49
Submitted December 6, 2019, reversed March 17, 2021
A. K. F.,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Paul Andrew BURDETTE,
Respondent-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
18PO11242; A169942
484 P3d 362
Respondent appeals the trial court’s continuance of the restraining order
issued against him under the Elderly Persons and Persons with Disabilities
Abuse Prevention Act (EPPDAPA), ORS 124.005 to 124.040. Respondent argues,
among other things, that the record was insufficient to establish that petitioner
qualified as a “person with a disability” under the EPPDAPA definition found
in ORS 124.005(9). Specifically, respondent argues that there was insufficient
evidence to find that, at the time of the hearing, petitioner was a “person with a
mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” See ORS 124.005(9) (incorporating the definition of “person with a disability” in ORS 410.040(7)). Held: Petitioner’s claim of a substantial limitation in
the major life activity of sleeping was insufficiently developed and insufficiently
supported by the evidence. Thus, she failed to present evidence sufficient to meet
her burden of proof on the “disability” element of her prima facie case under the
EPPDAPA and ORS 124.005(9). Accordingly, the trial court erred in continuing
the restraining order.
Reversed.
Paula J. Kurshner, Senior Judge.
Kenneth A. Kreuscher filed the briefs for appellant.
A. F. filed the brief pro se.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge,
and Powers, Judge.
LAGESEN, P. J.
Reversed.
50 A. K. F. v. Burdette
LAGESEN, P. J.
Respondent1 appeals the trial court’s continuance of
the restraining order issued against him under the Elderly
Persons and Persons with Disabilities Abuse Prevention Act
(EPPDAPA), ORS 124.005 to 124.040. Respondent argues,
among other things, that the record is insufficient to establish that petitioner qualifies as a “person with a disability”
under the EPPDAPA definition found in ORS 124.005(9).
Specifically, respondent argues that there was insufficient
evidence to find that, at the time of the hearing, petitioner
was a “person with a mental or physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” See
ORS 124.005(9) (incorporating the definition of “person with
a disability” in ORS 410.040(7)). We agree and, for that reason, reverse.
The EPPDAPA provides special protections against
abuse for the elderly and persons with disabilities. Under
it, “an elderly person or a person with a disability who has
been the victim of abuse within the preceding 180 days …
may petition the circuit court for relief under ORS 124.005
to 124.040, if the person is in immediate and present danger of further abuse from the abuser.” ORS 124.010(1)(a).
“Immediate and present danger under this section includes
but is not limited to situations in which the respondent has
recently threatened the elderly person or person with a disability with additional abuse.” ORS 124.020(4). An order
issued under the EPPDAPA is effective for one year or until
the order is withdrawn or amended, whichever is sooner,
ORS 124.020(1), unless it is terminated, ORS 124.030(2)(a),
or renewed “[f]or good cause shown,” ORS 124.035.
To initiate this proceeding, petitioner completed a
court-provided form for seeking an EPPDAPA restraining
order. She checked the box stating, “I am a disabled person.
I have a mental or physical disability: that substantially
limits one or more of my major life activities.” Petitioner
described her impairment on the form as “severe anxiety
exacerbated by respondent.” The trial court initially granted
the order ex parte, as provided for by ORS 124.020(1).
1
Consistent with ORAP 5.15(1), we refer to the parties by their designations
in the trial court.
Cite as 310 Or App 49 (2021) 51
Respondent, once served with the restraining
order, requested a hearing pursuant to ORS 124.020(9)(a).
At the hearing, petitioner appeared pro se, and respondent
appeared with counsel. Addressing whether she qualified as
a person with a disability for purposes of the act, petitioner
testified that, during the period relevant to the allegations
in her petition, she sought “professional help and therapy. I
was diagnosed with generalized anxiety and major depressive disorder.” Then, petitioner attempted to enter into evidence a letter from her counselor.
Respondent objected to the letter on the basis
of hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection.
Petitioner argued that respondent’s counsel had agreed to
entry of the letter, though respondent’s counsel denied that
claim. Rather, respondent’s counsel explained that he was
willing to allow petitioner to call her therapist and appear by
telephonic testimony. When petitioner’s counselor appeared
to be unavailable by phone, the court asked respondent
whether he disputed that petitioner qualified as a person
with a disability. Respondent confirmed that that was a
disputed fact. Testifying about her anxiety at the hearing,
petitioner relayed that she was having nightmares. At the
close of the hearing, the court continued the restraining
order. Respondent appealed. As noted, he contends, among
other things, that the court erred when it determined that
petitioner qualifies as a person with a disability within the
meaning of the statutes.
We review an order issued under EPPDAPA by accepting the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by
any evidence in the record. See Doyle v. Rohrback, 257 Or App
523, 525,
306 P3d 789 (2013) (EPPDAPA case (citing Travis
v. Strubel,
238 Or App 254, 256,
242 P3d 690 (2010))). In the
absence of explicit factual findings, we presume that the
court found facts consistent with its judgment in petitioner’s
favor. Vanik-Burns v. Burns,
284 Or App 366, 367,
392 P3d
386 (2017) (Family Abuse Prevention Act case). We review the
trial court’s legal conclusions for errors of law.
Id.
The question before us is whether the record is sufficient to permit a finding that petitioner is a “person with
a disability” under ORS 124.005(9). That statute provides
52 A. K. F. v. Burdette
that “ ‘[p]erson with a disability’ ” means a person described
in “(a) ORS 410.040(7); or (b) ORS 410.715.” ORS 410.040(7),
the provision that petitioner has invoked in this case, specifies, in turn, that “ ‘[p]erson with a disability’ means a person with a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities.”
The text of ORS 410.040 does not specifically define
the terms “substantially limit” or “major life activity.” To
determine the legislature’s intent, we look to the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 125.005(9)2 and ORS
410.040(7).3 See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72,
206
P3d 1042 (2009). Generally, the first step in the statutory
interpretation task is to give the words of the statute their
plain meaning. See State v. Dickerson,
356 Or 822, 829,
345 P3d 447 (2015) (“When the legislature does not provide
a definition of a statutory term, we ordinarily look to the
plain meaning of the statute’s text to determine what particular terms mean.” (Citation omitted.)). Context includes
other provisions of the same and related statutes. State v.
Maynard,
168 Or App 118, 123,
5 P3d 1142 (2000), rev den,
332 Or 137 (2001).
Context supplies the answer here. Several statutes
define “person with a disability” in the same way that ORS
410.040(7) does. Notably, the legislature also adopted the
same general definition for “person with a disability” in its
global statutory definitions. ORS 174.107 provides, in part:
“(1) As used in the statute laws of this state, ‘person
with a disability’ means any person who:
“(a) Has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities;
“(b) Has a record of such an impairment; or
“(c) Is regarded as having such an impairment.”
2
ORS 125.005 was first enacted in 1995 as the Elder Abuse Prevention Act
(EAPA). Or Laws 1995, ch 666, §§ 2 - 9. Then, in 1999, the legislature enacted
the Elderly Persons and Disabled Persons Abuse Prevention Act, which amended
ORS 125.010(1) to allow a “disabled person” to petition for protection from abuse
under the EAPA and amended ORS 125.005(2) to define “disabled person” for
purposes of who could petition for protection. See Or Laws 1999, ch 738, § 1.
3
ORS 410.040(7) was originally enacted as ORS 410.040(5) in 1981 as part
of a comprehensive consolidation of administrative services for seniors and “disabled persons.” See Or Laws 1981, ch 784, § 1.
Cite as 310 Or App 49 (2021) 53
In our view, ORS 174.107 is significant because it
suggests to us that the legislature intended for the phrase
“person with a disability” to mean the same thing whenever
“used in the statute laws of this state,” unless, of course,
the legislature explicitly provides an alternative definition.
See, e.g., ORS 133.515 (defining “person with a disability”
differently in the criminal statutes in determining when
an interpreter must be made available during criminal
proceedings); see also, e.g., ORS 311.66 (defining “person
with a disability” differently in statutes addressing qualifications for the deferred collection of homestead property
taxes). Additionally, legislative history indicates the same
aspiration to uniformity. The legislature amended ORS
410.040(7) in 2011, and the legislative history indicates that
the current definition was intended to track ORS 174.107.
See Testimony, Senate Committee on Health Care, Human
Services and Rural Health Policy, HB 2057, Feb 25, 2011,
Ex 6 (statement of Fred Steele, Community Adult Protective
Services and Abuse Prevention Manager at Department of
Human Services (DHS)) (testifying that HB 2057 “was introduced on behalf of [DHS]” and that the definitional change
in ORS 410.040 “aligns with the general statutory definition
for ‘person with a disability’ provided by the legislature in
1989 (see ORS 174.107)” (parenthetical in original)). Having
concluded that the legislature likely intended the term “person with a disability” to mean the same thing in each statute employing the same definition, it is appropriate to look
to other statutes using the same phrase to give context to it,
in the absence of previous case law interpreting or applying
ORS 410.040(7). In particular, we think it appropriate to do
so in determining what it means for a person to be substantially limited in a major life activity.
ORS 659A.104(1)(a) is one statute that defines
“person with a disability” the same way that ORS 410.040
does. See ORS 659A.104(1)(a) (providing that a person has
a disability if “[t]he individual has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of the individual”). But perhaps more significantly,
unlike ORS 410.140(7) and ORS 174.107, ORS 659A.104(3)
provides an additional helpful explanation of what it
54 A. K. F. v. Burdette
means to be substantially limited in a major life activity.
It provides:
“An individual is substantially limited in a major
life activity if the individual has an impairment, had an
impairment or is perceived as having an impairment that
restricts one or more major life activities of the individual
as compared to most people in the general population. An
impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely
restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity
in order to be considered substantially limiting. An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity of the
individual need not limit other major life activities of the
individual. An impairment that is episodic or in remission
is considered to substantially limit a major life activity of
the individual if the impairment would substantially limit
a major life activity of the individual when the impairment
is active. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute
a disability within the meaning of this section.”
(Emphases added.)
To be sure, the legislature did not explicitly supply
the same guidance with respect to either ORS 410.040(7)
or ORS 174.107. That omission certainly raises the question
whether the legislature might have intended for the same
words in those statutes to mean something other than the
meaning ORS 659A.104(3) gives them for the purposes of
that statute. But that would undercut the apparent goal of
uniformity signaled by the enactment of ORS 174.107. And,
in any event, guidance included in ORS 659A.104(3) tracks
a commonsense, ordinary understanding of what it means
to be substantially limited in a major life activity, a phrase
that, by its plain terms, suggests some form of essential
reduction from what would otherwise be ordinary. The dictionary defines “substantially” as “in a substantial manner
: so as to be substantial,” and defines “substantial,” to mean,
among other things, “important, essential.” Webster’s Third
New Int’l Dictionary 2280 (unabridged ed 2002). It defines
the verb “limits” pertinently as “to curtail or reduce in quantity or extent.” Id. at 1312.
For those reasons, we conclude that it is appropriate
to look to the definition in ORS 659A.104(3) for the purpose
of assessing whether a person qualifies as a “person with a
Cite as 310 Or App 49 (2021) 55
disability” under ORS 410.040(7). That means that, to qualify as a “person with a disability” under ORS 410.040(7), a
person must demonstrate that they have a physical or mental impairment that restricts one or more major life activities, when viewed in comparison with most people in the
general population.
Examining the record in this case under that standard, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence that
petitioner qualifies as a “person with a disability” under
ORS 410.040(7). Although the evidence would permit a finding that petitioner has a mental impairment in the form
of a diagnosed anxiety disorder, and also that the impairment has affected petitioner’s sleep, the record contains no
evidence about the degree to which petitioner’s sleep has
been disrupted when compared to most other people in the
general population.4 Petitioner testified that she has nightmares, but introduced no evidence that those nightmares
interfere with her sleep in a way that differentiates her
situation from that of most people in the general population. Without such evidence, there is no basis for concluding
that petitioner’s mental impairment “substantially limits” a
major life activity so as to render her a “person with a disability” under ORS 410.040(7).5
4
In her brief on appeal, petitioner argues that her anxiety affects other
major life activities. She has not supported those assertions with any citations
to the record below, and our review of the record confirms that those contentions
were not presented in any clear way to the trial court.
5
For what it is worth, our conclusion also is consistent with federal court
decisions implementing the federal anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Weld Cty., 594 F3d 1202, 1218 n 10 (10th Cir 2010) (noting, with regard to
major life activity of sleeping, that many nondisabled people have nightmares or
disturbed sleep patterns; under the Americans with Disabilities Act, plaintiff is
obliged to present evidence that will permit comparison of the effects of her sleep
disturbances to those experienced by the average person). In that regard, we note
also that, not only has the legislature signaled an intention that the phrase “person with a disability” have a uniform meaning throughout the Oregon Revised
Statutes—except where it has expressly indicated otherwise—in at least one
instance, the legislature has also signaled an intention that Oregon statutes protecting people with disabilities be interpreted to promote uniformity with similar federal statutes. See ORS 659A.139(1) (“ORS 659A.103 to 659A.144 shall be
construed to the extent possible in a manner that is consistent with any similar
provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended by
the federal ADA Amendments Act of 2008 and as otherwise amended.”). Thus,
although it requires a judicial journey through several legislatively excavated
rabbit holes to get there, it appears somewhat likely that the legislature intended
for the phrase “person with a disability” to be construed uniformly with federal
56 A. K. F. v. Burdette
In sum, petitioner’s claim of a substantial limitation in the major life activity of sleeping was insufficiently
developed and insufficiently supported by the evidence.
Thus, she failed to present evidence sufficient to meet her
burden of proof on the “disability” element of her prima facie
case under the EPPDAPA and ORS 124.005(9). Accordingly,
we conclude that the trial court erred in continuing the
restraining order.
Reversed.
statutes doing the same. That said, the legislature’s omission of a provision
similar to ORS 659A.139 in ORS chapters 174 and 410 raises questions about
the weight it intended for federal authority to be given in the context of those
chapters. We need not resolve the question definitively today, as the only federal
authority we have seen is consistent with the conclusion we have reached.
