period of 30 days, shall, after 60 days’ written notice of
   the delinquency, be suspended from membership in the bar.
   The notice of delinquency shall be sent by the executive
   director, by registered or certified mail, to the member in
   default at the last-known post-office address of the member. Failure to pay the fees or contributions within 60 days
   after the date of the deposit of the notice in the post office
   shall automatically suspend the delinquent member.’ ”
Id.
 at 249 (quoting ORS 9.200(1); emphasis in Leisure).
        In considering the issues before it, the court
explained, “Statutory rights may be waived, but only to
the extent that they serve no broader public policy but are
directed solely to the protection of the individual who purports to waive them.” 
Id. at 253
. The court held that the
notice and default period requirements of ORS 9.200(1) were
“designed, at least in part, for the public good” and could not
be waived, noting that:
     “permitting those provisions to be set aside by agreement would violate a legislative policy that is concerned
   more broadly with the public good. More specifically, ORS

    4
      Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Leisure, the legislature has amended
ORS 9.200. See Or Laws 2013, ch 3, § 2; Or Laws 2015, ch 122, § 5; Or Laws 2017,
ch 94, § 11. References to ORS 9.200 in this opinion are to the version of ORS
9.200 that was in effect at the time Leisure was decided.
386                                          Stanton v. Medellin

   9.200(1) strictly controls the manner of Bar suspensions
   for default on membership dues or PLF assessments, to
   ensure that the suspension process is orderly and that the
   Bar does not overstep its authority. That policy reflects a
   concern for the chaos that might result from unexpected
   and precipitous suspensions, not just for the suspended
   lawyer but for courts, opposing counsel, and, particularly,
   for clients. Unnoticed, eleventh-hour suspensions create a
   likelihood that clients will be left without counsel at critical moments in pending cases. The legislature’s decision to
   specify notice and default period requirements for administrative suspensions authorized by ORS 9.200(1) is, in our
   view, a clear recognition of that concern.”
Id. at 253-54.
          The difficulty with defendant’s reliance on Leisure
is that the statute in that case, ORS 9.200(1), “strictly control[ed] the manner of Bar suspensions for default on membership dues or PLF assessments,” reflecting legislative
recognition of the “public good” protected by the notice and
default period requirements in ORS 9.200(1). Id. at 253-54.
Importantly, ORS 9.200(1) did not expressly provide attorneys and the PLF the ability to contract to notice and default
terms other than those mandated by ORS 9.200(1).
         In contrast, as noted above, under the ORLTA,
the legislature expressly provided in ORS 90.220(1) that
“[a] landlord and a tenant may include in a rental agreement terms and conditions not prohibited by this chapter or
other rule of law.” As also noted above, we have interpreted
that provision to, in effect, “free[ ] a landlord and tenant to
include terms more favorable to the tenant than the statutorily mandated terms.” Morat, 
294 Or App at 441
. Although
the legislature expressly provided that in rental agreements
tenants may not agree to “forgo rights or remedies under”
the ORLTA, ORS 90.245(1), the ORLTA does not contain
a broad prohibition against landlords forgoing rights and
remedies under the ORLTA.
         In both this case and Leisure, legislative policy is
clear: In Leisure, legislative policy was clear, in part because
the legislature expressly mandated the notice and default
provisions in ORS 9.200(1), and did not statutorily provide
attorneys and the PLF with the ability to waive them. Here,
Cite as 
308 Or App 376
 (2021)                                                   387

legislative policy is clear, because under the ORLTA, the legislature allowed landlords to forgo the rights and remedies
that otherwise would be available to them, as long as doing
so is not prohibited. ORS 90.220(1). Although the purpose of
the ORLTA as a whole is to protect the public, see LeBrun,
197 Or App at 183-84
, we reject the notion that “public policy” prohibits a landlord from doing what the legislature has
allowed landlords to do.5
        We also observe that, even if a landlord has bargained away their ability to terminate a tenancy for a reason
that the landlord would otherwise be entitled to terminate
the tenancy under the ORLTA, a landlord is not without
remedies to protect their property from harm by a tenant.
For example, ORS 90.401(2) expressly provides that “a landlord may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for
any noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or ORS 90.325,” which governs tenant duties.6 And,
     5
       To bolster her position, plaintiff sets forth a number of consequences that
might arise if we conclude that a landlord can bargain away their ability to terminate a tenancy for reasons that they otherwise would be entitled to terminate
the tenancy under the ORLTA, viz., (1) “termination may be necessary to serve a
fundamental ORLTA policy of providing habitable dwellings to Oregon tenants”;
(2) “giving effect to the purported waiver of [a landlord’s] right to terminate …,
encourages blight because a landlord may be financially forced to abandon his
responsibilities to repair and maintain the dwelling if it becomes unprofitable to
do so”; (3) “no-cause evictions allow landlords to terminate tenancies when tenants violate local nuisance ordinances, which violations may not be violations of
the ORLTA or the rental agreement”; (4) “no-cause terminations facilitate a landlord’s ability to terminate a tenant who is aggressive towards other tenants at
an apartment complex”; and (5) and giving effect to the rental agreement in this
case would have the effect of restraining “the alienability of private property.”
     We do not discount that there may be some merit to plaintiff’s policy concerns. However, we understand ORS 90.220(1) to mean what it says: “A landlord
and a tenant may include in a rental agreement terms and conditions not prohibited by this chapter or other rule of law including rent, term of the agreement and
other provisions governing the rights and obligations of the parties.”
     There is no prohibition in the ORLTA or any other rule of law prohibiting
landlords from bargaining away their ability to terminate a rental agreement for
reasons that the landlords would otherwise be entitled to do so under the ORLTA.
Rather, ORS 90.220 “frees a landlord and tenant to include terms more favorable
to the tenant than the statutorily mandated terms.” Morat, 
294 Or App at 441
.
     6
       ORS 90.325 requires the tenant to, among other things, use “the parts of
the premises … in a reasonable manner considering the purposes for which
they were designed and intended”; keep “all areas of the premises under control
of the tenant in every part as clean, sanitary and free from all accumulations
of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin as the condition of the
premises permits and to the extent that the tenant is responsible for causing the
388                                                    Stanton v. Medellin

in this case, Clause 11 of the rental agreement requires the
tenant to “reimburse Landlord, on demand by Landlord, for
the cost of any repairs to the premises damaged by Tenant
or Tenant’s guests or business invitees through misuse or
neglect.”
        In sum, we conclude that neither the ORLTA nor
public policy prohibit a landlord from bargaining away the
landlord’s ability to terminate a tenancy for reasons that
the landlord would otherwise be entitled to do so under the
ORLTA. To the extent that there might be some contractual
terms that public policy would preclude, a contractual term
waiving the right to terminate a tenancy without cause is
not one of them.
          We emphasize, however, that our analysis in this
opinion is limited to considering the parties’ arguments
under the ORLTA as it existed prior to passage of SB 608;
that is, under the ORLTA as it existed at the time that plaintiff purported to terminate defendant’s tenancy. We express
no opinion on how the parties’ arguments would fare under
the current version of the ORLTA.
       Consequently, we affirm the general judgment and
supplemental judgment.
           Affirmed.




problem”; dispose “from the dwelling unit all ashes, garbage, rubbish and other
waste in a clean, safe and legal manner”; and use “in a reasonable manner all
electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning and other
facilities and appliances.” It also provides that a tenant shall not “[d]eliberately
or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the premises
or knowingly permit any person to do so.”

/308/orapp/376 · .json · Public domain