Milliken v. Meyer

¶3Mr. Justice Douglas

¶4delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶5The Colorado Supreme Court held null and void a judgment of the Wyoming court against the claim of Milliken that that judgment was entitled to full faith and credit under the federal constitution. 101 Colo. 564; 76 D. 2d 420; 105 Colo. 532; 100 P. 2d 151. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted because of the substantial character oí tüé federal question which is raised.

¶6The controversy is over a l/64th interest in profits from operation, of certain Colorado oil properties. Transcontinental 1 on August 31,1922, contracted to pay Meyer *4594/64ths of those profits. Milliken asserted a claim to a two-thirds interest in' that 4/64ths share. As a settlement of that dispute Transcontinental on May 3, 1924, contracted to pay Milliken a 2/64ths interest and Milli-ken assigned2 to Transcontinental all his claims against Meyer pertaining to thé lands in question and to Meyer’s 4/64ths interest in the profits.

¶7Later Milliken instituted suit in the Wyoming court alleging a ’ joint adventure with Transcontinental and Meyer and charging a conspiracy on their part to defraud, him of his rights. He sought a Cancellation of the con- , tracts of May 3, 1924, and an accounting from Transcontinental and Meyer. Meyer, who was asserted to be a resident of Wyoming, was personally served with process in Colorado pursuant to the Wyoming statutes; 3 buh he made no appearance in the Wyoming cause.4 Transcontinental appeared and answered. The court- found, that there was a joint venture between Milliken and *460Transcontinental; that the contracts of May 3,1924, were valid; and that the action against Transcontinental should be dismissed with prejudice. It found, however, that there was a joint venture between Milliken and Meyer; that they were entitled to share equally in 6/64ths of the net profits; and that, while Meyer had regularly received 4/64ths, he had refused to account to Milliken for his l/64th part. The court did not purport to .decree the l/64th interest to Milliken or ányone else but entered an in personam judgment against Meyer for the profits which Meyer had withheld from Milliken, together with interest thereon; and enjoined Transcontinental from paying, and Meyer from receiving, more than 3/64ths of the net profits. This was on July 11, 1931. Thereafter the l/64th share was withheld from Meyer and paid over to Milliken.5 In 1935 respondent instituted this suit6 in the Colorado court praying, inter alia, for a judgment against Milliken for the sums withheld under the Wyoming judgment and paid to Milliken, for an injunction against Milliken attempting to enforce the Wyoming judgment, and for a decree that the Wyoming judgment was a nullity for want of jurisdiction over Meyer or his property. The bill alleged, inter alia, that Meyer at the time of service in the Wyoming court had long ceased to be a resident of Wyoming and was a resident of Colorado; that the service obtained on him did *461not give the Wyoming court jurisdiction of his person or property; and that such judgment- was violative of the due process clause · Case Law">due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Milli-ken’s answer alleged, inter aim, that Meyer was a resident of Wyoming at the time of the Wyoming action and that the Wyoming judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Colorado under the federal constitution. The Colorado court, on issues joined, found that Meyer was domiciled in Wyoming when the Wyoming suit was commenced, that the Wyoming statutes for substituted service were constitutional, that the affidavit for constructive service7 on Meyer was filed in good faith, substantially conformed to the Wyoming statute and stated the truth, that Wyoming had jurisdiction over the person of Meyer, that the Wyoming decree8 was not void, and that the bill should be dismissed.

¶8That judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. It did not .pass on the question of whether or. not the Wyoming court had jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter.. It held that the Wyoming decree was void, on its face because of an irreconcilable contradiction between the findings and the decree. In its view the finding of the Wyoming court that Milliken’s assignment of May 3, 1924, to Transcontinental of his claims against Meyer was valid, deprived the court of any ground upon which it could predicate a judgment against Meyer, since *462the only basis for an action by Milliken against Meyer rested upon the claim before its assignment.

¶9Where a judgment rendered in one state is challenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter is of course open to inquiry. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287; Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59. But if the judgment on its face appears to be a “record of a court of general jurisdiction, such jurisdiction over the cause and the parties is to be presumed unless disproved .by extrinsic evidence, Qr by the record itself.” Adam v. Saenger, supra, at p. 62. In súch case the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is- based. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282. Whatever mistakes of law may underlie the judgment (Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308) it is “conclusive as to all the media concludendi.” Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra, at p. 237.

¶10Accordingly, if the Wyoming court had jurisdiction over Meyer, the holding by the Colorado Supreme Court that the Wyoming judgment was void because of an inconsistency between the findings and the decree was not warranted.

¶11On the findings of the Colorado trial court, not impaired by, the Colorado Supreme Court, it is clear that Wyoming had jurisdiction over Meyer in the 1931 suit. ' Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service. Substituted service in such cases has been quite uniformly upheld where the absent defendant was served at his usual place of abo.de in the state (Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun 578; Hurlbut v. Thomas, 55 Conn. 181; *46310 A. 556; Harryman v. Roberts, 52 Md. 64) as well as where he was personally served without the state. In re Hendrickson, 40 S. D. 211; 167 N. W. 172. That such substituted service may be wholly adequate to meet the requirements of due process was recognized by this Court in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, despite earlier intimations to the contrary. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733; Burdick, Service as a Requirement of Due Process in Actions In Personam, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 422. Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent' on whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (McDonald v. Mabee, supra)implicit in due process are satisfied. Here there can be no question on that score. Meyer did not merely receive actual notice of the Wyoming proceedings. While outside the state, he was personally served in accordance with a statutory scheme which Wyoming had provided for sueh occasions. And in our view the machinery employed met all the requirements of due process. Certainly then. Meyer’s domicile in Wyoming was a sufficient basis for that extraterritorial service. As in case of the authority of the United States over its absent citizens (Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421), the authority of a state' over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may''also exact reciprocal duties. “Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable” from the various incidences of state citizenship. See Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276, 279; New York ex. rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308. The responsibilities *464of that citizenship arise out' of the relationship to the state .which domicile creates.'- That relationship is not dissolved by meré absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has'provided and employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against - him. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 47, 79; Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427. Here such a reasonable method was so provided and so employed.

¶12Reverséd.