State v. C. A. M.-D.

                                         1

  Argued and submitted August 7, 2020, affirmed June 3, petition for review
                  denied October 10, 2021 (

)


                    In the Matter of C. A. M.-D.,
                       aka C. M.-D., a Youth.
                       STATE OF OREGON,
                             Respondent,
                                  v.
                             C. A. M.-D.,
                            aka C. M.-D.,
                              Appellant.
                  Multnomah County Circuit Court
                             18JU07933;
                    Petition Number 180705187;
                               A171383
                                    

    Youth appeals a supplemental judgment imposing restitution based on his
admission to committing acts that would constitute fourth-degree assault, ORS
163.160(1)(a), if committed by an adult. Youth contends that there is insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusions that his actions caused the
victim’s medical expenses or that the expenses were reasonable. Held: On this
record, the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s conclusions that
youth’s conduct caused the medical expenses and that the bills were for reasonable amounts.
    Affirmed.



    Beth A. Allen, Judge.
   Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause and filed the
brief for appellant. On the reply brief was Matthew J. Steven.
   Philip Thoennes, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and
Mooney, Judge.
    DeVORE, P. J.
    Affirmed.
2                                                      State v. C. A. M.-D.

           DeVORE, P. J.
         Youth appeals a supplemental judgment imposing
restitution based on his admission to committing acts that
would constitute fourth-degree assault, ORS 163.160(1)(a),
if committed by an adult. In a single assignment of error,
youth contends that there is insufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s conclusions that his actions caused the
victim’s medical expenses or that the expenses were reasonable.1 For the reasons below, we affirm.
         The facts are few and undisputed. As part of his
admission, youth admitted to “caus[ing] physical injury to”
the victim on July 2, 2018. Prior to the restitution hearing,
the Crime Victim and Survivor Services Division (CVSSD)
of the Department of Justice requested restitution in the
amount of $5,965.44. That amount consisted of $5,486.33 in
medical and ambulance bills, which CVSSD paid on behalf
of the victim, and $479.11 in lost wages, which CVSSD paid
to the victim.
         At the hearing, Shaw, a manager with CVSSD,
testified that, upon receiving an application for compensation from a victim, the division investigates to determine
whether the victim is eligible to receive assistance. Shaw testified that, prior to paying a medical bill, CVSSD “gather[s]
information to ensure that it is crime-related.” The division
reviews police reports, bills from medical providers, and
explanations of benefits from any insurance providers, and
it contacts detectives or police officers on the case to “ensure
that [CVSSD is] paying bills that are a direct result of whatever crime we have accepted that claim for.”
         Shaw confirmed that CVSSD had received a
request for compensation from the victim in this case for the
assault that occurred on July 2, 2018. She testified that the
victim was transported by ambulance to a specific hospital
and, as a result of that hospital visit, incurred a hospital

    1
      Youth also argues that the evidence below was insufficient to establish the
causation or reasonableness of the restitution amount sought for the victim’s lost
earnings. That argument is unpreserved, and we reject it without further discussion. See State v. Wyatt, 

, 

 (2000) (explaining generally that an error is unpreserved if the defendant did not adequately identify his
argument before the trial court).
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bill of $11,253.18. Shaw testified that, because the victim
did not have health insurance, CVSSD followed the Oregon
Workers’ Compensation Fee Schedule for payment of the
expenses and paid only 34 percent of the victim’s hospital
bill—a reduced sum of $3,848.59.2
         Youth argued that the evidence was insufficient to
permit a restitution award for the victim’s medical expenses
for two reasons. First, notwithstanding Shaw’s testimony,
youth argued that there was a “complete absence of cause
between the criminal conduct in this case and the amounts
billed here.” Second, youth argued that, without testimony
from a medical expert who had examined the medical bills,
there was insufficient evidence of the reasonableness of the
bills.
        The juvenile court disagreed. It found that Shaw’s
testimony regarding CVSSD’s investigation and payment
practices was sufficient to support findings that the youth’s
criminal actions caused the expenses and that the expenses
were reasonable.
         On appeal, youth renews his arguments from below,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of causation and reasonableness.
        We review a restitution order for legal error and are
bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings if they are supported by any evidence in the record. State v. Riekens, 

, 

 (2019), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 

, 

 (2020). We review the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s restitution order in the
light most favorable to the state. State v. Smith, 

, 

 (2018).
         Restitution in juvenile delinquency cases is governed by ORS 419C.450(1)(a), which provides, in part, that
“the victim has the right to receive prompt restitution” in
any case “in which the youth offender caused another person
any physical, emotional or psychological injury or any loss
of or damage to property.” “Restitution” is defined, however,
    2
       Shaw’s testimony referred, in part, to State’s Exhibit 1—a request for restitution that contained a list of the amounts paid by CVSSD for hospital, prescription, radiology, and ambulance; those amounts totaled $5,486.33.
4                                         State v. C. A. M.-D.

by reference to the adult criminal procedure code, specifically, ORS 137.103. ORS 419A.004(28) (incorporating the
definition of “restitution” from ORS 137.103 into the juvenile
code). It means “full, partial or nominal payment of economic
damages to a victim.” ORS 137.103(3). In turn, “ ‘[e]conomic
damages,’ ” in relevant part, is defined to mean “objectively
verifiable monetary losses including but not limited to reasonable charges necessarily incurred for medical, hospital
… and other health care services” and “loss of income.”
ORS 31.710(2)(a); see ORS 137.103(2)(a) (incorporating, for
purposes of restitution, the meaning given the term in ORS
31.710, with the exception of future impairment of earning
capacity).
        To support an order of restitution, the state must
produce sufficient evidence of criminal activities, economic
damages, and a causal relationship between the two. State
v. McClelland, 

, 

, rev den,

 (2016). Youth’s appeal challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence as to causation and reasonableness of economic damages.
         As to causation, the record must support a nonspeculative inference that there is a causal relationship between
the defendant’s criminal activities and the victim’s economic
damages. State v. Akerman, 

, 

 (2016). “The requirement of a causal relationship means
that the defendant’s criminal activities must be a ‘but for’
cause of the victim’s damages and that the damages must
have been a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s
criminal activities.” State v. Emerine, 

,

 (2020).
         Youth, relying primarily on Smith, argues that there
was no evidence presented to support the conclusion that
youth’s criminal activity was the reasonably foreseeable,
“but for” cause of the health care costs. In Smith, the defendant pleaded no contest to fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence. 

. He then appealed
the supplemental restitution order that reimbursed CVSSD
for amounts paid on behalf of the victim for her chiropractic
care and acupuncture treatments. 

. The defendant
argued that the testimony of a claims examiner that CVSSD
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had provided compensation “related to” the case was insufficient to establish a causal connection between that compensation and the defendant’s conduct. 

 We held that the
examiner’s testimony did not “provide a nonspeculative basis
to support the inference that there was a causal relationship.” Id. at 791. In that instance, where the record did not
disclose a particular injury or condition that resulted from
the defendant’s criminal conduct, there was no basis for the
trial court to infer that the chiropractic and acupuncture
expenses resulted from the admitted assault. Id.
         Despite some similarities with Smith, the evidence
in this case was sufficient to support a nonspeculative inference that the victim’s bills were connected to youth’s conduct.
Youth admitted in his plea that he “unlawfully caused physical injury to [the victim] on July 2, 2018.” Shaw testified
that CVSSD received a claim from the victim for expenses
arising out of “an assault that occurred on July 2nd, …
2018.” The dates coincide, and there was no intimation that
the victim needed urgent medical care on that date for any
other reason. Shaw testified that the hospital bills paid on
behalf of the victim were a result of the victim being transported by ambulance and admitted to a specific hospital.
         That evidence was focused in time and circumstance. It provided a more direct connection between the
assault and medical expenses than the general assurance
in Smith that the chiropractic and acupuncture treatments
“related to” the defendant’s admitted assault. From the evidence in this case, it logically follows that the victim incurred
the challenged medical bills as a result of youth’s admitted
assault of the victim on July 2, 2018. See State v. Olson, 

, 

 (2019) (noting that an inference is permissible where there is a logical probability that
an ultimate fact will follow a stated narrative or historical
fact).3 The evidence admitted at the restitution hearing was
    3
      To the extent that youth argues that there is no evidence establishing
causation as to each individual cost billed from that hospital visit, that is a question of necessity rather than causation. Those issues are distinct. See generally
State v. Perdew, 

, 

 (2020) (explaining that whether
medical expenses are “necessarily incurred” is a different inquiry than whether
the injuries were caused by the defendant’s conduct). Given that youth does not
challenge whether the expenses were “necessarily incurred,” we need not address
that argument further.
6                                          State v. C. A. M.-D.

sufficient to establish that youth’s conduct caused the medical expenses incurred by the victim.
         As to economic damages, youth’s argument turns
upon the definition of economic damages as “reasonable
charges necessarily incurred for medical, hospital, … and
other health care services.” ORS 31.710(2)(a) (emphasis
added). We have previously explained that a medical charge
is reasonable if it is at (or below) the market rate for the services, drugs, or other medical expenses. State v. Campbell,

, 

 (2019), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 

, 

 (2020).
        Youth argues that testimony from a CVSSD claims
manager that the victim’s medical bills were reimbursed in
accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule does
not alone establish that medical charges paid at those rates
were reasonable. For the reasons stated in State v. Workman,

, 

 (2019), we disagree.
That is, due to statutory requirements, “it can be inferred
that workers’ compensation fee schedules reflect customary
market rates for medical services and, consequently, that
medical charges paid at those rates, as happened here, were
reasonable.” 

 (referencing ORS 656.248(1)). That
inference, coupled with the testimony offered, compels the
same conclusion in this case.
        On this record, the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s conclusions that youth’s conduct caused the
medical expenses and that the bills were for reasonable
amounts.
         Affirmed.