367
Submitted October 20, 2020; in Case No. 18CR74486, reversed; in Case
No. 18CR59415, affirmed March 31; petition for review denied July 29, 2021
(368 Or 511)
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PATRICK MANNING WIGGINTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lane County Circuit Court
18CR59415, 18CR74486;
A170015 (Control), A170016
484 P3d 1103
Charles D. Carlson, Judge. (Judgment in Case No.
18CR59415)
Debra E. Velure, Judge. (Judgment in Case No.
18CR74486)
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
PER CURIAM
In Case No. 18CR74486, reversed. In Case No. 18CR59415,
affirmed.
368 State v. Wigginton
PER CURIAM
In this consolidated appeal, defendant contests
convictions for first-degree theft and first-degree failure to
appear. Defendant claims the trial court erred by (1) denying
the motion for judgment of acquittal in the failure-to-appear
case, (2) imposing a probation sentence in the failure-toappear case, and (3 and 4) instructing the jury that it could
return nonunanimous verdicts in both the theft and the
failure-to-appear cases. Because we conclude that the trial
court erred by denying the motion for judgment of acquittal
for failure to appear, we reverse the judgment in that case,
and do not reach the other assignments of error related to
that case.1 We affirm the conviction for first-degree theft.
In the first assignment, defendant argues that
the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment
of acquittal for first-degree failure to appear. While defendant does not dispute that he did not personally appear in
several pending cases, he argues that, under the terms of
the release agreements, he was not required to, but instead
could appear through counsel. The state concedes that the
relevant release agreements did not require defendant’s personal appearance and that the court should have granted
the motion for judgment of acquittal. As we have explained
in State v. Kelly, 307 Or App 268, 269,
475 P3d 126 (2020),
and State v. Lobue,
300 Or App 340, 347,
453 P3d 929 (2019),
because the relevant release agreements did not unambiguously require defendant’s personal appearance, his appearance through counsel was sufficient to meet the statutory
appearance requirement. See ORS 162.205(1). Therefore, we
accept the state’s concession and reverse the conviction.
In the fourth assignment, defendant asserts that
instructing the jury that it could return a nonunanimous
verdict in the first-degree theft case constituted a structural
error requiring reversal. After the United States Supreme
Court ruled against nonunanimous jury verdicts for serious
1
We note that, for the reasons explained in State v. Ulery, 366 Or 500,
464 P3d 1123 (2020), because the jury returned a guilty verdict with only 11
guilty votes for failure to appear, we would have needed to reverse and remand.
However, because defendant should have been granted his motion for judgment of
acquittal, we resolve the appeal on that basis as it provides defendant with more
substantial relief.
Cite as
310 Or App 367 (2021) 369
offenses in Ramos v. Louisiana,
590 US ___,
140 S Ct 1390,
206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020), the Oregon Supreme Court held
that providing a nonunanimous jury instruction was not a
structural error that categorically requires reversal in every
case. State v. Flores Ramos,
367 Or 292, 319,
478 P3d 515
(2020). When, as here, the jury returns a unanimous verdict despite the nonunanimous instruction, such erroneous
instruction is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Ciraulo,
367 Or 350, 354,
478 P3d 502 (2020).
In Case No. 18CR74486, reversed. In Case No.
18CR59415, affirmed.